



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

12 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] USMC, [REDACTED] Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, [REDACTED] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II MEF Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What training did you conduct prior to the deployment to prepare for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer. As part of our Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) in June 2020, we conducted some NEO training. We completed the MCCRE before we had our change of operational control (CHOP) to the MEU. We also conducted a few NEO exercises before that. One of our mission essential tasks (METs) is evacuation control center (ECC) operations. We went down to [REDACTED] where we set up an ECC and set up the NEO tracking system (NTS) just to get repetitions. In January 2021, as part of our pre-deployment training program (PTP) we conducted a four day NEO training package through the Expeditionary Operations Training Troup (EOTG). As part of the package, 1/8 sent a company to do an embassy reinforcement, the 24 MEU sent in a forward command element, and we conducted ECC operations.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] USMC, [redacted (b)(6)] Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

Throughout the NEO in Afghanistan, we processed a total of about 80,000 records in the NTS, while about 40,000 others were processed through other government agencies (OGAs). We sent over tablets to help assist them in their processing of individuals. The OGAs processed the Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU) personnel. They also didn't process everyone. Some were just sent on to the plane.

In January 2021, we came to the agreement that we would focus on our other METs while we were at sea. We started our Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) in February.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Do you think what you did for NEO training adequately trained you for what you saw at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. No, you would have to simulate all the human factors and issues we faced there. You would have to do a continuous flow of people. It was 24 hours a day processing people. It would take a lot of resources to provide that level of realistic training. I'm not sure if it is in the capability of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to provide that training. I don't think you can really train for that. You could possibly do 24 hour operations for a few days processing people.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you deploy?

(2) Answer. I deployed 21 March, after we conducted COMPTUEX, the MEU certification exercise, in February.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Was there anything you guys were doing while underway that prepped you for NEO?

(2) Answer. Until May we were training in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), and finished up training in [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] before we completed our CHOP to the CENTCOM AOR on 1 June. Before we completed our CHOP, we knew that Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR) was preparing for a NEO. During the month of June, we conducted a Theater Amphibious Combat Rehearsal (TACR) in [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] Arabia. Throughout the TACR, we focused primarily on providing combat service support to the infantry units conducting training in vicinity of [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. Throughout the month of June, we thought there was a 50/50 chance we would be staying in CENTCOM, and then on 29 June the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) made it official. When we knew we were going to be in CENTCOM, we shifted our focus and

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] USMC, [REDACTED] Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

got out our NTS kits to make sure they were fully functional, and got some repetitions on the systems and ECC operations. July is when the planning started to ramp up.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Who did you deploy with? How many are with the ECC, is it a platoon?

(2) Answer. We had 296 marine and 2 civilians as our battalion total. The total we deployed with to HKIA for ECC operations was about 225. Our battalion has a Landing Support Company, Motor Transport Company, and an Engineer Company, but I task organized them into three Combat Logistics Detachments (CLDs) spread across the three ships. The Marines we took to HKIA to run the ECC pulled from all the CLDs. We built our ECC to be a unit that could execute 24 hour operations. We were told to expect up to 300,000 people. We wouldn't be able to take that capacity.

We had a heavy and light package that we were going to send, but I had to keep some people on the ship because we thought we were going to be at HKIA a while, and once the ships returned to the US, I would need people to manage the equipment offload as well. We went ashore in [REDACTED] stage the third week of July, and that was absolutely the right call. [REDACTED] my [REDACTED] was already there to receive us. I knew that I needed to have at least a captain to stay back to help coordinate with the MEU while we were forward at HKIA, and [REDACTED] made the most sense, so that's why she ended up staying in [REDACTED]

Before offloading in [REDACTED] we did a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) with BGen Sullivan in HKIA around 10-13 July. The purpose was to get a lay of the land, survey the gates, and meet with the units. This was kept quiet because we couldn't tell the Turkish military personnel at HKIA that we were planning a NEO. We offloaded the CARTER HALL into [REDACTED] and before we left [REDACTED] got approval from BGen Sullivan to offload people. 15 July was when the quartering party left for HKIA. I sent [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in with the quartering party to run the ECC. I also had four other Marines with NTS kits.

Based on imagery analysis, we had planned to set up the ECC at Abbey Gate. When we went to HKIA for the PDSS, we validated what we had planned off the imagery. We had everything on graphics, and set an ECC up, to scale, at [REDACTED] We ran through three mission profiles, each one getting more complicated as we progressed. The second run through we processed about 250 people, and on the third we ran through IEDs, and other threats.

There are various stations of an ECC, including the search area, bracelet issue, scanning area, and other various stations. The last stage before getting on an aircraft was going to be the comfort area. We planned for about 5,000 people per day, but theater logistics was not in place at all. We had submitted our plan up through the MEU,

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(b)(1)1.4c and I assume it went up through CENTCOM logistics, and we identified all the tents and everything else that was supposed to be staged at HKIA prior to our arrival. We identified all our requirements, but when we arrived at HKIA for the NEO there was nothing there. Logistical requirements were identified no later than the second week of July. We identified a certain number of tents, generators, etc. that we'd need to conduct ECC operations. Logistical support was a major source of contention for the Marines.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(b)(1)1.4a

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Were you anticipating a NEO around 17 July when you offloaded into (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. It was a two-fold effort in (b)(1)1.4a. Part one was the staging phase, and part two was getting the equipment washed down in prep for redeployment. At this time the SPMAGTF was going to be the main effort, but it later switched to the MEU. BGen Sullivan knew it was one of our core METs. The IWO JIMA was not in the Arabian Gulf yet, she had to do the Straits of Hormuz transit, but once it entered the Gulf and the MEU was whole, we were tasked to lead the NEO.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you conduct any other preparation?

(2) Answer. We started seeing all the districts falling, and the map go from blue to red, but that didn't change what we had to do. The rest of the BLT was prepping to man the gates at HKIA. We didn't know until August that 2/1 would be responsible for all of Abbey Gate. The initial plan was that they were doing part of the ECC with the Turks assisting. We had 1/8, the 82nd, and 2/1 coming to also help support the airfield.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When did you get the order to deploy to HKIA?

(2) Answer. It was just as everything started to collapse around 13 or 14 August. There were additional forces we sent in such as a representative from our Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) and (b)(6). We were able to add these teams because JTF gave us more spots on the initial wave into HKIA. The majority of the force was still in (b)(1)1.4a

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

We had about 10 total in country by the time the NEO started. The entire footprint of the MEU was about 30.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Talk to me about deploying in to HKIA? What do you see when you arrive?

(2) Answer. They wanted a small security element and most of the ECC prioritized for the initial flights. Elements of the MEU Command Element (CE) went on the first flight. The second group of flights was the ECC. I got there about 0400 on 15 August. This was the day Kabul collapsed. I flew into HKIA. Everything was peaceful when I got there. They already had the ECC established at the PAX terminal, and they had already started processing people.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Why was the ECC set up at the PAX terminal initially and not Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We didn't have any of our equipment there yet. If we sent the ECC to Abbey Gate, it would require all our tents and generators. Everything at Abbey Gate would have been my organic equipment, but we just set up at the PAX terminal because none our equipment arrived on time. The first people through our first day were multinational embassy workers. As the helicopters brought people in we would process them through our ECC and put them directly on to the aircraft. We had processed several hundred Spanish, Danish, and other nations as well.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What happened during the night of 15-16 August?

(2) Answer. We were the first to see the masses of people coming across the airfield. Some of my team were sent out to help stop the people flooding the air field. 1/8, JOC personnel, our team, and anyone that was available helped to stop the flow of people. Now in regards to filling the aircraft, I remember seeing all the people that had boarded a C-17 without being processed. I was on the ramp, trying to get the people off the plane, but no one was budging. Then the engines fired up, and I ran along the outside of the plane to talk to the pilots and let them know the plane was full, and they said that they knew, and they were just going to take them. We filled most planes with 450 people, but that one had at least 600 on board.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. How do your operations continue from there?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. There were a couple of instances that aircraft were trying to land but couldn't because of the massive amounts of people. It took about a couple of days to secure the airfield so we could restart our ECC operations.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. You had about 225 Marines in HKIA. How many were working the ECC?

(2) Answer. We were doing about eight hour shifts, with three shifts. I had people manning the tablets, assisting screening at the gates, and the Shock Trauma Platoon. We had about 70 Marines for each shift. This was only their day job. When they got off they would provide combat service support to the other units. I had Marines finding dump trucks and forklift to move MREs, pallets, pick up trash, and transport items around the airfield. Prior to the NEO, we hadn't planned to deal for the massive amounts of trash and human waste, as we thought contractors would handle that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Was the CLB expecting to provide as much combat service support as it was required to, or were you expecting to focus primarily on ECC operations?

(2) Answer. We thought there would be contractor support, so that the overall NEO process would be relatively easy. The contractors started to evacuate four to five days in to the operation. I had my guys focus primarily on the ECC. They were very proficient on the NTS. I asked the SPMAGTF's CLD to focus on the combat service support stuff.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Do you know 2/1's [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)? Did she coordinate any logistical support through you?

(2) Answer. I never met her. I spent a lot of time at the ECC and at the gates with the female search teams, and never crossed paths with her.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How did you get tasked with the female search team mission, and how were they organized and tasked?

(2) Answer. I had responsibility for the female search teams because I had the preponderance of the females at HKIA. We supplemented the search teams with female corpsmen from 1/8. The training they received wasn't like traditional Female

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6), Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

Engagement Teams (FETs) would get going through 29 Palms. They were a team of female Marines and corpsmen task organized to search women and children at the ECC, but then were tasked to serve at the gates in direct support of the companies out there. There were about 35 female search team members, who worked eight hour shifts at the North, East, and Abbey Gates. Sgt Gee, who was my Marine that was killed, was at the ECC processing people earlier that day. I had talked to her that day. Towards the end, when we were processing a lot of people, none of the female search team members were at the ECC, they were solely focused on searching people at the gates. Sgt Gee was an electronic maintenance technician. She wanted to laterally move to EOD, and had been meritoriously promoted to Sergeant in July. She was one of the top 5 sergeants in the battalion.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Can you talk to me about the State Department's role at the ECC and how it helped or hindered you in the execution of your mission?

(2) Answer. I had Marines outside the PAX terminal who would bring people into the ECC. The people were staged outside the PAX terminal. There were either two or three State Department personnel at the entrance of the PAX terminal checking documentation. The issue with them was that they wouldn't do 24 hour shifts. When it was time to shift change they would just leave, not rotate in place, but just leave to change out elsewhere. They would be gone for a few hours. When the volume of people lowered they would just leave. This would happen all the time. The fix for this was for the Marines to just check documents even though they weren't qualified to do so. In the mean time I had people outside the PAX terminal wanting to get through the process. My main concern was throughput. There was a time that the civilians rioted and we had to restrain them. My fear would be that we would get behind and not be able to fill the aircraft quickly. When the State Department representatives were not there it would slow down the process. It was a big issue.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Would it be fair to say that you were mainly focused on the ECC throughout the NEO?

(2) Answer. I was tasked to lead the ECC. I would go around and check on my Marines, and I interacted with the JOC, but spent most of my time was at the ECC.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. You mentioned earlier that based on imagery analysis, you had selected Abbey Gate as the location for the ECC, then confirmed that during the PDSS in July, but it ended up being set up at the PAX terminal. Why did that happen?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6), Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. The bottom line was that when we did rehearsals we thought it was going to be an organized, orderly NEO process, but it wasn't. North Gate was the first gate that was opened and we quickly learned that it wasn't going to happen how we imagined and practiced it. Based on the geography, based on how it would need to be set up, and based on how we were bringing in Afghans, it made more sense to do initial screening at the gates then bring them through to the ECC at the PAX terminal.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Based on the situation at the various gates, do you think it would have been possible to separate those with proper documentation from those who did not have documents at the gates, so that the ECC could have been set up at Abbey Gate as planned?

(2) Answer. No, the people were too desperate and pushing too much down at the gates. Once they got to the ECC, we'd tell them that they were going to get on a flight, but they still tried rushing the aircraft to get on flights. The process was first in and first out. The SPMAGTF and MEU Marines did a good job of keeping them in sticks and in the order they arrived to the ECC prior to getting them on flights. When Afghans saw the planes come in they would start to rush the aircraft. It was every man for themselves. The men would rush through without their wife and kids. We had all kinds of women that were at the ECCs that would come up and talk to us about it. When you see the news reporting about how we could just go out to the gates and grab AMCITs, they were completely wrong. It was rough.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What engineer assets, including personnel and equipment, did you have at your disposal?

(2) Answer. Most of my engineers were doing ECC operations. I had about 35 Marines in the Engineer Platoon, comprised of combat engineers, heavy equipment operators and mechanics, and utilities Marines.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Was it a fairly even split?

(2) Answer. It was about a third of each. We had planned on bringing a bunch of equipment but because of logistical delays it didn't arrive. The only equipment we set up at the PAX terminal was communication equipment.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Did you have any engineer officers working for you?



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. A 1302 lieutenant. The BLT had a combat engineer platoon. That is the standard with the MEU. The JTF-CR may have had an engineer on staff.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. What force protection improvements for the gate were requested of you, if any?

(2) Answer. 2/1 was given the Abbey Gate and maintained full control there. 1/8 had North and East Gates. If the units wanted support they would send a support request through the MEU, and the BLT Engineer Platoon was in direct support. It wasn't a CLB mission, but we would assist them when we could. My Marines would operate dump trucks, and forklifts as needed, but I don't ever recall seeing a crane for moving barriers.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Was CLB tasked to provide sustainment for 2/1 at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We assisted in moving food and water out there. If the BLT or 2/1 had a truck to pick up MREs and water, then they would just come get it. Food and water deliveries were mainly ad hoc based on how many people were coming through, as the Marines had to take care of the Afghans once they were inside the gates. I wasn't receiving the logistics support requests, but I know our team would move things as required. Whenever I went out to the gates, I saw plenty of pallets of water. We were never short Class I that I was aware of.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. How did the female search teams being pushed out to the gates come about?

(2) Answer. When we were doing the rehearsal in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a we already had the teams put in place. Other units didn't have search teams. CLB provided the female search teams, and there were BLT corpsmen embedded in as well. I had teams at the North, East, and Abbey Gates. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the senior female search team lead. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the [REDACTED] (b)(6). Since the BLT and SPMAGTF were in charge of the gates, the female search teams were in direct support to those units at the gates. They were directly engaged with the people at the gate. They enjoyed their job, because they felt like they were doing important work.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [redacted] (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(1) Question. At any given time how many female search Sailors and Marines were at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. On average there were probably about six to eight.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. How many total Sailors and Marines were part of the search teams?

(2) Answer. We had 35 females trained in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a who went through the full mission profile training, but others were added to the team when we got to HKIA.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Did you have a role in the decision making process regarding when the gates were opened or closed?

(2) Answer. It was mainly a BGen Sullivan decision, but when flights weren't coming in, and there were a ton of people at ECC and comfort area, I would call the JOC and recommend that they close the gates. This was primarily because of the throughput issue. It wasn't on our end, it was mainly because the birds weren't coming in and the temporary safe havens couldn't take any more evacuees.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Were you aware of any flights that went out empty, or partially full? There were reports in the news of flights leaving empty, although the photos I saw looked like they were commercial aircraft. Were the people you were processing flying out on commercial flights?

(2) Answer. It was primarily C-17s, there were only about two commercial aircraft that we sent. We started out planning to send 300 out per flight, but we got up to about 450 per flight. However, there were times we'd be told to manifest 450 passengers for a flight, but when the aircraft would arrive the crew chief would say they could only handle 412 passengers, or something similar. I would then have to take a bunch of people off the manifest, which caused problems. I would have three sticks of 450 passengers staged and ready to get on aircraft at any given time.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Were you at Abbey Gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No, I was there on the 25th. We walked all the way down to the chevron and down the canal. I was literally standing where the blast was 24 hours prior to it happening. It was right about 1400. I remember going through a hole in the chain

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6), Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

link fence, and seeing people in the canal holding up paperwork. It wasn't a mass of people at this time. I believe that this was when the people were pushed back up passed the bridge.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Did you notice a difference in the level of desperation at the gate versus what you'd see at the ECC?

(2) Answer. Yes, people were a little more desperate at the gate. They would yell and hold up various documents, and were mainly trying to get our attention.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Do you remember hearing about any threat reporting throughout your time at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I remember that there was a threat in the vicinity, but not sure if it was Abbey Gate itself.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Do you remember if the threat level was increasing leading up to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I don't recall. I remember around that time there was an ISIS-K threat being talked about. I don't remember it being with any specificity. We had nightly meetings at the ECC with the leadership. I talked about the threats of suicide vests and ISIS-K.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. At the ECC, did the threat streams change how you operated?

(2) Answer. Yes, once the attack happened we made the civilians consolidate their personal belongings into a clear plastic bag. We would put their stuff through the scanner, while it was working. After the blast they had to dump all their stuff and reconsolidate it into the clear bags.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. After the attack occurs, and there's notification of a MASCAL event, what do you do?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [REDACTED] (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. I got a call from the JOC sometime in the afternoon. The Shock Trauma Platoon that had been working near the PAX terminal was deployed down to the gate. They had NTVs that were modified into ambulances. They started bringing people back. The more severe cases went to the Role 2 and the lower priority cases went back to the PAX terminal for lower level triage. I knew that there were Marines that were killed. I found out later that one of them belonged to us. It was Sgt Gee. She was evacuated to the Role 2. I remember having the conversation that at the gate she had a pulse but wasn't breathing. By the time she made it to the Role 2 she had passed away. That night we went over there, around 1830, we went over to the morgue to identify the bodies. She was in the back right corner. I'm not sure what her immediate status was when the blast initially happened. I don't know what the ultimate cause of death was, but I was told she had some fragmentation.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Did you have any other Marines wounded?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in between the inner and outer gate area when the blast went off. He may have had a concussion. I don't think he was diagnosed with a grade three, but I know he had some effects. I think he was down there to check on the search team Marines. He was inside the gate, not outside where the females were. He worked at the ECC, often times at the front. He may have been down there for that or just to check on the Marines. He is one of the Staff NCOs that always wanted to be engaged. Nothing changed operational wise. A couple of my Marines on my team were in tears. I addressed the unit and shared the facts of the tragedy. I told them we must continue what we are doing in order to get people out. There will be a time to grieve. I told them to check on Marines that may be taking it exceptionally hard.

We processed people until 0800 on the 30th of August. This was about two hours before we left. We had a small team of about 10 with me. This was just enough to process people before we left. We took IDF on the morning of the 30th. They almost put rockets through aircraft before we left. We flew into [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a then redeployed on the 24th of September. All of our flights went through Romania or Ireland.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Do you have any story boards that may be helpful to us?

(2) Answer. I know the MEU did an AAR that may be helpful.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Is there anything that you want us to know or have any questions that we should have asked?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, [redacted] (b)(6), Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. The theater logistics support wasn't very good. We conducted our PDSS and submitted our requirements in plenty of time, but still didn't get the support we needed. We felt like we were alone out there.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
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ACTS-SCK-DO

12 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. For brevity, C1 will indicate BG Curtis, [redacted] (b)(6) will indicate [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will indicate [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will indicate [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (C1). When did you first start training to be certified as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and when did you think you would deploy forward?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Training for the MEU is started in July of 2020. Before we even formed as a MEU, we started classroom training with our amphibious squadron. Then we went up to Little Creek, Virginia to do integration training with them with a focus on amphibious assaults. One of the staff planning exercises that we executed in a classroom environment at the end of July 202 was a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). We went through the planning process of inserting the command element and preparing for a follow on evacuation. It is part of the standard progression up to evaluation by the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). NEO wasn't the focus of the course, but it was covered.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

Then on about 09 August of 2020 we formed the command element of the MEU. In steady state the command element of the MEU is about 70-80 people, but it picked up a lot of people to deploy. The command picked up communications, human intelligence, and Military Police (MP) to bring that number up to about 250. The entire MEU was formed in early September when we gained our Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB), our aviation squadron (consisting of heavy lift, attack helicopters, the UAV detachment, and the harrier detachment), and the battalion landing team (BLT) (an engineer platoon, a light armor reconnaissance (LAR) company, and the base infantry battalion).

Throughout the fall we were doing individual courses. There was NEO involved in that, about a week long. The primary attendees are the evacuation control center (ECC) folks, the CLB, and some folks from the battalion landing team that would pull security. Generally the executive officer (XO) would go forward with that command element, so that XO could coordinate with the embassy they arrived at. Obviously, that was unnecessary during this operation as so many higher headquarters arrived before us.

The fall is just those individuals' courses. Then we had an exercise to establish an ECC, train their guys on NEO tracking systems (NTS). It was mostly the CLB and BLT involved in that. Our first at sea period, was PHIBRON-MEU Integration Training, and that's really just figuring out where you live on the ship and how to get on and off. That happened in mid-October, then we went to sea again in early December. That was our first evaluated exercise. We are evaluated by EOTG and the carrier strike group forward, a one star admiral. We executed raids, and one decision I would like to note from II MEF by LtGen Beaudreault, his perspective was if you can do the higher level stuff you can do a NEO. His decision was not to use the at sea days for the NEO, and use it for the higher priority exercises.

There ended up being a delay of the deployment in front of us. That 1 star admiral has to evaluate everyone, so that delay pushed us back as a result. Our final exercise was February into March. That was a COMPTUEX and go. Normally you would take leave and do final maintenance prior to departure. We still had to go to Norfolk first, but we deployed straight from there. Between the 2 exercises we did a NEO exercise, with an embassy and a couple of remote sites where we could do evacuations. It was integrated in with the operational scenario known as the Treasure Coast Scenario. It was in line with all of our exercises, the first one we had done was an urban training situation with the same political situation of a deteriorating country. So we planned on a NEO, deployed our forward element, security, and the CLB. Then we deployed the NEO element to execute and pick up evacuees to a nearby landing area. We answered requests for information (RFIs) on how we would bring them back to the ship. That was done in January.

(3) Question (C1). You had harriers?

(4) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, they flew off the USS Iwo Jima. They had about a 6-8 hour flight time and they did a total of 8 sorties while we were in HKIA from the 19th to the 22nd.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (C1). Alright, jump forward to the EOTG and tell me what training you did, I'm told you have 13 Mission Essential Tasks (MET)? What did you do to conduct a NEO at EOTG?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It's down to 11 METs, 3 were combined into 1. Conduct a NEO is one of the MET tasks. We did individual courses that were NEO focused and some of those courses were interagency focused. There is a bleed over with foreign humanitarian assistance, so we sent a lot of NEO folks to that course. The NEO course is taught by EOTG. We sent our artillery battery and a rifle company platoon to a nonlethal weapons train the trainer course which is important for ECC crowd control. We also have a small MPs detachment of 4 on the staff.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (C1). How were you certified by EOTG?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We are actually certified by II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and validated by EOTG. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the MEF, a peer headquarters, did the recommendation to LtGen Beaudreault as we executed. During the course of our 3 at sea exercises, 2 of which were evaluated, and the 2 we did on shore (the urban training and the NEO in January) we executed all 11 METs as necessary. EOTG has a general rubric of how many times they need to see each event in order to be validated. NEO is a long execution, so EOTG only wants to see it executed once. Some of the shorter ones that only take half a day, you may have to execute 4 times.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (C1). When are you validated and certified? You are validated then certified?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) At the end of our COMPTUEX exercise in mid-March. Yes sir, they are close together but that is final step.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (C1). When did you deploy?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We know we are going to EUCOM. In late February there was a Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) change that gave us to CENTCOM for 30 days in June because we were the backfill for a big deck carrier. We deployed at the end of March 2021, around the 28th. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We know we were going to CENTCOM so we started planning exercises and crisis response with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

Afghanistan came up a little bit, but at that point anyone thought that a withdrawal would be more like a draw down with a long term presence.

g. Question and Answer 6.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (C1). When do you hear that you may be supporting Afghanistan? When are you sure?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) About mid-June. We knew that [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 was standing up as an on call Joint Task Force for Crisis Response (JTF-CR) as a part of that withdrawal plan. I believe the President's announcement was in April. CENTCOM did some of its withdrawal plan in May and there was a NEO annex in that plan [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 got that commanders estimate in June.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I remember that, you all flew to Afghanistan in mid-July and conducted that site visit. A few days after that, we all moved ashore to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (C1). What did that visit look like?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We talked with all the U.S. personnel, but not that much with the Turks due to the concern of spooking the herd The Brits arrived when BGen Sullivan

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

did, they were the only foreign partner that we really got to coordinate with. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to visit the embassy at the same time that Gen McKenzie and RADM Vasely visited. While they did that, the planners and crisis response element that we had present wanted to pick out where we would set up for NEO and where would we call in Joint Mission Essential Equipment Listing. By the time they returned from the embassy we had a plan on ground and we decided that Abbey Gate would be our primary gate. It would provide the best security as it had more standoff than the North, and more space to spread people out than East Gate. At the time we weren't too aware of the Barron's role for the UK or the potential role of Camp Sullivan. We also looked at the Afghan Border Police check points that approached Abbey Gate. It was the only gate that had depth, and therefore space for processing. That would have let us hold evacuees at the cargo area at the far eastern end of the airfield, and then bus folks to ramp 8 to load at the PAX terminal.

After the PDSS, we went back to the ships. We weren't sure if we could go ashore. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c was seeing who would let us stay near an airfield, and Al Jabar became the best option. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 had just left to consolidate in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a so there was space. It was within reach of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We probably could have flown our C-17s out of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a instead of going to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We continued to plan with SPMAGTF-CR, they were better postured to get in from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a than we were in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a They were the main effort until the 1st of August. Everyone's preference was get the MEU in, since we had trained on NEO and EEC operations as a MET. It was not a core MET for the MAGTF, even if they had trained for it. It may be an additional MET for them. We had less competing missions as well, they still had to control the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a embassy and maintain some training presence in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We brought almost double the number of companies that they brought. But we needed everyone we could get, we ran out of people quickly.

In the second half of July we were moving our ships in. Iwo had to do an exercise with 2 other ships. Our CLB headquarter was ashore and ready to go as an ECC and control element. As soon as we were in range we flew in to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We were officially capable. This was around 20 July, and Iwo continued to steam around before offloading the rest of the battalion a few days later to get everyone ashore. That's when we became the lead element and SPMAGTF had to provide support.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4g

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (C1). When do you know for sure that you are going?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It became clear on the 13th but we still didn't really know when we were going. Around the 9th Kandahar fell, and there was an announcement that the

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

embassy would do a deliberate draw down. Between 9th and 10th our tether pushed from 48 hours to 24 hours. The night of the 12th it was a 12 hour tether. The other concern that night was a quick collapse of security on the airfield, so we bumped some security up from force package 3 to force package 1. That caused some friction, we didn't understand why at the time, but it was because they were trying to prioritize space to bring in the 82nd. I'm not quite clear on the 12th, but I think only 3 of the 6 C-17s in theater were functional, so the 82nd with C-17s may have been better positioned than us.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (C1). When are you boots on ground and what does that look like?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Initially we had 2 companies and a headquarters elements on ground. We left on the night of the 13th and got in around 0200 on the 14th. By that evening 2 and a half companies and some of battalion headquarters element (sniper, scout, engineers, and a 25 man jump HQ for the MEU) were in Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). We had a few folks, about 10-15 get in early with the JTFCR. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (C1). What was the force flow?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Onn the 14th we had our initial force with 2 companies. Maybe we got some more bodies on the 15th and 16th. Then as the zombie apocalypse started on the 16th into the 17th we weren't getting much in. We leaned heavily on TF Polar Bear. The next day the crowd rushed the airfield, and there was some gunfire. 1/82 showed up at this point, and we tried to put them on line to pull security to the south but they had to go secure ramps 2 and 7 in the west, near Alvarado. There were times when BGen Sullivan wanted to employ arrivals in a certain location, so we would go grab a stick as they landed and position them in a security location.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (C1). When do the first 82nd elements arrive?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The first night that the crowd broke out of the civilian terminal. The 17th or the 18th. They flew in over the course of the next days, and they were pretty short on manning. The white and red devils were both there, but one of the battalions was basically just a company for the first few days.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (C1). I think you shut north gate between 22-23 August, with the exception of special targeting, and you shut east gate on the 24th. Why?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) We never liked North Gate. We started there because that's where the crowd was and the Taliban had some control there. It was along the road, which was a high speed avenue of approach. It was also en route to Kabul from the prison to the north. A lot of the threat picture from previous attack on the airfield had come from the northern direction.

We didn't like North Gate, the walls are up against the road and it felt breachable and climbable. As we execute at North Gate, it was a challenge of crowd control. They were using riot control elements and flashbangs. The Afghans are firing rounds in the air, at people's feet, or at people to crowd control. Every few hours we would have to take in a gunshot wound for treatment until RADM Vasely ordered to stop treating noncompliant military aged males.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Additionally, a lot of international forces coordinated to use that gate. That worked for a few days until word got out and that gate was getting crushed by people. That wore out the Marines manning that gate. Steady state manpower for that gate was 2 rifle companies for 12 hours. They'd pull over watch, security, and close and open the gate as necessary. That was our initial threat focus.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Threat reporting was generally at North, East, and Abbey Gates from the beginning. The Taliban owned South Gate and you didn't hear about it. To the North there are elements of key terrain with the possibility of plunging fire and there had been some historical machine gun fire from that northern area toward the airfield at some point. It felt like a risk, and our going in assumption was not to use the North Gate. The crowds changed that, they were always present at North, East, and Abbey gate. There was no time when there weren't 2000-3000 people at a gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (C1). How about East Gate?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) You still have crushing at East Gate. There is a lot of density. It doesn't have same opportunity of plunging fire, but it just a single gate. Mostly a vehicle gate. It is very simple. It's about 12 feet tall.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The first couple of nights it worked out for our foreign partners to bring in a few convoys at night. It was a nice balance for international operations for a day or 2, but once word got out it was crushed as well.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (C1). Why and when did you close East Gate?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) It took a company and a half to man that gate. It ate up two more units of combat power, and had some of the same problems of people crushing against

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

that gate. It was actually easier at North Gate to pick out certain individuals like someone with an orange flag and telling the Taliban to bring that person. It was too hard to open the East gate, and the Taliban commander at East gate was ornery and didn't like being there. The Taliban commander basically told the company commander to shut the gate down around the 24th because he wasn't going to cooperate. We observed them bringing in mortars around us there as well. But mostly once the crowd collapsed there, you couldn't get anyone in that gate. I think we closed it on the 24th. The 24th and 25th were only Abbey Gate. A couple people came through North Gate during that period, but none through East Gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (C1). Could they have operated a mortar there?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) They observed them moving the mortar by there, in transit, not actually setting it up.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Our legal team thought that there was enough legal standing for the Marines at the date to have shot at the Taliban, but I think it was the right call not to.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (C1). Why did you like Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) It gave us more standoff, and as we learned that the Brits were going to use Barron we knew that we would have to keep that gate open anyway. We were manning that south eastern area anyway as a buffer in case the crowds tried to jump the fences and get to the commercial terminals. That never happened, the Taliban and the 1/82 locked that area down pretty well. There was probably some bias as well since our initial plan was Abbey Gate, but we liked the depth and that there were a series of gates to close. In our initial assessment we did not give enough appreciation to the canal, we only assumed the road would be used.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Not to say we set conditions, but we were using that drainage ditch. The Taliban were stopping high risk Afghans, so we recommended that some families come along that footbridge until we saw them and would pull them through the hole in the fence. You would typically see Afghans on the village side, but at first not in the canal or on the fence side. But once we did that for a few days, you see a large mob in the canal. That mob was manageable on the 24th and the 25th, but it was huge on the 26th. The word just got out.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The embassy was also deliberately messaging to use Abbey Gate in addition to the National Strike Unit (NSU) Gate.

s. Question and Answer 18.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Those other gates were very targeted, weren't they?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. The walk up gates are Abbey, North, and East. The NSU and South Gates were generally targeted. Around the 19th or 20th we lost a gate on the Northern side (AAF compound) and people poured in, it wasn't as viable.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (C1). How did the situation on the ground at Abbey Gate change from the 25th to the 26th?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I don't think there was a major change on those 2 dates. I think there was a surge of personnel across that canal because the word got out about it, and because the Taliban hadn't quite figured out to screen that area yet. The Taliban had checkpoints elsewhere, but the canal could avoid them. We were pulling those high risk folks in through the hole in the fence, there is a much lower presence of Taliban around here and they wouldn't be stopped, so we have them go around. We were successful at that for about 3 days, but that word was fully out by the 26th and the crowd was huge. On the 24th and 25th it would be busy after 1100 in the canal, so we would try to pull people out in the morning. By the 26th, that wadi is filled on both sides, and the Brits are no longer along the fence line as they had been for 3 days prior. The Brits were focused on the Barron, they didn't have the manpower to manage the fence line and the Barron. They can't secure the gate/fence and the Barron with the crowd there, there was only a company or two of 2nd Para. The Battalion Commander was the tactical commander of the 2nd and 3rd Para companies that were there.

(3) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It was a task force. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (C1). When do you want to close Abbey? To lay it out, I see that the crowd has grown. The Brits have made it clear that they need us to keep it going. I think that the end time for the Brits kept changing because they couldn't keep up, is that accurate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The afternoon of the 26th. I think it is somewhat accurate, I think they were trying to get everyone out, but the crowd was too thick for them to convoy through the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (C1). Are we concerned that if we closed Abbey Gate the risk to force and mission on HKIA increase? Would it have taken 48 hours to reestablish operations which was unacceptable due to the tight timeline?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Part of the atmospherics was that the quality of intakes had decreased.

(3) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) To back up, when we had that breach on the 17th we had control back by the 19th. At that point, I understand that there was a push from the executive branch to get the flow started. Doing the right processing was too slow, so the quality of intake dropped because we were barely checking paperwork. At one point we had 18,000 people on HKIA. That's just evacuees total, and some NSU folks. 3,000 people were at the ECC site alone, and the holding areas were full.

(4) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Those holding areas weren't even constructed as we had planned.

(5) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We were dealing with people getting in, but we had nowhere to put them because the air craft weren't getting in which exacerbated the problem and pushed us to 18,000 people.

(6) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) At the same time we had to turn the gates off from the 20-22nd to deal with that backlog.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So even though we paused, other nations are still getting people out?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. Some birds are coming in, but they are foreign planes and they are only getting out their people. That frustrated the crowds that we were trying to control, and they would get extremely distressed when they saw those planes coming and going.

(3) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It didn't help that we were also rejecting people from inside HKIA.

(4) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) That started happening later, because they would get to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and then be rejected. Then we had to go back and be stricter with our acceptance criteria, and we had the logistical nightmare of trying to kick people out that we had previously let in but we knew would be rejected further down the road. We had to fill busses of people that got rejected and push them out. I think that when it comes to opening and closing gates, there were also the company commanders making decisions to temporary close the gates in order to push people off in order to reestablish control. That was acceptable, and if it went on for a bit too long the command desk would ask what the situation was and the commander would explain that they or the NSU were pushing the crowds back to reopen the gate.

x. Question and Answer 23.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). When does the blast occur? I've heard 1730-1745.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think it happens at about 1300Z. I think that time frame you  
have is about right. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (C1). What do you do when the blast happens?

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (C1). Who has a picture and information on the guy in the ball cap who stood near the bomber and looked suspicious? Allegedly the recon guys fired at him.

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) I don't know if they fired shots at him, I think they wanted to. I think I have a picture of him.

aa. Question and Answer 26.




ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). I was told that the recon guys fired at him right after the blast because he was standing around. Warning shots finally scared him off but he still looked unconcerned. What do you think was going on there?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, I have a picture of him that I can get to you. I can DOTs it over to you on SIPR or send it via Signal. I don't know if anything can be done about him, that's speculation at this point. We could maybe [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a It's not clear to me exactly what they did if they fired at him.  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me about him initially, but I don't know the answer to that.



dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have post blast photos?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6). Yes, the Brits and the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) did a post blast analysis that have some photos. We may have included that in our initial brief, and I can provide that to you.

ee. Question and Answer 30.


(1) Question (C1). I've been told at any time there are as many as 60 threat streams?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I don't know about 60, but the threat reporting was definitely consistent. I would say there were 4-6 separate threat streams at any given time.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021



hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (C1). What kind of screening are you doing on women? Are you using Female Engagement Teams (FETs)?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We don't have FETs, we just had females searching females.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It was basically a pat down search.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (C1). Did we ever find anything?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They maybe found some knives or some handguns, no devices. I think this may be a better question for [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) He may have better fidelity about what was found, I think that anything that was found went straight to EOD.

(3) Answer [redacted] (b)(6), Most things that were confiscated were found, like abandoned bags.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Do you have any reporting that the bomber flashed American identification to get closer?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) No, that would be a first heard for me.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (C1). Any reason to key in on this guy before he blew himself up?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6). No, we are having a hard time even identifying him at this point. It's possible we saw him, but we don't have a solid description of who he was. It's all speculation. If you were looking at that crowd, you were looking at a hundred people. Even if there was a go pro that were recovered I don't think we could pick him out. With that, I know there was some reporting of small arms fire thereafter.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (C1). Do you think there was a complex attack?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't. I believe there was shooting, but I don't believe they were being engaged by an adversarial force.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I agree, the Taliban was probably shooting to back up the crowd, I don't know if they shot at them.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (C1). I believe that the Marines returned fire after the blast at some Taliban individuals that they saw on top of the crack house. The Marines probably viewed that as hostile intent, and fired on them. I think that is a possibility.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't know that I have seen a single report of any Taliban being shot during this event, but we couldn't know for sure. It could be possible, but the Taliban would have informed us that we shot some of their guys.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) You are going to hear tomorrow from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that they think our doctors treated people with gunshot wounds.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) There are Taliban on the connex boxes, and there are Marines stretched all along that corridor. We had the non-green tipped rounds, the Taliban usually have 5 or 7 millimeter weapons, but there is no telling what kind of rounds there are in theater. There is probably green tip all over the place. The MEU showed up with an open tipped, non-colored, copper jacketed barrier blind round that I was not familiar with and the SPMAGTF showed up with green tip (M855). It is conceivable that some people may have got caught in that crossfire given the layout of the area. I did see some open source reporting of rounds being pulled out of Afghans, but we can't know

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

for sure. There are 20 years of rounds being in the theater and the ANDSF armories have been abandoned and opened for weeks. There is no way to know, but there is enough uncertainty that I am not convinced that there is anyone shooting at the Marines.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (C1). Any reports of the sniper tower taking fire? The snipers say they took 3 rounds, but that has been unconfirmed.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't recall, I would have to go back and check.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I heard that reporting, but it was never fully actioned by the time it got to us.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) When you look at the ball bearings, they are small. It is conceivable that it would look like gun shots. I don't know if anyone has a ball bearing, but you can see the scale in the EOD report. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(5) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) We got sporadic reporting of shooting throughout the night as well, around when we got circular reporting of the IED in the market.

(6) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) We did get more reporting of a secondary IED at the back of the Barron, but that was the same threat.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (C1). You don't believe it was a complex? Do you think we fired at the Taliban on the crackhouse?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I do not think it was. I was unfamiliar with a Taliban position on the crack house, so I could not say.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't believe it's impossible, but I have no reason to believe it was. My speculation is that all the compounds in the area had local management that hired their own security forces. Some of those were contractor facilities. Camp Sullivan had probably a platoon of its own contracted security.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Did you get any RFIs saying that Taliban were killed? I was told there was an issue up north?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I have no indication that Taliban were shot by U.S. forces. If they were shot up there that was probably the National Strike Unit (NSU).

qq. Question and Answer 42.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (C1). Do you think any Taliban were killed in the blast?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't think so. Taliban usually have a weapon and some load bearing equipment and are distinguishable from the rest of the population. I do not recall a report saying there was a Taliban in that location. I remember reports of suspicious individuals in the wadi, but no reports of individuals with weapons that would indicate that they are Taliban.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I think the Taliban weren't there, we wouldn't have needed the PSYOPs to come help with crowd control if they were helping with the crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (C1). Any reports of the Taliban laughing after the explosion?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I am not aware of any reports like that.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (C1). Are there EOD guys that were present at the gate? Anyone present here at Lejeune?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I think we should defer that question to our EOD officer. We can coordinate that for tomorrow.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How did the gate change over time?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We initially used the wadi to get people around the Taliban check point. There were always Afghans on the building side. They were not in the wadi or the fence side initially. The recon company commander would know better than me, again, he was there every day. His gunny and his guys could give fidelity on that concentration.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (C1). Would the Taliban have told you if any of them were killed?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The Taliban were good about reaching out when their needs weren't met. If the Taliban were wronged they would have reached out and said something.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (C1). What do you think Dover will have?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They will do autopsies and pull any projectiles from the bodies.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (C1). Could we please have your contact information?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (C1). Anything you think we missed?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) In terms of calculus for keeping the gate open, Camp Sullivan never went away as a possibility for ways to get Americans out. Like I said, the quality of our intake had gone down so there was speculation that if we stayed longer we might go to Camp Sullivan for a collection area. It had pros, like having an existing infrastructure to support about 3,000 people. It used to be a SOF training camp.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) When we were having the Camp Sullivan discussion, I recommended that we not use it. I saw the sheer volume of people at the gates, and I knew that this space would be difficult to control since it was outside of the wire at a time when we had very high threat streams. I recommended considering other options and not going that far south.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) But part of keeping Abbey Gate open, was keeping that Sullivan option open if we stayed longer. By the 26th we had gone final on our withdrawal plan, but I don't know if anyone believed it until the blast. People were trying to keep options open, and Abbey Gate would have been our answer. We planned on closing the gate as soon as the Brits left. The White Devils would come take the gate right afterward. In the back of our mind we felt like we weren't done yet and we would go to Sullivan.

(5) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I'm confident that if we stayed past the 31st we would have had a huge fight on our hands. I don't think the Taliban had any deal making left in them.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (C1). How fragmented was Taliban leadership? I have heard that they were not cohesive.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6). That is accurate sir, there were different levels of how much these guys talked to each other. The senior leadership would talk, but the battalion and company level had pretty fractured understandings of the situation so you would get different cooperation at the lower level. There was some reporting of lower level Taliban moving over to ISIS-K when the Taliban started working with the Americans. It presented an ideological issue for them. I think the brigade level Taliban had fair control, but at the lower level execution I think you had some problems.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The other side is that the Taliban would follow instructions to the letter. If the dad had documentation they might let the dad through, but not the family.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) That's true they would either follow it exactly or maybe not at all. That presented issues and we had occasions where a bus would be stopped and families separated at the south gate. It got to the point that we had to provide a detailed list to the Taliban of who would be on a bus or they wouldn't let it through.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (C1). Which flag officers spoke to Taliban?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I don't have great awareness on that. I know that MG Donahue and RADM Vaseley did, and I don't know that BGen Sullivan didn't. Company Commanders at the gate would also speak to the local Taliban commanders at their respective gates.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, [redacted] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6), 2-1 didn't have a gunner but you did. Any reason to talk to him?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6), [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were always together, they did the PDSS at Sullivan together and were there for about 30 days before we got there. I think that would tell you the same thing, so you could speak to either of them.

(3) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) To close us out, we were told to stay in CENTCOM in July and we came ashore late July in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a In early August the provincial centers are falling. After that you had about a week and half until the Taliban entered Kabul. As soon as that decision to take provincial center occurred, the writing was on the wall. The country and its government were actively collapsing. In my professional opinion, that is when the NEO should have been called. We should not have waited until every provincial capital had fallen except for Kabul.

And that brings up the sensitive topic of when to talk to the President of Afghanistan about what our plans would be, in order to shape the governmental decision. It just feels like on our end, when the capitals were falling and the news was saying 90 days, we knew that was false.

(4) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Even the day before Kabul fell, RADM Vasely was telling the leaders in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a not to approach Kabul or they would be bombed but that was eventually overcome by events.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 103

ACTS-SCK-DO

12 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), US Army, recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your background and what was your duty position with the MEU?

(2) Answer. I was the [REDACTED] (b)(6). I'm currently with 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) and this was my first deployment. The platoon I had on the MEU was my Platoon whom I trained with for almost 2 years. I was dual hat being the Engineer Platoon Commander and worked in the [REDACTED] (b)(6) assisting the Operation Officer and Assistant Operation Officers.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Describe your element and force structure?

(2) Answer. We deployed with a total force of 43 to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). We left behind the Motor Transport (MT) Operator, a MT Mechanic, a

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

12 October 2021

Heavy Equipment (HE) operator, HE mechanic, a Electrician, a Food Service Marine and a couple Combat Engineers who'd gotten into trouble, so I had most of my Marines out there. The Engineer breakdown of the platoon was myself and 2x 1371 staff NCOs. 35x 1371 / 2x 1345 / 1x 1141 / 1x RTO / 1x Corpsman. We had no females in the Platoon which meant no one to get pulled into the female search teams at HKIA.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Describe the training and operations your element participated in during the deployment, prior to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were very focused on survivability, mobility, and counter-mobility training. We knew we could potentially be tasked to execute a noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), but our tasks would be engineer related. Since we aggregated as a platoon we trained to execute missions based on survivability, mobility and counter-mobility operations and had a lot of range time focused directly on those tasks. While deployed the whole platoon got a chance to do some training in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a We got to do some force protection and demolition training. We secured a few gates around the Logistics Support Area and created guard shacks with a knife rest. We also emplaced wired obstacles around the Command Operation Center and the Ammunition Handling Area. During our Bi-Lateral training with the Saudi Arabian Royal Army we demonstrated the construction of various wire obstacles.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at HKIA and what was the atmosphere upon arrival?

(2) Answer. We were split up. My Platoon Sergeant; (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), went out first on advance party. He was in HKIA on 9 August and was with the initial MEU elements. He assessed what we had for HE and Class IV Materials and made sure we knew what we were walking into. Then I had a squad flown in on the 16th that linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The insane influx of people on the runway happened the next day. The remainder of the platoon including myself arrived on the 17th or 18th.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What were your first tasks and priorities at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I showed up in the middle of the night. My Platoon Sergeant greeted me and talked to me about setting up some type of obstacles across the southern portion of the commercial passenger terminal to get control of that portion of the airfield. There was Infantry Company and a Light Armored Recon Company setting up defensive positions across the southern side. We ran wire as much as possible across the grassy area south of the flight line. We ended up having to move and use about 20 connex boxes to create a little bit of a canalizing feature. We used a flatbed tow truck to

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

12 October 2021

move the containers and save a lot of time. We used the Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) to load containers on the back of the flatbed tow truck, and then we would drive it around and move the container as necessary using the tow truck. That took us through the first day. We were really still getting the equipment and identifying what we could use. Class IV on hand included: Engineer pickets, concertina wire (c-wire), barbed wire, razor wire, HESCO 7 footers, and 6x6, and 4x4s, and some plywood. Initially they had stocks of wire on hand, but as much as we used we started running out. I put in requests for resupply, but by the time the requests made it up, they never got a chance to get more back. We never got resupplied with Class IV while I was there. Equipment wise, we had contract equipment. We had a crane, front loaders, dozers, fork lifts, backhoe, dump trucks, semi-trucks, a tow truck and excavators. We used the crane once and broke the cable on it. We had knocked down a bunch of guard towers and they were outside the wall and because some Afghan civilians were using them to observe the airfield or to climb into the airfield, we had to knock them down from the inside. We used the excavator to knock them down in order not to go outside. We ended up using the crane to try to knock down the last tower. The tower came down but it broke the crane. We had stocks of barriers, but they were already inside the gates and we basically moved them around to the best situation we could make at each location. We couldn't really get the crane into the Abbey Gate area. We didn't have any certified crane operators, so my guy who'd been on it before was just operating it to make it happen. We used the RTCH to move T-walls. With the RTCH we were limited to about 8 feet of height clearance. There was no way to move taller walls over other walls using the equipment we had on hand. We made some tetrahedrons using some rebar and welding equipment in a mechanics shop we had. They let us make some obstacles and improvised obstacle pieces in order to cover areas and create barriers. We double stacked a lot of ISO containers. We did that a lot because it was something we had a ton of and it was effective.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did you have any clear tasks upon arrival or did anyone ever specifically task or prioritize tasks to you?

(2) Answer. We were working at each gate. East Gate was our #1 priority and we would work wherever 1/8 needed us and had companies at the line. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the BLT was the Ops O and directed that effort. I'd bounce from East and North Gates to Abbey. I worked with the British Royal Marines. We put the chevron in place for 2/1. I worked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on that effort and it was somewhat sketchy even when we did get out to the outside gate area due to the amount of people there. He directed a little effort out there and then we didn't really have anything else to do for them after the chevron. We installed that on the morning of the 20th but it took all night. Throughout most nights we were shoring up holes in the wall. There was an area west of North Gate that used to be a gate and the Afghan civilians were hopping the fence in that area. There was another Army unit out there, TF Polar Bear, and we happened to be right there with them when the 50+ CIVs hopped the gate. We would work with these units and we would constantly have to plug holes in the fence. The guard tower take down

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

12 October 2021

took a night in itself. We were originally supposed to destroy the concrete towers outside the perimeter, but that got canceled because we couldn't do so without impacting all the civilians nearby. We did get tasked to come back down to Abbey Gate. This was coming from the BLT so it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sending me. On the morning of the 25th the 2/1 Marines said we weren't going to talk about the gate improvements because they were shifting focus to the draw back and gate closure. The role had switched from operating the gate to then looking at the echelon back movement once we closed the gates and that wasn't really just at Abbey Gate. We were looking at emplacing disruption obstacles following the pull back. Getting back out there on the 26th we weren't asked to help with anything outside the gate at all.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Is it fair to say East and North Gates were your priority, considering you are the BLT Engineer, and those gates were manned by BLT Marines?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was clearly and specifically briefed that way.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. What assessments did you do at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. My first assessment was passed back to me by 2/1 saying, "I'm not worried about the gates because we're turning them over." We got called back out there to improve it again on the morning of the 26th, but it was inaccessible other than the outer gate area and even that was crazy with the amount of people processing still. We basically couldn't input anything else at the gate, and the inner corridor was extremely dangerous to operate equipment in because of the crowds.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did you ever receive any requests for support to gain standoff, create obstacles, or increase or decrease traffic flow?

(2) Answer. Not after the first tasking to put in the chevron. Everything after that was to go down and talk with the infantry companies to see what they needed and could use to improve the area. They had pushed civilians back, but they were right on the road and we had no room to operate. When we were placing the chevron obstacle, I was with the HE operator and we were ground guiding the vehicle which was super dangerous on the 20th let alone later on. We had the RTCH and an up armored vehicle with a plan to fall back if the crowds got crazy. I was on the ground and there was a second ground guide basically keeping people from grabbing and touching the containers while they were in the air. I was on the ground helping them. I was working with the British Royal Marine who was also an engineer and he had been out there for a while.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

12 October 2021

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What assessments did you do as the BLT Engineer? Did you have time to do any assessment or was it always responding to the crisis of the moment?

(2) Answer. I had time to look and assess but getting the units to understand what we would need in order to move things all over the place was the hard part. We had the evenings sometimes, but the crowds restricted us from being out there even then. We provided as much assessment as we could to help them improve their areas and force protection. The gates would change by who was working it also so the gate changes were different every time I came back. It was the same at the other gates too, so this wasn't just Abbey Gate. We had the gate set up and they briefed what they would do but they were doing a lot of searching and crowd stuff at the gate that wasn't happening at other gates.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. When you got out there on the 25th, what'd you see?

(2) Answer. The 25th was crazy. The people were lined all over the place and the entire area was flooded with human traffic. The Marines were trying to keep it organized but people were packed in. I couldn't even get out past the break in the fence when I tried to look at the area. The company leadership even told me it wouldn't have been worth it to try to get out there to assess potential force protection improvements because there was so much traffic of humans there and we couldn't make any changes among the crowd. I couldn't even see past the break in the fence to look at the problem set they had. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) loved our help, and he was super complimentary of our work, but when I came back on the 26th, he couldn't give us space or time to be able to make any changes to what existed. The crowd was going nuts. It was crazy at Abbey Gate on the 26th. Compared to the other gates it was worse on that day.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What was the situation like at the other gates?

(2) Answer. North Gate was crazy in their own way. 1/8 ended up going outside the gate after the gate got pushed in. We were stacking wire everywhere to help them gain space. We had to push the people back so that they were not right up on the gate. It was effective until we abandoned the gate later on. It was crazy at all the gates. The ANA was kind of helping but shooting a lot of warning shots so that was confusing. The Taliban were out there and traffic was right next to the highway and they were also shooting warning shoots. East Gate wasn't that bad. I only went out there once and it wasn't that bad. I knew things were crazy at all the gates, but East Gate never had too much craziness after we stacked the vehicles up against the fence. And none of this was the focus after the first improvements. I was really concentrated on the plan to pull

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

back and so was everyone else. We were constantly trying to just figure it out based on what we had and what we were being asked to do.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Leading up to the 26th, were you aware of the increasing threat stream?

(2) Answer. Never. I never got an official brief about changing force pro conditions. It was at best a conversation in passing. Nothing like intelligence about a specific threat. I was never briefed any of that. We worked all day and worked all night. We would hear it was an IED, but nothing specific about the threat to Abbey Gate or size or type of bomb. I had heard about the possibility but nothing specific at any time or place, and as far as I was tracking there was never any effect on force posture other than taking shelter at the very localized level at the gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Describe the scene on the 26th.

(2) Answer. Busy, chaotic. They were still pulling people in and processing. I had a whole flatbed truck full of wire and I came out there to try to help them. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was focused on finishing at the gate and they couldn't gain any space to install anything anyway, so he was focused on changing over with 82nd. They were also focused on lane closure in the fall back. They couldn't get me any space in order to work outside so we couldn't really drop anything outside the gate by the sniper tower. At the time the IED went off we were fixing a breach that had just happened at tower 8. We saw 11 Afghan civilians come through a break in the fence. We were addressing that right when the IED went off.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Did you have any role in the CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. No sir, we finished the gate breach fix and I had guys setting up trip flairs in order to address the other problems and perimeter breaches all over the place because of dead space and sight lines. We were busy at all times. Working to fix holes, working to shore up breaks, working to solve strange problems.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. So the attack happens, what role did you have in shutting the gate?

(2) Answer. Nothing. We had about 24 hours after the IED before [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g indicated a follow on requirement at Abbey Gate. On the 28th I went back out there and linked up with the CPT from 82nd Airborne. They asked us to put a barrier

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 12 October 2021

at the gate in order to stop anyone from coming in. Because the fences were pretty solid, we basically moved cars in to position to create a serpentine and filled the rest with wire. It was a disrupting obstacle, not a blocking obstacle. There was too much space and not enough time to make a block. We got that set up between the morning to mid-day on the 28th.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. After that?

(2) Answer. We went back to our compound and we departed on the 30th. Between then we were cleaning up the passenger terminal area and still kind of plugging holes in the perimeter. We were filling holes, pushing trash, and really just making sure things were ready to roll out.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Anything else you think we should know?

(2) Answer. We played a role but we were really focused on the BLT. We had no engineers with 2/1. We didn't have any of the Marines tasked directly with them. The Marine from CLB-24 were pretty much working with the evacuation control center (ECC). I spoke with the Engineers from MWSS briefly but really didn't have any exposure to them directly. We had the biggest engineer force and because of that we got the bulk of the engineer work.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Any thought about contracting heavy equipment support?

(2) Answer. When my Platoon Sergeant was out there on the initial push to HKIA we knew we would have shortages of manpower and licensed personnel to run the equipment we had. The RTCH was our main mover for the most part for lifting. Contracted support wasn't really discussed.

Contact info: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [REDACTED] (b)(6) and

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis (C1) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6): How long have you been the [redacted] (b)(6) of 1/8?

(2) Answer: Since February of 2020.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6): When did you lock on with the MEU? Can you discuss your pre-deployment training in preparation for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer: We locked on in September of 2020. Prior to that, we did our pre-deployment training under our Division. We completed three pre-deployment training blocks, including the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) in the first half of July This was when our Division certified us and confirmed that we were ready to lock on with the MEU. The attachments that joined us include the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company, an Engineer Platoon, an Artillery Battery, and a few months later, the Reconnaissance Platoon. At the Change of Operational Control



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

(CHOP) in September, we conducted three amphibious trainings, including getting on and off ships and practicing raids. We were evaluated on this training. We also conducted many field operations, to include Realistic Urban Training.

We conducted a Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise (MEUX) specifically in preparation for NEO in late January. The MEUX is where we really focused on NEO operations and were evaluated. We practiced embassy reinforcement during this training. This is an assigned Mission Essential Task (MET) for us.

We got on our ship in February to deploy. Between February and March, we conducted our Composite Training Exercise (Comp 2X), which is our certification exercise with Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). We officially deployed in March.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you conduct any other NEO, or any elements of NEO, training between your time of departure and time of arrival at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: Yes. June was when we first started to hear about a possible NEO. We were in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a for three and a half weeks conducting our amphibious training when we first heard about NEO. We completed the training in June and got back on the ship in July. We kept hearing about Afghanistan and geared our training toward a possible NEO. We conducted publication and internal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) reviews while on the ship. We were only on the ship for a week or so and got off in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a to stage for HKIA. Once in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, we conducted NEO training every day. We focused on all types of security. We leveraged the Air Force Security Forces to help conduct training.

I conducted a site survey of HKIA for three days in July and got a strong situational awareness on what HKIA looked like. This helped shape and adapt our training in mid-July and August. We really learned how to secure a base, use the mechanical arms available, train on anti-terrorism measures, practice Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations. We received a lot of role-players from the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) that helped create realistic scenarios. We would inject a lot of different scenarios.

Communication between leaders at this time was very strong. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c were already on the ground and helped a lot.

In June, we were focused on high-risk levels of sustainment training. In July and August, we focused solely on NEO training, to include drivers training, security operations, and other NEO-related training.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6): When did 1/8 arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: The lead element, consisting of approximately 130 personnel, arrived on 13 August. This included of my staff primaries, the command element, all of Alpha Company, and some portions of Bravo Company and Charlie Company. I had my Gunner with me and my Assistant Operations Officer on deck to help us integrate with the MEU staff. I sent my gunner and three corpsmen to HKIA from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a in July to help set up our processes and systems.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Can you describe the rest of the force flow?

(2) Answer: It was very simple; full companies would come in on flights. The lead element received tasks right away. We established the towers, had a QRF element, and started pulling security on the gates to begin processing people. The arrival of the rest of my elements were delayed for about four days due to the 82nd bumping our flights. All of 1/8 was on ground in a period of darkness on the 18th of August.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Talk me through the breach of security on the airfield.

(2) Answer: The breach occurred on the civilian side of the airfield. The Gunner and I were circling the entire airfield but never went to the civilian airport. We never anticipated the abrupt departure of Afghan security forces on the airfield once the government fell.

We took rounds on the 16th when the breach occurred. We were bolstering our positions. No one really knew that it was coming. I came into the JOC and everyone was staring at the screens. All you could see were thousands of people running on to the airfield. I picked up my gear and ran out. I grabbed the one company that I had, without chow or water, and we ran out to the airfield. We didn't know the threat level or the capabilities of any threats. We ran out to Apron 8 and saw thousands of people everywhere. I looked west and saw one C-17 being overrun. The pilots were in the cockpit. I looked south and saw that the only option we had was to push everyone back off of the airstrip. I knew we didn't need to use lethal force.

We got on line immediately, riot control-style, and marched forward. More forces began to arrive and help. An Army platoon was behind us, mounted, and helped. Some staff members came out of the JOC to help. A few others from 1/8 came out. We had

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

about 300 personnel in total. It took us until about 0200 to push everyone back. I was calling back for engineer support because I needed something to block these people. Eventually we got concertina wire out there and started setting it up. We had everyone contained now. There was a lot of shooting going on near the south side, from the Taliban. They were pushing North to South and we were pushing South to North, causing the crowd to get condensed in between. A lot of people in the crowd were military members, trying to get their families out.

I thought we had it pretty well under control, but around 0400, people found another way in on the southeast side. I didn't know it at the time, but this area was very porous. Thousands of people broke through on this side now. We had a few thousand people that we already pushed back and now thousands more were coming in.

I took some of our people off the line to take control of this breach. We ran the concertina wire further and got everything contained.

The C-17 was now behind us and eventually took off.

I was supposed to receive 82nd personnel during this time to help reinforce our security but I never received them. I don't know what happened, but I didn't receive any help. I kept getting told more reinforcements and engineer equipment was on the way. Eventually, a company from 2/1 came to help. I think it was Echo Co. I also received a company from 10th MTN. They arrived around 0700 or 0800 in the morning. We eventually received some water and chow.

Now that the airfield was clear, C-17s started coming in to land. This caused excitement in the crowd. I pulled the mounted Army platoon up to the line to help. They were almost out of ammo. The crowd was relentless when the C-17s would land because they saw it as their only way out. The Taliban were becoming very aggressive at this time and we killed about six of them. They were armed and pushing the people in the crowd and were shooting at us. We had the crowd kneel down and we returned fire on the Taliban and killed them. I don't actually know if they were Taliban, but they were hostile and armed. This showed the crowd we were there to help, but the C-17s kept landing and the crowd was hard to control.

We had about 8,000 to 10,000 in the crowd now and only 300 of our forces holding them back. People in the crowd began stepping on the concertina wire and broke through our line. They ran across the airstrip and we tried to run them back. This happened a few times throughout the day. I wasn't receiving forces, and in fact, I kept losing people. Many people augmenting us were leaving.

The crowd swarmed the parked C-17 again and the pilot signaled to me that we needed to move because he needed to take off. He taxied on the airstrip and took off.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

This is the moment where you saw three guys that were clinging to the aircraft fall off in the air. This moment deflated the crowd and they became easier to push back.

We finally got the crowd across the airstrip to the civilian terminal. We kept them there for a few hours but then they overtook us again. I noticed that the crowd was finding other places to breach. They were very clever at finding ways to get in. We were never lethal with them because we knew they were just trying to get in. We played this back-and-forth game all day.

Later in the afternoon, toward dusk, the National Strike Unit (NSU) arrived to augment us. I was at the Northwest Gate to link up with the commander. The air operations were shut down all day. We let the NSU mostly take over after they arrived and we pulled the Marines back to Apron 8. The NSU was very violent and clearly had different Rules of Engagement (ROE) than us. They pushed everyone back off of the airstrip and we never had a problem with being overrun again.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Is this around the same time that the Taliban began helping the US?

(2) Answer: I went back out to check on the NSU on the 17th. I knew the JOC was looking for sites to begin processing people. This was the first tip that I got that the Taliban were helping us because I saw their first checkpoint they had set up. I looked for a few different sites to set up the ECCs and went back to brief the General and Col to pitch the ideas I had about where to set up ECCs.

My forces began to flow in by this time and we had everyone on deck.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Did you have any other elements, Task Organization (TASKORG) wise?

(2) Answer: We had the Headquarter and Services (H/S) element and Weapons Company. I left a small element in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and about 200 personnel remaining on the ships. We had 996 Marines on ground.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) At this point, there is relative security of the airfield between the Marines, Army, NSU, Turks, and somewhat the Taliban. Aircraft are flowing in and you're starting to find ECC sites. Talk me through the initial gate operations and TASKORG.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

(2) Answer: We focused on North Gate, East Gate, and Abbey Gate. When 2/1 arrived, they took over Abbey Gate from us. I had two companies at North Gate and East Gate. I rotated them off the gate every 12 hours as part of the rest plan. We were still receiving warning shots and sniper rounds and it was exhausting. We also had security at the passenger (PAX) terminal where we were helping with the ECC. We had to reinforce this area a few times because we would get an overflow of people and no aircraft to send them on.

On day one, we had a frontage of Marines on the gates trying to help people as much as they can and pull people in. It became unsustainable to keep this slow process. We eventually created a lane to bring people in to conduct initial screening and this made the process faster. However, we weren't bringing in the right people and we had too many people on the airfield. BGen Sullivan recognized that this created a security threat and we began to find ways to remove people that weren't eligible.

Our focus on this time was security, both internally and externally. Once aircraft started to arrive the flow was better. The issue now was that there were changing requirements for processing. The Department of State (DoS) constantly changed the requirements needed to get on a flight. Another issue was with the coalition forces. There were many people that looked like us and spoke perfect English, but they held Spanish or other passports. We would try to pull them in and help them when we could. Also, coalition partners would constantly come to the gate and start pulling their random people out, even when we had the gate closed. This created a lot of anger with the crowd. We had to push them back a lot when this happened.

Eventually, we had created a comfort area within the gates containing about 5,000 people that still required screening. We wanted to finish screening these people before bringing more people in, but we needed more consulars present to screen. About 15% of these 5,000 people actually had the correct documents and we had to escort the remaining 85% out. This was soul-crushing for the people being escorted, and the Marines, because these families had just fought for their lives for days to get inside the gate and now they had to leave.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6): Going back to the initial clearing of the airstrip, you mention that there was an engagement with the Taliban in which the Marines killed six members of the Taliban. Was this verified?

(2) Answer: Yes, I was there when it occurred. It happened near a gate close to Aprons 4 and 5 on the southside of the airfield near the international terminal. The crowd in this area kept telling us that they couldn't move back because the Taliban were killing people in the rear. I don't know for sure if it was the Taliban, but the crowd was

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

saying it was the Taliban and they looked like the Taliban. We were getting shot at all through the night on the 15th. These men caused the crowd to run away from them. They would swing sticks at the crowd and beat them. Around this time, I had pulled the mounted Army platoon back off of the line to refuel and get more ammo, causing the crowd to push forward

I saw six of the guys that the crowd alluded to coming through the gate. The crowd cleared away from them and that was our chance to eliminate them. They had displayed hostile actions and hostile intent. They had been firing at us before they came through the gate. Once they came through the gate, we had a clear line of site and we killed them. I saw three of the men go down personally. Shortly after the engagement, the crowd overran the airfield again.

The civilians in the crowd had received fire from the Taliban throughout this time period and we rendered aid to them. Sometimes the crowd would take them away to render their own aid or bring them to a hospital. If someone was very injured or died while out in the crowd, people in the crowd would just take them away.

I didn't know that we were working with the Taliban at this time. I heard about RADM Vasely talking with the Taliban the next day and that was the first time that I heard that we were working with them.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) What happened to the six men that were killed?

(2) Answer: We never went to check them like we normally would do. We were quickly overran by the crowd when a C-17 landed and weren't able to go to the location. When we were able to return to the area, the bodies and weapons were gone.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: C1: How long after the engagement with the Taliban did the C-17 land?

(2) Answer: I'd say it was an hour or two after the engagement. It landed, taxied over to the apron, and then the civilians overran us onto the air strip.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you say that the aircraft were receiving fire?

(2) Answer: Yes. It was around the morning or early afternoon of the 15th when there was fire coming from the Taliban towers onto the airfield. I saw all of the Afghan

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

Security Forces leave their security towers when this happened. There was a C-130 staged on the airstrip that received fire. I think the firing was coming from one or two nefarious actors that were the ones firing. We recovered one round from them and my gunner and EOD conducted analysis on it. They said that it was an armor-piercing round and that it was pretty large. The rounds only came in when aircraft were parked there.

We were posting security at this time. TF Polar Bear was patrolling the area, mounted, at this time. I linked up with their Platoon Commander and spread their screen line wider. Once TF Polar Bear had their two M240s pointed in their direction, the fire stopped.

I eventually had some guys take these towers down with high explosives because people from the crowd were using them to jump over the fence.

After this, I went in to the JOC. This is when I watched the video feed of the thousands of people pouring on to the airfield.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of these rounds?

(2) Answer: Yes, I have photos and EOD conducted an analysis.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6): What were the ROE when you arrived and what did it transition to? Was it CENTCOM ROE?

(2) Answer: Yes. It was CENTCOME ROE. We were never unclear on the ROE. Our SJA did a great job briefing us. We conducted training on this and also handed out cards to each fire time. The only ROE change I was ever told was on the evening of the 15th. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: C1: Can you provide one of the ROE cards to us?

(2) Answer: Yes

r. Question and Answer 17.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

(b)(1)1.4a

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: C1: How are things changing between 18-25 August in terms of force structure? What are you seeing in the dynamics of the Afghans in the crowd?

(2) Answer: I finally had all of my people. They started flowing in the evening of the 18th. We went from approximately 150 people on ground to 996 people. We were a battalion minus, but reinforced. I had eight maneuver elements. Alpha Co, Bravo Co, Charlie Co, Weapons Co, H/S, the LAR Co, the Artillery Battery, the Recon Platoon attached to the MEU, and the Engineer Platoon. The Engineer Platoon was tasked by me but they used by all as general support.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: C1: Who was your boss and was the chain of command clear?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was very clear. He arrived to HKIA with me on 13 August.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What was your mission set once your entire battalion is on ground?

(2) Answer: Simply put, security. We had security of the north and east gate. We had security for North HKIA and the towers/perimeter security here. We had QRF and snipers.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you have security of Abbey Gate with the Brits?

(2) Answer: When we had security of Abbey Gate, we were there with the Azerbaijani. The Brits were in the Barron Hotel.

w. Question and Answer 22.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

(1) Question: C1: Where was the best overwatch that you had on the perimeter?

(2) Answer: There were towers available and we leveraged the camera system available at the gates.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: C1: Who had the sniper tower at Abbey Gate? Were any of your forces pulling security at Abbey Gate on the 18th?

(2) Answer: 2/1 eventually took that gate. I don't think we had anyone there on the 18th.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6): Who did you change out with at Abbey Gate and when? What did the changeout look like?

(2) Answer: We changed out with Echo Co, 2/1 on or before the 18th of August. I'm not sure how many people they had. I wasn't there during the change out. Every gate was open at this point.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: C1: Were you at Abbey Gate on the 25th or 26th?

(2) Answer: I was there on the 26th but was at East Gate at the time of the blast. I heard the blast perfectly. I was out with my guys at the time and knew exactly what the sound was. It didn't sound very big; I thought it was a suicide vest or small Improvised Explosive Device (IED). I couldn't see it. As soon as the blast occurred I grabbed my SgtMaj to go check it out. I wanted to see what my other guys were doing.

We were walking that way and saw many vehicles speeding by with casualties. I saw blood on the vehicles. We saw three or four casualties that had already received care.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: C1: Was East Gate closed at this point?

(2) Answer: Yes. Abbey Gate was supposed to closed at 1800 on the 26th. We were receiving threat streams all day about an IED at one of the gates. We were taking measures to spread our people out.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: C1: Even though East Gate and North Gate are closed, were specific people still being pulled out at the gates at this time?

(2) Answer: Yes, at North Gate. We pulled a group of New York Times reporters and a large women's organization out at North Gate. These extractions were very targeted. We continued pulling special groups out here up until the 26th. The threat stream was too high to keep doing this. Thousands of people were still outside East Gate even though it was closed.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: C1: Did you see the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP)?

(2) Answer: Yes, they were at East Gate. They weren't receiving a lot of patients because no one knew where they were located. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me they had received some casualties from the blast but I wasn't in that area to verify.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: C1: Is there any way for people to cross from Abbey Gate (34 on the map), across the apron to Tower 3, to get across the airfield? \*Uses map as reference\*.

(2) Answer: Yes, there was. There was an offshoot with a fence that brings you out to Apron 2. We had this blocked by vehicles, so they would have had to move the vehicles to get through. The unimpeded route was the route that the casualties took.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: C1: From Abbey Inner Gate the distance to the hospital is about 3 kilometers. Can you clearly see Tower 3 from across the airfield? Could you see the hospital?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

(2) Answer: It was about 3 kilometers. You can see the tower but can't see the hospital.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: C1: About how long does it take to drive the route that the casualties took to get to the hospital?

(2) Answer: It would take about ten minutes. There are a lot of turns and people in this area causing you to have to go slowly.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: C1: Generally, how long do you realistically think it would take to move a casualty from Abbey Gate to the hospital? Did you see anyone deviate from this route and take a different way?

(2) Answer: I think it would take about 15 minutes. I didn't see anyone else use a different route.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Were aircraft flying in and taking off at this time period?

(2) Answer: Yes. I don't specifically remember any movement during the time of the blast. But airfield operations were open.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: What time do you think the blast occurred?

(2) Answer: It was in the later half of the afternoon. I didn't think to look at my watch.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: How much time was there between the blast at Abbey Gate and the direct fire? Could you see anyone shooting?

(2) Answer: Maybe about ten minutes. I saw our Marines on top of the barriers and in the tower, all aiming toward the direction of the fire. I did not hear us return fire.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6) Did 1/8 have suppressed weapons? Did you hear suppressed or un-suppressed weapons?

(2) Answer: I heard un-suppressed fire. It sounded like it was coming from an AK. The Marines had round impacting around them.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: C1: What did the fire sound like?

(2) Answer: It was sporadic to sustained fire for about five to ten minutes. It was ineffective in the fact that no one was hit, but it did cause heads to go down for protection.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: C1: Did some of your Marines hear the rounds coming in?

(2) Answer: They could hear and see impact.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6) Did the fire sound louder as you got closer?

(2) Answer: I guess, yes.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: C1: Did you talk to your guys after this?

(2) Answer: Yes. I talked to [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) afterward and he was pretty rattled. Everyone was concerned with the blast and casualties. We had one of our Marines serving on the Female Search Team, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) get injured during the blast.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6) Many things led to the decision to close the gates. Can you talk about this?

(2) Answer: North Gate needed to be shut down. It was very hot and people were passing out often. It was untenable and there were a lot of Taliban nearby. There was also a huge Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threat at North Gate.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

We did the same thing and shut down East Gate before the 26th. The threat streams coming in were very high. We were taking active measures at both of these gates to spread them out and reduce man power.

I would say the blast occurred around 1500. I walked toward that area and saw that 2/1 had the situation under as much control as they could. I had my guy come help pull security for 2/1 so they could worry about the gate and evacuating their casualties.

Many other units showed up to try to help and were bringing in a ton of large vehicles. [REDACTED] (b)(6) kept these units away and off the road to ensure that 2/1 was able to evacuate casualties as easily as they could.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) As the blast happens, do you see an increase in civilian activity at the gates? Or was it more of a dispersal?

(2) Answer: I think they felt unsafe and many made the decision to leave. They had been out there for three, four, five days and did feel like it was safe enough to stay.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of North Gate or East Gate to show what you were dealing with as far as the crowd and the surrounding area?

(2) Answer: Yes. I have photos I can share.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: C1: At one point, East Gate was used for deliveries to HKIA. I'm tracking it only had only one gate instead of the double gates. Is this true?

(2) Answer: Yes. I also have photos from the PDSS that would show the area well.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did there appear to be a change in the atmospherics of the people as you got closer to the 31st?

(2) Answer: At first, when we were being breached on the 15th and 16th, the crowd thought that it was a free for all to leave. Once we began controlled gate operations, people were just trying to push and shove and get through the lines. After

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

about six or seven days, the crowd realized it was a process and took a lot of waiting to get through the gates and on to a flight. As it got closer to the 30th, people gave up and were leaving. The crowd was almost cleared when I turned our operations over to the Army on the 29th.

It wasn't immediately after the blast that people left, but as we got closer to the 30th, the crowd dwindled down.

Around the 27th, the Taliban started telling us to get off the wall and they began pointing RPGs at us and telling us to leave.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: C1: Our main Taliban point of contact was located at the South Gate. I think that we felt that if we told this guy something, he would push it out to everyone. Instead, I believe that the Taliban did not have a unity of command like this and information was not spread throughout their command structure. Is this true? Did the Taliban commanders at the gates work separately? Who was the hardest to work with?

(2) Answer: Absolutely. The Taliban commander at the North Gate was the hardest to work with. The Taliban at the North Gate made things difficult and wouldn't talk to us. The Taliban at the southern side would talk with us and work with us.

The Taliban at the North Gate were still firing pop shots. I believe they were firing at the NSU. They hate each other. Guys from my Bravo Co saw an NSU man get shot in the chest and die from a Taliban firer.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question: C1: Did you ever talk to anyone from the Taliban? Do you know who was the Taliban Commander at the East Gate?

(2) Answer: I don't know who he is. I can remember some of the ones that I talked with.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of the Taliban?

(2) Answer: Yes.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you see the Taliban setting up any mortars around East Gate on the 23rd?

(2) Answer: The Taliban were moving rounds and tubes around the buildings in that area. According to the ROE, the Marines could have engaged that Taliban at this time but they didn't. I went to the JOC to discuss this. I was concerned with the Taliban's intent. It seems like they were setting the conditions for their actions after August 31st.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question: C1: Did you see any other weapons that the Taliban set up?

(2) Answer: No, just heir typical RPGs and the mortars. Nothing else.

bbb. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you interact with the Department of State? What was your interaction with them?

(2) Answer: Yes. There were usually only one or two consulars at the Gates. They were initially very intermittent and hard to find. We kept requesting constant consular support and finally received it. We created relationships with some of the consulars and could get them to flex to certain areas as needed, such as the comfort area when it was overflowing.

\*BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) refer to the map of HKIA and draw out locations of the comfort area, Taliban areas and checkpoints, gate locations, and their set-up.\*

ccc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question: C1: Is there anything that we haven't asked you that you think that we need to know?

(2) Answer: I will forever wonder how the 82nd arrived before my guys. The rest of my battalion was stuck in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and their flights kept getting bumped by the 82nd.

ddd. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question: C1: It doesn't sound like the Taliban reacted very heavily when the Marines killed six of their men. Is that correct?

(2) Answer: Yes. I never heard anything else about it.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

eee. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question: [redacted] (b)(6) What kind of external pressure, as a [redacted] (b)(6) at the tactical level, did you experience while you were on ground? How much of your time did this take?

(2) Answer: Quite a bit. With my name, picture, email, and phone on our unit website, I received a lot of traffic. I had former Congressman hitting me up on Signal and emailing and calling my phone. I had Marine veterans that I knew reaching out to me. I received requests every day.

I kept the mission of the security of the airstrip and Marine security as my highest priorities. I would have the people reaching out to me conduct all of the coordination to get their requested people out. I would tell them which gate to go to and I would meet them at like 0300 or 0400 in the morning. I would act on maybe one or two of these a day but would receive about 15 requests a day. I told my subordinate commanders to push requests that they received to me. I let [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) know about everything. I pushed some of the extracts to my recon element because it was part of their mission set to do these special tasks.

fff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What was your duty position with the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)?

[redacted] (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. When were you actually assigned from the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to support the MEU?

(2) Answer. June or July of 2020. I did the full work up with them, to include the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) MEU Staff Planners Course (AMSPC) where you do top level planning that is blue side coordination. We did Realistic Urban Training (RUT) that we did on the ground here in North Carolina, which is just the green side MEU executing against targets from the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). Then we did Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) MEU Integration Training (PMINT). That was the last time that I was on the ships, since they knew that I would be the LNO. I was left on shore for ARG MEU Exercise and the Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPUTEX). [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The MEU was doing COMPUTEX and go due to COVID, so I went out to Italy with enough time so that I could quarantine and be ready to work before they changed of operations (CHOP) in to theater. 6th fleet used LNOs like they should, so I reported to the director of fleet operations and the fleet admiral the way that I should, and they understood that I represented [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I worked with my friend [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at 6th fleet. At 6th Fleet the PHIBRON and the MEU are treated as their own task force commanders.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Alright so you are in [REDACTED] (b)(1) from March through July, then where do you go?

(2) Answer. I transferred to [REDACTED] 1.4a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already there and we linked in with [REDACTED] (b)(6), I went with my PSOYP Marine, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We had two PSYOP Marines in the MEU, one was with me and one was afloat. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the [REDACTED] (b)(6) also came with us. We three get told to get with the Joint Task Force (JTF) and focus on the NEO planning and execution from the time we get there. We left [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to run the steady state stuff. I also did a little IO stuff, like [REDACTED] (b)1.4c while I was there.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Alright, you get there on 08 July, when do you get to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. I did not get on the pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) [REDACTED] (b)1.4c does not use their LNOs appropriately, they use us as extra staff officers. I ended up helping

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

with planning, and I only had 2 conversations with their Commanding General. Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) planners were brought in, so that ramped up planning really fast, and things would spin down a bit once a plan was developed. Then the situation would change, and planning would ramp back up. Things were changing rapidly. I'm sure you have ascertained that State thought they would have a diplomatic presence and keep processing visas regardless of the situation in country. I'm not suggesting the military was more correct, but the two perspectives were not in line.

The JTF deployed the Early Entry Assistance Team (EEAT) to help speed the visa processing up, but really it had a lot of Marines for the Evacuation Control Center (ECC), gate protection, and air traffic control. At the time our [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), caught some shit for sending [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in to HKIA. He was there for 51 days, and they needed him for planning. BGen Sullivan was trying to get in as many people as he could, so he was willing to lie bit for the purpose. They used [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as the LNO even though that wasn't really his job.

Meanwhile, the MEU was figuring out what we needed. We knew there would be a huge IO need, so we pushed [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to [REDACTED] (b)(1.4a) to work with the CLB and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) on messaging and signage. We also pushed cyber to [REDACTED] (b)(1.4a) before they went to HKIA, they had [REDACTED] (b)(1.4c)

f. Question and Answer 5.

[REDACTED] (b)(1.4a, (b)(1.4c, (b)(1.4g)

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Around when are you tasked to deploy? What's your team and equipment set?

(2) Answer. I got there during the period of darkness (POD) from the 18th-19th of August. In the JTF scramble to get there, they realized they were missing a SOCCENT IO planner and an Information Warfare Task Force-Afghanistan (IWTF-A) IO representative. The MEU figured they could fix that problem by sending me, and sending [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He is a 0510 additional MOS, an intermediate level information operations planner. He was given to the MEU before RUT, and he is a great coordinator. He was an additional IO planner, and he is sent to [REDACTED] (b)(1.4a) to coordinate with the IWTF-A in [REDACTED] (b)(1.4a)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

(AUAB). We are filling all billets as best as possible. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already in Afghanistan and so are my 2 cyber guys, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Those 3 are in country. [redacted] (b)1.4c

[redacted] (b)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1.4a, (b)1.4g, (b)6

[redacted] (b)1.4c

[redacted] (b)1.4c but they are Military Information Support Operations (MISO) equipment that we use to broadcast messages across different frequencies. [redacted] (b)1.4c

[redacted] (b)1.4c

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Between you and your team, you can operate and employ all of these systems?

(2) Answer. Correct. [redacted] (b)1.4c, (b)6

[redacted] (b)1.4c, (b)6

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Marines didn't get out to Abbey Gate until the 19th, I understand?

(2) Answer. True, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had already been out there a good amount. Our focus of effort when there is on the ground messaging. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was technically my boss for IO, but we did everything together. We worked on force closure, employment of equipment, and closure of gates. Messaging crowds to stop throwing rocks at Marines for instance. We were getting messages translated and approved through IWTF-A. They would send us the recordings, and scripts back in English, Dari, and Pashto. We would load that on an MP3 and loop that. We might put a translator on a mic to do ad hoc messaging as necessary. That doesn't need approval from PSYOP authorities, because that is solely force protection at the discretion of the ground commander.

[redacted] (b)1.4c

[redacted] (b)1.4c I had 3 micro fractures in my fibula. The British held that tower for

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

a long time, and the Yorkshire Regiment, the blue patch boys would message from there. They were pretty loose with their messaging, but it was helpful to them. I went to get it back from them since it was out of batteries, and I fell down the ladder there.

On the 20th, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from IWTF-A arrived. Also, I forgot that I brought some [REDACTED] (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g, (b)6

So [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived on the 20th. Previously we had an [REDACTED] (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g

Everything we had was in play. Some Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles with speakers were in play and the German PSYOPs guys were messaging at North Gate. All capabilities available were being used.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the first Army PSYOP Soldier on the ground at that time?

(2) Answer. Yes, he is from 9th PSYOPs and is filling the billet at IWTF-A. The rest of my guys, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SSG Ryan Knauss, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in on the 21st. So I have 6 guys, which I break in to 2 teams of 3.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Who decided you would be in charge of the PSYOP guys?

(2) Answer. The MEU and the BLT started to take over the gates, and we knew the PSYOP Soldiers would be in support of the gates. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided that the guys would be TACON to me as they supported the gates. The only one that worked for me permanently was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The cyber guys end up being re-tasked because their systems weren't approved. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) became a watch officer at some point, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) became an NCO who did what needed to be done.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Alright, so there are 6 PSYOPers and yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, and also [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sometimes. I broke them into 2 teams of 3. I split up [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to spread the knowledge of the Marines out between the teams. The day team was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Ryan, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). They would work 9am to 9pm. The night team was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). On and off was a misnomer, the off team was focusing on gear maintenance, vehicle procurement, or getting random extraction phone calls. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

13 October 2021

recovered the family of a cultural advisor that carried some political attention. Off time was really was special projects time, sometimes they would provide other gates support at that time. They might go deliver cigarettes to Marines that hadn't slept, they would trade non-lethals between the gates, and they would provide tactical advice to commanders on ground. They were Special Operations Forces (SOF) who had deployed previously, so they had tactical, mundane, messaging knowledge that was helpful. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped them communicate that to the Marines.

A lot of time we were dealing with Afghans who had already been screened through the gates, so that was a different change for these guys who were tense coming in country. There is a picture of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that went viral of him in his soft cap speaking to a local leader inside the wire trying to keep things calm.

My guys are probably sleeping 2-3 hours a night. I would run 48 hours on, 6 hours off. That was untenable, so we eventually tried to rest more. The timeline had collapsed so rapidly that we did not have enough time. Abbey was supposed to be the ECC with a linear set of features from security, to medical, to COVID screening. It just couldn't be done with the time and crowd we had.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Alright, you are in direct support of the companies manning the gates, providing knowledge and equipment, and in your free time they are floaters who are providing assistance and guidance?

(2) Answer. Cross training the Marines on the PSYOP gear was critical. We would leave a system at a gate anytime we left, and we had to make sure there was a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) that knew how to use them so that the Marines could pull an interpreter and push messages to the crowd as necessary. We would have to do more cross training later as the Marines grew too comfortable and started using them too carelessly. That was at North Gate, East Gate, Abbey Gate, and the comfort area that the guys would rotate through. When the guys would come in they would check with the (b)(6) and they would go to any hotspots he identified as a 3 man team. They would take out officers like the (b)(6) (b)(6), (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would push out with them as well. I spent 50% of my time working translations, approvals, and CONOPs and the other IO work I was doing. I would try to go out with my day and night team each once a day and keep a feel for the commanders.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. How did your priorities change based on the threat or Department of State messaging?

(2) Answer. Our messaging had to be in line with State messaging. When I would get new translations, I would run them through State. There were only a couple times

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

13 October 2021

where they vetoed our message. The difficulty was that they didn't want things to seem final. When we closed North Gate on the 23rd or 24th, we were not permitted to say the gate was closed, we had to say this gate is temporarily closed, please go away. That wouldn't convince this massive crowd to go away. They were willing to wait it out. That was something we had to deal with. In regard to the threats, because we were in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), we had the freshest information. We would pass that greater information around to the gates in higher detail.

We told them about the gold convertible Corolla that our snipers shot the tire out of at North Gate. Threat streams didn't change our operation, but it would change the posture of the guys at the gates. We would adjust our message based off that, and tell the crowd to disperse due to threat etc.

We had a message playing stating the only three documents that were acceptable to get in. There was an [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c report that we reduced the crowd by 70% at one point, but there was a backfill that if that crowd left the people further back who had been waiting would rush in and fill the gaps.

The PSYOP guys that showed up were authorized to use tactical questioning (TQ). They were able to do that to wall jumpers to find out why they did that and if anyone directed them to do so.

Our priorities did not change with the tactical threat stream. The priority was to support the ground commander, the message affected their posture. Gate closures were confusing. Marine Lance Corporals are not qualified to say if identification is valid, but there was one day that State said anyone with a photo ID was good to come in. At one point that led to 50k to 60k in the wire. That lasted for one day. Then we had to kick people out, so priorities shifted to internal support of riot control, riot prevention, and crowd subduing as the crowds inside were also large and frustrated.

The comfort area had a 6 hour long, rock throwing riot. Our [REDACTED] (b)(6) was leading a counter charge against a riot at the terminal. He was punched in the face at one point. The people had been waiting for days and were frustrated. We had to message to try to combat that issue. I estimated that my guys prevented 6 riots and helped to put down 2 more. It was an important job.

Tempers flared for a while, even with Marines so we had to talk to the Marines to calm them down. Same with the Brits, we had to use the British LNO in the JOC. Their dudes would get hot too and get a little rough with the crowds.

#### o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Okay, so on the evening of the 25th into the morning of the 26th Echo had pushed all the way passed the bridge. When Golf gets on deck, they collapse that back down to the jersey barrier due to the threat stream and the manning, correct?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

, 13 October 2021

(2) Answer. Yep, and admittedly the Taliban weren't our enemy but there was a house down that foot bridge, the crack house, that had about 15 Taliban and they would come out and point rifles at Marines anytime the crowd got rowdy. That was just not something you wanted to deal with, especially that far way. And again, if a bomb had gone off, that was very far away to egress.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. When were you out there?

(2) Answer. I was there by midmorning of the 26th. I had planned to go out with the gate team, but they left without me. I went with the Antiterrorism and Force Protection (ATFP) team to Abbey Gate. The (b)1.4a, (b) was messaging that the gate was temporarily closed and that only people with the 3 valid forms of identification, the passports, green cards, or U.S. Visas, were the only acceptable ID.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Were you tracking the threat stream? Had you heard that Abbey Gate was the highest threat?

(2) Answer. Yes. I put myself there since I thought it would be the highest point of friction and I wanted to disperse that crowd. I worked the positioning of the (b)1.4a, (b) and tried to observe the crowd on both sides of the wadi to see if there were any suspicious individuals. My day team probably got there at about noon, and my team joined me up on the HESCO to observe the crowd. Ryan was the best at it, he would spot the suspicious guys right away and call it up to 2-1 and the snipers on the radio. He could find them instantly and give a great description.

The rest of my guys are pushing messaging and trying to disperse the crowd due to the threat stream. We told them the threat was high and we tried to reject people due to poor documents and tell the crowd what documents we were rejecting. We would get people to leave, but they were always backfilled by the crowd further back.

After about 4 hours we were going to leave, I went to tell (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that because I wasn't having an effect. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me they were having a massive issue at the jersey barrier where people were being crushed to death. We had dealt with that previously by putting the vehicle up against the fence line with the (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g messaging that, "you are hurting women and children, please stop," loud enough to hurt their ears and try to back them off.

We put the truck by the gate, half in and half out of the lane in case the British came through. We started playing some messaging, but we needed an interpreter. I went and grabbed a guy who had already been pulled into the area between the outer and inner gates with his family. He was nervous to leave his family, but I told him I'd have him back in 10 minutes. (b)(3)130b, (b) was in the driver seat of the vehicle, Ryan was scanning the



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

crowd, and the interpreter and I are standing right next to the vehicle on the passenger side as he pushes the messaging. The interpreter was getting into it, he's pleading with the crowd to stop because he sees what is going on. I had told him that I would get him back to his family in ten minutes, but at the end of that he is crying because he could not get the crowd to stop. I start walking him back to his family like I promised, and that is when the bomb goes off at about 1730ish.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Where was everyone at the time?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the driver's seat. Ryan and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were both behind the vehicle, talking. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was standing outside and speaking to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the interpreter are at the vehicles 11 o'clock moving back toward the gate. The bomb goes off. I didn't see the interpreter again after that, I don't know what happened to him. I think I was in between him and the blast, I fly front left and break the grip on my rifle. I checked myself and didn't find any wounds. I was fine.

My first thought was about where my guys are. I couldn't find [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), but I saw Ryan laying on the ground on the driver's side. We are behind the vehicles, and I hear gunfire from the chevron direction. I can't tell where the rounds were from or where they were going. I was trying to decide to either treat Ryan there or drag him back, since I didn't know where the threat was. I dragged Ryan in behind the gate wall and screamed for a corpsman until one showed up. I stripped his plates off, I swept him, and I didn't find anything. He was in and out of consciousness, and he was still breathing but it was labored. His tongue was swelling up, the corpsman and I try to fish it out. A truck came screeching up. At this point 2/1 was flooding the zone, and casualties are being dragged back to the casualty collection point (CCP). We lifted Ryan on to the back of the truck and I got in the truck with him. I hopped out to make room for another casualty and to look for my guys. As soon as I got out I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helping some Marines, so I knew he was fine. I went to the truck to look for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and at that point [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran in to look for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in, screaming and looking for Sgt Gee. I realized that the truck was in the way of the British, so I put the truck in neutral and some of us Marines pushed the truck back into a wall.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. You didn't try to turn the truck on?

(2) Answer. I didn't even try. It was a white SUV and I didn't have the right screwdriver to turn it on. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g and the seats had been ripped out to make room for more equipment.

The vehicle actually was essential in the EOD report, they knew exactly where the vehicle was at the time of the blast and they could tell by the angle of fragmentation in the vehicle where the blast came from.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

After I moved the vehicle out of the way, I told a fire team to orient at a nearby tower, and I realize that I am not being helpful. I went to keep looking for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) someone passed off a female teenager to me that I walked back to the CCP. 2/1 had a full security posture, and the gunfire stopped a while ago.

I know where Ryan and his weapon were since I put them on a truck, and I had seen [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I went back to look for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) again, and that's when I saw Sgt Gee. She was already dead, she had a ball bearing right through her forehead. She was one of the few casualties that I could recognize. I knew her from an investigation I did on her unit before we left, and then from our PSYOPs guys interacting with her some times.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did your teams work with the Female Search Teams (FSTs) a good amount?

(2) Answer. Yes, we would pull them if we needed them specifically for handling.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Was she outside of the fence line?

(2) Answer. I saw her outside the fence before the blast went off, then I saw her again on a stretcher coming through the hole in the fence on a litter. She was clearly gone.

After I got that female back, I told the corpsman the female with me was shell shocked and had no injuries. I felt useless at this point, I still couldn't find my dudes. Then I heard my name. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are in an 82nd Airborne ambulance, they got yanked by them since they were also Soldiers. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) had a tourniquet on his arm, and a bandage on his hip. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) was sitting across from him, he had holes in his cheek and blood was pouring down his face. The driver saw me and asked if they should grab more guys, I told them to roll. En route we heard that the Role II was packed and since both of our guys were stable we went to the 82nd's Role 1 at Camp Alvarado for treatment.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) couldn't see out of his right eye, and they were watching [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, [REDACTED] (b)(6) because his arm was initially arterial bleeding. We get to the Role 1 and they started treating. I was waiting outside, and I wanted to find out what happened to Ryan and I knew that I should get back to North HKIA because our leadership knew I was at the gate. I bum a ride from some Captains, and gave my report back in the JOC. I briefed that my guys are accounted for. I may have been the first eye witness back in the JOC.

It was either me or [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the type of guy you can't pull from a problem, he had been there for hours trying to help people while I was trying to find my guys. The Colonel pulled me aside and asked what happened. To me it sound like a complex

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

improvised explosive device (IED) initiated ambush, but I don't know who was shooting at who. I saw Marines from 2/1 firing, but I didn't see anyone to fire at. They were firing toward the chevron and the Barron, down that avenue of approach. My hearing was messed with, but it was generally that direction.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. How long do you think those guys were shooting?

(2) Answer. When I saw Gee on the stretcher, is when I noticed that the gunfire had stopped. It may have been before then, but that is when I realized.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What did you do when you went back to the JOC?

(2) Answer. I made my report then I went back to the 3/5. I asked [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b to grab the night team. She ran out the door to get them, but she couldn't find them initially. They were out doing something. I tried to go to the Role II, but officers kept stopping me from going over there.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Why?

(2) Answer. Part of it was they wanted to talk to me, part of it was that I wasn't in a great state, and part of it was they knew Ryan was being worked on. Eventually the night team showed up, and we tried to go to the Role II. They didn't let us in. At this time, the Colonel tells me that we had to go to the ECC to get checked for a concussion. I was cleared, and we went back to the office.

We got permission to put [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the Role II with Ryan. We were able to get in touch with the 82nd, and got [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) transferred over to our Role II to get our guys in one spot. We started to get the casualty reports, and the rules of engagement (ROE) changed all over HKIA. Lethal force was authorized on HKIA for anyone who jumped the fence with a backpack or bag. We prepped those messages, I don't know if they were pushed from on high. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1 had been set up by Ryan, and he was the only one who knew how to use it. We had jerry rigged that one to work with SIM cards from Afghans who were getting on planes. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stuff was over with the 82nd now. We had our cellphones in the JOC, I popped out and sent my mom and wife a text message saying that I was fine. I had my guys do the same.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back from the Role II in a hospital shirt and his boxers. He was loopy on meds and told them he was leaving. He wanted to get back to work. We told him to sit down and let us find him some pants. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6) 13 October 2021

(b)(6) His vision is fine now (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was treated, (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) so he got sent on a flight to Germany that night.

My night team went to go recover their stuff that night, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) found Ryan's plate carrier and some of his kit. They saw the vehicle against the wall, and they were able to turn it on. The (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d absorbed most of the fragmentation and protected the radiator. They drove it back to the JOC, that pissed EOD off but it was fine because they could still see the tracks from where it was.

After that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in at 2300. He had updated us at 2130 that Ryan was in surgery. At 2300 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us Ryan had passed. He told me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) so we went and told the guys in the parking lot. After that, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) flight out was at 0300 on the 27th.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Alright so at 1200 on the 27th, there was the dignified transfer, did you attend?

(2) Answer. Yes I was one of the pall bearers. Our whole team acted as pall bearers for him, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went with him on the flight.

After that, it was getting our shit together. Later on that morning, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) caught Army and (b)(1)1.4d soldiers stealing (b)(1)1.4a from their rooms which made us late to the dignified transfer. After, we provided a list of stolen equipment to the British and the 23rd Military Police. After that, we just focused on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d and handing off our gear to the 82nd to use. They wanted the gear, but not any of our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d and packed them out. We consolidated the critical components of that from 11 pelican cases to one. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d We continued using the speakers at the gates to push the message that the gates were temporarily closed, even though it was permanent. The 82nd wanted the speaker sets (b)(1)1.4a We showed them how to use them.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went with me and the MEU to (b)(1)1.4a We got the final report that an IWTF-A (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) completed the final destruction of gear in country, because the 82nd didn't do it.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. When did you fly out?

(2) Answer. On the 28th or the 29th, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I are in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the Honor flight and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is getting treated in Landstuhl. Our aircraft, which had about 250 people on board, landed at the wrong airfield. We texted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he told us he was on an (b)(1)1.4a We thought it was

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), 13 October 2021

elsewhere, but then we found out that we needed to line a route for the dignified transfer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hopped out and we get to see him and Ryan again, and say goodbye. After that we went to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and decompressed there.

To be clear, I want to go back to the closure of the gates. On the 26th, Abbey Gate was technically closed. We had access to the canal, and we were pulling from there to a limited extent. We were only at that gate in order to avoid ceding that territory to the crowds in order to let the British through. The final closure of the gate wasn't until the British came through some time that night.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. In your mind, we are only outside of the outer gate in order to let the Brits through?

(2) Answer. Yes, my understanding is we were just waiting for the British convoy that was supposed to come through at 1600 and then the outer gate would be permanently closed. After that, there would be no way to pull anyone out. It would have been like North Gate, where I could see some people that I wanted to pull, but I couldn't because opening the gate would have caused a riot. To answer the question, our role in the final closure of the gate was just our [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a telling the crowds to stay away.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Anything you want us to know?

(2) Answer. Tactically, I think I would be in a worse position mentally if I had made a tactical error. Those SOF guys were under me, I didn't order them because they knew how to execute. They were there because of me. The Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) that my guys ran when they left a gate was to check in with the ground commander there. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me later that if I hadn't checked in with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) before we left, he would have done it and the result would have been the same.

In the 4 hours that we were at the gate, Ryan probably spotted and communicated 7-13 bombers to the sniper tower who kept an eye on them. Everyone had bags because they were trying to leave. Was that area the best defensive position? No, but it wasn't bad. There was some cover and there was security. I think we had the vehicle in the right place, and my guys were using the jersey barriers and the vehicle as cover. We had all of our protective equipment on, and every one of my guys and the guys on the line were scanning the crowd, which was hard to see through. If I had made a tactical error, I would be in a worse mental place than I am, but I think we weren't over extended and we had the right gear on.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) 13 October 2021

(1) Question. Can we get your contact information and are there other people we need to speak to?

(2) Answer. My cell is [redacted] (b)(6) and my email is [redacted] (b)(6)

Talk to [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is over there as well, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) weren't there for this but they are a bit older than [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may also be good to speak to.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 106

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis (US Army) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (US Army) recorded the interview for transcription below. For the purpose of annotation of who is speaking, the following queues will indicate the speaker:

Brigadier General Curtis – BG

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(6) – What's your background

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I've been with Recon for a long time. I'm at 15 years in and have been with 31st MEU twice, did 13th MEU twice. I've been with 2nd Recon since 2017. I've been the (b)(6) since Jan 2019.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview, [REDACTED]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(b)(6) – I've been with Recon since 2019. I was a 1371 in 7th ESB originally. I deployed in 2017. I was on the 15th MEU.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was your duty Position in the MEU?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We went in as a platoon plus. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were also with us. We had 20 Marines and we ended up on 3rd line defense originally when we were put there by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took us from the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and Tactical Control (TACON)'d us to the MEU. We were running special recovery missions all over the base.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was your force structure?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I ran it in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and my team leaders were out on the line and running missions. The platoon was roughly 22 personnel. There were three teams of 6 plus some comms and medical personnel. The attached trailer element is a security element in addition which we had with us, essentially doubling our numbers.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What was your mission and effort?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – Special Operations Forces (SOF) was running their own stuff and we were picking up their leftovers and we would every once in a while catch some other high profile stuff. We were assigned to a lot of different missions and we would end up pulling individuals out as well. We were working to identify targets and known people from within the crowd and we would specifically identify them and go get them in personnel recovery. We were consistently active. So we were never activated. We were getting tasked from the [REDACTED] (b)(6) the MEU, phone calls, the white house, people everywhere. We were the right people at the right time.

(b)(6) – Also we dealt with a woman in Kabul while outside the gate, and she had a US Senator on the phone. I asked her to Facetime us and it was in fact a US Senator from their office. I don't remember who it was specifically.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(6) – Did your team feel the comms and coordination struggles?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – None of the JOCs were linked and there were at least 5-6 operations centers which were not linked. Army, Marines, Department of State (DoS),



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

Navy, Air Force, comms, none of it. No unity of command, nobody had the ball at all times and we didn't know who was in charge from minute to minute and the tasking was constantly prioritized and re-prioritized. Rank gets things done usually but when the civilians get involved and all the non-uniformed military and all the people calling and getting involved, things got crazy even among the military.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at HKIA and atmospheric?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I left on the ADVON but he made it in before me.

(b)(6) - 15 August we left (b)(1)1.4a We saw all the craziness going on at the airfield through watching it on CNN in (b)(1)1.4a In flight we had no idea what to expect. 5 min out we were prepared to fight our way in. When we landed and realized it was coordinated and organized we just started working on getting set up. We met up with another Marine on ground and they got us set up with living space in the basketball court.

(b)(6) - I left the day prior and we flew and got routed through (b)(1)1.4a The C17 that had the bodies on it from the 15th was parked next to ours. I ended up sitting on an airfield in (b)(1)1.4a I was with 16 trailers then. We arrived in the morning and next Period of Darkness (PoD) we took off and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had already left. The other element became our Advanced Party (ADVON). We were on ground quickly and we had a space. It wasn't ideal because it was without cover. Once (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved us off the 3rd line of defense we ended up being his special recovery team. We moved to elevated positions and could see the civilian air terminal. We manned it 24 hours per day and we did that 16-18 August. We got a sniper mounted and set up to be able to observe the terminal and provide overwatch to the entire apron area. Started moving our guys back and off the Apron. We officially started recovery operations on the 19th.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. BG - When did we get in the business of targeted extraction?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We got taken from BLT 1/8 on the 19th. Our initial requirement was to get them from the terminal to the (we started working with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Simultaneously we were working Platoon Security Detachment (PSD) ops for MGen Sullivan. The SOF lead was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We worked with him a lot too. We were really getting tied in indirectly before we became part of the direct effort. From working with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) our name and numbers started getting passed out and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would pass directly to me in order to get us out to get guys. We were checking papers and then pass off for the coordination to our team leads. We would get them from specific locations out in Kabul and we would basically exploit other business and use those to leverage access.

i. Question and Answer 8.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question. BG – Where was most of the activity by gate? Which gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We would get names and then we would coordinate a location and work with them to get to a point where we could grab them. After working with the liaison teams. Normally we would try to avoid North gate because there were so many people originally. One of the things we did with the SOF Liaison. We went out and got them originally but that would make the crowd mad because they'd see us grabbing people. We identified the rat maze we could work to try to get people in other ways. The "Black Gate", I think it was the Army or Aussies who controlled it, we had some great success there. We used this method for a minute but it drew attention. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran his operation there.

(b)(6) Brits owned the gate but Army operated it. This would have been the 18th or 19th. NSW shut us down a lot because they didn't have coordination with our folks.

(b)(6) I had connections with them and SEAL Team Six, but they didn't like us using their access point. One of the guys with DoS that we worked with at Santa Cruz gate didn't talk to the other DoS guys at other gates and even though we tried to work with them it didn't work out to get people in that way. The north west gate, that was the National Security Unit (NSU) gate, that gate denied access to people unless an American came up there and pointed out specific people to them, at that time and we weren't allowed to go out past the Blue ring (points on map). Our authorities only extended us to the immediate protection of the walls of HKIA. With the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) we could get out there. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was one I worked with for over 9 days to get him inside. To answer your question, we bounced around a lot. There was a spot at the East gate we could pluck people but that caused problems too. The Canal was flooded by the 26th. The French, Germans, and everyone else started using the canal as an access point at Abbey because it was a means to get out there and interface.

(b)(6) – We didn't want to burn our locations and access. We moved around to keep from burning out our contacts and access so we would spread as much as possible to keep from utilizing any one point or location. It caused problems a lot so we had to be careful about leveraging one location.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. What did you do on the 25th?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We had planned ops at the black gate. We had 2 interpreters and support people (b)(6) that would work with us. They people outside the gate were listening and they would behave and it was going great. Our operations were halted, as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) put it, "your op is on pause". His op was taking over that location, and he had not coordinated the gate or times. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ended up taking that location and he ended up taking some of our guys and our females for his search team.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(b)(6) – The first night – once word got out the gate would get swarmed and it became a focal point because every time they would work it other people would identify that and redirect their people there. For that evening it was the first 'Be on the look out' (Bolo) we got. It was a tan Hilux. Because that was so bland and broad we would have to get out there and get out of the traffic as soon as possible.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Talk about the 26th before the blast.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – After the night of the 25th we got shut down at Black gate and we had to re-route people to Abbey. We had lists of 500-1000 people at any given time. The most I ever got was one group with 29 people and it was him and his wife and their kids and their kids. I personally pulled them through on the 26th that day by direction of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was SIV approved and there was a green card in the group. Coming from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he said they were approved. It was between 1400 -1600 on the 26th. Also, it took a while to get him because he was in the crowd and his family was back off the crowd so they had to work forward to get to us.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Photos – Do you have them?

(2) Answer. Both - Yes

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. In the photos you have, did you capture the guy with the ball cap?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I've got it. I saw the man in the hat in the crowd. I walked down there and the guy with the hat was down to the South of the bombing site. I looked at him and he looked at me. After the explosion one of the Marines from 2/1 said he saw the guy on the water tower filming. Some of the guys were using their phones as challenge and pass codes. We set up all kinds of pro words and similar challenge and pass stuff. Initially he started at the site that would later be the blast site. I told my guys about it. I saw him further down towards the chevron. After the blast I saw him at the bridge.

(b)(6) – He was across the canal, he was standing and observing. He was across the wadi. He was back by the bridge and watching back towards the tower. He was standing up over the wall and we could see from his shoulders and above. He had on a blue t-shirt. Almost European dressed. We shot above his head after and he ducked and ran, but he was almost not at all effected by the blast and it was odd how calm he was even in the aftermath of the blast.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview, [REDACTED]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] 12 October 2021

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Blast occurs, what actions did you take?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]— I was on the wall outside the gate facing South. We were trying to pull out a guy. He was about 5 feet back from the entrance to the tower on the opposite wall. I was out about 18 meters off the blast when it went off. The closest person to me would've been one of the 2/1 Marines. Maybe 6-7 meters from me off to my left. I saw it with my left eye and felt the pressure and initially thought it was a flash bang. I watched it turn to chaos. I lost hearing momentarily. It turned into me yelling at my guys. Time was 1606. [REDACTED] were all out there with me. The Blast went off and everyone was yelling and screaming and a ton of CS gas was flooding the area. I knew what it was immediately. We could see the CS cloud billowing up and we heard gunshots and they sounded like they were from my right (chevron direction). My guys bounded up to me. I could feel snaps when I was running up to the concrete barriers. I didn't see any impacts but it was hip to head high and it felt like it was coming from the chevron area. By the time we made it back to the gap in the fence I couldn't see where it was coming from.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you remember gun fire immediately following the blast?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]— I could not see an impact but I am certain about the rounds and hearing gunfire. I was oriented towards the threat, and I am certain of that. Due to the CS gas I couldn't really focus super well, but I know I heard and felt the snaps and cracks of rounds all around me. The wounds from the individuals was cauterized because of the blast. It was the civilians and the Marines who had blood pooled in a way that it looked like the puncture was different. The wounds I saw which looked like gunshots were also protected from the blast area. The people who sustained wounds below the wall would have been protected by the wall. The parking lot would fill up and be full at night. We had been told earlier in the day about guys with S-vests. Because of that we were making sure anyone with bags wasn't getting through up to the gate.

[REDACTED]— So unless the blast occurred from an elevated position such as a held up backpack the blast couldn't have caused lower extremity injures. In terms of the guys on the crack house area, though, I saw the guys peeking through the fence. I could see through the screen at the fence and the gaps in the screen and it was often we'd see guys come up to the wall and fence and peek until we would look. I could hear the snaps and cracks inside the corridor as I made my way to the exterior gate entrance. We saw the ball cap guy in the vicinity of the bridge. We saw the guy and he was overlooking the blast area. We shot directly next to him. [REDACTED] shot two unsuppressed hammered pairs right next to him and then the guy bounced out. My gut says he was watching our response. It felt like we were being surveyed in our reactions. We never went back to find out.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Back to the fire which you heard, not the ones you fired.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) 4-5 round bursts in multiple bursts. Maybe 15 seconds of shooting with the associated cracks and pops around us which is what queued me into the rounds being incoming fire.

(b)(6) – Sounded like an AK to me and it was distinctive. It sounded very clear to me that it was maybe 30 seconds total of sporadic fire. After we shot at the guy with the hat on a couple of the 2/1 guys threw CS grenades over the wall too. We did observe the Brits in the tower, but they weren't shooting and their weapons were oriented down outside the exterior gate.

(b)(6) – once the smoke cleared all the gunshots were already finished. The wind was blowing to the west that day so it also would've been worse from the CS down by the gap in the fence.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What else haven't we talked about that you think is important?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – When we showed up out there that day on the 26th we knew that the North gate was the last gate open prior to Abbey being the final. The PSYOP folks were telling the crowds at the gate that there was a imminent threat and that their paperwork should look like this or that. They were saying the message in multiple languages. Also because of the position of the walls there's no way that the injuries to the lower extremities.

(b)(6) – The blast was on the same side of the canal as we were. It occurred directly in front of the sniper tower I ran up to the wall and the plume appeared to be right up against the tower. The bodies were splayed out from the blast sight right up against the wall and the sniper tower. It looked to me like the preponderance of bodies were right up against the wall near the sniper tower side. The orientation of the bodies were not against the wall. There were bodies in the wadi that appeared to have died from overpressure related injuries, not from frag or projectiles.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. BC – Did you hear other Marines return fire?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I didn't see any Marines return fire during that time, there didn't appear to be clear areas or targets to engage. From the smoke, debris and CS gas, it was not easy to identify any viable targets. I saw and heard Marines fire warning shots. 2/1 kept telling us the Brits were constantly firing warning shots which was detrimental to crowd control. My initial actions following the blast were to run to my guys who I knew

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

were in the blast area. Once I had them accounted for, we looked for targets to prosecute. When there appeared to be no one to engage, we ran back in and try to work casualty assistance and work on the movement of Marines.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) phone number – (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS  
BG, US Army  
Investigating Officer



ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered together. It is annotated accordingly when they answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your MOS?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(6) 3531 Motor Transport Operator

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 0621 Radio Operator

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Is CLB 24 your first unit?

(2) Answer: Yes

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: I understand that the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) had built the female search team by pulling female members from various units to function similarly

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

to the Female Engagement Teams (FET) of the past. At which point do you get pulled in for this?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] We began training for this while on the ship. They kept calling us FET, but we never trained as an engagement team, just as a search team.

[REDACTED] We began training on actual searches once we arrived to Kuwait, the third week of July.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When did they consolidate all of the females for this function?

(2) Answer: While we were in [REDACTED] Once we were pulled together we split in to different teams. One team was Landing Support (LS). They handled most of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) tracking systems (NTS). We all trained on the NTS.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Did you anticipate that you would be in the Evacuation Control Center (ECC) at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: We were told that all of the CLB would be in one location. We didn't know anything about the gates. We practiced setting things up a different way than what actually occurred. The plan seemed to change when we landed.

[REDACTED] I was told that I would still be doing some communications operations.

Once in [REDACTED] we were told that all females would be on the female search team. There were about ten to twelve females in each team. There were three teams. Each team would pull eight-hour shifts.

We trained with the Air Force Security Forces to learn about basic searching and how to use batons and metal-detectors. We also completed realistic night training and pulled our shifts and practiced searching the Air Force personnel. We did this three or four times during our training events.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Did this training seem sufficient in [REDACTED]

(2) Answer: HKIA was chaotic and it seems like our training wasn't actual training compared to what we saw.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you find out that you were going to Afghanistan for NEO.

(2) Answer: At first, we were put on a 36-hour stand-by. Then it changed to 24 hours, and then we were told that we were going. It was around the first week of August when we knew we were going for sure.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When did you land at HKIA?

(2) Answer: It's hard to remember the actual dates because they all meshed together. We flew in with the CLB. We flew in before the commander. We were the first team to arrive and we set up the NTS kits. The rest of the CLB was supposed to fly in the next day, but then the airfield was rushed by civilians and their flights kept getting pushed back.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: The airfield security breach was on the 15th and 16th of August, so you arrived before that?

(2) Answer: We arrived to HKIA the night before that, so the 14th. We unloaded all of our gear and equipment, went to get some sleep, but then got woken up right away because we had to go help with the rush of people.

After this was handled on the airfield, we moved in to the building and moved our kits upstairs.

The other team arrived three or four days later.

Around two days later, we were working on the NTS kits at the passenger (PAX) terminal. We got pulled every once and awhile to search females. They were all from the embassies and were wearing Flak vests. They were orderly. They opened the North Gate shortly after, around the 17th, and we all went out there to conduct searches. We didn't sleep for the first three days.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: How many of you went out to the North Gate? What did you do?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

(2) Answer: We had teams of two. One would be up toward the front to do a quick search of the personnel and then they would go through the gate to the next team member to do a thorough search.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: How long were you out at North Gate?

(2) Answer: The shifts were about 8-12 hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Were you strictly out there to search and interact with females and children?

(2) Answer: Yes. We only searched women and children under 13 years old.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Were the women cooperative?

(2) Answer: For the most part they were. They were scared. They didn't speak English and we didn't have an interpreter.

There were interpreters at the East Gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Were you ever given an actual mission at the gates?

(2) Answer: We didn't know what we would be doing at the gates when we first got there. We didn't even know the gates were open at this point. We learned we would be conducting searches from the other females on our teams that we relieved when we got to the gates.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: As your unit and other units arrive, how long did it take to build out the female search teams? Did you get additional team members from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c had their own teams out at the gates. We didn't know anything about what they were doing. It wasn't a combined or joint team.

q. Question and Answer 16.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

(1) Question: I was under the impression that Sgt Rosario was pulled in to be a part of your team. This isn't true?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No. The first time that I saw her was after the blast when she was a casualty. I saw them cutting pants off of female legs and that was the first time that I saw her.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: When did your team get built up to about 35 personnel?

(2) Answer: The teams sort of split up. When we first arrived, the CLB barracks were in one location but we quickly ran out of room and people had sleeping areas other places. We ended up having the teams consist of the people that lived together. We only interacted with the other teams when we relieved them.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: In your time at HKIA, how often were you at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: We were only out there for the last week and a half. We were mostly at East and North Gate. The Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) people were the ones at Abbey Gate. They requested more females and shifts to support searching. We relieved the SPMAGTF team on the 26th.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Prior to the 26th, describe the atmosphere at Abbey Gate and the job that you conducted there.

(2) Answer: We were asked to search females at Abbey Gate. The female search team location was located behind the outer gate, across from the sniper tower. We had cammie netting set up where we would conduct the searches. We took turns in groups of two to be by the canal to check peoples' documentation and escort females to the search area.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: How many people did you have on your team at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: We had four on our team and three or four from the SPMAGTF. This was how it was the first few times we were out there.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

We were often requested to go outside the gate to search a baby or woman. We would go out there in buddy teams every time. Eventually, we were requested to have permanent shifts out there.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Were you responsible for identifying people in the crowd?

(2) Answer: Yes. We were told to look for special colored flags or people that would say a special phrase to us.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Was it your job to escort women and children that needed to be searched to the search area?

(2) Answer: No, any Marine could escort them to the search area. However, males couldn't touch them, so when we had to escort them out due to improper credentials, we would get called over to help.

A lot of women would fake fainting or actually faint and we would have to drape their arm around us and/or carry their children.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: Describe the area by the canal.

(2) Answer: It was very smelly. We called it 'Schitt's Creek.' Our gloves would turn yellow because they would pee on themselves. It was very unsanitary. People would spit on us and call us names. Some people that didn't have the proper paperwork would call us names and yell at us.

We would direct people from other countries to where their coalition forces were located for them to go to for processing. They would call us bad names as if we weren't trying to help them, but we weren't able to process their paperwork.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Was it mostly men or women doing this?

(2) Answer: It was mostly men. However, some women got very upset with us when we were trying to help them with their children. Some women left their children behind.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

(b)(6) One woman I was helping wouldn't let me help with her baby and she instead dropped it in the canal. No one helped to get it out and it stayed there and died.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Did you feel a lot of pressure to get as many people out as possible, either from your chain of command or personally because you had to look these people in the eye while they were asking for help?

(2) Answer: We didn't feel pressure from the units or chain of command. We wanted to help as many people as we could. Our chain of command would always tell us to take a breath and take breaks as we needed.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: How often did the required documents needed to get through the gate change?

(2) Answer: All of the time. When we were on an 8-hour break, we would hear the changes in the paperwork more often than while we were at the gate. When you're working at the gate, we would find people with the documents that we were told were required, bring them in, conduct the searches, and then bring them to the Department of State (DoS) and they would get turned away. Sometimes at East Gate, when this would happen, we would just have the personnel wait to the side until the document requirement changed again and the DoS would accept them. They changed the requirements so often and it was hard to escort people back out.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Do you think this slowed down the process?

(2) Answer: By the time we opened Abbey Gate and began looking for Special Interest Visas (SIVs), a lot of the people didn't have recent paperwork. The people that had recent paperwork or had American family members made it to North Gate before we closed because they had constant contact with people telling them where to go. North Gate mostly saw American Citizens (AMCITs), students, and people that had been in contact and knew where to go to get processed.

East Gate mostly saw interpreter families that had contacts at East Gate that were helping them get out.

Abbey Gate was where people went when they thought they maybe could get through as a last-ditch effort. The threat level felt very high at Abbey Gate. There was less security here and we were out there with the people.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Were you receiving threat streams leading up to the 26th? What information did you receive?

(2) Answer: We heard Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threats every time we went to begin a shift. We were given some non-lethal measures, like batons and spray, during this time. The 26th was the only day that we were told that we wouldn't be going up to the gate due to the threat.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: What threats did you receive on the 26th? What was different?

(2) Answer: We relieved a team at Abbey Gate at about 1200 on the 26th and they told us that there were three IED threats. We didn't pay too much attention to it because we always had these threats. This was the last shift being pulled by the SPMAGTF.

(b)(6) Me, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee were the females on the team on duty. We were told by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that we wouldn't be at the front by the canal anymore. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was only out there with us for a few minutes because she was puking and sick and went back to rest. She made it clear that we wouldn't be out by the jersey barrier by the canal. About an hour or two after she left, we had a SgtMaj and Lt request us up by the canal. We told them we couldn't go up there. They discussed it and eventually had two of us go up to their location. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee were the females that went up there. They were there for about an hour and then came back to the search area. We got called up again and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I went out. We were there at about 1500 or 1600.

The crowd seemed more hectic. There weren't any more coalition forces out there anymore, just the Marines and Army. The canal seemed emptier because they were pushing people back.

We were only out there for about an hour but were told we weren't taking people in anymore. We went back to the search area. We were just sitting out there waiting and then we got called out again. Gee and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went out this time. About five minutes after they went out there the blast went off. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were sitting right inside the outer gate when it went off.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

(1) Question: What happened after the blast?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I was sitting, sort of facing away from the blast. There was an explosion and I saw smoke and papers flying. It was very hectic and people were running around. I looked at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and saw she was ok. I was waiting on Gee and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to come through the gate and never saw them. They weren't coming out so I knew I had to go out there and find them. I lost (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and was running around looking for Gee and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was yelling for them. I went through the fence and found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) next to the canal near the jersey barrier. She told me not to look down at the body near her. I looked anyway and saw Sgt Gee on the ground. People were running around everywhere. I was trying to pick Sgt Gee up. With everything I had on, and my rifle, I was struggling.

I thought about (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sgt Gee was already dead when we found her. We left her to go find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I saw people cutting into the fence to get someone through. I couldn't see who it was. I kept looking and looking. There were corpsmen everywhere. I went back inside the gate near the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). I saw female legs and ran over. They were cutting up Sgt Rosario's pants. I didn't recognize her. I turned around and saw some corpsmen carrying a body and recognized a black belt that I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wore. I went up to her and she asked me what the fuck just happened. I

[REDACTED] (b)(6)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6) Someone said something about Gee. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be right back and went to check it out. I was told to check Gee's pulse even though I knew she had passed. I kept looking for a pulse anyway. When I left to go back to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) she had been taken away. I think the Reconnaissance (Recon) guys were the ones that carried her away.

Someone put a blanket over Gee. I found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we posted security, moved, and pulled security again. A GySgt found us and asked who we were reporting to. I told them (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The GySgt then told us to get in a vehicle to go back to the Joint Operations Center (JOC).

(b)(6) I was sitting when it went off. I jumped up. I didn't know if it was an IED or a flash-bang. It wasn't much louder than a flash-bang. It sounded like someone dropped one close by. We were getting pushed back by the gate. I kept yelling at the SPMAGTF to let us go get our girls back. I ran up to the truck and talked to some Sgt and asked to go in. I lost (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and decided to go through the gate by myself. I went in and saw a lot of Marines shooting by the jersey barrier. There was a lot of smoke. I couldn't see where they were firing. They grabbed me and I started firing my weapon as well. I don't know what I was firing at. Some other Marines started grabbing casualties. I was looking for the woodland cammies that we were wearing in order to find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or Gee.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

I saw a boot that looked like Gee's and I ran over and found that it was her. I took off her flak and started checking her. At first, I thought she was just knocked out or had burst her lung. Another corpsman came up to Sgt Gee. I was looking for her pulse and couldn't find one. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and tried to block her view of Gee. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started trying to pull Sgt Gee up and then realized that she had passed.

I knew that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may still be alive so I went to start looking for her. I was screaming [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) name and was running around looking for her. I asked some of the Marines that were pulling security if they had seen anyone in the same cammies as me. They said no. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I kept running around looking for her. I saw a male corpsman that had a leg injury and he was yelling and screaming. I grabbed someone else's tourniquet and brought it to the guy giving him care.

After this, I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The corpsmen that carried Gee out said she still had a pulse. I was checking, she didn't. I went back to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I started providing care to wounded Afghan women and children after [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was evacuated. I went and pulled security with another Marine. I ran and left with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and went to the JOC.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Did you see any other casualties?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(6) They were dragging a lot of bodies. I couldn't recognize anyone. I was told that Sgt Gee died because of the ball bearings.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Do you know how many rounds you fired?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(6) No, but I didn't have to reload my magazine, so not that many.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: What happened once you got to the JOC?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(6) We talked with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He brought us outside and let us calm down a little bit. We were waiting outside for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to come outside of the JOC and knocked for her to come out. I explained to her what happened and that Gee passed and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the hospital. We went in to the JOC and the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us that they were working on Sgt Gee and that she would be ok. I was mad that he was lying to me.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC,  
Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

They told us to go to the CLB room in the JOC to calm down. We were sitting there and a ground attack alarm went off. We asked if we could go back to our sleeping area and then walked back when they approved.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Did anyone task you to go out to the gate after the blast?

(2) Answer: No. We only worked at the PAX terminal after that. We missed our first two shifts because they were confused on how to work us in to the schedule without [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee. Having this downtime made everything worse.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer: We left around 0200 on the 30th and went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. We were there for about two and a half weeks before re-deploying back to the States.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Is there anything important that you think we should know?

(2) Answer: No.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 108

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis (US Army) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions to [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (US Army) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. How did you enter into HKIA and what was your Task Org and Reporting?

(2) Answer. I had a Company minus consisting of one Reconnaissance platoon, our Infantry trailer platoon, and a small company headquarters. Our reporting requirements and command relationships changed during the operation. In short, we began the operation as part of the Battalion Landing Team but spent the majority of the operation as part of the Command Element. There is some history behind this. We originally were assigned to the 24 MEU as part of the Command Element, however during the workup we were attached to the Battalion Landing Team (BLT). We were part of the BLT for most of the 24 MEU deployment. When we arrived in HKIA, we were part of the BLT and were reporting to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). This changed shortly after we arrived. On 18 August, a group of reporters and sources associated with the New York Times were recovered through the south/domestic terminal of the airport. The terminal was not an established gate or official way onto the base and involved coordination with

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

13 October 2021

the Taliban and the Americans who were in defensive positions near the terminal. The recovery was successful, but it was hastily organized and a group of 24 MEU staff members had to personally conduct the recovery operation. Because of this, the MEU Commander determined a force was required to coordinate and facilitate recovery of individuals/groups that wouldn't come through the normal gates. The Maritime Raid Force was assigned this mission and designated as TACON to the MEU CE. We remained TACON to the CE for the rest of our time at HKIA reporting directly to (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was your mission?

(2) Answer. We facilitated recovery for individuals or groups who were unable to enter via the normal gates, required special assistance, or were designated as high priority by elements within the DoD or USG. Our focus was on the actual recovery, not designating who should be recovered/prioritized. If the MEU said "here's the people we want," we would go get them. We created solutions and developed methods for getting people onto the airfield. Although we didn't belong to them, this effort was tied to the international coordination cell. When we began doing these operations on 19 August, many people from across the staff reached out to us in an attempt to help Afghans they knew or were getting contacted about. All sorts of Americans were reaching out to people they knew were in HKIA trying to help Afghans. There seemed to be a general sense that "if we can just get ahold of someone on the airfield it will be easy to get this group of people onto the airfield." Requests like this flooded in and were impossible to keep up with. We limited our recoveries to only those authorized by the (b)(6) the (b)(6) or the reps of their team. However, we would conduct multiple recoveries for a point of contact once they were authorized by the (b)(6). For example, after a successful recovery, a group of American officers who worked with a special mission air wing (provides mission list details) requested several additional recoveries from us, which we succeeded in. If we were contacted directly by or passed info from clearly important groups, we would backbrief the MEU and begin helping the group. This happened with US Institute of Peace and Reuters News Agency among others. We ended up recovering at least 2,245 people who were identified as high priority by high ranking members of the DoD or USG and were unable to enter the normal gates for whatever reason.

e. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. We've heard about so many people who've been making contact. Did you have direct contact with Senators or President?

(2) Answer. No, however we were passed people via staffs from at least the Senator level. Most of our tasking came via intermediaries or had funneled through the MEU or J3 before it got to us. We did have some unexpected contact with high levels of the USG. For example, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had an Afghan claim

~~ACTS SCK-DO~~

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

13 October 2021

he was sponsored by a US Congressman. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked for proof and the Afghan Facetime called the Congressman and handed the phone to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We allowed that onto HKIA. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frequently the senior Marine on-site at recoveries and he in particular has a lot of unbelievable stories and spoke with all types of people.

f. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. 26th in the morning

(2) Answer. I was working in the Joint Operations Center. I was the day shift while [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on nights. We had fallen into a rhythm at that time and I would spend the morning discussing our activities with my recovery teams. I briefed them on what tactics we were seeing have success for the day and giving them their assigned groups for recovery. They would back brief me on the results of their individual operations. Many of the methods to recovery people had been used up at this point, and the sewage canal was the best chance of success that day and we were planning to use it to get some folks out. (THIS IS MY MAP!!) We had several methodologies to bring people in. One method was to coordinate with Afghans on site. For this method we used NSU gate or South gate. We would coordinate with the Afghan NSU allies, Taliban, or 82nd, or who ever we needed to in order to get the targets in. We also had established ratlines consisting of holes, service gates, or ladders. We built a lot of connective tissue with adjacent units, afghan interpreters, and SOF elements to keep us plugged in to multiple means to get access to and control certain areas. However, at this point we had burned a lot of the backdoors we knew about, and the crowds would know where our ladder points or fence gaps were. So by the 26th the sewage canal method at the Abbey Gate was becoming the best and possibly only way to bring people in. We had worked with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a lot to make sure we did things without disturbing his operations or overall security at Abbey gate. I briefed my guys that Abbey was the only game left in town and tasked out my guys with different groups to recover. I recognized that this might be one of the last days we could recover people, so I assigned the bulk of my force to work that entry way, two Recon teams and an Infantry Platoon. Personally, I was also absorbed on that day with helping the US Institute of Peace and Asian Women's University get a bus convoy onto HKIA. They both had a lot of complex issues getting access to the installation and had frustrations.

g. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Where are you physically when it happens?

(2) Answer. I was in the JOC. I believe the attack occurred between 15-1600.

h. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What do you remember about the moment it happened?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

13 October 2021

(2) Answer. Blast was announced and it was reported that small arms were also associated with the attack. I heard continued small arms fire reports longer than I expected. I heard that there was a large number of casualties and a lot of reporting about the movement of personnel between the gate and the role II.

i. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Any reason you preferred Abbey gate?

(2) Answer. We preferred to use Abbey Gate because of the sewage canal. The canal was unique because it presented a secure area where we could pull people from a crowd without chance of the gate being overrun. The canal wall was high enough people couldn't climb up but low enough you could reach down to grab someone. We could grab a lot of people efficiently there.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Contact Phone number (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), assistant investigating officer, at (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Page 94 redacted for the following reason:

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Exhibit 109 - (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

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Page 95 redacted for the following reason:

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(b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

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