



**SECRET//REL USA, FVEY**  
**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**  
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**  
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO

5 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1 October 2021

1. On 1 October 2021, [redacted] (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When an answer was provided by one person, it is annotated accordingly.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Where were you and your team on assigned at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer.

(2.5): We had the people pushed up way past the bridge with a squad and a half. They weren't able to get past us. We were able control the flow. We maintained the whole area down past the bridge. When we came back on the 26th, all the people were back.

(2.2): We advised the other company on what to do to keep the people back.

(2.4): We had guys lined up along the canal. We were in charge from the jersey barrier. We would push them all the way back to the canal bridge where the British were conducting security. We eventually just tried to prevent them from being in the water. The DoS guys would come pull a lot of people from the canal which would cause a

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disruption. We had it under control while we were in charge. Golf Company would keep losing control of the crowd.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What crowd control measures did you use?

(2) Answer.

(1.1): We would just push them. (b)(1)1.4d We just got on line and pushed them back. (b)(1)1.4d We think 1/8 used them as well.

(2.4): The British were forceful, but within the limits. They had to be aggressive sometimes.

(2.5): You can't be afraid to be a little aggressive to control the crowd. We wouldn't let the other countries mess anything up. They would pull like 50 people up at a time then those people would just sit there. We had to deal with other countries' problems as well.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was the process for escorting people and processing them?

(2) Answer.

(1.3): If their paperwork was good, our Marines would push them through the acceptance lane. They would then be searched. There were a lot of times that we were there, but the DoS would not be. They wouldn't do changeover at the, but they would change over back on the airfield. They wouldn't do a one for one swap at the gate. The DoS would make us escort out the people that didn't make the cut. It would take either one Marine or a fire team. We would escort the rejects all the way down past the bridge. My platoon sergeant and platoon commander tried to take the burden of walking people to the rejection lane. I tried to look at the positive of all the people getting out.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What happened on 26 August 2021?

(2) Answer.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(2.5): Golf was all bunched up. 1st Plt (Echo) was doing searching. We were in the inner area.

(3.2): We were setting up obstacles. We were setting up concertina wire near the wall so if they jumped up they would hit the concertina wire.

(2.2): We were also doing concertina wire to control the crowd.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What threat streams were you hearing about at the Gate?

(2) Answer.

(1.3): I remember that two hours before the blast they had us do accountability. This was the only thing that was out of the ordinary during the last few days.

(2.4): At one point they said that there was an attack imminent so we got down behind the walls.

(1.1) This happened about an hour before the blast.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACTS-SCK-DO

5 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
Regiment, 1 October 2021

1. On 1 October 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When an answer was provided by one person, it is annotated accordingly.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Who was at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021?

(2) Answer.

[redacted] (b)(6) Everyone was. We went back to the staging area to consolidate our gear. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were just pulling up to the gate as the explosion went off. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the opening of the fence on the road. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the sniper tower.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Who is the best Marine to talk to about the events at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you occupy the tower at Abbey Gate?

(3) Answer.

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(b)(6) 19 August, in the morning. We were tasked with overwatch for the platoon going to Camp Sullivan. They were supposed to go get AMCITs and come back, but that didn't happen. At that time there was poor control of the gate. This is when they started to push the crowd back. This was one of the most hectic days minus the MASCAL. The chevron (blocking position) did not get put into place until the 20th. The Marine Engineers put it out there around 0300 on the 20th. Behind the chevron, there was a forward Taliban check point. Twenty meters past that they had a bunch of Taliban presence for another check point.

On the 20th, word spread that people could bypass the Taliban check point to go through the canal. We were in contact with friends of friends who were telling us that the canal was the best option. The Taliban later set up more check points for people going into the canal. The Taliban would shoot people who would try to get through the check point. They were definitely doing some shooting.

(b)(6) There was a night when we saw a bunch of muzzle flashes and we saw a lot of bodies drop during the night.

(b)(6) About the 24th is when the British and Echo cleared the western side of the canal. We had a Marine every 10 to 15m. None of the civilians could get passed. That was the best control of the area the entire time. 25 August is when Echo was relieved by Golf Company. 0100-0300 26 August Golf Company pulled back off the strip to just east of the tower.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Was there anything different that occurred on the 26th?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) We knew that there was an imminent threat for an IED. We were given a time that it was supposed to go off. At that time all the Marines were knelt down. It didn't go off at the expected time.

(b)(6) We were watching guys for hours. They had bags and were moving suspiciously. We found one of the bags.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What was the situation like in regards to controlling the crowd?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) It was like controlling a flood at all times.

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(b)(6) We couldn't even see the ground because of how many people there were. People were shoving. The only time they calmed down was when I shined a big flash light on them.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What were the threats reported on 26 August 2021?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) We got descriptions about VBIEDs (yellow Toyota corolla). Psychological Operations (Psy Op) gave us a description of a person of interest. We watched him for hours. We took his picture and passed them up to higher, but never heard anything back. This guy was out of place because he wasn't trying to get through, he was talking to people and hugging his friend. He had a shaved head, closely trimmed beard, clean clothes, and he wasn't trying to get into the airfield. There was a Taliban guy who was in green garb with a chest rig with grenades and gun, he was hitting people. Then there was a big guy with a RPG. These two guys were trying to link up. There was also a time that something impacted the sniper window right next to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). This is when we started keeping all the windows closed. We passed the pictures of the guy at 0800 and lost the guy at 1000. It bothers me still that we lost track of him, and never heard anything back from higher about him.

(b)(6) The guy was bald and had a beard.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. What happened when the blast went off?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) I looked at my watch; it was around 1745 when the blast went off. I was looking directly at the blast. There didn't seem to be any warning. As the days started to get closer to the 30th the tension was high due to the fact that everyone knew the gate would be closing soon. You could feel the tension. There wasn't any obvious person that stood out. We were taking pictures of the crowd when the bomb went off. When it went off I saw the plume of smoke and felt it. I was concussed. It was super bright orange light. I got back up and oriented myself to what was happening. We saw the carnage that happened. The tower started taking pop shots.

(b)(6) We had just pulled up behind the tower, we watched the blast go off. We felt the shock and saw the bodies blown back on the ground in front of us. I climbed into the tower, and got down because I started hearing rounds go off. The rounds were

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1st Marine

Regiment, 1 October 2021

coming from the north east direction. I saw a child shot in the chest. The doctor told me he was dead so I ran into the tower. I saw Marines return fire. I heard three distinct shots hit the back windows of the tower. The third round impacted right in front of my face as I was closing the ballistic glass window. I put the gun out the window and was looking for the gunman. He was coming from the northeast building with a single door. There was also someone in the alleyway, smiling and taking pictures. We could not find the actual shooter.

(b)(6) I was in the truck with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When the blast went off (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran out the door and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went out the back. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) climbed into the tower and saw that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was hit. I made sure all our guys were good. I climbed down the tower to check on the corpsman. I didn't see him at the CCP and saw him helping casualties at the fence line. We knew what ISIS's TTPs were for potential secondary blasts, so we were trying to keep the civilians from going back to the area. The Taliban weren't shooting at us. We started scanning for the shooter. I saw a guy in the alley but couldn't find the shooter.

(b)(6) I saw the rounds impact the windows. I stayed in the tower.

(b)(6) After getting out of the truck, I started running towards the tower. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They were concussed. I looked out at the canal and saw dead bodies and smoke. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when the smoke cleared. I told the team to stay in the tower. I grabbed the fence cutters to cut a hole in the fence and pulled (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) through. When I ran up to the tower I heard a .50cal shooting. There were pop shots while I was getting (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out and then I scoped in towards the Taliban, but I didn't see the Taliban doing anything. I then ran back into the tower.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. How much time was there after the blast to the closing of the gate?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) It was about 20 minutes to get everyone out and about 45 total until the gate was sealed.

(b)(6) I saw a guy burning, I treated him and took him to the CCP. I heard gun shots around me. The CCP was about 30m from the gate. I treated about five or six Marines. I was with the Golf corpsmen and some Echo corpsmen. It took about 20 minutes to get to the hospital. The first patient got to the role 2 before the medevac got to the landing site.

(b)(6) The posture of the Taliban remained the exact same. They didn't care that the blast went off. Except the guy that shot the .50 cal.

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(b)(6) Once the Taliban started to occupy the chevron, they started setting up chairs and started selling candy and food. Their posture didn't change when it came to the blast. They were just the outer cordon security. There was one time that the tower got lasered. We think that they had look out points down the road. They were there 24/7. The CCTV tower was about 300-400m to the south. There was always a guy up there. Sometimes he had a radio and other times he did not.

(b)(6): We got lasered two times.

(b)(6) The day prior they were bringing up different Taliban up because they were closing gates. You'd see guys with kits and M4s with scopes. There seemed to be important people that came up a few times. They seemed to be doing a key leader engagement.

(b)(6) At first I thought it was the Taliban, but after we looked at them we just saw them sitting there laughing. They weren't doing anything.

(b)(6) There were times that we were able to get eyes on the ground. We even were able to get eyes on top of the Baron Hotel and view the area.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Were any Taliban killed?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6) I don't think so.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Did you hear any rounds impacting after the blast?

(2) Answer.

(b)(6): I heard rounds coming in close. I saw a kid that was hit. I could tell it was a gunshot wound because the ball bearings were too small to cause such a big wound. I put my pinky in and turned him around and saw his back blown out. I can say for sure that we could have been hit. Three shots hit the tower. One was in line with my head.

(b)(6): On the morning of the 26h we establish a CCP because the British said there was going to be an attack. We prepared but nothing happened.

l. Question and Answer 11.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Marine Regiment, 1 October 2021

(1) Question. Is there any other information that you would like to tell us?

(2) Answer. Our biggest complaint is that we don't know what happened to the pictures that we took. One time, Psy Op walked us on to this guy and we never heard anything about this guy. We lasered him and he was 16.2m away.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACTS-SCK-DO

01 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

1. On 1 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) spoke with a select group of Marines from Echo Company. The questions and answers found below are a transcription of the conversation between (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the Marines.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Describe what you did immediately before, during and after the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August?

(2) Answers. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2/1 Infantry Battalion – I was pulling overwatch with escorts in the search area in the inner gate area. When the attack happened, I don't remember really looking at anyone's faces. I just started grabbing people to bring them into the Casualty Collection Point (CCP), which was next to the search area. A Marine came up to me with a huge shrapnel wound, so I took him to the CCP. His arm was bleeding everywhere. I'm (b)(6) so I started providing aid to anyone who wasn't being taken care of. I've been to several other first aid courses. Another Marine came up to me and he was yelling "Code Black" It was clear the blast disoriented him and he was not well. I also took him to the CCP. I moved to a casualty at the CCP who clearly couldn't breathe, other Marines were trying to help, but they weren't addressing the breathing problem. The corpsman and I cleared his airway and I started to give him oxygen. I stayed there for a while providing the oxygen. We loaded that casualty into a vehicle and I road with him to the hospital. We offloaded, and returned with the vehicle. We went to the QRF area for an update, they really didn't have anything. I made my way back to the gate and civilians were in the gates with injuries and injured children. We funneled them to the QRF area. I got to the CCP and gave aid to some of the less wounded. My squad leader was looking for me, so I went back to my squad and took up a security position. We were on over watch on the HESCOs on the outer wall of the inner gate. We didn't need relief so we held that position. I did not witness the blast. Right before the blast were aware of a guy walking around the canal area with an AK-47.

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

(3) Answer. [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2/1 – On the day of the attack, my squad initially took over the search area. We were relieved, and I moved down to the inner gate with my squad. We were just looking for Marines and people to help. I ended up with [REDACTED] escorting an interpreter and his girlfriend, who were looking for their dad in the crowds. We went down to the canal, then towards the south barrier, then back north past the entrance to the canal, looking at the crowd. The crowd was huge and we were looking for an older man in a blue outfit. [REDACTED] We were outside the fence on the near-side of the canal when the blast occurred. I was facing that general direction, less than a 100 meters away. The shockwave hits us and the crowd and Marines all get down. There is a lot of white smoke, people are knocked down, and there were shots fired. I thought they came from a three story building southeast of the gate. It was not a large volume of fire. I raised my weapon, but had no shot and could not identify the shooter's position. I moved toward the canal entrance, but a CS canisters went off. A Marine was wearing a canister on his vest and it was hit and dispersed. I had to clear the area, wash my face and eyes, I even threw up. Once I was cleaned off, I went back through the canal entrance to find casualties. Every casualty I came across is clearly deceased. I worked toward the jersey barriers at the base of the tower. We start moving injured Marines and set up security. There were enough personnel doing CASEVAC but security was lacking. I took a security position, other Marines joined, and we spilt the sector. More Marines took up security and we continue to divide sector. After the blast, a man in a reflective vest hopped up on the wall, pulled a cell phone, and makes a call. We yelled at him to put the phone down. I moved my position back toward the canal entrance, the hole in the fence. [REDACTED] tasked me to get accountability for the PLT. I ran all the way back to the CCP to get a head count. Throughout I was struggling to remember numbers. We pulled everything back to the inner gate and set security.

(4) [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2/1 - I was back in the QRF area, which is fully inside the HKIA perimeter, standing by and monitoring the radio. SSgt Hoover would have been the guy to call us down to the gate if anything happened. Later we rotated down to the gate and started escorting evacuees chosen to be moved into HKIA, later in the afternoon. DoS wasn't there so we weren't much employed. [REDACTED] ordered us to organize the CS gas canisters. I was at the entrance of the sniper tower when the blast went off. I looked over the wall and smoke, dust, and debris went up. [REDACTED] was nearby and he immediately took up a security position, aiming his weapon at the Taliban. [REDACTED] of 2nd PLT, told him no, it wasn't the Taliban. There was definitely small arms fire (SAF), because the rounds snapped around us. I could only identify UK Soldiers in the distance so no targets. I bounded to the psyop vehicle position in the outer gate and found casualties. I bounded to the entrance to the canal in the fence/gate, but I ran into CS gas. A Lieutenant and platoon members came up to the Jersey barrier at the fence too and got hit with the CS. The Lieutenant ordered his unit to put gas masks on. I didn't because that was a waste of time. I moved to set security over the canal on the south end. NCOs were putting Marines into security positions. I came off security and grabbed the

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first casualty I came up on. The Marine had no external injuries but he was coughing up blood. That's when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought up a pole liter. We carried him to the CCP and cut off his clothes. A corpsman helped remove the clothing. Other injured Marines were coming into the CCP. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who spotted civilians with bags who were running the gates. We gave chase, but they threw their bags. We caught up with them and conducted a search. Nothing was really found. I moved back to the canal and they were treating (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who had a bad injury on the upper leg/pelvic area. We needed a litter but none were available, so we had to carry (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped us lift (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on a riot shield. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was originally with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We took him through the new hole in the fence. The hole in the fence was cut by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) an engineer. That's how we were able to move from the attack site to the CCP faster. We dropped (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) off with the CCP and a corpsman. I went back to fall into the security positions. We tried to move the civilians away from the fence. Some were trying to come forward and give us papers. Given the circumstances, we turned them away. While we were pulling security, guys started moving the civilian casualties. We were told we weren't going to take any of the civilians. I made contact with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he ordered me to get accountability of the squad.

(5) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2/1 – I was standing by at QRF for two hours, before coming down to gate to relieve the search element. There was a report of SBIED during that period. We searched six families during the time I was working the search location. SSgt Hoover talked to us while we were searching evacuees, but walked away. Shortly after he departed our area, the blast went off. The first person I saw was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was dazed. We took some small arms fire. We moved to the Psyop Vehicles area as a fire team. We could not get PID on the shooters. We then helped an injured Marine to the CCP. When we arrived at the CCP the Marine went non-responsive. I moved another Marine to the CCP with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The casualties started to build and I informed leadership we would need vehicles soon because the CCP was getting full. I moved toward the canal, and found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I help move him to the CCP. I got accountability of my squad and we moved into security positions for ten minutes. Then we pushed down into the inner gate to establish another security position.

(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2/1 – I was working a tasking to fortify and emplace obstacles between Abbey Gate proper and the outer gate because the gate was closing. While we were doing the task, we were notified the ground outside the gate we had gained earlier was lost, so we had to go to the gate. We got put back on the gate. My squad helped with searches and escorts for DoS rejects. We were walking the escorts from the inner gate to the canal entrance, and down the near side of the canal. There was a threat report and everyone was put into a defensive posture. This went on for about 30 minutes, but nothing happened so we went back to processing. The crowd did not take kindly to us stopping the gate movement. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Before the attack, I

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

noticed the Taliban at the Chevron was filming our positions and activities. When the blast went off, I was walking with a civilian who was rejected by DoS, and I got knocked down. I saw SSgt Hoover, he was injured, and I grabbed him and took him to the CCP. A corpsman put a needle-decompression in SSgt Hoover. I handed him off to the corpsman. During casualty collection, I set a security position pointed toward Taliban at the Chevron, in case they were the source of the attack. The casualty collection point was filled up, and another was added across the inner gate, but then that filled. The team running the CCP established a third position in the middle of the inner gate, but they moved the casualties to make sure the "road" was clear. We moved the casualties by priority. The engineers were brought up after the attack to cut the fence so we could better access to the casualties. It reduced the distance to the casualties by about 100 meters round trip. CLB (FET) was also out at the Gate and they were helping with casualties. I thought any inefficiencies in the CASEVAC were caused by unfamiliarity between 2/1 and the other elements helping out. Two of the FETs were at the canal at the time of the attack, but I don't know what happened to them. It took about 20-30 minutes to get the casualties CASEVAC'd from the gate.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Who heard gun fire after the blast?

(2) Answer. All the Marines present agreed there was small arms fire immediately after the attack. All also agreed it wasn't sustained for long and most was ineffective.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – "I heard a good rip on a machine gun right after the attack."

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – "I could not assess where the fire was coming from or how effective it was."

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – "I also could not assess where it came from or how effective it was. I could hear it though. "

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – "Agreed. I could not figure out its source or where it was coming from, but there was definitely some small arms fire aimed at our gate."

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – "I thought it might have been coming from the Taliban position by the Chevron."

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Who got TBI or a concussion that day?

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(2) Answer. Marines present held up their hands if they thought they suffered a concussion or TBI.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Did not indicate he believed he suffered a concussion or TBI from the blast.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Raised hand.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Did not indicate he believed he suffered a concussion or TBI from the blast.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Did not indicate he believed he suffered a concussion or TBI from the blast.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Raised hand.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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01 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Echo Company,  
2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

1. On 1 October 2021, [REDACTED] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. [REDACTED] spoke with [REDACTED] Echo Company. The questions and answers found below are a transcription of the conversation between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Prior to 26 August, please walk me through your plans?

(2) Answer. Morning of 22 August we arrived at Abbey Gate. Prior to that Golf CO and 2nd PLT from Fox, were at Abbey Gate from the inner gate to outer gate (Abbey Corridor). We arrived at 0200 on 22 Aug. Everything is very out of sorts. The whole team (Golf and Fox CO) is in the black and couldn't speak coherent sentences. It became apparent very quick that they didn't have a rest plan or platoon boundaries. They had been up for about 48 hours straight. We did a brief RIP. [REDACTED] split areas from the chevrons to the outer gate and outer gate to inner gate. We also have a QRF and rest plan. On the outer gate we had door security. Near the chevron we had a few guys taking passport holders through the chevron and sending them to the rear. The people would get staged at the outer gate then get searched at the inner gate. We had our fire teams doing near side roving security. The goal was to keep the people back down the canal. We also are able to handle our own rest cycle.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Did the Marines on the gate have an criteria for who we were taking? Did that criteria evolve?

(2) Answer. This started out as just American Citizens (AMCITs), then SIVs were important, then it was everyone. There were people in the crowd who had a phone with someone on the other end vouching for the person. I talked to a congress person and a few retired Cols. We had to stop because people were just giving us their phones to try and make it through.

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. How where the Taliban letting people in?

(2) Answer. They were only letting certain people through the gate on one side. They kept roughly 6 to 13 Taliban on the connex at a time. They sometimes would bring kids up there.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What are your observations on the Taliban atmosphere?

(2) Answer. When you would walk up to the chevron you couldn't see the openings because of all the people. However, you could hear the difference between someone being shot and warning shots.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Echo made the decision to clear the position behind the tower?

(2) Answer. On 23-24 August there was a mass of people in the canal area. We concluded that the area between the outer gate an inner gate would be a better area to search people if we can focus on clearing people out away from the outer gate. We wanted to push people towards the chevron, but managed to push people back 100m past the bridge in the canal.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Were there other nations present?

(2) Answer. The countries I could identify were

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

The countries would pull the family (potentially 20 members) from the canal. This doesn't mean that they would get processed. Some countries would then deny them because of bad paperwork or because they chose incorrectly. If they were denied the countries would just leave them in the processing lane for our unit to deal with. We had to escort those members back through the exit.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Did the Department of State (DoS) work with you?

(2) Answer. They would show up in teams of three. They would only show up for a few hours. They also would randomly leave and show up 10-12 hours the next day.



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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

There is no continuity at all. We are getting sent down that AMCITs are priority, but the councilors kept changing who can come in. The DoS workers tried to get my team to bring in various group. I flat out said no, my team will take care of AMCITs due to complications they were placing on us. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a We would escort them through the exit point that the previous CO had made. On the evening of the 24th about 12-14 councilors showed up with someone who seemed to be the supervisor.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. When did you improve your position?

(2) Answer. I believe this was on the 23rd. We created a plan of action on how we were going to begin fixing the issues we were seeing. The intent was to create more standoff distance between the people and us. We decided to push the mob from the gate to the bridge in the canal. There were no DoS workers and no flights at this time so there was nothing to hinder our process. It takes us about six hours to get the stragglers out of the inner gate towards the outer gate section. After which, I began to redefine the tasks for each section. My platoon is tasked to clear and control area between the chevron and the outer gate. The big issue that we identified is that people are trying to cross the canal. This major section had people shoulder to shoulder at all times. Down about 100 meters (m) was a bridge that the British were holding. Our goal was to push the civilians to the wall and place a squad on the wall so when someone does come down the canal we know it was from us letting them in. I had eight Marines shoulder to shoulder to push the crowd back to the bridge. It was successful. We are now working jointly with the British. After about 48 hours total we pushed the crowd 100m past the bridge. On the evening of the 25th, after 48 to 60 hours, my platoon was rotating out with Golf/Fox Co. The crowd seemed relaxed before we left. We were being replaced by Golf/Fox Company for about 18 hours. Our company would then come back on the 26th to hand over security operations to the 82nd.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Do they give you the same mission or a 'be prepared to'?

(2) Answer. Yes, the intent was going to be that Golf and Fox would handle the outer gate to chevron, and we would take inner gate to the outer gate in preparation for retrograde operations. The thought process was that midnight on the 27th the gate would be closed. From midnight to the morning 82nd would assume operations. The intent would be to set the conditions to cease operations in preparations for the 82nd to take over. We were told to be prepared to be out at the gates for the next 24 to 48 hours in order to fortify our position and hand it over to the 82nd. All was supposed to be done by the 27th at midnight.

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Was the Taliban denying access from the Chevron?

(2) Answer. We were hearing that from the people going through the canal that the canal was the path of least resistance. The people wouldn't take the Chevron route because the Taliban were abusing and shooting people going through. The Taliban occupied security position on top of the connex. There would be about one kid for every three Taliban. They used the kids as a PR stunt. They would take the kids, allow the family to go through, then give the kids back on the other side of the canal.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What plan did you have for the RIP with Golf and Fox Company?

(2) Answer. The plan was that Golf would take the outer gate to chevron and Fox would take the inner gate to outer gate. They assumed all position that we had taken. When we are leaving at this time it was a calm atmosphere. The civilians were still 100m past the bridge. I can't remember how many British were on the bridge as security, possibly six. They were getting ready to leave as well. I heard from the British that they were going to start to exit on the 26th during a period of darkness. They would rip 1800-2000

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Is there a discussion prior to the 25th for British retrograde?

(2) Answer. There wasn't any discussion down at my level. I received the information from my higher.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What situation transpired between Golf and Fox Company?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that Golf CO probably wouldn't hold the same distance that Echo held. We were packed and ready to go with the expectation that we had 18 hours of rest. I had gotten up at 0830 and around 0930 S-3 grabbed the CO and pulled him into the JOC. We start getting everyone ready to leave. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) comes back to tell us that things are getting out of control. He tells us to eat something and be ready to go. At about 1130 the first half of my platoon goes back to get on the bus destined for Abby Gate. By 1220 we have everyone walking through the inner gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

(1) Question. What is the initial assignment coming back to the gate in the morning?

(2) I did a face to face with (b)(6) It is understood to me that the same plan is in place. Golf/Fox would take outer to chevron and our company would take inner to outer gate.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Were there any DoS on 26th august?

(2) Answer. Yes, there were three to maybe five at this time. They were doing prescreening for people to get in the gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What changed when you returned?

(2) Answer. Just south of the outer gate there were people up against the barrier near the canal. It is full of people unlike the 18 hours before. There are people trying to get across. There are less nations, but the British and French are still trying to processing people. There were less nations than there was before. The far side of the canal and the near side is completely shoulder to shoulder. Inside the canal people are still streaming in. I talked to the Golf (b)(6) about why it is so packed...what happened? There are people getting crushed up against the barrier. Every two to three minutes someone would throw a flash bang to get the crowd under control. Golf (b)(6) said that we may have a potential IED attack so we wanted to collapse security. This was the first report of an IED I had received. I then disseminated it to my team.

Now in my mind I know we are going to be here for 24 hours so I know what my platoon of 43 needs to do. I send the QRF back toward the inner gate and we assume our positions. Our concern was that people could throw stuff in the sniper tower. We had to fix the situation. I knew we only needed 20 Marines so I sent the rest of the team into a rest cycle. The time is now 1300. The squads will cycle out on rest at 1500. (b)(1).4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Around 1530 someone from Golf Company tried to cook-off a flashbang, but ends up blowing off part of his hand. It was now known that Golf didn't have a handle on this. About 1530 and 1630 we start to see about 12 total DoS personnel. Five DoS personnel were going into the canal and others helping out elsewhere. Some were armed others are not. Before it got dark, around 1630, I don't believe that there were other nations working. I talked to the CO (b)(6) about what are we going to do. I asked him if he minded if I emplace people to try and influence the situation. SSgt Hoover and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are assisting with the management of middle of the canal. I'm going back and forth between the outer gate and the north canal area. This was about 1700. I left the

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SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

canal about 10 minutes prior. I'm at the line of the outer gate and I look back at SSgt Hoover when the blast goes off.

We carried the first causality to the initial CCP. My self and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) go and grab more people. We identify one dead Marine. We go and get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) and his uniform is torn up. We put (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on a riot shield to evacuate him to the CCP. At the same time I've got guys cutting a hole in the fence for a faster egress. He get him to the CCP within a few minutes and we start setting up security. After we get all our Marines back though the gate I wanted to close the gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said we need to get the rest of the civilians. I said no we need to get our Marines back to medical, close the gate. 1720 we have the sniper tower shooting of pen flares to keep people back.

We get accountability and establish security, which took about 2 hours. At about 2230 the machine gun team took over the snipers area that's when we go to the Role 2. I told my guys I'll be back. Before we leave (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) radio is going off about staying because the RIP with the 82nd guys. When we get to Role 2 they told me I was the first officer. I was asked if I could identify the bodies. I looked at one body and recognized one, but not the other two. I talked to the doctor and he walked me from the most stable patient to the more sever. I tried to remember how to communicate what my two guys looked like, but I was having trouble speaking correctly and I had trouble recalling. I tried to explain that he had a skull tattoo. He brought me to the OR room, and I identify him. The doctor then told me that SSgt Hoover didn't make it. He takes me, my 1stSgt, and Platoon Sergeant to the morgue to identify him. I see the CO CDR and tried to talk to him. He didn't understand that SSgt Hoover didn't make it. The CDR was upset that he had passed. I tell him that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was still alive. I take the CDR over to him in the OR. After checking on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we go back to the staging area, smoke a cigarette, and go back to the platoon to tell them. Originally the KIA were going to leave at 0400, but was changed to a different time. We were able to get our seven guys barriers to send our KIA home. At this point in time it is the morning of the 27th. The 28th we had one more tasks to destroy all sensitive items. We get on the plane the morning of the 29th.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. What question didn't I ask?

(2) Answer. I would want to ask...What was the decision to collapse the canal? The estimation of the security decision was a direct cause for Echo to get called back early to reestablish security.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), assistant investigating officer, at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with Echo Company Marines, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

5 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
SPMAGTF, 1 October 2021

1. On 1 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) MARCENT G5, conducted an interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) interviewed [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in a conversational manner. This interview was transcribed by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and rendered to writing.

## 3. Discussion.

a. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) began by explaining the scope of the investigation, the methodology to be used to capture the statement, and introduced everyone in the room.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Describe your background and duty position?

(2) Answer: I've been EOD for approximately 12 years. I'm part of the SPMAGTF and lead a team of 10, but we only took two teams of two to HKIA.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Who worked the post blast analysis?

(2) Answer: My teams were working in 12 hour shifts. I was on the team that did the initial response to the blast on the evening of the 26 Aug. Other teams assisted with the analysis because of the delay, which wasn't done until about 12-15 hours later.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: What were there other EOD elements at HKIA?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
SPMAGTF, 1 October 2021

(2) Answer: The 24<sup>th</sup> MEU had four teams of two and some of them came down to Abbey Gate after the blast. That's who assisted with the post blast analysis, the morning after the attack.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Describe you pre-blast prep or assessments?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g The units at the gate did not have the experience. We managed them throughout, centrally, to ensure the ECPs were covered. It was best we managed them under the circumstances, because very few Marines knew how to maintain and employ the systems. We did not go down to the gates and provide an assessment for additional blast mitigation. We really didn't have the assets to implement any of them.

f. Question and Answer 5.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Anything else you would like to mention about prep?

(2) Answer: Under the circumstances, I don't think we could have mitigated the attack any more than we did unless we closed the gates completely. That wasn't an option yet. I've thought about this question a lot, but nothing else to add.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: What actions did you take when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer: I was on shift at the time of the attack. We grabbed our kit, got in the vehicle, and drove to the gate. We made it to the gate within 10-15 minutes. They were

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
 SPMAGTF, 1 October 2021

still CASEVAC'ing casualties when we arrived. I immediately started look at secondary device possibilities. There were backpacks everywhere and all the civilians were on their cell phones. We did a quick search, we even stopped a guy from talking on his cell phone. Once the gates closed, we pulled in and the focus was CASEVAC. We cleared a lot of vehicles and casualties of ordinance – CS grenades, flashbangs. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Did you conclude the device was command detonated?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g we searched the blast site and could not find anything to show a radio controlled device was used.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What did you do in addition to clearing the ordinance?

(2) Answer: I advised the commander there were still casualties outside the gate, civilian casualties. Apparently the decision was made previously that either the Brits or the Taliban would take care of the civilians. The commander (Echo, 2-1 INF) made the decision to not let us go outside the gate for a full analysis immediately after the blast. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went up into the tower and took photos. It was probably 45 minutes after the blast when he took the photos. The Brits had taken security over at the outer gate while we were inside. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g because there was no analysis to be done yet. We did exit the gate that evening to conduct a hasty equipment density list scrub, sweeping for serialized gear (NVG, weapons), but were limited to the area generally known as the outer gate and holding area. We did not cross into the canal. We took the dog out with us, a UK working dog, as a second sweep for additional devices. The US forces pulled back to the inner Abbey Gate (proper) and we didn't get out to the blast site that night.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Did you talk to the UK EOD?

(2) Answer: Yes, and [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d The J2 wanted me to coordinate with the UK and get their evidence. They briefed us the following morning and gave us some of their evidence, but I did not see their full assessment. They had a radio battery they believed was part of the device.



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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
SPMAGTF, 1 October 2021

However, the radio battery was actually a US Forces component. We collaborated and concluded the device was command detonated.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: When did you get to do your post-blast analysis?

(2) Answer: The next morning, we took the UK interpreter and exited the outer gate to conduct our analysis, and the Taliban provided security while we were out at the canal. We spoke with the UK EOD team and did the analysis of the site. There was a lot of trash and debris, so not a great site for exploitation. Based on the damage, specifically the part of the "pack" in the c-wire, we concluded it was a vest or backpack that was chest to head high. We sent samples to Kuwait for analysis, but nothing was found from the forensic analysis to determine the type of explosive. We observed the blast direction/frag pattern and damage from the far side of the canal, up on the wall of the tower at the outer gate. The person elevated the device, so either on their chest, or holding it above their waste. We don't think he was up on the wall because the frag pattern went down into the canal and if he was up on the wall, the blast would not have gone so low, inflicting so many injuries in the canal. The injuries closer to him were all blast injuries, not frag. There was also no damage on the wall behind him, so he was most likely on the edge of the canal when he detonated, several feet in front of the wall. The group concluded command detonated, elevated, and directional frag charge.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Who was conducting the analysis with you outside the gate?

(2) Answer: In addition to myself and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from my team, 24th MEU included [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Any other observations or thoughts on the blast?

(2) Answer: The initial thought was bullets did a lot of damage. However, we could see the directional frag pattern and found the ball bearing in objects struck by the blast. We did not find DNA affiliated with a potential bomber and that could be attributed to the delay in exploiting the site.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: What else would you want us to know?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

SPMAGTF, 1 October 2021

(2) Answer: I wish we would have gone out the night of the blast to do our analysis. It may have gathered better results.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Contact Information where we can reach you.

(2) Answer:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Remaining on Pendleton until summer of 2022

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

6 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd  
Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, October 2021

1. On 1 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.
2. **Methodology:** [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered.
3. Discussion.
  - a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.
  - b. Question and Answer 1.
    - (1) Question: What is a shock trauma platoon (STP)?
    - (2) Answer: It consists of a damage control and resuscitation team and a critical care team. It includes two emergency room (ER) doctors, an ER physician's assistant (PA), a PA, an ER nurse, two nurses, and 15 corpsmen. It is a Role I enhanced, with no surgical capabilities. We provide "en route" care. Our team at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) was comprised of two ER doctors, one PA, two nurses, and 12 corpsmen.
  - c. Question and Answer 2.
    - (1) Question: What were your pre-deployment operations?
    - (2) Answer: We were attached to Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 21 during our pre-deployment time. We did not complete much cross-training at this time. We did our own internal training. I created a larger training plan for our group. More than what anyone else usually does. We also completed a certification exercise prior to deployment. The 1st Medical Battalion was the certifying authority. This occurred in December of 2020.
  - d. Question and Answer 3.
    - (1) Question: When did the platoon deploy?

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

(2) Answer: We deployed between March and April of 2021. We had four personnel in Baghdad and one in Kuwait. We moved all 22 personnel to [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] between May and June of 2021.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] when did you get warnings that Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan had a potential to occur?

(2) Answer: I received warning of a NEO between the middle and the end of June. We understood that the NEO briefs were more situational and that the Department of Defense (DoD) had not stated any formal request yet. We had already been preparing for that type of situation while we were at [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. [redacted (b)(6)] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (SPMAGTF-CR- [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]) was a big help to us because he emphasized the need to conduct medical training. We conducted training with the Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) C-130 team. We knew that if we were not training or taking care of patients then we needed to learn more. We started doing more Mass Casualty (MASCAL) exercises in May of 2021. Once we learned that the NEO was going to occur, 2/1 wanted us to start planning our processes. We completed two mission rehearsal exercises (MRX). These included Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations as well. We practiced loading and unloading for medical evacuation procedures.

In May, we had a MASCAL exercise at [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. In June, we conducted another MASCAL exercise with Echo Company, the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), and the MV22 Osprey crews. We also conducted multiple MASCAL exercises with just the medical teams at the Combined Aid Station (CAS) on [redacted (b)(1)1.4a], focusing on transfers from Role 2 to CAS. In July, we had two MRXs with 2/1, including a MASCAL exercise. In August, we conducted a base-wide MASCAL drill.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: When were you notified that you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer: I had a meeting with 2/1 on 14 August when Kandahar fell. We sent two personnel with the quartering party on 15 August. The two personnel were initially pulled into a security detail, but eventually joined the Role 2 at HKIA. The rest of our team left for HKIA on 16 August and arrived on 17 August. At the end of July, we had sent a PA and a corpsman to be COVID screeners as part of the embassy support group. These two personnel stayed at HKIA and assisted with Role 1 duties for 51/5 Marines and the CLB.

Most of the medical planning from higher was focused on COVID but I was focused on planning for casualties. COVID mitigation was always a focus. I am unsure why it was so heavily emphasized, but it was being pushed down from the O-6 and higher level. I think the emphasis was being pushed down from the Department of State (DoS). Whenever I asked about MASCAL planning I would be told that there was a Role 2 on HKIA that would focus on that. We had more medical assets than I have ever seen in one place, however, when I would ask about MASCALs the answer would always defer to the Role 2. I was told that there was a MASCAL plan in place from NATO, but that it only included North HKIA. I asked detailed questions about MASCAL coordination, blood at the Role 2, and patient transport. I feel as if my questions were waved off. The TF surgeon sat in on planning with SPMAGTF, Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT), and Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR) and they always discussed COVID. I do not understand why they were so concerned about it.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: What did you see and do when you arrived to HKIA on 17 August?

(2) Answer: I arrived during the night of 17 August. Everything seemed to be more orderly than I anticipated. I flew in with E Co, 2/1. I checked in with the Medical Planners from JTF-CR. There was a large medical meeting on the morning of 18 August. This meeting included [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (Air Force), the head of the Role 2 hospital, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), the Medical Planner from JTF-CR, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the Medical Planner for MARCENT, an Air Force MAJ that worked for RADM Vasely, the 82nd Airborne's medical staff, the Norwegian Executive Officer of the hospital, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Medical Planner, the MEU surgeon, and the rest of the STP officers.

It seemed like no one was tracking what the pre-established plan was. The MEU was at the PAX terminal. 2/1 had not been tasked with manning Abbey Gate yet. We were trying to figure out where to best employ a Role 1-E (STP), and ultimately decided that we would go wherever 2/1 gets tasked. 2/1 was tasked with manning Abbey Gate later that day. Before they took over Abbey Gate, we conducted a jump exercise to rehearse moving an ambulance across the flight line to the southern perimeter. We ultimately opted not to conduct that rehearsal again due to safety concerns.

On the night of 18 August, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I met with the MEU Medical Planner and got a ride to Abbey Gate and East Gate to figure out where to establish our location. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had identified a position near East Gate that would be good for the STP to operate out of. 2/1 was adamant that we would be located in a hardened structure, but the closest one was located at East Gate, about a quarter of a mile from Abbey Gate proper. We arrived on the morning of 19 August to set up the STP. 2/1 was not going down to Abbey Gate until around 0900.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: What happened after you established the STP at East Gate?

(2) Answer: There were people everywhere on the morning of 19 August. Initially, just a small team from the STP had gone to set up in the building. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d set up perimeter security, and had to barricade both doors to keep people out. We waited for the rest of our gear and personnel to show up and they almost got overrun. We set up our space. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g We let 2/1 know that we were established around 1100. We had a light footprint due to our equipment never arriving. We borrowed some equipment from the MEU. We were set-up to support the care of two to three critically injured personnel on 19 August.

We began treating Afghans immediately. They were passing out, dehydrated, getting injured from being trampled, receiving fragmentation from flash-bangs, and being assaulted by the Taliban. People were still trying to get into our building, so 1/8 provided a Marine guard at the door. The 1/8 corpsman began to triage outside the door while providing security. We were busy for the first five days. We rotated our nurses and corpsman on 24-hour shifts (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I stayed the entire time, with the exception of going back to get some sleep or take a shower.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Describe the conditions from 19-24 August. Were there any MASCAL rehearsals during this time?

(2) Answer: There was no time available to conduct rehearsals. Taking care of patients helped us prepare internally and helped us prepare for the MASCAL. We quickly established smooth procedures for getting patients in and out. It was similar to a busy metropolitan emergency room. Sick patients came to us, we sorted through them, and then took care of those that we could. If we could not provide care, we would push them to the Role 2. According to the Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE), as I understood them, we were obligated to treat anyone inside of the gates on HKIA.

We took care of approximately 186 Afghans from 19-24 August and transferred around 22 to 23 Afghans to the Role 2 during this time. We saw a lot of patients with seizures and pregnancies. We lacked some of our typical equipment that we would normally have. This impacted the type of care that we could administer to patients, but not necessarily those who suffered trauma.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What were the conditions like on 25 August?

(2) Answer: East Gate closed on 24 August, so on that day I was able to get out of the building to see what was going on at the other locations. I went to check on 1/8 Marines that were holding security at East Gate and also the 2/1 Marines at Abbey Gate. The patients I had seen during this time were emotionally torn up. I made it my goal to go out and see everyone. I was very focused on their mental health. I took care of some smaller injuries at the various sites on 24 and 25 August. On the night of 25 August, 2/1 requested an ambulance to go forward. My team told me this around 2100 and we pushed it out with an en-route care team consisting of one critical care nurse, one en-route care corpsman, and two additional corpsmen that were driving. They were going to pull 12-hour cycles but were replaced by the day-team the next morning around 0700. Those four were at Abbey Gate proper all day, leaving us with five personnel at the STP to include myself, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and three other corpsmen. The rest of the STP was at North HKIA on their rest period. The plan was to switch the teams out at 1900.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What time did the blast occur at Abbey Gate on 26 August?

(2) Answer: 1738 is when it was reported [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g by 2/1. The only communication we had with the Role 2 was via Wi-Fi. I texted the Role 2 at 1739 saying "IED, Abbey Gate, casualties pending." At 1740, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) texted the Role 2 saying "MASCAL, US casualties." My nurse located at the gate originally thought that there were only Afghan casualties but quickly realized that there were US casualties.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: What did you do after the initial report of MASCALs and the follow-up saying there were US casualties?

(2) Answer: I immediately directed the corpsmen to put all litters that we had on hand out by the road. Earlier that day, the MEU had taken back their equipment that we had borrowed so we were very limited on critical care equipment. We were left with one good monitor and only handheld equipment. I began double-checking all of our gear and opening our medical bags. Within five minutes, the first two casualties came to us with massive facial injuries. Because of the number of casualties and the Marines medically evacuating (MEDEVAC) on their own, they could not perform the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) that they normally would do. Because of this, they would just bring the casualties to us and then go back to the gate. There were a lot of vehicles that bypassed us and went straight to the Role 2. The drive to the Role 2 would normally be a ten minute drive, however, there were a lot of people waiting for flights and there was not a base-wide announcement of the MASCAL to get people out of the way.

The first US casualty arrived at the Role 2 at 1754 and was ultimately declared KIA. The first few casualties that came in were KIA. Out third casualty was critically

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, October 2021

injured and would have died if we transported him to the Role 2. We gave him blood, oxygen, and medicine before moving him to the hospital. He arrived at 1815 with [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] who was already in the MEDEVAC vehicle. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] arrived at the STP no later than 1755 and was close to [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] He arrived at 1815. We sent another Marine to the Role 2 after [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] In total, we treated four casualties and sent them to the Role 2.

My team that was on rest had gone to the Casualty Collection Point (CCP) in the ambulance bay at the Role 2 to conduct TCCC and evaluate patients. The speed with which Abbey Gate was MEDEVACed created a huge shortcut to normal MASCAL procedures. The speed was due to the perceived threat at the site. I do believe, from reading the KIA reports, that none of the KIA would have survived. All 13 of the KIA passed away at HKIA. Some Afghan casualties were treated at HKIA and then moved to Landstuhl, Germany.

After we had sent out our four surgical patients, we radioed out that we could not take any more urgent surgical patients. I went outside and started treating Afghan casualties being transported in pickup trucks. Afghan children were being carried along in the ambulances that were transporting service members.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: What time were all US casualties moved from Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: All urgent/priority casualties were at the Role 2 no later than 1830. We stopped treating Afghan casualties moving past our STP location by 1900. My team had returned from the Role 2 and said that everyone had been triaged and were receiving treatment. We started cleaning up and getting prepared in the event of a follow-on attack. [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] Between 1900 and 2030, my en-route care team at Abbey Gate asked me to come to their location. They had set up a CCP but I was unsure of what they needed due to our poor communications. 1/8's CO had stopped by looking for Sgt Gee and asked if I needed anything. I asked him for a ride to Abbey Gate and they dropped me off there. I wandered in, took a look at the canal, and saw the floating bodies there. I found my team set up behind the wall with an ambulance at their new CCP. I was there for a few hours with them, checking on Marines during this time. I checked in on all of the corpsmen. Everyone was very stoic. I talked with some of the platoon and company commanders.

A blast went off to the north, in Kabul, and I waited to see what was going on. At around 2100 or 2200, my other en-route care team that had been on duty on 25 August replaced the team that had been on duty all day. I went back to the STP with the team coming off duty. We had a group discussion about what to do if there was another



attack and talked about the feasibility of keeping the STP open due to our limited supplies.

Between 2300 on 26 August and 0300 on 27 August, we retrograded the STP back to the Role 2 due to our lack of supplies. I went to the hospital to see patients. By 0200, the first Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) flight took off. We were trying to help identify casualties. The Role 2 was settled. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in surgery. At 0600 on 27 August, they announced a walking blood bank across the base to get fresh blood. My nurse initialized a walking blood bank at Abbey Gate with 2/1. My en-route care team retrograded later on the morning of 27 August. The Hero flight was at 1200 on 27 August. I had a meeting with 2/1 at 1000 that morning for a hot wash of the events.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Did you see any casualties with gunshot wounds?

(2) Answer: No I do not think that anyone ever saw actual bullets while treating patients. It is worthwhile to reach out to the trauma surgeon, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Everything that I saw, and everything that I have heard since, has been that all injuries were due to fragmentation and blast overpressure.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: What were the MEDROE?

(2) Answer: I had asked for the MEDROE in July, when we began discussing this, and no one could get that for me. When we had our meeting 18 August, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me they were still working on it. There were people already being shot (Afghans) at that point. There was a big commotion about CENTCOM not having signed off on the MEDROE yet. We never had them in writing until 22 or 23 August. We only received them because the AF Major working for RADM Vasely took care of it. If people were inside HKIA, we'd treat them no matter what. If outside HKIA, and injured by the US, we'd care for them as well. If they were injured outside of the gates by someone else, they were not ours to take care of. I pushed that out to the 2/1 Staff and Officer group chat, but it was never clear to the corpsmen at the gates, or the Marines at the gates. We saw this was evident during the MASCAL when they were unclear if they were to treat the Afghans. If we had gotten the MEDROE earlier, we could have communicated it at all levels. The only way we could disseminate information was via Signal, as [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g would not have been appropriate.

If the communications Marines had not figured out how to make Wi-Fi work at our STP, we would not have had communications with Role 2.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd  
Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, October 2021

I'm highly frustrated by the fact that medical planning for a MASCAL was not comprehensive or inclusive of any areas outside HKIA. The only reason it worked was because we had enough vehicles to move patients, and we had five trauma teams at the hospital. This is unheard of. It was out of sheer volume of assets on the ground that the MASCAL succeeded, not because we had a plan.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

3 October 2021

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 387th  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

1. On 3 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, Kuwait to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview. He provided information on why the interview was being conducted, and how the interview would be captured for review after.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. When did you guys arrive to Kuwait and what unit are you with?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) We arrived 23 June 2021. We are with 387th Quartermaster Company.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What did you do for the first few months on country?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] (b)(6) I was in Kuwait City International Airport as the Mortuary Affairs representative.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I was waiting in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, Kuwait until I got my security clearance fixed, then went to Ali as Saleem as a Mortuary Affairs LNO.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you get to HKIA?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 387<sup>th</sup>  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

(2) Answer. (M1) 22 August 2021.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Who did you work with/fall in under at HKIA?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] with the Role II E. He was a doctor there. The guy in charge of the morgue was a Norwegian, [REDACTED] introduced us to him. He only did the introduction and didn't help with anything else. We saw the morgue on the first day. Initially, we thought it was very small.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Were you concerned on the size?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Not initially because we didn't really think of having a MASCAL. We were tracking only Afghan remains would be an issue first. There were room for eighth bodies in the morgue and there were already Afghan bodies in the morgue when we got there.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. How many Afghan remains were there?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Four. They had been there for a long time, over a week. They usually hand the remains over to the locals but it wasn't really an option so they were stored at the HKIA morgue.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Did those remains eventually get released?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] On 25 August 2021, [REDACTED] from USFOR-A was talking with us. A random civilian guy came by and said he had a POC from Red Crescent. We have no idea who he was, but he got in contact with the Red Crescent and they picked the bodies up that afternoon.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you ever get extra morgue space?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] No, we eventually converted a reefer.

j. Question and Answer 9.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 387<sup>th</sup>  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

(1) Question. Was the decision to convert the reefer made before or after the MACAL?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) made the decision. The decision was made at the time of the MASCAL. An Australian civilian with the hospital had an issue with using the reefer but after I explained it, with draping the flag and avoiding separating the bodies, he agreed. We also knew there were no ice capability and needed the reefer.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What else did you do before the 26 August 2021?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) Just small details. We had issues getting help with the mortuary affairs stuff, because no one knew we were there. We kept wandering, trying to find who could help. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was very helpful and knew that we needed assistance. We had no POCs.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Did you ever work with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) We maybe saw them, but never talked to them.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Before 26 August 2021, was there anything strange, weird, or anything we should know?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) There were people breaking in to our supplies—flags, transfer cases, human remains bags. Some people stole some flags. At the time it wasn't a big deal but it ended up being a problem.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Did you interact with any locals or evacuees? What did you think?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) We saw them a lot. It was unreal to see, like a dream. It felt like a warzone. The living conditions were not great. It was sad to see the families separated.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What happened on the morning of 26 August 2021?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 387<sup>th</sup>  
 Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] We linked up with the postal guys on the 25th at the word of [REDACTED]. That morning we went to the postal office to help them deal with the mail retrograde, which was a good thing, because we ended up finding a container of extra transfer cases. Which was good, we did not have enough with us. Later that afternoon, we got a WhatsApp from [REDACTED] Prime Power. He asked us for a headcount/status. He was put in charge of us leaving. He had us come in to the office on 26 August and he told us that something happened at Abbey Gate and were told to stand by. That's when we found out that there were 11 casualties. We had heard the alert on the speakers saying 'incoming'. We didn't help with the MASCAL, the hospital dealt with that. Then once the SMs were pronounced dead, we were called to start working. At that point, it was non-stop work in the tent where the dead bodies were.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Who else was in tent?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] There was a Marine Chaplain, [REDACTED] from 82nd, and a bunch of other people. [REDACTED] stopped by to check on us. There were a lot of people.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What was the process in the tent?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] The bodies were already in the white hospital Human Remains Pouches. The hospital had already taken off the clothes and IDs of the remains. The issue was identifying the remains since the hospital removed everything. They should have left the clothes and stuff but needed to remove things to provide medical care. There were a lot of facial injuries making it hard to identify the remains. There were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] named "D.W. Page" on HKIA. [REDACTED] This created a lot of confusion when we were trying to identify bodies.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How else were remains identified?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Marines would come in to identify their buddies.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Were there any other issues?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 387<sup>th</sup>  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Yes. We made the identification tags and then someone mismatched the tags. Some of the hospital people were helping out since it was too much work for us two to handle.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Was it too much help?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] At a certain point it was a lot, because there were too many people and it created a distraction. If we didn't ask for help, we needed them to give us room to work.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. After identifying remains, what happens next?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] We transferred the remains to the Turkish DFAC, which was already closed. We used random vehicles to get them over there and put them in the reefer that we converted. It was about 0200 or 0300. We didn't have enough flags since they were stolen. [REDACTED] went around finding flags and brought us more than we needed.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Explain the ramp ceremony.

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Initially, the flight time was 0500. It wasn't enough time for us to prepare so it was good that the flight was delayed. They left around 1200 on the 27th. From the get-go, we knew there would be some kind of ceremony. That morning, a 1SG from 82nd came over and said they were working with the Marines to have the ceremony start an hour before the flight.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What other preparation is needed after bodies are stored in the reefer and paperwork is complete?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Draping of the flag. Normally you iron the flag, but the situation wasn't possible. We didn't have a table but had an iron. I tried my best to make it look as nice as possible but just draped the flag.

x. Question and Answer 23.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 387<sup>th</sup>  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

(1) Question. Were there any issues with the ceremony?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)] No.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Do you normally have anything to do with the flight?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)] No, our MA team from 1TSC was already working on booking the flight and sent us the ULN.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. What happened after the ceremony?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] called us in to talk to us and thank us. Then we went to sleep because we had been up for over 36 hours.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)] August 2021.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Was it intentional that you stayed so late?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)] Yes, the 82nd wanted us there as long as they could.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Who did you fly with?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] two other power guys, and the 82nd guys from the perimeter.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. Any other pertinent info we should know?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)] Nothing really. We weren't told any operations, just what we needed to do.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 387<sup>th</sup>  
Quartermaster and Mortuary Affairs Company, 3 October 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and  
[redacted]

[redacted]

Approved for Release

Exhibit 068

**MISSION INFO**

Mission ID: AMYFT11YT238      Precedence: Urgent      Type: Contingency  
 State: COMPLETED      Date-Time: 238 2021 1730      Created On: Lo-Sika

**LITTER AND AMBULATORY SPACES**

Leg	Orig ICAO / Dest ICAO	Total Litter Spaces	Litter Spaces Used	Litter Spaces Remaining	Total Seat Spaces	Seat Spaces Used	Seat Spaces Remaining
1	O: DTBH / D: OAKB	48	0	48	54	3	51
2	O: OAKB / D: ETAR	48	17	31	54	9	45

Report	Name/ID	Cite No./PMR State	Ready Date/ Orig Facility/Dest Facility	Orig ICAO	Dest ICAO
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<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846339 Completed		02 OAKB	02 ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123843594 Completed		02 OAKB	02 ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846340 Completed		02 OAKB	02 ETAR
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<input type="checkbox"/>	2123846354 Completed	02 OAKB	02 ETAR		

2899 Report PMR

Mission ID: ALM107011239 \* Precedence: Urgent \* Type: Special Assignment Civil Mission  
\* Status: COMPLETED \* Date-Time: 230 2021 1400 \* Lo-Side Created On: Lo-Side

Leg	Orig ICAO / Dest ICAO	Total Litter Spaces	Litter Spaces Used	Litter Spaces Remaining	Total Seat Spaces	Seat Spaces Used	Seat Spaces Remaining
1	O: ETAR / D: LTAG	46	0	46	54	3	51
2	O: LTAG / D: OAKB	46	0	46	54	3	51
3	O: OAKB / D: ETAR	46	7	41	54	4	50

Report	Name/ID	Cite No./PMR State	Ready Date/ Orig Facility/Dest Facility	Orig ICAO	Dest ICAO
<input type="checkbox"/>	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	2123846395 Completed	230 2021 2332 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846383 Completed	230 2021 2538 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846367 Completed	230 2021 0118 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846396 Completed	230 2021 2332 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846386 Completed	230 2021 0118 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
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<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846391 Completed	230 2021 2336 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR
<input type="checkbox"/>		2123846357 Completed	230 2021 2332 Kabul (HKIA) LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MED CTR GE	03: OAKB	03: ETAR

2899 Report PHR


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Exhibit 069



# FALL OF GIROA TIMELINE



**3-9 MAY**

Burkah, Baghlan

**10-16 MAY**

Nerkh, Wardak

**17-23 MAY**


Dowlat Shah, Laghman  
Jalrayz, Wardak

**24-30 MAY**

Washer, Helmand



# FALL OF GIROA TIMELINE



## 31 MAY – 6 JUN

Dowlatabad, Faryab  
Ab Band, Ghazni  
Jawand, Badghis  
Kohistan, Faryab  
Chinartu, Uruzgan  
Muqer, Ghazni  
Jaghata, Wardak  
Ishkimish, Takhar  
Pato, Daykundi  
Sozmah Qal'ah, Sar-e Pul  
Bahram-e Shahid, Ghazni  
Arghanj Kwah, Badakhshan  
Sayad, Sar-e Pul  
Chorah, Uruzgan  
Aliabad, Kunduz  
Lash-e Juwayn, Farah  
Arghandab, Zabul  
Khash Rod, Nimroz

Zari, Balkh  
Almar, Faryab  
Chah Ab, Takhar  
Tulak, Ghor  
Saghar, Ghor

## 7-13 JUN

Dowlatabad, Faryab  
Ab Band, Ghazni  
Jawand, Badghis  
Kohistan, Faryab  
Almar, Faryab  
Chah Ab, Takhar  
Chinartu, Uruzgan  
Muqer, Ghazni  
Jaghata, Wardak  
Ishkimish, Takhar  
Bahram-e Shahid, Ghazni  
Arghanj Kwah, Badakhshan  
Pato, Daykundi  
Sozmah Qal'ah, Sar-e Pul  
Khash Rod, Nimroz  
Chorah, Uruzgan  
Arghandab, Zabul  
Lash-e Juwayn, Farah

Zari, Balkh  
Tulak, Ghor  
Sayad, Sar-e Pul  
Saghar, Ghor  
Aliabad, Kunduz

## 14-20 JUN

Khanabad, Kunduz  
Anar Darah, Farah  
Sangcharak, Sar-e Pul  
Gosfandi, Sar-e Pul  
Khas Uruzgan, Uruzgan  
Shirin Tagab, Faryab  
Dahanah-ye Ghor, Baghlan  
Baharak, Takhar  
Nahr-e Saraj, Helmand  
Khvajah-Sabz Posh, Faryab  
Mirzakah, Paktiya  
Mardian, Jowzjan  
Pusht-e Koh, Farah  
Darah-ye Suf-e Pa'in, Samangan  
Bangl, Takhar  
Hazar Sumuch, Takhar  
Darah-ye Suf-e Bala, Samangan  
Khvajah Bahawuddin, Takhar

Khvajah Ghar, Takhar  
Yangi Qal'ah, Takhar  
Chahar Bolak, Balkh  
Dasht-e Qala, Takhar  
Dasht-e Archi, Kunduz  
Kanaqah, Jowzjan  
Mingajik, Jowzjan  
Darqad, Takhar  
Chal, Takhar  
Faizabad, Jowzjan  
Kharwar, Logar  
Namak Ab, Takhar  
Kishindeh, Balkh  
Qal'ah-ye Zal, Kunduz  
Doshi, Baghlan

0598

## 21-27 JUN

Khvajah Hijran, Baghlan  
Sholgah, Balkh  
Dowlatabad, Balkh  
Aqcha, Jowzjan  
Imam Sahib, Kunduz  
Jaji, Paktiya  
Chimtal, Balkh  
Baghlan-e Jadid, Baghlan  
Lajah Mangal, Paktiya  
Balkh, Balkh  
Ghaziabad, Kunar  
Qarqin, Jowzjan  
Lajah Ahmad Kheil, Paktiya  
Maiwand, Kandahar  
Nahrin, Baghlan  
Chahar Dara, Kunduz  
Shamulzai, Zabul  
Tsamkani, Paktiya  
Dand Patan, Paktiya  
Siyahgird Ghorband, Parwan  
Khash, Badakhshan


Ahmadabad, Paktiya  
Tajah Wa Barfak, Baghlan  
Andar, Ghazni  
Zurmat, Paktiya  
Gurziwan, Faryab  
Qurghan, Faryab  
Qarah Bagh, Ghazni  
Azrah, Logar  
Shahid-e Hasas, Uruzgan  
Bal Chiragh, Faryab  
Qaram Qol, Faryab  
Khost wa Firing, Baghlan  
Andkhoy, Faryab  
Guzargah-e Nur, Baghlan  
Pul-e Khumri, Baghlan  
Du Lainah, Ghor  
Khan-e Chahar Bagh, Faryab  
Qal'ah-ye Kah, Farah  
Qush Tapa, Jowzjan  
Shinwari, Parwan  
Khakrez, Kandahar

Ghorak, Kandahar  
Fayroz Nakhchir, Samangan  
Mizan, Zabul  
Ma'ruf, Kandahar  
Shor Tepah, Balkh  
Rustaq, Takhar  
Arghistan, Kandahar  
Sayyidabad, Wardak  
Khinjan, Baghlan  
Sayyid Karam, Paktiya

02/02/22



# FALL OF GIROA TIMELINE



## 28 JUN – 4 JUL

- Yamgan, Badakhshan
- Khvajah 'Omari, Ghazni
- Baraki Barak, Logar
- Khugyani, Ghazni
- Kaktar, Balkh
- Alah Say, Kapisa
- Farkhar, Takhar
- Tagab, Kapisa
- Tashkan, Badakhshan
- Tagab, Badakhshan
- Shah Wali Kot, Kandahar
- Warduj, Badakhshan
- Kishim, Badakhshan
- Shahr-e Buzurg, Badakhshan
- Panjwa'i, Kandahar
- Darayim, Badakhshan
- Kalafgan, Takhar

- Kuf Ab, Badakhshan
- Ziruk, Paktika
- Argo, Badakhshan
- Baharak, Badakhshan
- Warsaj, Takhar
- Nesh, Kandahar
- Ishkashim, Badakhshan
- Zaybak, Badakhshan
- Shuhada, Badakhshan
- Yawan, Badakhshan
- Khwhan, Badakhshan
- Shiki, Badakhshan

## 5 – 11 JUL

- Muqur, Badghis
- Zindah Jan, Herat
- Kuf Ab, Badakhshan
- Nusay, Badakhshan
- Shighnan, Badakhshan
- Mya Neshin, Kandahar
- Chisht-e Sharif, Herat
- Hisarak, Nangarhar
- Dilaram, Nimroz
- Wakhan, Badakhshan
- Qadis, Badghis
- Badpash, Laghman
- Pashtun Zarghun, Herat
- Surk-e Parsa, Parwan
- Firing wa Gharu, Baghlan
- Hazrat-e Sultan, Samangan
- Darwaz-e Pa'in, Badakhshan
- Nawah-ye Barakzai, Helmand

- Kushk-e Kuhnah, Herat
- Shindand, Herat
- Adraskan, Herat
- Gulran, Herat
- Karukh, Herat
- Kushk, Herat
- Chakhansur, Nimroz
- Shorabak, Kandahar
- Shaykh 'Ali, Parwan
- Alisheng, Laghman
- Taywarah, Ghor
- Pasaband, Ghor
- Garm Ser, Helmand

## 12-18 JUL


- Arghandab, Kandahar
- Malistan, Ghazni
- Chahar Sadah, Ghor
- Pur Chaman, Farah
- Musa Khel, Khost
- Alingar, Laghman
- Spin Bojdaq, Kandahar
- Tamek wa Jalalak, Zabul
- Gomal, Paktika
- Dand, Kandahar
- Pusht-e Rod, Farah

## 19-25 JUL

- Nejrab, Kapisa
- Deh Rawud, Uruzgan
- Barg-e Mata, Nuristan
- Majjah, Helmand
- Nad Ali, Helmand
- Naray, Kunar



# FALL OF GIROA TIMELINE




**2-8 AUG**

Kamdesh, Nuristan  
Kang, Nimroz

**\*\* 8 AUGUST: Stopped tracking Fallen District centers to focus on Provincial Center losses\*\***

0600

# ASSESSED DRIVERS FOR THE RAPID COLLAPSE OF GIRoA




**06 AUG** | **07 AUG** | **08 AUG** | **10 AUG** | **11 AUG** | **12 AUG** | **13 AUG** | **14 AUG**

- ~~Nimroz~~
- ~~Samangan~~
- ~~Jowzjan~~
- ~~Sar-e Puli~~
- ~~Kunduz~~
- ~~Takhar~~
- ~~Baghlan~~
- ~~Badakhshan~~
- ~~Farah~~
- ~~Ghazni~~
- ~~Kandahar~~
- ~~Helmand~~
- ~~Herat~~
- ~~Badghis~~
- ~~Paktika~~
- ~~Zabul~~
- ~~Uruzgan~~
- ~~Logar~~
- ~~Ghor~~

## Assessed Drivers of GIRoA Collapse

- Systemic corruption
- Ghost soldiers
- Failure to proactively consolidate
- Failure to implement a national campaign strategy

(b)(1)1.4d



### 15 AUG

**\* RAPIDLY FELL DURING OR SHORTLY AFTER KABUL:**  
 Daykundi, Balkh, Bamyan, Faryab, Wardak, Parwan, Kapisa, Khost, Paktiya, Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman, Nuristan

(b)(1)1.4c



~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~**26 AUG 21: Timeline for Day of HKIA Abbey Gate Attack (Kabul, AFG)**

- **1250 hrs: Threat Stream of Imminent ISIS-K Bomber Attack**
  - Intel indicates ISIS-K picked up media leader and suicide bombers are ready
  - (b)(1)1.4a
  - Intent to attack HKIA gate(s) sometime today
  - Traveling from 10km southwest of HKIA
  - (b)(1)1.4a RADM Vasely and MG Donahue notified
- **1530 hrs: Prep with Gen McKenzie, Pre-SECDEF Update**
- **1600 hrs: Reported crowd estimates outside gates**
  - North Gate – 700 pax
  - East Gate – 500
  - South Gate – 300
  - Abbey Gate – 2000
- **1600 hrs: SECDEF Daily Update**
- **1743 hrs: CJOC reports Suicide Vest Bomber and Small Arms Attack**
  - **Abbey Gate – blast, followed by small arms**
  - Initial report, no U.S. casualties
  - Follow-up report, 6x USMC injured and being evacuated
  - 1755 hrs – Up to 20 Marines injured
  - 1800 hrs – 15-20 U.S. casualties, no KIA, urgent but not critical
  - 1803 hrs – IDF reported, no further info
  - 1808 hrs – 2x Ambulatory patients going to ROLE-2
  - 1813 hrs – 4x USMC KIA, 2x USMC Expectant, 18x total USMC casualties, 3x civilians casualties (status unknown at this time)
- **1815-1902 hrs: POTUS Update**
- **1823 hrs – CJOC reports second blast at Abbey Gate, just northwest of first blast site**
- **1829 hrs: CJOC reports 17 total USMC casualties, 4 of them KIA**
- **1847 hrs – CJOC reports 29 U.S. casualties, plus 4 KIA**
  - 15 U.S. wounded in ROLE-2
  - 14 U.S walking wounded outside ROLE-2
  - 2x Medical C-17s flying in from AUAB at this time
- **1906 hrs: Gen McKenzie call with RADM Vasely, Post-POTUS Update**
  - Priority is close Abbey Gate
- **1908 hrs: USFOR-A FWD J2 Update**
  - Second explosion reported earlier at Abbey Gate
  - Third explosion just now at Abbey Gate; box thrown over a wall
  - No casualties in second or third attacks
  - *(NOTE: Later determined 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> explosions did not occur; erroneous reporting)*
- 1911 hrs: (b)(1)1.4a
- **1935 hrs: ROLE-2 casualty update**
  - 34 casualties (mixed U.S. military/civilian)
  - 11 U.S. KIA (10 USMC, 1 US Navy Corpsman)
- **2200 hrs: Casualty Update**
  - 12 U.S. KIA
  - 24 U.S. WIA
- **2330 hrs: Casualty Update**
  - **13 U.S. KIA (11 USMC, 1 Navy Corpsman, 1 Army)**
  - **18 U.S. WIA (all USMC)** *(NOTE: Later updated to reflect final - 22 U.S. WIA)*

~~SECRET//REL FVEY~~

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Exhibit 071 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

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Chat Direct Message

- Rooms +
- Subscriptions +
  - HKIA
  - TIPPER
- Dashboards +
  - HKIA

(b)(1)1.4c 26-Aug-2021  
 09:09 AM (b)(1)1.4c a detection of a High Explosive IVO HKIA 1306:52z POSIT 13:06:53.610  
 343315N 0691304E, MRGS 42SWD200236  
 (b)(1)1.4c in this event, multiple sensors, multiple systems reporting

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) 26-Aug-2021  
 09:16 AM (b)(1)1.4a  
 IED at Abbey gate.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) 26-Aug-2021  
 09:20 AM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) 26-Aug-2021  
 13:20:07 Z  
 Summarization of what we know @1748: Explosion IVO 42SWD 2017424114, (b)(1)1.4c reporting stated that an SVEST was employed within the crowd near the drainage ditch. At this time, unknown casualties.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) 26-Aug-2021  
 09:20 AM Summarization of what we know @1748: Explosion IVO 42SWD 2017424114, (b)(1)1.4c reporting stated that an SVEST was employed within the crowd near the drainage ditch. At this time, unknown casualties.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) 26-Aug-2021  
 09:23 AM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)  
 13:22:59 Z  
 Taliban remain at the checkpoint (IVO 42SWD 1998023933) with vehicles blocking the area and Taliban stopping any personnel from moving north toward the gate





ABBEY GATE ATTACK NARRATIVE

- ~~(S//REL)~~ U.S. Marine Corps Joint Task Force-Crisis Response and the UK JFHQ opened Abbey Gate on 17 August to screen AMCITS, SIVs, Entitled Personnel (EPs – UK term) and at-risk Afghans.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ As of 25 August, there were multiple reports of ISIS-K posturing to take actions against US forces at HKIA. Coalition partners conducted a mass casualty response full scale rehearsal on 25 August. The U.S. DOS issued an alert warning AMCITS to avoid traveling to HKIA and for those outside to leave.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ On 25 August, the North and East Gates were closed. Abbey Gate remained in use for processing evacuees; was scheduled to be closed late on 26 August following US ECC/UK (Baron Hotel) operations.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ U.S. Marines positioned at the ECC point of Abbey Gate assisted with crowd control, sorting and processing. A female engagement team positioned at Abbey Gate assisted with searches. A PSYOPS team was also present to message to the crowd. 2,000 to 3,000 Afghan citizens crowded Abbey Gate for entry.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Aerial ISR at the time of the attack was being conducted by [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] captured the event (only before and after footage exists). [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]
- ~~(S//REL)~~ The Taliban conducted check-point operations, blocking traffic / screening pedestrians on the HKIA extended perimeter.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ The suspected suicide bomber, [redacted (b)(6)] used a forged ID to clear the Taliban CP; with one side being a Texas drivers license and the other side being U.S. permanent resident card.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ As the only open gate, the large crowd was active and physical. Multiple U.S. Marines postured forward of the actual gate as the formation conducted screening operations. Units had provided every Soldier and Marine with the threat warnings; screening / tactical tasks were conducted accordingly.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ At 1308Z the explosive device was detonated. The device is assessed to have been inside of a backpack. The 20-25lb device was composed of a improvised directional fragmentation charge (improvised claymore) using 15-20lbs of commercial/military-grade explosives and 5mm ball bearings.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ISIS-K executed a complex attack with SAF immediately following the explosion. Eye witness account from a FG Officer note enemy gunmen in dominant overwatch positions from adjacent buildings; this threat is rapidly defeated. The large casualty count is directly attributed to the complex attack.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ JTF-CR launched QRF elements and initiated CASEVAC support to the Role-II hospital on North HKIA. ISR and coalition reinforcements stabilize the situation and secure / close the gate.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Casualties included 13x USMIL KIA (11 Marine, 1 Sailor, and 1 Soldier), 22x USMIL WIA, and an estimated 169x Afghan civilian casualties; for a total of 182x casualties.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Aeromedical Evacuation C-17s were launched from [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and Ramstein Airbase, Germany. The first aircraft arrived at HKIA at 2137Z on 26 AUG (approximately 8-hours after the incident) and the other two arriving on 27 AUG at 0055Z and 0110Z. All three C-17s departed HKIA on 27 AUG at 0103Z, 0327Z and 0508Z.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ ISIS-K's likely motive was the disruption of Coalition evacuation operations, increased panic among civilians and to cause friction between Taliban and Coalition Forces.



**SECRET//FVEY**

Exhibit 074

# Operation Allies Refuge After Action Review 24 SEP 21

## USFOR-A FWD Submission



SECRET//FVEY

# Defense of Hamid Karzai International Airport

## Defense of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA):

(U) Issue: Force not set to establish security of HKIA and commence ECC operations at start of the NEO.

(U) Discussion: At the start of NEO CENTCOM and USFOR-A (FWD) were still setting the force. On 15 AUG, we were out of position relative to airfield security and a large majority of the security force was still flowing in to theater. At the time CENTCOM directed 1/82 ABN to move into theater, ARG/MEU and SPMAGTAF forces were still flowing into HKIA. In-theater C-17s and C-130s were at a readiness rate of 50% with 3 of 6 in theater C-17s and 2 of 3 in theater C-130s having maintenance issues. This impacted our ability to move in-theater forces rapidly. Within 72 hours we had the appropriate forces to secure the airfield perimeter and rapidly respond to any breaches in perimeter security. Prepositioning security forces earlier in the sequence could have prevented the initial breaches in airfield security. The flow into theater was initially slow due to maintenance issues and activation of TRANSCOM assets.

(U) Recommendation: Align flow of forces to NEO conditions matrix triggers and consider using forces in theater as an initial in-extremis measure should timeline accelerate.



SECRET//FVEY

## DoS Integration

### DoS Integration:

(U) Issue: Consular affairs personnel rotated during NEO.

(U) Discussion: On 21 August, DoS brought in new consular personnel and replaced the consular team that initiated the evacuation. This mid-evacuation rotation caused confusion as the new consular team established operations. The new team shifted to initially AMCIT and legal permanent residents only, but then shifted back, allowing P1/P2 refugees, and establish a level of SIV processing paperwork that was acceptable. This caused confusion for security personnel and evacuees which led to delays in evacuee processing. Consular staff did not have sufficient manning to supervise all processing at the gates which often led to Department of Defense (DoD) personnel at the gates making on the spot calls concerning paperwork. The Consular provided examples and training to the DoD gate guards for processing paperwork, though with the limited time and exposure, there was confusion as to what paperwork was acceptable.

(U) Recommendation: As recommended in JP 3-68, Department of State needs to identify in NEO planning the expected NEO numbers by category. The DoS needs to provide the adequate number of consular officers that were part of the NEO planning to facilitate the evacuee categories. The criteria for prioritization needs to be presented up front and designed with DoD lead ECC planners.

USCENTCOM FORM 21-0546  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

0652

02/02/22

SECRET//FVEY

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(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.7e



SECRET//FVEY

# Crisis Action Planning: Abbey Gate Attack

## Crisis Action Planning: Abbey Gate Attack:

(U) Issue: Casualty identification and tracking practices were insufficient for a mass casualty event.

(U) Discussion: There was a severe failure in patient administration/tracking during the 26 August MASCAL event. This failure caused the misidentification of one set of remains and at least one casualty that was in critical condition. The names were misreported through official channels, but the discrepancy was discovered prior to notification. A full accounting and re-identification of all casualties was conducted prior to any further casualty processing.

(U) Recommendation: Establish and rehearse casualty marking and accountability practices. Designate an individual/team with the sole duty of maintaining positive identification of casualties as they are identified and tracking location and status.



SECRET//FVEY

# Afghanistan Special Interest Groups

## Afghanistan Special Interest Groups:

(U) Issue: Special interest groups contacted the Multinational Coordination Cell directly, and did not prioritize American citizens.

(U) Discussion: The Multinational Coordination Cell was created to facilitate extraction of personnel through requests received via phone and emails. Additionally, requests to evacuate at-risk Afghans came from executive branch officials, lawmakers, their staff offices, retired and active duty GOFs, and special interest over pursuing AMCITs prioritized by the US Ambassador and DoS. These requestors used both implied and actual authority to coerce members to extract their special interest groups, resulting in devotion of limited manpower solely to this task and creating undue pressure on an already complex process.

(U) Recommendation: Follow planning and preparation guidance in JP 3-68. Ensure all requests flow through designated channels and not directly to the force executing the NEO. Develop an IA TF to serve as the focal point for requests that has the resources and ability to prioritize evacuation requests, and consider forming on-site NEO coordination cell. Sustain the MNCC concept and resource this in future NEOs to facilitate US and coalition requirements.





SECRET//FVEY

# Drawdown and Evacuation

## Drawdown and Evacuation:

(U) Issue: Delay in embassy staff drawdown, NEO declaration, and lack of agreed upon IA NEO I&W conditions increased risk to mission upon NEO execution.

(U) Discussion: Despite five EACs and persistent collaboration with the Embassy RSO and key leaders on the deteriorating security situation, USEK was slow to order needed reductions in its 2400 US person manpower. On 21 Jul, the Embassy directed a 17% cut by 10 Aug bringing to the total civilians to 2000 over a three week period. The Inter Agency NEO TTX on 10 Aug identified the deteriorating situation which predicted the full isolation of Kabul within the next 30 days, but concluded with a lack of consensus on conditions that would trigger a decision to execute a NEO. Attached USFOR-A (FWD) I&W conditions matrix highlighted 6 of 7 indicators in the RED on 9 Aug. On 11 Aug, the Embassy informally request DoD support in the evacuation over a 17 day period which would have completed the withdrawal to HKIA by 31 Aug. This slow draw down over weeks (verses days) forced USFOR-A (FWD) to place most of its focus on evacuating the embassy over a 12 hour period on the 15th of August as the capital fell to the Taliban while simultaneously working with JTF-CR on building and setting the force to secure HKIA. As the Taliban entered the city on 15 Aug, several thousand Afghan civilians breached the southern entrance to HKIA before security could be set, delaying the ability to secure the airfield for close to 48 hours and set conditions for JTF-CR Evacuation Control Centers (ECCs). Had there been a more holistic understanding of the I&W conditions being set for a decision to initiate a NEO by O/A 9 AUG, the evacuation of the USEK could have been executed more efficiently and enabled USFOR-A (FWD) and JTF-CR to manage security conditions at HKIA to allow for a more orderly NEO process.

(U) Recommendation: Future crisis planning should include a discussion on building consensus between DoS and DoD on NEO I&W conditions with triggers for actions that should be taken to avoid strategic surprise. One of these actions should be to establish agreed to minimal manning posture well in advance of a NEO being executed to ensure conditions are set for evacuation process.

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545

0634

02/02/22

SECRET//FVEY



## ISB and TSH Site:

(U) Issue: Insufficient processing capacity at temporary safe havens paused evacuations.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Discussion: USFOR-A (FWD) developed two branch plans in cooperation with multiple DoD organizations and DoS using a key assumption that embassy evacuations and Afghan SIV evacuations would not occur simultaneously. Additionally, an interagency rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill identified that the total evacuation population was unknown, and temporary safe havens would reach capacity in only 48 hours. During the NEO, White House direction to increase the flow of evacuees coupled with several hundred special interest group request for support outside the prioritization scheme rapidly increased the throughput of evacuees. As a result, simultaneous processing and evacuation of all groups resulted in temporary safe havens quickly reaching and exceeding capacity. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(U) Recommendation: Planning for large scale NEO operations requires a mechanism to synchronize the flow of evacuees between departure and reception facilities and organizations. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a



SECRET//FVEY

# Taliban Coordination

## Taliban Coordination:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Issue: Direct coordination with, and sharing intelligence with the Taliban enabled layered security, facilitated evacuation of AMCITS, and likely mitigated further ISIS-K attacks.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Discussion: POTUS directed and CDR USCENTCOM approved the sharing of intelligence for force protection threats with the Taliban (en extremis). (b)(1)1,4c intelligence obtained through

(b)(1)1,4c reports enabled USFOR-A (FWD) to pass hard copies of

(b)(1)1,4c This intelligence sharing built trust and opened critical lines of communication with the Taliban Commander assigned as our direct coordination POC. This coordination provided a critical conduit to coordinate crowd control, external security of HKIA, and ensured the evacuation of prioritized civilian personnel. The 26 Aug ISIS-K attack reflects the risk of reliance on Tb as they failed to ensure checkpoints were in place to screen personnel approaching the gates, however, following this attack the Taliban increased force protection measures (stopping traffic, searching vehicles, reducing crowds at gates, etc). This cooperation likely averted the imminent ISIS-K attack planned for 29 Aug and follow on attacks planned against the JTE on 30/31 AUG. This direct coordination set conditions for a coordination mechanism led by DOS to further evacuate AMCITs and SIVs post-31 August.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Recommendation: Be prepared to cooperate with traditionally hostile parties when strategic objectives dictate. Intelligence sharing served as the foundation of building trust with the enemy in an extreme situation and enabled further cooperation on security and evacuations after the JTE.

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(Abbey Gate Investigation)

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## Command Relationships

### Command Relationships:

(U) Issue: C2 deviation from what was planned for NEO execution

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Discussion: NEO planning resulted in several options for HKIA security augmentation if required. This problem set was exercised during the interagency TTX and CENTCOM ROC Drills. In execution an alternative option was chosen, the 82<sup>nd</sup> ABN DIV security element was called forward with the addition of the division headquarters to fulfill a C2 function of airfield security. This led to three general officers and corresponding staffs operating under an initially unclear COMREL based on the conditions on the ground. It wasn't until mid-NEO that COMREL was published by CENTCOM, even then it was unclear to many subordinate elements. The decision to incorporate the 82 ABN DIV TAC enabled effective division of tasks and relationships amongst the GO/FOs and key staff ultimately provided the foundation for a successful working COMREL. However, the absence of a clear and published COMREL prior to the execution of NEO had the potential to increase risk.

(U) Recommendation: Higher headquarters must publish COMREL prior to the start of an operations for all echelons especially when outside forces are included in the force presentation. Commanders at all levels must ensure this is clear to subordinate elements in execution.



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# International Support

## International Support:

(U) Issue: Multi-lateral diplomatic forum essential to unifying coalition support to operations

(b)(1)1.4d

(U) Recommendation: For all operational theaters, identifying, understanding and harnessing the framework by which senior diplomatic and military representatives can come together is essential to mitigating risk, providing time and space to make decisions.

Page 86 redacted for the following reason:

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Exhibit 075 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release



ACTS-SCK-DO

6 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
2/1, 06 October 2021

1. On 06 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at 1 Marines Communications Facility, Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) US Army, was recording the conversation for transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) discussing the scope and purpose of the investigation. The framing of the discussion surrounded the pre-deployment and deployment timeline along with the Abbey Gate and Blast/Post Blast timeline. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) informed the Marines [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be recording the conversation and would provide them a synopsis of the conversation for confirmation that the information and discussion was captured to the best of their knowledge.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your professional background, how long have you been in this duty position?

(2) Answer.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) and arrived to the unit in May 2020.  
[REDACTED] (b)(6) and I started as [REDACTED] (b)(6) in January 2020. I arrived to the unit in June of 2018 and served as [REDACTED] (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Describe the units pre-deployment training, certification, and internal force structure

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) – We did a 16 month work up with our core mission essential tasks (MET) being Crisis Response with a focus on Embassy reinforcement, Facilitating

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Humanitarian assistance, plus the MEF specific lists of requirements. The concept of the work up is to start at the team level and work up to company and Battalion events. Things like operating in a counter IED environment. Early in the work up through mid-2020 we spent a lot of time working individual to team to company level. We used the Infantry Immersion trainer and then went to our Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) at 29 Palms. Our MEF level certification actually got put on hold because during the ITX our deployment got cancelled. We kept training and eventually the official word came down that we would be part of the 31st MEU. SDOB got approved at the end of January and it became official. We trained a lot for the TRAP mission. EOTG used their own reps to certify us in TRAP during the conduct of this exercise with NSWG 1.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - From an outsiders perspective this is very intense on a compressed timeline in execution with joint force which feeds your ability to work internally and externally with a joint force.

(b)(6) - Absolutely, and especially since Plan and execute with joint and interagency wasn't on our MET list at the time. We trained all required tasks for all assigned METs. TRAP was the only assigned MET that required certification and it was certified by EOTG during TRIDENT Exercise 21-3 with NSWG 1. Each company went through exercises with working with Embassy response, crowd control, interpreter training, non-lethal weapons training, and each company had non-lethal weapons instructors (NLWI). Every company had NLWI. We also worked with Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group Basic Engagement Course for advisor training and skills.

(b)(6) (b)(1)1.4c  
(b)(1)1.4c

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you deploy?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - March 12th. Golf went to (b)(1)1.4a Everyone else went to (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a Fox went to (b)(1)1.4a 1 CAAT team went to (b)(1)1.4a TF TRAP went to (b)(1)1.4a Stalker Detachment went to (b)(1)1.4a Our UAS team went to (b)(1)1.4a We had guys all over and everyone was kind of task organized to be able to keep training through their locations.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did the Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) discussion and direction come up?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - May 21st. We were on a leaders recon for deliberate retrograde. We were looking at HKIA in a site survey in the 3rd week of May.



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(b)(6) – When we did our Relief in Place (RIP) with 3/1, we thought it was kind of weird that they didn't keep an eye on Afghanistan. Not like they forgot but it wasn't much of a focus.

(b)(6) – Also in May we transitioned the Battalion Headquarters (BN HQ) to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a But at some point we saw traffic to establish a JTF which originally was supposed to be the SPMAGTF. So by June we began planning and ended up getting some really good reps in. We did 2 Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX). We got to confirm our planning and load exercise and conduct STRATMOBEX to confirm cargo loadouts and TPFDD entries.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So when you did your mission Rehearsals, did you have role players to act as OPFOR and NEO personnel?

(b)(6) – Yes, in the first MRX we had a small group to act out the requirements, but in the second one we got about 500 role players from the Army and Air Force in July. I'm pretty sure we had a full up After Action Review (AAR) on that we sent through the MEU. Those were both great opportunities to kind of proof some of our load plans and force flow concepts.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So you looked at lessons learned with those MRX opportunities?

(b)(6) – Regarding the MRX, we didn't have a full up Integration Exercise. We practiced a grand gesture of how to track NEO and matching to logistics and support to define what scope and responsibility we would assign to the different teams and use for planning factors.

(b)(6) – We developed a full annexed OPORD which, the biggest thing I was worried about was fires and force protection. I was concerned about out of scope issues and control. The other big thing we developed was an Excel document which helped us develop Entry Control Point (ECP) procedures and planning for Heavy Equipment (HE) requirements. We actually required our Engineers to go to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a to do assessments and see examples.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Looking at Embassy reinforcement with NEO?

(b)(6) – It was a concept to establish an ECP and process evacuees. Very relevant to that discussion was the phased time approach of when we would likely execute and hand off different operations in the process. That discussion had a lot of value for how we ended up understanding the requirements later on.

f. Question and Answer 5.

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(1) Question. So Golf company was in [REDACTED] working with UK forces. Was 2/3 Pararescue there? Didn't they end up in HKIA with you?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] We did work with them, 2/3, but not on NEO. They were part of some of our training and we worked with them. We basically established a working relationship with them.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. So you ended up getting a deployment order. Talk to me about the force flow and infill.

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] on 12th of August we got the initial notification. The original notice didn't mention 2/1 Marines. We assumed we would be a supporting effort and we actually went to a +24 cycle. What was tricky about this was that we had no official task, so we looked at it as a 'NEO kind-of' but planned to fight our way in against the Taliban.

[REDACTED] So we had no consistency with tasking prior to August 15th because so much was shifting. You saw the Afghans giving up, but the Government of Afghanistan (GIROA) was still in play. We thought we'd get in fine but the Afghans would maintain posture.

[REDACTED] From my perspective the J2 was planning for a permissive entry.

[REDACTED] the CENTCOM/DoD was briefing different than others. Inconsistent planning factors were being briefed all over the place and in trying to anticipate what would happen with GIROA, we really had a hard time centering on the actual situation on the ground.

[REDACTED] We were feeling "audio doesn't match the video". Why we couldn't get posture and protection answers was connected to separate DoD entity messaging. It effected our planning and preparation. But we were planning on HKIA. We knew where, we just didn't know the when and how.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Talk through the Planning Phase. What was your Force flow, shifts, and steady state?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] Planning after the 12th shifted all over the place. As of the morning of the 15th we were looking at terrain, adversary, and logistics, but we had no task. We flew that night with the security from E Company with about 85 Marines. In period of darkness between the 15th and the 16th, we arrived in HKIA. That was an at risk landing. At the time the airfield was completely uncontrolled from the tower, from a security perspective, and had no assessment from anyone we were connected with.

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(b)(6)– Nobody was on the runway. There were abandoned airplanes and people congregating at the terminal. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6)– So on the morning of the 16th the initial insert was basically a ‘fill the gap’ exercise. Between the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, the 10th Mountain, and us, we were trying to establish some version of control from the south side of the runways. The efforts all became focused on tying in together and clearly identifying sectors for security. I don’t want to call this sporadic, but it was a constantly evolving situation where understanding who was where at what time and keeping civilians out of our perimeter was the main concern. We were just trying to establish the CoC. We were supposed to have dedicated space, but we found a room and set up a room with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and started running our operations out of there. We were up and running in the CoC within 8-12 hours with initial operating capability. We were really doing crowd control in order to establish airfield security. Just trying to make a defined perimeter. Specifically we were looking to control the Airstrip. It became very apparent very quickly how challenged we would be based on our numbers.

(b)(6)– Once the Airstrip was cleared, we established the blocking positions where there were gaps. We were using whatever means we could to try to identify gaps and fill them.

(b)(6)– Aside from the Taliban, our biggest known concern was the ISIS-K threat. We went in knowing that ISIS-K was both the Most likely Course of Action for the enemy, and the Most Dangerous Course of Action. We didn’t want to present them a target. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, it was already the worst case scenario because we had no control over the airfield and had no control over any established area.

(b)(6)– Small arms fire wasn’t even a concern necessarily at that point. The biggest thing was isolating and controlling the airfield and gaps.

(b)(6)– the 16<sup>th</sup> through the 18th was all about control.

(b)(6)– We were processing no one and trying to establish control. Admiral Vasely clearly understood that, and messaged even through the Taliban that we needed to get control of the airport. Until the Afghan civilians were off the airfield, we weren’t getting anything done.

(b)(6)– Evening on the 16th is when the clear finally happened. Sometime in the early evening we were able to establish control of the known perimeter and to link in with

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what we thought was a reasonable level of assurance that the National Strike Unit (NSU) and Army and us in our sector had control of the perimeter.

(b)(6) — Once the NSU got through the North gate and almost like the people understood what was required, they kind of dissipated and moved back.

(b)(6) — So that was the big part of what I've been calling Phase 1. So I generally broke it down to 5 phases:

Phase I: Insert/Airstrip regaining from the 15th through the 16th

Phase II: Established perimeter security from the 16th through the 18th

Phase III: Opening Abbey Gate between the 18th and the 19th

Phase IV: Processing between the 19th and the 26th

Phase V: RIPPING off the gate and exfil on the 26th through the 28th

(b)(6) — For force flow, we primarily got Fox, some of Headquarters and Support Company, and Echo was already on ground. Golf came on the 18th. On the 19th we got The rest of Echo, Fox, and Golf plus Weapons Company. Once we had all our Marines, we understood our perimeter to be from the Passenger Terminal to Abbey Gate.

(b)(6) — I was concerned about our tie ins with other units and partnership with other sections of the perimeter. Like: how would we know what was happening with them at their positions and on their lines and at their gates?

(b)(6) — Our adjacent units were 1/8 from Abbey Gate to the north, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, NSU, and 82nd. Initially on the 16th through the 18th 82nd was flowing in. On the 17th to the 23rd I was operating on a map with tactical control measures. It wasn't perfect but it got the job done and I kept a common operating picture. On the 18th we set our guys in on security after a little bit of relief from crowd security.

(b)(6) — We had one sniper team forward. At this point we started getting passive threats to make sure that it was clear the 31st was the date. The Taliban were clear that they would work with us but we weren't welcome forever. Roving patrols, and the Taliban were the understanding that the 31st was the day.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has a document that you need to see. (SEE EXHIBIT 95). 18th/19th RIPPed on the inner perimeter. We focused CAAT Platoons on the Abbey gate.

(b)(6) — So at this point there is a discussion about the Abbey gate construct. The northernmost gate near the airfield is the inner gate. Next closest to it is the UK, or middle gate. The Chevron is on the southern side. (Diagram is drawn on the board and matches the naming and locations agreed upon by all as the locations and names that match the narratives seen from here on out.)

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(b)(6) – So Phase III, starting on the task of getting the Abbey gate open on the 19<sup>th</sup>. We went to Abbey Gate proper. 250-300 meters between Abbey Gate proper and the Chevron. UK controlled Abbey to middle gate. Between UK and Chevron the Brits were cut off. Admiral Vasely walked down here at one point. We did crowd control to push the crowd back. G Company, F Company, Weapons Company, CO, S3 were all there at the gate.

(b)(6) – Snipers and CAAT were doing overwatch looking for BOLOs and doing Intel collection. Working together they were overwatch and guardian angel.

(b)(6) Task Org has CAAT Platoons controlling the gate. Initial NEO went from Abbey gate North. For the first couple days it was G Company and F Company (-) who was working with E Company switching out. We pulled 750 people for processing while clearing the gate AO. Unity of effort, but not unity of command with the Brits. But working with them we pushed back the crowd, and they remained calm pretty much all the way to the where the chevron would be with a very low level of force. Later the chevron got put in and the Taliban manned it.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So the plan was coordinated with the US and UK? You worked with them about setting up the single entrance and that was understood to be the plan?

(b)(6) – The 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> was still clearing. We had the same task org throughout this time. We just kept processing and operated the gate. Abbey never went down even when other gates were sporadic. Having depth of manpower helped us operate the ECP. We were very concerned about Force Protection. We had jersey barriers and some control measures, but distance and standoff was a serious concern given the structure of the Abbey gate corridor. (board discussion on the diagram of the Abbey gate corridor specifically highlighting the distances of the locations and control measures at each location)

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Was the embassy and Department of State were responsible for the schedule of gate opening and closure?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – The Direction to open or close the processing of personnel at Abbey gate was not our call. Higher controlled this movement and timing of personnel and it was not always transparent to us. Operating the gate consistently helped us to control the corridor because the civilians would see progress as long as it was happening.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So security and processing operations were very codependent and as a known requirement, working processing kept further manpower and clearance from being required to operate and reinforce?

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(b)(6)– Yes sir, and we discussed among ourselves what acceptable documents looked like. That definition kept changing. Because we were bringing people in, people kept showing up at Abbey because they heard it was working. The people knew that Abbey was the primary processing location. Other gates closing created desperate conditions for us because the population would surge down to us coming from other gates that weren't operating as consistently. Also, because the Taliban were operating at the chevron, the populace just understood that no one was getting through there and so they would just bypass the chevron to come to Abbey from the canal side.

(b)(6)– The other gates were functionally closed for days. Calm to chaos was a gradual thing and took a bunch of contributing factors to compound over time. The texts were coming in, Pineapple, Congress persons, Germans, everyone – it was constant and because we offered a known point of processing that stayed open we became the answer for a lot of people. We created grab teams and had tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) for how to hold up a sign or send us a visual signal to correlate to a message or specific individual.

(b)(6)– Taliban caught on too. As soon as they would start seeing the signs or the visual signals, they would catch on to what we were queuing in on. They noticed and they modified their behavior for their guys inside the corridor area. This was interesting too because the other people would see the things that groups were doing and they would start to mimic it and make signs, so we would get a bunch of people who didn't actually have a passport or connection that would accidentally get prioritized by mimicking some of our TTPs.

(b)(6)– So because we saw what was happening, and we kind of hit an understanding of operations as they were happening, we would start OPTs for the next phase, Joint Tactical Exfiltration (JTE). I prioritized two main things: first, Engineer effort to assess the drawback from Abbey gate and what obstacles or changes needed to be implemented to assist us in that when the time came. Second, we recommended closing on the 25th in order to send the message that the timeline for full stop was coming. We didn't want to plan to be the last ones operating and having the massive surge of humanity be solely at Abbey gate. Because we were concerned about the Brits getting isolated and losing contain of the perimeter security.

(b)(6)– A lot of JTE planning we were hearing from others and from higher was focused on the 31st. We knew that timeline was flawed based on being in a position to actually be out on the 31st. (b)(1)1.4c was not really functional at this point. (b)(1)1.4c lull then came back up. We kept getting info on a relevant threat stream. We know ISIS-K was looking to Suicide vest IED (SVIED). So we kept pushing the BOLO questions down to the small unit leaders and Marines. We fact checked a lot at the lowest level for stuff to look at and understanding. Gate trends was my focus. On the Morning of the 26th someone took a picture of a shady looking individual. PSYOP saw a guy. (b)(1)1.4c

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took a pic. We had a lot of specific, but then circular intel reporting. We were not synched at higher level. I kept asking for radio recon. I don't understand why we didn't have a dedicated asset. (b)(1)1.4 would've been great to have dedicated for oversight and visual. We didn't have our (b)(1)1.4. I had a hard time with asset allocation and control given our position and point of impact.

(b)(6) – This was very centralized. We were stacked all on top of ourselves and compressed. We kept trying to make sure our supported elements were taken care of, but we didn't always feel like we were being taken care of. It speaks to the difficulty of the operation. The coordination and relationships are really difficult to create until you already have the mission.

(b)(6) – We didn't really feel the shift away from counter terrorism focus.

(b)(6) – So this all led to us creating a reference document for the OPORD for the RIP and Extract phases. We outlined areas of responsibility and planned to have the CAAT teams on guard. Snipers were overwatch. The Gate corridor breakdown was basically that E Company was to control with G Company in support and F Company was controlling middle to chevron. We had the shock trauma platoon attached to the battalion and they ended up moving to the battalion area at Abbey gate when the East shut down. We got our [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a set up and really tried to make sure they were utilized to best support the Force Protection conditions. I had two different Engineer assessments done in order to emplace block and disrupt obstacles that would allow us to pull back and not have the surge be able to follow onto us. We asked for t-walls and a bunch of other stuff but based on location and availability of time and supply the engineers just couldn't facilitate.

(b)(6) – The 25th is when things got noticeably more crowded and hectic. We did a time-distance analysis of the populations ability to move in the corridor and we figured it would be an hour to get from the entrance area into the blast sight based on the crowds and how packed it was by the 25th and 26th.

(b)(6) – G company was controlling chevron to middle. E Company was in the corridor from middle to North. In order to facilitate drawback from Abbey gate, F Company was at the passenger terminal. Technically that was a bit of a relief.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. You made a recommendation to close on 25th. Why did that get delayed?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Brits weren't ready. They never really said why, but their timeline slipped and we couldn't close the gate

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(b)(6) The Brits had a lot of guys down there at 1800 on the 25th which was the original timeline. Then that slipped to 0700 on the 26th. It kept slipping. I captured that in the (Exhibit 95). The timeline shift really hindered our ability to plan and institute our own drawback.

(b)(6) Command and Control was at the gate. Internal control measures allowed us to have shifts and locations locally controlled.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Talk about the day of the 26th leading up to the blast.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) There was concern. We saw the buildup of personnel and we kept asking about the timeline for the Brits and we started really asking for the plan to stop taking people in. the 26th morning traffic was insane. Dysfunctional. We stopped working with the facilitators who were trying to call and text us to get people in the gate. We were telling everyone the gate was closing and we were shutting down the reception of individuals.

(b)(6) We didn't have a pinpoint. It was ongoing and daily increase in the expectation that things were shifting to a new threat. We knew things were changing but the timeline slippage just kept us having to relook everything.

(b)(6) the Joint Ops Center (JOC) was focused on the larger view and getting numbers out.

(b)(6) Ops and intel, General Sullivan specifically acknowledged the existence of the threat but knew the mission had to continue. On the morning of the 26th was still kind of unclear about timeline versus reality.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Knowing that the timeline was shifting and seeing the second and third order effects on retrograde, did this effect your timing, planning, and actions.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We looked at all of that. Other than airlift from the Barron Hotel, we didn't really see an alternative for the Brits to get back to us, so we couldn't pull back. But we didn't really get a timeline.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Clarify the RIP and when E Company got pulled out and came back in?



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(2) Answer. That would've happened sometime between 19th to the 25th. We did it on the hood of a car there right at the entrance to Abbey Gate proper. We worked out the issues and the rotation where [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got pushed back to Abbey and middle gate.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had gotten pulled off but then got an order to get back down to the gate?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) 25th would make sense for that. When E Company was on the corridor, it was better controlled but that had a lot to do with the crowd situation. Getting Echo back on the Abbey gate was key to the RIP timeline when it did happen.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We had to make the deliberate decision whether to hold at the bridge on the canal or pull back. When the RIP happened between E and G Companies we decided to pull the perimeter control back to the tower and the jersey barriers. We made that decision based on the risk to the mission and the force, and we needed to collapse back to the middle gate at minimum to be able to hold before the final RIP.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. So the RIP between E and G has happened, lets talk about the blast and timeline right before.

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) I went with the [REDACTED] (b)(6) where we were talking with General Sullivan an hour before the blast. The crowd problem was really bad at the barrier. The PSYOP Truck was parked inside the gate and I'm standing there when the blast goes off. My immediate response was to get on the radio and they were asking me for a casualty assessment. I told them 20-30 Marines, and then I started working to try to get out to the blast area. I did register gunfire but I never saw the point of origin or got Positive ID on any one individual.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) Our documents and after action are really unclear about all that. Reports are hard to compile and separate on this specific point.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) Nobody was shooting into the crowd or anything. Nobody was just shooting. I knew someone was shooting at a perceived threat.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) My best understanding is captured in the (Exhibit 95) document

[REDACTED] (b)(6) So you're wounded but you're working CASEVAC at this point?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
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(b)(6)– Yes sir, I was working CASEVAC and getting the Company Commanders back to get security.

(b)(6) I was in the JOC and had already heard initial reports. I was hearing and documenting what I could and trying to coordinate reports and ISR. I was just working to get information and to inform higher. The crowds dispersed and Marines started doing security. 3 Minutes between blast and security set in place where gunshots were happening. 15 minutes between blast and gate shut.

(b)(6)– I saw vehicles pack up with casualties and get moving. I was kind of going through my head seeing the company commanders, getting security set in. Then I started feeling some of my wounds and things kind of shifted.

(b)(6)– Not long after the situation occurred, 82nd sped up their timeline and were in to take the gate. The Brits went back to the Barron. Next day E Company supported the Post Blast analysis. The Taliban were also helping. They supported our plans to pull back. There would have been no other ISIS-K observation due to our positions and overwatch of the area. No Taliban or ISIS-K would have been possible based on the observation available and what positions we controlled. It is possible the Taliban could've maybe taken some shots, but I don't have any confirmation of any of that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. When did the Brits clear out of the Barron?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– That was the next morning. 82nd was in place and they RIPped through 82<sup>nd</sup>.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What else did I need to know? Do you have anything else you want to talk about?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– No sir, nothing to add. (b)(6)– No sir, nothing to add.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Approved for Release