

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 041 (b)(5)

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Page 2 redacted for the following reason:


Exhibit 041 (b)(5)

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SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ROMIA

JTF COMMANDER'S PLACEMAT | HKIA BATTLE SPACE FRAMEWORK

CAO: 23AUG 2021_0600




Force Composition:

- ☐ JTF-CR HQ (83)
- ☐ 24MEU (1,250)
BLT 1/8
A, B, C, WPNS Co
CAAT, LAR, MRF
CLB 24
- ☐ SPMAGTF-CR-CC (785)
E, F, G, WPNS Co, STP
- ☐ 10th MTN DIV
2-30 INF (TF Wild Boar)
HHC BDE (SAF)
- ☐ 82 ABN DIV
1-82 ABN BDE
1-504 INF Bn
A, B, C, D, WPNS Co
2-504 INF Bn
A, B, C, D, WPNS Co
2-503 INF Bn
1-194 INF Bn
3-319 AFAR
4-31 INF (TF Polar Bear)

LEGEND
 ★ ECC Processing (b)(1), 1.4d
 ▲ Taliban Checkpoint

SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, ROMIA

230600AUG



| | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|------------|---------------|---------|---------|
| XX | X | III | II | II (-) | II (-) |
| USFOR-A FWD | JTF-CR | 24 MEU | SPMAGTF | 2-30 IN | 4-31 IN |
| X | CRE | (b)(1)1.4d | TURMIL SECFOR | COMHKIA | JFHQ |

CAMP ALVARADO

x || ||

B2 ABN 1-504 PIR 2-504 PIR

|| || (-)

4-501 PIR 3-319 AFAR TF TALON

(*)

TF CRAM

LEGEND

★ ECC Processing | (b)(1)1.4d

▲ Taliban Checkpoint

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 043: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

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Page 9 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 045: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(5)

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Exhibit 046: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Exhibit 047: (b)(1)1.4g

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Exhibit 048: (b)(5), (b)(6)

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Exhibit 049: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 1.7(c)

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
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~~SECRET//REL TO USA//FVEY~~
JTF CR CASUALTY NOTIFICATION/COORDINATION

CAO: 15 Aug 2021



~~SECRET//REL TO USA//FVEY~~

JTF CR CASUALTY NOTIFICATION/COORDINATION

CAO: 15 Aug 2021

**HKIA GATE SENTRY
US Casualty
NOTIFICATION** 1

AFG Casualty
REQUIRE DECISION
BASED ON MED ROE

JTF CR BWC 2

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Alternate: Radio
Contingency: TAC Chat
Emergency: NIPR or Whasapp

JTF CR MED LNO

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Alternate: Blue Radio
Contingency: HF Radio
Emergency: TAC CHAT

JOC

BDOC BWC

Purpose: Coordinate available assets to scene.
Battle Captain
Strike Bridge: (b)(6)

Alternate: Blue Radio
Contingency: HF Radio
Emergency: TAC CHAT

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| USFOR-A FWD Surgeon/JTF Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | 1/82 Airborne Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | MEU Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) |
| JTF Deputy Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | 3/10 MTN Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | MEU Medical Planner (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) |
| JTF CR Lead Medical Planner/ Deputy Director, MED (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | GST Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | SPMAGTF Surgeon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) |
| JTF CR Medical Planner/Log (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | PJ Medical Team (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | SPMAGTF Medical Planner (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) |
| JTF CR Patient Evacuation Center (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | POCs | |
| | | UK Surgical Team (b)(6) |

Legend

Primary →

Coordination ← - - - →

HKIA ROLE II TOC: CASEVAC/MEDEVAC 3

(b)(6)

Alternate: Blue Radio
Contingency: HF Radio
Emergency: TAC CHAT

★ ROLE 2 PROVIDE INPUT 4

- Role 2 Hospital decision based on MED ROE+ capacity to care for casualty
- Delegated Approval to COL Lynch from USFOR-A FWD Surgeon

AEROEVACUATION LIAISON TEAM (AELT) 5

Coordinates AE/CCATT

TPMRC-E for inter/intra theater lift

TPMRC-E coordinates with LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER (LRLM, GER) 6

Role 3/4 care and notify AELT (HKIA) MEDEVAC APPROVAL

~~SECRET//REL TO USA//FVEY~~

JTF CR MEDSITREP

CAO: 22 AUG 2021
1200D

Total Casualties

- KIA 1
- Injured/SI 1
- Critical/V-SI 0
- Minor/NSI 4
- LRMC (GER) 0

24 Hour Patient Casualty Report

CAO: 22 AUG 2021 1200D

Nationality Key:

- United States: US
- United Kingdom: UK
- Turkey: TR
- Germany: DE
- Denmark/Danish: DK
- Afghanistan: AF
- France: FR

HIGHLIGHTS:

- **PRIORITY: Redistribution of Medical Supplies**
- Anticipating high rate of heat casualties and extreme dehydration/sick once gates opens
- Pediatric supplies and food delivered to medical teams in 4 areas (Comfort Area, Pax terminal, East Gate STS, R2E)
- Mortuary Affairs Det (2 pax) arrived (w/ USFOR-A FWD)
- **R2 Hospital Require assistance on Security outside ED and an Interpreter during night shift**

CHALLENGES/NEED HELP ON:

- Distribution of medical supplies due to lack of transport. Leaning on J4 for assistance
- Potential shortage of MASCAS supplies

DOS RELATED ITEMS/REUNIFICATION CENTER (ROLE 2E):

- 7 yr old Minor Afghans reunited with parents with help from UKMIL
- Delivered 30 IFAKS to DOS
- Pediatrics supplies and medicine ordered through (b)(6) (b)(6) ETA: Pending

| Date: | UNIT | INJURED/ SI | DNBI | CRITICAL/ VSI | MINOR/ NSI | KIA | ICU | IWU | ORCases | MEDEVAC | Surgery/ICU/MEDEVAC Details |
|--------|---------------------------|-------------|------|---------------|------------|-----|-----|------|---------|---------|-----------------------------------|
| | CUMULATIVE TOTAL | | | | | | | | | | |
| 22 AUG | R2E HOSPITAL | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1/82 nd Role 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | MEU R1E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | SPMAGTF STP R1E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 3/10 MTN R1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 AUG | R2E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1/82 nd Role 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | MEU R1E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | SPMAGTF STP R1E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 3/10 MTN R1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20 AUG | R2E HOSPITAL | 5 | 10 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 4/7 | 5/14 | 0 | 1 | GSW x5 |
| | 1/82 nd Role 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | MEU R1E | | | | | | | | | | |
| | SPMAGTF STP R1E | | | | | | | | | | 5 patients seen CAO 0700D |
| | 3/10 MTN R1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 AUG | R2E | 9 | 16 | 1 | 12 | 0 | 3/7 | 2/14 | 2 | 0 | ICU: AFG - SEIZURES x4 AFG GSW |
| | 1/82 nd Role 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | MEU R1E | | | | | | | | | | 60 total patients seen |
| | SPMAGTF STP R1E | | | | | | | | | | 68 total patients seen |
| | 3/10 MTN R1 | | | | | | | | | | |

~~SECRET//REL TO USA//FVEY~~

| Category | Emergency | | Routine | | DoD Fixed Wing Patient Movement | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | Authorized | Reimbursable to USG | Authorized | Reimbursable to USG | Intra-Theater | | Inter-Theater | |
| | | | | | Authorized | Reimbursable to USG | Authorized | Reimbursable to USG |
| 1. Deployed or TAD/TDY US Service Members | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
| 2. Coalition/Host Nation Military Forces | YES | YES (See note #1) | YES | YES (See note #1) | YES | YES (See note #1) | YES | YES (See note #1) |
| 3. Deployed or TDY DoD Civilians | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
| 4. Contingency Contractors (Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force - CAAF, per definition of DODI 3020.41) | YES (see note #2) | YES | NO (see note #3) | <u>If authorized.</u> YES | YES (see note #4) | YES (see note #4) | YES (see note #4) | YES (see note #4) |
| 5. Non-CAAF Contractors | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES (see notes #5-6) | YES | NO | NO |
| 6. Local nationals care for saving patients with acute injuries at risk of losing life, limb, or eyesight AND one of the following: is requested by host nation authorities; patient is presented to CJOA-A MTF or injury/illness in the vicinity of CJOA-A forces; AND use HN medical facilities are neither available or able to be reached in a timely manner. | YES with limits (see note #6) | TBD | NO | NO | YES (see notes #5-6) | YES | NO | NO |
| 7. Patient was injured as a result of JTF/CJTF/MNF combat operations. | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES (see note #7) | NO | NO | NO |
| 8. Care for NGO, PVO, IO patient AND use of HN medical facilities are neither available or able to be reached in a timely manner. | YES | TBD | NO | NO | YES (see notes #5-6) | NO | NO | NO |
| 9. Care for USG Civilian Non-DoD Employees | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| 10. Care for International Organization patients AND use of HN medical facilities are neither available or able to be reached in a timely manner. | YES | YES | NO | NO | YES (see notes #5-6) | YES | NO (see note #9) | NO (see note #9) |
| 11. Non-military Personnel invited by DoD to accompany the CJOA-A (eg. Red Cross or USO) | YES (See note #8) | NO | YES (See note #8) | NO | YES (See note #8) | NO | YES (See note #8) | NO |
| 12. Press | YES (See note #8) | YES | YES (See note #8) | YES | YES (See note #8) | YES | YES (See note #8) | YES |
| 13. Detainees | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
| 14. DoD Beneficiaries (Retirees & Family Members) | YES | YES | Space Available Basis | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Notes | | | | | | | | |
| #1. Care authorized on a reimbursable basis unless existing authority/treaty/agreement established (eg. ACSA, IA to an ACSA authorizing care, treaty relationship) | | | | | | | | |
| #2. All DoD contingency contractors are only authorized <u>resuscitative care</u> , as defined in DODI 3020.41 unless further care is authorized in the Letter of Instruction | | | | | | | | |
| #3. Routine care is not authorized unless specified in contractor's Letter of Instruction. | | | | | | | | |
| #4. All fixed wing patient movement subject to reimbursement to the USG. Contractor's employer has first duty to coordinate patient's evacuation and DoD will assist if necessary. | | | | | | | | |
| #5. Evacuation is only authorized inside the CJOA <u>AND</u> must be for one of the following reasons: a. In order to transfer patient from CJOA-A MTF to non-CJOA-A MTF; <u>OR</u> b. Provide point of injury evac to MTF. | | | | | | | | |
| #6. Once care is rendered and patient is stabilized, they will be transferred to a host nation MTF as rapidly as practicable. | | | | | | | | |
| #7. Care is <u>ONLY</u> authorized up to the limits of the deployed capability within the CJOA. | | | | | | | | |
| #8. Authority for care limited to needs arising in the course of invited activities. | | | | | | | | |
| #9. Care and movement for IO personnel may be approved IAW existing bi/multilateral agreement. | | | | | | | | |



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 053

ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 30
September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, [REDACTED] USMC conducted an interview of the above personnel at LSA 3, [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What's your background?

(2) Answer. I started in the 3rd Infantry Battalion and then progressed to 2/6 Marines. I did two deployments with them, one being to Iraq. I left there as new captain and went to Japan to train the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). I deployed in support of OIF as an individual augmenter. I finished my time in Japan and went to Fort Benning, GA for training. I then went to Camp Pendleton as a junior captain. I returned to Afghanistan shortly after I arrive to 29 Palms. I also went to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. I came back to 3/1 as a Company Commander and deployed. I then served two years in manpower management at Quantico. I served as the security company commander in Maryland. I went to the TTC-EG in 29 Palms as the S3 and XO. I then got selected for command and went to Camp Pendleton, Ca.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What did your battalion do for pre-deployment training?

(2) Answer. We started training in January of 2020 and deployed in 2021 from [REDACTED] The Headquarter and Services (H/S) Company was located in Kuwait. We started conducting basic unit training at the platoon-level and worked our way up to service-level exercises in September and October. The battalion got to train on all warfighting functions. We did a combined live fire and warfighter exercise as a battalion, which qualified us as CORE MET complete

on offense, defense, and amphibious operations. We completed training for crisis response/TRAP, stability operations, and humanitarian operations within 60 days. A lot of our training was provided through COTV. We also had the opportunity to work with [REDACTED] We did three mission profiles with them. We thought it would prepare our team better. We were also the battalion that did the IOTV with the new amphibious vehicles at Camp Pendleton. We were ready to deploy.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at [REDACTED] ?

(2) Answer. In April 2021, we arrived to about nine locations: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When is the first time you thought you would be going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I want to say it was late May to early June. There was an SDOB on 27 May. I felt that this was what Central Command (CENTCOM) was planning for. We knew that Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) was solely focused on Afghanistan, especially during the late-May timeframe. Late June is when we started hearing more about Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). We started planning our training around that. In July we ran two exercises. One was 6-8 July and the other was on 20 July. We worked hand-in-hand with the Operations Officer (OPSO). We focused on the NEO lite and medium packages. The exercise was focused on the NEO light. We thought that it was the package that was going to be sent. We didn't think that the medium was going to be needed. The assumption was that HKIA was going to be guarded. We ran a few exercises here.

There is a short 50-meter range here for live fire opportunities. We had moved all of our stuff over to airfield. We practice step-down procedures. The training was all about bringing the team together. We launched aircraft, landed, and offloaded. We went through a full rehearsal. The NEO light package included air assets and the shock trauma team. We already knew that we could extract our team and other personnel according to the timeline. For the next exercise, we practiced processing hundreds of people. On 20 July, 400-500 people from the Air Force came through so that we could practice processing personnel.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. When did you know that you were officially going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. At 2200 on 11 August, the night before the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) was released, we had received word. The XO ran in at about 2200 saying that the President was making an announcement. The SDOB was released on the 12th. We were ready because we were on an N + 24 ready-to-launch pattern. We were ready and just waiting on aircraft to show up. We flew out on the 15th of August at about 1700 with two C-130s. No C-17 were available because we think they were reserved for the 82nd.

We arrived around midnight of 15 August. I was sitting up in the captain seat of the C-130. I talked to the pilot about the airfield. He told me that it was surrounded by hundreds of civilians. I told them that we had to land. We needed fuel and we had to get on the ground due to the amount of equipment and Soldiers. We didn't know if it was overrun by the Taliban. I told my team to go to 'condition one'. We were inbound and the pilot told me that they were still trying to get people off the runway. They landed the C-130 on the taxi way. They taxied over to north side of HKIA and pulled into 8-B. We got out and pulled 360-degree security around the aircraft in the prone position.

We saw contractors with forklifts and asked them to get the packs off the aircraft. They moved our equipment close to the terminal/cargo lot near the eastern border. The aircraft took off afterwards, empty. Me, my OPSO, and [REDACTED] (b)(6) go into the JOC. Echo Co stayed close to the passenger (PAX) terminal to get everything settled. They took able-bodied infantrymen to help clear the airfield. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had 34-35 infantrymen with enablers. His orders were to get with the MEU (1/8 - LTC [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to help clear the airway. We started to establish command and control at this point. These are the only forces we had until the 17th when we received more Marines from Echo Co. We received more from Fox Co and Weapons Co later as well.

We were able to keep the crowd off the airfield until about 1000. It was pandemonium. We contained the crowd to the south side of HKIA. We had concertina wire (C-wire) and vehicles from 10th MTN. They were pouring in from everywhere. All of my forces were on the airfield getting the crowd under control. I watched the aircraft take off, shown in a popular video, where men from the crowd were falling off the aircraft in the sky. At this point, my Marines were extremely tired because they had been up for over 16 hours. It wasn't until that night, when RADM Vasely talked to the Taliban and NSU, that we were able to clear the airfield.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did the mission change when you landed?

(2) Answer. Yes absolutely, it was absolute chaos. We knew that we had to do crowd control in order to save the airfield. We can't have NEO if we don't have an

airfield. We used elements of 1/8, 2/1, NSU, JTF, USFOR-A, 10MTN, and the Taliban. This was captured in the photos that went viral on the 16th of August.

Airfield operations picked up during that night of the 17th. This is when we started getting the team in. On the afternoon of 17th, we got tied into the 82nd's southern perimeter security. Echo Co was tied in to the southwest. On the morning of 18th, we sent the remainder of Echo Co and Fox Co to relieve the Echo team that was already there. We assume all of the southern area to relieve the 82nd. We held this position until the 19th. We gave it back to the 82nd because it was determined that the 82nd was in charge of security and our mission was NEO. 19 August was the first day we started to push the crowd back out through Abbey Gate

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Could you describe the Abbey Gate ECP progression?

(2) Answer. On the day of the 19th, people were flooding the iron gate that the British were guarding. They would barely open the gate for a vehicle, and then almost an entire platoon would have to use leverage to close it. All gates were closed at this point. This is the time we started to sync with the British. Golf Co (135 PAX) and Fox Co are at the gate. Echo Co was resting. On the ground at the time were the British, 2/1, and some Air Force Pararescue. The main effort is Golf Co with Fox Co 'minus'. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was leading.

The plan was to line up shoulder-to-shoulder to clear space at Abbey Gate to push people north out of the gate area. The inner gate was already secure. While we were pushing the crowd back, the rest of the Afghans were being processed. We were also searching for green card holders, blue card holders, and embassy personnel at the same time we were clearing the crowd. This was the beginning of the NEO at Abbey Gate. This was all day. Later that night, the Golf Commander came up with a plan that, if we could push the crowd back to Barron Hotel, it would allow us to be able to move with more freedom. It would also allow the Taliban to cover security and the British the freedom to get their team in to help on security. The chevron was built as a result of the plan and it was put in place on 20 August.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Do you already have a pre-existing relationship with the British Forces on ground at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Yes, we trained with them before. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had already worked with this team. There was a good plan establishing the new security posture. There were 7-10 days of training in Jordan. The Fox Co [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the [REDACTED] (b)(6). They gradually moved the crowd back to the Barron Hotel. They didn't use any crowd-control devices. By the time the sun came up, they had the

crowd behind the Barron Hotel. At the same time, they used containers to formulate the chevron obstacle. This was the pre-screening area with the British and Taliban. There was a backlog of civilians in the processing lane, but it was continuing to move. It was working for us.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. What is the rough estimate of personnel present before and after clearing?

(2) Answer. At one point, there were about 2,000 people in between the outer gate and the chevron. We were able to get it down to about 200 people after flights started to flow. This was more manageable and allowed the British better access to the Barron Hotel.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was happening on the 20th-21st of August?

(2) Answer. We start to make improvements to the area. We put in latrines and improved the screening process. However, the flights stopped because other countries were fully and weren't taking anyone. Between the inner gate and outer gate there were roughly 1500 people just sitting. We had department of state personnel on the 19th, but we didn't have the consulars until the 20th. There was a unity in effort between these groups. 20-21 August is about the time when civilians noticed that Taliban was on the perimeter so they started to look for different way to get around the Taliban. They found holes that lead them to the canal. We had to improve the canal area to provide more security. We had to reorient our defense. There were no flights on 20-21 August.

Flights began flowing again on the 24th. We were identifying the individuals that met the criteria full time again. Our biggest advocate was the Army physiological operations team. They were able to get on the microphone and let the crowd know what was going on. This helped keep the crowd calm. I sent Echo Co in to relieve Golf Co and Fox Co so that I could continue 24-hour operations.

We are working hand and hand with British the entire time. Of note right around the 21st when we did have a normal flow all the other countries from NATO stated to come out and park their vehicles between the gates. They would use the Marines and British for security and pluck their people out from the crowd to get them through. They were operating underneath our umbrella to get their team out. There was no coordination for them to pull security. It was affecting our ability to pull security because it would make the crowd angry to see others being pulled out. They didn't understand why people were getting selected from the crowd. Some counties were purposeful when they took their people. Other countries would not be good at it. They would grab people out of the crowd and make them sit for days in the holding area (Germany and Italy).

Not all nations were doing this 24hrs a day. We dealt with all these issues through the army physiological operation steam. It was working early on. We were in a rhythm by the 22nd. I believe we filled 42 C-17s. The first few days Afghans were staying on the side of the canal, but ended up getting into the water. Abbey gate was the most difficult position to move people because other gates were closing and pushed a lot of people in to Abbey Gate.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Can you differentiate between the outer gate and inner gate areas?

(2) Answer. The search area was at the outer most gate. The screening was conducted between the gates. We transported camo netting, tents, and porta johns. We had been feeding and giving water to all of the civilians. No one was injured, but we had capacity issues.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What prevented you from putting people in the comfort area?

(2) Answer. Capacity, we didn't have any flights for 48 hours. I did eventually get it down to a more manageable number (from 2000 to about 5-600). By 24 August we had it down to about 0.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Why were other gates closed?

(2) Answer. Around 22-24 August there was a VBIED threat that was way too high. The juice wasn't worth the squeeze. The quality of people we were getting at the north gate wasn't good. We had to turn those people around. We were having more success at Abbey Gate with qualified people.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Why was there success at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We were able to operate as a BATTALION. We had the manpower to create standoff that other units didn't. We were able to create standoff, the risk assumed was that we were right up on the civilians because of how the gate and the terrain was formed. We were able to take more risk because we were integrated with the Taliban, British, and had all the electronic countermeasures. Communication was terrible at the gate because of it. We took measures to reduce the risk, but we had to keep the gate open. We had the shock trauma team at the inner gate. The mission was to get American citizens through the gate. We had to continue the mission.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. What makes you decided to put in the chevron?

(2) Answer. We had to keep people from flowing. It helped slow the flow of people getting in. This also diverted people being screened to the US or British side.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. If you are an Afghan and walk up to the chevron what happens?

(2) Answer. A squad of Taliban would screen those people's passports. I was using them to limit the force flow.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How would the British and Taliban working together?

(2) Answer. It was cordial, strictly business.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Who is in charge of the Taliban at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The oldest of the five men I met was in charge. He did not have a weapon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He appears to be in charge at the chevron. He was the senior-most guy at the key leader engagement. We had plans to pull out on the evening of the 26th. I met with them at 1620-30 for a 30-minute meeting. The meeting was done around 1700 and the attack occurred about 1730-40.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. What did you talk about at the KLE?

(2) Answer. There were five of us; the 82nd Commander, Golf Co, Fox Co, a linguist, me, and five Taliban members. The meeting started with the British and was then passed to me. Last, I introduced the 82nd Commander. The British Battalion Commander started the conversation. The British said what they were going to be doing over the next 24 hours with the understanding that they were stopping operations on the 26th. The 82nd Commander would own the gate on 27th in regards to security. He then explained what we wanted the Taliban to do. It was a productive meeting. I don't remember if anyone from the DoS was there.

The intent was to talk with the Taliban in order to get an understanding of who would own the gate and what the intent would be night of 26th going into the 27th. We opened the outer most gate at Abbey Gate on the 19th. From then on, we hadn't physically closed the gate until the attack occurred.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Can you explain more about the area and people within?

(2) Answer. Right on the inside side of the outer gate is where they would conduct pat downs. The holding area had roughly 2,000 people in 300 meters in length of space. If they made it to the inner gate they would most likely make it out. They only brought people past the inner gate in groups of 50 because that's what the buses would handle. They don't move forward until the buses arrive. It would take roughly 48 hours from start to finish.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What does a non-successful attempt look like?

(2) Answer. We had great success with the consular affairs team. They would be able to tell us what paperwork was needed. The no-goes were sometimes random individuals with Afghan passports with no affiliation to any of our national partners. A successful example would be that I have my sister in-law with me, her husband is in the US. I need to bring her. She would be accepted. Civilians were not denied because of weapons. They were red because they didn't have the correct paperwork. The search area was at the outer gate. They didn't uncover any weapons or experience any hostile behavior during the searches.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Was there anyone that was accepted that wanted to get out of line?

(2) Answer. Yes, they didn't want to wait all day. I didn't see any blue American passport holders leave, but I did see consulars approve people and then say they would leave later. I didn't see any women or children do that, but I did see men. I saw maybe three percent of the people that processed in total leave. Most were military-aged males that left. The purging area had a hole in the fence before the outer gate. The Taliban wasn't letting anyone back up through the chevron area once they were through.

We were getting emails and text messages from buddies at home or General Officers that someone would be holding up signs or random things to get our attention. They still had to have the necessary paperwork. People were passing information all the

way down to us. I was giving it to the Company Commanders, but the squad leaders would brief it to the team. They were actively looking for these people.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. How do the British accept or reject civilians?

(2) Answer. The Brits would always move their people in vehicles. They would pull people from the chevron into the Barron Hotel for processing. Then they would drive them to the terminal. We had to clear a lane for them. They would drive the vehicle through the crowd. It was super slow, but it was working for them. The coordination between our teams allowed for more throughput once the crowd was processed faster. This was also easier when the crowds started coming from the canal. When they arrived from the chevron they would walk along the T-walls. If you were American/other nationality you would travel down one side of the chevron. If you were British, you would travel into the Barron Hotel and be escorted by vehicles. The Brits were manning their portion of the perimeter 24 hours a day.

The physical searches didn't occur until they reached the outer gate portion. We only had a squad-sized element at the chevron for a few days before we pulled them back to the outer gate/canal area. It is suspected that the bomber went through the southern area, travelling north through the canal, just above the watch tower.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Why didn't people make it through the chevron successfully?

(2) Answer. They didn't want to go through the chevron because it was riskier. The Taliban was shooting and beating people at the top of the chevron. They didn't want to take the risk of going through the chevron because they were scared of the Taliban.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. What am I seeing outside the chevron at this time?

(2) Answer. You would see a line of people all the way down the road. They didn't want to face the Taliban so it was dwindling down. It was roughly 200 meters long. Civilians were getting crushed to death. There were three to four people that died because of the pressure against them getting pushed against the containers.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Did you have any situations in which people would do something crazy?

(2) Answer. They were desperate, thirsty, and running from tyranny. That's why we used PSYOP to help communicate. They would listen to us. They weren't hanging on anyone to get through. We never threw any flash-bangs or smoke, [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d The people were fairly compliant. People were standing shoulder-to-shoulder, front-to-back at the bomb site. They were extremely desperate because they knew the gate was going to close soon.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Who was in the tower?

(2) Answer. The sniper team was in the tower. There were three sliding ballistic windows and a ladder that took you up to the top. They had the rifle pointed down the access lane. All windows were closed. They were reporting atmospheric and producing photos.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. What do the edges of the air field fence look like?

(2) Answer. It is a metal fence with fence composite. There is razor wire on top of it and bundled on the bottom as well.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. How close was the bomber to the PSYOP vehicle?

(2) Answer. From the bomber to the truck it was about 35 meters. A few Marines in Blast Zone C had Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs). Mostly everyone had shrapnel in Blast Zone A. I had Marines near the gate guard (Zone A), pulling women and children from the C-wire near the tower.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. What was happening before the blast?

(2) Answer. I walked up to the fence to look through the crowd for threats. I don't think anyone would have found this guy because he was in the back of the crowd. It was so crowded. There were tons of people in front of him. If you would have walked along the back of the wall, no one would have seen you. I was right next to the truck when the blast went off. The Operations Officer (OPSO) saw the women and children being hurt so he walked back to pick them up from the C-wire. He asked the PSYOP team to start messaging about going home tonight, to please calm down, to please stay away from the canal, and about how the crowd is hurting women and children. I was

facing the blast when it occurred. The last thing I remember before it went off was that there were about eight scattered Marines on the wall and another fire team against the barrier along the wall. We had medical personnel treating casualties near the tower. It was fairly crowded due to the surge of assets that were needed for the crowd.

I get knocked down on my knees. I felt like the blast was about chest high, directly across from me. It was a big ball of orange/red fire. I felt something hit me. After it knocked me down, I did a limbs check, saw some blood, but began to move. I fell toward the gate area. A few Marines grabbed me and pulled me through the gate. At this point, some of the Marines near the tower started to immediately tend to injuries and coordinate medical transport. I got checked out by the medic. I had a big black and blue mark on my leg. I ran back out the gate and saw my team coordinating casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). We grabbed serialized gear and casualties. The Afghan locals had all cleared out. A few stayed thinking that they would get pulled through. We took them and processed them later. Marines entered Blast Zone B to provide additional security while others assisted with CASEVAC. The team pulled security near the barrier to make sure no one else came through.

We conducted the evacuation in under ten minutes. We had a casualty collection point (CCP) behind the tower. We had stretchers pre-staged and ready to go. The shock trauma team was pre-staged. They immediately moved up and started assessing people. They loaded them on the ambulance to be shipped out. We had people get any vehicles they could to help transport casualties. The OPSO got on the radios and communicated back to the command post to send every vehicle they could. Everyone was launching vehicles to the blast location. I didn't know at this point how many were killed or injured. We all knew when it happened that it was a suicide bomb.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. What happen with the rest of the Afghan civilians?

(2) Answer. All of them fled. Some came back, but not a lot. We did pick up a few Afghans that were injured in the blast and took them to the rear. The ones outside the canal were treatable for the most part, but if they were in the canal near the blast they were probably part of the 160 that died.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. What kind of injuries did you see?

(2) Answer. I saw two Marines being loaded. It was like a shotgun blast that was finite but fatal. The ones that weren't fatally wounded had ball bearings, punctures, blown ear drums, shrapnel injuries, and injuries to their extremities.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Who is the best person to talk to about the injuries received?

(2) Answer. The shock trauma doctor, [REDACTED]

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Do you know the timeframe from the initial blast to evacuation completion?

(2) Answer. 15 minutes.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Were you evacuated for a higher level of care?

(2) Answer. No. After we got everyone out, we did a search to make sure we didn't leave serialized gear. [REDACTED] was the Crisis Response Commander. He was tasked with security for the Abbey Corridor, the outer gate to the inner gate. He had the largest force. He was supposed to relieve Golf and Fox Companies because his team was fresh. I tasked Weapons Company to support him. I tasked Golf Co to retrograde with all personnel and equipment as soon as possible. Fox Co would extract next.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Who was injured on ground?

(2) Answer. 1st Platoon, Golf Co was working in the canal all day. Fox Co had a small portion of their team near the sniper tower near where the vehicle was located.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. Who was at Abbey Gate from the Battalion Command element?

(2) Answer. Individual names are listed on the slides by zone. All of Echo Co was inside the compound. Only one or two personnel from Echo Co were outside the gate. Two thirds of Golf Co were inside the perimeter. Me and the OPSO were outside the gate. The SgtMaj was tucked in behind the tower.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. How close was the nearest Marine?

(2) Answer. He was 15 meters from the blast. I was probably 25 meters away.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Who was the farthest from the blast?

(2) Answer. Some Marines were probably 35 to 40 meters away and most likely received mild cases of a TBI.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Were there people in the blast zone that were not from your battalion?

(2) Answer. There were Servicemembers from the MEU and [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a that were part of the FET Teams and SSG Knauss from Army PSYOP.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. After the 15 minutes that it took to evacuate casualties, were there any injured individuals still requiring aid?

(2) Answer. There were a few injured troops from Fox Co that stayed to help.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. You tasked [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to close the gate. What did that process look like?

(2) Answer. We physically closed the outer gate so that no one would breach the perimeter wall. We then provided security between the inner and outer gates. Next, we physically placed barriers in the Abbey Corridor. We closed the gate and parked vehicles right in front of it so that no one could get through. The Marines in the tower were providing overwatch. As I looked over, I saw that the Taliban were laughing. The British were still evacuating. They may have had some minor injuries. They may have needed some assistance. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had to open the gate up again about an hour later so that the British could get the last of their people through.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. Do you think the Taliban had any idea of when the blast was going to happen?

(2) Answer. No, I don't think they knew. I think there was a chance, but I don't think they were working with ISS fighters to impede the operation.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. What did the Taliban talk about with you?

(2) Answer. It was strictly business. We talked about tactics and how we were going to give them control. I didn't talk to them after the blast. I didn't feel weird around them at all. I didn't think they were trying to hurt us.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. Who told you that you had to get treated for injuries?

(2) Answer. BGen Sullivan. I saw him after I gave my subordinate Commanders tasks and after everyone else was evacuated. I was trying make sure the logistics were pushed so that Golf Co would be able to leave. I took SgtMaj back to the JOC and linked in with the Weapons MGySgt. As soon as I walked into the JOC, I was talking louder than normal to the General so he suspected something was wrong. My ears were ringing a little bit. As soon as I walked in the General pulled me into his office. We briefly talked about what happened. We talked for about five minutes. He knew that I needed to attend to my wounded. Before I left, he handed me a baby wipe to wipe blood off my nose. I went straight to the Role 2 to check on my Marines.

I went to the Role 2 with my SgtMaj. I linked up with the nurse at the entrance. She walked me over to where they had the fallen staged in a separate tent area. They are in body bags covered up. They were matching up individuals with their stuff. There was a rough count of the injured and killed but we were not sure who was part of 2/1 and who wasn't because there were three others that were killed. It was too soon to figure out who everyone was. One of the fallen had dog tags from another Soldier in their pocket. The only reason I could figure that this happened was that he grabbed his fallen brother's tags and then also passed. I didn't have Marines succumb to their wounds until they were back in the Role 2. They did have issues right before the aircraft took off with identifying personnel.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. What did you do next?

(2) Answer. I went to the emergency room side and linked up with the nurse to see my other Marines. She took me back to my wounded. There were two Afghans and the rest were Marines. The OPSO was laying there getting fix up. There was also one Cpl and LCpl from Golf Co. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had minor wounds. There was a Cpl with a ball bearing in his shoulder waiting to be seen. I had a closed door conversation with my staff. I highlighted that there would be no phone calls, emails, or anything that would be seen until the next of kin was notified. We needed to respect the process. I tasked my MGySgt to spread this information with the SgtMaj. They were

trying to make sure that the names were matched with the fallen. I also stayed tied in with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was providing security. The 82nd accelerated the RIP timeline with Echo Ce so that my battalion could be pulled off the wall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. What happened next?

(2) Answer. I remember hanging around between the emergency room, the COC, and walking around talking to my leaders. I sat down with the chaplain to talk with him to make sure he was with Golf Co exclusively. I stayed around the COC to make sure that we were tracking the flights in and out for our wounded. I wanted to make sure we were getting things for our team. I was in **direct support of the meeting**, BGen Sullivan treated me as a separate commander.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. From this time to mission complete, what happened?

(2) Answer. The next day, we completed the RIP after [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was relieved from the gate. On 27 August we did a ramp ceremony, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted to go over to the Evacuation Control Center (ECC) so that his team could see the evacuees that were getting on the plane. This was so that they could see a different side of what they went through. We pulled duty at the ECC until the 28th when we left late in the evening. Golf Co left first, then Fox Co with Weapons Co. Our flight left at the same time as Echo Co. We flew during a period of darkness on the 28-29 August. We landed between 0400-0500 at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a Echo Co landed one hour later.

xx Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Is there anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer. Operations were nonstop for us the entire time. We would only sleep every other night, and only in patches. There was a period within the first 50+ hours that we didn't sleep at all. There was a period the day before that I didn't sleep because we were figuring out how to extract civilians. I don't feel as though we could have done anything different to prevent what happened. The mission was to extract Americans and SIVs.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. What were your injuries?

(2) Answer. My left leg received an injury from a ball bearing, but it didn't penetrate. My nose was cut and shrapnel went into my right arm. It stopped shy of

entering the muscle. They couldn't get it out because of a lack of medical equipment. There is something still in my arm. Everyone in Zone A had received shrapnel injuries.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. Where did you get your screened for TBI?

(2) Answer. I was screened on the 27th or 28th August in Afghanistan. When I got back to [REDACTED] the screening was on the 30th or 31st of August.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Did anyone else that have injuries that hadn't been evacuated?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] had a mild TBI. [REDACTED] might have received shrapnel and he definitely had a TBI. There were also some injuries from Fox Co.

4. This portion is a continuation of the interview with [REDACTED] conducted on 1 October 2021.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Was there an assessment on the 25th of August about keeping Abbey Gate open? What are your thoughts on the gate from the 25th going into the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes. I have some of my notes here. The gate closure relied on two things. One was the timeline for when the British were going to exfil and shutdown from the Barron Hotel. The other consideration, the primary one for us, was our departure timeline and our RIP with the 82nd. Our battalion was initially supposed to depart, I think, on the 27th. We were back planning from the 27th, knowing we would need 24 hours for a RIP with the 82nd. We knew we had to shut down the gate early enough to guarantee the 82nd wouldn't have any civilians in the corridor. This was based off back planning, and that was my recommendation to BGEN Sullivan. This was our primary concern, the secondary was trying to get the Brits onto our retrograde timeline. The caused the timeline to shift to the right at least twice

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. Initially, the Brits said they would be done operating around 2000 on August 26th. Then they said 0300 on the 27th, right? That's what I've heard, which agrees with what you're saying and I'm sure that this decision was tied to personnel throughput.

(2) Answer. Yes, this is right around when the British Prime Minister was up in arms about having to leave by the end of the month. This was driving the British to stay as long as possible. What they failed to grasp was that the Marines were the ones keeping that gate open and we had to leave. That aside, my recommendation to BGen Sullivan was based solely on our back-planned retrograde timeline and the RIP we needed to conduct with the 82nd.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. Some individuals we interviewed yesterday said that on the 26th, at 1430, the British pushed through the S2 channels that there was a 10, 5, and 2 minute blast warning. This warning caused the Marines to take low-profile postures and stop gate operations. The blast doesn't happen and they continue mission. Do you recall that?

(2) Answer. Yes, I remember that. I was at the hotel with the British commander. I wasn't physically at the gate for that so you'd have to ask my S2. As I remember, there was a lot of circular reporting. It was unclear which reports were new.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. On the 25th, Echo and Golf/Fox Companies conducted a RIP. Echo Co at the time had the path along the U.S. side of the canal pushed out about 300 meters. PAX are still in the canal and on the far side. On the 26th, Golf and Fox Companies are no longer pushed together like this. What's your assessment?

(2) Answer. I remember asking [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about that. When the North and East Gates closed it increased the number of PAX at Abbey Gate and it became impossible to maintain that standoff. There were way too many people.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. BGen Sullivan said he discussed that in a conversation with [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the mass got much larger at the gate which affected its operation.

(2) Answer. Yes, we couldn't handle it. There was no way to maintain that standoff. North and East Gates had been shut for 24-48 hours. The Afghans knew processing at the gates was closing because it was almost the end of the month. Everyone had a cellphone. I guarantee that those who made it through contacted people they knew. It was messaging and desperation. They were pressed up on the jersey barrier adjacent to the sniper tower. We could not hold them off any longer and it was impossible to maintain that standoff. They were not as compliant as they were days prior.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. To encapsulate all of that: the British timeline is slipping so you feel obligated to keep the gate open to help them and you also recognize that the crowd, in terms of numbers and mood, is becoming more dangerous. While this is happening, you are still trying to achieve a timeline tied to your RIP, as you believe your flight out is on the 27th. Those are three major pressures constituting the crowds, the British, and the timeline. Is that correct?

(2) Answer. Yes, we kept the gate open to continue extracting as we dealt with all of that.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. Did BGen Sullivan speak directly with you? Or only [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Yes, he treated me as an individual commander even though I was technically subordinate to [REDACTED]

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. Were there reports of, or did you personally hear, gunfire after the blast?

(2) Answer. I heard small arms fire immediately after the blast. It was coming from my right flank. I was facing toward the blast. This came from over by the chevron/Barron Hotel where the Taliban were standing. It was short-lived. The gunfire erupted within a matter of seconds after the explosion.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. It was coming from the chevron? So roughly southwest?

(2) Answer. Yes, roughly southwest. I believe it was the Taliban or Brits shooting in the air to disperse the crowd. That's what I believe. I think our Marines may have believed they were being fired on and fired at the Taliban. I think the majority of our Marines that fired probably fired one to four shots. They were knocked down by the blast. They got up, saw someone with a weapon, and fired off a couple shots. We had seen Taliban for the duration of the gate operations, but they were dazed and saw the Taliban firing their weapons. It would be easy to see that as hostile intent. A few Marines probably fired at the Taliban, but this was short lived and only lasted two to three minutes. I don't feel as if I was being fired upon. It is a distinct, clean, crisp snap when you are being fired at. I didn't see anything bouncing around our position. I didn't feel I was being fired upon but I did hear gunfire. That snap is unmistakable, it's almost very silent. Almost those snap bracelets that you hit on your wrist. There was none of that.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 30

September 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assistant investigating officer, at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines, 30 September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your name and background?

(2) Answer: My name is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I have 22 years of service. I came to 2/1 in Jan 2021. The unit deployed (Advon) mid-march, I arrived to the CENTCOM AOR in April.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: What kind of pre-deployment training and certification did the unit undergo?

(2) Answer: I can't really answer that because I arrived shortly before deployment and didn't participate in any of the work up or certification

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: What operations/tasks did 2/1 execute in CENTCOM before deploying to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When did the Afghanistan NEO become a task for 2/1?

(2) Answer: Very early in deployment; it was communicated to us as a 'Be Prepared To' order and E Co, as the crisis response company, made that their sole focus.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: What kind of prep/planning was done for the potential NEO?

(2) Answer: The unit did two mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), essentially putting the unit through evacuation control center (ECC) rehearsals. Both the rehearsals used the light package (E Co and Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) elements). E Co would execute security for the ECC, while the CLB was doing their own prep to get the processing down. The Battalion is interesting in a MAGTF – the Battalion Commander is more of a force provider, but it was anticipated that the Battalion Commander would be in command of the element that went in. The first MRX was focused on identifying tasks and developing ECC processes and tracking. The second MRX was very focused, everyone knew their tasks and worked through their portion. Later, as conditions on the ground progressed, there was a question of who would be the overall CMD – either MEU or SPMAGTF (both O-6s). That was an open question throughout the prep. The division of labor was thought to be one O6 with security, one O6 with ECC/NEO.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Was there any crowd control or riot control training?

(2) Answer: None. We were expecting an orderly, controlled NEO with a functional airport. We did not anticipate having to hold back hordes of people.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Do you have anything else to add on preparation?

(2) Answer: We prepped for heavy and medium packages as well. A light package consisted of an O5, E Co, CLB element for ECC, and a portion of the shock trauma platoon (STP). G Co was added to make the medium package. F Co and the Weapons Co were added to make the heavy package. An alternative was 24th MEU

going in as the main effort, which became the plan in early Aug, with 2/1 as a surge capability.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When the order to deploy came, who went in?

(2) Answer: All of 2/1, minus the F Co portion staying at the Embassy in Iraq. A platoon from G Co remained at Camp Titin for security and the BN XO stayed behind. It was essentially the heavy package, but as a surge under the MEU.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: When did you arrive at HKIA?

(2) Answer: Our first elements hit ground at HKIA at just after midnight on 16 August. This included me, the BN staff, E Co leadership, and a platoon from E Co.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What was the situation when you arrived?

(2) Answer: It was chaos on the ground. A significant breach occurred at the southern terminal and forces were trying to push the people back. Apparently people had already made it to the tarmac. We put our only platoon in the line to help push the crowds back. This happened immediately after we arrived with no RSO&I or ROE brief.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: What followed the decision to put the platoon in the line after arrival?

(2) Answer: The BN Staff went to look for space, but with no RSO&I to help with setup or guide us to our AO, we struggled a little. We setup the COC and communications in a building on North HKIA and made sure we had contact with the one platoon. The platoon was our only combat formation for about 24 hours. We were watching the people come out on the tarmac and climb on aircraft from the feeds in the COC. We emptied the COC of personnel to help push people back. I don't know if the 82nd had arrived yet but when we went out to help push the people, there were numerous forces on the tarmac – Army and Marines from the MEU. The Marines from the MEU had different colored cammies.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Would you describe the force flow as a mess then?

(2) Answer: Correct, the initial group arrived and was immediately put into action. The rest of the unit came in at different times and was piecemealed and interspersed with the arrival of other units.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Was there a mission or task and purpose change on arrival?

(2) Answer: The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d We spent a couple of days pushing people off the tarmac. We took over Abbey Gate on about the 3rd day, approximately 18 August. Then we got down to executing the NEO tasks we planned for. Entry Control Point (ECP) security, ECC ops, shock trauma were positioned close with us. MEU took the PAX terminal operations. The Brits were already operating out of Barron Hotel when we took over Abbey Gate. A lot of other partner nations were also operating out of Abbey Gate and going out to the Barron Hotel. The situation unfolded strangely, and sadly I have to say, thank God for the Taliban. If they didn't help, we wouldn't have been able to keep the gates and perimeter. The National Strike Unit (NSU) showed up on 17 August and they took over our positions on the southern perimeter. We moved to Abbey Gate by 18 August. The thought was that we would open the gate and start the NEO and ECC ops, which is what we planned for. The 82nd also took the southern perimeter. The Taliban were on the outer perimeter on the south. 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (part of the MEU) took over East Gate and North Gate. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d On the night of 18 August, we were fragged/tasked to clear Camp Sullivan which is down the road, past the Barron Hotel and a significant distance from Abbey Gate. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was concerned about the risk and utility of moving out to Camp Sullivan and clearing the camp for use. I believe there was a key leader engagement (KLE) with the Taliban, and we asked them about the camp. They recommended not doing it because of the crowds. That task went away. Instead we focused on Abbey Gate, building it up, and getting into operation.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then drew a diagram – will be an enclosure)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: For the build-up of Abbey Gate, when did the "chevron" blocking obstacle get emplaced?

(2) Answer: I believe we put that in. We had heavy equipment available, and that equipment was moving containers around to create walls across the southern perimeter. The equipment mover dropped some containers to make the chevron shortly after we arrived. The Taliban manned the outside of the chevron. We were conducting KLEs with the Taliban starting on the 18 August to coordinate security. I thought this

was mind blowing. It was clear there was an agreement that if they didn't screw with use, we wouldn't screw with them. We established a FWD CP on 19 August with [REDACTED] and Battalion Commander moving to the Gate. The chevron would have gone up about that time.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Was there any other hardening of the site/gate?

(2) Answer: We worked on getting concertina wire. We pushed around some vehicles to create obstacles. We wanted T-walls but we never got them. We used the concertina wire behind the chevron and across the canal fence, which has gaps in the fence. The canal fence was the biggest risk because the crowd could push through. The Marines had to convince the crowd to wait and they would be processed. E Co Commander can speak to what went on at the gate. He was there for the majority of the time, with G Co coming into relieve them.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Were there Department of State (DoS) personnel at the Gate?

(2) Answer: At first, the DoS were not on the gate. We asked their representative in the JOC where they were and they always said they were rotating. Eventually they had DoS personnel at the gate but there were always gaps with hours that they would be missing. It got better as we progressed. There was a lot of confusion about who we were letting in at any given time. It rapidly changed and we wouldn't know. We actually brought folks in who we thought were acceptable, they would go to the PAX terminal, and they got sent back. The guidance changed hourly and constantly. We were forced to close gates a lot because the PAX terminal was full or the comfort holding area was full.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Did the stopping and starting of gate flow affect the crowd?

(2) Answer: The E Co Commander can give a more full answer on this one. However, when we closed flow, the multi-national partners kept bringing people through and that definitely made the crowd angry. Our coordination with the Brits was great. They had an LNO with us who worked with the Battalion Commander regularly. We were on the same page. There was a lot of distraction from phone calls from the States trying to get us to let people through. The Battalion Commander had to turn his phone off so he could focus on the mission.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did the NSU ever work at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: Not that I'm aware of. The Taliban stayed outside the chevron and they were not in the canal area until after the attack. The NSU was on the south perimeter as far as I'm aware, and they were very aggressive.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Describe day-to-day operations at Abbey Gate from 19-25 August.

(2) Answer: By about the 20th, the gate found its rhythm. Shifts at the COC were established and [REDACTED] had set up the supply chain to get things down to the gate. We ran out of water early on. A company worked the gate full time to man the entire gate. One company would be on rest plan back inside the gate. The FWD CP was collapsed because the demand in the North HKIA was too high. We had a squad to platoon-sized QRF staged at the inside of the gate. We were eventually tasked with security of the terminal because the ECC couldn't contain the evacuees waiting for flights. It was getting ugly there so they needed additional forces. We provided a platoon for that task but it was infrequent. We always ran Abbey Gate throughout the NEO. We also provided security at the comfort area on the east end of the runway. The comfort area task was transitioned to the artillery battery with the MEU. The gate operations consisted of us processing evacuees, closing when necessary, and maintaining security. Busses were used to pick up evacuees at East Gate, but they rarely came to Abbey Gate. We had Afghans wait more than 24 hours at Abbey Gate and some of them actually left HKIA because they didn't want to wait anymore. We had to secure those evacuees who did make it through and did not move. The processing went on through 26 August, then the attack, then the closure, and the RIP with 82nd.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: How many people were outside Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: There were thousands; so many you couldn't really count them. The canal was orderly chaos, meaning the people were behaving themselves but there were so many people smashed together, all holding up documents. Marines were on the outside of the fence, between the fence and the canal wall, and they would keep people back. People would get into the canal but most were on the far side.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: What equipment for crowd control was available and what PPE were Marines wearing?

(2) Answer: Typical PPE was being used – helmet, vest, eye pro, gloves; especially on the line by the canal. The company had a rest area where Marines could

drop some of their gear and cool down. There were areas where Marines could step back and take a breather, remove their helmets. Everybody had their assigned weapons and we eventually got flash bangs and CS gas down there. I know we used the flash bangs some, but not a lot. I never actually saw us use them. I know they were using them at other gates. I didn't really think the flash bangs were very effective. Our guys on Abbey Gate were talking to people and keeping them calm. There was no camera on Abbey Gate, so we weren't watching it 24 hours a day, but I went down there a lot. Marines in 2/1 did not fire warning shots. That was the Battalion Commander's call. I completely agreed because they weren't a good idea. Other units at gates were firing warning shots and you became numb to it. You couldn't tell if that meant that there were troops in contact.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: What was the rest cycle?

(2) Answer: The company leadership can give you a better answer on this one. Once all the forces arrived we set up a good rotation. They would be down, off post, for about 6-8 hours. It was stressed heavily that the Marines sleep or eat, no phones, and get rested.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: What was the role of the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP)?

(2) Answer: They were setup between East and Abbey Gate in a building they took over. Some 2/1 guys found an up-armored land cruiser, which the STP used as an ambulance. They saw a lot of Afghans during ECC/ECP ops.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Did you perform any mass casualty (MASCAL) drills or preparation?

(2) Answer: We did one at both of the MRXs. It involved the STP and was a full exercise of the process. At HKIA we had a MASCAL plan, a casualty collection point, and the STP was integrated so that they could help execute, but did not get a rehearsal in. There just wasn't time. We were task-saturated and we relied on our SOPs. The terrain made it clear where the different levels of care were located and flow to the Role 2 was natural. There was a problem with identifying one of the KIA, because they were separated from their identification.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Did the pressure to keep the gates open for flow conflict with security and the decisions on the ground?

(2) Answer: The JTF warned us to look at opening up a 4th gate. There was a lot of pressure to let in as many evacuees as possible. There were stops because the PAX terminal and the ISBs (intermediate staging bases) were overwhelmed. There were too many people on HKIA. Honestly, the PAX terminal ECC operations personnel probably felt this pressure the most.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: What was the threat reporting?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] kept everyone up to date on threats. It was always ISIS-K interested in attacking HKIA. There were a lot of reported threats. We heard a lot on VBIEDS and SVIEDs. Usually the reporting lacked specificity.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Were there any changes on threat reporting 25-26 August?

(2) Answer: The reporting continued to be full of unknowns. The snipers in the tower took a picture of a guy who was in all black, villain like, observing the crowd, staying back. He was very out of place. The Battalion Commander gave guidance that if that individual made any moves, he should be assessed as having hostile intent. This was on the morning of 26 August, possibly 25 August. [REDACTED] took a video of the crowd about two hours before the attack on 26 August. The reporting was always very generic, for example, the typical white Toyota Corolla. The reports really didn't change operations because there was nothing concrete or specific to drive a decision. We just kept our posture as strong as we could. I don't think we could have done anything to prevent the attack. They picked the most vulnerable position we had but it was the only way to maintain security.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Were there any changes in force posture because of the threat?

(2) Answer: None specifically. We had to keep the personnel flow going and we had the Brits at Barron Hotel, so completely closing the gate was not an option yet. It was going to close very soon, and we were planning with the 82nd for closure and RIP. The thing holding it back was the Brits at Barron Hotel.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: If the gate crowds got out of control, who made the decision to close gates temporarily?

(2) Answer: The Company and Battalion Commander would make that decision. They were down at the gates all the time.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: Were you at Abbey Gate at the time of attack?

(2) Answer: No, I was at the COC

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: From your perspective at the COC, what were your observations?

(2) Answer: The report came in, we looked to the [REDACTED] and you could see the crowds running. There was an immediate report of shots fired. There was a lot of traffic into and out of COC. I put out the notice to the JOC – “attention in the JOC – there’s been an attack at Abbey Gate”.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: What were your actions after?

(2) Answer: I was in the JOC and the Battalion Commander, [REDACTED] were on the ground at the gate. We launched a vehicle for CASEVAC and we pushed folks to the hospital to help with overloading casualties. The COC rest plan was maintained. Marines on rest cycle were not rushed to the gate to reinforce. The Taliban cleared the canal area of crowds and our Marines pulled back to consolidate inside one of the gates.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: Which units were at the gate at the time?

(2) Answer: G Co was there mostly. Army Psy Op was helping control crowds with their PA system. The Brits were there and they had not completed their passage of lines.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Post-blast, what happened next?

(2) Answer: We closed the gate but we maintained security of the gate. The Brits were still coming through from Barron Hotel. The Taliban continued to control the crowd in the same area. The closing was really just to keep people out initially, we did not physically seal the gate. The 82nd units RIP'd with us shortly thereafter.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: What did 2/1 do after their RIP with 82nd?

(2) Answer: We fell back to the PAX terminal and took up security there. We (Crisis Response Company and BN) departed approximately 0000 on 29 August. Others left earlier. F Co, G Co, and Weapons went to Camp Buehring on 28 August.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer: Yes. We had one last task before we could leave and it came with the threat that we would not leave at all if it was not completed. This task was to police call the PAX terminal and exterior area. Our task was to clean the area. There had been over 120,000 Afghans in that area, defecating and leaving trash, bags, clothes, and other unspeakable things. I asked the MEU staff/JOC if this was serious. They were serious and I went and found some cleaning supplies like brooms to push the trash and rubber gloves. It was degrading and ridiculous. We took a lot of casualties and put a lot of effort into that mission and to close it out that way was wrong. Morale was really down at that point and it was an extremely pointless effort.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: What is your contact info if we need to reach you?

(2) Answer:

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I will be staying at the unit for another year.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd Battalion,
1st Marines, 30 September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview and how it would be conducted.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your name and professional background?

(2) Answer: My name is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for 2/1 and I've been with the unit for [redacted] (b)(6) with the 31st MEU and even deployed while I was there.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Describe the pre-deployment training as a MAGTF?

(2) Answer: Started with company level training, F Co went to Twenty-Nine Palms for a month and conducted iterative Amphibious Track Training. The BN pushed a C2 node out to Twenty-Nine Palms to exercise the staff (July – Sept). We conducted an Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) in September 2020, which included a battalion distributed operations exercise (C2) and force on force. However, the deployment was canceled at the end of ITX, but in February 2021, we were alerted we would deploy. We finished most of our training by December 2020. ADVON left in March 2021 and the of the battalion rest followed in April.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Describe the Deployment?

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd Battalion,
1st Marines, 23 September 2021

(2) Answer: The Battalion dispersed to multiple locations in the AOR. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Describe the unit's activity in theater before deploying to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: The BN went to PSAB with E Co serving as crisis response company.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We worked admin clean up because this was going to be the last SPMAGTF in CENTCOM. Pretty early in the deployment we were aware a NEO in Afghanistan could be possible.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: What kind of preparation did the unit do for NEO?

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(6) started figuring out structure and tasks by the end of June/July. We developed a light, heavy, and medium package to be prepared for contingencies. I started to look at logistics support for Afghanistan and building Joint Mission Essential Equipment List (JMEEL) requests. We submitted orders for all classes of supply to shore up any problems or shortfalls. The Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) would be included in our packages. The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) and Marine Wing Support Detachment (MWSD) were then included in the package and started planning with 2/1. They would provide the logistical support and run the Evacuation Control Center (ECC). The ECC OIC worked with the E Company Commander to develop the process and security plan. The first rehearsal focused on C2 but included all players, and lasted 36 hours. The second rehearsal was conducted in late July, on the airfield at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a with tents and role players, and tested processing evacuees, as well identified tasks and responsibilities. The assumption was the process would be orderly and controlled. The COMREL was not clear during planning and we were planning on the light package. This was in early August. We were not sure if SPMAGTF and/or MEU would be C2 or both. Later COMREL was clarified and MEU was designated the main effort. The split operations were a large problem for the SPMAGTF, because we would have to execute distribution and support to NEO in Afghanistan, steady-state operations, and re-deployment. Re-deployment was already in motion and the unit was supposed to close on Camp Pendleton on 11 SEP 2021. Equipment was already being packed and shipped, but we had to plan for the potential NEO. The initial warning order in early August was 2/1 would not deploy to HKIA. However, on 14 August, 48 hours' notice was given and we initiated movement of

equipment and personnel to the flight line. The BN had to plan for a quartering party, under the circumstances of our deployment, which was another late change.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When did you depart?

(2) Answer: We were given a WARNO on 14 Aug, some departed on 15 Aug for HKIA. Before we departed I was informed the support chain would be pushed through 1st TSC in Kuwait. But logistically, we were not set. I had points of contact but did not have fidelity on the supply chain.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you arrive at HKIA and what did it look like?

(2) Answer: My flight arrived after midnight on 16 Aug. The LNO, who was on the ground for a week, took us to some locations to set up the COC. There wasn't an immediate task to execute, so I went to Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR) to find staff but the JOC was empty – most likely out pushing the crowd back. There was a fight for spaces and logistics, especially between US forces and partner forces. Contractors were not executing services any more. Quarters were essentially anywhere you could find ground. We slept in the gym.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: How long before the rest of the unit arrived?

(2) Answer: It took about two days for the unit to close on HKIA. The 24th MEU and 82nd Airborne units were arriving at the same time as well. The MEU had an element on the ground about a week prior. They secured a lot of transportation, HMMWVs, MAT-Vs, airport vehicles to support operations.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What did you do to figure out logistics at this point?

(2) Answer: We deployed with three MREs per person, so we were covered for a short period before resupply would be required. We worked through the JTF and MEU to secure Class I. Bottled water was at hydration stations spread around HKIA, but MREs were limited. There were pallets in the Class I warehouse, but they were for everyone and rationed. It wasn't dire straits yet for class I since the population on the ground was still small. The contractors quit on the 2nd or 3rd day, so DFAC services for food stopped. Once resupply started to arrive, with ammo and Class I, we had to guard it because it would get pilfered.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What medical assets were on the ground?

(2) Answer: The STP initially arrived with only the medical officer/provider (ER Nurse [REDACTED]) and was augmented with corpsmen from the LCE. The medical platoon from 2/1 was spread around the theater and was not deployed to HKIA. The STP supporting SPMAGTF was at [REDACTED]. The STP deployed forward and closed on HKIA shortly after our arrival and occupied a collection point between East Gate and Abbey Gate.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Was there any change in mission or task and purpose once you arrived at HKIA?

(2) Answer: Not really, after the initial chaos, 2/1 occupied Abbey Gate and began to secure the Entry Control Point (ECP). The ECC personnel were pulled under the MEU to consolidate ECC ops at the PAX Terminal. Their Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) took the lead. Our original plan had the ECP and ECC operations together, so that was a change.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: How did the concept of support work on HKIA?

(2) Answer: There was not a time when we were down to one MRE a day. We were always two MREs a day, at a minimum. The DFAC closed shortly after we arrived, so that decreased the supply while the demand was increasing. There was a rumor that we would go to one, but I wasn't concerned by the 19th of Aug. We were able to get supplies through JTF-CR/SPMAGTF, to include ammo, Class I, and Class IV (concertina wire). To prevent theft, we had to guard the supply stocks. It was a huge waste to have Marines guard the supplies. They would otherwise be conducting resupply or helping the mission in more productive ways. At some point on the 19-20 August, the flow of personnel stopped and all in-bound flights contained resupply. There was a rush to claim pallets of supplies that were ordered by others, so we had to be ready to secure. Resupply was handled by the LCE we had in support. We used our C-130s to move a lot of our supplies in. I was on a group chat to ensure I knew when aircraft were leaving, and we could figure when they were arriving.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: What was your role with Class IV supply and use?

(2) Answer: Lots of units brought Class IV in, so there was some on hand. The SPMAGTF was able to resupply with pre-staged Class IV at [REDACTED]. There was no lumber, but the Engineer platoon was not with 2/1-1 BN, they were at the Embassy in Baghdad. The LCE had an engineer section who helped with the ECP build up. When threats were starting to be identified, there was a renewed effort to get more Class IV.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Where were the medical assets?

(2) Answer: The STP was set up between the gates, Abbey and East, and Role 2 was in main HKIA, sometimes called HKIA North.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: How often did you get out to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: I was down at the gates three times total. I went once on the early site survey of the gate, approximately 17 Aug (when it was closed), but there were already crowds. We executed a site survey at night. We had a squad with some riot shields and concertina wire out front. The "chevron" was in place and Taliban were on it. We didn't put in the chevron. Throughout the mission, we were supporting the units' attempt to harden the ECPs. They provided a sector sketch with changes they were trying to make and we would coordinate for engineer assets and Class IV. Unfortunately, we could get heavy equipment but couldn't maneuver it down to the gate. There were no cranes available and the equipment we did have started to break down. The contractors were no longer around to maintain the airfield equipment. I was also out there on the 24th twice. There were a lot of people, more trash than was there previously, and the concertina wire had been rearranged to better support flow. The unit had rest areas established.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Were any requests for non-lethal weapons filled?

(2) Answer: Our units had their initial set they deployed with. We tried to push non-lethal from [REDACTED] and Kuwait. It was really tough to get the non-lethal equipment because the flights weren't updated in the system, so you wouldn't know what was coming and going. The pallet of non-lethal equipment was on a C-17 or C-130 but it was taken off at a stop before HKIA. The riot shields were kicked off an aircraft and never made it to HKIA. Some were found on HKIA and the Marines were using them.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Did you feel, or notice, any of the tension or pressure on the Chain of Command to balance the need to increase the flow and not compromise the security of the airfield?

(2) Answer: [REDACTED] definitely was getting messages from people in the States, so there was pressure. People were contacting me to ask what the best routes were through Kabul. I didn't know much, since it was changing all the time. The thousands of people outside provided their own pressure; their desperation provided a lot of incentive to get as many through as possible. It was certainly a factor in closing and opening gates. We were very aware what might happen to them if they didn't get through the gates and they remained in Afghanistan.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: What threat reporting were you aware of before 26 August?

(2) Answer: We did a hand off on staff with [REDACTED] every shift, and at a minimum, that was when threats were always briefed. There was a report of VBIED but it was against North Gate. The threats shifted later to Abbey Gate.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Were you aware of the threat reporting on/about 26 August?

(2) Answer: The reporting on the morning of 26 Aug was more intense, but the reporting itself seemed similar to all other reporting. The units were trying to reinforce the gates, and just continued to work their plans to add security measures. I was not aware of anything new occurring or changing, based on the threat reporting.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What were you doing at the time of the attack on 26 Aug 2021?

(2) Answer: I was not at Abbey Gate, but we got the report in the COC. The 24th MEU JOC officer walked in to make sure we knew. We didn't have anything for support to offer them since we were out of vehicles. [REDACTED] contacted the COC, confirmed it was a suicide vest IED (SVIED), 13 WIA critical, 1 walking wounded. The 1/8 BLT sent support for CASEVAC (might have been on rest cycle). The WIA were staged at the STP collection point and then they were moved to Role 2. Some of the STP corpsmen went with casualties. After casualties were CASEVAC'd, the units did accountability and re-supplied. The mortuary affairs process was not well worked out yet, so that portion was a little choppy. We (our Battalion) didn't have an LNO at the Role 2 (the medical section was not with 2/1). The MEU medical officer was trying to capture the names of WIA and KIA. We tried to get accountability of everyone who was WIA and KIA. I was working the WIA, who were already on MEDEVAC aircraft. Other Marines

were put on the MEDEVAC, but no one told us, so we didn't capture the names. The medical officer in Kuwait was able to track down the information on the names of those MEDEVAC'd. The MEDEVAC of all personnel was gone no later than 0400, probably earlier. The Ramp Ceremony was at 1200, and the remains departed at 1300. Personal effects for the evacuated Marines did not make the flights, but they were inventoried. We were able to get the personal effects out on a C-130. Our unit medical team in Kuwait went through everything, checked the inventory, and got 2/1 battalion supply to mail the property back to the States.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: After the attack, what was the focus?

(2) Answer: The BN was still focused on the gate on 27th, and the upcoming relief in place (RIP) with 82nd.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Do you know when the Brits finished passage of lines?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: When was the RIP with the 82nd?

(2) Answer: Late on the 27th, sliding into the 28th. Following the RIP, we started to demilitarize equipment and make decisions on demilitarization. We were planning this earlier in the operation. The Army instituted a process for using empty space on airlift to get equipment out ("Opportune Air"). We lost control of the C-130s that are part of SPMAGTF, but found alternatives to retrograde a lot of the munitions (Javelins, TOWs), weapons, and communications.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: When did you depart HKIA?

(2) Answer: Night of the 28th with the BN Commander and SgtMaj. E Co was last out with the BN HQ and G Co was first to depart. We had our LCE pushed back to us when they stopped ECC ops, so that was another element to get on the aircraft. There was a lot of confusion on who was leaving and when. The JTF had a matrix but it was difficult to follow and there were always a lot of changes. While we were waiting for the flights, we had to do a "police call." There were other units there, but we seemed to be the only ones executing a police call. Different theories were given for why – (1) public relations, handover to Taliban is respectful; (2) Punishment for spray painting

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2nd Battalion,
1st Marines, 23 September 2021

inappropriate things on vehicles; (3) Punishment for breaking things during demilitarization. While this was going on, I was working with JTF to find spaces on aircraft for those remaining. That's when the police call thing happened.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: What else would you want us to know?

(2) Answer: COMREL was not really established for several days. It created a problem with securing supplies because no one was responsible for our supply. Higher HQs were willing to help and did but we didn't know who was responsible to help us. We could get a lot from [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] with our organic aviation support but not all classes of supply were available through [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. A lot of logistics personnel were re-tasked to other efforts and not re-supply, managing stocks, working supply ordering in support of our efforts. There also weren't enough vehicles to support the various tasks that had to be accomplished for supporting the ECP – re-supply, CASEVAC, movement to and from gates for rest cycles. Marines and other personnel were hot-wiring vehicles to ensure they could get the job done, but then other units started stealing them from each other.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Contact Information where we can reach you.

(2) Answer:

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] KSA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [redacted] answers individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [redacted] describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: How long have you been in the Marines?

(2) Answer: I graduated from the Naval Academy in 2013, so I have been in for a little over 8 years.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: What is your background in the Marines?

[redacted]
(b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: What Echo Company do to train up for this deployment?

(2) Answer: We trained on defense operations, on being the Helo Company, on urban packages, IED lanes, squad attacks, platoon attacks, and finally had our Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) in late September of 2020.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When do you first deploy to the CENTCOM AOR?

(2) Answer: We left on April 2 of 2021. I went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We were the crisis response company and conducted our RIP with Lima Company 3/1 on 12 April. We made the move to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a from 13-14 May.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: When you arrived to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on 14 May, what was your job and what did you focus on?

(2) Answer: Our biggest priority was becoming fully operationally capable. That took us about 72 hours to establish. We moved with everything; communications equipment, ammunition, and our weapons systems. At the time, we were just working out issues with computer networks and storage. As a company, we were ready to deploy organically, but the computers were a limiting factor for us.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When do you first hear that you may deploy to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer: We first heard rumor of deploying to Afghanistan on 4 May. I was about to go on a leaders recon to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. A couple of hours prior to departing we received a call from SPMAGTF saying that Afghanistan was looking pretty sketchy. We got back to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on 10 May. Things are looking the same at this time so we prepared to move from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you first know that you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer: The biggest indicators started in the beginning of July. The MAGTF as a whole was beginning to conduct evacuation rehearsals and Evacuation Control

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

Center (ECC) exercises during the last week in June or the first week of July. We received an Executive Order on the 13 August. On 15 August, we began planning sessions. We received confirmation that we were going at 1130 on 15 August. We were wheels up by 1800 on 15th August. We flew on a C-130; myself and 48 of my Marines.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When did you land at HKIA and what do you see?

(2) Answer: We arrived around 0200-0300 local time on 16 August. The majority of the airfield was dark. Based off the info we received while in flight, we knew that the southern perimeter was breached and that there were personnel on the airfield. We interpreted that as the breach being a dynamic, deliberate combat event, not people flooding through holes. While we were landing, we were lased by a green laser. We landed and saw some Afghans waiting to be evacuated. We also saw personnel from the MEU and the MAGTF waiting to receive us. We had no urgency to get off the airfield or get to cover. First, we went to our temporary billets to drop off our main packs. Then, I went to the JOC to link in with the Battalion Commander and OPSO to get an overall update

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What was your assigned mission?

(2) Answer: Our mission was to move to the southern perimeter. Initially, we were supposed to be Abbey Gate to link in with 1/8 and get tasked from them, since I only had about a platoon-size element with me.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: So 1/8 is on Abbey Gate at this time?

(2) Answer: We pushed to Abbey Gate, but when we got there we didn't see any Marines. The Brits are outside, but the gate is held by Turks and Azerbaijani. I made the call that 1/8 was likely at the terminals, so I pushed my Marines west and linked up with 1/8 at the international terminals.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Did you leave anyone there are Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: No, we moved everyone to the international terminal.

m. Question and Answer 12.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(1) Question: What did you do there?

(2) Answer: We linked in with 1/8 and met with their Battalion Commander. He told us that they have been on line for 24-36 hours. My Marines relieved his at the international terminal for perimeter security. This is around 0700 on 16 August. 1/8 was pulled off the line and we only had my guys pulling security on the C-wire perimeter around the terminal. My Marines were about 20m apart, pulling security.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Were there people on the airfield?

(2) Answer: At that time, it was about 1000, and we were seeing people around the airfield.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Was the famous flight that took off with people hanging onto the plane around this time?

(2) Answer: That was around 1100-1200 on 16 August. I had pulled my Marines back for better dispersion. 10th MTN and the 82nd were tied in with us on the western flank. My Marines were holding right in front of the domestic terminal. They held along the wire barrier to the west. Some individuals had been trying to get across the wire. Around 0900, the crowd broke through on the western flank. They were flowing that way because they saw that the U.S. was dispersed and there was an opportunity. The flank broke through the wire and we saw the civilians start running across the air field.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: What were you thinking?

(2) Answer: "How do I prevent that on my side of the wire?" But once there's a hole, the crowd floods over there to the 10th MTN and 82nd area. I started retrograding my guys about 100m at a time to build standoff and keep us tied in with other forces. That went on for about 30 minutes.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: What does that look like?

(2) Answer: There was a little building next to Ramp 1. There were CAAT and shock trauma vehicles in our area. When the crowd started coming north across airfield

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

there was no ability to form a line with the 82nd or 10th MTN. My Marines were intermixed with the crowd and there were thousands of people. They were not threatening. They were just running north towards the C-17s on the aprons in North HKIA. They were also taking any chow or water that was pre-staged for us.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Your Marines are interspersed with the crowd. Were there any clear lines?

(2) Answer: We are trying to get north of the crowd and form a line. Many of the other units are also entirely intermixed, regardless of if they are dismounted or in vehicles.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: How does that situation end?

(2) Answer: It continued on like that for hours. They made it about 3/4 of the way up the airfield. When the C-17s taxied out and took off, a lot of the crowd lost their goal and dispersed with it. It allowed us to reform a line on the southern perimeter of north HKIA with 1/8, 10th MTN, and 82nd. Once there was a line, we just started riot control and pushing people back. Most had already egressed. Some were sitting on the southern end of the airfield. Some people were going through the buildings on the western side.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: How did you reestablish these lines? Do the crowds end or does it go on until 17 August?

(2) Answer: It ended on 16 August around 2200 or 2300. Most people had just gone home. They understood that there were no flights coming in since they were on the airfield. At this point, we re-established the southern perimeter. Then the NSU showed up and started getting the rest of the crowd out. They are rough. They were supposed to be there around 1900, but it was more like 2300-0000. The NSU showed up and secured international and domestic terminals and Apron 5 to Apron 2.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: The NSU had vehicles; what do the NSU look like?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: Yes, they had Toyota Hiluxes. All of them were similar color; tan, gray, or green. Their uniforms were all different, some had tiger stripe uniforms, but all were identifiable as NSU.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: As the NSU shows, up did you see any Taliban?

(2) Answer: No, they didn't show up at this time.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: What is E Co doing at this time?

(2) Answer: We were focused on holding aprons 2 through 4. We held a couple of positions for observation. We were essentially a second line.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: When did the 82nd show up?

(2) Answer: A small element arrived on 16 August, but I'm not sure when they started flowing in. They went straight to (b)(1)1.4a not north HKIA.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: When did you first have a mission assignment and go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: On 22 August. The company is split between the PAX terminal in north HKIA and the eastern holding area. We were doing site security at both locations. I went back to the HQ and received news we would RIP with G Co at Abbey Gate since they had been on for 48 hours straight.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: What's the mission, as you understand it, on 22 August?

(2) Answer: We were supposed to relieve G Co in place and control Abbey Corridor from Barron Hotel to Abbey Gate proper. We tried to bring order to the chaos as the crowds were surging at the gate. We refined and accelerated the evacuation of individuals through the canal.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

****Clarification between what the investigative team calls parts of the gate with what [REDACTED] refers to sections of the gates as. Inner=proper, outer=middle, chevron=Baron/Taliban gate****

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: Was the chevron established when you got there? My understanding is that it was established by G Co two days prior.

(2) Answer: I first went to Abbey Gate on 20 August. I took photos at that time. It was very open and the Canal Zone at that time was open. I have some photos from the 22-25 August when we held the gate. Those should be my last photos. The pictures were taken from the sniper tower at outer gate. We can see the Taliban positions and the Taliban on the chevron. You can see the ECP by the chevron.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: If you're an Afghan who made it to the chevron, what happened? Were you ever physically standing at the gate?

(2) Answer: I was not ever at the Taliban gate, I was only with U.S. forces and the British.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: We heard initially that the U.S. wanted the chevron to have a Brit side and a U.S. side. I heard Taliban balked at that?

(2) Answer: There were two entries, but they weren't broken by nationality.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: Are the Taliban patting down individuals or just looking at documents?

(2) Answer: I only ever saw the Taliban check documents. I saw the Brits do a quick pat down before passing them to us once. After that, they were put right in the holding area by the outer gate.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: Are there any Female Engagement Team (FET) members forward?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: Yes. My platoons were in the search area between the outer and inner gates. 2nd Platoon was south along the canal and the western side of the wall. Force protection was in line with the sniper tower. On the days we worked there, we pushed about 300m north along the canal.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: How far was it from the outer gate to the chevron?

(2) Answer: About 250m.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: I'm an Afghan who just passed the chevron and I come to the outer gate, what happens?

(2) Answer: Immediately, you would be held in the outer gate holding area. You could also be pulled straight from the canal to the outer gate holding area. This area is right above and alongside the canal. Eventually, we were able to put up camouflage nets and pass out water and chow there discretely so as not to panic those in the canal. As far as the personnel coming out of the canal, it was easy to vet them. In terms of people coming from the chevron, sometimes the British would just push people to us.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: What does the holding area look like?

(2) Answer: It was surrounded by hesco barriers and C-wire and most people were sitting on the ground. We had processes to separate American Citizens (AMCITs) and Special Interest Visas (SIVs). We tried to keep the capacity to about 150 people. We vetted them for paperwork and we did a pat down, but paper work had largely been checked by this point. In the holding area, it was a mix of both from those in the canal and those from the chevron.

When we first got there, every section of the gate had holding areas that just had people sitting there. We cleared them out as it created too many threats and they were too unruly.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: These are part of the 2,000 that you needed to push to HKIA, but couldn't get to the eastern comfort area because they were full. So overall, it was over 7,000 people with nowhere to go?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: Yes, there were no flights going in or out. We had push people out from the inner gate holding areas. Department of State (DoS) would come and vet those at the gate. We had our search area just north of outer gate and we also had our first FET north of there. We were doing physical searches there.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: Ever find a weapon?

(2) Answer: Yes, one handgun with two magazines. It was a military-aged male there with his family.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Why?

(2) Answer: He said it was his protection. As a whole, there were not many objects that could be considered weapons.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Did you ever see people with bags of cash?

(2) Answer: Yeah, I saw one large bag of cash, some small bags of cash, and some counterfeit US cash. We never found any drugs.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: So the mission from 22-25 August was to secure the corridor from the inner to the outer gates. There is a search area outside the outer gate, then a more comprehensive search area inside the inner gate. Are there Marines on the walls?

(2) Answer: We did have Marines on the wall. We had a seven-man sniper team in the tower. The Jersey barrier beneath it was our forward line of troops (FLOT). We had Marines and Brits alongside the canal wall.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: How did the flow of personnel change at this time?

(2) Answer: We were seeing fewer and fewer people coming through the chevron. The evacuees knew that the Taliban may not let them through, so they'd flow east around the chevrons and come down the canal instead.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: Some of them may have tried the chevron, then tried to flank through the canal?

(2) Answer: Correct, it was just a residential area and groves off to the side. You could walk to the canal without impediment.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: Explain the canal to me.

(2) Answer: There was C-wire ringing it, there was a lot of trash, sewer water flowing through the middle, and tons of people and bags in the crowd.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: What does the population in the canal look like?

(2) Answer: In the canal, it was mostly military-aged males because they were willing to stand in the water for long periods of time. In the population east of the canal, it was military-aged males but more families.

Many people who tried coming through the canal did not have a true ID. They might have a letter appreciation from the Marines in 2012 or a Bagram mess hall worker ID badge.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: What does pulling people out of the canal look like?

(2) Answer: It was based solely on the Marines' judgement and the information we currently had for individuals to be on the lookout for. During the two days we were on the gate, we pushed the FLOT 300 meters out on the western side of the canal past the bridge. We used that bridge as an exit corridor to get them out if they were rejected.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: Were you ever told of a desire to close Abbey Gate? Were they unable to close it because of the large amount of people?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure. If it was kept open, it was for evacuation purposes.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

What I recommended when I held Abbey Gate was to seal off the gate by putting T-walls along the canal fence line all the way up to the Barron Hotel. It would have separated us from the crowd, while leaving access to the hotel. The Department of State coverage was spotty at best and I was asking if we could pull RSOs from other countries to help evacuate personnel. When we had no DoS we couldn't get anyone out.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: On your watch, how greatly did the number of DoS at your gate vary?

(2) Answer: The fewest present would be two agents and the greatest would be eight present. We never had more than eight document verification lines. Eventually, they got closer to the outer gate to setup their vetting process. Once they were approved, they would go immediately to bus stop since we were not doing holding areas anymore. If they were denied then they'd go back out through the fence.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: We've heard that, at the time, if the gates were closed people would be crushed against the gate and they'd fall in and get grabbed by Marines to be screened when the gate was opened?

(2) Answer: Yes, but that was before we controlled Abbey Gate. When we first arrived on 16 August, I'd get assignments saying there were three Germans that we needed to get out. The whole corridor was packed with bodies. We would pull a couple of people in from the front, those we were looking for, and then the Turks or Azerbaijani would shut the gate.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: Were you relieved at Abbey Gate on 25 August?

(2) Answer: Yes, we were relieved by G Co Company between 1600 and 1700 on 25 August.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question: What conversations were you having with the G Co Company Commander at this time?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) walked around our lines. They were different than what he had previously. I wanted him to make an assessment on his own. I explained I had

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

two battle positions. I had six platoons at my disposal, so I would utilize two at a time. Two each on post, react, and rest cycles in eight hour blocks. He had six platoons at his disposal as well. We have four line platoons internally, plus two platoons from weapons.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: After the changeover was complete, what happened?

(2) Answer: We left on the evening of the 25th. I recommended that he adopt our platoon rotations and our defensive line, specifically along the western wall of the canal. I knew we would be re-tasked to Abbey after about 24 hours of rest to control the Abbey Corridor and facilitate the Brits, F Co, and G Co all retrograding. We would then secure the gate until the 82nd changed out with us on the 27th or 28th.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question: Point of clarification, is it purely E Co Company on the gate other than the FET, Trauma, and Weapons elements?

(2) Answer: Yes.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question: Why was the decision made to incorporate G Co and F Co going forward?

(2) Answer: They were smaller. E Co has about 200 bodies, G Co and F Co have about 220 combined.

bbb. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question: When do you retrograde from HKIA?

(2) Answer: On the 29th at about 0200.

ccc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question: How big is the shock platoon, which is acting as a battalion asset?

(2) Answer: It consists of about 15 people. There is one PA, one Doctor, one Independent Duty Corpsman, and some others.

ddd. Question and Answer 54.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(1) Question: How much pressure from the outside, such as the President, Senators, etc. is making it to you?

(2) Answer: A lot, sir. I Face Timed with Gen McKenzie's PAO. They were trying to get reporters' families through. [REDACTED] CENTCOM PAO, was telling me that a 120-person group of New York Times reporters' families had to be brought through. I told him I couldn't verify these guys' info. He took my number and told me that I might hear from him or Gen McKenzie, in a negative way.

eee. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question: Did you ever help anyone get out?

(2) Answer: I helped one buddy of mine get his former interpreter out. Then I started getting hit up by dozens of people. My number must have gotten out that way.

That group of 120 New York Times reporters and families were eventually escorted in around the 18th or the 19th by the Taliban. We had to square off and get a hold of that group.

fff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question: Is there anything you want to add?

(2) Answer: On the 26th, on the top of the chevron and on top of the houses a bit north, there was a greater presence of Taliban. I don't know why. I felt like the attack was going to happen and I rehearsed in my head what I was going to say when it did.

ggg. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question: What time did the blast occur?

(2) Answer: It occurred around 1730. We had came off of duty the night of the 25th and were done by 2000. We were told to take 24 hours of rest and then to come back at 1800 on the 26th. When we returned to Abbey Gate, the plan was for E Co to cover Abbey from the inner to the outer gate, what we called the Abbey Corridor. F Co and G Co would hold the outer gate to the chevrons. All of this was to enable the Brits' final retrograde, which we expected at 2300 on the 26th. G Co and F Co would then pull the chevron ISUs against the wall, sealing that off. They'd do defensive measures, then retrograde through us. We would hold the corridor, close the gate doors, and wait for the 82nd to change out with us.

hhh. Question and Answer 58.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(1) Question: What was the decision-making process to put so many Marines out on security?

(2) Answer: It was to maintain the security presence we had, while facilitating the obstacle emplacement so that the airfield didn't risk getting overrun when the gate closed. My company's squad of engineers were the only engineers the battalion had. They needed the force protection to enable them.

We had the perimeter pushed about 300m north on the western side of the canal. I recommended that [REDACTED] do the same. He said "I don't know if I'm that bold". I recommended he not let the perimeter get closer than the bridge. This was only on the western side, not in the canal or on the eastern side. It allowed for much better visibility of the crowds. G Co had collapsed their positions at 2200, right after we left.

On the morning of the 26th at about 1000, eight hours ahead of schedule, the OPSO calls and says E Co needs to get to Abbey Gate. I woke up the company. Our first guys were down there at about 1115. At that point, the crowd was all the way back up to the Jersey barrier by the sniper tower. The crowd had grown, G Co seemed overwhelmed.

iii. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question: Why did crowd grow?

(2) Answer: They knew we were leaving. When I changed out on the 25th, that night the crowd was calm. There were a lot of people but they were calm. Individuals in the crowds would ask about all the multinational forces that would show up and pull people out of the crowd. This was an issue. Multinational forces would show up, pull people out, and put them along the fence or in the corridor. Then they would actually do the searching. After that, the multinational forces would leave the civilians sitting in there. If they were left, we would kick them out.

jjj. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question: Is this a contributing factor? There's more panic as the timeline shortens, and then NATO forces are whipping them into a frenzy by pulling people out?

(2) Answer: Yes. We told the partner nations to stop. They were causing friction and chaos in the crowd as they pulled people out. They wouldn't explain to the people nearby. We needed them to coordinate with us so we could increase security and message the crowd. They got better at this.

kkk. Question and Answer 61.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(1) Question: The main reason it causes instability is because these people aren't coming through the chevron. The crowd sees people getting picked, but they don't understand that they are being pulled because they are affiliated with those countries.

(2) Answer: Yes, absolutely. People were agreeable when you explained the situation.

III. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question: So back to the 25th, what are the threat streams you're receiving?

(2) Answer: We received some threats of insider attacks. Snipers had a couple BOLOs and we had continuous reporting of suicide bombers on motorbikes, or a gold corolla being used as IED. We knew a Toyota couldn't drive to where we are. However we figured maybe they would use that vehicle to get closer.

mmm. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question: Did you receive any very specific threats?

(2) Answer: No, we were told to look at backpacks, etc. We were being told that it would be a backpack or a vest. The threat reporting increased on the 26th.

nnn. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question: What's that look like?

(2) Answer: At about 1230, I was near the sniper tower again. Someone attempted to throw a black pack with pink and purple flowers/butterflies over the wall but it got stuck in the c-wire. We knocked it down back to the crowd side. It seemed like a heavy bag and it was suspicious that it couldn't clear an eight-foot wall. The only reporting we had received that was specific was a BOLO for an unspecified type of bag that was black with white arrows (backpack, duffel, brief, unknown) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) one of my Platoon Commanders, actually dislodged it and knocked it back to the other side of the wall. This was about two meters north of the sniper tower.

After that, we had flowing forces. I had two platoons in the QRF area on Apron 2 inside the inner gate. 2nd Platoon was working the corridor by escorting, conducting searches, and pulling security. 1st Platoon was tasked with supporting engineers and building on obstacle plan to secure the gate.

ooo. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question: How big is your engineer element?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: It is a 13-man squad.

ppp. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question: Where are you when the blast happens?

(2) Answer: About 22 meters away, just north of the outer gate.

qqq. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question: Could you see the blast? Could you feel the concussive wave?

(2) Answer: No, the door was in the way. I saw the white cloud from the explosion coming over the tower. I didn't feel a wave, just an overpressure. I did get a mild TBI from it. Immediately, I pushed about three to four meters south through the gate to assess the damage. I saw about four to five KIA Marines, laying on each other. I saw other casualties and noted the civilians. [REDACTED] for Weapons Company, ran by to work CASEVAC. He yelled at me to get my Marines to come help, I yelled back that he needed to wait a bit in case of a 2nd attack. After that, I ran back north through the outer gate.

rrr. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question: Is anyone in the Abbey Corridor or the sniper tower injured?

(2) Answer: No one in the corridor or the tower was hit. A sniper was hit, but he was out of the tower. SSgt Hoover of mine was out assisting because he volunteered. He died later in the role 2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So I pushed south, saw the MASCAL, pushed back north, and told my 2nd Platoon to get aid and litter teams. I pushed south about another 15 meters to get good green gear communications to contact the shock trauma platoon at the inner gate to send an ambulance. I didn't send a 9-line report, I just told them to send the vehicles. Immediately after, I started setting my company's security position. I ran into the sniper tower to get better observation and to be able to see the canal over the wall and observe the civilian and Taliban actions.

sss. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question: Was that the only sniper team?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: The only one of my teams, which is seven people, was working at the tower. At the time, two were in the tower, one was on the ground, the other three were driving to relieve them. There was another guardian angel position at the inner gate compound itself. There was another tower there that can see the northern part of the corridor and some of the city.

ttt. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question: Do you have a company overlay, fires plan sketches, or anything like that?

(2) Answer: No, we didn't have that at the time, we just had a map that we sketched on. I might be able to get a photo of that at the time. I will get with [redacted (b)(6)] to see what photos we have from the 25th and 26th.

uuu. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question: What changed from the 25th to the 26th?

(2) Answer: The first person I saw when I got to the gate on the morning of the 26th was the G Co [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]. I said "what the fuck happened". He said the situation changed. He said that 500 military aged males rushed the lines and it got crazy. I think they intentionally pulled back their line. I don't know if they intentionally pulled all the way to the tower, or if they started pulling back and the civilians saw it as a moment of weakness.

vvv. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question: When are the last casualties evacuated post blast?

(2) Answer: Maybe 20 minutes after, if that. I had enough forces to surge. We first established a hasty collection point at the base of the tower and a larger one closer to the inner gate. The corridor was lined with vehicles owned by us or other nations. We took them and got our wounded back to receive care.

www. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question: Were there any wounded Brits or Afghans? What happened to them?

(2) Answer: No wounded Brits but there were wounded Afghans. Immediately post blast, some Afghans tried to run through the gate. My Marines held them back. We collected some of their wounded as well.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

xxx. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question: After the blast, did all the Afghans run and leave their wounded?

(2) Answer: Yes, sir. Everyone ran and dispersed, no one stayed to help. The majority of those to the rear of the blast were dead. There were piles of bodies, stacked on top of each other. All of them were dead, those in the back and in the canals. There was some blood, but not much. On the western side of the canal, north of the Jersey barrier, those individuals were very bloody and mangled. I saw two individuals in their death throes. There was another guy lying on the wall, alive but soaked in blood. The majority of those by the bomber were killed due to overpressure. I think he was right along the wall, with his bomb oriented to the Marines.

yyy. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question: Those behind and around him were killed?

(2) Answer: Yes, due to the over pressure. The post blast indicates that the wall on the other side doesn't have frag pattern any lower than 2 feet down from the top of the wall. I think it was likely that he was on the wall. The fatalities in the canal were likely due to overpressure or a ball bearing to the head.

zzz. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question: Do you remember the black mark here on the wall? *indicates post blast imagery

(2) Answer: From the 22-25th people were putting up temp structures, setting up bazaar, along that whole area so I couldn't say. It may be a char pattern.

aaaa. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question: Was there anything left of the bomber? How far to each side did the people die?

(2) Answer: Nothing left of him that I saw. There were bodies 10m to either side on the western side. On the eastern side, at the Jersey barrier was the greatest density of casualties.

bbbb. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question: Did you take any photos of the area post blast?

(2) Answer: I didn't, but my snipers may have. They are here as well.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

cccc. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question: Did you see ball bearings laying around?

(2) Answer: I didn't see any laying around, but we picked some out of vehicles, walls, and kit. We finished the evacuation. G Co had already moved north of outer gate. F Co was next after them. We got additional Marines from my company in the blast area to sweep for any casualties we missed and fell in the canal, or any SI laying around.

dddd. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question: How close are the nearest remaining Afghans?

(2) Answer: About 75 meters away. A crowd of about 200 was still present to the south because they were stuck against the Barron Hotel compound. Several hundred other were 75 meters north and holding or pushing into villages. I sent my Marines through to grab their kit. Then we shut the gate. We closed the doors, and put the bars through.

eeee. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question: Did you see the Taliban at this time?

(2) Answer: I didn't see them but one of my platoon sergeants did. He said the Taliban were laughing at what was going on.

After shutting the gate, we pulled the PSYOP vehicle, which was pretty badly damaged, back through to help shut the gate.

ffff. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question: Did you weld the gate shut?

(2) Answer: We parked a vehicle against it and ratchet strapped it to the frame of the vehicle, then laced the area with c-wire. The entire corridor was lined with jersey barriers. If the blast hadn't happened, the plan was to use them all as disrupting barriers in the corridor.

gggg. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question: How many snipers are still there?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: Five or six. They were in the tower for the duration of E Co and G Co times at the gate. They were battalion assets.

hhhh. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question: Is there anything else you'd like to add?

(2) Answer: Leading up to the blast, around 1400-1430, we started getting reports from [redacted] through the Brits that a device was about to blow in 10 minutes. Five minutes later we got a five min-to-blast call. This was all fed to us from the British to our [redacted]. Then we got a two-minute till blast call. All of our forces moved away from the wall and we stopped all evacuation operations. Everyone hardened their positions and got below the canal wall. We held those positions for five minutes, then got back to evacuations operations.

iiii. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question: Are the consular and department of state still there?

(2) Answer: Yes. We keep asking when they would shut the gate, pre blast, around 1600. [redacted] asked them. They wouldn't give a clear answer, but for days prior they had been saying it was basically up to us.

jjjj. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question: You have the decision-making authority to shut it?

(2) Answer: Yes for a threat, but not for when the final time to stop processing is. Department of State said it was up to Marines, but they don't have a time. We had planned to cease evacuation operations at 1700, and then switch to FORCEPRO and obstacle emplacement. We were told the Brits would be done at 2000. At 1700 on the 25th, we were told they wouldn't be done until 0300 on the 27th. Our shutting down was entirely contingent on British retrograde. [redacted] and the 1-82 BN commander discussed this timeline with the British. All those individuals spoke with the Taliban at the chevron to inform them of this plan. So we changed the plan to continue evacuating until 1800, before switching to FORCEPRO and obstacles. I think [redacted] was the primary, he discussed it with the BC and OPSO. My company's role was to facilitate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question: Could this have been prevented?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: Could the attack have been prevented? Maybe not. But there are things we could have done to mitigate the number of casualties. The 300 meter buffer on the western side of the line would have prevented casualties. It would have created dispersion between the Marines and made the crowds more manageable for observation and control. We had escort teams to pull people out, and Marines were spread out about every 20 meters with that in place. The bombing could not have been prevented, but casualties could have been prevented. With the buffer in place, no one was on the U.S. side. The canal was seven feet deep. The western space was packed with people once the buffer went away, which allowed for more casualties.

III. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: [redacted (b)(6)]

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer



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ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your name and professional background?

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: What was the pre-deployment training like?

(2) Answer: We have a good group of platoon leadership teams. We conducted an ITX (Integrated Training Exercise) and came out of it very well. However, the pre-deployment training did not include preparation for NEO. It was not mentioned in the rear or during train-up. We didn't start working the NEO problem set until we arrived in the CENTCOM AOR.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: When did you arrive in theater?

SECRET//REL USA, FVEY

(2) Answer: I arrived with the main body of the unit in April 2021 to (b)(1)1.4a

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: What operations did you conduct while in the CENTCOM AOR?

(2) Answer: E Co did a lot of training with the platoons rotating through different locations. The company was also designated the crisis response and Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) company.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: When did you start preparing for NEO and what did you do to prepare?

(2) Answer: We started preparing in June when there was a strong possibility that we could be executing a NEO. By July, we executed two Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) and planned another. The first MRX was a setup and Command and Control (C2) shake out and the second was about Evacuation Control Center (ECC) processes. We included the Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) sections who would execute the ECC operations.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When did you arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer: We flew out on 16 August and arrived on 17 August under the cover of darkness. The rest of the company arrived on 18 August. We had a weapons platoon attached to us bringing the company strength to 232 personnel on the ground at HKIA.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: What did you observe when you arrived and what tasks did you execute?

(2) Answer: We were initially taken to billeting, but then we consolidated to help with perimeter security. Once we were inserted into the line, we worked 24 hours straight.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When did you move to Abbey Gate?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: After we came off the perimeter we moved to the gate. Fox Company was already there. We relieved them. We put one platoon on QRF, one platoon on the inner gate, and two platoons on the outer gate. We had Marines potentially getting sick because of the conditions, so we had to work out a rotation to move Marines off the line/gate.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What was going on at Abbey Gate when you arrived?

(2) Answer: Honestly, it was chaos. There was really no process or structure to ensure security, over watch, screening, or searches. We installed concertina wire to control the crowd. We built a search team with the Female Engagement Teams (FETs), and resupply was established [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the Logistics Combat Element (LCE).

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: How did the Marines handle the crowds?

(2) Answer: We integrated with the Brits well on the line. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d We got the Marines to communicate with individuals trying to get through and that seemed to work well.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: How did the rest cycle work?

(2) Answer: Initially, the companies would rotate between F Co, E Co, and G Co to work the gates. The weapons company was under E Co. The rotation on the gate was 24 hours between the companies to begin with. Once we set the rhythm and processes, we were able to maintain the gate in a steady way with the companies rotating one platoon through a section of the gate at a time. A section would be at the inner gate screening and holding area, the outer gate initial holding area, and the chevron area. The companies also picked up other tasks, but they could now spare a platoon to execute the new tasks and still get some rest.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: How did you get the Marines to take a lighter touch when dealing with the Afghans?

(2) Answer: We talked to the Marines and told them to look at the evacuees as fellow human beings. We told them to treat them with some empathy because they were just people trying to get to a better place. Others working Entry Control Points (ECPs) or the perimeters were using warning shots and some other aggressive, non-

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], USMC, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

lethal means. We never used warning shots and hardly used any non-lethal means. The same approach was applied when the evacuees would be screened and sit waiting for Department of State (DoS) personnel who may never show up. They would get frustrated.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Did the unit conduct any MASCAL training?

(2) Answer: The Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) was integrated into MRXs before we arrived at HKIA. Those MRXs were focused on platoon-level MASCAL with STP support, which was incredibly helpful. We did not execute a MASCAL exercise at HKIA.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Were you aware of the pressure on leadership to increase or keep the flow of evacuees moving and balance that against security concerns? Specifically, did you receive any phone calls asking for assistance?

(2) Answer: I didn't receive any calls but it was difficult because the Afghans were desperate to get in. For everyone you helped, there were hundreds who were standing there wondering why they were not picked for screening. Then they would sit there for hours waiting for the DoS. Despite the desire to help everyone, the Marines were incredibly fair about applying the always changing standard. It got really hard when an American would come to the gate, through the crowd, have the documents, but try to bring Afghans with them. We never knew what the standard would be for that situation. The missing DoS personnel at the gate would have been incredibly helpful to us trying to initially screen. It was very emotional when people are so desperate and we are trying to be fair.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: How long would you go without DoS screeners?

(2) Answer: They would be missing for a minimum of 12-15 hours after they were supposed to appear. Several times they would be gone for 24 hours.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: What was the threat reporting leading up to 26 August?

(2) Answer: Threat reporting was very generic; nothing stood out. We just stayed on alert the whole time. There were bags, suitcases, and purses on the ground everywhere, so spotting an IED under those circumstances was impossible. The

Marines were searching everyone who came into the outer gate. However, many other evacuees were not being searched if brought in by other nations.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: What about threats on 26 August?

(2) Answer: I didn't hear anything different from the other days. We were on the gate on 25 August and were supposed to get relieved for a rest, but we still had guys on the gate on the 26th. We weren't presented with any information specific to any threat beyond the usual reporting.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Was Echo Company on duty at Abbey Gate on 26 August?

(2) Answer: Yes. I was not, but the unit was on the gate. The first third of the inner gate was ours, G Co had the outer gate, and Fox Co had the chevron. I was prepping for movement, since we were planned to depart in the next 48-72 hours.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: After the attack, what did you do?

(2) Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6) When I was told there was an explosion at Abbey Gate, a guy from the company (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) came to get me and drove me out to the gate. When I arrived, I tried to get down to the outer gate area. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) stopped me and asked me to get a CCP at the inner gate because casualties were already evacuated and no one had accountability. I got accountability and we were short two – SSgt Hoover and (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) We went to the hospital. SSgt Hoover had already passed and was in the morgue. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) was found in the OR. He was in surgery getting shrapnel removed. A little later, I went over to the refrigerator container and identified SSgt Hoover. I reported our numbers and accountability to the (b)(6) There was some confusion over (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) getting counted as part of another company. I stayed at the hospital for a while to help the (b)(6) with getting the other companies' accountability figured out. We had other casualties who probably had a concussion. When I was done at the hospital, I found the company back at the gym. We had been pulled off the gate.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: You mentioned concussions. Were there any other injuries?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: We had several other personnel with concussions, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) was medically evacuated (MEDEVAC) to Germany and then went to Walter Reed to see some specialists. The last I heard he was still at Walter Reed. (b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6) who was not in the tower. He was on the ground at the time of the blast.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: What was your assessment of the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)?

(2) Answer: I think it went well because guys were evacuated quickly. We could have done the accountability piece better, but it may have been at the cost of treating the wounded. The STP was close and other nations let us use vehicles to execute the CASEVAC quickly.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: When did all of the MEDEVACs depart?

(2) Answer: The wounded were gone from HKIA by 0300 or 0400 27 August.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: When was the Ramp Ceremony/Hero Flight?

(2) Answer: It was the very next day to the best of my memory. It happened very quickly.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: What did you work on after the ceremony now that you were not on the gate?

(2) Answer: We worked on demilitarizing equipment that we couldn't take with us. We were looking after the morale and mental health of the Marines. We tried to keep them busy. The demilitarizing equipment task was maybe given to us to help keep the Marines from sitting around and thinking too much. Apparently we broke too much stuff, because we were told to clean some stuff up.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Is there anything that you would like to add that we have not asked?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 30 September 2021

(2) Answer: There is nothing I would add. You should definitely talk to the NCOs that were at the gate at the time. They will be able to tell you what went on at Abbey Gate at the time of the attack.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: What is your contact info?

(2) Answer:

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6) 30 September 2021

1. On 30 September 2021, BG Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview. [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) captured the contents of the discussion for the purpose of this memorandum.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your background?

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Were you at Abby Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes.

d. Question and Answer 3.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) 30 September 2021

(1) Question. Were you around the blast?

(2) Answer. I was about 400 meters away. At the time of the blast, I was standing on top of my vehicle with [redacted] (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Were you part of force between 22-25 August that was providing security at the gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, during this period the platoon was pulling security south at the outer gate and the pathway that led to the north area. [redacted] (b)(6) had about eight Marines between the canal area and the foot bridge area. We were pushing back a group of around 200 military age males.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What is the distance from the outer gate position to the inner gate?

(2) Answer. It was about 300 meters. We had four to five Marines pushing people south to exit the area. [redacted] (b)(6) happened to get a little too far spread out, so I was focused on pulling them back a little.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What kinds of things did you see on the ground between the 22nd and 25th of August?

(2) Answer. On the 22nd of August it was complete chaos. Closer to the 25th of August there was more order at the gate.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Why was there more order?

(2) Answer. There was more dispersion. There were so many people on the 25th that I couldn't even notice the canal area. We were able to push people north and flush them down and out the Abbey Corridor if they didn't have the credentials.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you see any Taliban near the blast area?

(2) Answer. I never saw any armed individuals, but I was in a different location. I didn't see the individuals with sticks hitting people or individuals with AKs in the crowds. I only saw that on the 27th of August.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 30 September 2021

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Where were you on the 27th of August?

(2) Answer. After the blast, we opened the gates and we swept from the inner gate to the chevron looking for anything that dropped during the explosion on the 26th. We passed a lot of British. The Taliban were still on the chevron. We retrieved pieces of clothing, 5.56 rounds damaged from the ball bearings, pieces of body armor that fell out, and magazines. That morning I recommended to [REDACTED] (b)(6) that we bring Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) out to do an analysis. We didn't find it appropriate that more people should see all the bodies. There were just scrapes of big flesh on the wall. The evening of the 26th that canal was full of people. The bodies had been moved by the morning. I looked down in the canal to see if anything was down there that wasn't supposed to be, like other Marines or their equipment. The British were looking down in that area as well. Bodies were being pulled out of the water and being put into the ambulance.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What were you doing about 400 meters away?

(2) Answer. I was standing on a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle with [REDACTED] (b)(6) scanning north of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) looking for Afghan Army positions and looking at the prison to see if Taliban were in those positions. We heard a boom and I turned around. The smoke was white and probably 100 feet tall. We could clearly see it over the T-wall.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What time was the blast?

(2) Answer. Between 1600 and 1700. My perception of time was related to the darkness setting in and the sun going down.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Was it bright outside or was the sun setting?

(2) Answer. It was still a little bright, but we were putting the street lights on. Other guys were mounting their night-vision devices (NVDs). This was about the time we started setting up security.

n. Question and Answer 13.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 30 September 2021

(1) Question. When the blast occurred and you see the smoke, where are you physically located?

(2) Answer. I'm closest to the inner gate, on the other side of the battalion staging area. We were on the quick reaction force (QRF) cycle at this time. We had two gun trucks put in position there.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What did you do post blast?

(2) Answer. The platoon was just below me and [REDACTED] (b)(6) We told them to get the kit on. We got down off the MRAP, grabbed the guide and three others. We ran east past the Turkish controlled gate and we saw people start to come up. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) saw the first injured Marine. Someone said that there was shooting, so we got down and continued to move to the blast site. We saw people getting transported to and from the casualty collection point (CCP) by any means necessary.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. How far down did you go?

(2) Answer. I moved the 425 meters to the location by foot. It took about four to five minutes. We knew this because we had rehearsed it before the blast.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Did you hear any gun shots?

(2) Answer. I heard gun shots, but I didn't hear any incoming. I heard pops the whole way until we got down to the CCP. The first Marines we saw were alongside the 8 ft. T-barriers. The barriers in the Abbey Corridor were covered in Marines. They were trying to get eyes on to return fire.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Do you feel confident that you heard gun fire?

(2) Answer. Yes, from the crack house area. I don't think that it was Taliban, but I did hear different things about how people were getting through the Taliban check points.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. From the time that you saw the smoke plume to the time you heard gun fire, about how long was it?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

30 September 2021

(2) Answer. Three minutes. I was moving toward the canal at that point and I had told my guys to wait by the Turkish military gate in case we needed them.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. What are your next actions? Moving from inner to outer gate?

(2) Answer. I heard six to seven shots that sounded like they were from semiautomatic weapons. I moved down the middle of the road. We linked up with more Marines next to the T-barrier. We move along the western side down toward the outer gate.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. What was happening at the outer gate?

(2) Answer. I saw people running around dragging others through the gate. I talked to this female Marine from the 2/1, she had been injured with tourniquets on both arms. Something had cut her trousers open, and it wasn't the size of the ball bearings. The Marines took her and addressed her wounds. I saw another person with a neck wound. That person died. I saw a female Marine crying over another female Marine. I dressed her wounds, but she was dead. I moved to back down to the gate, but by that time most of the Marines were evacuated.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Can you see the blast site?

(2) Answer. At this point the outer gate was closed. All that I described was before the outer gate.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. How long until the casualties are evacuated?

(2) Answer. My perception of time is skewed. To me it felt like three or four minutes. When I looked up it seemed like all of them were gone. (b)(6) placed guns by the crack house. I staged 14 M4s and 2 pistols for retrieval. I was just trying to find anything I could do to help.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. What do you do after the casualties were evacuated?

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) 30 September 2021

(2) Answer. I met up with [REDACTED] (b)(6) and we put them up on top of the connex directly behind the sniper tower where we thought there was sniper fire. I saw a ton of gear laying out so I started collecting weapons. At this time it started getting dark. I heard a siren going off saying something about a ground attack about to happen. We noticed that the people started to move rapidly from the south.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. How does this event end for you? Do you stay until all gates are sealed?

(2) Answer. We got accountability and were actively protecting the sector we were responsible for. This was so 3rd platoon could take the security position near the inner gate. I linked up with [REDACTED] (b)(6)

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Do you have any information you may need to provide that I didn't ask?

(2) Answer. The following morning when we went with the EOD team, it was interesting. We had the Taliban watching us the entire time. What was interesting on the 27th was that the Taliban was intermingling with the British in the corridor. The interpreter met us to explain that they were conducting a post blast analysis, and that the Taliban was posting exterior security. My Marines set an inner cordon. I've heard multiple stories of kids' videoing and Taliban laughing after the blast. There may have been kids videoing the bodies from the wall, I was told about one specific 12 to 13 year old that was doing so.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. What did the post blast team say?

(2) Answer. On the morning of the 27th, they pointed out the pattern of the fragmentation and showed us the ball bearings that penetrated the fence post. The green mesh (sniper screen) that was up against the tower was covered in the bombers flesh.

ab. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Who did the blast analysis?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6), 30 September 2021

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release



ACTS-SCK-DO

01 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Regiment

1. On 1 October 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) spoke with all four lieutenants, and for the sake of brevity their responses will be labeled according to the following abbreviations: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What was your platoon doing during the day on 26 August?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) Our first squad was pulling security, and emplacing concertina wire near the outer gate and inner gate. Second and third squad were on a rotational pattern. Our job was to be in the search area and escort civilians back to the rear. A bus would come around and pick them up at the bus terminal. On the 26th, the platoon was tasked with security (Platoon Sergeant was at outer gate), and others were out emplacing concertina wire.

(3) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) Two of my squads were at the outer gate, another squad was near the screening area, and I had a couple Marines with Golf Company. We took a few guys to the canal to help fix problems. One of my Marines was 22 meters from the blast. We arrived at Abbey Gate on the 22nd. Golf and Fox Companies were split between the passenger terminal and East Gate.

(4) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) I was with 4th Platoon in the QRF staging area.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Was there a reason why you were emplacing concertina wire, was it due to an increase in threat reporting?

Regiment

(2) Answer. (b)(6) It was the part of the exit plan. We were trying to make it as impenetrable as possible once we closed Abbey Gate.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Was the process for getting evacuees through the Abbey corridor easy?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) No, we had to wait on the DoS consular personnel to show up. We had to hold people at the outer gate until they came. We would escort those that didn't have credentials back out through the hole in the fence. We had to wait for hours to get the consulars out to the gates.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Were you and your Marines pulling people out of the canal?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Yes, we had our machinegun team pulling people out of the canal that were identified as having the correct credentials.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What were the threats that you were hearing while operating at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We heard there was probably going to be a suicide vest IED. We received word an attack was imminent, and we had a count down and for about two minutes we got down behind the wall, but the attack never happened. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

h. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Were you receiving phone calls, text messages, or emails asking for help getting certain people out of the crowd and into the airport?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) No, that only happened to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. When would consulars show up to Abbey Gate to process people? Did they have a consistent presence there?

Regiment

(2) Answer. (b)(6) They were not there consistently, and sometimes it would take them hours to come out to the gate. It was very hit or miss, sporadic.

k. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. How did that effect your job?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Outer gate would get crowded because the consolors weren't there to move the process along. Other countries would pull people out of the canal. Some countries would not even process those people. They wouldn't make then leave either. They left them for us to deal with.

l. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. How much pressure did you guys feel like you were under to get people out?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Quite a bit. We would have people run up to us asking us to get a bunch of people out. Groups of contractors would drop of 70 – 100 people off then leave. They would just leave people for us to handle.

m. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Did you have Afghans handing you phones asking you to speak with someone about letting them in, or showing you documentation to convince you to let them into the airfield?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Yes an Afghan would hold their phone up saying that they had someone on the phone that they needed us to listen to so that they could get through the line. It happened all the time.

n. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Was there anything different on the 26th versus other days?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Our company's task was to go out at 1100 to assist Golf Company because they had consolidated their security posture and thought they couldn't hold the crowd at the canal bridge. The civilian populace were crunched together and trying to flood through the canal up around the tower. Everyone knew it was one of their last opportunities to get out. They were getting nervous and desperate.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Regiment

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



ACTS-SCK-DO

5 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Platoon Sergeants [REDACTED] 1st Platoon Sergeant,

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1st Marine Regiment, 1 October 2021

1. On 1 October 2021, [REDACTED] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] answered individually. All answers are annotated accordingly.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] asking the first question.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Where were you located on throughout the day on 26 August 2021?

(2) Answer.

[REDACTED] I was on top of the container near the sniper tower.

[REDACTED] I was with the QRF, back behind Abbey Gate proper.

[REDACTED] I was located close to Abbey Gate proper, just on the outskirts looking out on top of my gun truck with my platoon commander. I saw the plume of smoke after the blast. We immediately took off down to Abbey Gate on foot. We got there in less than three minutes. We know that it was 3 minutes because we had practiced it before.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What were your platoons' jobs on the 26th?

(2) Answer.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with Platoon Sergeants (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Platoon

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1 October 2021

(b)(6): We were setting up security outside the outer gate. Usually the families would listen to our instructions, but the single men were harder to control. It was really hard to tell the families that they had to leave because they didn't have the right paperwork. I went up to the chevron (blocking position) a few times to check visas and paperwork. We would rotate a few times because of how the Taliban were eyeing our Marines. The tactical site exploitation (TSE) area seemed tenser because no one had been searched prior to reaching that location. We found small knives, lighters, finger nail clippers, nail filers, etc. while searching people.

(b)(6) My platoon's job was to escort people from the inner gate to the bus stop. When the DoS showed up they started saying yes or no to personnel. There was friction when the DoS only selected parts of families. It really bothered us when it happened to kids. The DoS representatives would split the families up if they didn't all have the correct paperwork. We had to be aggressive sometimes to get people to leave. The DoS were really inconsistent about showing up. We were told that we couldn't process anyone until they showed up. It was hours of standing around with people getting mad. It definitely impacted getting people processed. It would fill up the holding area and stop the entire process.

(b)(6) We were at the passenger terminal. We consolidated at Abbey Gate about the 23rd-24th. We ran the search area, the area where DoS personnel processed people, and down to the bus stop. When we arrived it seemed to have gotten a lot better. We would do the escorting of the rejects to the exit gate. My biggest gripe was the DoS personnel. My Marines were out there 24hrs a day while the DoS were the main effort. They would come out to do their shift and randomly show up and leave. They were slowing down the entire process. I couldn't understand what their thought process was. Sometimes DoS were rushing the process, and almost had us escort out a US green card holder.

(b)(6) I climbed up the sniper tower and talked to my guys. I was watching the crowd and looked through their scope and noticed that there were a ton of Taliban at the chevron. There was about a squad of Taliban. I never saw that much Taliban in one place before that day. They were also on the building past the chevron. The crowd wasn't any different. The only thing that changed was how the other company addressed the intelligence on the possible S-Vest. We had the crowd pushed all the way to the bridge. We had plenty of dispersion. We did that just to give us space on the wall and it was easier to control the crowd. We had to have at least 12 people to control the crowd. The crowd was pushing and shoving to get through.

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with Platoon Sergeants [redacted] 1st Platoon

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1 October 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~