



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

11 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

1. On 6 and 8 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the investigation and the format of the interview. Both [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and BG Curtis (C1) asked questions, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) responded.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) If you could, would you please provide us with a rundown of your professional background?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I commissioned in 2012, graduated from The Basic School in 2013, and I have 2 previous deployments with the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF).

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So you had two previous deployments with the SPMAGTF?

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) You've been in command for over a year now, is that common?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) In the past you have seen some guys get two company commands, but the way that promotion zones look right now a year is more common. I'm hoping to get 2 full years, but a lot of people will only get 1 year right now.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) You've been in command since June of 2020, so you had about 6-7 months of pre-deployment workup?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, we had a clear workup but I would say that it was odd due to COVID. In June of 2020 we were scheduled to participate in Operation Desert Fires, a 2 week long live fire exercise (LFX). Right before it was supposed to kick off a dozen of my guys got COVID and the [redacted] (b)(6) had to go on lock down so we didn't do the LFX. Our next major training event after that was the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) in the fall in 29 Palms. It is a culminating training event similar to the Army's National Training Center (NTC). That exercise involved a build up from buddy pair live fire to platoon supported attacks in the 10 days prior to starting the exercise. During the ITX we progressed from platoon level operations, to battalion level, and ended with a force on force, regiment on regiment fight. It's a form of certification that most units will execute prior to deploying and is the biggest culminating evaluation for the companies and the battalion. It used to be a go or no-go, but now it is more focused on a teach, coach, mentor approach. I got to watch the company go from not having completed a live fire since February of 2020, to starting with a buddy pair live fire 10 days prior to the ITX, to executing a company attack at range 400. I think, based off the feedback that we got, that Golf Company performed better on that day than any other company across the two battalions. I'm very proud of how well the company executed and we were able to build up to that. We worked our butts off during the 10 days prior to the ITX, not sleeping much more than 2-3 hours a night, because we built from buddy pair, to squad LFX, to a platoon night raid. That absolutely prepared us for Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), and the guys said as much. It made us physically and mentally tough. We did this exercise from the end of September through mid-November of 2020. It was 60 days total of training.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What event kicks off the ITX?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The live fire portion begins with platoon supported day and night attacks. Platoons need to execute three of each which is a very long day. The platoons did very well during all of this, still not sleeping that much. The tempo was designed that way, to focus on going hard for a few days and then get a day to recover. After that it was urban training for a few weeks, once again building from the individual through platoon and culminating in a company attack through an urban complex. I think that went well, we definitely had an above average performance. It was a tough start, but the guys gained momentum as they got going. That company attack had the engineers and

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mobile assault platoon built into execution. After that, we had a few days off. Then we went to Range 400 for a daytime company supported attack. We crushed it, and the company felt a lot of pride on the back end. It was great to see everything come to fruition after the grueling workup.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How much competition is there between the companies within the battalion?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) There's definitely a lot of competition, but I think it is at a friendly level. The other Company Commanders and I are definitely competing but it makes us better. If it wasn't good natured and it was legitimate, things just wouldn't have gone well at the ITX. That is high pressure situation, the division Commanding General is watching how you perform. If push came to shove we had each other's backs. We have a close battalion, which was critical at HKIA.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) After culminating in the company attack, the exercise moved to the Battalion level?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Yes, there was battalion level base defense operations center. The scenario was a large mechanized breach, which was hard to do without tanks. The battalion distributed Fox and Golf Company with a mountain range in between us which made it difficult to support with fires and air support. The guys were excited for this because there is no rehearsal on the terrain before you go, you had to react on the fly. Before this, everything was rehearsed on the objective. We were given a company attack to seize an objective, then we were told to move into a defense. We were facing a mechanized enemy coming through the pass and we needed to execute a defense. We held the line and called for fires for effect. It went well and we got some good praise there. Then we had a few days off before the maneuver warfare exercise (MWX) which was the regimental force on force. The night prior to that they cancelled our deployment and turned off the SPMAGTF. That was a tough challenge because it had such a hit on morale. A lot of Marines had extended to do this deployment. To tell the guys that before a large regimental exercise and still keep them invested was a unique leadership challenge. For the actual MWX, we were in reserve the whole exercise and hiding in the rocks so well that no one found us. Right near the end we got a tasking to clear an objective, I gave a great order and the guys were super excited to execute. Then the exercise was ended, which was frustrating, but I was very proud of our guys and how they did during the ITX.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) To recap, the ITX was 60 days total. You spent 10 days focused on internal operations, then moved from platoon to company to battalion before culminating with the MWX. That takes you into the 2nd week of November and at this point you still think that you're not deploying?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Around December, we start to get warnings that Gen McKenzie was working on getting us to deploy, and he usually gets what he wants. Those warnings built up from possibly deploying, to likely deploying, to imminently deploying. We kept one foot in and one out until we were officially turned back on the 29th of January. We hadn't executed too much training between ITX and then. A lot of the training we had scheduled had been turned off when we weren't deploying. Once we found out we were deploying, Division did the best they could to turn that back on. That was difficult though since we essentially only had from 01 February to 15 March when ADVON was going to leave to complete all admin, mission specific training, and two weeks of leave. That really only left us with 2 weeks to train. We managed to do 1 LFX at the fire team level and also train on high explosive employment using rocket and grenade launchers. We also had 1 week at the infantry immersion trainer (IIT) which is set up to mimic a mini village. At the IIT each platoon got one day of training, then had white space on fixed site security and the fundamentals of the defense with different terrain. The next day in the IIT we had a notional embassy focused on controlling crowds and processing evacuees. The Marines took away a lot from that, especially in regards to rules of engagement (ROE) and sector sketches.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Is IIT a realistic training event for the company? Did it incorporate sensory factors by incorporating smells, noise, role players?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, absolutely it was very realistic. They would mass crowds for us around the embassy that we created. You could see folks in their shops, then they would mass and create disturbances. It felt like very good training for all the platoons on how to deal with a large crowd and a complex environment.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) You had limited time to train before the 2 weeks of leave, and then the ADVON departed on March 15th?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, on the 15th, about half the company left. We sent half a platoon to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a is a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) platoon, to

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

best training area I have ever seen, with the exception of not being able to use mortars

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there. It was great terrain, everything was accessible. The ammunition supply point needed some work, but you own all your own logistics and can walk to the ranges. So yea, on the 15th 2 of my platoons, along with my executive officer and my gunnery sergeant departed. The other half of the company left in the middle of April, so they were there a month before us.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) By mid-April the entire company was deployed?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, 3 of the 4 platoons and leadership were there in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a the 4th platoon was in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

m. Question and Answer 12.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Talk me through what your company did in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a from mid-April until the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) kicks off.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We had a great setup there. I was able to cycle each of my platoons through [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a which was paid for and built by Americans and they now charge us to use. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a That place was great, you could get feedback on individual shooting and there was a LFX urban environment with target feedback. We were able to work individual and team urban skills, it was an infantryman's dream.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Were you working with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yeah, so I had three platoons and they would rotate between security, training, and duty platoon. We definitely worked with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and the subject matter experts (SME) there. We worked with their Quick Reaction Force medics down in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a My guys really enjoyed that time working with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a A platoon would go up to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a for 10 days at a time. They would work up to the squad level, doing a lot of chance contact work, focusing on how to win from the point man through the squad. Right before we deployed for the NEO, in July, we focused on the squad package. We executed night ambush, reaction drills during the day and night, and a full

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contact patrol. The full contact patrol would start at sunrise, include a 5 mile movement with contact at some unknown point, and then a 5 mile movement back. It was an ass kicker of a day and the full squad moved through. You'd learn a lot about the squads and the Marines during that, I think it was significant.

Also, there were a couple things to note. We lost some range time because the Bravo Company of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) showed up to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a in June. We backed off and let them take the priority on training for about a month. We are still training, but we slow down for them. On the back end, Alpha Company of the British 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Paras) showed up. Their regiment was all over [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a conducting training at this time. We got integrated and conducted a 3 day force on force with one of our platoons conducting a defense in depth against their company. It was great training. After that the Brits came to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and we integrated for an LFX involving a small arms exchange, an integrated platoon attack, and then some dry fire together. We had a joint party with an alcohol waiver and a boxing tournament on July 4th. It was an awesome event and we became super close with them before we fell in right next to them at Abbey Gate. That relationship was huge.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) From the middle of April through the end of July you have the bulk of the company at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Your platoons were working a rotation between security, training, and standby to support the SMEs and the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Then the MEU rolls in and you slow down training a little. Around the end of June the 2nd Paras come in and you build a relationship and camaraderie through training with them. In addition to all of that training, did your guys get some good exposure to the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think so. All Marines had a chance to go to Petra, the Dead Sea, and Aqaba to get some exposure to the culture. We also had some interpreters on post, as well as some contracted workers that the Marines interacted with. I would say all the Marines had a good relationship with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Do you feel like you made up for the lack of pre-deployment training while you were in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. [redacted] (b)(6) shot 50% of the 5.56 and 75% of the 7.62 allocation for the SPMAGTF during this time frame. Every Marine qualified on their weapons systems. [redacted] (b)(6)

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Did all of this training, and the tactical proficiency associated with it, give your guys some more confidence in HKIA?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. They definitely had trust and confidence in their weapon systems and their own ability. I want to highlight that, since it was such a small camp,

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we became a very cohesive company. The company leadership was very close as well between [redacted] (b)(6) came in January, we had no [redacted] (b)(6) or the ITX. The Marines only had about 4-5 weeks with him before we deployed, and the Marines worshipped him. He modeled discipline and leadership and that trickled down. While we were in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a e also spent a long time building a common language on how we discuss and report things. We focused on combat orders and transmissions under fire. We tried to create an understanding of our SOPs and what words mean what and you have to be able to understand each other in order to do that. That was helpful in HKIA, since guidance could be given and understood in a two sentence order. In the end, it comes down to trust between the Marines and the leadership. They understood that their leadership cares and wants them to be proficient and disciplined.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Coming to the end of July, were you hearing that you may support the NEO in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) When we arrived in April, I thought that we would be at the Afghan Embassy. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was telling us that there was a 50/50 chance of that. I believe that ended up being 10th Mountain. Over time, we began hearing about the NEO and some of the contingency planning revolving around that, but it wasn't focused on us. The whole time prior to NEO, we were hearing that there was a low likelihood of us being used. Even a week prior to NEO, we are hearing there was less than a one percent chance of it happening. On Thursday the 12th of August, when I departed for [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to see my TRAP platoon which had just returned to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a I was under the impression that there was no way that we were going. The belief was that the retrograde may happen, but not while we were there. A week prior, there was a hard shift in focus to retrograde ops at the MARCENT level but we weren't thinking that it would affect the MAGTF.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Were you under the impression that the MEU would handle that?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We had seen the latest Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Our understanding, from my happy training place in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a is that the Army would be there in the middle of August as would the MEU which is uniquely qualified to handle the NEO. Those factors felt like they should make the SPMAGTF fall in priority and I figured at most Echo would get involved as the crisis response company. We were the alternate crisis response company, so we were prepared to go if we had to. The night of August the 12th, the *Washington Post* announced that 2/1 was going into Kabul. I texted [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and he said I should go back to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a I spoke to the TRAP platoon [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a they had only arrived in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on 01 August. They weren't the best trained since they had been focused on their operation. That was 3rd

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platoon under [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They are a talented force which is why they were selected for the TRAP mission. I tell them to train their ass off since we may be in Afghanistan soon. I drove back to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on the 13th. Around that time, we were moved from a 96 to a 48 hour tether. I cancelled the platoon training package, began building a warning order, and started preparing equipment to go on the 13th. It was rapid, just a few days prior to going we still thought there was a less than 1% chance of going and we were focused on training.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So you're building a warning order on the 13th and you're on a 48 hour tether. When do you know that you're going, and when do you pull your other platoon back from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We knew we were going on the 13th, we just didn't know exactly when. I briefed the warning order on the 14th. The TRAP platoon returned on the 14th as they were scheduled to. They arrived, we moved to a 24 hour tether, and we had the whole company together to go. We started admin prep and built our final rosters. We knew for sure we were going on the 14th when we get that 24hr tether, but we were still waiting on our exact tasking.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What did you think the mission would be?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The battalion thought we would be security on South HKIA. That was very in line with what we had been training for, we were well prepared to conduct a defense.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What did you from the 14th until you arrived in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We tried to do all the live fire training we could before we left to go. On the 15th, we zero and co-witnessed our night optics, and conducted an M32 (Multi-Shot Grenade Launcher) shoot in case we needed to use nonlethal rounds. We also placed a heavy focus on medical, combat lifesaver (CLS) refreshers, and 9-line training.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What non-lethal did you have?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We didn't have anything at this time. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was a training mission, the plan was to show up and pick up whatever we could.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What non-lethal did you want?

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(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I wasn't thinking too hard about that, I thought we would be perimeter security and we hadn't seen any crazy crowds on the news yet.

On the 15th, we got word to posture two flights on the 16th. We staged on the 16th. We attempted to get everyone out on that push. We went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on C-130s out of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. As we watched the situation develop, we realized that we would likely need to use crowd control measure. Since we had no non-lethals we started to talk about tactics like what is a buffer force, what is a reserve, what is forward element to deter, and when do you commit the reserve. Once we get a look at the runway, we decided to forget open order tactics and focus on close order drill. We would have to assume 360 security in the airport since people were everywhere. I tried to start driving home the mindset of 360 security. We did a lot of white board work in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a from the 16th-18th while we waited for our flights. The big focus was that we needed to understand the decision point on when a platoon commits its reserve, since the company would need to know in order to become the new reserve. We no longer had the dream defense ratio of 1-3, the ratio was more like 1-1,000.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Where is the battalion leadership at this time?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They were between [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. The alpha command was in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. The alpha command inserted on the night of the 15th. At that time, the only information we were really getting pushed was logistics and flights. We had a hard time trying to find red lines to talk.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) At the time do you know have a relationship with the SPMAGTF leadership?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the [redacted] (b)(6) had come and seen us in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Did any of them come forward to HKIA?

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(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) No, they didn't, but we felt we had a strong relationship with them. Our [redacted] (b)(6) had gone to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a for a week to see our guys there and helped further our relationship with them. It's rare to see junior Marines emulate a Colonel but they would follow [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his [redacted] (b)(6) anywhere.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So Fox was focused on embassy security at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Is the battalion 4 in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and did they go forward?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, they are ripping with the army. The 4 was in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and did not go forward, but the 4A did.

But back to the force array tied to insertion, my understanding is that Echo was only able to get 2 platoons in initially with the battalion alpha command. We beat their other 2 platoons in. So half of Fox, Weapons, and half of Echo get in quickly. Then we made it into [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on the 16th. We knew that we needed to get all the shooters on deck after the night of the zombies at HKIA.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So you move to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on the 16th?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. We thought it would be one day to get out, but a knife fight started for planes. The 82nd and the MEU were fighting for spots. We had 3 platoons in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a since 2nd platoon had a flight delayed. They didn't make it in time for our insert into HKIA during the period of darkness (POD) from the 18th-19th. 2nd platoon ended up being tasked to work security on flights. We had already gutted them for their machine gunners and mortar men. We went in with our 60s in case we had to fight our way out, since we thought we were still doing perimeter security.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) At this point do understand you will probably be putting hands on the refugees for crowd control?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What time do you actually arrive in HKIA?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) About 0100 local on the 19th.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What are you seeing, and what do you do when you land?

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(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We didn't sleep the night of the 17th since we kept being told we would leave in 2 hours. I, and a lot of the staff, hadn't slept in 24hrs. The company leadership broke off to link up with higher and it looked like the end of the world, everyone was very busy. We could hear rifle fire and see tracers going across the sky. It smelled like burning rubber and shit. We completed that link up while the company staged their gear. Then we were tasked with the evacuation control center (ECC) at Abbey Gate. We were supposed to replace Echo Company with the Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) and Fox supporting. Fox would be riot control and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) since they were more trained on that. At the time, I thought we could still focus on security. We pack our guys into the gym, on treadmills, to rack out for a bit around 0300. I sit down and start writing the order and planning.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Who is with you at this point? Company staff?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I'm pretty much the one at the table, but the whole staff is running around. I made the platoon leadership sleep around 0400. The relief in place (RIP) was supposed to be later that morning. I initially thought we were replacing Echo, but they had been re-tasked. We saw Echo around 0800 and they were exhausted. That morning, I haven't slept at all, I ask for transportation to the gate. I get told to find a car and hotwire it.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) How far from the gym to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Too far to walk. Our billeting was on the north side of HKIA above the area labeled 8a on the map. The gate is south. We were able to find some of the Brits we know and they give [redacted] (b)(6) myself a ride to the gate on the morning of the 19th.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) When was this?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Around 0700 in order to execute a leader's recon. One of my platoon sergeants started hot wiring a few vehicles while we went on our recon. He was able to hotwire a big blue bus (Blue), a white baggage truck (Casper), and a gator all-terrain vehicle. Those were our main vehicles while we were at HKIA. There are a few other busses that the battalion controlled, but those were being used for a lot.

We get down to the gate around 0700. At this time, we see Alpha Company 2 Paras. Fox Company was staged between the inner and outer gates. There were trucks of Special Forces and recovery teams from every nations at the gate.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Orient us to the Abbey Gate area as you see it, how much did the Brits control?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think the Brits only controlled along the fence on the canal. The fence on the other side of the canal had Taliban on it. They were on top of the buildings nearby and they were on top of the chevron (blocking obstacle). They were integrated into our security procedures.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Alright, so back to the 19th, you acquire some vehicles and head to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, I pushed down around 0700. We were trying to get the rest of the company there around 1100.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Where are 2 Paras located?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They have a few guys on the west side of the gate and they are driving convoys along the corridor. The Brits would shove people out of the way to make room for the vehicles, and then push people back from the gates to allow them to close. They had some control over the gate there. They had a company, about 100-120 people, there. I also saw Fox Company, the OPS-O, the Battalion Commander, and multinational Special Forces at the gate.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (C1). This picture that you're showing is from the 21st, is that what it looked like on the 19th?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, very much so. The Brits would run their convoys through the gate from the Barron Hotel. The U.S. and other countries were focused on trying to pull people out of the crowd.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Are there people clustered around the sniper tower?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) What is Fox Company doing at this time?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They are in a holding pause at this time. I stood on a car and tried to get a lay of the land. I saw the OPS-O and the Battalion Commander. I spoke with them and heard that they were planning on using Fox to push back the crowd and gain some space.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) This was due to their prior crowd control training?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, that is my understanding as the plan was developing.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Echo isn't there at the gate yet, correct? What is your company going to be doing?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Echo was getting some rest, they hadn't had a chance to bed down yet. At this time, it is still unclear what the task and purpose for Golf would be. I figured that we might pull security on the gate, and that the Brits might pull back to the hotel. I was trying to understand what the Alpha Company 2 Paras were doing.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) That's the company you worked with in Jordan?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, at this time, they are the only Brits I can see. During the operation, that increased to as many as 5 British companies, but Alpha Company was always there. We had solid continuity with them.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (C1). That continuity seems unusual.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) There were all sorts of weird things that happened. I ran into people from my first SPMAGTF rotation, like my interpreter from 2009. Alpha Company had actually gone back to Britain and were reinserted for this. It was sheer coincidence for us to end up there together.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Can you talk about the crowd, atmospheric, and crowd control measures on the 19th? How are [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d doing things and what are you planning on changing?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) *Shows a picture* Outside the gate, you can see the crowd stretch back from the gate to the hotel. The chevron was not in place. The first 24 hours at that gate were wild. The gate was closed, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d were in front of it, and there was only a little standoff. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d were doing warning shots. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) are doing warning shots. Before I got on deck, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) laid the foundation for what the 82nd and the MEU were doing to control the crowds. He explained that they were very aggressive.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) When you were going into HKIA, you knew that the Taliban would be there?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, I came to understand that they were our most effective adjacent unit.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Alright, so at the gate in that sea of humanity, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d are acting fairly aggressively?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d Camp Sullivan was nearby and as I recall we had Americans there. I remember now that the plan was for Fox Company to push all the way to Camp Sullivan in order to establish a ground line of communication (GLOC) and make movements from Sullivan. The Battalion Commander was going with them. These Brits were working out of the Barron in coordination with the Taliban. Right before my first platoon showed up, I saw Fox start to stage 3 lines deep with no riot shields. The first thing I noticed when I got to the gate was that there was no one person in charge, there was no shared unity of effort. We didn't know who was in charge of what.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) The Battalion Commander was there, but not in charge?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) No, the Brits are running the gate. I'm watching the planning going on. I have the luxury of just watching at the time, we were just tasked for the security. Fox was just recently tasked to establish this GLOC. As I stand off to the side, I see the Brits, Air Force, DSS, all on a different page. Fox opened the gate and started

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

to push through. This is different for the crowds, they were not used to traffic moving in this direction from the outer gate. Fox made it through the gates, but people in the crowd are able to cave in from the sides around the gate. Fox is out in the crowd, but the Brits lose control of the crowd as my platoon walks up. My platoon commander arrives, I grab him and tell him to get his guys on line to shove the crowd back. They funnel through the gate, and start helping with the crowd.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Did you give them a task and purpose, or just tell them to get on line?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I just told them to get on line, there was no time. The Battalion Commander with Fox and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made it to the end of the chain link fence and were able to calm down the crowd there and reestablish their lines. But the crowd near us was in a rush. Myself, 1st Platoon, and the Brits were all trying to hold the crowd back from the gates. This situation is a mess, and ranks of Marines get layered through the crowd. Everyone only knows to push forward, so we end up with rows of Marines isolated with the crowd in between them. There is no relief from this pressure, everyone is getting pushed. I get convinced that I'm going to die and be crushed in this crowd. I pull myself out and I realize I'm not being useful as a commander. I tell some Brits to fall back from the outer gate to release some pressure off the crowd, and we will corral whoever gets in against the wall. This allows us to work backward and pull Marines out of the crowd. It was a frustrating time, especially since all the Special Forces guys are watching this happen from their vehicles.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Why do you think they do that?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think that they feel like they are above it. Its grunt work. It pissed me off, they could have let some young Marines die. Some Special Forces were great to work with later, but I was very frustrated and emotional at the time.

After this, we have a crowd of hundreds inside the outer gate who are not vetted and present a threat. At the same time, we have to spend the rest of the afternoon trying to get forward to Fox. We are trying to get the crowd inside the gate processed, but Department of State (DoS) is not there for another 24 hours to process or screen people. During this period the crowd fills from the outer gate to the inner gate.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Why wasn't State vetting?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think they were undermanned, but I also think there was some fear involved. A former Marine contractor of mine worked for them. He said they were

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lazy and scared. I think that was unfair, but they were nervous and undermanned for sure.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So you spend all of the 19th focused on clearing this group of people between the outer and inner gates out?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We set up searching inside the outer gate after the first big wave. My Marines are searching everyone else as they come in. We are looking for paperwork and other documents that would get them through.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Have you been given any guidance from State about what documents to look for?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, we were looking for five documents at this time. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

pushed us that information when he got to the gate.

They were pushed out to the Marines through Signal, which was our primary method of communication for this. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there at this time, but not constantly. We were looking for passports, green cards, American visas, U.S. Embassy yellow badges, Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications/actual SIVs. We learned that the SIV documentation was damn near impossible since most of it was replicable. You had to match the name on their email address with their identification, which was time consuming and difficult while trying to maintain security.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) At this point, where is the document check occurring? Person by person at the gate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We have our search area inside the outer gate on the opposite side of the sniper tower. We were prioritizing passports and green cards. We were trying to separate and fast track those folks, but there were still no flights or State Department support. We knew that 90% of folks in-between the inner and outer gates will be rejected.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) How many people were between the two gates?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) At least a thousand people, but only about 10% have proper documentation.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So only about 100 people in that crowd have sufficient documents to get on a flight, and the other 900 will get pushed out?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. To back up a bit, on the night of the 19th, we have formed up with Fox. We were trying to figure out if we would clear to the intersection past where the chevron would be.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So I see the jersey barrier next to the sniper tower. How are you keeping people from the canal?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) At this point, not many people are coming through the canal because the chevron and the Taliban aren't slowing people down.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) But why don't the people flank from the canal?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) There is still a chain link fence and they'd need to link back into the back of the crowd. They see the Barron being used. Abbey Gate has a ton of people, but it is still not being advertised as the coalition gate so it's not getting that additional traffic. Other gates also flooded, but they don't have to deal with the separate entity of having the Barron Hotel. Other gates only had to carve out a space for people to come through, not maintain that link to the hotel.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) How much space is there between the fence to the wall of the canal?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) About 10ft, the canal itself was also pretty narrow. So on the evening of the 19th, Weapons Company is securing the inner gate. 2 platoons are securing the crowd between the gates. One platoon was with me at the inner gate with Alpha Company 2 Paras and another company from 3 Paras. At the time, we relieve Fox on the line with the Brits. I don't think all of those companies were there, probably about 100 guys between the two. At the time, it was not clear what we needed to do next. We were finally able to fully break contact when [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d threw a CS grenade. On the 19th, 7 civilians were crushed to death in the area between the outer gate and the Barron Hotel. Speaking with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d commanders, we are running out of daylight, we don't want to do the CS again. There are too many people. We figure we can wait till the the following morning when the crowds are calming and then push. Then our OPS-O told us we must push then because a British brigadier showed up and asked why our Marines weren't pushing out.

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The sun was going down, there was no way I would do NVGs and gas masks and push. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided to get an interpreter and try to talk to the crowd [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d still have no idea what their purpose is.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) How far did you have to push?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I don't know, it wasn't until 0200 when I knew exactly what the task and purpose was. Probably to the Barron Hotel. At 0200, we had cleared and I made it into the Barron. The Brits secured our left flank, 1st platoon was on line with company leadership. I walked with an interpreter and we talked and tiptoed forward from the "piss shack" where Fox had held previously to the Barron Hotel. About 400 meters. We walked and shoved people from about sundown at 1830ish until early the next morning.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So there's 1 platoon on line, 2 in the pass between inner and outer gates, the Brits are securing the left flank, Fox is in reserve in case things get wild. Are you locked arm in arm?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Shoulder to shoulder. I was walking in front with the interpreter. We would talk. Allow for 10-20 minutes to allow the word to trickle back. Folks would budge, we start to move forward and apply pressure. We had 1st Platoon Commander on the jersey barriers so that everyone could stay aligned with him. It took about 8 hours to make it to the Barron. The 2nd and 3rd Para commanders are in the Barron, so it became clear why we had to make it there. I received a brief at the Barron and they tell us by 0800 the chevron obstacle that would be emplaced. I had heard about an obstacle, but thought it would be concertina wire. The British engineer was in charge of the chevron, and he was phenomenal. But at the time, the two British company commanders almost get into a fight next to me.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) To recap, at 1800 you get the word to clear forward to the Hotel, no reason why. You get on line with 1st platoon and you have Fox in reserve. You start pushing forward for the next 8 hours, moving inches at a time by talking to people and letting the word trickle back over 10 minutes. Do you have any PSYOP soldiers with you?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) PSYOPs showed up the next day, we had a great relationship with SSG Ryan Knauss.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So at 0200, you get to the Barron, link up with 2nd and 3rd Para battalion commanders, and learn about the obstacle. You thought initially it would be concertina wire. You learned that the Brits needed that obstacle at 0800, why was that?

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(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They needed the obstacle to get the Brits through on their side for processing. I didn't want to do that given the force structure and the amount of Marines that we had. It would have funneled people in towards our lines, and it just moved further out where we had to push the crowd. So after the 0200 meeting, I was in 2 negotiations with Taliban and British leadership that morning. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d didn't have a realistic view. Following that meeting, the British engineer major and interpreter were speaking with the 5 Taliban leaders sitting on vehicles in the area where the chevron was supposed to be. We explained to them what was going on. They were very helpful, and hotwired cars to help us move them out of the way. By that time the MEU brings a forklift from the airfield, and engineers shove jersey barriers to the right to make room. The shipping containers used for the chevron come from the airfield.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So really we are executing this [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d ?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, they were reliant on us for executing this. They chose the terrain and idea, but we executed and set up the obstacle that morning. So now we, Americans and Brits, control the chevron area. The Brits are generally on the Barron side of the chevron at the gate of the Barron. It's always about a full company of 120 people. They have to form a human wall to control the crowd.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Was there ever a discussion of blocking off the fence line along the canal side?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, there were discussions. Limiting factors were finding something to block it. Concertina wire would still need to be manned. Also, we used that fence line to push people through the hole back into the canal. There was more to it. I wanted to block it off, but [redacted] (b)(6) convinced me that this was the only truly safe entrance for people being hunted by the Taliban. They didn't have to go through any Taliban checkpoints to get there, so if we closed the canal side we wouldn't get the people that we really needed. Also, we couldn't do shipping containers because it would block the vehicle convoys that the Brits needed to execute their plan.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Talk to us about emplacement of the shipping containers? People are forward to make space for the engineers?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. For situational awareness, on the corner of the canal and hotel, the Brits had to maintain that human wall. We called it the leaky faucet, there was a constant bleed from the canal side there. The blob in the Barron was growing, and their bleed off became our problem. Same goes for anytime SF pulls a group out, it lets a bleed in. Therefore on the 20th we have people from inside the chevron to the inner gate. So we are using Fox, Golf, and Weapons to try to clear and control this whole

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area. Meanwhile, the Brits are inside their area sleeping. So going back to unity of command. I told the Brits I worked for them since they run the gate.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did your battalion commander or OPS-O tell you that?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] No, and to my failure I never asked. It seemed apparent after the initial push to clear to the Barron Hotel that we were in support of them. So the 20th ends up being a very frustrating day. The Taliban are on the chevron, multinational forces are on buildings trying to pick people out, but our guys are still getting crushed in the crowd. We haven't slept, there's no rest plan, we've been going since the morning of the 19th. The 20th was a continuous buildup of people. No flights, no busses, no relief of pressure, and a very hot day.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So are the people bleeding through right now screened or not?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Both, some are screened by Brits and rejected and become our problem so we end up with more than a thousand people between the chevron and the inner gate. I went into the Barron Hotel on the afternoon of the 20th, and spoke to the two Brit battalion commanders about what would come next. We were working on getting integrated with their CoC. On the 20th we just hold. On the 21st we start to see a lot more processing. There's large scale screening at the gate, we were not even waiting for State. Marines are screening, busses are used to get people to the airport. A lot of other gates are closing temporarily, so people are being rejected and escorted out through our gate. The canal starts to fill up. At the same time the Taliban temporarily closed the chevron, and we believe it was due to the indication that Americans may stay past the 21st. The Taliban got less cooperative, so the canal is taking off. We are focused on controlling the canal side. State Department keeps changing guidance on what documents to bring through. Guidance from our CoC is to get more people through. On the 22nd we get the first continuous bus and State support that allows us to clear the backlog between the chevron and inner gate.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So you are going on 3 continuous days working with no support or rest plan?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] No, we have probably slept 3 hours in that time frame. By the 22nd the Brits have 5 companies, they relieve us heavily on security along the fence line and we focus on the corridor. Then we RIP out with Echo Company on the evening of the 22nd. On the 23rd we just sleep for 18 hours straight. On the 24th, we got to PAX terminal, pull security, and watch families get on planes. That is an important mental break, and keeps the guys focused. After all that time it was easy to get callous. So on the night of the 24th, I frag the platoons. I hear that we will take the gate on the morning

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of the 25th until we RIP with the 82nd on the night of 27th. This fluctuates to 28th, then back to 26th.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So was there any discussion about threats against Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Between the 20th and 22nd we are getting threat streams, very specific, about a black backpack IED. We're told he would be bald, with a tight beard, wearing a black pack with three arrows. We also heard something about a Corolla, but weren't worried about that due to the chevron.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So 25th you push back to Abbey Gate, has the situation changed?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The situation is very different when we arrive. We were concerned about creating standoff. The Brits and Echo had pushed on the western side of the canal. I disagreed with that decision, it spread the line out way too far. There were still people in the canal. If someone got hit, it would've been a 400-600m casevac through a crowd.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Who did you disagree with? Who are you replacing?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We were replacing Echo, I don't know who made the call to push that far down. I know that as quickly as tasks were coming at HKIA it could have been pushed down from anyone. There was more threat reporting on the 25th, so I spoke with the Brits about pulling that line back in due to the threat of being isolated. We had less guys than Echo, who had 4 full platoons and we had 3. The first step was to fall back about 200 meters east of the outer gate, near the bridge that crosses the canal. After that we collapse all the way back in

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) At what point do you do these two collapses?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) It's all throughout the afternoon of the 25th.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So first the decision is due to manning, but the second due to threat stream?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, both were always a thought process. But I used both of those as my justifications to make decisions with the Brits.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(1) Question (C1). **We have reconvened on the morning of 8 October, and BG Curtis leads off by telling [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that one of the important things we need to know is whether or not the Abbey Gate attack was a complex attack.** Was this a complex attack, were Marines returning fire? We have received mixed reporting saying that from the crack house, or the water tower, or the chevron that Marines are receiving fire. Snipers in the tower are saying that immediately post blast there are three shots, 2 that hit the tower and 1 that hits the ballistic glass. The battalion S2 thinks that didn't happen. I want to know what you think, because early on everyone was saying it was simple attack. Early on, there were some reports of gunshot wounds or rounds lodged in Marines' kit. The second thing I need to know is where the wounded individuals were located. I need your best opinion, by name, on that.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The short answer, is I don't think so, but I can get into detail on that as we get to it later.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) OK, it's the afternoon of the 25th. You get to Abbey Gate. Echo has pushed people all the way back from the sniper tower along the canal. Marines are dispersed about every 10 meters.

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I'm pulling up the chat log on [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c from that day. At 1700, we were definitely at the gate already. By that afternoon we were definitely in control. I believe that RIP with Echo was complete by 1500 on the 25th. We were out there with our 3 platoons. Fox remained in support of Echo and us during a lot of it. They are rotating in and out while executing a rest cycle. At this point I remember it being heavy on Ghost Company on outer gate, and Weapons on inner gate. My concern was unity of command. I wanted my guys on outer gate. When we first got to the gate, Fox was working outside outer gate and we were stretched pretty thin because we were stretched about 400m down the canal to make the perimeter. Echo mitigated this by having 81s mixed in, and worked 12 hour shifts. We only had 3 platoons, and I wanted each company to own their elements. Golf was on the canal, Fox was up between outer gate and Barron at the outer holding area, with the queue and search area, and Weapons was on the inner gate. The search area was also supported by the FET and some elements of the MEU.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Speaking of the FET, were they given a task and purpose at Abbey Gate? I imagine the various commanders down there were discussing division of labor, who had what responsibility. Was the FET ever assigned something? Was the FET ever given a written order, or was it just verbal?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The FET was assigned to Victor 2/1. They were attached to the search area. We had requested the FET from BN, and the BN coordinated to get them from the MEU. They showed up around the 21st, and they were there to assist with searching and processing. In terms of clear command relationships, I just know they

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

were sent to Abbey Gate. When we went to Abbey Gate, one of my platoons showed up late because someone rushed in and said a platoon was needed at PAX terminal. Orders happened rapidly, things weren't usually put out in writing. It's something we eventually brought up with Gen Rock and Gen Sullivan that we needed just some stability in where units were being tasked. But I never even had an initial conversation with the FET staff noncommissioned officer about their tasks. Fox was primarily working that search area, and their corpsmen integrated the FET. I only really went over there to check on the situation and remind people to wear PPE.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Was there ever anything codified saying that if you as a commander were at the gate, that the supporting elements fall under you?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I received two pieces of paper. It was like a task order. Golf would be put on the gate as the main effort, and Fox was assigned as the supporting element for Abbey Gate. I would coordinate with Fox XO and tell them what we expected, the same thing with the Weapons Company platoon commanders.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) When you RIPed with Echo did that task order change?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We only RIPed with Echo one time. That was on the 25th when we took over from them. I could tell they had a Weapons Company platoon on the line. CAAT RED, CAAT Blue, and 81s. CAAT Red and Blue were at the inner gate where there was a JLTV. The 81s were a larger platoon and would come work the line. Again, that's where I reorganized and gave each company their area. Golf on the canal, Weapons at the inner gate, and Fox in the holding area.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (C1). On the 26th, what is Weapons doing?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) They are primarily at inner gate. Some elements of their leadership are running snatch teams out of the crowd.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question (C1). Are any of them around to speak with?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be a good person to talk to. He was the Weapons XO. He just PCSed to Quantico. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was around, he's on leave. For perspective, when the bomb went off about all of the captains and leadership in the battalion were at the gate. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) would be a good guy to talk to, he is on leave. As is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just PCSed to Camp Lejeune to EOTG. They could give a good perspective on the inner gate. Most of Weapons was at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and just got back a couple of days ago.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Alright, back to the 25th, what are you hearing about the threat streams at this point?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c At 1600, just about, I sent a message to my team about an IED threat. That reporting was based off British and American intelligence [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c Allegedly it was more toward North or East Gate, based off reporting. I believe this came from the Brits. The only place I really had wifi was the British CoC so I probably got that from them. An hour later I called for all platoon commanders and company staff at the outer gate to meet at 1800 order to settle how to reduce our footprint on the canal, and how to reduce the growing backlog along the canal and holding areas. I also wanted to discuss our rotation plan. On another note it comes out that the PAX terminal is full so outflow is starting to slow down. Additionally, the canal is increasing in activity. It's not as wild as the 26th, but it is the highest it has ever been. They are pressed up against the wall all the way to the Barron.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Why were you concerned about reducing your footprint at this time?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I was concerned about the IED threat. I wanted the minimal number of people on the canal. How few people did I need to maintain control? Marines wanted to push out as a fire team or squad, and put more people on the line than needed. Also, we were exhausted. We didn't know how long we would hold, at this point we were tracking the night of the 28th so we needed to rest. But in a 24 hr period the closing time ends up changing half a dozen times.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) So on the night of the 25th, you want to shrink your footprint due to the threat stream and the desire to implement a rest cycle since you leave on the 28th?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes. I am worried about sustaining and protecting the force at this time. At around 2100 the night of the 25th, I am going to say, "I'm talking with the British battalion commander about force pro on the canal," at this point, as I remember it, the Brits are discussing clearing the canal from the Barron Hotel down past the sniper tower. I talked them out of it. They were talking about needing standoff, but at the end of the day it is always a human wall holding the people back, so there is no such thing as standoff. The Marines are the wall.

I then send a message 20 minutes later telling all company staff to meet me here (by the cut in the fence) time now. Everyone on the wall takes a knee. I tell them to be prepared to clear backwards en route. To this point, all we had done was fall back to the footbridge and formed and L shaped blocking position there.

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) About how much of a reduction in footprint is that?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) When we showed up position one was about 100 meters past the bridge. So at 2200 we have collapsed back about 100 meters. The distance from the bridge to the sniper tower is about a couple hundred meters, maybe about 150 meters.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) You send that message about taking a knee, tell company staff and platoon leadership to meet you at the hole in the fence. Is that due to threat reporting?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Around 2100, 2130 I send that message. Tell them to take a knee where able, and BPT to clear backwards. We are going to collapse down the British and American position at the footbridge because the threat reporting is very specific. I had just coordinated this with the Brits at the Barron, as we had increased IED threat reporting.

As a side note, while I have this chat log open, on the 26th, at 1300 I send a message that says, "ISIS attack imminent," I also say be on the lookout for a motorcycle in the marketplace and for a cameraman to dismount. That market place is directly across from the footbridge.

Another thing to note, on the 25th at around 1530 we are told to stop processing for 3 hours to avoid overcrowding at the pax terminal. We continue to pull people from the canal knowing we'll have hours to clear the backlog. We do this because we feel obligated to get as many people out as possible. I briefed the Battalion Commander and the OPS-O on this. The plan was to search and hold as many people as possible so that we could still keep processing as long as possible before sealing the gate.

On the 25th at around 2200, I send, "legitimate SVEST threat on Abbey from BN." That night we stopped pulling people out and stayed on our knee the whole night. We collapse from the footbridge to the jersey barrier. We are collapsed to the footbridge by 1800 while the sun was up. Between 2200 and 2300 we collapsed from the footbridge to the jersey barrier. For the rest of that night, from like 2300 to 0730 we have them on a knee, with a minimum posture necessary. There's a squad reduced at the jersey barrier where the crush of people are. The people took ground as soon as we gave it. I have video what that looks like the next morning. A lot of pressure starts building there. We now extend most of the way up to the Barron to handle the canal, as I told the Brits we would handle it. I wanted command and control along the canal. I wanted one platoon there handling it, one platoon on QRF, and one platoon resting for an 8 hour shift. Fox would continue to run internal Ops between the gates, and I told Weapons to work by the inner gate. I felt much better about that in terms of command and control. We had that in place by around midnight on the 26th.

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(6) So from midnight on those guys are all on a knee. And you pulled no one from the canal?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We had PSYOPS tell the crowd we would not pull anyone that night. And we didn't pull anyone because of the threat, which is why we reduced force posture and took a knee. We do our 3 platoon rotations, and I wrangle the foreign SF teams and tell them none is coming in until 0800. They agreed, but there was a (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d that gave me problems all night. By 0730, we allow one SF team at a time to pull people. Our guys on the wall know if they see a blue passport or a green card to pull them from the crowd. Our intelligence told us that ISIS prefers dawn attacks. I wanted to give it until 0800 to wait to start pulling people out. I wanted as few bodies out at a time, which is why I limited the teams.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(6) So the ISIS TTP is to attack at or near dawn. Then you know you have to keep going, who told you that you had to keep processing?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I decided to reduce during the night due to the SVEST threat from my OPSO. He told to me to watch standoff and force protection. I briefed leadership on my decision as I saw them.

Around 0315 on the 26th we get a report, "imminent SVEST threat heading to Abbey."

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (C1). Can we get these logs ((b)(3)130b, (b)(6)) chat logs (b)(1)1.4c ?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes sir, I will screenshot them. If you look at these logs you will see two occasions when the threat was imminent and we had to brace. Nothing happened and we had to continue doing our job.

There is one news report that says there was a countdown that matched the time of the explosion. I don't know if this is the case. My (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he and I spoke about this, he swears that there was a countdown that ended 5 minutes before the blast. He was in (b)(1)1.4a since he was unvaccinated, sitting in the SIPR vault watching the chats and drones. He believes there was a countdown that matched the time of the explosion. We had this discussion when we got to (b)(1)1.4a I told him to keep that between us, and I haven't been able to get back into that yet. But he believes he saw that chat log and would tell you the same. If those chat logs are saved, that would confirm.

I know that the last report I got and pushed to the group chat was around 1330. Brits were reporting an imminent IED attack. I was in the Brit COC and they told me there.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(1) Question (C1). I imagine that there is some fatigue occurring from receiving all of these reports?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, I even remember the distinct thought of, "OK," as this was like our fourth imminent threat. I got everyone in a knee and reduced manning. 4th platoon was on the line at this time, around 1400. We gave it some time. Between 1500 and 1600 the battalion starts converging on the Abbey Gate AO because we finally established a RIP timeline with the Brits and the 82nd. Echo starts showing up early afternoon.

The plan is Ghost will have from outer gate to the chevron, Echo will have outer to inner gate, Weapons will remain in support near inner gate, and Dox will remain in support near outer gate. That's a little tricky, it's not real clear cut so [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I work that out.

At 1700 in the Barron, my Battalion Commander and I, and the British 2 Para Battalion Commander and the 82nd Battalion Commander go to meet with the Taliban. Some [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c guys from the MEU are there, as is the [redacted] (b)(6) who owns the Barron. He flies out with us from Kabul. His plan is to hand over the hotel to a local militia and try to come back and reclaim his business later. We tell the Taliban our plan. We decide that the Brits will stop letting people in at 1800, and we agree on the same time. From 1600-1800 we surge Weapons Company and 2nd Recon to grab as many people as possible. We were motivated to do that. Around 2000 the Brits would start echeloning through the gate. 2300-0000 I would pick up security on chevron for Brits to make it through Abbey Gate proper. We would then collapse to outer gate and absorb all of Golf as we go. Taliban would then back fill as we pulled back. We would then shut the outer gate. We would do our left seat- right seat with the 82nd company. Then Ghost would fall back through the inner. Then Echo would collapse in through inner.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) POD (Period of Darkness) 25-26 August, do you see a surge of people filling the canal?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) By the morning of the 26th it is the most chaotic it will be. The people realize that other gates are closed. President Biden has announced that by the 31st we will be done. People are doing the math and realizing that it will be closing soon. We were putting this together, we were in tune with what the CIA Director was doing. We were tuned in to the news and watching the Taliban in case there was an issue.

When they were talking about staying longer on the 21st, the Taliban picked up and left from the chevron. There was a RIP of Taliban units at the time where they brought in their red units, their specially trained guys. They still had some regular guys working in the crowd with us on the 26th.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] led by BG Curtis and [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(1) Question (C1). The Taliban were working with you in the canal? Were they there for the blast?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] They were working there with us. I don't know if they were there for the blast. I have pictures of them in the canal.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (C1). Can we see some pictures?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] On the morning of the 26th, at about 0530, I took these pictures from the hole in the chain link fence. It was fairly calm at the time. We weren't really pulling people from the crowd. As you can see, we have a pretty good backlog because we were told not to send people to the pax terminal. That built up through the day.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (C1). I keep seeing 53 everywhere (References a man in the photos wearing a Steelers jersey with the number 53)?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] He is a famous Afghan body builder. He worked his ass off to help us control the crowd. Those guys we brought to the State and told them we know these guys. I think he got through, I don't think his family did though.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (C1). So were there Taliban killed?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)] His relationships were going very well, they even invited him to come back when the situation died down. He may be able to say better.

I have this video from 0800. The crowd is getting agitated as we pull people out. We need a lot of guys at the jersey barrier.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (C1). Did they ever pull your guys into the crowd?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] No, they matched what we were doing if we were calm. They never pulled us into the crowd.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] Talk more about the morning of the 26th.

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] You can see in these pictures that people are getting crushed in the crowd. They are getting pushed into the concertina wire or the jersey barrier. That hole is at the concertina wire between the jersey barrier and the sniper tower. A guy was getting pushed into the concertina wire there, but you couldn't pull someone through there or you'd never shut it again. Eventually we get a jersey barrier in place to

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

close in that gap. The Taliban were working there asses off and grabbing people for us. If we saw a guy in the crowd the Taliban would go grab him. We got reports that Taliban elsewhere were ripping up passports etc, but the ones with us were cooperative. I have a picture here of him giving us a thumbs up to make sure he's doing what we want.

It is a long, frustrating day. Our guys are getting pissed off, more callous. We were getting the threat reporting, we would pause and knee for an hour, then get back at it. That happened the night of the 25th and the 26th, then that one time on the afternoon of the 26th. On the 26th, I pulled everyone off of the canal and held a minimum footprint. When I wasn't working with the Brits to coordinate, I would walk around and ask individuals why they weren't behind concrete barriers, what they were doing in a group, etc.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) You had a squad minus on the barrier, how long did they stay there? How long were the rotations between platoons?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Rotations were conditions based, as that job was brutal. By mid-day we had our whole company to the gate, because we knew we were leaving in 12 hours. The night before we had a platoon rotating back to the berthing area to sleep for 3 hours. The timeline with the Brits was shifting and it was sustainable. By mid-day we had all 3 platoons in vicinity of the outer gate because Echo and Weapons took over inner gate. I can't remember where Fox was at this time, they may have handled that search area.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Were your Battalion Commander and OPS-O there?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, I briefed them on the plan and went to the 1700 meeting with the Taliban. With the imminent reporting I told the company leadership that I didn't want any leadership next to each other outside of outer gate. I emplaced all 1st Sgts and all corpsmen in one spot just inside of the outer gate. I explicitly tell [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) that I didn't want any corpsmen in the canal area. We had a plan. One thing we didn't follow, is that people were heat casing and passing out in the crowd. Children or pregnant women. The Marines would call for corpsman up, and the corpsmen and the FET would respond because the Marines weren't always tracking the plan. So for the most part they stayed where I told them, but they occasionally went out into the canal when they got called.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Okay, let's discuss the events of the blast.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) The way we were arrayed was we had first platoon on the line for about half an hour. 3rd platoon came off the line early. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was coming from inner to outer. [redacted] (b)(6) is standing right inside the outer gate. The Battalion

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

Commander and the OPS-O are by the PSYOP truck outside the outer gate. I am on the line with 1st platoon by the canal. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c The blast was directly across from the jersey barrier next to the sniper tower.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question (C1). When do you think the blast occurred? Why do you think that?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) 1736. That's just the time I understand. But the blast is a directional device with ball bearings. I think there was potentially some explosive on his back as well. I heard 20 lbs of HE is what they were carrying.

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question (C1). Anyone ever say, "watch that dude?"

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, several times. Some of my guys saw these guys multiple times.

cccc. Question and Answer 106

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) There were reports in other interviews about suspicious individuals spotted across the canal, early in the morning on the 26th. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) even said that Cpl Lopez and Cpl Sanchez were staring some guys down.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) There is one guy early on. Occasionally Marines would say a guy is matching the description, and looks suspicious. You would go look at the guy and think, maybe. But there were tons of people there just to watch the show. No attempts to get in. Most of the outer wall, the men sitting there, were only there to watch everything. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) guys snapped two photos.

dddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question (C1). Photos of the actual bomber?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Of other suspicious individuals. *Shows pictures from Recon.* You can see in this picture all the guys hanging out. This guy with the ball cap is very suspicious looking. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tells me that his guys see that individual after the bomb maintain a calm presence and maintain his location. He keeps observing. Recon fires warning shots at him to drive him away. That's what [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with the MEU tells me afterward.

So do we see the bomber? I don't know, maybe. He leaves Bagram the week prior, allegedly. We figured we were seeing this individual somewhere. But the conclusion was, what can you do.

I have 1st on the line, 4th on QRF, and 3rd platoon nearby. I see the flash in the corner of my eye, and I hear a vague pop. I hear tons of screaming. I don't know if I was

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

knocked over or not. The next thing I remember is yelling security, security, sectors, sectors. My guys take a knee. I start to smell tear gas, and I learn later that my guys who got hit had their CS canisters punctured. I realize we can't sustain so I start yelling Americans this way, the direction toward the gate. We were not in a sustainable position.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Did you suffer TBI, and have you been screened for TBI?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I don't know, I haven't been screened. At this point I can't really see through the tear gas. People start grabbing me at the gate. Before I leave the line, I hear gunfire in the area behind the canal. My gut is that rounds are being exchanged. All of us have suppressors. But I am hearing cracks. My gut is that there is a gunfight, but it doesn't sound close to me. I only hear it for a second, and then nothing after that. I get passed into the outer gate and they check me for bleeding. I shake my head clear of the gas. And I have the most surreal clarity of my life on what I need to do. That's when I look to my left and see my guys laying on the ground. I'd say this is about a minute to 2 minutes after the blast. I run out and see a guy on the ground and the CS is dumping out of him. I find [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) with his radio, he tells me he will call the casevac and I will do security. I see [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hovering over Cpl Page who was dead and his best friend. I tell him we got to go and that he's dead. Then we see [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) so we grab [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and bring him back. At this point we have cleared all of our casualties. This happened very quickly. As soon as the blast went our guys went back in and got all of our guys out.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) How do you know Cpl Page was gone? What are [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) injuries?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) You could tell by his face, I couldn't see any of his wounds. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was his squad leader. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) myself and 3 Marines carry him to the casualty collection point (CCP). I remember [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) writhing around, his leg was the major concern. I think he took some shrapnel to the face. He is communicative, talking and moaning. All the corpsmen are at the CCP. By the time I go back out for the third time, the casualties are gone.

Initially I was confused to find those two guys at the fence by the sniper tower. I learned later that they were dragged there till the hole was cut. After that, I went back to the canal because I was concerned there may be guys in the canal. There were bodies packed into the canal, you could have walked across. Meanwhile, Marines were still pulling security. Some were mine, some were [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) some were from the MEU, some were Echo. I could tell that some were from the MEU because of how they looked, they had been there to snatch people.

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At this point I realize there is nothing for me to do. Security and the CCP are running. I run to the Brits to grab all their medics and do a face to face because I know we have to pull back. The Brits are calm, they don't understand how bad shit is at the blast. Some guy asks me why we need their help. I said we took casualties, he asks civilians, I say 20 marines. Finally they cooperate. I had brought [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a couple others to escort.

Once we step out, the Brits won't sprint. He says he won't makes mistakes that way. I have [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) take him to the CCP with the medics. At this point I tell the Brits they need to hold their own security. Members of the 82nd, the company commander, were in there at that time. The guy I was supposed to RIP with – there is a chance I did this at the outer gate – I tell them I am no longer part of this RIP and they need to coordinate with each other. They agree. I grab the COS of 2 Paras, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he tells us he has vehicles and will serve as a liaison and help us bring more vehicles. He and I run back to the CCP, and check what's happening. The Brit vehicles he coordinates aren't coming from Barron as I thought, they come from inside HKIA. By this time we had finished actions outside the gate. This was about 10-15 minutes after the blast. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted to close the gate at this time, as there were many back packs on the ground. I tell him we need to leave it open for the British vehicles. Once we realize the other direction for the vehicles we close the gate. At this point, all the Marines, about 3-4 companies worth, were all oriented to the wall by the canal.

I watched [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) get taken out in a stretcher. They initially took off without him, so I chased after the casevac vehicle and they came back and picked him up. I realized operations were complete, told [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the owned security and I would retrograde my forces to inner gate.

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Do you see the Battalion Commander following the blast?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I link up with him inside near the sniper tower, and back brief him on everything I did. Looking back he was clearly concussed. I link up with [redacted] (b)(6) a lot of my Marines are in the mass of Marines pulling security. I make my way to where the STP is treating individuals at the inner gate, where they pushed an ambulance earlier in the day.

[redacted] (b)(6) and first platoon are now at that CCP. There are some walking wounded and routines. I found it disorganized. [redacted] (b)(6) had gotten in an argument with them about using the ambulance, because they were told not to let the ambulance leave the inner gate. It was clear that the STP contingent there was overwhelmed. I asked their nurse who was in charge, and she didn't know. I realized she was ineffective, but by that point all of our urgent casualties had been moved. At this point I saw Gunny, 1stSgt and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) doing accountability. At that time I thought it was 3 casualties, and then I learned it was more than 10. I tasked [redacted] (b)(6) out for accountability. I speak with the Battalion Commander at this point. I coordinate with

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

other companies that I can see, and tell them I am going to consolidate and retrograde Ghost. This is within about 30 minutes of the blast, it's twilight.

Then I run back down and link up with platoon commanders and 1stSgt by the holding area. I explain the retrograde plan. We are still getting threats of more VBIEDs, a second explosion, and 15-20 fighters on base. I gave the order to reverse banana peel and get back. We were trying to find the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a bag, that distracted us for the next hour before we found it. Crypto was not compromised. Gunny and XO then begin to work transportation plan from the inner gate to berthing. I sent 3rd platoon ahead a while ago to secure the berthing area due to the insider threat.

It takes us a long time to retrograde. I am on the last bus out of there. That takes us through into the retrograde. I would like to highlight how well [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trained our corpsmen and how well he and the 1stSgt prepared for a mass casualty event. Once threat reporting started coming in, I told him I wanted him and 1stSgt inside the gate. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) treated 8 people himself, did an emergency tracheotomy himself, and got people to Role 2 within 17 minutes. The first casualty was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) who got hit in the jugular, and walked through the gate himself.

What Doc, 1stSgt, and Gunny did saved lives. We brought home more people than we should have. It was great to hear the Marines felt that their training kicked in and saved lives.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question (C1). Do you think it was a complex attack?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) No, I do not think so. I think our Marines engaged a Taliban over watch position. Do I believe my Marines fired on a position on the other side of the canal? Yes. I believe the shooting down by the canal, are the Recon Marines firing warning shots at that suspicious individual in the picture. The Brits didn't fire, and any rumors about a Brits recovering a back pack are not true. No firing happened at the chevron, the Taliban were sitting there calmly the whole time.

I don't think anyone further up by the Taliban and Barron realized how bad it was in the canal. I didn't think the blast was loud from where I was. After the IED reporting came in, I remember discussing force pro. I said we didn't have any and the British Battalion Commander pointed out that it was the people because they'd absorb the blast. Technically that came true.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question (C1). After the blast, are there people in the canal? Did people bunch up at the ends?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) No. If there were, I would have trained my weapon on them. There may have been a group by the Barron Hotel, but I don't think on the other side

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

because there was the footbridge that would let out to the marketplace, and people went out that way.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question (C1). Okay so back to the complex attack.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Talking to the US forces, mainly the Recon Company Commander, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and speaking with my Marines, I believe the Recon elements fired toward that suspicious individual. A Recon gunny mag(azine) dumped into the crack house on the other side of the canal. I am only tracking one of my fire teams using their weapons. They were elevated on the T-wall inside the outer gate, opposite side of the sniper tower. I was tracking that they saw about 6 personnel, but that number has dropped to 1-2, at the crack house. I don't think there was any firing from the chevron area. The Taliban and the Brits were both very relaxed until I walk into the Barron Hotel, they were consolidated but some of them were standing in the open. Their attitude changed when I told them we had 20 casualties.

kkkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Your belief at the time is that the Barron Hotel and the Taliban at the chevron cannot see or understand what's happening at the blast site?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think they know a blast occurred, and that a lot of civilians are dead. I don't think they suspected Marines until I told them. But based on the fact that the Brits I saw were standing and not taking a knee, and the fact that the Taliban continue to just watch from the chevron, indicates to me there was no gunfire. I distinctly remember one Taliban with his elbows on knees and face in hands just watching.

I believe the Taliban had a vested interest in not allowing an attack to occur by ISIS. That being said, some of the Taliban and some of the Afghan young men were just trying to get all the way into the airfield. I think they were scouting what to do and reconning with the intent of COA analysis for if we didn't leave on the 31st.

I know there were reports of them bringing in large equipment around the airfield. I think I got this from BGen Sullivan that they were increasing posture around airfield to increase messaging and be ready if we stuck around.

lllll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question (C1). So, no belief of a complex attack? Any reports of the 82nd tower firing?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Correct. I heard reports of fire from 82nd tower direction, but I didn't hear it. It's possible that when the blast went off people got scared and started firing at Afghans they saw with a gun.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) led by BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(1) Question (C1). Any indications of firing from between the outer gate and the Barron?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The Recon Marines were shooting warning shots at the canal. That's what I believe it was and it lines up with what Recon is telling me. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the company commander there and could speak best to that.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (C1). Tell me what you think happened with your Marines inside the gate who fired?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The Taliban had a vested interest in not allowing ISIS to attack. They would not have given up their good vantage point to ISIS, they understand key terrain. Maybe the couple Taliban guys in the building across the canal fire, maybe not after the blast. I think my Marines saw them with weapons immediately after the blast, probably within 15 seconds, and shot at them. It was fast, my gunny and platoon sergeants don't believe it happened at all. But I definitely heard firing. I did not hear the firing from inner gate to the Barron area myself. I heard the recon gunny and my fire team IVO of the outer gate fire over the canal, but it was quick and did not last long. No one ever went to cover from it, I don't believe it was a complex attack.

If they (ISIS) had the capability of making such a complex weapon, I think they would have mag dumped into our lines right afterward.

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question (C1). Do any of your Marines think they hit someone?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I have heard that one of them thinks he hit the individual on top of the tower, but we don't know.

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you do a round count or expenditure report after retrograding back from the gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Some of my Marines definitely reported having fewer rounds. A couple of Marines had been right along the canal outside the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has told people he was shot through the shoulder and returned fire across the canal. I haven't spoken with him directly, but that is what I have heard. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is also fairly concussed when all this goes on, his recollection of how LCpl Nikoui dies is all wrong at the time. He died instantly, we all know it. His mother thinks that we are lying about how he died, and she has been vocal about that. I don't think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a reliable witness due to his proximity. Page's magazine had a 5.56 round in it, but that could have kicked off from some of our guys who were hit. Our seasoned combat guys were scanning after the blast, they didn't see anything. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was screened for a TBI that night, he said that he returned fire. If you ask him now he will say no. If you ask if he had all his ammo he will also say no. What I do know is that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took shrapnel

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to his hip, then carried out 4-5 guys while concealing his wounds so he could stay with his platoon. He's a hero.

That's why I don't think this is a complex attack. The Taliban wouldn't have let them get close. Maybe there is a brief exchange between Marine and Taliban positions, but it was fast and that was my take.

qqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have any knowledge on what happened in the sniper tower? They told us they took 3 rounds, 2 in the wall and 1 in the window on the eastern facing side.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Back to my theory, if you're the Taliban and spooked by the bomb, they would first engage the greatest elevated threat. If they took 3 rounds on that side, it could be from the Taliban position firing at them. If it were ISIS, the TTP is to fight to the death. If they were willing to use a heavy hitter to do the blast, they wouldn't have sent the JV shooters to suppress the sniper tower.

rrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question (C1). Agreed, they would probably have a sniper set up, a talented individual. If it was 3 shots to get right on the money, that could line up with that. You have Marines saying they saw impacts from rounds in the dirt inside the outer gate. Have you heard that? Who are your combat veterans?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) First time I have heard that. All three platoon sergeants, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They have all dealt with MASCAL, my Company Gunny as well.

ssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (C1). Who are your most and least credible Marines?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a very good Marine. I don't think he's embellishing or lying, he's one of our better team leaders. It might have happened, I think it was just a Taliban position.

tttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question (C1). How does this end for you? The whole Abbey Gate after 30 minutes post blast?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) We are consolidated at inner gates, Company Gunny and XO go works transportation. 3rd platoon goes back to secure our area, due to the insider threat. While we are waiting, 2 shots about 4 min apart go way above our heads toward the runway. I reported that, but it wasn't particularly unique. I was on the last wave in. We get back into the berthing area, then I lose track of the sequence. I go straight to the hospital to see what is happening with our guys there. I get the list of the killed. I address the company and talk to them, try to get their heads back in the game as there was work to do. I had the chaplain talk to them. After that I have to ID the bodies. That's

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a problem because ID cards got mixed up. I see (b)(6) there, and I get taken to the mortuary. 1stSgt is there, and they tell me (b)(6) is dead. I say fuck no, I just saw him in the mortuary. We saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from (b)(1)1.4a all the sergeants major are there to identify bodies. Once they come back, we realize we have a problem. We see another guy on the operating table with the same bad mustache that Page had. They tell us it's Page, but we have already identified one of the dead bodies as Page. We are trying to figure this out, we have somebody unaccounted for. I make the mistake of telling (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that Page is alive. I have (b)(6) go get ISOPREP information so we can go person by person. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has done this twice, so I do it with him. We find out that Page is dead when we go down the line and confirm, so we don't know who is on the operating table. We had confirmed accountability with Ghost at this time, so we knew that it wasn't one of our guys. But (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) look at the guy on the operating table, and we find out it is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Then maybe I talk to the company, I don't know, I can't remember. We have a heavy security presence on our compound, I grab an hour or 2 of sleep. We do an after action in the CoC led by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We start to work details for dignified transfer. We conduct that ceremony. I told the Battalion Commander that day we need a job. We worked in the pax terminal, we kept the guys in the fight and worked through the night with the plan to fly out the next day. We flew out 1300-1400 on the 28th out to (b)(1)1.4a. The first 48 hours there everyone just slept. We took care of small flesh wounds and any TBI from 1st platoon. I knew we needed to start talking. I tasked each platoon with running a detailed AAR starting on the 16th, to force the guys to talk and create a common story. We knew the enormity of what we just did. Then we had a company AAR, I took the opportunity to explain everything I knew and all of my decisions that I couldn't explain in the moment. I made sure to tell them that it wasn't their fault. I explained to them that I gave them an impossible task and that I was unable to equip them with what they needed to be successful. I told them if they felt they had failed in an instance it was on me. I gave them orders and did not equip them to be successful. We planned the company memorial, and that went well. I said make sure we are doing unit PT every day. We ended up getting the 72 hour warning that we would go home, we packed up our stuff and got home period of darkness Sep 15-16th.

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question (C1). You can't blame yourself, everything I have seen indicates you did the best you could.

(2) Answer (b)(6) I believe I prepared the company as best as I could for the situation. I know I would change a few small things. I think that no matter what I did there would have been casualties. I think I did the best I could, I just didn't want any of my guys to blame themselves.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have contact info for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and can you share any pictures and video you have?

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] led by BG Curtis and [redacted] on 06 and 08 OCT 21 in Camp Pendleton.

(2) Answer [redacted] Yes.

*Transition to white board sketch of where people were KIA and WIA, and [redacted] talks through the sketch with [redacted]

wwwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question [redacted] Is this drawing by [redacted] accurate? Any changes? The WIA we are a bit less sure on, especially because people were getting moved. Are the categories of wounded we had accurate?

(2) Answer [redacted] For the KIA, this all makes sense. I don't think I can add much more clarity to this. PSYOP was going to go speak with the crowd about closing soon. I agree with the area that all of these individuals are located. For the WIA, [redacted] stands out as possibly inaccurate, given how quickly he came through the gate. I was under the impression that he was by the truck, and he walked off after the blast with his hand pressed to the wound on his jugular. I would like to get back to you on that, [redacted] will agree with me on that. [redacted] we did not get put in for a purple heart, he just some shrapnel to his helmet. He may have TBI. I think I was a little further away for the accuracy of the diagram.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and

[redacted]

[redacted]



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07 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines, 07 October 2021

1. On 07 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered accordingly.

3. Discussion.

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. When did you hear that your unit would be deploying?

(2) Answer. It was on and off. Officially I heard around mid-February that it was back on. As a company we had been talking with our Marines and were in a ready posture just in case it would get turned back on. We were training as though it was going to be turned back on, even with limited resources.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. When did you depart?

(2) Answer. I was Main Body 2. It was around early April. It went ADVON, Main Body 1, and then Main Body 2.

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d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Were you in [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]

(2) Answer. Yes, early July to the beginning of August.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Over the past few months you had been training, how do you think it went?

(2) Answer. It helped the individual Marines' confidence and the morale of the unit. There was a lot of kicking and screaming on the way, but it was overall good. The morale was different in a good way. The training wasn't something that I have seen before even on the division side, mainly due to the money. We happened to have a lot of rounds and training opportunities while we were there. The training was just a stepping stool for things done at Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) and the common things that they hate to love it, but they love it.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Who was driving training? Was it set up by the Battalion Commander?

(2) Answer. Collectively it was between the big four. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] was the vision of the entire thing. He had the vision of what he wanted to be like by the end of the deployment. There was just enough white space to implement a Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) course and Martial Arts Instructor (MAI) course. There were some points that we were able to do culture awareness trips. We were able to get definitely 90 percent of the team to at least one trip to Petra or near the Dead Sea. Knowing what I know now, even with the hundreds of different scenarios, the training that we were conducting was excellent. We were able to properly instruct individuals.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did you feel like your Marines got enough training, and good exposure to another culture to develop soft skills?

(2) Answer. Without a doubt, when you see someone that looks like they are from Iraq or Afghanistan it raises your hairs on the back of your head. We were trying to get Marines to experience the culture in order to make the realization that these are real people. These people showed us nothing but kindness and respect.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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(1) Question. Were they able to see them as humans?

(2) Answer. Yes, with reservations because we have been trained to see them in a different light. Some of these 18 and 19 year old mean can't tell the difference so I think it did help.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you hear about if you would be supporting the NEO mission in August?

(2) Answer. Yes, by August there is a good chance that the NEO will happen, but there is also a good chance that we won't be supporting it. The analogy I use is that when you move out of your house you bring more people, not less, to help you leave. So there is a decent possibility. The issue is you can't think that you are not going or tell the guys you aren't going because if it turns back on that would hurt the team morale.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When did you start preparing for the NEO?

(2) Answer. From the training aspect, I don't think we switched anything. We were in the middle of the planning process where we were just wrapping up a squad package. When we rolled up into Kabul is when we were going to do the platoon package.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Did you hear about NEO 13 August, but officially found out on 14 August?

(2) Answer. 13 August at around 0500 or 0600 is when we found out that the NEO mission was being executed. We returned from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We sat in a brief that weekend and the next day we told them we were on tether.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(6) you have a unique role, you just got word, may or may not understand mission, what steps do you start taking to help prep the Marines?

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(2) Answer. I was tracking it was going to be a security mission. I started making go/no-go roster for who would be actually going. Accountability across the board was my primary concern. We had individuals not vaccinated so they had to stay back, and we also had to identify individuals that would stay behind with the equipment. 2nd Platoon was to provide security at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a with the understating that they would be replaced by an Army unit. The understanding was that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a was going to become a cold site. 2nd Platoon would then go to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a or to a secondary site. By the 15th they were told that they were going. The non-vaccinated would hold security at Titin while the rest would move forward. We sat at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a for a few days waiting on a flight, we thought 2nd Platoon would join us, but the evening of 18 August we were bumped. 2nd Platoon flew after we had just left.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What are you doing to get prepared?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a was a good time for us because we were able to talk about nonlethal force. We conducted a basic training course on nonlethal actions and how to move people from point A to point B appropriately. I had some experience with this type of environment. In 2007 while deployed to Iraq there was a riot with the Sunnis. We had to do a lot of riot control. I just finished a MAI course, and had a few Marines with training so I talked to them about where to place your weapon, how to escort individuals, a lot of importance on where you are in the crowd and how to handle the crowd. We balanced that with some of what the SEALs wanted to do. We knew that as time was concluding people would be getting more desperate. We stressed the importance of this. We also talked about how they may be trying to send their children off and all the crazy stuff they would see. Our goal was to get the Marines into the right mindset. I thought that based off of 2007 I knew what I was going into. I couldn't even imagine what I would actually see. I would have emphasized a few more things knowing what I know now.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Were you in communication with other Staff NCOs at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Yes and no, I was in a group chat with the other [REDACTED] (b)(6). There wasn't any, "hey this is what you're getting yourself into," conversations. I really wasn't getting any responses. Once I got there I started to understand why they weren't sending information. It was chaotic. We were expecting to fly in and kick people off the aircraft as we got off. We were thinking we were flying into a hot LZ. We got off in a file and went to the berthing area to deal with the packs. The big four (CO, XO, 1stSgt, Co GySgt) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) linked in with us and took us to the Battalion COC. The Marines went to their gym for their billeting area. This was on 19 August at about 0100 – 0200.

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We got a quick FRAGO from the Ops-O explaining that we would be working alongside the Taliban. We get our piece of the pie, figure out where we are going to be, break contact and move over to the tent to pick up our packs from the stacks. We then come back to clean out the gym in order to make space. There wasn't too much space to fit 142 Marines to include 2nd platoon. There are about 105 on the ground at this time.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. When do you get to Abbey Gate for the first time?

(2) Answer. We were going to do a port/starboard with the big four and the platoon leadership before getting to the gate. The idea was to develop a rest plan before hand, but it didn't go as planned. We only had one vehicle to transport everyone around. The preplan was to get the key leadership to go out and do a leader's recon to see the area we would be working in. This was early morning. I began establishing a company COC in the gym. I was figuring out where everyone would be. We started punching out 18 at a time to Abbey Gate. We didn't expect to get our guys out the door so fast. We didn't expect this so none of the guys took chows or day packs.

We were expecting a leader's recon and to relief in place (RIP) out later that day with Echo Company, but that didn't happen. There was an expectation to pack light because you would be able to come back for chow, sleep, and to clean ourselves up. However, that didn't happen. My first time on deck was sometime between 1300 and 1400. I was the last person to leave the tent. Right off the bat [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was trampled by the crowd and hurt his ankle. We moved him off to the side because we thought it was broken.

When I got to the gate there were a ton of people on the other side. The gates were shut and a vehicle was parked in front of it. People were everywhere. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was standing on the jersey barrier with the XO on his left and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on his right pushing the people back. The task was to move the people back to an unknown distance. There wasn't a clear purpose. The chain link fence stood between the gate and the canal and was propped up, but over time it started to droop.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. What is the first night like? Could you describe the scene? How do the Marines respond?

(2) Answer. All the Marines' eyes are wide open the first day. They aren't sure what the intent is besides pushing the crowd back. We were really unsure of what we were supposed to do, there wasn't a clear end state. We could already see desperation

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from the Afghan people. It was the same level of desperation from the first day to the last day. There were certain times of the day that it wasn't as aggressive. During the mornings it wasn't as bad but throughout the day it would get worse. That night was really bad. We witnessed a few bodies being pulled from the crowd back to the gate to be seen by the corpsmen. They appeared to be dead.

After looking at the mission of what we were briefed, I didn't understand why we were operating in a different AO than what was briefed. By the time we ended up getting the people pushed back really far, we thought we were doing a good job, but we were told that we needed to push them back even further. They wanted us to push the people all the way behind the gate or it would be considered a mission failure. This area was near the Taliban, which also had broken down vehicles. We established communications with the Taliban, which was weird. We didn't know the intent of why we were pushing them back so far until the morning when they started moving the connex boxes into position.

I see the CO and move through the crowd to get to him, all the while I start seeing him talk to the Taliban. At some point we find out that it's a mission failure unless we move them back a certain distance. I start telling the Marines that something is about to give. We are pushing them into the Taliban which could turn lethal. Somehow we end up controlling it all. The MEU CDR showed up to our meeting by the gate, with the British CDRs and said something about that it was going to be an easy task. I look back to the CO like this is crazy and it's not going to happen. We do need to look at the bigger picture and not get frustrated. By the following morning the cranes were coming in to place the connexes together. We establish that there is an entrance and exit. The area is starting to get extremely crowded.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

q. Question and Answer 16.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

u. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How did you move the mass of people?

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(2) Answer. We were just talking to them. We emphasized that we had to establish a process. A lot of people understood English. There was typically one male that would be the main person in the crowd. That person would usually calm the crowd and tell the crowd what to do based on the information we are explaining to him. We just had to take inches at a time. Things did get aggressive, but it didn't develop into any fully shoves at this point.

r. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. How were other units/nations employing escalation of force?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] appeared to think warning shots were acceptable. They had batons at one point, but I don't know how they were instructed to be used. I saw them just poke at people. I didn't see anyone actually get hit hard. They would just hit surfaces to get people to comply. We didn't use CS gas, other people may have. We had to balance off a few things with our national partners. They wanted us to warn them when we would use flashbangs. We were advised to throw them in the air to get an air burst. It was supposed to be used when we take a step forward. It offered us to take a full step forward and control the crowd better. They could have been used excessively, but I wasn't out there at all times to know.

s. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. There weren't any people being processed because of a lack of Department of State (DoS) presence until 21 August correct?

(2) Answer. Yes it wasn't until 21 August that there was a full detailed plan with the DoS. [REDACTED] did a great job talking with multiple CDRs and leadership to make sure everyone one was on the same page. He took his own intuitive to insert himself in the process to bring everyone together. They had talked about search pits, screening, and how things would work. None of the Marines at this point were briefed on what documents were needed to get people through the gates. It wasn't uncommon to see other nations new sources come up to the point of friction, interview someone, and then immediately leave.

t. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. When do you stay out at Abbey Gate? Were you out there from 19–23 August?

(2) Answer. There was no established rest plan, but we did just sleep wherever for a few hours.

u. Question and Answer 21.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 07 October 2021

(1) Question. After the first three or four days did you begin to establish a better process?

(2) Answer. Yes by the third or fourth day we were getting better. We had a good routine, but we were pulled off the line. Everyone got to sleep for about a full day. It was also great for the Marines to see Afghans getting on the plane. Dehumanization was coming into play so it was time for us to get pulled back. At the time I thought we were balanced as a company, but looking back I see points of friction between Marines seeing how the Afghans were acting. You'd see a male take water and let their kids sit there dying. It was great for the Marines to see the kids and people get on the plane to go home. It helped their mindset. However, we were not logistically ready to supply Afghans with food and water.

v. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What does it look like when you return on 25 August?

(2) Answer. It was a little frustrating. We had control then came back later to the same mess. We just saw more crowds of people from where we had pushed them back. Once Golf took over on 25 August we pushed people from the jersey barrier, east along the canal past the bridge, but eventually it collapsed back in due to the IED threat. This allowed people all the way back down to the jersey barrier by the sniper tower. When we received the IED threat we are all scattered throughout between the outer gate and the chevron. We all take a knee and eventually gave up the ground. We did this so that we didn't have to transport people past 300 meters if something bad were to happen. I didn't want to give up the ground because we had a great exit strategy for people.

w. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Were you out there that night of the 25th to 26th? Any changes in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Yes, leaving on the 23rd the crowd wasn't as thick and there couldn't have been more than 50 people in the canal all spread out. This was compared to when we got back, there were hundreds in the canal.

x. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. On 26 August could you describe anything about the threat streams?

(2) Answer. What I didn't notice was that on the other side of the sniper tower there were three individuals sitting down with the turban under their face. They weren't talking loud or trying to get through the crowd, they were just checking out the Marines. I

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went to check on two Marines. They were in a stare down with the three guys on the other side of the canal. I told the Marines that if they do anything crazy to shoot them. They had been there only once before the blast.

y. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Were people more aggressive or desperate?

(2) Answer. Yes, I do know that it seemed as if everyone had gotten word that Abbey Gate was letting people in, that other gates were closed, and Abbey Gate was their best chance. We had a system down at the time to get people through. We had other nations that would ask to get a bunch of people from the canal, this would get the crowd angry because they saw people leaving but they weren't making it through.

z. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. How much pressure were you under to get as many people out as possible? Was the pressure from higher or was it more on a personal level?

(2) Answer. There was a sense of urgency. Towards the end we knew that, from what I was briefed we were going to have to close the gate. Prior to closing it, we would need to get a big queue lined up. This would allow us to still process people as we were leaving. By the 25th and 26th everyone knew who to look for and what to look for. We had corporals and lance corporals that were able to identify people in the crowd and make the call to pull people up or not.

aa. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. What impact does that have on your Marines who could make that decision?

(2) Answer. We talked to them about it. We emphasized that even though it was them that made the call at the time, it wasn't really them that made the ultimate decision. It was the CDR. It wasn't really their decision. It will impact them, but it is something that we keep emphasizing.

bb. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. During the afternoon of the 26th, where is everyone located?

(2) Answer. 26 August I was holding a riot shield with the Marines at the exit point. [redacted] (b)(6) was near the exit as well. At this point we also had BGen Sullivan and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) near the jersey barrier to see that people were being crushed. He left about 15 minutes before the blast went off. We were pulling one person

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out and put them in the canal over and over again. 4th Platoon was at the jersey barrier around 1600-1730. The level of frustration was going up and they get relieved early due to the crazy crowd at around 1700. 1st platoon replaced 4th Platoon. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went up toward the Barron, but was near the canal area. I end up right inside the outer gate when the blast went off.

cc. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. The IED goes off, do you know the time and how far you were from the blast?

(2) Answer. I knew it was around the ball park of 1730 and 1750. I was just inside the outer gate. I was looking toward back toward the entrance to the outer gate when the blasts went off. I haven't been checked for TBI. The blast goes off, my guy was down at the entrance of the gate, it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I assisted in pulling him back inside the gate. He was the first one to the CCP. He got pulled back further as more casualties were brought in. I run back in to the blast area where I hear gun shots going out toward the south west. There wasn't any shots coming from the chevron.

I am now at the entrance. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was stumbling in. He was visibly wounded. I helped shoulder carry him off, threw him in the van, and grab a corpsman to help. There were a ton of people and vehicles to help. I turn my attention back to get the next person. I see the Company [REDACTED] (b)(6) stumbling, he was coughing a lot. He breaks contact, I don't see him again till later. I run back past the gate and look west in the canal and see a bunch of dead bodies. There was a lot of people wounded. I run back and pull out my notebook to start tracking injuries. I get about 15 names, they were all my Marines. Some were wounded and others were dead.

I see Lopez with his eyes rolled back and ask [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if he was breathing. He says faintly but will probably die soon. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) bleeding out of the neck. We start to triage/prioritize injuries. We start extracting more injured. I run back to see if there are any more and realize all have gotten pulled back. People were attending to SSgt Hoover at the gate. He ends up bleeding out before getting to the Role 2. I see [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) coughing, we rolled him on to his side to cough up everything. My primary focus was to get accountability of my Marines and list their injuries.

I started going through the ZAPs by name. I was off by one name and noticed it was a KIA. I was going off of the Doc's initial assessment. I had the Marine listed as wounded instead of KIA. There were others that appeared to look good, but died later. Others that appeared to be ready to expire, survived. I thought people were shot because of the type of wounds they had. I knew that Sanchez and Lopez were gone and saw a bunch of other of our guys were injured.

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I went to Abbey Gate proper and back again for accountability. We had established security between the inner and outer gate. I saw [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] looking through a duffel bag for a potential IED, and left him because he had it under control. I link up with the CO to give him our personnel status. He told me to worry about accountability while he works on security. As we get back to Abbey Gate proper, we establish a RIP with Echo Company. The corpsmen and 4th platoon were located near the CCP. We didn't want the FET outside the gate because there wasn't a need. Someone had called the FET Marines' to get people back in the canal. I had 1 Marine officer, 12 Marine enlisted wounded, 1 Navy enlisted wounded, 8 Marine enlisted and 1 Navy enlisted KIA.

dd. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Where were the KIAs located?

(2) Answer. They were just on the backside of the jersey barrier trying to keep the masses of people calm. They were between the barrier and the exit. I know that Corporal Lopez was directly across from the blast. We had several Marines that didn't go to Walter Reed. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] pulled ball bearings out of his body and proceeded to escort people to safety. I can't pin point exactly where individuals were at because we were all consistently moving. All the Marines were between the fence and the canal, and from the jersey barrier to the cut of the fence.

ee. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. How long did it take to take evacuate the wounded?

(2) Answer. It took about 15 to 20 minutes, for me it was always about getting the casualties out. Somehow we were able to fight our way out and take care of our wounded.

ff. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Do you think the MASCAL response was executed well?

(2) Answer. Yes without a doubt. We did so much medical training at [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] We were doing what we were supposed to be doing and it all paid off.

gg. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Where did Golf Company consolidate?

(2) Answer. The platoons consolidated by Abbey Gate proper. Later that night we went back into the gym. We talked to the Marines quickly, they were coming in waves of 15, because they were a little heart broken. All Marines that were hurt were from 1st

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Platoon. I give a short speech to the Marines, CO takes over and talks a bit, we let them hygiene and shave, and gave them social media guidance.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) all have our individual taskers. I go to a white tent to see the ones who are KIA. They open the bags and some are identifiable and some are not. I had to identify a couple. The doctors/nurses asked if I was sure, and I said yes 100%. I get the platoon sergeant to confirm certain individuals. The bodies were then transported to a refrigerator. The Plt Sgt helps to identify everyone in the hospital. We identify everyone except the Army Soldier and two female KIA. I was told that the bodies were going to be transported shortly (about 0100, roughly 7 hours later). Initially the medical facility put dog tags and boots on a certain operating tables. Some of the guys on the table look just like the guys we lost. It was up to us to actually identify our KIA due to this confusion. I went back to the hospital to check on the wounded. Some were being manifested to get on an aircraft about 0400-0500. I get back to my guys at the gym later that night. About 1200 on 27 August, we conducted a ramp ceremony. The wounded had already been flown out.

hh. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. What is the total count of wounded?

(2) Answer. 19 total wounded from Golf Company.

ii. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. On the 27th were you told what was next?

(2) Answer. There was a plan to get us back. We were told later that day to pack everything we had and to not leave anything behind.

jj. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. When did Golf Company fly out, on 29 August?

(2) Answer. It was the following day, we all left at the same time. We were checking bags during the 29th because we kept hearing people were throwing bags over the fences. We had to make sure that no one was taking bags on to the aircraft. We had a few interpreters on the flight and found a few people with bags. The aircraft CDR wanted to see what was in every bag to make sure it wasn't anything bad. I was still counting people to make sure we had accountability.

kk. Question and Answer 37.

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(1) Question. Is there anything else you want us to know or something that you wanted us to ask?

(2) Answer. No, I think I've said everything I need to say. There are some people who did very heroic things, but that time will come. I think the investigation, the uncertainty of the mission... there were just so many nations and different commanders. From my perspective there isn't any fault on any commanders.

II. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Is there any specific Marine that we should talk to?

(2) Answer. We did an AAR in Kuwait for a few days. One thing that we noticed was that everyone's story has a different perspective even though it ends the same. It helped to spark new memories and develop more of the story. Some things didn't even register as a memory until we started the AAR. Some of the Marines were concussed and could only remember certain aspects.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and

[redacted]

[redacted]



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6 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

1. On 6 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your name and position?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Can you describe your career in the marines?

(2) Answer. I joined in 2005 and did four deployments with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. I worked for the School of Infantry for a few years. Then I went to Hawaii and did a few deployments with them. I came to Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment in Sep 2020 as the [redacted] (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Can you describe the pre-deployment training for F Co?

(2) Answer. I arrived in Sep 2020 and went to Amphibious Combat Vehicle training right away. It was a month long. After, we conducted defense training for two weeks and then did an Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) at 29 Palms. At this point, we

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were told that our upcoming deployment to join the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) was off and we thought that we were going to be joining a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) instead. I still kept in mind that we should train as SPMAGTF. After the ITX, we were told that the deployment with SPMAGTF was back on. Once we returned from the ITX, we conducted platoon rehearsals.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did you deploy to the CENTCOM AOR?

(2) Answer. I deployed in March as ADVON with SPMAGTF [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. When did you first hear of a potential Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I think the rumor of a NEO started spreading during the beginning of August. [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] doing security and sat in a lot of briefs with the SPMAGTF. I think I first heard about a possible NEO in June.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Where is the rest of the company at this time?

(2) Answer. By April, all of F Co [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. When was F Co notified that they would participate in NEO planning?

(2) Answer. It was around July that I left [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and traveled as ADVON to [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] F Co brought two platoons to [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] for training on individual and team/squad-level infantry operations.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Were you part of the 2/1 battalion rehearsals?

(2) Answer. No, none of F Co took part in them. I think the rest of 2/1 left [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] for [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and F Co stayed in [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. I remember they moved MREs into the CP labeled "do not touch—for NEO" at the beginning of August and this alerted us that the NEO could be happening.

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j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Is that when you first started talking about planning for NEO?

(2) Answer. Correct. [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) came to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and briefed us and told us that the NEO was on the table and to be prepared for anything.. At this point, we had two platoons from F Co, Weapons Company, and some of E Co with us in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. The week following the brief, we were told that the NEO in Afghanistan was happening.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your task organization at this time?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) went forward to Afghanistan from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. The two platoons that went forward were 2nd and 3rd platoon. The F Co Commander went to the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Once you got the order for movement to Afghanistan, what actions did you take?

(2) Answer. We continued with training. All of my guys kept talking about the NEO. I gave my guys a class on Afghanistan to teach them what happened during my time there and how things will be different now. I focused my class on the general public and terrain, and gave a brief background on the Taliban. I focused mainly on the Afghanistan culture and shared my experiences.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. When were you last in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. 2009.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. When was the deployment order given?

(2) Answer. The order was given on 16 August. By 17 August we had all of our F Co element boots on ground in Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). I worked out a deal with the MEU to have ten people from 2/1 fly with them as ADVON. We flew five personnel from F Co, to include myself, and five from E Co with the MEU. We were kicked off the plane because of limited space a few times but were persistent and flew

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with them. W left the night of 16 August and arrived on 17 August around 1000. We immediately started planning our locations. The rest of the 2/1 elements arrived around 1500 on 17 August.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What did HKIA look like when you arrived?

(2) Answer. As soon as we landed, we heard warning shots being fired from the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d, 1/8 marines and the US army were also firing warning shots. The rest of the base seemed like they were going about normal business but in a panic.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Was the airstrip clear at this point?

(2) Answer. Yes, the rush happened the day prior.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Was there relative security when you landed?

(2) Answer. Yes, we attended brief with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). They said that instructions were continuously changing and that they were trying to solidify missions for us. They advised us to find our area of operations and that they will give us more tasks and purpose when they receive more information.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. When did you finally receive a mission?

(2) Answer. We were briefed that night, 17 August, around 2200 that we would take over for 1/8 and cordon off a portion of the airfield next to Abbey Gate. We were tied in with E Co to do this. We were told to do this around 0800 on 18 August. We didn't start moving until 0900 to establish security. We had two platoons from F Co to do this.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Is this the same time that the Abbey Gate Entry Control Point (ECP) was established?

(2) Answer. We had walked over to Abbey Gate earlier in the day because we heard shooting and my guys were on edge. E Co was on my right and we were located

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in the area between the chevron and the PAX terminal. The chevron was not built yet at this time. We were positioned at the far side of what would become the chevron. There were T-walls blocking the view of where the chevron would eventually be located.

The shooting we had heard were warning shots being fired by [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d at Abbey Gate.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Were you there when the chevron was built? Talk me through it.

(2) Answer. Yes, we assisted with clearing this area. We stayed doing outer security with E Co until 18 August. On 19 August at 0200 we were told that the US Army was replacing us and that we would move to Abbey Gate. The army showed up early at 0000 and we did an hour changeover with them. Then we pushed to Abbey Gate. I had my guys rest once we arrived to Abbey Gate. I didn't go visit the outer gate until around 0500 the next morning. This area was packed. The Brits were screening and letting people, to include American Citizens (AMCIT), Special Interest Visa (SIV) holders, and British civilians, in the gate one by one. They had vehicles holding the gate shut.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Is most of F Co still located by the inner gate or are they all now by outer gate?

(2) Answer. F Co was still located by the inner gate at this time. Only me and some of the other leaders went to see over the outer gate to see the crowds of people. At 0918 on 19 August we received an order that would have us move in patrols to push outside the outer gate, go to Camp Sullivan, grab an unknown number of AMCITs, and bring them back in through the gate. We prepared the guys to leave at 1000. We were staged and ready to go near the outer gate but then the mission was canceled.

This mission supposedly came down from one of the generals, but I think it came from higher than that.

At 1400 on 19 August, the mission was back on. We prepared and were staged but it was canceled again. At 1500, an order came down to us to push outside the outer gate. There was a chain link fence that ran along the canal. We were supposed to clear along the canal down to the end of the fence. We were successful at this. We only had F Co for this mission. G Co had just landed at HKIA that morning. They were trying to bring G Co over to us. A platoon from G Co was en route. We opened the outer gate and pushed everyone back to the end of the chain link fence. We started receiving CS gas from behind. I'm not sure where the CS gas was coming from, but I was told it was from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d I jumped up on the T-wall barrier and looked up at the 2/1 sniper tower. I mouthed to the snipers to have them stop gassing us and to bring G Co up to us.

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We let around 20 Afghan citizens through a break in the fence during this time because we couldn't see from the gas. G Co arrived and we held our spot. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with us at his time. We ended up getting pushed back due to the amounts of people and lack of support that we had. I had my guys fall back to where the center of the T-wall barrier was located and form two lines. This is where we would start checking documents for those trying to enter. We received some information the day before about the seven required documents needed for personnel to enter, but we didn't have any examples of what some of these documents were. I pulled in two of the LTs and had each one in charge of a side. I told them to look for the seven documents and let those with the documents flow into the outer gate.

I called for an interpreter from the crowd and had him explain to everyone what we were doing. This helped calm everyone down and be more orderly. I explained that we wanted to help them. I used hand and arm signals and the interpreter to relay my messages. This is when I kind of became the face of Abbey Gate because I could speak to the people and calm them down. I was able to set the example for the marines on the ground. I advised them to not use any CS gas or warning shots.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Who were the toughest people to interact with in the crowd?

(2) Answer. In general, the male were the most aggressive. Approximately 60% of the crowd consisted of military aged males. They wouldn't listen to our processes and what we were saying. There were a lot of people in the crowds that could speak English that would say that they understood our directions and that single, military-aged males were the ones causing issues. I had them point them out to me and then had my guys move these individuals to the back of the line. I worked collaboratively with the crowd to find the best way to process them.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. At this point you have relative stability and good processes. When does G Co come arrive?

(2) Answer. G Co came in during the daylight of 19 August. They were swapping out with us so that we could have a rest cycle. I felt like I was taking a big lead so I stayed out with G Co while my guys rested. I don't recall the actual rest cycles because I stayed up at the gate. I was up for about 48 hours before I took a break. I wanted to keep the rapport and continuity. I remember that at some point, I went behind the sniper hut, sat there, drank some water, and then went back out. I don't think I slept for the first four days on ground due to pure adrenaline and the need to help people.

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x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: At what point is the chevron established and what does that look like? Are the Taliban out there at this point?

(2) Answer: We established the chevron on 21 August or night of 20 August. We had heavy equipment operators come in to help. Around 0300 on 21 August, the chevron was fully established. This was the first time I was around the TB. I was still working the crowd area but the Taliban came in very aggressively. They were very rough with the crowd and often used their buttstocks to shove people. It was very weird working with the Taliban due to my prior experiences with them while deployed. The Brits had pushed their personnel out a little bit and were helping us at this point.

z. Question and Answer 24.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Where was the [redacted] (b)(6) at this time?

(2) Answer: He was at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d. He was the senior leader there so he couldn't leave the guys there to fly out to HKIA to be with us. The [redacted] (b)(6) was the senior ranking officer from F Co at the time. He got really sick from the water and was puking and had flu-like symptoms. This happened to about twelve of my guys. This is one of the reasons why we were working so closely with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) we were short-staffed on officers. I was the most senior enlisted on ground for F Co. G Co had only three platoons on ground but E Co had their whole company. We were tied in with G Co a lot since they had a small element.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: What did you and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) discuss on 21?

(2) Answer: We discussed a rotation plan. We split up the work/ rest cycles. On 21 August from 0300-0800 my guys went to sleep. Completed our changeover with G Co at 0800 and I brought in the leaders to give them an update of the situation.

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When the chevron was established, there were a ton of crushed vehicles in the way. We had to communicate with the Taliban to help keep pushing forward to work around them because of this.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: What happens next? Where were you at this time?

(2) Answer: My guys were physically off the line at this point but I stayed.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Talk us through the day to day operations with the crowd and with the Taliban.

(2) Answer: In the following days, F Co, G Co, and, toward the end, E Co, started doing rotations for duty. The Taliban was on located on top of chevron. The Brits had an opening on either side of the chevron to let people in. They would funnel British nationals straight to the Baron Hotel (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d We opened one side to make a funnel for the AMCITs. Other countries would come out to try to grab their people in the crowd from their nations and the crowd noticed that they were pulling them through a hole in the fence. This angered a lot of people in the crowd. Some AMCITs were getting pulled through by other nations as well.

From the outer gate, we had a search pit and a fire team consisting of four individuals. This is where people would come after their documents approved. The Department of State (DoS) was located on the other side.

To be put simply, personnel in the crowd were initially screened, brought in the gate, searched, and then brought to the staging area. The staging area is where the DoS would do final screen. If they passed the final screen then they would be bussed to the airport where DoS screened them again. The two DoS locations were not on the same page. This caused some families to be ripped apart once they arrived at the airport. It sucked for us because if families didn't have the proper documents, the DoS would make them go back. These were our daily operations up until the blast on the 26th.

One the night of 22 Augsut, E Co changed out on the gate with us. We left to go rest and provide security at the PAX terminal. I went with them. We got there around the morning of 23 August. This is where we got some rest.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

(1) Question: When did you get the order to go back to the gate?

(2) Answer: We went back to the gate on the morning of 25 August. I left before then and went back to the gate after I had slept for eight hours. I went back to help with whoever was on the rotation at the gate.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: What was the gate like at this point?

(2) Answer: It kept changing. Despite the briefs we would give to those replacing us, the companies would change the operations at the gate. They would move which side of the canal people would need to be on. Sometimes the Brits would guard the gate. At one point, the Brits pushed everyone back 100m past the sniper tower on the side closest to us. The canal was full at this point. Both the far and near sides were full. It was full outside of the gates as well. People were standing shoulder-to-shoulder. We started having civilians get heat exhaustion. I think a few people even died due to the heat near the chevron. We would pass out MREs and water to people in our lanes when we could.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Are there any times in which they stopped letting people in? What did this look like?

(2) Answer: Yes, our crowd mostly stayed quiet. We gave them food and kept them as calm as possible. I went over to their side, took off my helmet and just talked with them to hear their stories. I was so scared that there would be a riot so I tried my best to keep them calm and patient.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Were people that were getting denied entry being dumped in your area?

(2) Answer: Some people getting turned away by the Brits would make their way through to our side.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: Were you able to identify those in the crowd that were causing issues?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

(2) Answer: Yes, and I would send a team to go in to move them to the back of the line or crowd. They would often come back. It was hard to deal with those people because so many good people were trying to get through. They either didn't have the proper documents, or had lost their documents, and would try to cut the line. Some would carry around a piece of paper that said 'visa' or have an email on their phone that was forwarded out to so many people. I had my guys checking the pdfs to verify if they were real or not.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Are you at Abbey Gate between the 25 August and the time of the blast on 26 August?

(2) Answer: I had left to go back to the comfort area where they were staging the orphans. We had taken some orphans over there on the morning of 26 August. One of them had cried out to me and had a translator tell me thank you for being kind. I went back to check on her to make sure she made it on a flight. After visiting this area, I drove out to the North Gate. I had received a photo of an ANA General and needed to find where he was located. To do this, I had to physically go to the area and compare the photo to the terrain and surroundings. The photo did not match the North Gate area. Marines from 1/8 advised me to check out Black Gate. I was at Black Gate when the blast occurred.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: How did the situation on 25 August change from your perspective?

(2) Answer: E Co left after changing out with G Co. The Taliban was still up on the chevron. They were being very aggressive, assaulting people and firing warning shots. This caused an influx of people trying to come in through other locations, especially the canal, in order to avoid the Taliban. The only other gate that was open at this point was the Black Gate.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: When did it transition to only Abbey Gate and Black Gate being open?

(2) Answer: We heard word on the morning of 25 August that it was just Abbey Gate and Black Gate open. The locals were figuring out that we were getting ready to leave and this was causing a lot of urgency for them to get through the gates. I went out to the North Gate and it was closed. The 82nd was running the Black Gate. I spoke to a CPT with the 82nd and they said that the Black Gate was only open during certain

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hours. The morning of 26 August is when I went to check North Gate again and Black Gate. On my drive back to Abbey Gate from Black Gate, the blast went off.

To get through Black Gate, you had to know someone to help get you through. I wanted to get the interpreters that were helping us and their families get through. I spoke with one of the general's aides and asked how to get them through. The aide told me that they made a roster, brought it out to Black Gate, and then at certain hours they would call the names on the roster and those people would get through.

At this point, Abbey Gate and the canal side was the only opportunity for people that were very desperate to get out. The Taliban had sent two checkpoints out near Abbey Gate and this also made it more difficult for people to get through.

All of these things were major influencers to why the people had a heightened sense of urgency.

mm. Question and Answer 37

(1) Question: What other things are influencing the crowd at this point besides the limited open gates, the Taliban, and the impending timeline?

(2) Answer: The other countries, except for the Brits, had left and ceased pulling their people. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

The timeline for the Brits to leave kept changing as well.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: Did you feel an obligation to support the Brits?

(2) Answer: Yes. I believe the night of 25 August is when the Brits at the Baron Hotel began marching out. Some were in vehicles. The crowds watched the Brits leave and this emphasized that everyone that could help them would be leaving soon.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Did you see any people in the crowd that you suspected to be part of the Taliban?

(2) Answer: I received reports from people, mostly from former interpreters coming through the canal, that the Taliban were moving in on the far side of the canal.

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The Taliban were beginning to integrate with the crowd. I didn't see them with weapons, but some carried sticks with them. There were a few people that looked out of place, like military-aged men, that could easily move through the crowd. People would move out of their way. This was suspicious to me and we assumed they were part of the Taliban.

The Taliban on the chevron had M16s and AKs.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: What happens after E Co changed out with G Co on 25 August? What influenced the decision to pull the guys back toward the sniper tower?

(2) Answer: It was difficult because a new commander was there with every change-out and they all did things differently. When the Brits left, we had lost control of a portion of the inner gate.

There was a changeover at this time and I was escorting a family and was not at Abbey Gate. When I came back, we had been pushed back and we had lost control of that area.

We had a few casualties near the canal. A child was trampled and broke his back. We had a hard time evacuating him; this influenced the decision to consolidate near the sniper tower due to casualty concerns. There was also a potential for marines to be isolated far away from the group. This was a large risk and was another reason that led to the marines getting moved closer to the sniper tower. The decision to move them happened during the changeover.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: Were people grabbing at the marines over the wall?

(2) Answer: Yes, some. I spent a lot of time on the far side of the wall. I would exit out through the break in the fence where we had two marines guarding the hole. I went through the crowd a few times. No one messed with me, but there were a few times where they would grab at me to get my attention. This was before we retrograded toward the sniper tower.

** [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shows photos of 24 August on 0800-0900 to give SA of the canal that he used to show his guys**

rr. Question and Answer 42.

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(1) Question: What population was usually standing in the canal?

(2) Answer: It would usually be the fathers, the males, trying to get their families through. The families wouldn't have to wait in the canal when they did this.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: What did things look like on the morning of 26 August?

(2) Answer: On the morning of 26 August, we received a countdown for when a suicide vest going would be going off. We were informed that it was supposed to go off in 10 minutes. We received this notification from (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) had them bunker down and alerted the sniper tower. I positioned myself and the marines in the search pit and behind the T-walls. The search pit located right inside of the outer gate.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: Did the blast occur?

(2) Answer: No, nothing happened. There was another instance, the day that I was up on the gate, that there was a gold Toyota that was a VBIED. At 0300 on 26 August there was supposed to be another blast but nothing happened. For this alert, we were on the lookout for a clean-shaven man around 25 years old that was carrying a gray backpack or computer case. We didn't receive a description on his dress. Nothing happened. My boots were untied and I joked that if I tied my boots that something would happen. Snipers were aware of the description that we were to be on the lookout for.

On 26 August around 1200 we received the countdown of the IED that eventually did go off.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: Was anyone talking about closing the gate at this time?

(2) Answer: We had been talking about closing the gate but I don't remember the time and date that we started talking about it.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: What external gates are open on 26 August?

(2) Answer: Only the Black Gate was open, I think. This is when I got word to locate the ANA General and went searching for him. Again, I went to check on the orphans, then I went to the North Gate, then left and went to Black Gate. I left Black

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Gate and was just passing through the staging area when the blast went off at Abbey Gate. I was about 200m away from Abbey Gate at the time.

I don't think I heard the blast, but I saw a vehicle speed by. I felt like something bad had just happened. We jumped in the truck and headed toward Abbey Gate. We stopped at the inner gate and loaded our first wave of casualties here.

We loaded up a SSgt that was on a stretcher and one of the marines that was hit in the shoulder.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: What kind of injuries were you seeing?

(2) Answer: It looked like the marines left shoulder had a ball bearing go through it. The SSgt on the stretcher had a tube in his throat.

We heard gun shots as we were rolling up and I remember thinking that I needed to put my helmet on. I thought the pop shots we were hearing were from the 82nd. I didn't feel like I was under fire, but I still put my helmet on. I didn't feel like being in an ambush.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question: Can you describe the location of the other sniper tower?

(2) Answer: It was approximately 50m from our sniper tower to theirs. We were told it was the 82nd manning the tower. They were offset, closer toward the search pit. We were not sure of who was in this sniper tower, but we knew they were army. They had previously fired shots toward the direction of the chevron on a period of three separate times before 26 August. We were confused at what they were shooting at and asked them. We never got a reply from them. We didn't even know they were up there until the first time that they fired shots.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: Point of Clarification: Did you look at the sniper tower after actions were complete?

(2) Answer: I did not. I went back down to Abbey Gate and saw the bodies floating in the canal, I looked to make sure my guys weren't around there. I didn't even think to look at the sniper tower.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

(1) Question: Is there a chance that any disoriented marines may have been shooting after the blast?

(2) Answer: It is possible but I did not have eyes on the location. I was in the bed of a hot-wired truck providing medical care at this point.

During a hot wash in HKIA on 27 August, it was discovered that one of the marines that was KIA had his CS go off from the blast. This also could have led to the disorientation.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question: What were the Taliban doing after the blast on 26 August?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be able to give you more information on this because he had eyes on the Taliban immediately after the blast.

bbb. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question: After the first two casualties you received, what happened?

(2) Answer: I loaded the SSgt, the Marine with the shoulder injury, and one of the doctors into the truck. We drove as fast as we could to the medical center. I was monitoring the pulse of the SSgt and felt it weaken. I gave him breathers and his pulse started weakening again. I had the doctor check his pulse again and we ended up performing CPR on him. I think he died twice on the way to the hospital. We dropped them off at the hospital then left to go pick up more.

At this point, the marine casualties had been moved. We drove back to the inner gate and loaded three Afghan casualties into the truck. All three of them had head wounds; one also had a shoulder wound. We were in the 'blue ambulance'. I applied aid to them while on the way to the Role 2. We dropped them off, and then I remember stopping and staring at the scene. I saw (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) on a stretcher at this time and went to talk to him. I grabbed his hand and told him that he would make it. I then left and went back to the gate again.

My guys were now located on the center T-wall. We had E Co and F Co at this location. The Weapons Co was guarding the outer wall.

We met with the other Co Commanders and decided to move the marines away from the outer wall.

Me, the other Co commander, and the 2/1 Commander made a plan to move the marines back further. We had them moving back in teams.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

ccc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question: What was the security posture outside of outer gate after the blast?

(2) Answer: I don't recall. I was distracted by the body parts laying everywhere.

ddd. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question: At this point was there any movement toward closing the outer gate.

(2) Answer: I think we were told that the Brits would be taking over.

eee. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question: Did you ever physically see the outer gate close?

(2) Answer: I think E Co tried to close it but I really don't remember. I believe it was closed. We needed two vehicles there to secure it since the gate was so flimsy. I don't remember the vehicles being there. I pushed a four-man fire team inside the outer gate, near the search pit, to allow E Co to move their guys back. Then the rest of F Co started peeling back.

The biggest threat I felt at this time was a bomb or something getting thrown over the gate.

fff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question: Was there a lot of activity in this area after the blast?

(2) Answer: No. The crowd was dispersed. I think a few people were out looking for their families but otherwise there were just dead people. It was very quiet.

ggg. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question: How long did it take to clear the casualties?

(2) Answer: It was very quick; probably about 20 minutes. After the second trip of casualties I went back out to Abbey Gate. The [redacted] (b)(6) had a vehicle and I remember it driving slowly away from the gate. I think [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) was with him. They would be able to tell you if the gate was closed.

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hhh. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question: What was the security posture of marines at this time?

(2) Answer: We were all in a security posture, kneeling along barriers from the outer gate to the inner gate. No shots were heard at this point.

iii. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question: How much time was there between the blast and the first sounds of gunfire?

(2) Answer: I really don't remember. It didn't sound like an AK, though.

jjj. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question: There was a sweep for serialized gear after the blast. Where you part of?

(2) Answer: No.

kkk. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question: Were you a part of the post-blast analysis completed by EOD?

(2) Answer: No. We had pulled all of our guys out at this point and were at the staging area. F Co, E Co, and G Co were all at the sleeping areas. Weapons Co stayed on the gate.

lll. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question: Is there anything that you think we should know that we haven't asked about?

(2) Answer: I think the alertness and welfare of the troops on the deck are important to ask about. We had just gotten swapped out before the blast and had only been on duty for around eight hours, so we were pretty fresh. The guys weren't fatigued.

mmm. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question: Did you personally lay eyes on AMCITs while at HKIA? How could you tell who they were?

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(2) Answer: Yes. A majority of the time we would verify AMCITs by their passports. Everything boiled down to having the proper paperwork.

nnn. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question: When were personnel identified as AMCITs?

(2) Answer: They were identified at the initial checkpoint, where my guys were located behind the chevron. We would also identify them along the canal. They would show us their passports there and we would pull them out. Everyone in the canal would be trying to hold up their paperwork. The passports, green cards, and yellow embassy badges are what would stand out to us. The instruction on what was being accepted at the time kept changing, making it difficult to pull people.

ooo. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question: How many Department of State (DoS) agents were typically present to vet paperwork?

(2) Answer: We had two DoS agents come down to the search pit on the night of 24 or 25 August. The agents said that everything was moving too slow. They only stayed for about an hour and then left. The only time I saw them was the morning of 24 August, some parts of 25 August, and I don't know if they were there on 26 August. I remember a male and a female agent. The agents also had two DoS security personnel per agent.

ppp. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think is important to know?

(2) Answer: I can't think of anything.

qqq. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question: Do you remember anyone from 2/1 taking photos while at HKIA?

(2) Answer: No, many marines didn't have their phones. I think the leaders are the ones that mostly had them. I remember seeing one British film crew by the chevron. It was weird because the Taliban let the crew come up on top of the chevron. They wouldn't let me go up there but they let the Brit crew up there. They also allowed the British Special Forces Interpreter on top of the chevron.

rrr. Question and Answer 68.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)] Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 6 October 2021

(1) Question: Were you getting requests from people to help them get people in the crowd out?

(2) Answer: Yes. Some were from people that I didn't know. Some people would have a sign with my name on it and that helped me easily identify them, check their documents, and then pull them to put in our line.

sss. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question: What is your contact number?

(2) Answer: [redacted (b)(6)]

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)] assistant investigating officer, at 318.430.2167 and [redacted (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)]

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer



ACTS-SCK-DO

7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with G Co [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines SPMAGTF, GCE, 7 October 2021

1. On 07 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis, US Army, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the two Marines often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. For the purpose of the interview recording, the following Army General Officer and Marines are identified in their responses:

BG Curtis - BG

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the discussion and interview. The purpose of the interview is not to seek out wrongdoing, but to find facts and provide context to reports and information from the available sources of information. The Marines several times throughout the interview referenced personal pictures and information which they provided to the interview team. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took notes and the below dialogue is the captured comments and information as it took place in the interview:

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(6) Introduce yourself, your background, and when you arrived to the unit.

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) My name is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am assigned as the Company [redacted] (b)(6) of Golf Company 2/1 Marines, I am an Infantryman and I arrived at the unit in October of 2018.

[redacted] (b)(6) My name is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am assigned as the Company [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) and I am an Infantryman. I arrived at the unit in October 2020.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2/1 Marines SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Talk about your pre-deployment training and the timeline leading up to the deployment of the SPMAGTF.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We got to G Co after ITX. Covid hit pretty hard and we had to do a bunch of force on force training. Battalion focus was on combat operations and the Combat Operations Center (CoC). Weapons and Echo Company was force on force against Golf in a couple training events. We got to G Company in November. Chances were likely we'd go. Our Commanding Officer (CO) focus was small arms proficiency.

(b)(6) Yeah I think Battalion was running the heavy machine gun ranges though.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. BG – Jump to deployment, you knew you were headed to (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Yes, Sir, the SDOB was released in January and by early to mid-February we knew what we were doing. March 14th we left on Advanced Party (ADVON) for (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6) We had a little bit of a scramble to get out the door. Moving gear and packing and whatnot.

(b)(6) Plus because of the timing we had a larger than normal ADVON. Ramadan was happening so we focused primarily of weapons proficiency.

(b)(6) We ended up working with the (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6) pushed hard to train with the Brits. A Company 2nd Para was the unit we ended up working with. And we did an exercise 29 June through 3 July where we did force on force with the Brits.

(b)(6) It was great to comingle with the Brits. Working with them was great and we got to do weapons familiarization with them, fire and maneuver, and really worked in close with them to develop relationships.

(b)(6) We wanted the Marines to develop relationships. We did suppress, maneuver, and Forward Passage of lines.

e. Question and Answer 4.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2/1 Marines SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(1) Question. BG - When did you know about HKIA?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) August 14th or 15th. I remember reading a New York Times article that said 2 Marine Battalions. I had a close relationship with (b)(6) because I had worked there before, so I leveraged that and asked them what they knew. They confirmed.

(b)(6) Battalion referenced the Crisis Response company, but we had a lot of questions about where and when who would be going.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. BG – Talk about going in. Arrival.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We ended up getting spun up and we inserted on the 19th. I remember running off the aircraft and seeing the airfield and just having the mass of bodies completely uncontrolled on the airfield, the aprons, the taxiways, the buildings. It was nuts, but they were calm. And there were about a hundred refugees getting processed but everything seemed under control. They weren't violent or anything and weren't panicked.

(b)(6) – Definitely calm compared to later on. There were a ton of civilians, but not the mass of bodies we had at the gates later. Just uncontrolled.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. BG – How did you end up at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We went on a recon after some of the initial cleaning up of the civilian access side. We tried to find vehicles and any form of transportation to use to shuttle our guys back and forth and get around more quickly. We had heard we were headed to Abbey Gate. We knew the Brits were there and we had heard that they were fully in control of the area. (b)(6) went down to the gate in some vehicle we had at the time. I never saw that truck again. But we met with the Brits between 0700-0800.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. BG – What did you see at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I have a picture from the 19th when we arrived. I need to try to find that picture (NOT PROVIDED FOLLOWING INTERVIEW). Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) Red was established at the inner gate processing civilians when we got

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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there. We noticed it was hard to control but we also noticed the length of the corridor and the space and the logistics staging area, so it wasn't all bad.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) There were two land cruisers holding the outer gate closed. They had set up a rig of tow straps to the gate so that the masses of people couldn't push through. There were about 50-100 civilians inside the gate who had already proven they had documents, but nobody was there to move them out yet.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) So the Brits were firing warning shots when things would get too crazy and they were working from inside the gate to keep the civilians out and keep them back. There were probably a few thousand Afghan Civs outside the gate, but they weren't panicking yet and they weren't on top of each other. It was basically calm compared to everything that would come later. There were about 12 Brits holding back throngs of people. The canal was a natural barrier and they weren't really pushing through that. So with [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, we planned to take inner gate and [REDACTED] (b)(6) was working on getting a common operating picture for how we would manage it in the long term.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We saw a bunch of guys who were hard to identify their affiliation. They were US Personnel for sure but uniforms weren't standard and they didn't have patches or anything. Slick gear.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) So the next step was to gain standoff. We initially planned to do it with minimum manning. But [REDACTED] (b)(6) told us to get the company and we definitely needed it.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We got a flatbed truck from somewhere. We got the Blue truck at some point. That was big blue and we used the hell outta that truck. We started getting roles laid out and Platoon Sergeants (PSG's) knew what was happening. We were shuttling 13-15 Marines down to the gate area at a time to prep to push out of the inner gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(6) So you're now staged. What's next? How did you end up gaining standoff?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) Until I came back I hadn't seen any change. Three hours later it had moved back. But I wasn't working at the gate full time. I was shuttling the Marines back and forth.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) They moved back slowly, and calmly. There were former interpreters in the crowd, so they would turn around and help us work with the crowd to move people back. It was slow going, but it was calm. We got them pushed back to start, but we recognized the need to get all the way back to the Barron. We kind of identified task and purpose was to hold the line and search and process those with obvious documentation like blue American passports. But the big issue was that we had to prep for the night. It was

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getting late and we were really starting to make progress. We ended up pushing through the night. There was some discussion about timing, and then The Ops O gave us the order that we needed to go re-establish the line at the Barron around 1900, we later heard that the order had been passed down to our Battalion from the British. The CO, terps, Brits, and us all start moving the AFGCIVs back slowly and deliberately. It wasn't a fight, but some of us decided to drop our rifles because our First Platoon had gotten caught in a crowd earlier in the day and their slings started choking them out and becoming a liability because they were grabbing at gear sometimes.

(b)(6) To clarify, what was the task organization at this point? Who was with you?

(b)(6) F Company, G Company, and the Brits and then CAAT Red on the gate behind us.

(b)(6) — We spoke to the Marines and we were very clear with them about treating people with respect. We were adamant about all that because that was the only way to keep things calm and these people were scared.

(b)(6) I cannot understate the importance of how much it helped to have the crowd be calm and cooperative. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was working through an interpreter and some of the civilians helped as we slowly moved forward.

(b)(6) It took all night. We got to the Barron hotel gate sometime early in the morning. The Battalion was saying the heavy equipment guys had to get in behind us to place the chevron in. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the middle. The crowd was cooperating and calm. The flood lights were on but it's pitch black dark outside that. We used vehicles behind the lines of Marines to keep things moving.

(b)(6) is gone for a while once we finally get to the Barron Hotel, meeting with headquarters elements from the Marines and British. The Brits were mostly behind us as they peeled off as we pushed forward to hold the flank on the canal. The Taliban were there on their own checkpoint down by the Barron. Seeing the Taliban was interesting. There was a guy in a black turban who was obviously in charge. It's midnight or later now and we start hearing the heavy machinery coming in behind us to place the containers to create the chevron. (b)(6) was meeting with the Taliban to talk about how to help control the crowd.

(b)(6) — Standing this close to the Taliban we were concerned about the people in the other side and whether or not they could get through.

(b)(6) So later on MG Donahue from 82nd came out. The Taliban were kind of helping move cars and trash so we could get the area a bit organized. We were making room through the crowd but it was hard. (b)(6) was pushing really hard for a 0500 timeline to get the equipment and containers in place. But to be clear we didn't really have a

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good picture of what was happening in the larger sense. It was late and it had been slow going to get all the way out there. We were beat. We basically hadn't slept in 3 days.

(b)(6) — There was a bunker inside the inner gate. The Department of State (DoS) guys were back in the bunker processing people out of the inner gate area by about 0900 I think.

(b)(6) Yeah, but before that at about 0500 the chevron ended up getting put in place so now there's people all over the fence line but not in the canal yet.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. BG - So that was kind of the last big event before hitting steady state operations of processing for a few days right? (Marines agree) Okay, so let's focus forward onto the 25th. Talk me through the operations and context of the 25th.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We were told to go relieve Echo Company on the 25th. We had come off the gate for some rest and recovery so that helped, but we rotated back down to the gate on the morning of the 25th sometime around 1000-1100. It wasn't crazy, but it was way more crowded. When we left the gate for a few days a lot had changed. The Taliban controlled the chevron and nobody was coming from that way at all. The flow of people was coming through and over the canal side up by the bridge. We could really see people building up now and they were spilling into the canal. People were absolutely packed into every available space. Inside the canal wasn't too bad yet but the sides of the canal up by the gate and along the green fence were absolutely swarmed. So by 1400-1500 we were in place and we RIPPed out with Echo.

(b)(6) — There was a lot of frustration and confusion about transportation and movement of personnel and for the AFGCIVs it was a big problem. Rejecting them back out was a whole different problem because we kept getting tasked with that too when they would get screened out.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. BG – What about the Brits? Did you stay linked in with them? What did your planning or discussion look like with them.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) We were absolutely tied in with the Brits. They were aware of our actions and we planned on staying tied in with them. We were setting conditions for their withdrawal and they knew we were planning on the 29th or 30th for the gate shut down initially, but that had changed to the 27th I think. We were planning off of the 27th at midnight by the time we got back to the gate. Another interesting change we saw at the gate was a big increase in military aged males (MaMs).

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(b)(6) – That was kind of a big thing too because at 1500-1600 we were seeing a shift in their attitude. They were getting agitated more easily, but it wouldn't be for a sustained amount of time.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. BG – this seems to indicate a big change in atmospherics. Would that be safe to say by the afternoon on the 25th?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) Absolutely. We were told by the Battalion Operations Officer that reporting was saying an IED threat was imminent. When I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when we got back down there, he had confirmed the same reporting with the Brits and he made the call to bring everyone back as we were strung out deep on the inner canal. So the (b)(6) heard what was being briefed and also trying hard to pull us back because we were way more exposed to the crowd being pushed so far forward. And even once we got pulled back to the jersey barrier they were still pushing against it hard. People were getting hurt. The AFGCIVs could tell things were changing and they knew the timeline too. That stayed pretty aggressive through the early night but it calmed down at night. We heard Suicide vest IED quite a few times through our intel reporting that day and night and into the next day. We would lower our profile and pull back a bit, but then it wouldn't happen and we would go right back to maintaining the line. But we stopped processing people through when the DoS guys left and didn't start again until about 0800 the next day (the 26th). (b)(6) did some pretty specific planning for CASEVAC.

(b)(6) - And the shock platoon came up later that morning too.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. BG – So we're up to about 1500 on the 26th. Talk me through your actions.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) So we've really started to hit a stride on processing on the 26th by that late in the afternoon. But the barriers were absolutely bonkers by that time. The people were just desperate and there was all kinds of stuff we hadn't seen before going on like kids getting thrown and pushing at the barriers. Echo Company was coming up to assist us at Abbey Gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the plan was for us to take everything forward of Outer Gate and they would take the corridor from Outer to Inner. CAAT and Weapons Company would continue processing through the Inner Gate.

(b)(6) – I was working on getting 3rd platoon over to the gate, but it was 1st Platoon forward of the outer gate at the barriers, 4th platoon at the wall, and 3rd platoon at the gym. And the company command post was operating behind the sniper tower. I was at

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the hospital with (NAME OF MARINE) who blew part of his hand off accidentally with a bad flash bang.

o. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(6) So it's 26th at 1700.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) The 26th at 1630 I met with the CO. They were going to meet with the Taliban. We decided that at 2100, the set up would be 1 platoon on the wall, 1 platoon at the quadcon behind the tower, and 1 platoon on Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The PSYOP truck showed up at about 1700 to help us with the crowd by using the loud speaker to play messages. We knew by that time that Abbey was the target of all these IED threats, but we were still processing people and we didn't set the rules for when to start and stop that. So the understanding was that any time we would be told about an imminent threat, we would stop, lower profile, and check for signs. But after that happened we would then kind of just go back to processing. We heard Suicide vest, we heard Vehicle IED, we heard a bunch of stuff. I came back at 1700 and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back from meeting with the Battalion Commander. PSYOP guys are blasting their messages and telling the crowd that we would only be processing civilians who had blue passports and green cards. I wasn't seeing a major change in behavior from that, but it was already pretty crazy. We did notice some specific sketchy dudes and we couldn't really specifically pick out and credible sketchy behavior. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I met and we decided to continue processing until 1800 before we would stop. At that point we would keep a platoon on the canal and get ready for the British withdrawal that night. I was walking back to the barriers inside inner gate away from the sniper tower and (b)(6) was behind me and that's when the SVIED went off.

p. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. BG – Blast happens. Talk me through what you remember and what you did.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I heard gunfire. I oriented towards the Taliban on the chevron but I couldn't see any of them shooting and they didn't have their weapons raised. There was a short delay, then firing. It sounded like it was down past the chevron. At the hole in the gate I saw the (b)(6) took his radio because at the time I didn't have comms with the ambulance.

(b)(6) I was moved to behind the PSYOP vehicle then working to get the Marines riot shields. People were trying to get a handle on the number of casualties. (b)(6) tells me to go to the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). We re-established the CCP a little closer than original because we needed to get closer to the Outer Gate because of the high number of casualties being carried out. We were pretty shocked at the number of guys who just kept coming.

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(b)(6) – The shot pattern in the canal was unreal. The number of bodies was insane. Timeline for getting up to the canal and getting our guys moving back was super fast. No more than 10 minutes off the X. We had several vehicles and we were using the baggage carts. We thought the casualties were between 20-30 Marines. The CS canisters that got popped during the blast made a lot of things more difficult too. Also

(b)(6) got his radio hit in the blast and that got lit on fire too.

(b)(6) – The security posture changed quickly too. We closed the gate. The Brits weren't close enough to the blast to see any casualties from their side. They were close but not on the X and not wounded. There were a few AFGCIVs who tried to run through the gate but we'd established a pretty solid security perimeter while the evacuation was happening so they didn't get anywhere. No Marines were on security outside the gate within 7 minutes. It was later I heard that the 82nd had taken over, but it was Echo Company who took security at the Outer Gate after we pulled back. I believe they conducted a RIP with the 82nd. We had several wounded from our company, plus the Ops Officer and SSG Hoover. We were concerned about the gunfire we were hearing but that was quick and then over and we had control very quickly again.

q. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. BG – Any reports of people taking video or photos?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I did not see any of that. (b)(6) – same, sir.

r. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. BG – Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I saw him near the Operations Officer when he was being evacuated. I saw him asking where the Ops O was and then pointing to him put on a stretcher. Nobody realized really until that moment that the Ops Officer was hit. He just kept on saying "take care of the guys". He had a tourniquet and ended up getting morphine from the docs.

(b)(6) – I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He asked if I knew how many guys were down and at the time I think I told him 8.

(b)(6) We ran back, I saw the area past the Turks, and we kept coordinating busses to get guys out of there. I was worried about getting our guys cleared back out of there.

s. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. BG – Who relieved you on the gate?

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(2) Answer. [redacted] Echo Company took the Outer gate security. I heard after the fact that they had conducted a RIP with the 82nd [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also later told me the 82nd Company Commander was on the deck and he quickly said they would get security to the gate. We were supposed to RIP out at about midnight with them anyway some of their leadership must've been on sight doing prep and turnover and planning. I had a conversation with the 82nd Company Commander who was supposed to replace us. They were at the Outer Gate quickly. I know the RIP was complete within an hour, maybe even less.

[redacted] (b)(6) It would have been 1830-1900 in the process of us leaving Abbey Gate. Which is super quick considering all that happened. We went back to the gym to coordinate and get accountability, and that was pretty much it.

t. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. BG – Is there anything else you want to make sure is included or make sure you highlight here before we close out the discussion?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6) Department of State being in and out of processing and the inconsistency of processing times and capability was the biggest problem we faced in keeping a consistent operation.

[redacted] (b)(6) I recommend talking to as many of the younger Marines as you can. They have so much experience at the Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant and below level for all the tiny details.

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)