

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. C1: What were the shifts? Were there any changes when (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrives?

(2) Answer. The night shift was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Day shift was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Knauss, and myself. We got more equipment, but we were mostly trying to flex to support the Marines. North and East Gate were under control in the first couple days, ran well. Abbey was run well by the (b)(1)1.4a at the time.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: Why were East and North gates closed?

(2) Answer. I don't know.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: I believe North Gate was the VBIED threat and East Gate was difficult to process and secure.

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Once those gates were closed they were locked tight. East Gate didn't have anywhere to hold people once they were filtered through. I believe they closed on the 23rd. We kept messaging the crowds because they didn't disperse.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: Were you messaging that the gates were closed?

(2) Answer. We didn't talk about it because we were getting conflicting guidance. So we kept the messaging the same about what kind of people would have entry, stop pushing on the gates, etc.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: So you never stop messaging at the other gates?

(2) Answer. No. The comfort zone always took messaging too. It started getting better the 23rd, but people are overheating and suffering from exposure there so we had to message that crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Were you working with state? Were they messaging the crowd?

(2) Answer. No, only the (b)(1)1.4a team messaged the crowd.

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tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: Okay. Any changes to your dayshift/nightshift breakdown or was that steady state?

(2) Answer. That was steady state.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: Talk to me about training conducted before you arrived in terms of pre-deployment training?

(2) Answer. We did JRTC with 1st Special Forces Group. Gained some familiarity with integrating into ODA. We did team internal training on loudspeaker placements and how to talk to people to get them to work with you on the team level. The NEO was the first time we did kind of just a messaging sphere since the battalion's last FEMA mission. It was not necessarily what we trained for. We did not have NEO specific training. We were not prepped from a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a perspective for NEO operation. We didn't do a validation exercise for a NEO, it was a figure it out as you go thing.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Talk to me about rules of engagement tied to this operation?

(2) Answer. The most was to not engage just anybody. The Taliban and ANDSF (Afghan National Defense and Security Force) were outside with weapons. So for RoE, I wasn't going to shoot anybody. There was a low tolerance for putting your weapon on fire and just engaging somebody.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1: Could you engage with hostile act and intent?

(2) Answer. I wasn't sure. If somebody had done something, I'm certain action would have been taken. But I wasn't clear on what that was.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Could you defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes I could.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. Did you talk about RoE internally?

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(2) Answer. We did. A big part of (b)(1)1.4a is de-escalation so we talked about how to do that. If push came to shove though, it would be my life vs someone else's life.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: I see a lot of restraint and de-escalation during this whole operation, is that accurate? Why?

(2) Answer. Yes. This was a high visibility operation. It was all over the news media. The temperature in the room, and the acceptability of a civilian casualty when we were trying to save Afghans would be contradictory.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: Did you talk about escalation?

(2) Answer. Yes, there were just so many people on the ground. We knew if there was an incident, there would be confusion so we talked about how to calm the crowd.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: If US forces had escalated what do you think would have happened?

(2) Answer. There would have been desperation and panic. The crowds would have been more violent to get on HKIA.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1: Could you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. That first night I pulled security next to a Taliban. It was surreal.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Why do you think that happened?

(2) Answer. I know there was an agreement between us and the Taliban to help us leave by 01 September. They didn't want anything to interrupt that timeline.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think they would have acted differently if we didn't have that agreement?

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(2) Answer. I don't know. My understanding is that the Taliban always would have wanted us to leave.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1: Did you feel threatened being that close to the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I was nervous. It was a high stress situation, but I didn't think they would have done anything if I had turned my back. They were probably the same age as me, maybe younger. I don't think they were trying to agitate anything.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1: You felt it was clear that the Taliban didn't want to detract from the time? Did you see Taliban in the crowd? Did you see them interact with the crowd?

(2) Answer. Correct. And yes, there were a few Taliban members with a headband or bandoliers in the crowd around Abbey Gate on the 25th or 26th. We could see them interacting with crowd.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1: Did you see the Taliban around the Chevron exhibit hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Not towards us. Towards the crowds outside Abbey Gate, they were aggressive. They had whips and guns. We never saw them shoot anybody. The only person I saw get shot was around the 18th. A member of the ANDSF shot a hostile individual in the crowd.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: Did the Taliban beat people?

(2) Answer. I would say so. I never saw it first-hand. The Marines never got too close to the chevron to see what the Taliban were exactly doing.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1: Did you hear anything about threat streams?

(2) Answer. Only when we would go back to the JOC. We heard the VBIED threat at North Gate, which was the biggest, consistent one. I don't remember exactly what they said to look for, but it was the classic description.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

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(1) Question. C1: What actions did you see tied to specific threats? Did they reduce posture?

(2) Answer. There was no closing of the gate for a short period of time. There was reduction to a small scale, but they needed bodies to process evacuees.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever see brief cessations of operations?

(2) Answer. No, I didn't see that personally, but I wasn't at the gates all the time.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. C1: Any 'be on the lookouts for' suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Not that I received. I knew there was credible reporting for SVESTs, but that was almost daily reporting.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1: It was common to have multiple specific threats every day?

(2) Answer. Definitely. We would hear some sort of credible threat every day, but we weren't focused on looking for those.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1: My understanding is threat streams for BOLOs were nonspecific? Did you speak with the Snipers about that at all?

(2) Answer. No I don't recall that; I never went up to the tower. I don't remember speaking with the snipers at all, maybe the night shift guys. But I don't think we did.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1: Did anyone ever pass you info about thinking they saw someone specific? Any of the Marines pass that info? Did they speak to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. No. Not to me. I don't know if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ever got any of that info.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. C1: Was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) close to you at any point?

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(2) Answer. I don't remember specifically; I think he was speaking with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time that it happened.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me about (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. He was in charge of the IO cell. He was basically our direct supervisor at the time. He'd come out with us to supervise or help us, so he was out on the 26th at Abbey Gate.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1: If there were specific messages they needed you to message how would that happen?

(2) Answer. It would generally come through (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was the touchpoint between the command and us.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: You're in a unique situation, a rank heavy situation with all NCOs and no lower enlisted. Who is your immediate report at the time?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he is the team lead and the senior. He was on dayshift.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. C1: Who was in charge at night?

(3) Answer. I believe it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who would pass it to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but we had open communication with him. If I wanted to talk to him directly I could.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. C1: Did you sync between teams?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. We had open communications. We all work together in SOF, so we were all trying to find the point of the most conflict and identify where we were most needed within the team.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1: The blast happens at 1736 and 52 seconds. We know that from Overhead Persistent Infrared Radar. Do you know about that?

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(2) Answer. I know from when we were back in (b)(1)1.4a I saw the feeds. So I knew there were assets in the air.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1: These platforms detect the blast specifically. Before we get into that, I believe the situation at Abbey shifted drastically with more people showing up. Accurate?

(2) Answer. I agree. North and East Gate were closed and people realized that. BY the morning of the 26th HKIA was ghost town, which is crazy compared to the tens of thousands of people from days prior. The inside looked like everything was shutting down.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Because they were actually evacuating people?

(2) Answer. Yea, the comfort zone definitely was draining out at this point. So I had heard that pretty much only passport holders were getting in through Abbey Gate at this time.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1: When did you leave Abbey on the 25th?

(2) Answer. In the early evening. I believe the Marines fully had Abbey buttoned at this time. The marines controlled Abbey Gate out to the footbridge, and that night they collapsed down to the sniper tower. There was a jersey barrier out there.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. C1: So the marines changed force protection when they took over?

(2) Answer. Yes, it became more condensed.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. C1: It seems like the crowd grows because they realize that Abbey is the only option.

(2) Answer. I would agree with that.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. On the 25th, Echo Company was extended further down the canal. When Golf Company took over, they collapsed towards the sniper tower and the jersey barriers because the threat was increasing? This is beginning when you leave on the 25th?

(2) Answer. Yes, that is accurate. On the 25th we did our rounds then finished at Abbey Gate since that is where everything was happening. There were not tons of people being pulled from the crowd at this point.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. Threat mitigation is increasing as the crowd size increased. Is your message changing?

(2) Answer. No, it is staying consistent. When the Marines collapsed back, the crowds on the near side were pressed up against the jersey barrier.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. C1: Messaging at this time is you are messaging the crowd about the jersey barriers and people being crushed?

(2) Answer. That is accurate. Initially our vehicle was further in and wasn't able to effectively message the crowd which is why we moved it up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the car, I was behind the vehicle, and Ryan was walking to get another interpreter when the blast goes off.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. What happens at time of blast?

(2) Answer. I felt a surge of pain, then a burst of adrenaline. I got to my feet and went around the truck to get cover (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came out of the vehicle and to the rear with me immediately after the blast.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. Did you see the blast? Feel the concussion?

(2) Answer. It definitely got hazy. I remember seeing the dirt and my blood mixed together.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. C1: CS Gas?

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(2) Answer. I don't remember any CS gas being thrown or feeling any CS Gas.

iii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. C1: Were you knocked down by the blast?

(2) Answer. I get knocked to a knee before standing up to stumble to the back of the vehicle.

jjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. C1: Did you know what had happened?

(2) Answer. I was pretty well aware there had been a blast. You could smell it, all the charring. Looking to the blast location you could see the damage.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question. C1: What do you see? I am sorry to ask you this.

(2) Answer. The biggest thing was the bodies and the body parts. A lot of people were injured, Service Members and Afghans. Then a lot of mass pandemonium, people departing from HKIA. But there was a lot of blood, a lot of mangled people.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. C1: Who can you see that you know?

(2) Answer. Really just [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I went to the rear of the vehicle and pointed my gun to the canal. I thought it was going to be a complex attack. I couldn't see any bodies up close, until I looked to where the canal was.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. C1: So then what did you do?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I waited 30 seconds to listen for any gunshots. Then we moved inside the outer gate to look for cover. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have a lot of adrenaline at the time?

(2) Answer. Funny story. When [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked how I was, [REDACTED] (b)(6) He asked what was wrong [REDACTED] (b)(6) That wasn't good.

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oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question. C1: Could you see any key leaders?

(2) Answer. I saw a group of Marines in the inner corridor at the CCP make the decision to go out and recover injured Marines.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. C1: Then what?

(2) Answer. We start looking for Ryan. We didn't know exactly where he was. [REDACTED] and I split up to look for him. [REDACTED] went outside with a group of Marines to look for him. I hobbled the length of the inner corridor, down and back, and didn't find him. So then I linked up with a group of Marines by some barricades at which point a Marine [REDACTED] I was waiting on [REDACTED] to come back inside, then I saw them loaded onto CASEVACs. I then hopped in with [REDACTED] and moved to the CCP by the inner gate.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. C1: Do you hear any gunfire?

(2) Answer. Not that I remember. If there was any, I think it emanated from US Forces. I didn't see anybody shooting.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. C1: I know from the investigation that warning shots were fired from three locations, which contributed to a belief of a complex attack post blast. That's why I asked you. Did you feel concussed at the time?

(2) Answer. Not at the time with the adrenaline. Once we got into the vehicle and got checked at the Role II, I remember me and [REDACTED] having the same conversation like every five minutes.

10 Minute Break

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you help anyone other than [REDACTED] with Medical Care?

(3) Answer. We did some brief checks with Marines nearby, but they were uninjured. It wasn't until I was in that CASEVAC that I did more checks of the wounded.

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tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question. C1: To the best of your knowledge did your team get photos or photo cards or descriptions from any of the Marines at the gate?

(2) Answer. No, nothing other than the general stuff about be on the lookouts (BOLOs) at the gates.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any of the threats from the 25th or the 26th?

(2) Answer. Just the general traditional afghan garb, but that is everyone at the gates.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question. C1: Was there any threat reporting about the blast being imminent?

(2) Answer. Not that was passed to me. That immediate time preceding the blast, we were just talking to the crowd to get them to stop pushing people.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question. Do you remember the interpreter at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. Not really. I remember the individual about 10 minutes before the blast had been screened, and then his wife and children were just screened by the Female Engagement Team (FET). He left with his family. Ryan was searching for an interpreter at the time of the blast, so at the time we didn't have an interpreter [REDACTED] was in the driver seat talking to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I'm sure [REDACTED] will be able to clarify.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Talk us through the environment. You had Marines on the ground, you had the [REDACTED] team, the snipers in the tower, leaders at all levels doing battle field checks. Did you feel integrated? Was the communication?

(2) Answer. Our TTP was to tie in with the OIC/NCOIC at the gate. From there, [REDACTED] we would talk to them and find out the issues. We would get the back brief. At Abbey Gate at the time the commander told us their issue was people being crushed on the jersey barriers and people were trying to come from the canal. That's when we moved and started trying to calm the crowd.

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yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So everyone is on a different rotation schedule. Was there ever a period of time when whoever was in charge synced with all subordinate element leaders? Was intelligence discussed?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would normally have those conversations. He was tied in with OIC, but we went tied to a specific position so we had to be flexible. I don't know anything too specific. I think just general threat reporting based on credible sources. I would say that everyone was guarded, but the threat stream was very regular.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Talk me through the role of players on your teams. We know [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was tied into the leadership, quarterbacking the team. What was the role between the day and night shift?

(2) Answer. It was about flexibility. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would talk with leadership, then Ryan and I would flip flop and talk to the crowd or fix the speaker. At Abbey I was repositioning the vehicle and Ryan was looking for the interpreter.

aaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Your team sticks out as proactive enablers. Always moving to friction between the three gates. You had your own battle rhythm, but never sat there waiting idly for something to do. I commend you for that.

(2) Answer. Thank you, sir.

bbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. C1: Do you maintain contact with anyone, via social media or phone conversation, after the incident? Anyone outside your friends or family you talk to about the event?

(2) Answer. Never anyone that I am not intimately familiar with.

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question. C1: Where is [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) now?

(2) Answer. He is with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

dddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question. C1: Have you seen anything on social media about Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. Just a brief we received on the video of the blast, and then a laydown of where service members were at the time of the blast. I thought it was mostly accurate, but obviously I couldn't see where everyone was in the chaos after the blast. I could see where the majority of the wounded were.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question. C1: You said mostly accurate, anything specific that stood out to you?

(2) Answer. Nothing that stood out to me.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question. C1: You saw the video of the blast. Do you think you ever saw that video in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Not that I could say for certain. There were lots of people dressed in a very similar, traditional way. I wasn't searching the crowd for specific people.

gggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. C1: Do you ever remember specific threat reporting about a bald individual with tan 'man-jams'?

(2) Answer. No, I don't.

hhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Who brought up the fish weights?

(2) Answer. Just [REDACTED] and those guys in the days after the blast.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you have any knowledge of a 'test' IED run in the days prior to the blast? A previous IED detonated as a test?

(2) Answer. Not to my knowledge.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. C1: When the Marines escorted the Afghans that didn't have the appropriate documents as indicated by department of state, what was the feel of the Afghans?

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(2) Answer. People had pretty high emotions. The Marines had a separate release point that wasn't right in front of the gate. I wasn't sure. From what I saw, once they didn't have the proper documentation they were released at a separate release point. I didn't see too much of it, but they were distraught. I didn't see any violence, just pleading.

kkkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question. C1: Is there anyone you think we need to talk to that has information tied to the kind of questions we have asked you?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if you haven't interviewed him yet, he would probably be the best source.

lllll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else we didn't ask that you think we should know?

(2) Answer. No.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. C1: Can we contact you with any follow on?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) is a good number to reach me at.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question. C1: Have you had the opportunity to speak with anyone in regard to this event? (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I will do so.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is BG Lance Curtis at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

Operations Battalion

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 5 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 23. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

5 OCT 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

5 OCT 2023
DATE

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

CCJ2 INFORMATION PAPER

14 March 2022

(U) Subject: Background Information on the Abbey Gate Suicide Bomber

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Purpose. Background information pertaining to the suicide operative responsible for the 26 AUG attack at the HKIA Abbey Gate, Afghanistan during the U.S. NEO.

2. (U) Discussion.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Details of Abdul Rahman al-Logari's Role in HKIA Attack.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Abdul Rahman al-Logari was the sole suicide bomber who targeted the Abbey Gate of Kabul International Airport (KIA) formerly known as Hamid Karzai International Airport's (HKIA) on 26 August.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) We initially believed Logari bypassed Taliban security checkpoints to come within at least five meters from U.S. forces at the time of the attack using two fake American identification cards (IDs).
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Further investigation by the Abbey Gate Investigation Team (ARCENT) revealed the Permanent Resident Card and Texas Driver's License IDs initially attributed to the bomber, were not Logari's. The ARCENT team determined these ID cards, and others, were found in the attack area, and the Texas Driver's License was seen on a U.S. Marine's GoPro prior to the explosion.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) An ISIS media post claimed the attack the same day and included a photo of a masked fighter wearing a suicide vest and carrying a gun, whom ISIS later identified as Logari.



b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Logari's Familial Background and Radicalization

- (U//~~FOUO~~) According to the ISIS-K propaganda magazine, Voice of Khorasan, in 1996 Logari was born in Pakistan to a wealthy Afghan family from Logar Province. He spent his childhood and higher education in Pakistan, reportedly studying journalism in Islamabad although other reporting indicates he was studying engineering. His native language was Urdu, he had a basic understanding of Arabic, and was fluent in Dari and English.

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- (U//~~FOUO~~) In 2016, Logari moved back to Afghanistan where he joined ISIS-K. His family pleaded with him to abandon this pursuit, but he did not waver. His family severed communication and monetary support to him.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Logari received jihad and explosives training, facilitated online recruitment and migration of foreigners to join ISIS-K, and eventually transitioned to suicide operations.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On more than one occasion, Logari was reportedly part of a suicide operation where he was already wearing the suicide vest when the plot was foiled.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Logari's Chain of Custody

- (U//~~FOUO~~) In 2017, Logari reportedly traveled to Delhi, India to conduct a suicide attack against the Hindus for revenge of Kashmir. He was detained a week before the intended operation and transferred to Bagram Prison in Parwan Province northwest of Kabul, then Pul-e-Charki Prison in Kabul.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) In late-January 2021, Logari was moved back to Bagram from Pul-e-Charki to disrupt him from an operationally permissive environment. He remained incarcerated at Bagram until the mass release in August 2021.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Logari's Prison Release

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 15 August, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan and released ISIS and al-Qaida prisoners from at least three prisons. Logari was among those freed from Bagram and immediately reintegrated into ISIS-K.

Prepared by:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved by: MajGen Dimitri Henry, CCJ2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(U) Identity Resolution - Quick Look

(U) Date of Report: 10/24/2023

~~(CUI)~~ **Case Overview:** On 24 October 2023, the USARCENT Abbey Gate Investigation Review, Assistant Supplemental Review Officer requested a 1:1 Facial Image Comparison between an open source image of Abdul Rahman al-Logari (Image A), and an un-sourced image of an unidentified male (Image E). Image E exhibits poor image quality due to extreme face angle, head obscuration and low digital resolution. Despite the poor quality of Image E, the (b)(3) 3024(i) assesses the images exhibit sufficient facial characteristic detail for comparison. On 24 October 2023, the (b)(3) 3024(i) compared Image A to Image E resulting in a comparison score of (b)(3) 3024(i) most certainly not the same person.

~~(CUI)~~ Comparison Assessment Reference

~~(CUI)~~ Identity Assessment

(b)(3) 3024(i)



Image A
~~(CUI)~~ Abdul Rahman al-Logari
Open Source



Image E
~~(CUI)~~ Unidentified Male
Un-sourced image

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(U) Identity Resolution - Quick Look

(U) Date of Report: 10/24/2023

~~(CUI)~~ **Case Overview:** On 24 October 2023, the USARCENT Abbey Gate Investigation Review, Assistant Supplemental Review Officer requested a 1:1 Facial Image Comparison between an open source image of Abdul Rahman al-Logari (Image A), and an un-sourced image of an unidentified male (Image F). Image F exhibits poor image quality due to extreme face angle, head obscuration and low digital resolution. Despite the poor quality of Image F, the [redacted] (b)(3) 3024(i) assesses the images exhibit sufficient facial characteristic detail for comparison. On 24 October 2023, the [redacted] (b)(3) 3024(i) compared Image A to Image F resulting in a comparison score of [redacted] (b)(3) 3024(i) most certainly not the same person.

(b)(3) 3024(i)




Image A
~~(CUI)~~ Abdul Rahman al-Logari
Open Source

Image F
~~(CUI)~~ Unidentified Male
Open Source

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(U) Identity Resolution - Quick Look

(U) Date of Report: 10/17/2023

(CUI) Case Overview: On 16 October 2023, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division requested a 1:1 Facial Image Comparison between an image of Abdul Rahman al-Logari (Image A), suicide bomber who targeted the Abbey Gate of Kabul International Airport (KIA) formerly know as Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) on 26 August 2022, and images of Abdul Rahman Hamid Ghulam Sakhi (b)(3) 3024(i) associated to (b)(3) 3024(i) (Images B/C/D), Islamic State of Iraq and Ash-Shaam Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) militant group in India. Images B/C exhibits fair image quality due to bad lighting and low digital resolution. Despite the fair quality of Image B/C, the (b)(3) 3024(i) assesses the images exhibit sufficient facial characteristic detail for comparison. On 18 October 2023, the (b)(3) compared Image A to Images B/C/D resulting in a comparison score of (b)(3) 3024(i) most certainly the same person.

(b)(3) 3024(i)







Image A

(CUI) Abdul Rahman al-Logari
Open Source

Image B

(CUI) Abdul Rahman Hamid Ghulam Sakhi

(b)(3) 3024(i)

Image C

Image D

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(b)(3) 3024(i)

(b)(3) 3024(i), (b)(6)

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S036 (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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31 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 31 October 2023, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

Questions from [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It is my understanding you were the [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) during HKIA?

(2) Answer. Generally, I did platoon Sergeant stuff, oversight of administrative stuff, food, water, meds. I was in charge of manning, telling which squad to go where, and such. There were three platoon sergeants (PltSgts) that had been to Afghanistan a lot of leaning on us for understating. I have high expectations and was very involved. Making sure dudes were eating. I had to decided how much water and food to save to distribute to locals. Drinking water, you would notice time passing. When I would remember to drink, I would remind others to drink. I took charge, it's my nature, and made sure to tell Marines when to eat and when to sleep. I was blessed with a like-

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

mindful platoon of incredible marines that always wanted to be doing something. Easy to get caught up with what squads were up to. If we were up late working at the gate, I would stay up all night to catch up on my guys. I'm not positive about whether other platoons were task oriented because I was focused on my unit. My company commanders did a good job of being at all the places. They would come to us, so we didn't have to leave. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the company commander. My platoon commander was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. We've heard folks talk about the Taliban murdering folks, at will, within sight. What was your and your leadership's perspective?

(2) Answer. Personally, I never saw the act conducted. There were inklings that suggested murder. I heard other people say they 'saw' and 'heard' from intel reports, but I never personally saw it. I did witness acts of violence. People coming in who didn't meet the screening were terrified to go back out of the gate. I saw one dude with a pipe, hitting people. The Taliban would help us canalize people to the entry points using methods that are not methods we would use, I hate to admit. The Chevron point... so, when we opened the outer gate for the first time, it was before we established the Chevron. Not sure of exact dates (before the 26th). Around 0800, we initially opened the gate. At that point, everyone was canalized. A huge mele ensued. We were able to get them pushed about 20 meters out from the gate. We knew that the Barron Hotel area was where the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d were. We had a platoon isolated from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d that could not make their way to the outer gate because of congestion. We formed a line to push back while engineers built the Chevron and spent the next day until noon helping. During that point, at night at about 0400, there was group of Taliban there that were hitting people and getting them to move. There were some officers, maybe even the [REDACTED] (b)(6) who were communicating with the Taliban (the agreement had been made), and they helped keep people back while we established the Chevron.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. What was your understanding of ROE. Whether and how much they talked about it. How familiar were you? Was 2/1 more stringent?

(2) Answer. This has been a thinking through point of mine. While we were there, there were different briefs. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d had their own briefs. I talked to people from the MEU and talked to some company. I know that 2/1 got the same briefs, but there was a more liberal interpretation between what everyone understood. 2/1, specifically, was more strict than 1/8. People from 1/8 would make recommendations. People that I did not expect to, would be telling others to do things that I wouldn't do. Like firing warning shots, using CS gas. Some others may have used it. But not my platoon specifically; I care about my platoon. I would not let them do anything non-lethal without my authorizing. The same people who told me to fire warning shots, I saw them muzzle thump people who didn't need it. We would be low on food and water; we would be

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directed to save for food and water for us only. I noticed that if I gave people water, it would calm them down. So, I would give food and water to the local civilians to calm the civilians and to help the platoon worry about less.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You're not the first person who described violence by the Taliban. What was your understanding of Hostile Act/Hostile Intent (HA/HI)?

(2) Answer. I always knew HA/HI. It got kind of grey with HA/HI. When you see a local national being harmed that once would have been considered HA/HI. Now that the Taliban were potentially allies, we were not able to react the same way.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For HA/HI, do you recall where that directive came from? Was it the company commander?

(2) Answer. Typically, I'm used to Marine lawyer briefings. Since we were the crisis-response, we were getting it second-hand. I heard it directly from my company commander (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) since the [REDACTED] (b)(6) was not on the ground yet. I briefed my platoon directly. I was very lucky to have the platoon that I did. They would ask me ROE questions like, "if I see this, what do I do?" I used my past situations to give them guidance on what to do.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There has been talk of an IED dry run in the outer corridor near-side walkway. Open-source talk. Did you hear anything about a dry run or a probing?

(2) Answer. The night of the attack, yes. Maybe Aug 25th into the 26th. We were in the outer corridor at the same exact location of where the IED later went off. We knew there was a threat. We had Marines down the canal wall with limited exposure. My second-in-command in the squad and I, were used for talking to people; hearts and minds stuff, building rapport. Whoever is in charge you would take your kevlar off when talking to civilians to show trust. I had mine off when the bomb went off. I would tell the people to stay calm and you can't get in right now. Anyway, I remember a group of three – two men and one woman. I remember that Cpl Lopez tried to talk to them. Others trying to evacuate would want to talk to us. But these three would not talk and just stared. These three individuals were dressed in black. We tried talking to them and even offered them to get pulled out of the crowd. Once the gate was open, we lost sight of them. We communicated that up and that was it. That was about 0200. That night we had only had illumination from the moon. It was dark. I think the idea was to make it dark so people would mellow out and go to sleep. Most people just stopped where they were and slept. Almost positive that was the night of Aug 25th going into the 26th. I'm pretty sure that the day of the 30th was the hard cutoff.

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h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is 0200, no illumination, you identify 3 individuals in full black. Do remember other descriptions of these individuals?

(2) Answer. One was not fully clean shaven but had been shaving, the other male other had full facial hair and the woman's face was exposed, which was the biggest determinant to the group being weird, since Taliban and ISIS woman did not expose their face. The men had black head wraps and a man dress. The woman was wearing a hood. They all looked like they were in their 20s, the men looked in their early 20s and the woman looked in her mid-20s.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) About how far were they from you? It was dark, but how was the illumination?

(2) Answer. They were in the exact spot where the IED went off, and I was directly across from them. There was full illumination and it was surprising well-lit, but they were about the same distance from me to that wall (gestures a distance in the room approximately 12 feet away).

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recognize this person as being among the group? [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shows the picture - exhibit S066))

(2) Answer. No, I do not recognize the individual in the picture. They were wearing full head wraps, black.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You noticed they stood out. Once you noticed, you directly engaged with them. You say, "I want to talk to you help you out." To validate, were you trying to engage them to confirm whether their behavior was linked to threat activity? How did they respond?

(2) Answer. Stalwart silence. Completely unresponsive to our engaging with them. They would look at us but not say a word. Not confirmed but, Cpl Lopez said that he saw the woman taking pictures at approximately 1100. Everyone was taking pictures, so I did not think anything about it. My priorities were directed elsewhere. It had been 12 hours since then. I would have thought the prime time to set off an IED would be later, not on the 26th. Probably on August 29th.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Why did you think the attack would occur on Aug 29th?

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(2) Answer. Just my intuition; not intelligence.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. What intelligence were you receiving? Any specificity of what you felt was legit? What registered with you at the time?

(2) Answer. Every day at I don't know what time, a.m. or pm, my company commander had a sync meeting with 51/5 CO. He met with higher to get an intelligence report and would immediately come brief the platoon leadership on whatever was passed that pertained to what we were doing. My area was the nearside canal across from where the IED went off and the area between outer corridor, inner walkway from the original hole in fence to the sniper tower. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d had everything else towards the Barron. We were briefed that there was potential for an ISIS threat. I don't know if it was default on my part, I thought a suicide IED was the only possible threat. You couldn't get a vehicle through there. ISIS would be more upset that people were trying to leave and would target them more. Also, by dealing with the Taliban until the 26th, be upset that they would sweep in when we left. From some special unit, or private contractors or different country, we heard that there was a threat. They heard that ISIS was finding ways to get to Abbey Gate because people were coming to Abbey Gate. The Taliban started scouting people waiting at the gate for threats.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Any specificity in any reporting that you heard, in terms of specific threats, other than what you saw the night before?

(2) Answer. Nothing specific as far as a BOLO for an SVEST, typical TTPs have been dressed in all black carrying a backpack that looks bigger. The saddest part, I talk with others, it was so densely packed that you couldn't see past the front row and they were being smushed in by the crowd. What bothers you on social media is the scout snipers request to shoot on what they believed to be the IED bearer, from the sniper tower. This area was condensed for my platoon. Far-side canal, to the jersey barrier and beyond, on the nearside walkway and canal, was so filled with people that you couldn't engage without shooting civilians. I was shocked to hear people speaking perfect English. I remember one lady, I asked her for her Special Immigrant Visa (SIV), and she pulls out her New York driver's license and says, "I'm from Brooklyn, get me the fuck outta here!" That's when it hit me, there were Americans out here. So, I emphasized not throwing flashbangs, not throwing CS grenades and other riot control measures. That lady was picking up her grandmother and nephew. She was talking in English, talked about being an Uber driver and working at some store. At that point, the thought of collateral damage was unacceptable. It wasn't beforehand, but it really hit me at that point. I can see why no one would authorize a sniper shot. At that point, I had no idea that scout snipers had seen anybody. That was never brought to me, even though I was standing at the base of the sniper tower.

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o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As far as, sniper tower and the snipers, what was your interaction and what is your assessment of their observations, as a leader?

(2) Answer. By no means do I consider this a flex. There was no staff NCO that spent more time there than me. My interactions with the 2/1 sniper towers were limited. I viewed them as overwatch. Having worked with my [REDACTED] (b)(6) and company commander and communicated by the [REDACTED] (b)(6) that the place was so densely packed that an attack would never happen. Just in case, we got attacked they were there to help. The tower was protected, they had three windows. To me, if anything happened, they would be fighting from a fortified position. I didn't talk to them too much because my focus was the canal.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you there through the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. With the threat of an IED, my commander dictated that leaders rotate behind the wall, behind cover. Me and my platoon commander would take turns from 0600-0900. I bullied my platoon commander into staying back because if something happened, he would not be able to respond. I got into an altercation with a Cpl from another company, so after that it was better that I just be around my guys in the inner corridor.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How were shifts and responsibilities meted out?

(2) Answer. We planned for 2-hour switches. Whoever was in the corridor would be with the QRF at the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) vehicle. That ended up being our casualty collection point (CCP), behind the sniper tower on the inner corridor. That day I did a one-hour shift and then shifted back out with my platoon commander, who was tasked with transferring people from the outer corridor to the inner corridor for vetting. At that point, he became the liaison to the other company.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your take on the decision to collapse security and what it meant?

(2) Answer. It was my recommendation to collapse security. Initially, after we pushed forward to allow for the Chevron to be built, we did a day of work in the outer corridor. The unit wanted to push us back from the gate for rest. They rotated us back. My platoon got to sleep and then we ran a shift at the terminal, taking evacuees from the bus drop-off point to the terminal to get on the plane. I think the idea was for us to

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

see the finished product (people departing via air) to make us feel better. It helped but made us want to go back to the gate to help even more. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) begging to get back out there with my platoon. Everyone wanted to go back to Abbey Gate rather than stay at the old gym. I don't know how he got it to happen, but they took us back out that afternoon. The relief-in-place (RIP) with Echo Company that had pushed the outer security element to about there (points to location near the far-side walkway and the footbridge). This was the exact moment I think about when using nonlethal tactics. There was the walkway. That's where we stopped. I had like one Marine trying to hold back 20-25 people by themselves. I made the recommendation to collapse the security. My company commander started making it happen and then the (b)(1)1.4d came and pretty much forced us to collapse. When we were started to collapse, (b)(1)1.4d was pushing the crowd and was pushing us into the outer corridor. No help from the (b)(1)1.4d. That left probably 40-60 unscreened people that were behind us just standing around. We would ask who had papers. Some did not even have papers.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. When you assumed responsibility for that area, there were 40-50 Afghan civilians that you had not pulled out and not seen or verified?

(2) Answer. In a way yes. I honestly just assumed, since I had a good working relationship with other platoons. They pull QRF within the outer corridor, I assumed they would take them to the inner corridor. At the time, (b)(1)1.4d was already pushing people out with dogs. Then there was the other company, Echo Co with Weapons Co personnel from Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) Blue. A sergeant, I don't remember his name. Simultaneously, (b)(1)1.4d was pushing through while the other company was departing. So, we were getting pushed on two sides. So, maintaining the footbridge along with everything else, it was too chaotic. (b)(1)1.4d let me through but did not let my guys back through. I saw how spread out my platoon was and communicated to the platoon commander to communicate with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d literally pushed my Marines into the crowd with the working dogs. We got them back (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw the situation and we collapsed back to a jersey barrier next to the sniper tower.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. As a platoon sergeant, was there other specificity? Suicide bomber threat?

(2) Answer. Besides open-source while we were still in (b)(1)1.4d. I tried to keep in contact. We got 48-hr notice that we were going (to Afghanistan). There's never no chance. We were bored by month four in (b)(1)1.4d. Every day was exactly the same. Dudes were keeping track because it was the hot thing to talk about. We would hear gunshots in the northern portion. One of the ANA engaged his friends in the living area near one of the roads to the north of our where our CP was. One of the roads in the actual terminal. There was a quick shootout that ended very quickly. I took two guys, and we walked over to see if there was a threat. It was already over. One of the ANA

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guys tried to turn (switch sides) that was rumor mill. I know some tried to engage people in the terminal and were killed. I have fought Taliban in prior deployments. The thought process of working with them I understood, but I would never trust them. I could see that that was an isolated incident, but saw that there was possibility for small-arms fire. There was talk of a general description of what could be any extremist dressed in all black, possibly clean shaven, backpack and looking bulky. That was so commonplace at the time, that was a stereotypical suicide bomber. The 51/5 CG was at the Abbey Gate about an hour before the attack, BGen Sullivan. The biggest threat we saw was the locals swarming the gate and the airfield. SSG Knauss, about one-hour before the bomb, he was messaging to people that there was a threat and they needed to leave the gate. "Please leave!" There was no increase of awareness at the point. It seemed at that point that it was a deterrence to get people to leave before the gate closed. People started to get like, "Where are we supposed to go? This is our only way in." That was almost as bad as the IED itself. So, open-source information was open to them too. They were asking if you are leaving on the 30th, then what is going to happen to us. "You're not moving fast enough." The hardest thing was convincing some people that they could skip the line if they stayed for like an hour to help translate. (b)(1)1.4a would bring their own translators. That was a lot of help, but they had to go back to work with State.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b To be specific, prior to or on August 26th with (b)(1)1.4a, describe interactions with them or interactions you witnessed.

(2) Answer. I only saw them there on the 26th. I think very early, then left for a bit and came back. I don't know if it was a different group. I didn't talk to them directly. At one point, they were trying to help on the canal wall but got pulled back. So, they could talk to the canal people and a security cordon of people back here. Only on the day of the 2, I knew they were in the area I think it was three of them. I remember SSG Knauss specifically, with his megaphone talking to the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b That day were you personally aware of checking the identification of someone suspicious? Collapsed or not, was there a particularly suspicious person identified?

(2) Answer. Platoon-level leadership would verify all documents before pulling anyone into the cordon. Me and my platoon commander were the only ones, primarily. That was unsustainable. I had two trusted guys, that knew exactly what I was looking for, checking documents. My platoon commander got pulled to focus on big company stuff. My squad leaders needed to help when we came back and were manning the whole area from the outer corridor to the inner walkway. That's when I realized I can't check passports and SIVs at multiple locations with just me. We were very direct on what we expected based on direction from State. Like yellow cards that were good and

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then they were not good. I told my squad leaders that if it is an American passport or driver's license, you can pull them in. SIVs and yellow cards needed to come to me. There were rules with yellow cards with specific codes. For example, if you had been like a janitor, that was not to be accepted. But if they ran processes, they were good. Sometimes the SIVs were forged. They would print off weird emails that didn't match. The SIVs were suspicious. If one document worked, they started screenshotting and sending to as many people as possible. None were specific, like because I thought they were a bad person.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What was the general layout of leadership? Company/Battalion Commanders?

(2) Answer. For the (b)(6) I don't remember. I saw him one time the whole time. I think he spent a lot of his time where all leaders were consolidated, in the JOC. I wasn't allowed to go there. For the company commander, I saw him all the time. Me and my company commander had a great working relationship. He would come talk to me very frequently as well as the other platoons. 3rd Platoon was just inside the inner gate and 4th Platoon was located behind the sniper tower, as a QRF in the inner corridor. I remember thinking the inner gate was really far away. He would make that walk consistently. Specifically, because the Department of State guy was never there. That was our biggest problem. For the Regional Security Officer (RSO), I'm not positive. He was there when we opened the gate. He looked like he used to be in the military. When we first opened Abbey Gate it was horrifying, like a zombie movie. From that point on, we never saw him again. I think that fucked him up. Never saw the RSO again at the gate. I assumed that messed with his head. I saw him back at the terminal with an M4.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Personal effects? To your knowledge was anyone tasked with inventorying personal effects?

(2) Answer. This has bothered me since that day. The night of the IED, I had to go verify KIA outside the Chowhall. I noticed gear and everything they had on, was gone. Stripped for the most part. I remember thinking, I don't know where they're stuff is. Being very platoon oriented, I can't emphasize enough the unique comradery my platoon had. I looked at these kids, they called me jokingly "dad", knowing that half of my platoon, at that time, was gone. We were staying in a gym by the Army section. By the time we left the gate, the news was on and confirming that there was an attack on Abbey Gate. At 0200 I went to verify the KIA. The serialized gear had made it back to the platoon, but not their personal effects and gear. We were close. We did stupid shit for fun. We would carry keepsakes. Certain things like that, that meant something, I wanted to have their gear back with us because I don't trust anybody. I knew the gravity; the last mass casualty (MASCAS) was a decade ago. I was worried that people

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

would steal their stuff. That really bothered me. Especially having to deal with the negative. The 51/5 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) really sewed some discontent at the KIA confirmation. I asked where's their gear? I had been allowed to see my Marines at Role II. At this point, it had been several hours. I had no confirmation on who was KIA or who was missing. When the blast happened, despite the language barriers, foreign units, PJs from the Airforce doing medical, various other people helping. When the moment happened, there was a syncing among everybody. Everyone understood what had to happen and offered to help. At KIA confirmation, the people I thought were wounded were not. Started asking questions because things were mislabeled. Because things were cut away for treatment. I started being told that I didn't know my own people. Because another person looks like Cpl Page, I had to walk into ROLE II and verify that it was not my Marine. My commander had to go see the 51/5 commander to be reprimanded. I was down 22 people. I had lists from my squad leaders who was KIA, wounded or who we did not know the status of. My company was actively trying to get updates. The missing gear was the biggest point of miscommunication. No one knew the status. The next day we loaded the planes to be sent to Dover. When we got back to our CP, I had everyone's day packs. All the rest of the stuff was still at the CP. When we came back to the CP, from the planes, their gear was gone. Someone told me it had to get inventoried. But we did not know anyone was coming to pick up their stuff. I assumed that it was someone from logistics since it had to be inventoried. I know some dudes got their stuff back in 3 months, 8 months. The missing gear belonged exactly to those people who were identified as KIA or WIA.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Has anyone told you that they had responsibility or who had responsibility for the personal effects?

(2) Answer. My company gunny, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the one that told me they had to do inventories. He was one of my first supervisors and we were instructors together. We had 9 years together and we were friends. He didn't know when it was going to happen, he just knew that it had to happen. We were all at the planes when they took the gear. What threw both of us off was that we didn't know it was going to happen or we would've separated it.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you describe the disposition of the gear?

(2) Answer. I made everyone pack up their stuff whenever we left, for cleanliness and for if we had to go on short notice. When we first got there, we had taken the packs out so that we could pull sleeping bags out. When we went to Abbey Gate there was nowhere to take them, so we staged them in the back corner. Everything was already consolidated. Except I found some of the kevlar here (drawing a diagram). I did not let anyone go to sleep without seeing a corpsman. So, no one pulled out their sleeping bags. All the stuff was just out, and we just slept on the floor. We woke up around 0800

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

and loaded the planes around 0900. Get up, clean up yourselves, we are about to go do this. We heard sirens, it was deemed not likely to be another attack. We did PCC/PCIs making sure we had accountability and knew what to do. The following morning, I went to use the restroom and saw about five FLAK vests, with blood, just sitting there. No one knew how they got there. They were later picked up.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. What about personal effects? When the explosion occurred was there a collection of phones or other personal effects?

(2) Answer. Of the Marines that remained, I expected a River City situation. I assessed more potential threats. I didn't want anyone putting anything out or notifying anyone's family. It was all very personal to me. We heard rumors that there was potentially something else planned that night like an attack on the terminal. People were just walking around like normal. Like nothing happened. It seemed like there was a lot of people at the terminal that had no idea what happened. At the hospital my platoon commander sustained an injury that he was getting medically evacuated for. He went with everyone to the hospital and collected all the phones of our people, but I can't confirm that anything was missing. [REDACTED] had planned to collect the phones of the wounded. I'm uncertain about the KIA.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Referencing the group of suspicious individuals, did you say they had backpacks? Do you remember an explosion that day?

(2) Answer. They did have back packs, but everyone had back packs. That didn't stand out too much. I remember the men had back packs not the woman. I do not remember any other explosions.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you consume any social media surrounding the event?

(2) Answer. It's impossible not to consume what is on social media. It used to bother me a lot. It still kind of does. There is so much misinformation out there. For me it is a little more personal than most. A lot of stuff like, "this should've happened" and "if this would've happened," "I blame this person" or "they were stupid for doing this." When you look at podcasts like OAF Nation, Northern Provisions, all kinds of stuff like that. They take the parts that will get them attention and abuse their already-strong following. They are better at delivering the content. Their delivery is more believable because it sounds tactical. Northern Provisions reached out to me; they are local to Sneads Ferry. They reached out to me to get an interview, which I wanted to do just to tell them the truth. It seemed like some parents were being abused by social media and corrupted to view the unit leadership as the bad guys. I watched the family roundtable. I

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

couldn't finish watching it. I have to deal with influencers describing that they had the bomber and there is no way they could've. I did not see [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC testimony. He has not reached out me. We talked about a year and a half ago. I saw what was going on and told him to be careful with these people because they will turn you into a speaker to twist for their own bullshit. I remember he would share stuff on Instagram about the event. There was a portion of the year that I was not myself. I would make comments on there. I would never publicly denounce him. My comments were more like 'what are you doing?' because he was an easy target. That was probably the worst time of his life. I think it made him more vulnerable and more angry. It's easier to get him to say the right things at the right time.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see him that day? Was he conscious?

(2) Answer. Cpl Page and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) have similarities. It was Cpl Page who I knew was KIA, I identified him by his tattoos. But I was pulled in for a second time to see him at the Role II. I knew who my Marines were. I can see if you were just looking at an ID, they could be confused. I knew [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had injuries. After that, I was told I didn't know what I was talking about. My team mentioned that everyone says that Page and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked alike, and they could've been confused. That's when I went back and saw that it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was not conscious.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see him at the base of the tower? Was he conscious?

(2) Answer. Yes I saw him. He was not conscious.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Of what you've seen of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) engagements, is there anything you would like to confirm or deny?

(2) Answer. At this point, I just want the truth to come out because I've seen nothing but so many lies. I have not been following up recently. But everything that I've seen prior made me shut his social media out. The inclination that there was a complex ambush. There was no gun fire following the IED. I did not hear any gunfire and neither did my platoon sergeant

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see the CENTCOM DoD briefing after the original investigation?

(2) Answer. Yes. I have it bookmarked. Of everything else, my only issue is that I don't think a lot of people saw it. From what I remember, it was perfectly accurate, but

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

my own recollection could be wrong. My problem is that most people haven't seen that brief.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. How long did you know your [REDACTED] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Difficult to answer. I got to 2/1 for this tour right after COVID and people were allowed to travel again. I got to the unit July 2020, pretty late because of COVID. Camp Pendelton had been split up. We stayed there until we did our ITX and moved back to Camp Horno. I spent the first 4-5 months at a different camp, so I rarely saw him. Never conversed with him. When we deployed, I was in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and he spent most of his time in another location.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you have a sense of his leadership style? Would he dress you down if you were making demands and using explicatives?

(2) Answer. In a biased way. I was raised by two Marines. My expectations are a little different. I personally did not care for the guy. I mostly tried to avoid being around him. I heard things about him denying engagement authority. I could see that. He gives the impression that he looks down on the enlisted. The overall attitude at Abbey Gate, it seemed like a lot of military courtesy went out the window. I was even guilty of it at times. But the [REDACTED] (b)(6), would not have tolerated it. He does not strike me as the kind of person that would.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Anything else from firsthand experience that we should annotate?

(2) Answer. I have a social media account, I've coordinated with COMMSTRAT to make sure I was not revealing operational data.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231031, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 35. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

20231031
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

231031
DATE

Approved for Release

~~CUI~~

Page 37 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 38 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 39 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 40 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 41 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 42 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 43 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S038 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 44 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S039 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 45 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 46 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 47 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 48 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 49 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 50 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 51 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S040 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 53 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 54 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 55 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 56 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 57 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 58 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 59 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S041 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 60 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S042 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 61 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 62 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 63 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 64 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 65 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 67 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 68 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 69 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S043 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

1 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review - Digital Data Recovery and Destruction

1. (CUI) The below outline efforts to recover data relevant to the Abbey Gate supplemental review, specifically photos taken by the (b)(6) sniper team from the Abbey Gate tower throughout the evacuation. Snipers allegedly took photographs of Taliban atrocities and suspicious persons at Abbey Gate, which snipers assert was the bomber.

2. (CUI) On 4 October 2023, I email the current (b)(6) of 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to ask about continuity of information/intel from HKIA. He promptly responded on 3 October 2023 (unknown why date/time group is inaccurate), and explained the 2/1 FreeNAS servers that were in use at HKIA were serviced by the FSR and the servers were replaced. SIPR hard drives were destroyed at HKIA and burned in place. All other equipment was turned over to 1/4 Marines while 2/1 Marines was fulfilling duties as the GCE for the 31 MEU. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also explained BN S2 sections do not normally move products to the various databases, which is common at the higher echelons. He informed us intel products from 2/1 may have been uploaded by 1st Marine Division or TF 51-5. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also performed searches of various platforms and webpages, but only found unrelated HKIA overhead imagery.

3. (CUI) On 17 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) contacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) former 82nd Airborne Division (TF-82) (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described hasty destruction plans associated with Joint Tactical Exfiltration (JTE). While some files were moved to cloud-based programs, like Intelink, physical hard drives and servers were demilitarized. For example, some hard drives were brought to the hard drive shredder located at a data facility on HKIA. Other hard drives, servers and information systems were punched through or even smashed.

4. (CUI) On 19 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) contacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TF 51-5 (b)(6) to request assistance in searching for any 2/1 Marines products or files from 1-30 August 2021. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reported not having photographs or images of the suspicious persons. He also described the imminent threat ahead of evacuation and the requirement to destroy military equipment before forces ex-filled.

5. (CUI) On 26 October 2023, I emailed 1/4 Marines (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to make contact with the S2 section. I was referred to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who on 26 October 2027 actioned our request to search for Camera SD Cards part of the MAGTF

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review - Digital Data Recovery and Destruction

(b)(1)1.4g Data was discovered on the cards with (b)(1)1.4g On 27 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) of 1/4 Marines, sent over 5 GBs of photos from all the SD Cards with 1/4 (b)(1)1.4g kits through DoD Safe. Those photos capture part of the 2/1 pre-deployment activities (ISOPREP Photos) and a small number of key leader engagements in (b)(1)1.4d Nothing of evidentiary value was discovered concerning HKIA or Abbey Gate.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl

- 1. Email from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- 2. Email from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (CUI) RE: Abbey Gate - Supplemental Review - Background
Date: Wednesday, October 18, 2023 12:49:45 AM

Sir,

Unfortunately, I'm at the point that I've exhausted all the avenues I can think of to track anything down on SIPR. I did turn up some archives of unnamed JPG & PNG photos on IntelDocs, but I went through all of them and although they were related to HKIA, none of them had the subject of interest (most were actually aerial shots, so probably from someone with an E-8 or something – or WMV video of kinetic strikes pre-incident).

I think at this point, my recommendation would be to track down the FreeNAS or the SD cards themselves – it's still possible they were erased, but that's probably the best chance you have of finding archives of IMINT that was never processed.

Additionally, I can be very confident that the subject never appears in any product that was made by the Marine Corps elements on the deck – I went through 100% of the daily briefs & INTSUMs for the months of Aug-Sept, and that individual never appeared in anything I could access on MKG.

My apologies for not being able to do more, but at this point I'm out of options in terms of product libraries to go through. I have confirmed that [Redacted] is the [Redacted] for V1/4 – not sure if that's helpful or not.

Very Respectfully,

[Redacted Signature Block]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, October 6, 2023 7:48 AM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: (CUI) RE: Abbey Gate - Supplemental Review - Background

Erik, who at 1st MARDIV G2 would be the best POC MCISRE Knowledge Gateway (MKG)? We may reach out to see anything from the HKIA timeframe made it on there.

v/r

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)**Sent:** Tuesday, October 3, 2023 7:45 PM**To:** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)**Cc:** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)**Subject:** (CUI) RE: Abbey Gate - Supplemental Review - Background

Good Morning Sir,

I can absolutely jump on SIPR to answer any specific questions, although it's unlikely anything I know would be classified. I'll also clear my schedule so that we can sit down face to face if you have any follow-up questions during your trip out here.

It's probably important for me to mention that I was not the Intelligence Officer during that period. Although I am familiar with it, I was still at my previous billet (actually on a watch floor at 1st MarDiv G2). Most of the things I know (or think I know) about continuity of intelligence are primarily based around the equipment I received on my account when I assumed this current billet, and then based on what my Marines have told me.

I'm not sure how much detail you need on how we manage our digital SIPR library, so I apologize if this is more information than you want – but hopefully it adds some context:

- The Battalion Intelligence section operates a suite of Common Intelligence Workstations (CIWs), which are our program-of-record computer loaded out

- with various intelligence software for SIPR.
- Based on the total number of CIWs, our account is childed a FreeNAS Server, which is a stack of SIPR harddrives and other components used to create a local ShareDrive.
 - This sharedrive is fully internal: although 1st Marine Division operates a similar SIPR ShareDrive in their G2, and in their DNOC, a deployed unit won't have access to it – hence the use of the local server.
 - Although we would theoretically “rate” 2x FreeNAS based on our allocation of CIWs, V2/1 (and now BLT 2/1) is only fielded 1x FreeNAS.
 - Typically, this becomes an S2's working library – final products should be hung on the MCISRE Knowledge Gateway (MKG) on SIPR. Although we will occasionally do this at the Battalion level, you tend to see more products from Regiment and up, and especially Division G2's or Intelligence Battalions.
 - SIPR assets are not taken with a unit deploying to the 31st MEU; in April, we executed an account turnover with V1/4, who were the previous BLT for the 31st MEU. Since these rotations are heel-to-toe, we fall in on the “BLT Account” gear that stays in Okinawa permanently (including their SIPR assets), and we give them all the gear that was previously on the V2/1 account. Similarly, when our ADVON returns to Camp Pendleton this month, they'll accept the V1/1 account – and V1/1 will then fall in on the BLT account that I'm managing now.
 - This is relevant, because the 8x SIPR harddrives inside of a FreeNAS are frequently transferred due to this rotation & account turnover. V1/4 now owns and operates the FreeNAS (and its harddrives, presumably) that I used to have on the V2/1 account.
 - Although I can't speak for their S2, my assumption is that they likely cleared all products by reimaging or wiping the harddrives. Since a FreeNAS is typically used for “working” documents, most of us (or at least I) tend to prefer to erase everything so that I can more effectively manage the information architecture from a blank slate. The other benefit of this is that it's included in our required annual classified clean-out, where we dispo all documents to ensure that we aren't retaining unnecessary amounts of intelligence information that's no longer relevant to our current mission.

Additional notes, some of which I can't actually confirm, but are based on the turnover that I received from the previous Intelligence Officer as well as my current Marines who were at HKIA:

- While on the (b)(1)1.4a, V2/1 did operate a FreeNAS server. This may have been in (b)(1)1.4a not HKIA.
- One of my current Marines was at HKIA at the time, and personally participated in the destruction of SIPR harddrives, which were then burned afterwards.
- That server was corrupted or damaged in some way by the time it got back to CONUS; which led to the S2 systems team turning it over to the CIW program FSR (who works within I MEF, Intel Battalion) for a replacement.

- When I arrived at V2/1, that replacement system was also non-operational, so I had my Marines switch it through the FSR a second time.
- That replacement server did eventually work, although it was then turned over to V1/4 when we executed the account turnover.

All of this is probably an unnecessarily long explanation, but leads to my assessment that it's relatively unlikely we'll have significant access to products from HKIA beyond what we can find across the wider IC. If I was trying to find internal working documents or something similar, the place I would probably have to look would be the 1st Marine Division SIPR ShareDrive, since I know that we operated a watch floor throughout HKIA, and I know that all members were directly ordered to preserve all documents related to the NEO. My assumption is that all files related to the evacuation are still somewhere in their file architecture.

The other place that then-V2/1 may have pushed information (potentially the most likely?) would probably have been to 51.5, who would have had to operate some sort of digital file architecture throughout the operation.

I'm not sure if any of that is helpful to you, but certainly standing by for any questions and happy to switch over to SIPR or sit down in person once you get here. Additionally, I have 2x Marines here who participated in the NEO, as well as names for other personnel that may potentially be more useful to you.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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From: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, October 4, 2023 3:09 AM

To: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: Abbey Gate - Supplemental Review - Background

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave me you email. We are curious about any continuity of information/intel from operations at HKIA during the evacuation. Would you have access to or know where to go to get it?

You can hit me up on SIPR, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Please CC [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

v/r

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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From:
To:
Cc:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion
Date: Friday, October 27, 2023 12:17:38 PM

Sir,

Yourself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would receive the images via DOD Safe shortly. It is approximately 5 GB worth of data.

Please let me know if you have any further questions or concerns.

Respectfully,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2023 10:29 AM

To: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion

(b)(6) awesome and surprising news. If possible, could you send us the pictures through DoD Safe. We don't really know what we are looking for, which is the same position you are in. I would just send all the photos that you can get off the SD cards that came from 2/1. Hopefully they are date stamped.

My gov cell is below if you need to talk. Also, please include [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] on the cc line in the DoD Safe exchange.

v/r

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

From: [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2023 12:31 PM

To: [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

Cc: [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

Subject: Re: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion

Good Morning Sir,

My Marines are currently reviewing all the [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] SD cards and have confirmed that there are images from 2/1 on those SD cards.

Please let me know next steps and how we can best facilitate your review.

Respectfully,

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2023 8:34 AM

To: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion

(b)(6) we are looking to close this out by next week, so a little time to react.

Thanks for the support,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2023 11:33 AM

To: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion

Good Morning Sir,

I have included our (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to answer the information as requested. Please be advised he is out of the office but we should have these answers to you as soon as possible. Is there a requirement to have this information before COB tomorrow?

-----Break-----

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) please see the below request and reach out to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) please let me know when this request has been completed.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2023 7:19 AM

To: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Subject: Abbey Gate Supplemental Review - S2 Discussion

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I am part of a team conducting a supplemental review of the Abbey Gate investigation, appointed by the ARCENT and CENTCOM Commanders. We were hoping to talk with your S2 shop to determine if any of the (b)(1)1.4 equipment was transferred from 2/1 to your unit and if the SD cards from the Cameras contain any data (pictures). Please let me know who we should reach out to.

Thanks,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

2 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (b)(6)

1. (CUI) On 2 November 2023, I conducted a phone interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(6) and deployed to Hamad Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August of 2021. The below is a summary of our conversation.

2. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) first explained the structure of the intelligence staff sections at HKIA. All unit command posts for the Marines at HKIA (2/1 Marines, 24th MEU HQ, and JTF-CR/5MEB) were consolidated at building 300 occupied by the JTF-CR. 2/1 Marines and various staff sections from the MEU had side rooms off the watch floor. The MEU staff combined with the small JTF-CR staff to man the watch floor. The same was true for the MEU S2 staff section, which combined with the small JTF-CR J2.

3. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked overlapping shifts on the watch floor under the supervision of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). They conducted the analyst function for both JTF-CR and MEU. Although there was a day and night shift, 0900-2100 and 2100-0900, most of the Intel Marines worked significantly longer hours. There were no Navy personnel with the 24th MEU S2 Intel Section or the JTF-CR J2 Intel Section.

4. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained that anyone of the Intel Marines listed above would have given a shift in-brief to the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs on any given day and she recalls this happening regularly. The brief was usually an update on the latest BOLOs and threat streams.

5. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) definitively recalled the reports of the same individual being seen multiple times at Abbey Gate on 25-26 August 2021, and agreed it was a bald male. However, the MEU intel analyst never saw pictures of this individual and were only aware of the descriptions. Those descriptions, and reports about activity at the gate, would have come from Marines at the gate, and not through intelligence sources.

6. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is aware of the claim the bomber was the individual who was seen at the gate multiple times, but recalled that information being propagated by Marines who worked at Abbey Gate. That was not an intelligence assessment or conclusion. Even if an intelligence analyst in the MEU S2 said something similar, it was not based on any intelligence source or data, but something other Marines were saying.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Phone Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

7. (~~CUI~~) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reviewed this memorandum and returned via email on 2 November 2023.

8. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACCG-SR

2 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. (GUI) On 2 November 2023, I conducted a phone interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and deployed to Hamad Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August of 2021. The below is a summary of our conversation. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is now a civilian and ended active service.

2. (GUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) confirmed there were no Navy intelligence personnel in the 24th MEU S2 or JTF-CR J2, and was confident there were none with USFOR-A J2.


3. (GUI) When asked about the comment attributed to the 24th MEU intelligence section about the suspicious person at the Gate on 26 August 2021, had been there multiple times, and was the bomber, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that was not said by him or anyone in his vicinity. He also stated that was not a fact-based intelligence assessment.

4. (GUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he never saw pictures from Abbey Gate, either from (b)(1) 1.4a Snipers or other Marines. He was aware the Snipers had an OIC in the 2/1 COC in the next room. The only pictures the intel section dealt with were imagery and FMV from overhead ISR.

5. (GUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also does not recall anyone in the JTF-CR/24th MEU/2-1 Marines COC discussing the identify of the bomber post-blast.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



(b)(3)189b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)189b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)189b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)189b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)189b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Release



(b)(3) (b)(6)



(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Exhibit S052



USCENTCOM W/2602/24/11



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

01 NOV 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 Marines

1. On 01 November 2023, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b and questions from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you in the Marines

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) The first two years I was general infantry. After my first deployment to Afghanistan, I joined the scout sniper platoon then attended the scout sniper course. Then I deployed for the 2nd time to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d as a scout sniper team leader. Primary mission was tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel and in support of OIR. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I deployed again to the US Embassy in Baghdad.

I was a school-qualified sniper for eight years overall. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I went to 2/1.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marinesc. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How long had you been with 2/1?

(2) Answer. I arrived in September of 2020, so maybe 6 months.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was the structure of the platoon?

(2) Answer. We had 24-26 people, with 4 teams. (b)(6) I had done this exact deployment before; this was my 3rd time. One team was going to the embassy, then two teams in (b)(1)1.4d then one team in (b)(1)1.4de. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you go to (b)(1)1.4d at all?

(2) Answer. Our team in (b)(1)1.4d did go down to (b)(1)1.4d.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you receive an RoE brief?

(2) Answer. I can't say if we did or did not. I was a new parent at that point, so I missed some stuff. I can't say if we did or did not.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you remember receiving an RoE brief in theater? What was your train-up before going into theater?

(2) Answer. No, no RoE brief that I can remember. Our team had just been in (b)(1)1.4d to do a training op with Golf Company at (b)(1)1.4a. When we got back to (b)(1)1.4d, that's when we heard Kabul had fallen and that we might have to go. I sat down with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to talk through the plan. We had our gear with us and were prepared to leave out of (b)(1)1.4d.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you ever talk hostile act, hostile intent, right to self-defense?

(2) Answer. I sat down with someone; I don't remember who it was. Overall, the RoE was hostile act, hostile intent, the right to self-defense, and the right to defend American Citizens if you could confirm their citizenship.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Marines

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you remember when you had that happen?

(2) Answer. I think that happened after we left from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and went back to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d for a week and a half prior to HKIA.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you do any training for that NEO?

(2) Answer. No, there was no understanding of what that mission was going to be exactly. NEO wasn't understood. At some point a Colonel came down and discussed with Sgts what a NEO was and what was going to happen. At that point I communicated equipment that allowed the sniper teams to use [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g to give us the ability to pass information.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was your team composition going into HKIA?

(2) Answer. A five-man team and a four-man team with me. We turned into a nine-man section. At this point the embassy hadn't been taken yet, so we thought we were going to a hide site IVO the embassy. So, we merged into a section. When we got onto the ground in HKIA we broke up into two separate shifts. We sent one member over to [REDACTED] (b)(6) to help support them. I was [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the time, and [REDACTED] (b)(6) was under me. I was the [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the time, since our Plt Sgt didn't have his COVID shot.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: For clarity, [REDACTED] (b)(6) was under Echo initially, then worked the front tower, who did you fall under?

(2) Answer. We were under 2/1 directly [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had it broken down into day and night shifts. He and I were both on day shift. We never spoke to the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6), but we would go back and brief [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the end of every shift on the intel that we gathered.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What would those briefs consist of?

(2) Answer. We would show him pictures we had taken, he would brief us on intel like the presence of Taliban Red teams, their more equipped forces. They were trying to get a whole picture of what was going on at the time. There was a time that we had a

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 Marines

Named Area of Interest in the parking lot; we had three suspicious individuals there that we suspected to have IEDs. We relayed that info to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). At that point, EOD had been down there with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g as well to help mitigate that threat.

That parking lot was on the western side of the canal, in between it and the water tower.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(3)130b: (b)(6): That parking lot, you received a BOLO for those three individuals?

(2) Answer. No, we spotted them. After watching people for long enough you understand what is out of the baseline, and that is what we were able to do. We passed that info to the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We passed that over VHF and I also passed that face-to-face. Between sniper teams we used black gear 153s and signal chat internally since initially we did not have the correct crypto.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6): Face plan and flow of comms?

(2) Answer. PP: VHF, other than that we had no assets. We also had SATCOM, that never worked. After that it was signal or face to face. Communications would flow back to the battalion CoC.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6): Date and environment of arrival?

(2) Answer. I think it was the 12th or 13th. Sometime during the nighttime. The airfield was a more relaxed environment. Weapons Company got settled in the cafeteria building. We settled down for the night and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got our tasks for the next morning.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6): What was your task those first few days?

(2) Answer. Our team was supposed to hold the frontline initially, in between the 82nd tower and the civilian terminal because the battalion was on the southern side of the airfield at the time. We had looked at 2 separate hide locations. That was before abbey gate was open. Our first position wasn't viable, so we picked the second location. That was day two. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was on the line with Echo Company at the time, on the northern side of the airstrip initially.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 Marines

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Was that your whole section?

(2) Answer. Once we got the mission, our section broke into two shifts. So initially we sent [REDACTED] (b)(6) out to our first site. When I went to replace him, we relocated near inner gate. We were in general support of the battalion at the time.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What happened the third day?

(2) Answer. Once we finished that push to the southern line, the battalion got tasked to open and hold Abbey Gate. My team had been out for a long period of time since journalists were coming in through the civilian terminals. My team was conducting overwatch for them. After that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us we were pushing to Abbey Gate itself. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was going to push up through the crowd to the forward sniper tower. That's when my team got pushed to the inner gate where weapons company was established.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was that disposition again?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) were one team at the inner gate. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was at the outer gate sniper tower. The sniper towers were physically identical in construction.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So, what was the chain of command?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in charge of [REDACTED] (b)(6). I was in charge of [REDACTED] (b)(6). [REDACTED] (b)(6) was in direct support of Echo Company at the time; they were technically part of Echo Company at the time.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Walk me through a team structure, what did [REDACTED] (b)(6) look like?

(2) Answer. Team leader, assistant team leader, radio operator, slack man. For [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Scout Sniper, School Trained was the [REDACTED] (b)(6). His third or fourth deployment with the BN. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was [REDACTED] (b)(6) School-trained sniper. Formerly security forces. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The [REDACTED] (b)(6), second deployment with the battalion, formerly of Echo Company. He didn't have the chance to go to the scout sniper basic course. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was not a school trained sniper, he was formerly with

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 Marines

1/7, he was pulled to the platoon for his level of expertise. They had [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was inexperienced, younger guy, very intelligent. Lastly, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he was very good at his job, very experienced with the Navy but this was his first deployment with Marines. They were dedicated to the platoon, but there were some issues that arose. We did also attach [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from our team. He was not school trained either, this was his second deployment.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was the chain of command and hierarchy? You talked about gathering intel, passing that to the battalion CoC. IRT chain of command who was responsible? The TL, the ATL?

(2) Answer. For [REDACTED] (b)(6) the entire team would go. We didn't look at that as a one-person thing, because everyone sees something different. The whole team would go straight to the S2 to turn into information.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Was that your battle rhythm even prior to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. There was only one day that wasn't abbey gate.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So, when did intel debriefs happen?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was out the whole time. They went back sporadically for rest and refit. We tried to force them to go back to avoid being burnt out. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I would push them back. When [REDACTED] (b)(6) did shift change, a couple times we sent [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) up to the outer gate tower to send [REDACTED] (b)(6) back. All our info drops were during shift changes.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What would a handover look like between two teams?

(2) Answer. We would keep the two junior guys on the gun. I was the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) for [REDACTED] (b)(6) I had my [REDACTED] (b)(6) Myself and my [REDACTED] (b)(6) would brief [REDACTED] (b)(6) on what we saw and any intel that had come down from the guys on the ground or the CoC.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What were your team dynamics, and personalities?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(2) Answer. There was a power struggle with [REDACTED] (b)(6) team leader that started within the platoon. The chief scout is the most senior scout. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had come from the school house together. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) became the [REDACTED] (b)(6) instead of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from [REDACTED] (b)(6) he took that to heart a bit. Once [REDACTED] (b)(6) went to Echo, they kind of secluded themselves a bit after that.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: When did your team get to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. First thing in the morning on Day 3.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What was your battle rhythm at the gate?

(2) Answer. The first day, we were gathering information on our own. Starting the second day, we came first thing in the morning. We wanted more people there before sunrise. We would do a battle hand over with [REDACTED] (b)(6) would go back and brief [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) would start scanning the canal and the open field to the southeast, looking for individuals and seeing where people would come from. If you look east of inner gate, there's another tower there; we would watch individuals from that location sometimes if it could give us better angles on people we were watching. We tried to be clandestine to do that move.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did you spend much time at the outer gate sniper tower?

(2) Answer. A couple hours a day. Towards the end, I was up there sometimes to pull people from the crowds. I would do the same thing from that tower. Scan the crowd, watch the Taliban, see if it was the Taliban red team, looking for people out of the baseline.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: How far down the canal and the corridor could you see from the inner gate tower?

(2) Answer. We couldn't see the chevron. We could see the southern walkway, where it reached the Barron Hotel, the spot where they had initially brought people in. The northern walkway where they pushed people out. We could see the corridor up until the water tower and the entire southern walkway.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

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Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Could you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Not really from our tower. We could see ones that walked up and down the canal, but not the permanent ones at the chevron. The ones we saw didn't do anything, just walked back and forth. A

At some point, people started asking us for help from the canal outside the inner gate tower. If someone showed us a blue passport, we would tell them to group up at our tower. I would throw down E-tape to mark them, tie it around their arm, then cover it, go to the inner gate tower. Wait till you see a tennis ball. Once you see the tennis ball, come across to the tennis ball where we were holding it in the air and hold up their marking.

We would only do one group at a time, switching colors so we knew what we were looking for. The inner gate area was just transportation at that time, after we cleared the area of people. The processing was happening at the outer gate, and we would bring them there before they went into the holding area.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How would you assess the crowd and US Forces ability to manage?

(2) Answer. Originally it was rough trying to manage that amount of people and their desperation. CS gas was employed to disperse the crowds, I know that injured an infant initially, so it switched to Marines with riot shields to force them to the southern side of the canal. At some point we started pulling directly from the canal because it was quicker, I don't know when that started.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: While you were at the outer gate tower could you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yea, there were normally 10 or so there at the Chevron beating down at the crowd with bats or wood sticks to manage the crowd and direct them how they wanted them to move.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you ever see Taliban use their weapons?

(2) Answer. Only in the air, not at the crowds.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(1) Question. AD: Did you get reports saying that [REDACTED] (b)(6) saw that?

(2) Answer. There were reports of the Taliban shooting people, but I never saw that first-hand. Of note, the only way [REDACTED] (b)(6) could communicate was through black gear to us then we would relay back to the CoC. We set up a Sniper Control Center (SCC) solely to relay that information back. We did that the whole time at abbey gate. So, all comms they pushed up would go through us. Comms at the outer corridor just weren't good enough.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b Was there ever a time that the SCC received reports of the Taliban or ISIS conducting an IED probe?

(2) Answer. I assume you have heard that from others. That report was initially from my team, then pushed down. That was the 3 individuals that we had eyes on with a blue duffel bag and tan and black backpack. There was an elderly man we called the shot caller in all white, a guy we called pancake hat because of his traditional hat, and a guy we called bowl cut. This was in the parking lot area; the shot caller was walking back and forth between two white corollas. Pancake hat and bowl cut would come in and out of the picture and talk to him. At one point pancake hat and bowl cut put on a tan pack and black backpack and carried a blue duffel in between them like it was heavy. They walked into the crowd, west along the canal toward the outer gate. I went and briefed [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and asked him to talk to EOD to bring [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g Over the radio we briefed [REDACTED] (b)(6) then I pushed up to them since I knew what they looked like.

While I was walking up, my team saw those guys take a break with the duffel and then keep moving. [REDACTED] (b)(6) and I never saw them, they must have got lost in the crowd [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I pushed up to the chevron telling all the Marines to backup and so we could look for the bag. We were briefing everyone to be careful. Then EOD arrived, set up [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g Then EOD searched a backpack that matched the tan packs description. After that I was constantly seeing tan backpacks.

When I got back, my team told me that those two individuals came back with no backpacks or duffel bag, but allegedly had identical backpacks sitting in the trunk of the cars that they opened. After an hour or so the two individuals who initially carried the backpacks went back into the crowd and reappeared with the bags placing them back into the same car trunk. When they replaced the bag, my team spotted other bags of similar description.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In your experience, do you feel they were up to something nefarious?

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 Marines

(2) Answer. Because no one else was carrying that amount of luggage. People had a backpack, almost no supplies. It was out of the baseline to carry those large bags and be there in the area for that long. I truly believe it was a probing attack to see what we would do, what our strengths and weaknesses were, if we would do anything.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So that was the first time that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To be clear, you believe that specific event was the IED probe people mention?

(2) Answer. I would say so with 90% certainty. EOD came, EOD searched a bag, and our forces pulled back.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That report was initiated by your tower and your team?

(2) Answer. Yes.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Up to that point, what threat streams were you getting at Abbey Gate and from where? Was information ground-up or CoC-down?

(2) Answer. We had multiple reports daily of an IED attack. A gold Corolla or a white Corolla. That's every vehicle. Or told to watch out for an individual with a shaved head, but how do you identify someone based off that. For me, it wasn't if something was going to happen, it was when. The IED threats were continuous. Sometimes from the ground, the signals intelligence guys, or outside entities down there. Sometimes from the CoC-down and we would push it out. So, it was separate sources.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any reports of suspicious people during that time period?

(2) Answer. An individual with a shaved head wearing brown or black. That was a day prior or the day of the explosion. I heard that report from the ground and from 2/1 CoC. We got reports of an explosion that was going to happen at 1630, an hour or 30

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 Marines

minutes before the explosion. I was pulling civilians out of the canal at that time. We all ducked behind that wall. We waited. Nothing happened. We got back to work.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Was that standard procedure for an imminent threat?

(2) Answer. That was the only time we got that report. Once we got that report, I relayed it back to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(6) then I just went ahead and took cover.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What were the hours for your team?

(2) Answer. We were doing 12 on, 12 off for [REDACTED] (b)(6) did continuous operations. If I could go back, I would change that to make them rest and refit more, but you can't go back.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: How many times do you think they went back to rest and refit between the 19th and the 25th?

(2) Answer. Between 4-5 times the whole time.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Who manned the radio at the SCC?

(2) Answer. Either [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) usually. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the platoon (b)(6) he was a communications RO and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't a trained sniper. We would rotate some people through, we didn't want to burn anyone out.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: To confirm, the only reports you received from [REDACTED] (b)(6) to relay back to the CoC, were of that bald individual?

(2) Answer. I would have to say yes. The gold or white corolla could also have come from them, but I think that came from the CoC.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: To clarify, what threats and how often did you push threats back to the CoC?

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 Marines

(2) Answer. Just that probing threat and then the intelligence individuals passing back to keep an eye out for that bald individual.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did you have any interactions with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) did not, they were usually by the outer gate tower.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did they interact with [REDACTED] (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I could not speak accurately to that.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Any interactions with NGO, DoS, or the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a?

(2) Answer. Little interactions with DoS, only when we pulled out marked families with blue passports that we would take to the front of the line. I do know the DoS would shut down at night, I don't know why, but that would lead to a direct standstill.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Back to those individuals in the parking lot, was there ever a point you considered that to be hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. Not that we could prove, no. I maybe could have seen that as hostile intent, but the guys on my team aren't looking to shoot somebody. We are just trying to protect our guys.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: That suspicious individual in black or brown, any other info on what acts he was doing?

(2) Answer. Reports he may have had a bag or suitcase with an IED in it. At some point we got a request for engagement authority because [REDACTED] (b)(6) saw an individual who matched a BOLO. I kind of laughed to myself because so many people could match the BOLO, but passed it up to the CoC, and if I remember we got a do not engage on that matching BOLO.

I didn't have eyes on, but I can tell you that there were a ton of people who matched that description. Whoever they saw didn't have a giant neon sign over his head saying

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Marines

that he was the bomber. I can show you pictures of the crowd and could show you a bunch of guys with a bald head that matched the BOLO description. The BOLO was just middle-aged man, black or brown dress, bald head, some kind of backpack.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Where did that BOLO originate from? The ground intel?

(2) Answer. I would have heard the BOLO relayed from [REDACTED] (b)(6) They got it from the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a guys, I think. Then I would have heard it from higher as well.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a gather and pass up intel?

(2) Answer. I may be speaking incorrectly; it was someone outside of the battalion. It may have been signal intelligence guys. The only thing I can tell you definitively is that it came back from [REDACTED] (b)(6) to us.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you remember what day you saw that 'probe' from the parking lot?

(2) Answer. 2 or maybe 3 days before the 26th.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Based on your recollection from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d receiving a brief on RoE, was there ever a time while you were on the ground that the RoE changed?

(2) Answer. No.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You said [REDACTED] (b)(6) did request to engage a target. When was that? What happened with that request?

(2) Answer. Probably noon of the 26th. We relayed the request back to the CoC via VHF, it was denied, we relayed that forward. All that [REDACTED] (b)(6) said was they had an individual matching a BOLO. Knowing their team and their team leader, that was their mindset. It was kill or be killed, and that wasn't the right mentality to have.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You're a school trained sniper, known as a hunter of gunmen (HOG) with 4 deployments. If (b)(6) had engaged, what other concerns would you have had?

(2) Answer. My biggest concern is what if he had a blue passport. What if he is an American. Or if he has a bomb and it still blows up. What if you miss. What if you hit another individual. It's a close shot, but it's possible to miss. Somebody can move in that environment in a quarter of a second, so civilian casualties could occur.

I can't speak for (b)(6) we hadn't zeroed our weapons in two weeks, we weren't zeroed to that elevation.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How often would snipers normally zero?

(2) Answer. On my second deployment, we would zero monthly at (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d. On my third deployment at the embassy, we could only do a fifty-yard zero, pretty frequently. On our last deployment we did ranges constantly and tried to zero every time, but I can't speak for (b)(6)

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: On the 24th, 25th, 26th how would you describe the crowd?

(2) Answer. Going into a mosh pit at a concert. As days went on the crowds got worse and worse. The canal was full of a sea of people. Men trampling women and children trying to save their own hides.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any change in threat reporting?

(2) Answer. As time went on, we received more and more IED threats, but they were still very generalized.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How did US posture change?

(2) Answer. Initially we were heightened, but as time went on it became more relaxed. People took off PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) in the outer corridor, things you wouldn't do. People were getting tired; line companies weren't getting to rest. That's why we took overwatch so seriously, at least we had some rest.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

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Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) teams posture change?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) got more relaxed, taking their PPE off. That's when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were taking trips over there, telling them to put their PPE on. We would go and see them not wearing their gear, behind the gun, in front of an open window.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You had only been in the unit for 6 months before you deployed, would you have anticipated this behavior beforehand?

(2) Answer. We knew there would be disconnect. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had some animosity since he was no longer the most senior sniper in the platoon, so we knew there would be some disconnect. For Example [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would reach out about their training plan or try to coordinate them to come shoot with us in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and they would ignore us or complain to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get out of it.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was your interaction with company and battalion leadership down at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I sought them out if I had important information to pass. We kept [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the loop when we could find him, but that was difficult to find people.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did leadership visit the gate?

(2) Answer. I can only remember [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to our position once just to see what we could see.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did command teams spend more time at the outer gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was frequently visited.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) pass those visits back to you?

(2) Answer. No. I feel they left us out of the loop on a lot of stuff. They would pass back pertinent information, but that was about it. They would pass info like that back in real time for us to pass back to battalion.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How did debriefs occur again?

(2) Answer. We would do debriefs in person with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the battalion CoC.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) do with that information?

(2) Answer. I don't know. I think he took it to the overall command in the same building, but I couldn't tell you. I know there was a higher S2 for all forces on the ground at HKIA.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How much interaction did you have with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I only saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) post-blast. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) interacted with to report the three individuals with the bags, then I would see him occasionally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked me in the eye, and he told me that he had a meeting with the Taliban the day prior, and he said that he was assured that nothing would happen. It put a distaste in my mouth that he was relying on the word of the people who had been our enemy thirty minutes ago. I had known (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from my second deployment, I had been attached to his platoon.

I know we needed Taliban support; I just didn't like that he was relying on their word and was not concerned about my report of an IED probe. I went to relay as soon as we saw that, and I didn't like that he wasn't concerned.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you interact with the battalion sergeant major or the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. No, they may have come to our tower once.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How often would you identify suspicious persons?

(2) Answer. Maybe once a day. Nothing actionable or worth passing out on the ground, just in our debriefs.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Anyone that you saw that fit engagement criteria during your at the gate?

(2) Answer. No, no one that I saw fit engagement criteria.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Your teams did not receive a formal RoE brief, so what did your team perceive as RoE?

(2) Answer. We did not. The perception was self-defense or defense of coalition forces or American citizens. That was clear across all our team members.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Okay, moving forward, walk me through night of the 25th and the day of the 26th?

(2) Answer. We would have changed over around 1600 or 1700 on the 25th. Done our debrief with (b)(6) then pushed back to our debrief with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved back to our staging area in cafeteria and prep our gear for the next day. Then we would bed down and wake up the next morning. We would get in our hotwired vehicle and push it down the road to get it started, then put our gear in, head down to the gate and changeover with (b)(6)

As time went on, there were spots behind our tower, south of the canal, inside of the inner gate where people would try to get over. (b)(6) had been using flashbangs to deter them which would work but people kept trying to probe ways to get in. Nothing hostile, just people trying to get out of the country.

The morning continued, reports coming in. Around 1000 or 1200 word would have come from (b)(6) of the BOLO they got from signal intelligence or (b)(1)1.4a for us to relay to the CoC their request for engagement authority on that individual. Never had anyone that had hostile intent or actions though.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did they ever show anyone that BOLO?

(2) Answer. No, they only could have done that by showing me a picture and I have never seen a picture like that.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) You were in the inner gate tower when the report from (b)(6) came through, do you know who received that report?

(2) Answer. I don't remember who took it. I remember it was through the black gear radio, so I heard it. I took the radio. I confirmed they were requesting to engage. They said they had an individual who matched description of a BOLO who they wanted to engage. I immediately passed the info via VHF to the CoC and their request to engage. I don't know who would have received that report in the CoC. Some Cpl or LCpl.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did a leader ever get on the net to get further info?

(2) Answer. There were times that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would get on the radio to ask for clarification. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was good about giving us extra information on existing threat streams.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) To be specific, we have heard that the (b)(6) went to (b)(6) position to see the target. Do you know if that happened?

(2) Answer. I don't know. We never got a report saying they talked to the (b)(6) I couldn't tell you where the (b)(6) was at that time.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Was there anything to justify the request to engage other than matching a BOLO?

(2) Answer. No, there was no PID or hostile intent. I'll say it again, I laughed when they sent that request, there was just nothing there to identify this individual as a threat.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Was the crowd different on the 26th?

(2) Answer. The desperation was higher. Everyone knew the deadline. Other gates were closing which increased the number of people we had. The crowd became a lot larger and a lot more aggressive. There were times that I was pulling people out of the canal, and they would grab my leg or my foot and pull.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did Marine posture change in response to the crowd change?

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Marines

(2) Answer. From what I remember, a Marine had been pulled into the crowd and recovered. I think we increased our posture. Just increasing the footprint that we had there.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Were you aware of the perimeter collapsing from the footbridge to the outergate sniper tower?

(2) Answer. From the original plan, the plan was to use the gate as an ECP. Then Marines pushed out and the chevron was emplaced. After they pushed out the gate, I don't remember a collapse.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Were you aware of a RIP between Echo and Golf on the 25th?

(2) Answer. No, I was not aware of that RIP at the time. I remember at some point one company echeloned back for rest and refit for a day, but I couldn't tell you who that was.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. The blast happened at 1736, where were you prior to that?

(2) Answer. My team was RIPing with [REDACTED] (b)(6) while I was pulling civilians and got the imminent threat. On my way back, there was a young boy that was unconscious, so I drove him back to the medical area. After that I drove back to the tower, loaded the team up, went back to our staging area. We knew we were leaving soon, and we had enough gear to sustain operations as two separate teams. We brought everything we needed, because I knew that we weren't going to get more gear later. We each must have weighed 500 lbs, but I wanted us to have the equipment we needed. So, the team went to try and find pelican cases to carry our gear and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to do our debrief for us.

While we were doing that, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sent us a message on signal telling us to come meet him at the staging area now. We got there. He told us to go back to Abbey Gate. We went with him; he filled us in that he had seen the blast happen on ISR. I sent my guys back to the tower and gave them priorities of work and gave them sectors of fires to the members with me in the vehicle. When we got back to the inner gate, everyone got out except for me and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and then we drove to the outer gate to make sure no vehicles were needed for the medical evacuation.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Who was in the inner gate tower at the time of the blast?

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Marines

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

III. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. AD: What did you and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) see at the outer gate?

(2) Answer. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and asked him if everyone was evacuated. He said yes. At that point I knew we would break down from the outer gate to the inner gate. I made a plan to create a MACO gate at the inner gate and set up staging areas inside the inner gate for the two companies that had been at the gate. I made a plan to mark off company areas with different color chem lights. I'm sorry that happened later.

After I heard the casualties were evacuated, we went back to the inner gate and linked up with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I heard someone near the CONEX box yell that they needed a sniper. I ran up and grabbed the M110 and we went to the CONEX box and there were army guys there. I asked them what they needed, they said they saw people running. I said there were people everywhere, but I set up and looked SE to where there was some vegetation that you couldn't see from our tower. While I was there, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up and I told him I needed him to find [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I asked him if there was an update to the RoE, if we needed hostile act or hostile intent. He told me, and I took this with a grain of salt, "if they point at you, drop them". I wanted to know this since everyone was running away; if someone was running towards us or had a weapon, was that hostile act or intent. I just wanted clarification since the situation had changed.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did you check on [REDACTED] (b)(6) while at the outer gate?

(2) Answer. At some point, I think while I was on the CONEX, or while I was driving down there, I ran into the 81s platoon commander, I think it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He told me [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had been hit, but not hit bad. Later, I got off the CONEX box. I started thinking like a Plt Sgt. There was an MRAP near the inner gate, I wanted to push that to the gate in case any threats came down from the outer gate but also to help [REDACTED] (b)(6) echelon gear back.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did you ever link in or see [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I took [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with me to the tower the second time to help them echelon gear out, since I wanted them to be the last ones out to keep overwatch. I told them to keep the M107 in case there was some kind of VBIED, so that they would have the capability to engage. Telling him that was my own interaction with him.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Who was in the tower at the time?

(2) Answer. I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the tower. I think they had just ND'ed a pen flare in the tower, they were flustered. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was just walking up to the tower when we got there.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you see any leadership during this time?

(2) Answer. Only [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). During that second trip is when I discussed setting up that staging area inside the inner gate.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Was there ever a point that you asked what happened?

(2) Answer. At that point, I was well read in from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Once I knew that all casualties were back inside the outer gate, I didn't have other immediate concerns.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you recall what time you got on the scene?

(2) Answer. Absolutely not.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What happened next?

(2) Answer. When I got back to the inner gate, I realized that no one was doing anything. People were shellshocked. Some nonurgent casualties were there. I took charge a bit, tasked people to set up a perimeter and establish staging areas. There was a group of random Marines from some company pulling a gaggle of a perimeter near our tower, I pulled them and moved them to try and establish a uniform perimeter. We had the 107 facing the southeast in case any vehicles came up the corridor to try and detonate a VBIED. At some point I got pulled into a platoon sergeant circle, I don't know what was discussed. At some point I took some of my guys that weren't engaged and set up a new CCP with our one dedicated vehicle in case something happened again. I relayed to the other Plt Sgt that I did this.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any contact or observation of the Taliban during this time?

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Marines

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No, it was almost like a wasteland. The area cleared out.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How much longer were you on the gate?

(2) Answer. Until the next morning.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: During that period did you see any shots or hostile acts?

(2) Answer. We saw one vehicle's headlights through the trees near sunset. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) yelled down that a vehicle was coming, he was on the M107. I told him if a vehicle was coming around the corner, I told him to shoot and aim for the engine block to disable it. But that was it, no other probes. I was standing on the CONEX box at one point (b)(3)130b, saw an individual in all black running through the trees. I told him to shoot if he saw a weapon, but that guy just disappeared. There were never any shots fired that I know of while I was at the gate.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you go up to the outer gate again?

(2) Answer. No, forces echeloned back 30 minutes or so after I left the outer gate. Forces moved back in a column; they would say what company they were with as they came through the inner gate. The Marines I had assigned would tell them which chem light trail to follow depending on which company they were with, in order to get to their respective staging areas. I remember it being a coordinated retrograde.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you have any more coordination with (b)(6) to retrograde them?

(2) Answer. I don't know if they retrograded in the rear, I was dealing with company-level concerns at that point so I couldn't speak to that. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was relaying info to the CoC over the radio and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in charge of the team. Once (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got back, I told him to go check on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) see if they could see him. I didn't know how bad he was injured; I was trying to boost their morale. When they got back, I told them to bed down. (b)(6) took security. We set up an antimaterial rifle aimed down the inner corridor from the MRAP in case of a VBIED.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when he came back?

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Marines

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. He was pretty shaken up. Our two corpsmen were devastated.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: At the time, did anyone say that they had seen the bomber beforehand?

(2) Answer. No. I know some people believe they had PID on the bomber, but that was hours prior that they saw the suspicious individual and they didn't have enough to act on.

aaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you communicate with the CoC again after that?

(2) Answer. No, I was dealing with company concerns. I was putting myself at points of contention to fill gaps. Subordinate leaders covered down on some of that.

bbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Who were the SIGINT guys you mentioned?

(2) Answer. I didn't have tons of interactions with them, I don't know if it was them; I believe they were there, but I can't say with certainty.

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: To reconfirm, where were you at the time of the blast and who was in the tower?

(2) Answer. I was in a warehouse. (b)(6) was in the tower, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gun looking toward the tower.

dddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Who from your section, (b)(6) who was in the tower at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he says that all he saw was a flash and thought it was an IED.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: That being said, did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) see or hear anything else following the blast?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(2) Answer. No. If you are referencing shooting, [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d during our time at Abbey Gate, we could hear that clear as day. I wasn't there so I couldn't tell you definitively yes or no, but no one mentioned shooting after the fact.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Are you still close with the other snipers? When's the last time you saw those guys?

(2) Answer. Yes. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about 4 months ago before I left. I don't keep contact with [REDACTED] (b)(6). I have tried to reach out to them, but they are black on comms. After the blast, it felt like them against the world. I think they point a finger at me and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for not granting engagement criteria. I have no regret on that, however; there was no indication that he was the bomber. If they had seen the guy walk up and blow himself up, I might have some regret. However, that's not what happened.

If they had really thought it was a credible threat to engage, why would their team lead and assistant team lead leave to go do a reset and refit? If I thought there was a legitimate threat, I would never do that. I would never leave the gun. But they were running their own show, they would kind of run rogue, they wouldn't tell us when they were leaving to do a rest and refit.

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: When they went back to refit, how many people were in the tower?

(2) Answer. 2 or 3. They had 7 total.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What are your thoughts on some of this info coming out now on social media or other venues?

(2) Answer. It's hard to tell. It really is. I think that they believe the story that they are telling, but I don't think they are recalling the story accurately. I think they feel betrayed and let down, like justice isn't being done. But I believe that as we move forward, when is the last time that a large-scale casualty happened in our military? There are times this has happened before in our history that it hasn't come up to this level. I know they feel mistreated, but they are leaving out details. Why not say that they left to do rest and refit and then the bombing happened? In my opinion, that blows up your story on how credible you think that threat is because you are willing to leave the tower.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Who do you mean when you say 'they' feel mistreated?

(2) Answer. I can't speak for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he was kicked out of the platoon shortly after we got back. We didn't want to kick him out of the platoon, but he had some [REDACTED] (b)(6) that we couldn't keep him in the platoon anymore.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What were the team dynamics of the platoon when you returned?

(2) Answer. I can't correctly speak to that. We got back on Wednesday. Then we went on two weeks of leave. Right after that [REDACTED] (b)(6). That was end of October, so I wasn't back around the unit until the beginning of January. Everyone had started transitioning in their careers by that point.

kkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you ever visit [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. No. I tried to reach out to a nonprofit to fly us out, but no luck.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How much longer were you in 2/1?

(2) Answer. 10 months, until I got out.

mmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Are you in a chat group or in touch with other snipers?

(2) Answer. I am in one with my team that gets used often, then one from the entire platoon that doesn't get used much at all.

nnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Have you all discussed some current events about this, how do they feel?

(2) Answer. We are confused. I believe [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is trying to stand up for the families and the wounded. I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is digging some of the families' wounds deeper. I talk to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mostly.

oooo. Question and Answer 118.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Have you given interviews or spoken to anyone about this?

(2) Answer. No. I believe in my privacy. I don't have social media.

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How often do you consume news or media about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I'll probably do a search on it once a month, just to see what people are saying about it.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Anything you've seen that you particularly disagree with?

(2) Answer. Yes, I do not believe that [REDACTED] (b)(6) had PID on the bomber just someone of many who looked like a BOLO.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Have you heard some of those stories about Service Members being shot post blast?

(2) Answer. I remember hearing that the whole time. I remember when the report came out, the investigation found that there were no gunshots. I remember some guys were disgruntled about it. But shots only could have come from the water tower, the chevron, or the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1 tower. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1 tower was in the hotel. The only spot that would have had eyes on to engage the blast site was the water tower.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer. I really don't think I have anything else to add, we have covered most of it. My biggest thing that I look back at is why the DoS thought they could maintain a diplomatic footprint while Kabul was being taken over. It felt like a last-minute cry for help, and we were put in a bad situation. The timeline was set prior to August.

ttttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Anyone else that you recommend we talk to?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b: [REDACTED] (b)(6) was in charge of the night shift of Abbey Gate and was the leader in back sniper tower when it happened [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my [REDACTED] (b)(6); he was with me when the blast happened. I know you've reached out to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if you can, but he is [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) right now. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be a good one.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Marines

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 11/01/2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 23. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Making Statement)

11/01/2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1 NOV 2023
DATE

~~CUI~~

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

01 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 01 November 2023, BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) (b)(6), to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Given that there are multiple interviewers, questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted as C1, those asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) those asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and those asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Do you recall what you were doing prior to notification.

(2) Answer. So, we initially had some news to prep; we started practicing search lanes and establishing SOPs a week before we no-shit got the call that we were going. I was in 2/1, Scout Sniper Plt. We were at (b)(1)1.44 as part of Crisis-Response.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Did you remember ROE. Can you give examples?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. Typical ROE brief, roughly two days before we pushed. I remember areas that were not clear because of the complexity. 1st cordon of security around Kabul and the ANA would hold. Once we got that changed...we questioned what our ROE was. Can we engage, or the legality of it. The brief was standard.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Were you aware that if someone fired on you, you could return fire?

(2) Answer. Yes

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Tell me about how you got into Afghanistan and what you saw.

(2) Answer. We were watching. We had a tent set up to watch live feed of the drones or ATO was send as part of Echo. We were pumped and wanted to see. In the tent, we were getting notification of TICs around the compound. We were watching drone feeds seeing mass crowds and vehicles around the airport. How we got there we 2nd plt of Echo. The rest of our team 5 guys, we don't know how the landing was going to be. At that point, the airfield was flooded by Afghans. Get ready to pop smoke and be ready from a 6-hour flight from (b)(1)1.4a As soon as we got off, it was like arriving at LAX. We jumped off ready to face the enemy in a 360 security perimeter and there was nothing out there; we saw a luggage cart. It was nighttime. I believe it was the 14th of August. I couldn't be sure. I know it was around the 14th or 15th.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. It's nighttime getting set up; what was your first day on Abbey?

(2) Answer. About 2 days in to being where we got tasking. We got word that we were going to open Abbey Gate. Initially, the gates were closed and there was a sniper tower manned by (b)(1)1.4 in the position initially. Scouted out fields of fire. From there, all hell broke loose. There was a sea of people and no established SOP on how to get them in after we opened the gate. Initially, we tried to pull people in one at a time, but that created chaos. Finally, I don't remember exactly how we got the gate open but it was two platoons' worth of Marines and some (b)(1)1.4 just pushing thru. It was funny I brought my med pack but got stuck up the against the wall. They started throwing tear gas. There were about 6-8 Marines stuck out from the initial front we created. It took hour 2-3 hours to get order.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Once initial order was established what was your primary role?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We had about initially six guys on our team. At Afghanistan we had 7 guys from another sniper team. A lot of people for being in a tower about the size of this room. Initially there were to be a pig that is what they want they're corpsman to be. Two on the gun, one person looking out the window or running comms. Sleeping. For the first 3 to 4 days, that was my primary role assisting. As the crowd grew, we got more casualties. From that point on I was a [REDACTED] (b)(6) providing aid to the locals and that stuff. Can I look at my phone? So, we got there the 16th to Afghanistan, and to Abbey Gate was the 19th. The 21st was when I went hands-off with the team and was primarily providing aid. I would just make rounds along the canal and then the Marines here (shared the overlay). Primarily, I would make rounds near-side of canal to the west and to the east to the foot bridge, where we would house the refugees, giving them food and water and medical aid that they might need. Basically, the whole area.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Have you seen the pic of the blast? If you have any pictures that would help us, we would appreciate them and will not attribute them to you.

(2) Answer. Yes

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Tell us about the leadership?

(2) Answer. Saw the [REDACTED] (b)(6) once while I was roaming; he asked how it was going. It was brief, very short. The rest of our company would cycle through. Occasionally, I would see [REDACTED] (b)(6) - [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Were you receiving threat streams?

(2) Answer. Yes, in the first threat that we had there were two bags that we located before we shut the near-side canal to strictly Marines. There were refugees all along here. This was the IED probe. I believe my team leader, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), I believe he ID'd it. Within 2-3 days, we were already picking up suspicious personnel doing suspicious activity. I don't remember the specific reasons for calling that out. After that was a pause and we stopped processing. EOD came up to the bag and said it was nothing.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Were you tracking those holding those bags? Some people we interviewed said that they had bags and were moving throughout the crowd, EOD searched and did not find anything. You guys called out EOD, took appropriate threat mitigations and EOD checked it out?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. I believe it was an older gentleman.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. How was the Taliban interacting with the civilians and military?

(2) Answer. Very forcefully. It was very strange to be from me to you to the Taliban; also, just seeing the things they were doing to Afghans. They would beat them, execute them on the backside of the Chevron.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. With your own eyes you saw the Taliban shoot somebody? Impact, and the person fall? How often? Where?

(2) Answer. Yes. I only saw it twice. Once on the top of the Barron Hotel and we did witness some executions on the backside of the Chevron. I was physically part of the recon. I only saw one. I was facing towards the back room on top of the Barron. We were patrolling that area. While the guys in the tower took pictures. There was a makeshift hide sight. I don't know if I have pictures of the hide sight. As far as that hide sight no I don't really.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Any pictures of suspicious persons?

(2) Answer. Only pictures taken on the team camera.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Common practice to take pictures?

(2) Answer. I do have those pictures but that was of Taliban on top of the Chevron. When they started pointing out suspicious persons I was in the outer corridor.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Where were you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. At this point, we split up into an Alpha and Bravo element along the fence line. We had just gotten back, and I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were still parking the vehicle. I went to the tower asking where [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went on the canal. At the time of the blast, I was right (here) east of U-shaped barriers next to the fence.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Time of blast what were you doing?

(2) Answer. Earlier, we had a flash bang go off. That is what I thought happened. But the ringing in my ears, I knew it was more than that. So, after that I hit the ground and oriented myself toward the blast to a plume of smoke. I felt the concussion and oriented towards where the sound was coming from. Immediately after that, I started making my way to the hole in the fence. One Marine was on fire. 1-2 guys grabbed him.

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6). I had him lean forward and then they started setting up the evacuation vehicle. I treated 8 people. From there, I started seeing more casualties in my peripheral view. I realized this is a mass casualty situation and moved on to the next. After that, there was another Marine I saw they were working on, Staff Sergeant Hoover. There were already 2-3 corpsman working on him. I moved to the next person. He took a ball bearing. I pressure-wrapped that. After about 6 patients, I started to hear [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) calling my name. When I heard him, I remembered looking for [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was why I was going out of the gate. They brought [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the base of the tower. That was a hard one. It was hard with all of them, but this was a guy I'd been with for over two years. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) He still had his flak on, and there were holes burned through it. I took it off and started assessing his [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were communicating with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trying to get his attention. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) I told him to just focus on me and he realized that I was there to get his mind to calm down a little bit [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) A lot of the trauma was not like how we typically practice. With these guys it was complex, because the ball bearings were tiny. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) There was a [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. For your team the pre deployment training you did before Afghanistan you gave your guys saved lives. A lot of your guys told us it was muscle memory because of your training. If you weren't doing it yourself, you were a force multiplier. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would not be alive. Do you know where he went?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Do you remember any threat streams on the 25th that got everyone interested, or the morning of the 26th?

(2) Answer. This is probably why we set up the CCP. Early morning, between 8-10 a.m., we received intel from the (b)(1)1.4 that an IED was imminent. I remember it being passed down. So, we had the morning of the 25th we had a vehicle staged with a little orphanage that was for misplaced kids. I was sleeping in one of those vans. I was woken up and told in 10-15 minutes be prepared there is going to be an IED going off. Actions, generally we would halt processing. I know that some of the Marines that were in position that could be compromised, they would take cover. Behind the gate, we just got med bags ready.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Do you remember any specific descriptions?

(2) Answer. I don't remember the description. Just word that they got someone. I did see the pictures. I was not in the tower at that point.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Were you aware of a conversation with the (b)(6) in the tower?

(2) Answer. I was not in the tower with the (b)(6)

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Do you recall a request for engagement authority for an individual in the crowd?

(2) Answer. I know of them talking about it, but I was never there. They said (b)(1)1.4a gave them a description.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Do you remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he would've have been a (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I saw him (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the base of the tower.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Anything about the day of the blast, before or after, that we need to know?

(2) Answer. You guys had mentioned that when we retrograded from the foot bridge. It was something that I thought was odd. The 25th and early morning of the 26th, we were getting ready to shut down.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Do you remember units or anyone in particular coming to the tower?

(2) Answer. We would always get special guests that wanted to see from the tower. All kinds of different countries and militaries.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. How much have you been watching social media from the members of your sniper team? Do you agree with their assertions/assessments?

(2) Answer. A lot. Yes, but not particularly. Nothing specifically that I disagree with.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Did you keep any types of logs?

(2) Answer. The tower had observations logs, but I didn't keep any type of logs.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. What about ROE?

(2) Answer. A lot of people were questioning our actions if we witnessed the Taliban engage because we had no way of differentiating whether someone was an American or not, an ally or not. Could we engage? I just remember a lot of it was that if you were fired upon, you could engage, because it was hard to determine what country they were from.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. It has been said that the sniper team was constantly picking up on suspicious persons. Can you describe the frequency?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. It was like they were scouting us and stemmed from the back parking lot. A vehicle would drive up and sometimes they would rifle through the trunk and not taking anything out. Sometimes they would just be talking on the phone. No urgency, they didn't fit the urgency of why most people were there. It was like they were not fitting the norm.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. Could you ID a pic of someone who was being watched?

(2) Answer. Potentially. Yeah, I'd remember.

(Shown image) I know that guy in the black, bald. I think that I've seen the guy with the hat (pancake hat guy). The description was that he was clean-shaven and wearing black garments. I have this picture from 8 a.m. (facing toward the east side).

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. When wounded would come, do you remember what happened to their kits? If someone had a kit, was it likely to get back?

(2) Answer. We had a pile; there was a white van. There was a pile of rifles. The Marine would stand by for a second and say here's their kit, here's their rifle. Not sure, there was a pile of rifles, I know we took all the rifles. I remember seeing a stack (kits) next to the rifles. I think they took it away. I'm sorry I don't remember what happened exactly. I remember clipping [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and setting it off to the side.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Was there a standard of where the Marines kept their tourniquets? Did you see anyone practicing with it? or problems with their medical equipment?

(2) Answer. A lot of the platoons have their own SOPs. As far as my guys on the team, we had it standardized. We would have one on the kit, and one in either shoulder pocket or in the leg pocket. The way we trained is to take it from the patient, but because people (units) set up differently, I just took one from my aid bag.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6)

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Did you get the FMF Pin.

(2) Answer. Yes. I did it actually prior to leaving for Afghanistan. There are others who should definitely receive their FMF pins, such as [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Anyone else I should speak to?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Review

1. Throughout the Supplemental Review of the Abbey Gate Investigation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided a statement on 1 November 2023. The statement was transcribed contemporaneous to the witness providing the account of events.
2. At the conclusion of the interview the witness had an opportunity to review the written statement and agreed that statement made was accurate and given freely and willfully.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

03 NOV 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

1. On 03 November 2023, [REDACTED] conducted an interview of the above person at [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] answered verbally. [REDACTED] recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by [REDACTED] will be denoted by [REDACTED] and questions by [REDACTED] will be denoted by [REDACTED].

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What is your name and when did you get to 2/1?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED], I joined the unit in October 2016. I joined the sniper platoon later that month. I was an [REDACTED] [REDACTED] during my 6 years in the platoon. I went to sniper school in 2020; I did not pass. I went through the advanced infantry course and infantry small-unit leader's course just prior. After I didn't pass, [REDACTED] and I went to the Foreign Security Force Advisor course. That was the last school I did before we deployed. We were trying to pull more people into the platoon right before we deployed; once we got back from deployment, we pulled in another 2.

c. Question and Answer 2.~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Talk to me about that deployment

(2) Answer. The MAGTF deployment was very mellow. We were on standby in case something happened. We would do a range, then just stay busy. Most days we didn't have anything to do, so we were in the tent all day unless we were in the field or actively training at [REDACTED], it was very relaxed.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: When did you hear you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. Afghanistan was on the radar the whole time. Initially, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I were going to go to [REDACTED] but that got shut down. [REDACTED] was with Echo Company in [REDACTED] and they were getting a lot of talks about the Taliban coming back. This was probably just prior to July, because we went to Jordan to train in July. So, right before that those conversations happened between Weapons Company and [REDACTED] then. It wasn't on the radar again until Afghanistan was falling, even then, we were on standby until the embassy actually fell.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you do any NEO'specific training?

(2) Answer. No, we had no idea what we would be doing. We did map recon and I used snapchat to see what was going on in the area via like home video. We had to decide which equipment to carry. We decided not to use our connex in case it didn't make it, so we hand carried all our carry. We were only one of two machine guns to make it into HKIA for Weapons Company. I was the [REDACTED] at that time, [REDACTED] was kind of our B Team, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Prior to going to Afghanistan did you get any intel or operations update?

(2) Answer. They showed the team leaders' and the assistant team leaders' drone imagery of the airport and told us they were trying to keep the airport clear. They were trying to get more Marines in, but apparently 24th MEU was having a hard time getting people in which made it hard for us to get approval to go in. We were looking at map imagery to maybe push out to some apartment buildings south of the airport, but that never happened. Other than that, we were going in blind; we didn't know what we were being tasked with – whether we would be on the line, doing overwatch, doing surveillance or reconnaissance or what, so we just brought everything we had. We

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

knew there was an evacuation, and that it was a NEO, but we didn't know the extent of our direct involvement.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did they talk about Rules of Engagement?

(2) Answer. The JAG came to all of Weapons Company CP maybe a day or two, or a week, before we went. We knew for sure that we were going at the time. I can't remember the day, specifically. I think the RoE, which changed once we started working with the Taliban, I think it was generic, essentially don't shoot someone that's unarmed, with no hostile intent/hostile act. I don't remember anything particular about it.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Any defense of others like American Citizens?

(2) Answer. We were told at some point that that was the case, but I believe that was a command discretion RoE, not in the pre-brief, based on what we had to do on the ground.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How did the RoE change as you linked in with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. It was weird seeing Taliban in direct support of the battalion. We were basically told that if they shot at the crowd, we couldn't do anything unless we saw an American passport holder in direct peril. We couldn't engage or kill the Taliban unless we saw that. There was lots of weapons pointing for the duration, but we couldn't engage, even if we saw executions, unless we saw a blue passport.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We arrived during the daytime, on August 17th. We stayed in [REDACTED] on the night of the 16th of August, then departed at 0600 on the 17th.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was it like when you got on ground?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] and I went to do the leader's recon with [REDACTED] and I can't remember any other officers. We were trying to make the transition for the rest of the company easier. We got there, we landed, and you could hear constant shots in the distance. We walked off the airfield into the cafeteria where Echo and Weapons

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

Companies established themselves [REDACTED] and I went to see [REDACTED] who had been there since he arrived with Echo on the day of the 16th. We got a rundown from him on what was happening. Then it was wait until we got a task.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You and [REDACTED] were the only ones to arrive on the 17th?

(2) Answer. From our platoon, yes. The rest of the platoon arrived the evening of the 17th, they were just on a later flight.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What mission guidance did you receive at that point?

(2) Answer. Organize gear and prepare for whatever tasking we had. Get our surveillance equipment, rifle, and ammunition staged in an area where it could be collected. The first mission we got was to provide overwatch for a platoon on the southern edge of the airfield. We set up positions in a couple airplanes, we did that for 2-3 days – me, [REDACTED] and a platoon of Echo were adjacent to us, set up in a communications tower that was 2 or 3 stories high. We were adjacent to them, more to the east about 200-300 meters in the boneyard of the airplanes. That started the 18th, then it was only two more days, and we left that position on the night of the 19th.

We gave overwatch to Echo Company who was escorting a bunch of reporters. We were watching the ANA since they were acting sketchy at that point, leaving and moving with about 50-100 vehicles, so we were watching them to make sure they wouldn't fire on Echo Company or the reporters and their families. Once we completed that, we went back to the mess area then a day or two went by until 2/1 took over Abbey Gate.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Abbey Gate opened the 19th, what was your mission at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] team was the most rested at the time, so they took the more forward tower position. We wanted to work a rotation with them to make sure they could get some more rest, we had to force them to do that a few times since they didn't want to leave their tower. We were at the inner gate sniper tower, and [REDACTED] ran the night shift at the inner gate sniper tower.

They had a lot of trouble with comms at the outer gate sniper tower, so they pushed comms to us. Somehow, we were the only ones that had comms with the COC. So, [REDACTED] would relay information back to us, and we would tell each other what we were seeing. From the inner tower, we could see to the water tower, where our field of

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

view ended, so we watched the parking lot there and along the canal. The Taliban had some very overt patrols there, guys with weapons and ammo all over them. There were other individuals that were suspicious, they looked like a bad guy, but they were not overt, they didn't have a weapon. They just acted outside of the baseline.

The description of the typical Taliban fighter was dirty, with a Turban, looking like they had been traveling around for days.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Was this your first deployment to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. To Afghanistan, it was. It was not [REDACTED] first time though. [REDACTED] was an intel officer and the battalion intel officer, [REDACTED] would review what the guys we were seeing. Everyone agreed, based on how they looked at everyone around them, it was every red flag that you could possibly have gone off in your head.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So suspicious was more of a demeanor than a behavior?

(2) Answer. Some, yes. But there were others, we had IED BOLOs going off every day, we tried to identify those as much as we could. To back up, there were kids that would go up, observe inside the gate, then run off. To us, it didn't appear they were trying to look for a way to get in, they were focused inside. It could have been curiosity, but some of them were 17-18. We were kind of building a narrative in our own head, but even looking back it makes sense that they were looking in to gather information for someone else. It didn't look like curiosity. Meanwhile, on the other side of the field we saw them build a structure on the side of a house with a tunnel. They weren't the homeowners; we saw the homeowners giving them water jugs. Sometimes that construction would send a guy out to the middle of the field to do a line-of-sight survey to our tower. We assumed they were building a fighting position in case we stayed past the 31st. We just saw weird things happening.

[REDACTED] was reporting people getting executed in the streets prior to the Chevron being emplaced. Civilians said there were bodies piled up after the Chevron was emplaced. I never saw that with my own eyes.

There was one time that there were two guys in the parking lot, the older heavy-set guy directing the younger one. At one point, he just nodded his head. Then, both men opened the trunk of their car, put on back packs, and started buddy carrying a heavy duffel bag. That was the first huge time that we tried to get EOD down there. We passed visual of those guys off to [REDACTED] who eventually lost them. Once EOD got there, [REDACTED] ran off with them to link up with [REDACTED] and try to find those packs in the crowd. It was two Nike backpacks, but there were thousands of those in the crowd. EOD thinks they

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

found one bag, but it was just clothes. The two guys eventually returned to the car without any bags and then departed. We didn't see those guys again.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What do you think that was, clothes drop off, a probe?

(2) Answer. It could have been either. You're never going to know unless you talk to them. The outcome was, showing our TTPs for if there was an IED in the crowd. Creating a cordon around it, moving the crowd, bringing the dogs in to check for explosives. Any bad actors could also see our response time to an event like that.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You mentioned the possibility of staying past the 31st, were you tracking that as the cutoff date?

(2) Answer. Yes, that's why the whole event was so rushed at the end of August. Until the blast though, there was some speculation that we might not stick to that date. After the blast though, we were absolutely gone by the 31st.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: So prior to the blast, did you get word that the 31st was going to change?

(2) Answer. Nothing official, just rumors.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How did you receive those IED BOLOs?

(2) Answer. We got that from whatever assets were collecting. They would come through the radio from our COC as "blank said blank, so look for blank".

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did any reports initiate from the ground, either your or [REDACTED] positions, then go up to the COC?

(2) Answer. Yeah, that duffel bag incident was our first major BOLO. I don't remember if there was another major one.

v. Question and Answer 21.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You mentioned Taliban in the canal, did you interact with them?

(2) Answer. We couldn't do anything, as they walked past our tower, they would just mean-mug us. They were just kids; the seasoned fighters were all out of the city. They would stand below us and motion that they would shoot us, and we would kind of motion back. That was the most we could do. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) blew a kiss to them, the crowd laughed, the Taliban got mad and stormed off. At one point a couple Taliban fighters pulled out a couple of American passports to taunt us, then kind of just left.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any interaction with entities outside your battalion?

(2) Answer. Yes, there were a couple plain-clothes guys that would come regularly to get guys out and look for gaps in the fence to pull people in. We assumed they were [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a we saw were uniformed.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any interaction with Army [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a ?

(2) Answer. Intel guys came by a couple times, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would come by. The way it ended up breaking down, the Afghans had to reach out to who they worked with stateside, that guy would find someone who went to the gate, then they would coordinate a link up. Most officers that came to the gate, that weren't from 2/1, were doing that kind of extraction. So, when he came, he was trying to find individuals to pull out. We didn't get passed intel in those situations. [REDACTED] (b)(6) did debrief every night when we switched off with [REDACTED] (b)(6) sometime between 1800-2000. We would report, give them our observation logs, give them our SD Cards with the pictures on them and break down that information. Those reports were with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who would generate a report.

We were using a rite-in-the-rain notebook. We would timestamp, describe the person and their activity, and note which picture was associated with that sighting.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You mention you would get info through the radio, what was your comms pace plan?

(2) Answer. There were two battalion nets on VHF, everything else was done on Signal. If you needed to reach a specific person, signal was authorized and recommended. If you were talking to a specific unit, you would talk on the battalion net. One net was reserved for casualties, civilian or otherwise. The primary battalion net was where we got most of our BOLOs from since we were one of the only points that had

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

comms throughout the entire Abbey Gate. We would receive the BOLOs. We had black gear, walk talkies, that reached to [REDACTED] We would pass them BOLOs or anything that we saw or any requests for information from battalion, and they would pass us back anything that needed to go on the net.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] If [REDACTED] saw a suspicious individual, I know both teams had a camera, could they pass you a photo?

(2) Answer. The only pictures that were passed was from our SD card, usually burned onto a 200MB CD because that was the technologically, we had available. Originally, we gave them the SD cards, but they had a hard time accessing them. That was the only picture dissemination.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How would you describe the threat streams or BOLOs were they very specific or very general?

(2) Answer. Normally, very general. Something like 'gold Toyota sedan'. That's the only BOLO I specifically remember until the 26th.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What do you remember about a BOLO on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Normally we would get the BOLO, we would tell the nearest officer at the inner gate or, if we couldn't find an officer from our unit, we would go up to the outer gate and find someone from the company staff to disseminate the info. They would ask us for updates, and we wouldn't normally receive them.

On the 26th, we received a specific time that a bomb was going to go off [REDACTED] and I were down at the outer gate at the time, at 1436 on the 26th. There was a count down, the tower shut its windows, everyone took cover. It was tense at the time since all the other gates were closed. The crowd was so dense, people were getting trampled, and the crowd was tense. We had talked, in our tower, about how this was going to happen eventually.

Earlier that day, we got a specific person to BOLO, and [REDACTED] saw them and lost them. He was bald, clean trimmed beard, bald head, tan dress. There were other heuristics you could see in someone biding timing, not trying to get evacuated. [REDACTED] saw him, but they eventually lost him. Then at 1436 we got that imminent blast.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How often did you go to the outer gate?

(2) Answer. We had a joke that our inner gate tower was the [REDACTED] Help Desk. Civilians would ask our tower from outside how to get in. Anyone that had an American Passport we could help; we didn't know what other documents or the SIV looked like. It was difficult to discern who would actually pass the DoS since they changed their policies by the hour on what type of paperwork they would accept. The DoS would also disappear for several hours for lunch, which would create havoc.

That was background, so back to the point, we started trying to help people with American Passports. We kept two guys in the tower, then two guys would go to the outer gate. The first time was [REDACTED] and Myself. Once the inner gate tower saw us in place, the guys in the tower would give the group we were helping some kind of physical marking. Then the family would move up the canal to our position. That's what we did the rest of our time there, that's why [REDACTED] and I were there on the 26th around the time of the blast threat. As soon we left, they announced the gate was closing. So, to answer your question, we would go to let specific people in or to relieve [REDACTED] for a night. I think we only relieved them twice, they would do 2-3 days nonstop at the tower with their own internal rest cycle. After their cycle, they would all go back and get a night of rest before coming back the next day.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was your TTP for a BOLO?

(2) Answer. There really wasn't one unless someone saw something very specific. Nothing changed at the outer gate.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Going back to the RoE brief, where was that?

(2) Answer. At [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were there. I don't know if [REDACTED] received a RoE brief prior in [REDACTED] but we discussed RoE at HKIA internally as the situation developed. [REDACTED] would ask questions about RoE to [REDACTED] or over the net, and then we would receive a clarifying answer. It wasn't like we were deciding RoE internally, it was trying to get the right answer.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You mentioned a suspicious person on the 26th, who was on the radio at the time of that report?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] I heard it, [REDACTED] requested permission to engage the individual on a couple of different occasions. The individual was in the crowd.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

[REDACTED] had the data to take the shot, but from that distance it would have caused collateral damage.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Collateral damage like what?

(2) Answer. Perfect world, they shoot the guy, hit no one else, it is the bomber, they save the day. Realistically, they shoot the guy and injure other people in the crowd. The crowd would then clear out. It would have been like the airplane, when the crowds saw people falling off the landing gears; the crowds would have left. So worst case scenario is they shoot the guy, kill several others, it wasn't the bomber, and they just shot several innocent people.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You said they requested to engage several times?

(2) Answer. Yeah, at that time all gates except Abbey Gate were closed so if something was going to happen, it would be at Abbey Gate. Our intel was getting more specific. [REDACTED] was listening to ISIS radio, and that's where we got the information. So, everyone was on edge that it could have been the one. But, ultimately, that guy left. If that guy had stayed, they would have got eyes on him and seen the blast. But I don't know.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How did they justify engagement in their request?

(2) Answer. They were requesting to engage the BOLO. [REDACTED] went to the gate, and so did one of the intel subordinates. I don't remember which one it was, [REDACTED] stayed down there. The intel kid came back and said [REDACTED] had spotted him, but that was it. All BOLOs prior, we saw it, and nothing happened, so it felt like there was no urgency associated. The reaction from people outside of [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED] just wanted to shoot someone, but I don't want to speculate.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Okay, so the reason to engage was solely matching the BOLO, nothing based off the RoE like hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was only because he matched the description of the bolo.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How do you know [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED]?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. He had to go through the inner gate, and [REDACTED] (b)(6) relayed that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) didn't have an answer from them on the engagement. That was over the black gear radios.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Getting into the 25th and 26th, where were you the afternoon and evening of the 25th, what was the environment?

(2) Answer. We would RIP with [REDACTED] (b)(6) just before the sun set. Most of what [REDACTED] (b)(6) was doing was keeping people from trying to hop the fence. There was an overlap behind the walls where kids would try to hop through and come out right into the area where people we had already processed were. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was mainly watching for that. We would head back, then do our debrief. Then we would scavenge for some food, get some rest, then head to the gate by 0600-0700 the next morning.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What was the crowd like at this point?

(2) Answer. Every day, every hour even, after east and north gate closed the crowd just kept compounding and getting more and more dense. The canal was starting to fill up, the walkways were already filled so that crowd was starting to get back towards our position. The crowd just kept building.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any change in threat reporting at that time?

(2) Answer. Other than the BOLO and the imminent blast threat, no, that's all I remember from the 26th.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Were leaders more present than they had been previously?

(2) Answer. Yes, battalion leadership was there on the 26th. They would come down occasionally to check on the guys, but the only other time that they had come down to leave the outer gate to my knowledge was to do a mission to push out to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) had tried to go on that patrol. That was the only other time that battalion leadership left the gate.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How long were you at Abbey Gate on the 26th?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Until around 1500. I don't remember the specific time we left.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did the force posture change, were more Marines forward?

(2) Answer. No, the leadership with [REDACTED] and I at outer gate around 1400 to 1430 was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was on the other side of the fence, in the vicinity. The only change on the 26th was that we were only accepting passports. No SIV, no embassy paperwork. Only passports were getting processed. That was DoS's call, I don't know why that change occurred. It happened sometime early in the day.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did the RoE change?

(2) Answer. Not at that time. Not even [REDACTED] knew what we were allowed to do down there, based on what he told [REDACTED]. The sniper platoon is the eyes and ears of the [REDACTED] during forward operations. Usually, the [REDACTED] would have that information, that would be a priority, because other than guys processing, the sniper towers were the only ones with eyes outside the airport on the ground.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Okay so you got a brief before you went into Afghanistan where you are told that it is standard RoE. Did you receive any scenario-based training to explore hostile act/intent?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was like a Q&A. If this happens, what can I do. It boiled down to, you needed to see a weapon pointed at a service member or passport holder in order to engage the threat.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did that understanding change at all prior to the blast?

(2) Answer. No, it did not.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: So that brings me back to your comment. You say that the [REDACTED] didn't know the RoE when [REDACTED] asked to engage. If the RoE didn't change, wouldn't the [REDACTED] know the RoE, but not have had the appropriate criteria to engage?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. That's right. I completely agree. Given the situation, and the current RoE, [redacted] should not have taken the shot. But why was that not specifically communicated to them? The [redacted] went up to their tower to see the individual. According to [redacted] on the 27th, he confirmed it looked like the BOLO. After the blast, we helped them breakdown and loadout their equipment. Later, on the 26th, they broke their position down and took rest, then jumped in rotation at the inner gate. That's when they talked about what happened in the tower.

Once we consolidated, [redacted] weren't saying much since they just evacuated the tower. They were the only ones in the platoon who had seen the carnage. They were upset and frustrated. They didn't say much, but they talked about that event with the [redacted] I don't know if [redacted] had their own echo chamber going on, but that's the only rhetoric that they had going on and still do, to this day.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [redacted]: Did one of those two seem more vocal than the other?

(2) Answer. No, at that time everyone was worried about [redacted]. We were focused on the threat at the moment. When we got back to the gate, the last casualties were being evacuated. The whole place was just kind of in a daze. There was no good security posture, and nothing was happening [redacted] and I established a CCP [redacted] took the truck and acted as a makeshift ambulance to get guys back to the Role 2. At this point, all the battalion leadership and weapons company leadership were at the inner gate. This was the night of the 26th, into the morning of the 27th. The [redacted] were still going back and forth to the Barron Hotel. So, the main concern was accountability and security posture.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [redacted]: To backup, where were you prior to the blast?

(2) Answer. After we RIPd out between [redacted] and I were on the airfield looking for boxes to load our equipment in since we could only take out what we could carry. [redacted] reached out to me over signal and told us to get back to the cafeteria. We made our way to our living area, grabbed our full kit, threw it in the truck and put our gear on, then drove back to the inner gate.

[redacted] was basically a member of [redacted] while we ran the Abbey Gate mission, so we were linked in with him. Once we got to the inner gate, we emptied our truck to make room for casualties. [redacted] acted as the ambulance driver. [redacted] and I went to check on our guys at the outer gate sniper tower, but the platoon commander for 81s saw us. There was a whole company pulling security on a wall in the inner gate, we were running past them along the inner corridor. Two-thirds of the way up, the 81s commander stopped us. We told him we were going to check on our guys for accountability, he told us they were all fine. That wasn't the case. We went back, I

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

grabbed the machine gun squad from echo and put them in the inner gate tower so that we had a machine gun looking to the west and south. [REDACTED] had the SASR, the 50-Cal, looking East toward the road in case there was a VBIED. I had the other SASR on top of the old Turkish CP, to give me a line of sight to the outer gate in case a VBIED tried to come through. There was a gun truck next to me, but the turret didn't work. I was worried about getting shot at from my left and took some old sandbags and built a makeshift parapet. We were in that security posture for the rest of the night until the 82nd came in and replaced us.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Until the next morning on the 27th, were any shots fired?

(2) Answer. We received a lot of reports from Weapons Company, the other section that had a machine gun, and that was set up between Abbey Gate and East Gate. They were getting reports of guys with weapons and backpacks throughout the field and wooded area over there. At that point, the RoE changed to say if anyone got within distance to throw a backpack over the fence, we could shoot them. That was from [REDACTED] who was on the ground at that time.

I asked for that update through [REDACTED], who asked [REDACTED] [REDACTED] relayed that new info to me; I told our tower who relayed it to the other machine gun position.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Back to the morning of the 26th, did any transmission ever come back down from higher to deny the engagement authority request?

(2) Answer. I'm trying to remember. There were a couple instances where [REDACTED] had asked. The morning of the 26th, looking at the same guy, [REDACTED] identified and requested to engage. I believe that request was denied. Then when [REDACTED] showed up, I believe they asked him again. But I do think that the first request was denied over radio, which may have been what prompted some people to come and check out the situation. I don't know why anyone from our intel or [REDACTED] would have come out otherwise.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you ever see a photo of the individual?

(2) Answer. No.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was the relationship between [REDACTED]?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Annoying. During the deployment [REDACTED] (b)(6) was always doing their own thing, without talking to Weapons Company Leadership or [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) since they were at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 and attached to Echo Company and had a lot of independence. Communication was poor, because all teams were separated except for [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) Since that event, [REDACTED] (b)(6) has separated themselves from everyone else. But that had started during the whole deployment, they were very focused on [REDACTED] (b)(6) It didn't happen overnight. I am still on good terms with them, I still talk to them, but they did separate themselves from the rest of the platoon.

There were conflicts between [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were new [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had been in the platoon for 8 years. When [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up, they took charge of the platoon and created good relationship with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was new. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at school, it just kind of happened. The change in leadership just didn't happen well. That's where the rift between [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) kind of happened, it felt like the OGs from 2/1 versus the new guys. It was annoying.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you keep in touch with guys from 2/1?

(2) Answer. I touch base with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) occasionally. I flew out to his retirement ceremony in Quantico, I was one of the only guys to fly out. I keep in touch with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Those three are the only ones I keep in touch with from [REDACTED] (b)(6) but I have known them for years prior. We don't talk about this though, I have only talked about current events with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I have seen [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hearing; the consensus is that we don't really agree with what was said during the hearing. [REDACTED] (b)(6) has taken on the idea that they had the chance to prevent it. Obviously, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) and a lot of guys were killed. Looking at it from their perspective, they had the BOLO and the intel confirmed by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and someone from the intel shop. Then they didn't do anything about it. Then hours later, the bomb goes off and kills hundreds of people.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I think the best-case scenario is they shoot the guy, and it clears out the crowd. The guy may have been or not been the bomber, but the threat would be gone. The Taliban weren't really in a position to engage us, so I don't think escalation was or should have been a concern.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said that you disagree with the hearing, what specific aspects do you disagree with?

(2) Answer. I disagree with the certainty that the individual was the bomber. They lost eyes on him. They would have seen him again prior to the blast. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were down there when the bomb was initially supposed to go off, and the guy wasn't in

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

the area. From my perspective, the bomb was supposed to go off, but everyone took cover so he couldn't get the effects that he wanted. The US presence was also spread out over 50-100 meters, between the base of the tower to the hole in the fence. Everyone was very spread out and taking cover, so from my belief, we think the bomber was there, but it wasn't the right moment when we took cover. But once posture collapsed to close the gate, that's when I think the bomber chose to detonate.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question on [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else you disagree with about any of this?

(2) Answer. Their tower had taken a shot a few days prior. The tower is bullet proof. Post blast, we know there were ball bearing hits on the tower. The initial report said it was not a complex attack. But there were also gunshots on the tower that don't match that. When we picked up [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they told us the gate was attacked and there was an IED and machine gun fire. Seeing pictures of the tower, its obvious that not only ball bearings affected the tower. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) all remember the first shot. Post blast, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the tower and said the tower was shot. That they had the windows shut and there were rounds hitting the glass. I wasn't there to hear those shots. We saw a video later of an Afghan perspective of machine gun fire, but that could be anything. That could have been shooting at any point at the airport, which was constant.

There was one position that could have engaged the sniper tower and the people on the ground, but they would have had to shoot through a privacy screen so that shots would have been random and not precise.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question on [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How long between the blast and you arriving to the gate?

(2) Answer. About 5-10 minutes.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question on [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Have you done any interviews or spoken about this event?

(2) Answer. No.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question on [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How much media and social media have you consumed on this event?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Retrograde and the HBO documentary. Other than that, I follow all the guys on Instagram. I just watched [REDACTED] hearing. I haven't listened to any of his podcasts; I know what he is going to say, so I haven't felt the need to watch any of that.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Have you spoken with [REDACTED] about your perspective on this?

(2) Answer. No. The last time I saw him before the blast was telling him to stay safe at the gate. I don't try to talk about it with him at all.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Anything else that you want to add?

(2) Answer. No, not within the scope of this investigation. The DoD did everything we could with the situation we had [REDACTED] and I have had this conversation. Something was going to happen no matter what, based on the structure and the way we had to process at Abbey Gate. We didn't have the time or ability to set up safeguards at the gate before we got there.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Anyone else we should take to?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] He wasn't fully on any team, but he was solely the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would have more specifics [REDACTED] doesn't know if he should or not because he is [REDACTED] so I'm not sure if he will or not. [REDACTED] They were one of the first units to respond to the blast, it may have taken them a minute to get there, and they were uninvolved in the blast. [REDACTED] because they were in the inner gate sniper tower when the bomb went off.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [REDACTED] at

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 11/3/2023, which begins on ^{Question} page 1 and ends on ^{Question} page 61. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

11/3/2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

3 NOV 2023
DATE

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

06 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

1. On 06 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] conducted an interview of the above personnel in [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] answered verbally. [REDACTED] recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions by [REDACTED].

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: Any time spent on the internet hearing information about Abbey Gate or interviews people have given?

(2) Answer. Nothing more than the original interviews. The one [REDACTED] gave while we were still in country. I see [REDACTED] stuff. Just his recovery and him speaking to the HFAC. I have seen clips of some of his podcasts, but I haven't watched all of them. I have not given any interviews myself. I think it is important to do this now to help gather information for the purpose of accountability, as much as it can be had.

c. Question and Answer 2.~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question. C1: Were you at [REDACTED] during our first round of interviews?

(2) Answer. No sir, I was at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] at the time.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. Could you run through your background?

(2) Answer. I was a communications Marine. A 2531, until that changed to the 0600 field. That was a field radio operator. Entered in 1999 out of Parris Island. Went to Okinawa after comms schools with Combat Assault Battalion. I deployed to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Afghanistan in 2021. So, altogether I had two Afghanistan and one Iraq deployment prior to this.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. Okay so you got to 2/1 in December of 2018, deployed with 31st MEU, then were reassigned to Weapons. How long were you with them prior to deploying with the [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Since January of 2020, so a little over a year before we deployed.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. How much did you interact with Scout Snipers?

(2) Answer. A lot. Weapons Company is a different dynamic [REDACTED] Echo Company, I was with all the guys all the time, but Weapons Company is a little more dynamic based on the platoons. Scout Snipers are sourced from the other companies. [REDACTED] It was a good time. I had a lot of interaction with them. They were always shooting the cool weapons systems at the ranges. Snipers and 81s were the crème de la crème for the company.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. We know that Weapons Company was spread out throughout the CENTCOM AOR while deployed. Could you describe that?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Other than [REDACTED], everyone was close together. We were at [REDACTED] next to the battalion head-shed once they came over from [REDACTED]. No one else split, so we were just training at [REDACTED].

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. How long were you there?

(2) Answer. We deployed April of 2021 and we were there until we deployed. We floated back and forth to [REDACTED] we would drive there to check on [REDACTED] or for the CUBs.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. When did you know we were supporting a NEO and when did you deploy?

(2) Answer. We had been watching it. If you have been around long enough, you see it coming. We saw the Taliban take province after province. We stayed ready and just waited on the call. Then there was some back-and-forth on whether we would go or not, until we got the call. Echo was the main effort, then everyone else flowed in behind. [REDACTED] and he was going to get us in there for sure.

I don't remember the exact date, a day or two prior, around the 13th or 14th, we knew for sure we were going, then we deployed to HKIA on the 16th.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. Did Weapons Company receive an ROE brief?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was a generic ROE brief before we went into country. The ones we talked about in country were more specific. Basically, we were there for a NEO, which is sketchy anyway. We were there to pull blue card holders and anyone with proper paperwork, but we still had to keep our head on a swivel.

The ROE they gave was basically if you see a threat, call back to higher and get the clear to engage, unless you were getting shot at directly.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. Did your Marines understand hostile act and hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Of course, yes. It was standard ROE, but that wasn't totally the environment. We were there to help. The guys did well. Once they saw what they were doing, they were vested. I tried to tell them we were there to do a job, so don't get too

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

attached because we were going to have to leave. We are talking about young kids though, this was their chance to prove themselves, and it was a NEO.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Okay, so you fly into HKIA, who did you arrive with?

(2) Answer. With Fox Company. Not all of Fox, like half of them. The half that could fit on the bird after we got on. Upon arrival, we went and holed up in what used to be the Turks' chow hall. We dropped gear there, then the skipper and I went to find out what was going on from Battalion. Who was going where, what PPE to wear, what the threat was. It was the wild, wild west. I had never seen anything like that.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was security like when you touched down?

(2) Answer. Everyone was locked and loaded. You had us, you had 8th Marines at a different gate, there was a [REDACTED] at the other side of the airstrip. Everyone held their piece of the pie. We came in a day after Echo and they had already taken care of the flight line, the flight line was 'secure', with some gaps, by the time we arrived. I remember seeing the gaps in the line that Echo was holding. The civilian airport was adjacent, so we filled in those gaps and provided our snipers for overwatch to help them out.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Okay so you went to the COC to get your tasking?

(2) Answer. Yes, we went to the COC, got our tasking. Stepped into the JOC, saw where our guys were sitting. Talked to the [REDACTED] a bit, because it was combined effort at Abbey Gate pulling security, especially before the chevron was put in.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Was there any discussion at this point about [REDACTED] coming back from Echo to Weapons Company?

(2) Answer. No, not that I recall. They never came back to us. Their numbers fell under Echo's numbers for accountability while we were at HKIA.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was your task before going to Abbey Gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We got the dudes situated. After that, received our tasking. Talked to the Plt Cdrs and the Plt Sgts. We got an orientation on procedures and PPE. There were potshots around the airfield. We were trying to get our bearings. Acquiring vehicles and figuring out who was who and where things were. Like the terminal, if people made it there, 9 times out of 10 they would get flown out unless DoS rejected them. In the early days we were more reliant on them until we found out exactly what to look for.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You mentioned a generic ROE brief before you got to HKIA, was this readdressed at HKIA in the early days?

(2) Answer. It was. It was a company conversation about what we were there for. If we were taking direct fire, it was still like you needed to call it in to engage the threat. It wasn't heavy out there, until we got intel about someone trying to bomb the Abbey Gate and we started getting BOLOs. We had one about a white truck and one about a clean-shaven man in a man dress with an older man and a backpack. That's when it got real. But at the time, only the Taliban were putting people down. Our focus was on helping these other humans out. The degradation of humanity out there was off the charts. It wasn't your typical, "we are going outside the wire," it was about keeping your head on a swivel while trying to get these people in.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You've got multiple combat deployments; you know this was the first deployment for a lot of Marines. There was a lot of gunfire all around HKIA, how were your Marines doing in the first few days?

(2) Answer. They were like any young Marines. No one was really shook or scared. That would come with conversations, telling them it pays to be a little scared and stay alert. It wasn't crazy though. There were shots going off, some other gates took contact. There were potshots going on everywhere, but we knew we were there to do a job. It's hard to describe, it was just different. We were just worried about covering our piece of the pie. Everyone was fine.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You mentioned being on the line with the [REDACTED] at Abbey Gate, what was your tasking going out there?

(2) Answer. The rotation was sometimes half of Weapons with half of Echo; everyone was out there at different times at the gate. Everyone had their piece.

Our first task was to hold the line and talk to the State Department. The chevron wasn't set up yet. DoS said the priority was getting blue book holders in. We had snipers in the

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

tower for overwatch, and that's really it. It was trying to figure out the process to vet people and get them in, while preventing the gate from being overrun.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Was that a monumental task at first?

(2) Answer. Yes, of course. You see people giving up their children since they don't think that they are going to get out. It was a little bit different; it wasn't just looking for a group of individuals or getting into contact and executing your job.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Once the chevron was emplaced from the 19th-20th and you establish some queues of people, we know that you've got [REDACTED] at the outer gate and [REDACTED] at the inner gate and cleared the canal. Where was the rest of the company?

(2) Answer. We had a CAAT position at the inner gate and a CAAT position near the flightline behind the inner gate in the direction of east gate. That inner position was oriented to the south and could see over the wall from a T-barrier.

On the night of the 25th, we collapsed back from the footbridge. We bedded down for the evening, when we came back Ghost collapsed and the whole canal was full again. I guess it got sketch during the night.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was your company battle rhythm?

(2) Answer. We were running platoons; I forget what their timeframe was for rotations. It might have been like an 18-hour shift, depending on what they needed. I remember half of CAAT being out there often, and we gave a portion of 81s to Echo as well; they bedded down with them in the gym.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What were your responsibilities?

(2) Answer. Trooping the line. Making sure the boys were straight and in the right mindset. Bringing goodies and keeping morale going. Especially [REDACTED] from their vantage point where a 19-year-old kid [REDACTED] could see the Taliban smoking people. He would ask if we could do something about it. I said all we could do was pass it up and ask. It is hard being that young, seeing that, and not being to intervene. That's his first time seeing something like that. He's a good kid, a great human being. What people

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forget is that these are young kids, they haven't had the chance to grow. You can teach them to be Marines, but they haven't lived all that life stuff yet.

I was [REDACTED] you have to get out everywhere and make an impact. I had been trying to get to the grunts my whole time in the Marines Corps. I got to 2/1 in December of 2018, and we were in Bridgeport in January of 2019. I loved it. That was a lot of good bonding.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was your personal battle rhythm?

(2) Answer. There is no set time out there. We would get up, see who is at the gate, go and check on our boys over there. [REDACTED] had his 81s, we would check on them if they had been on the line. We would then roll around. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would go to see the boys. We needed C-Wire, so we went and tried to acquire some and figure out how to get it out to the gate. We had meetings, we would check on the [REDACTED]

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What do you mean check on the [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. His right hand wasn't the type of right hand he needed at the time; he was older. So, I would go and check on him. I'm a dad up and down the ladder, so I would check on him and the [REDACTED] Only a handful of guys have seen combat, usually the upper echelon. We had company commanders who hadn't seen combat, so we had to make sure everyone was good.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What did you think of [REDACTED] as a commander?

(2) Answer. I thought he was great. We felt communication could have been better all the way around, but he was moving around. He was at the gate, he got hit in the blast too. He was a good commander. Everyone is human. I'm sure if you would ask him if he would change anything, he would say yes. But the whole time he was involved and around. He was outside the wire as much as he could be, but someone has to be in meetings and go to the JOC. But he is an infantry officer, I know he wanted to be out there even more than he was.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How was it when the chevron was emplaced?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. There was a better flow. We had more standoff from people trying to rush in. The Taliban were 'helping'. And they were, but only to get us out of there faster. But it's hard talking about it when they had been our enemies for that long. Now, they are helping, so for me it was a little difficult. We go back twenty years, and now we have to be gentlemen.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you interact with the Taliban at all?

(2) Answer. I went to one meeting with my Captain and them, by the Barron. Other than that, no. You would see them patrolling down the walkway, but that was my only interaction other than what you could see on the other side of the Chevron.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Any updates to the ROE regarding the Taliban and defense of others? Specifically, if they were targeting someone else or U.S. civilians?

(2) Answer. I don't recall that. How would you have been able to tell that it was a U.S. citizen, other than you could see documentation up-close. Between us and the chevron, the Taliban didn't do anything crazy. The killings went on past the chevron, but you couldn't tell who those guys were. Everybody was there, the Swiss, Spain, Germany. All trying to get their people out, so you couldn't know if it was an American.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: We know some young guys wanted to engage the Taliban because of what was happening. But they couldn't because of the situation.

(2) Answer. Definitely not. It would have gotten kinetic as heck between us and the Taliban. Keep in mind, ISIS-K is around too. I would talk about that with my guys. No one talks about the innocence that is lost. I always used to tell my guys that it is 50% good and 50% bad. There is good being done, but there is a dark side. I would talk to them about that. Talking to a lot of them afterwards, they told me I was right. I was trying to keep their moral compass good, to help them focus on the people that we were getting out. Not on the Taliban actions.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you see the Taliban kill people?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, from the Sniper tower with [REDACTED] Obviously, the Taliban are talking to people outside the chevron. The Taliban were on top of the chevron with their weapons and their bravado. They had their own checkpoint. You saw guys getting butt stroked, getting shot, and bodies getting pulled out. Looking down

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines

optics from the sniper tower, you can see clear as day past the sniper tower. There would be a whole group of people trying to get through, and the Taliban would beat them and kill them. Bodies would get drug out from that area.

It's different seeing that as an older man. Your emotional IQ is higher, but that was crappy. I saw humanity at its worst at HKIA. Coming out of Mosul, two clans were killing each other and that was pretty heinous, but this was way worse.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did the younger guys have a harder time with that than the more experienced guys?

(2) Answer. They all performed well. Things could have gotten super kinetic, but they didn't. The guys did a super great job keeping things together.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Going back on the 22nd, we are tracking there may have been an IED probe with a large duffel bag. Do you remember hearing or seeing anything about that?

(2) Answer. Not a large duffel bag. We had a BOLO for a white pickup truck that was out past the chevron. They couldn't make it past the chevron, but it was going back and forth out there. But once we got word about a backpack, a lot of the kids had similar backpacks. We would check them when they came in and we would check their bags. We would get FET involved for women and children to conduct their checks. I don't recall a duffel bag, but I do remember looking out for a white truck.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Any big threat streams that you remember?

(2) Answer. The clean-shaven man with the older man, in a man dress with a backpack. The gentlemen were the day of the attack. The truck may have been a couple days before. There were a few BOLOs written on the board in our COC. S2 was maintaining that. It would come across the comms or Signal when the comms worked. I didn't keep those messages. I lost a really good Marine in Hoover, and I couldn't keep that stuff.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. You'd mostly use Signal or radio to pass info?

(2) Answer. Yeah, Signal or tactical radio when they worked, but we had the (b)(1)1.4g so you would need to back away sometimes to get messages

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

through. We would get word at the battalion CUB, too, or from the COC. If something was going on, we would get that intel, and we would disseminate it as fast as possible, and the boys would look for it. But there was a sea of people. A lot of it was the day of, though. Prior to the chevron it was a body wall.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So, early-on, all threats were generic?

(2) Answer. Yes, general and non-specific. VBIED is always a threat when you have people massed in one place. Up until the 24th, it was all standard. It wasn't until other gates started shutting down and only Abbey Gate was open that things got crazy. We had a mass of people coming to the gate, trying to get out and get their children out. There were grown men who looked like they had been fighting to get out of there too.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How often did you check on [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Often, multiple times a day. Especially when we had some goodies. We were berthing in a chow hall, there were reefers in there with drinks and candies, things to keep morale up. [REDACTED] was putting in long hours, sleeping in the tower. Dudes everywhere were near that feces-filled canal, I'm surprised guys weren't getting sick. Even after people made it inside the gate, they still had to wait. There were holding camps on the airfield; I didn't even realize that until [REDACTED] and I saw that when we were driving around. But, yea, definitely multiple times daily.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Would [REDACTED] show you anyone acting suspiciously if they saw it?

(2) Answer. I do remember [REDACTED] telling me that someone was acting sketch, or there would be dudes on top of the building with the water tower scoping and looking like they were doing route recon to find vulnerabilities. But everyone out there looked like they could be sketch. The tower had windows all the way around, but we would normally look south. You could see people looking at us, looking like they weren't trying to go. Dudes would just be sitting there, not trying to leave, just watching. That didn't really start until the other gates closed.

Prior to that, no one was in the canal itself. After the other gates closed, that was full. Things just got thicker. We were trying to keep dispersion down to the footbridge.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] And that's when you got more suspicious individuals?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. They were just sitting and watching, not trying to get out, no desperation on their face. They were content with where they were. Everyone else wanted to leave and these guys were just squatted up on the wall.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You have mentioned one specific threat stream several times?

(2) Answer. Clean-shaven, wearing a man dress, with an older individual wearing a man dress. I can't tell you if that was the night before or the morning of the 26th. We received it in [REDACTED] tower; it came across the radio. I think I was in the tower at the time, but I may have heard it in the COC. It might have been the COC. I do remember it coming across the radio, too, so I might have heard it in the COC and then the tower again. In the morning, [REDACTED] and I would get the updates and BOLOs from [REDACTED] so it could have been there. I do remember it coming across the radio too, but maybe I'm confusing that with passing the visual up that my Marines saw.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you go to the tower on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Early morning, talking to the boys. When the BOLO had come out, maybe I went early to tell them based on the intel that the S2 was receiving. It wasn't until maybe 1000, sometime in the late morning, that individual had been seen. A call went up to battalion requesting to engage. I was with them in the tower at the time.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How did that request play out?

(2) Answer. I had been talking to [REDACTED]. He told me that he had the guy, clean-shaven, man dress, older dude, with a bag and it matched the BOLO we were tracking. I told him to call it in.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Do you remember him saying he spoke with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. I don't recall them saying so. Myself, [REDACTED] and I think [REDACTED] were in the tower in the late morning when they saw the guy and called it in.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did they show you the individual they saw?

(2) Answer. I don't remember if they showed me or not.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you ever see a photo of that guy?

(2) Answer. I don't remember having or seeing a photo. I want to say they pointed him out to me, but I don't know if that's me making a false memory where I see the individual in my mind. I don't remember any kind of picture. I'm still trying to remember what the original source of that intel was. I know we had overhead eyes scanning at the time.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Okay, so did they radio to the COC or radio their request to [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Yea they had to radio through the inner gate to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was back there too.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What did they say when they radioed it in?

(2) Answer. That they saw the BOLO and they asked permission to engage. But they couldn't. They got that response back, I think it was from [REDACTED] just relaying what battalion had told him.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Were you still in the tower when permission was denied?

(2) Answer. I want to say yes. I am sorry that this is vague, but I remember [REDACTED] frustration. They could see the guy, but they couldn't act.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What did you do at that time, have a conversation with him about ROE?

(2) Answer. If we did, it was just telling him that he needed to wait for the ROE. It would have been trying to ease the frustration. All he could do was report what he saw. It would have been trying to ease the frustration.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you feel like it met the criteria for engagement?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Definitely, coming from [redacted] perspective. All those guys were very mature.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [redacted]: Was it still a defensive ROE at this point?

(2) Answer. Yes, the ROE didn't really change until the bombing. Rounds were coming in after the bombing, the Army was shooting after the bombing, and I don't even know if the ROE changed then.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [redacted]: Alright, so you needed hostile act and hostile intent with PID, still based on the ROE, you didn't get any change to an offensive ROE?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall. Other than the initial conversation about someone engaging you, I don't remember the ROE changing.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [redacted]: If that individual matched a BOLO could you tell what organization he was a part of, such as a hostile force like Al Qaeda or ISIS?

(2) Answer. No, there were no identifiers. The only identifiers out there were that the Taliban were geared up, so other than that, no.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [redacted]: Were there other individuals that would have matched the description of the BOLO on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think there is a firm difference between people who match a description and don't. There is a sea of people that have desperation in their face. There is no not seeing people trying to get out of there for their life, so seeing people who lacked that behavior was odd. Seeing them sit there without gear and no fear or desperation was odd. When you don't see that, it throws up a red star cluster that they aren't trying to leave.

You've got people in the crowd who look like they walked for four days to get to the gate, so to see a clean-shaven guy was weird. These guys didn't have time to shave. People weren't trying to shave. People were there with just the clothes on their backs and a bag.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) it was two individuals that matched the BOLO? And you were there for the request?

(2) Answer. The clean-shaven individual, in a man dress with a bag, and an older gentleman. Yes, I was there for the request, and I think for the response.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. Were you there for any future conversations about those individuals?

(2) Answer. No, not again. I went to the inner gate to see what was going on. I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) I remember him being frustrated, and I think the platoon was giving him hell trying to get engagement authority. But he was just doing what he could do. There may have been a conversation with the boys, later, about that.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) Did you see the [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the tower or the outer gate around that time?

(2) Answer. I want to say he was there around that time, because BGen Sullivan came around that time to see what was going on. Then I think that afternoon the [REDACTED] (b)(6) came out with the Sgt Major after the halt in operations following the possible IED, where we pulled back and closed the little iron gate while we halted operations from like 1432 for like an hour and a half or two hours. Originally, we were supposed to have closed the gate at 1700, but I don't know who made the call to keep it open until 1800.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) Did you see the [REDACTED] (b)(6) talk to [REDACTED] (b)(6) or go into the Sniper Tower?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) mention a conversation to you, one that they might have had with the [REDACTED] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Vaguely. He would have talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) but I can't give you a definite if that happened or not.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you see [REDACTED] testimony about requesting engagement authority from the [REDACTED] and him asking who would know who had the engagement authority? Do you think that conversation may have occurred?

(2) Answer. I haven't seen it, but I see that conversation being likely. People and babies were dying. People were getting trampled. We had been there for two weeks, dealing with those people. I don't think it would have been disrespectful, but it may have been emotional or frustration. The [REDACTED] right hand man wasn't dealing with the right stuff going on, so yeah, I know the colonel had his battalion out there. He had frustrations too, no one else can see his side, where he isn't getting the answers that he needs from higher either. I think it's a bigger scale. There are congressmen flying into the AO. Being a leader, a junior Marine or a young sergeant isn't going to take those things into account or be aware of them. They don't understand the world is watching because we are on the ground, but the upper echelon had to answer to some of those outside entities.

I think that conversation could have happened, and I don't think [REDACTED] would have shied away from a conversation like that or taken it disrespectfully. Not at that point. He is a leader, and he understands. By that point, it was talking man to man. He was talking to the guys who were consistently watching that gate, so I do think it could have occurred.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. From what you remember though, the individuals that [REDACTED] identified didn't exhibit any hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. No, they didn't. Just the expressions that they made. You'd see these people through the mesh, and you could tell which people weren't there like everyone else. You couldn't see any wires or vests. There were lots of guys in man dresses with bags. It was really the expression that made the BOLO out of place.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What were you tracking about gate closure timeline?

(2) Answer. The gate was going to close at, I want to say, 1700. That was the word we received; after that, I don't know where the decision to close at 1800 came from. Once the word came down that the gate wasn't closing at 1700, that's when [REDACTED] got called out to come and tell the crowd that the gate was closing at 1800, and to tell the crowd to disperse since the gate was closing. [REDACTED] came, they pulled out and faced towards the canal. They were setting up; we were vetting and taking people in.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What was the crowd like at this point?

(2) Answer. It's crazy. We lost our foothold at the footbridge during the night. When we came back in the morning it was chaos, people were in the water in the canal, people were all the way up to the jersey barrier by the sniper tower. Guys were getting crushed there. It's just packed.

Right before the blast, FET was just inside the inner gate. Sgt Gee went out because there was a family the Marines were trying to get out. I heard them request her help and saw her run out. Gee was a hard charger, she went out, this was about 30 minutes prior to the blast.

At that point, I went back in the tower. Hoover, [REDACTED] and I were up there shooting the business at around 1720-1725. We are just talking. I wanted to get a picture with Hoover, but decided I would get one with him later. Later never came though. Hoover was about to go out to go find an old interpreter of his, I was going to head out with him. There was another guy in the canal with a sign that had [REDACTED] name on it, though, so [REDACTED] went out to see what was going on with that sign. The three of us exit the tower, it was just [REDACTED] in the tower at this point, [REDACTED] must have showed up right after we left the tower, but I didn't see him head up there.

As we were coming out, I saw [REDACTED] talking to the Sergeant Major. I told Hoover I was right behind him after I went and talked to those two. They were talking about where to put guys for the next cycle, so we wrapped up that conversation at probably like 1728-1729. I walked over to the outer gate for like a minute, [REDACTED] and I were heading back out the gate, just inside the outer gate when the bomb went off. I don't know how [REDACTED] and I didn't get hit. I couldn't tell you. We were walking right through the gate. The tower was between us and the blast.

Of note, there was crowd control earlier in the day when 9-bangers – 9 flash bangs being tossed up at once – would be used to make a sound. I thought initially that the bomb was a 9-banger going off. Then the cloud of CS gas came, and it all started to click.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You heard what sounded like a 9-banger, did you feel the blast?

(2) Answer. No, because the tower blocked it. We kept heading out. The first person we saw was [REDACTED], he told us he got hit. We grabbed him and put him just inside the outer gate where there was a tall T-Barrier and called for a corpsman. Looking in his eyes, you could tell he was a bit out of it. He knew he had been hit. He was taking my instructions. He and I had that relationship because I had been checking on him the whole time. We all start rushing out to see what is going on. You hear some fire from the Army at that time, and some shots from the south. We look and see the

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

Taliban on the chevron. The guys up there, you could tell, they had no idea. They looked confused, they weren't braced for a blast or anything.

It is solely due to the discipline of the Marines that nothing happened kinetically at that point.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you hear or see that fire from the 82nd tower?

(2) Answer. You could hear it. That was friendly area over there, so we knew that was okay. I looked to the south where there were guys on the building; we didn't see any hostile act or intent there, so we headed back in to grab vehicles to start CASEVACing people. At that time, I saw some of my 81s rushing up to see what was going on. People started pulling guys off the X. An alarm was going off, post blast, saying that a foot enemy was imminent. I remember that started as we were pulling people off, that's when we started hearing that. Once we got everyone off the X, we closed Abbey Gate. We put vehicles against the gate to brace it. Weapons Company then was tasked to hold Abbey actual at that point.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So after you situate [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you go into the outer corridor and observe what is happening to see if it's a complex attack, you don't see anything. Then you assist with the CASEVAC, what exactly did you do?

(2) Answer. I had the key to our vehicle. I brought it up. Dudes were grabbing guys at this point. Somebody, I don't know who, took over the vehicle from me. I got out to help, and the vehicles started taking the casualties back. I am directing, trying to get guys into vehicles. Guys are coming through the gap, then that whole part is kind of a blur for me. After getting guys to the vehicles, I just remember a rush of our guys coming up to see what was going on. Then once everyone was off the X, we shut the gate, we barricaded the gate, then we fell back to the inner gate. The next thing I distinctly remember is [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hugging me, because he hadn't accounted for me. I just remember the relief in his face since he knew I had been out and around the gate and he hadn't seen me yet since the blast. After that, I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He wanted to go back since he left his ATAK pad at the COC and wanted to have it to plot for the mortars – in case he needed it for follow-on operations. Him and I went back, he was covered in blood at the time, and I could tell he was a little shaken. It was his first time, too. He had been trying to get Hoover up but couldn't. We went back and got his gear, and then we went to the COC. By this time, some time had passed. People were off the X; we ran into SgtMaj and he was doing SgtMaj things, trying to figure out casualties.

Hoover was one of the names. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that as soon as we got back to the gate. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Hoover's PltCdr, and told him too. That was pretty rough. By the time we

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

got back to the inner gate, we were postured and still worried about foot-mobile enemies, so we were ready for that. At some point, [REDACTED] finds me again and asked me to come talk to his boys with him; that might have been around dawn.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You went back out with [REDACTED] to look for his tablet, did you assist with policing up any personnel effects when you did that?

(2) Answer. That happened during daylight on the 27th, I don't know who did that. When we went to grab the tablet, that was back at the CP, not at the gate. That recovery of personnel effects happened in daylight when people could see.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Did you have anything to do with gathering the personal effects of the WIA or KIA?

(2) Answer. I was shielded from that a bit because of my relationship with Hoover, but I made sure that someone had gotten his stuff together. I made sure that happened when we got back to [REDACTED] I remember that I wanted to see his gear and touch it.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Do you know who oversaw that personal equipment recovery?

(2) Answer. While we were at Abbey Gate keeping watch, I remember another company's MRAP had a .50 Cal on top; we had a guy on there, and I remember a platoon of Marines going out the gate to look for gear and other serialized items. But I don't know who that was, it might have been Echo. I couldn't tell you. From there, I don't know where that gear went while we were there. I just know that the next day, on the 27th, the Angel Flights went out. I walked Hoover to the bird. We watched the bird go. We came back, I remember, and I didn't realize at the time, that no one was left except for me, [REDACTED]. We walked back and went to figure out who was next. How we were going to get out of there, what the threat still was. After that, it was kind of just we went into destruction and sanitize mode. We knew we would be leaving; we didn't know if we would be able to get all our gear out. We got word we might only be able to bring serialized gear. We went around breaking vehicles, weapons, breaking ammo down. Anything the Taliban could use.

Feelings were high. Marines destroyed stuff. We got smacked in the face about that and were told we needed to clean up HKIA. Thirteen lives were lost, and they are worried about cleaning up HKIA for the Taliban. That sucked.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [REDACTED]: You were maybe 20 meters from the blast, you had some cover from the sniper tower, but you were still in close proximity. We know there were Marines around you that had some blast effects. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

this, because how can you worry about that when you had Marines affected by the blast in ways you don't even know. I was trying to lead by example. I'm normally a jovial guy, but I was a wreck. There was a mini-intervention with [REDACTED] and the 81s Gunny, where they came and talked to me in my office and told me they weren't leaving until they talked to me. Things could have been different; I still don't know why I stopped to save [REDACTED] from that conversation.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: To go back a bit, to the 25th, there was dispersion along the canal down to the footbridge. You bedded down on the 25th, then when you came back and that was gone?

(2) Answer. Yes. I was [REDACTED] but I was invested in all of the guys. I had been the [REDACTED] and it's hard to fully let go. So, they are all my guys. You can't be everywhere at once.

I know that there was a changeover between Echo and Golf at that time. When we came back on the 26th, I saw that [REDACTED] had collapsed back down to the tower. I was angry at the time, but he felt that the threat that night made it necessary to collapse. I spoke to him about it, I remember asking what happened. He said it was nighttime and he didn't feel comfortable with the threat and not being able to tell what was happening out there.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Had you been out to the footbridge on the 25th?

(2) Answer. Not all the way to the footbridge, but I had walked out that way.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How many Marines were out there at the footbridge, if you could tell?

(2) Answer. I don't remember how many people were all the way down there. I remember like 13 guys along the wall, and it may have been an L-shape. I think it was

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

13-15 guys out there. Once you got to the footbridge, there was only like space for one guy to come through. I don't know what it was like out there when [REDACTED] came out there at night.

I understand the decision more now; it definitely could have been worse if the blast had occurred out at the footbridge. It could have been horrible if guys had been trapped down there.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How much did you interact with [REDACTED] at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Enough. [REDACTED] was out there often, especially if his boys were out there. Everyone, especially on the officer side, was doing what I thought they should do. I will never carry the weight of command; it was good for me to watch how the leaders out there executed. I pray for guys like [REDACTED] and the SgtMaj all the time. But, yes, I saw [REDACTED] often. I could not have been prouder of every Marine in Victor 2/1 than I was during HKIA.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You're a pretty experienced SNCO, so in your opinion leaders on the ground were there doing their best to work in that environment?

(2) Answer. Definitely. No one knew what was going to come down from above, not even [REDACTED]. I understand the frustration of guys asking him to take a shot, I just wish we were better prepared for a situation like this. That some guys in a think-tank somewhere would have thought about what equipment we would have needed for something like this. It was the wild, wild west; I have never seen anything like it. Just trying to find gear and vehicles. But I will say, everyone was on the same page. We would source what we could, and we would do what we were supposed to do to get the job done.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you still talk to some guys from the unit?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] check on me the most. I spoke to [REDACTED] just two or three days ago. Snickers always come up, I brought them snickers and you could see their whole attitude change. I check on them and [REDACTED] often. [REDACTED] was out there for [REDACTED] retirement; I saw him there. I definitely check on them, and talk with them often, especially [REDACTED]. His innocence was taken that day, in a bad way. I think seeing that loss of life, when you're equipped to prevent it and can't, it has an effect on you. I would do it all again, 10 times out of 10.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think they had the guy in their sights?

(2) Answer. In my heart, yes. because I want retribution. But there is no retribution. That right there just leaves something indescribable in yourself, I just don't know how to describe that. It just hurts. Every other time, there has been a person or a group. But now there's nothing, just cowardice. I would like to say yes.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer. Just that Marines did their job. In the worst situation that you could ever put them in, Marines did their job. They showed up, and they showed out. I couldn't be prouder of them at all.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Anyone else that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure who you have talked to. [REDACTED] after we got back.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How was the relationship between company commanders?

(2) Answer. Good, I would say [REDACTED] was the outlier to an extent. [REDACTED] were always together. [REDACTED] is very smart, he's a calculated guy. He's thinking about how he wants to be seen down the road, so he is a bit of an outlier in that way, but nothing crazy.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~



GUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 2023 11 06, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 79. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

ent) 2023 11 06
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

2023 11 06
DATE

Page 169 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S057 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Page 170 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S057 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Page 171 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S057 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Exhibit S057 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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TRANSCRIPT
Gold Star Family Roundtable: Examining the Abbey Gate Terrorist Attack
29 August 2023

0:00
foreign I want to thank all of you for being with us here today
0:05
representing the service members who were murdered in a terrorist attack you
0:10
also represent the gold star families all of them through the Afghan conflict behind me
0:16
are the photos or the 13 U.S service members who were murdered in a terrorist
0:21
attack on August 26 2021 at the airport in Kabul
0:27
their names are Marine Corps Lance corporal David Espinoza Marine Corps Sergeant Nicole G
0:34
Marine Corps staff sergeant Darren Taylor Hoover Army staff sergeant Ryan Christian
0:41
canaus Marine Corps Corporal Hunter Lopez
0:46
Marine Corps Lance corporal Riley J McCollum Marine Corps Lance corporal
0:52
Dylan morola Marine Corps Lance corporal Kareem nikoi
0:59
Marine Corps Corporal jagan page Marine Corps sergeant
1:06
jahani Rosario picardo Marine Corps Corporal
1:11
Humberto A Sanchez Marine Corps Lance corporal Jared
1:17
Schmitz and navy petty officer third class Maxton Soviet
1:23
before we start I'd like to take a pause for a moment of silence in remembrance of them
1:41
thank you these men and women
1:46
or Marines Soldiers and Sailors they were Americans
1:51
they were patriots they were Heroes but to you they were more than that
1:59
they were your sons your daughters your hearts and they were ripped away from you in an
2:06
act of violence Halfway Around the World as a father of five I cannot begin to
2:12
imagine your pain and suffering yet two years later we are still here
2:18
seeking answers how did this happen what went wrong
2:24
why couldn't this couldn't this tragedy have been prevented these questions remain unanswered
2:30
because this Administration wants to sweep what happened under the Reich
2:36
they know they bear the brunt of the blame and they want to escape any accountability why we'll not let that
2:43
happen for months the president's own generals and intelligence Community warned that
2:49
withdrawing all U.S troops would result in a catastrophe our NATO allies begged the president to
2:57
reconsider when he refused to relent both Republicans and Democrats and Congress
3:03
urged the president to prepare for this ill-advised unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan
3:10
this was a disgraceful surrender to the Taliban
3:15
through my investigation we've learned that President Biden's own state department and Department of Defense
3:21
warned of increased violence that threatened the safety of our Embassy and American citizens
3:27
in February 2021 before the president announced his decision to
3:32

unconditionally withdraw all troops the regional security officer at the embassy warned that there was a quote clear sign
 3:39
 of violence in Kabul has risen sharply over the last 45 days in May of 2021 DOD
 3:47
 began planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation also known as a Neo
 3:54
 stating that conditions in Afghanistan were rapidly approaching the point of
 3:59
 triggering the Neo execution but the state department
 4:04
 the lead Federal Agency for Neo failed to request one from the
 4:10
 Department of Defense and they only did so after the fall of Kabul
 4:17
 there's an old adage if you fail to plan you plan to fail
 4:22
 this was an the utmost failure and on June 14 2021 the embassy's
 4:30
 regional security officer again warned of an increase in violence noting that there was
 4:37
 325 percent increase in attacks from the same time in the previous year largely
 4:42
 due to the unprecedented Taliban attacks in the country yet President Biden
 4:47
 ignored all of it and as a result the world watched the horrors unfold at
 4:54
 the Kabul Airport people falling from airplanes innocent women and children being beaten
 5:01
 and killed by the Taliban attempting to escape to freedom and your sons and
 5:07
 daughter witnessed this and then the unthinkable happened
 5:12
 a bombing at Abby gate killing 13 U.S service members and injuring 45 more
 5:20
 before this committee (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who is here today
 5:25
 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) want to thank you for being here testified that Marine snipers at abigate
 5:32
 spotted the suicide bomber before the explosion yet they were told by their superiors
 5:38
 that they could not engage the threat we're not given permission to engage
 5:45
 the terrorist responsible for this horrific attack was released by the
 5:50
 Taliban from a prison at Bagram Air Base which abiding Administration abandoned
 5:56
 and in fact thanks to the investigative work of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 6:02
 we learned the Biden Administration as the Taliban to raid an Isis K location
 6:07
 near the airport ahead of the bombing that was believed to be a staging ground
 6:12
 for an imminent attack on the airport not surprisingly the Taliban did not
 6:18
 agree we also know that the U.S military officials sought to strike an Isis K
 6:24
 sell in Afghanistan two days before the Abigail attack and U.S intelligence even
 6:31
 predicted the exact day and time of the bombing at Abby gate
 6:37
 yet two that request foreign airstrike was denied
 6:42
 by our U.S military in a massive slap in the face to every
 6:48
 person who served in Afghanistan the Biden Administration viewed the Taliban
 6:53
 as suddenly our security allies during this evacuation I've heard from
 6:59
 many of you your sons Taliban was the enemy and then they had worked side by side with the Enemy
 7:06
 this tragedy was a self-inflicted wound that not only killed 13 U.S service
 7:13
 members but also killed a hundred and seventy innocent civilians and injured 45 people
 7:21
 in a massive suicide bombing attack simply put

7:27
it was hell on Earth and the saddest part is it all could
7:32
have been prevented all I can do is offer you my promise
7:37
I will not relent in this investigation I will fight with every fiber of my
7:43
being and leave no stone unturned until we have the full truth as to how
7:50
the hell this happened this Thursday this committee will be interviewing Ambassador Dan Smith who
7:57
led the state Department's Afghanistan after action review and is a key witness in our
8:03
investigation and in the coming months or weeks in the coming weeks after months
8:10
of effort we will finally be interviewing the commanding officer
8:17
the Marine Corps (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I intend to personally be there for
8:23
that interview I will hold those responsible for this catastrophic
8:31
event I will hold them accountable and I will get answers you all the gold star families and our
8:39
our veterans deserve no less and you deserve the truth
8:45
and this committee will deliver as I stated we have with us here today
8:51
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who both
8:57
testified before this Committee in March and we want to thank you for your service and your sacrifice and your
9:03
courage to come before Congress and tell the American people and these families the truth about what happened
9:10
I'd also like to recognize all the Afghan veterans who are here with us today and
9:16
for those veterans who are watching this for those watching this here today
9:21
I have a message for you your service was not in vain
9:27
it is because of your heroism that we never witnessed a large-scale attack by
9:32
the terrorists since 9 11 in the last 20 years
9:37
we will never forget and we will never ever allow this to ever happen again
9:46
with that I'd like to recognize the ranking member the Democrat to miss Madeline Dean
10:10
I thank you chairman McCall I'm honored to be here with all of you today
10:17
to the Afghanistan gold star families both here in the room and those who are
10:23
at home many of whom are in my own District Pennsylvania's fourth congressional district Suburban
10:28
Philadelphia I offer my humble words of thanks
10:34
for your sacrifice your courage and your service to our country alongside your
10:41
sons and daughters family members I am so incredibly sorry for this
10:47
crushing set of losses to these Heroes the loss of your sons daughters husbands
10:54
wives brothers sisters and so many other loved relationships
11:00
over the course of the 20-year war in Afghanistan
11:05
2461 U.S service members were killed including 93 from my own home state of
11:12
Pennsylvania I have had the privilege over the years to meet many gold star families and I am
11:19
continually in awe of your courage Your strength your devotion to your lost family member
11:26
but also your Devotion to our country I'm in awe of your strength
11:32
what happened at Abbey gate two years ago was devastating obviously to you
11:38

but to our country I think you know that in your own grief in your own pain that
 11:45
 is unimaginable to me a mother to three a grandmother to four
 11:50
 know that our country lost in a crushing way alongside each of you
 11:57
 even as we cannot fully comprehend the Heartbreak that you have suffered and you will continue to suffer
 12:05
 I humbly acknowledge and thank the more than 800 000 men and women who served in
 12:10
 Afghanistan over the course of 20 years the weight of these deployments placed
 12:16
 so much on families and on loved ones 20
 12:23
 744 U.S service members were wounded and many many others suffer from the
 12:29
 lingering often invisible wounds of War including PTSD
 12:34
 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what an honor it is to be with you yet again
 12:40
 thank you for coming before this committee and explaining so much to us because we do have an obligation to
 12:46
 learn what happened from your family members from the service members who were there
 12:51
 and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) thank you also for your service to us this
 12:57
 Congress but obviously much more importantly to our country
 13:03
 you know that your family member's service was not in vain as the chairman has said to all of the service members men and
 13:10
 women who served you prevented another 9 11. it's an extraordinary feat over many
 13:17
 many people over many many years over a tremendous amount of sacrifice and suffering
 13:23
 in those final days your loved ones ensured that more than one hundred thousand people were evacuated to safety
 13:30
 even as they did not get to enjoy that same thing
 13:35
 Marine Corps Lance David Espinoza
 13:41
 Marine Corps Sergeant Nicole gee Marine Corps staff sergeant Darren
 13:46
 Taylor Hoover Army staff sergeant Ryan Christopher
 13:51
 canaus Marine Corps Corporal Hunter Lopez
 13:57
 Marine Corps Lance corporal Riley McCullum Marine Corps
 14:04
 Dylan merola Marine Corps Lance corporal Kareem nakui Marine Corps Corporal Degen
 14:13
 page Marine Corps Sergeant jahani Rosario picardo Marine Corps Corporal
 14:21
 Umberto Bert Sanchez Marine Corps Lance corporal Jared
 14:27
 Schmitz Navy petty officer third class Maxton soviac
 14:33
 their names will not be forgotten I wanted to be sure I said their names as well
 14:38
 so that they are Forever on the hearts and minds of everyone in this country
 14:44
 who will should never forget the sacrifice and the service that they offered to this country at the end of a
 14:51
 20-year War what a heartbreaking horror
 14:56
 We Are Forever indebted to you this 20-year War cost us so much
 15:02
 yet we could not continue to send Americans to fight a war no longer in the nation's vital interest and your
 15:09
 family members knew that we could not continue to risk the lives of our young men and women
 15:15
 it is a fact that the end was devastatingly heartbreaking a tragic
 15:20
 terrorist bomb tearing away so many civilians there as well as our service
 15:27
 members your loved ones still it was necessary to bring this war to a close

15:34
 we know that it was a series of decisions over multiple administrations that brought this war to an end
 15:42
 a very tragic end as secretary Austin testified to
 15:47
 Congress quote extending beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled our people and our mission the Taliban
 15:54
 made clear that their cooperation would end on the 1st of September staying longer than we did would have made it
 16:00
 even more dangerous for our people and would not have significantly changed the number of evacuees to get out
 16:06
 in the end it was a series of decisions made and executed over multiple Administrations
 16:12
 but we are here today to honor you to learn from you from your service your
 16:18
 sacrifice and your Grievous losses so that we in Congress will only do
 16:24
 better in the future for those who serve us may God protect and continue to watch over you and your
 16:32
 families and all of the troops of the United States of America and with that I yield
 16:39
 thank you Miss Dean I want to thank you for being here today to make this a bipartisan event as it should be
 16:46
 this is an American issue not a Republican or Democrat issue and I just want to thank you for being here with
 16:52
 that I'd like to recognize the chair of the oversight and accountability subcommittee in Afghanistan veteran
 16:58
 himself who sacrificed greatly the losses to limbs Mr Brian Mast thank you
 17:05
 chairman it's a debt that can't be repaid
 17:12
 literally nothing nothing can repay it their names have been said
 17:19
 I will say their names again because it's the only way
 17:24
 that our fallen live on it's the only way is that we remember
 17:29
 them we remember their smiles remember the ways that we could get under their skin the ways that we can make them
 17:36
 happy the things that would bug them the things that they did that's that's how people live on
 17:43
 is by remembering their stories what they did what made them great
 17:48
 what they wanted the world to know and how they wanted the world to be better and how they participated in that
 17:55
 marine sergeant Nicole G killed in action August 26 2021
 18:03
 Marine staff sergeant Darren Taylor Hoover killed in action August 26 2021
 18:14
 Army staff sergeant Ryan Christian canals
 18:19
 killed in action August 26 2021
 18:24
 Marine Corporal Hunter Lopez killed in action August 26 2021.
 18:34
 Lance corporal Dylan r merola killed in action
 18:40
 August 26 2021 Lance corporal Kareem nakui
 18:47
 killed in action August 26 2021
 18:53
 Marine Corporal Degen page killed in action
 18:58
 August 26. 2021. Marine Corporal Humberto Bert Sanchez
 19:07
 killed in action August 26th 2021
 19:13
 Marine Lance corporal Jared M Schmitz
 19:19
 killed in action August 26 2021.
 19:24
 Marine Lance corporal David L Espinoza
 19:29
 killed in action August 26 2021
 19:35

marine sergeant johanni Rosario picardo killed in action
19:41
August 26. 2021 Navy corpsman third class
19:47
Maxton w soviac killed in action August 26
19:54
2021 it's not easy to say the names of those
20:00
that we remember sometimes a song or a smell or a
20:05
restaurant or something can make us think of those that we lost but as I said before it's important to
20:12
say their names our president will not say their names
20:17
he hasn't said their names out loud
20:22
we will continue to do so so that we never forget the sacrifices that were made that as I said can never
20:29
be repaid I thank you chairman for convening this convening today's Roundtable
20:36
I will tell you personally I cannot and I pray that I never have to
20:42
try and understand that very visceral daily heartache
20:49
of losing a son or a daughter I have four children
20:55
I know the anger and the hatred and the Heartbreak of losing Brothers I've lost many in arms
21:01
and when I think about it I know that I can recite their names and the dates that they were killed
21:08
and I remember the moments that took them whether it was sniper fire or a
21:13
tripwire attached to an IED or the spray of an AK-47 I lived through it often in
21:20
my own mind my own memories I know what they were saying in their final moments
21:27
they were the most capable operators they were skilled they were serious they were deliberate in every action that
21:34
they were taking when they were executing their missions just like your sons and your daughters
21:40
they would do anything for our country they took pride in it
21:48
I also know that when one of ours fell we would scrutinize every detail of what
21:54
took place how they fell how do we do it better next mission how do we adjust our
22:01
tactics what did we miss was it just some kind of bad luck of War
22:10
August 26 2021 was not bad luck of war that took your sons and daughters
22:18
it was indifference by Joe Biden he did something that I thank God I
22:25
never experienced during my time in combat he sought to execute a political
22:30
operation to win political points instead of a military operation to win a
22:37
fight it's why he chose September 11 as a withdrawal date
22:42
that's why he sent our Fighters home and left the diplomats in place as Afghanistan was crumbling only to have
22:49
to bring them back bring back your sons and daughters and thousands more because
22:54
of his foolishness I said that he sought to execute
23:00
I did not say that he planned a military operation because we know for a fact
23:05
that there was a failing to apply any common sense to any level of planning that you could
23:11
say took place they operated on a mentality to count on the best possible circumstances not calculate for the
23:19
worst case scenario at all anybody that spent a day in the military knows that is not how we operate
23:26
he refused to acknowledge the warnings given by his own people on the ground dozens of his
23:32
State Department employees warned of what was happening in a descent cable he did not read it and to my knowledge

23:39
he has not read it to this day he used our military as pawns for
23:45
politics he Dishonored their duty to America
23:51
and he decided when he did that that they were as Expendable as the equipment that he
23:57
left behind I've spoken to many of you prior
24:04
and I know what you have expressed to me that you hope for
24:10
that something be learned that their friends that are still in uniform
24:16
not suffer the same fate because of foolishness because of an unwillingness to reflect
24:23
on how to do things better and what went wrong we will make sure
24:31
that that foolishness never happens again that your sons and daughters are
24:36
remembered and that what they fought for is what this country will always be
24:43
I thank you Mr chairman thank you thank you Brian that was very
24:49
powerful before I turned to the families I want to read a statement that I just
24:55
received from General Millie apparently the Pentagon and state
25:00
department are watching he says quote we owe gold star families
25:06
everything we owe them transparency we owe them honesty we owe them accountability
25:13
we owe them the truth about what happened to their loved ones I trust the Army Navy and Marine Corps did the best
25:19
they could in briefing the families who had loved ones killed at Abigail I believe the briefers gave every piece of
25:25
information that they could if there were issues with that we need to take whatever corrective action is
25:32
necessary and our hearts go out to those families he says this is a personal thing for all
25:39
of us in uniform we don't like what happened in Afghanistan
25:44
we don't like the outcome of Afghanistan we owe it to the families to take care
25:49
of them
25:56
and he says we owe it to them because their sacrifices were not in vain
26:03
for our soldiers Sailors Airmen Marines CIA officers Department of State officers anyone who served in
26:09
Afghanistan over 20 plus years the cost and blood was high but every single one
26:14
of us who served in Afghanistan should hold our heads High each served with skill dedication and
26:21
honor for two decades our nation was not attacked from Afghanistan and that was
26:27
our mission and each one can be rightly proud of their service
26:33
General milley I Thank The General for that comment
26:39
I know he cares deeply about this but now we want to turn to the families to hear your stories
26:45
though what happened to your children and we will go in alphabetical order and
26:51
first we will start with the family of Nicole G and miss miss Christy shamblin will give
26:57
remarks thank you
27:03
hi my name is Christy shamblin and I'm a sergeant Nicole liangie's mom-in-law
27:10
Nicole's mom Becky um is sitting with her in heaven or she would be here today
27:16
um to tell you about her daughter Nicole was a proud female Marine
27:23
she and countless others like her put on uniform every day to protect and defend our freedoms
27:29

they gave up their own freedoms to ensure a safer better more freedom-filled life
27:34
for the rest of us and our allies Nicole and the other Heroes who
27:40
evacuated over a hundred and twenty thousand allies did not have any part in starting this war
27:46
but they gave their very last breath to see it to the end
27:53
Nicole spoke about how very proud she was to be rescuing vulnerable and fearful people
27:59
I vividly remember her telling me
28:05
these mothers are throwing their babies over razor wire because we they know we will keep them alive
28:15
those men and women in uniforms loved their jobs and They carried out this humanitarian
28:20
evacuation in the worst of circumstances those victories belong to our troops and
28:28
the people in uniforms I'm sorry in uniforms while those victories belong to the
28:34
Troops there were failures and I can count over half a dozen opportunities to
28:40
stop this tragic ending systems we have in place were ignored
28:45
descent cables signed by unprecedented 23 members
28:52
or people our armed services request for air support multiple multiple military
28:59
personnel saying this is not a good idea are snipers asking for permission to
29:05
engage every one of them ignored these are red flags
29:10
why were they ignored please help us answer those questions so
29:16
we can create positive change the United States of America will again be called on to evacuate and to rescue
29:23
vulnerable groups of people please help us make positive changes so that we don't have to watch another
29:29
parent walk through the hell that we are walking through
29:37
I like to always tell a story about Nicole it makes me feel better so I'm going to end with a story about
29:44
her um she was a Powerhouse she was physically in the best shape I've ever known a
29:51
female five foot one female to be in we went hiking with her five years
29:57
before her murder our family and my youngest son was about six years old at the time and after we hiked in about two
30:04
miles he was voicing his discomfort in hiking back
30:09
and so Nicole cheerfully piggybacked him back two miles leading the group always encouraging us
30:17
to keep going and to stay hydrated
30:22
she was always encouraging and I'd like to encourage you guys to help us finish this make sure another family doesn't
30:29
have to join us thank you for your time and I look forward to what we can accomplish together
30:36
thank you Christy I know thank you
30:44
thank you Christiano and Nicole be so proud next we have the family of Taylor Hoover
30:50
Darren Hoover and Kelly Barnett
30:57
first of all I'd like to thank chairman McCall
31:03
ranking member Dean for being here and all the rest of this committee
31:09
we want answers we need answers and we expect those answers
31:17
I'm calling on you please don't let this fall through the cracks
31:23
you haven't thus far and have made us proud please continue it
31:29
I'm not going to talk I'm not going to talk a lot

31:36
but I am going to breathe a little bit of Fire I want to know why this current
31:42
Administration is enabled to take responsibility for their actions
31:47
in the days the weeks and the months leading up to
31:53
this fatal fateful day
31:58
not a single thing was set in stone since the withdrawal's date had been pushed back
32:08
if this timetable had been pushed back a couple of months why was the evacuation time so truncated
32:18
and on a specific timeline
32:23
honor about August 18 2021 General milley stated this
32:29
there was nothing that I or anyone else saw that indicated a collapse of the Afghan
32:35
Army or this government in 11 days
32:41
how is that not possible secretary Austin stated we'll evacuate
32:48
all Americans that we can at least until the clock Runs Out
32:57
or our capabilities are over extended
33:03
what in the world does that mean
33:08
what does that mean before the clock Runs Out
33:15
were there not contingency plans upon contingency plans upon contingency plans
33:21
executed made ready in case one plan fell through and
33:27
another one had to be taken into place as chairman McCall said
33:35
fair to plan is planning to fail
33:43
I've talked a couple of times with some special operators from in theater
33:50
that were there at the time and leading up to that fateful day
33:58
they tell the story a little bit differently there was a plan set in place
34:03
before the previous administration had left
34:10
it was not planned by suits it was planned by boots
34:16
and they were training for it training for it and training for it
34:23
they had it down they had the contingency plans set in place
34:29
this Administration walks in and blows it to Kingdom Come
34:34
ignorance to me it is
34:40
complete ignorance 11 days
34:47
that's how long it took for Kabul to fall the country the government
34:55
Bagram Air Base was abandoned under orders of this Administration
35:01
on July 1st several weeks prior to
35:09
the date our kids were taken from us not in 11 days
35:17
in several weeks leading up to that
35:28
then he gave up Kabul our citizens
35:34
and our allies to include the interpreters that were there
35:39
with our men and women in uniform
35:45

to me I asked the question did the right hand know what the left hand was doing sure doesn't seem that way
35:52
was it State Department running the show was it the Department of Defense or was it the suits in the
35:58
administration was General Miller not doing the baiting
36:05
of the dod the state department or Administration it was replaced by General Donahue on
36:11
the ground again why are the boots not being listened to
36:17
they were living and breathing the chaos in hell that was on the ground
36:23
every single day why did we the United States military
36:30
ask the Taliban to take out that cell in a hotel down the street
36:35
that's not their responsibility they were our enemy Isis K was our enemy we spent 20 years
36:43
fighting why was it denied a drone strike
36:48
a Precision drone strike to take those individuals out
36:56
we bombed a family we drone strike to family afterwards took out just that
37:02
family you can't you're telling me that we couldn't a Precision dropped on those
37:08
Isis K members this was all actionable Intel that we
37:13
sat on nothing was done why
37:19
why how is that going to change in the future was it done on purpose
37:26
I don't know I want that answered too
37:32
Intel have been tracking the individual the bomber
37:37
what he looked like what he was wearing
37:44
down to the computer bag the black computer bag laptop bag with white
37:51
writing on it does that not stand out and we can't do anything about it
37:58
our snipers can't do anything about it when they see him
38:06
Are we more worried about pissing off the Taliban why is that a bad thing
38:21
then we move to two weeks ago
38:27
we have Biden shouting in a press conference namely one single
38:32
objective that we set out to accomplish that we failed on name me one
38:37
in all of our history not one I say to you Mr President you've got 13
38:44
pictures that we have all named
38:50
you've got 13 that you did not accomplish
38:59
I know he can't name one of them without a card sitting in front of him or a teleprompter sitting in front of
39:06
him I say to him resign I've said it before and I'll say it
39:12
again secretary blinken secretary Lloyd General milley
39:18
you need to resign we haven't gotten any every piece of information is being withheld
39:27
now I moved to Lieutenant Colonel Whited you can't possibly think that you have
39:33
any respect from those that you command any longer with the actions that you failed to take
39:38
or that you did take Captain ball now major ball is a
39:46
disgrace to the uniform staying in his hotel well his guys were out on the line
39:53
then when he did show up chaos ensued even more he moved his

39:59
Marines to a compacted area in front of the gate they should have been spread out instead of clustered together
40:07
that's when Echo company came out to relieve golf or ghost company
40:13
they had to fight to regain some of the some semblance of order
40:20
after doing this for several days the Afghans started to notice that when the black shirts came out they had to behave
40:27
but when the green shirts out when the green shirts came out the Afghans created the chaos again and crowded the
40:33
gate in closing I want General Millie Stars
40:42
I want Colonel white at the birds I want major balls Oak clusters
40:50
in my hand now
40:55
you can no longer lead none of you have the respect of your men
41:01
and women anymore do what is right it's past time
41:09
today is the date two years ago that we received our kids home at Dover
41:18
two years ago today where we were disrespected
41:25
with stories of Biden's son and him looking at his watch
41:34
and today here we sit as their families begging you
41:40
two years later find these answers our veterans deserve
41:45
it the 22 a day cannot continue to happen because of these failures
41:54
thank you [Applause]
42:03
thank you Darren and uh Kelly did you have any remarks
42:08
let me just also say that General milley I talked to him recently and finally the Pentagon has said they will fully
42:15
cooperate with this investigation I also want to thank Fox News for reporting the
42:20
statement that was recently transmitted to me that I just read to you from General milley I hope
42:26
they will keep their promise and I it would be nice to hear from secretary blinken
42:31
as well to provide full cooperation to this committee to get to the bottom of
42:36
the questions to the answers that you deserve sir thank you Kelly thank you
42:42
um just wanted to provide of my heart thank you for letting us have a voice and thank you
42:49
for going on this journey with us I am staff sergeant Hoover's mom Taylor's mom
42:55
an amazing creature Kelly you're very quiet could you pull it a little closer please thank you is that better yeah
43:02
sorry um again I'm staff sergeant Taylor Hoover's mom Taylor's mom
43:09
um an amazing creature I'm angry today
43:15
this was an orchestrated nightmare from my perch that's what I see
43:24
the withdrawal from Afghanistan chaotic nightmare purposely orchestrated
43:31
the only question that I have is that why was the Taliban entrusted
43:37
with my son's security um
43:43
as you know he had served twice before in Afghanistan 2011
43:51
he fought these people we followed these people for 20 years
43:56
and we're supposed to rely on them for the security of our men and women
44:04
improper vetting there was no vetting coming through the Taliban checkpoint
44:10

hundreds upon hundreds of people came through without being searched who knows what came into our country
44:15
who knows what came into other countries the Taliban let the bomber through
44:26
the night of August 25th 2021 I received my last text from my son
44:32
I said I'm safe Mama I love you that same night it was his men's last
44:39
scheduled rotation of abigate the gate was supposed to be closed
44:45
all through the night they were taunted the Taliban were in the crowd
44:51
with the innocent they recognized them because they had seen them on the tower earlier in the day
44:57
they were telling them they were going to kill them all night long and then they would disappear into the Shadows
45:06
morning of August 26 2021 on the bus from the gym or they were sleeping
45:13
to abigate a chaplain jumped on the bus with them and said we must have a prayer there's a
45:18
bomber in the crowd we need protection they knew a bomber was in the crowd
45:25
these brave men and women did their job and they knew that there was imminent danger in their face
45:37
I don't want to hear lies I don't want to hear excuses from Joe Biden from the administration
45:44
from Lincoln Austin Millie Whited ball I don't want to hear excuses
45:50
they knew this was going to happen or it was part of their plan there are two busy shaking hands with
45:56
the Taliban cleaning up making sure we left it clean and tidy for the Taliban
46:02
to worry about giving our snipers the okay to make it all okay
46:11
I want Justice I know the justice that I crave will never be had in this life
46:18
I want them to stand on that wall hell I'll even throw in State Department
46:24
to back them up let's see how they fare I will settle for Leavenworth
46:33
I pray for the families of the Marines this last weekend that lost their lives I pray that they're shown honor and
46:39
respect they deserve I pray for the families around this table that I have grown to love and
46:46
respect and honor the veterans In This Crowd that I love and honor and respect
46:54
foreign I pray for the families that aren't here today I pray for my peace and my comfort
47:02
I pray for the strength to continue this fight for my son until my last breath I will
47:08
fight make me believe thank you
47:19
thank you Kelly and Darren for that powerful testimony next we have the
47:25
family of Army staff sergeant Ryan canaus and represented by Paul Canal
47:31
self good morning
47:37
especially to the gabool 13 families that are on this table I have grown to love them
47:44
took me a while since we were the only Army and they're all Marines almost but I came around
47:52
Congressional members you're making a difference every time you hear our voice you're
47:58
hearing the voices of thousands and thousands of veterans across this nation
48:04
who are hurt by what has not been Justice
48:12
and I tell the world out there watching and the nation our nation the United
48:18
States of America we will not rest
48:24
until we see Justice you have our word
48:31
my name is Paula Canal self I am the mother of two grown boys

48:38
one my oldest Tyler Christian canals and my youngest who chose to be Army staff
48:45
sergeant Ryan Christian canals and I'm very proud of those boys
48:53
in particular for Ryan Ryan was he was quite funny
48:59
a real comedian honestly he had a smile on his face all the time
49:04
he could light up a room as his men and women would tell you in the forces
49:09
Ron was also quite smart takes a smart man
49:16
to be wanting to be in the military because you have to be not just boots on
49:22
the ground but you have to use your head to stay quick and sharp
49:28
and he was a great influencer you know he always wanted to be cool growing up
49:35
but when I mentioned that to his Brothers in Arms the other day they looked at me and said
49:42
Ryan was cool we always wanted to be like Ryan which is quite comical he reached his
49:49
goals in that also he studied many great men and women
49:57
over the years of his studies and
50:03
what he was trying to do was is tried to be the best leader he could be and whatever he was going to do in life
50:11
so I really believe Ryan found the answer for that in serving with the United States armed
50:17
forces in particular with the Army 82nd
50:23
Airborne and with the Army Special Operations
50:29
psyops unit that he finished his service with
50:34
after serving his first tour in Afghanistan for nine months
50:39
as a new recruit for the 82nd
50:46
rain came back a little different not only had he been gone for nine
50:52
months as a new recruit but he had seen things things that he
50:57
might not talk about for years to come and he didn't talk about him initially
51:05
then he became designed to Special Operations ninth battalion
51:11
and Ryan said he was in his element then because he was using his Brawn with his
51:17
brain we were so proud of him
51:22
he volunteered for that second tour to go back to Afghanistan did you know
51:28
that he didn't have to go I begged him not to go as his mama
51:33
I said Ryan stay I'm getting ready to get married and I want you to be there he said mom I've
51:40
trained so hard I'm ready to deploy at any time
51:46
and I said Son be careful and come back home
51:56
so off you went volunteering for the second deployment to Afghanistan for the non-combative
52:02
evacuation operations in kapole Afghanistan in the
52:08
month of August of 2021. they only sent 12 of those special operations men and women
52:16
I guess they needed to help all those Marines yeah
52:23
but unfortunately we lost our handsome 23 year old son
52:31
along with the many 20 year olds
52:36

that sit at this table Taylor being the eldest at 31.
52:44
Ryan has numerous Awards and decorations he was a go-getter
52:50
in fact there's so many before he passed that he
52:56
just Shrugged his soldiers and said I got another one here it is
53:02
he was a go-getter but he also was humble
53:07
after his death of course he got numerous Awards but I can tell you this
53:12
I trade every medal
53:20
every award to have my son back
53:26
but he would go again if he knew even now the danger because that's what a good soldier does
53:32
they face death and they're willing to do that for our
53:38
country but it wasn't necessary to have lost him
53:46
we shouldn't have lost Ryan or any of these kids and we call them kids you know why we just let them go we just
53:52
like got him out of high school they were becoming young men and women and we watched them grow like that
54:00
where we shouldn't have lost any of them we shouldn't have lost
54:07
or had to go back for any United States citizens either
54:12
we shouldn't have had so many Afghan refugees
54:17
clamoring onto our planes by the wheel or any other way or throwing their
54:23
babies across a fence that's not the way the military strategies are
54:29
there had to be something that was causing the chaos our men and women on the ground
54:36
have order Ryan trained and was ready
54:41
what he wasn't ready for was the politics that came with it
54:49
there's three things that I would like to say today that I would like to see changed
54:54
number one President Biden and his executive cabinet must accept responsibility
55:02
publicly for the chaotic withdrawal at the end of the 20-year War
55:09
several presidents preceded Mr Biden in this 20-year War
55:16
but none of them are to be held accountable for the withdrawal that is
55:22
he and he alone that is that burden
55:29
the second thing that we request is the question now Bears on the executive
55:36
and Congressional branches how policies will be changed
55:41
no mother or father needs to sit at this table again with you and tell you that you failed in some way
55:50
somebody did now let's find out who those people are and let them be held publicly
55:57
accountable and the third thing
56:09
is as we gear up as a nation for a new Administration
56:18
my question to the GOP candidates will come as the following how do you plan to
56:23
protect America's borders and their interests
56:29
domestically and abroad do you plan to control the borders again
56:37
not allowing just anyone to pass through them
56:45
finally another question for the new GOP candidates coming how will you hold your current

56:52
Administration accountable for the the many eroding decisions that have
56:58
plummeted our nation in chaos to its own citizens and in the eyes of
57:04
the world we must keep our status as a power in this world
57:11
again I want to thank each one of you that came today and on behalf of Army staff sergeant
57:17
Ryan Christian canalsis family we thank you so much for allowing us to
57:23
be here today
57:32
thank you Paul for your moral courage and next we have the the family of Hunter Lopez represented by Alicia and
57:40
Herman Lopez
57:46
good afternoon uh chairman McCall and everyone that's gathered here today
58:01
the days leading up to this meeting were preceded by some of the most difficult
58:06
and dreaded days in my life that I faced the days leading up to August 26 are
58:12
full of apprehension fear and guilt
58:17
the days after August 26th are chocked full of memories of what we were doing two years ago
58:24
the visits phone calls text messages of condolence
58:30
the feverish planning of a trip to Dover the constant State of Shock and
58:37
disbelief the only thing that keeps you going
58:42
is the thought that if only I get myself and my family through this
58:48
everything will be okay
58:54
and Hunter will be waiting for us at the completion of this mission
59:01
foreign over the last several days I was rereading the text messages that I
59:07
exchanged with Hunter two years ago I read out Hunter explained the desire
59:14
to get to Kabul to help his fellow Marines and to help in the evacuation efforts
59:21
in those text messages Hunter shared with me the things that he witnessed things that we've
59:28
mentioned here today infants being thrown over walls and fences
59:33
the disregard of human life especially toward women and children
59:42
the lack of food the lack of water the sharing of their food and water that they had
59:48
with those they were trying to help
59:59
he told me of the struggles they were having with having the proper equipment having the
1:00:05
hot wire Vehicles just to get from one point in the airport to another
1:00:16
no matter what they stayed strong and they pushed forward with the mission
1:00:24
has been has been said today they took on the planning that others lacked
1:00:31
to do one of the things that Hunter mentioned that he found the most disturbing was
1:00:38
having to work side by side with a Taliban and take direction from them or
1:00:45
have things run by them first Audrey had never been in a combat
1:00:51
Mission but we all knew that the Taliban was our enemy this is something that was
1:00:56
foreign to Hunter into all his Marines
1:01:02
reading these messages always makes me proud of the work he was doing however the more time that passes
1:01:08

and the more information that is revealed about the poor planning and on-the-fly adjustments the accommodations given to some at the
1:01:16
added risk of our sons and daughters suddenly a feeling of anger and
1:01:22
disappointment overwhelms me as our country learns of the intelligence that was known and how it
1:01:29
was disregarded by some how care was given to the Taliban over the protection of U.S citizens and the
1:01:35
service members on the ground and how the more critic and how and more
1:01:41
critically of this threat could have been dealt with on a number of occasions is Unforgivable
1:01:50
so I'd insult to injury we find ourselves here in the nation's capital It's a Fight For answers
1:01:56
answers that you would think would come naturally to Gold Star families not only those of us present but to all
1:02:03
of those that came before us
1:02:09
you would assume that these that this information would come knowing that our lives our families have
1:02:15
been changed forever we find ourselves reading sanitized
1:02:20
letters from the White House on this anniversary of this tragic Day Led her seemingly authored to appease
1:02:28
Goldstar families with an overall tone of indifference to not only go Star families but to all the veterans who
1:02:34
fought in Afghanistan and all who were injured during these two decades of War
1:02:43
a letter to yours in the making but a follow-up to silence in a tears since the bombing
1:02:52
in sharp contrast we have our communities that have provided heartfelt vigils
1:02:58
to honor the lives and service of our loved ones they have supported us and recognized
1:03:04
our life-changing event something not done at the highest levels of our government
1:03:10
to our community our friends and family we're eternally grateful
1:03:19
in closing the process of getting to the complete truth has begun but needs to continue
1:03:24
it needs to continue without divisiveness without challenge
1:03:29
the secretary Secretary of Defense Austin I recall meeting you
1:03:35
in Dover two years ago during that meeting you told my family and I
1:03:41
that if we ever needed anything to call on you
1:03:47
and you would help us out well I'm calling on you today I'm calling on you today
1:03:54
to release a complete investigation of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and for a complete account of the
1:04:01
actions and inactions leading up to this attack on August 26 2021
1:04:09
information that will not only save lives of our current enlisted
1:04:17
and Military personnel but will protect our country
1:04:24
it is owed to these families it is owed to our country
1:04:34
General milley I we weren't obviously expecting this note that we received at the beginning of
1:04:40
this meeting but in his know General Millie mentions
1:04:45
that he apologizes for any lack of information provided during these briefings that we all had in our homes
1:04:51
the issue is not the briefing the issue is not the lack of information
1:04:57
during those briefings it is a disregard of intelligence it is the disregard of planning
1:05:04
that's what you should be apologizing for
1:05:12
McCall Mr Mast Mr Isa and many others we thank
1:05:17
you for your efforts we'll continue to be here and stand with you to get to the truth

1:05:25
and we thank you [Applause]
1:05:34
thank you Herman and we stand with you Alicia
1:05:46
my speech is going to be short we've had several families already speak
1:05:56
and just in case the administration is watching I would love to
1:06:02
be able to mention all the service members that passed during the war in
1:06:08
Afghanistan however that list is long
1:06:14
but I will mention the 13th that are pictured here
1:06:22
Marine Corps staff sergeant Darren Hoover 31 years old
1:06:29
of Salt Lake City Utah Marine Corps
1:06:35
Sergeant johanni Rosario 25. of Lawrence Massachusetts
1:06:43
Marine corporal Sergeant Nicole G 23
1:06:50
of Sacramento California
1:06:55
Marine Corps Corporal Hunter Lopez 22.
1:07:01
of Indio California Marine corporal
1:07:07
dig in W page 23 of Omaha Nebraska
1:07:14
Marine Corps Corporal Humberto A Sanchez
1:07:19
22. of Logansport Indiana
1:07:25
Marine Corps Corp excuse me Marine Corps Lance corporal
1:07:30
David Espinoza 20 years of Rio Bravo Texas
1:07:38
Marine Corps Lance corporal Jared M Schmidt 20.
1:07:45
of Saint Charles Missouri Marine Corps Lance corporal Riley J
1:07:51
McCollum 20 years of Jackson Wyoming
1:07:57
Maureen core lands corporal Dylan or morola 20 years of Rancho
1:08:05
Cucamonga California Marine Corps lands Corporal Kareem makui
1:08:11
20 of Norco California
1:08:16
Navy hospital corpsman Maxson w sylvia 22
1:08:23
of Berlin Heights Ohio Army staff sergeant Ryan canals
1:08:29
23 of Corrington Tennessee
1:08:35
please remember all their names
1:08:47
thank you wish you we will remember them and will never forget next we have the family of Lance
1:08:53
corporal Dylan morola represented by Cheryl Rex
1:09:11
good afternoon my name is Cheryl Rex I'm the mother of Lance corporal Dylan morola
1:09:17
thank you chairman McCall and everyone present today
1:09:23
who have taken the time to meet with us I am here today to discuss the failures that we're allowed to happen by Joe
1:09:30
Biden and his administration knowing the truths that have been revealed over time the missed
1:09:36
opportunities that were made at Abbey gate which ultimately allowed the deaths of our 13
1:09:41
service members including my son this Administration has not only failed
1:09:47

as As Americans to provide truths and facts but also have shown true evil as to lie
 1:09:54
 and cover up their failures this Administration has been far from
 1:09:59
 unsuccessful in anything it has or is currently doing those who seek to destroy within are the
 1:10:07
 true enemies those who choose to believe divide us to conquer need to remember as the United
 1:10:14
 States of America United We Stand once you start a lie that lie is covered
 1:10:20
 by another lie which ultimately turns into so many lies that you can't find your way out of the
 1:10:26
 first light that you told the plan to withdraw
 1:10:31
 that was already set in place this plan wasn't implemented during the weeks of our American troops
 1:10:37
 leaving Afghanistan I've never been to Afghanistan but it wouldn't be difficult to
 1:10:43
 understand abandoning Air Force Base and the United
 1:10:49
 States that the United States had control for over 20 years having a trauma-centered hospital that
 1:10:55
 could have properly medically treated people in the event they needed to use it
 1:11:02
 Dylan was on his first deployment to Jordan when there's a draw from Afghanistan began
 1:11:08
 it quickly turned into the evacuation
 1:11:18
 Afghan allies and civilians or of our Afghan allies and civilians
 1:11:23
 when he and his Battalion were then redirected to assist in this process my son was only 20 years old
 1:11:30
 our service memories as a whole were sent into in condition that was inadequate from the moment that they
 1:11:36
 arrived they put forth every ever ever sorry every possible effort to assist in
 1:11:44
 Saving as many lives as they possibly could
 1:11:50
 not only have our 13 not been recognized for their heroism and sacrifice to our country
 1:11:55
 are wounded and all those who dedicated their lives to protect others have also
 1:12:00
 not been honored
 1:12:05
 it is my promise to all those who served that I ensure you you will not be
 1:12:12
 forgotten the words written in our Pledge of Allegiance States
 1:12:17
 one nation under God indivisible and justice for all
 1:12:23
 one nation we are united as one under God a nation that is protected and
 1:12:30
 persevered by the almighty God will be indivisible to all Earthly powers
 1:12:37
 justice for all Justice Means the commission of a crime arrest by law
 1:12:42
 enforcement prosecution of a case in the trial courts detention and
 1:12:48
 supervision by Corrections agencies my son did not die because of your
 1:12:53
 ethnicity your religion your political views your left your right whatever you want to
 1:13:00
 make your statement on my son gave his life for what he believed in
 1:13:06
 he believed in the quality of life he believed in love respect honor for
 1:13:12
 all who came into his life saving lives means putting others before
 1:13:18
 yourself division some caused a vision
 1:13:24
 and some create Unity Unity you and I T together
 1:13:32
 it took a group not just one it will always take a hold to gain
 1:13:37
 I will continue my efforts for justice as they feel this is the only way

1:13:42
required action would prevent one from believing that they can misuse their power
1:13:49
is to be held accountable for their actions some of these actions could also be
1:13:54
easily spoken when those will tell their truths
1:14:00
and this the same way I did and San Diego Escondido with Isa
1:14:06
behind every heart is a hero behind every hero is their story
1:14:12
behind every story reveals what they have endured for you for me and for all mankind
1:14:19
please continue to stand with me myself and my family and the families of our 13 as we seek our answers to our questions
1:14:26
on the failures that occurred on August 26 2021
1:14:32
thank you
1:14:40
thank you Cheryl next we're the family of Lance corporal Kareem nikoi Steve his
1:14:47
father is here and Steve I want to thank you for the prayer before because we all need prayers right
1:14:55
now and healing is so important thank you thank you and I'll segue into that too and you know
1:15:01
give honor and thanks to our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ right now in in the capital of the greatest country of the
1:15:08
whole world of the whole galaxy of all the galaxies
1:15:13
on September 13 2021 the house on Foreign Affairs committee held a hearing with the Secretary of State Anthony
1:15:20
blinken and on September 29 2021 another hearing this time with General milley
1:15:26
General McKenzie and Secretary of Defense Austin which was not even a month after the attack
1:15:32
that killed my son and 12 other service members I never saw either of those hearings because in between both of them
1:15:38
I was burying Kareem I watched them last week after I had
1:15:44
watched the hearings from the this year on July 27th in which colonel krummer
1:15:49
colonel kolanda and Colonel Sergeant Major Smith testified
1:15:55
watching these in the order that I did give me a great perspective not even a month after these attacks
1:16:02
happened to our kids the propaganda and the cover-up were set in motion by these two first hearings
1:16:09
in which two four-star generals Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State testified
1:16:15
this was done because of the outrage by the American people on how the withdrawal was conducted how America's
1:16:22
portrayed around the world because of this withdrawal and how our
1:16:27
allies and our adversaries viewed us
1:16:41
viewed us viewed us after this catastrophe America was mad and we
1:16:46
wanted answers what was the mission what was the objective why didn't we do
1:16:52
the withdrawal from Bagram Air Base Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin answered both of these questions by
1:16:58
saying Bagram would take 5 000 people to operate and would put them In Harm's Way
1:17:04
what we now know from Colonel sergeant major Smith's testimony is that Bob Romero base would take two thousand
1:17:11
people to operate Secretary of Defense went on to say quote and it would have contributed
1:17:16
little to the mission that we had been assigned which was to protect and defend the embassy which was some 30 miles away
1:17:23
and that distance from Kabul rendered Bagram with little value in the
1:17:28
evacuation so staying at Bagram even for counter-terrorism purposes meant staying
1:17:35
at war in Afghanistan something the president made clear he
1:17:41

would not do end quote he Associated the use of Bagram Air Base
1:17:47
as a segue to staying in at the war in Afghanistan Colonel sergeant major stated Bagram was exponentially greater
1:17:54
than that of H Gaia H Kyle was a shared Airfield it was not completely
1:17:59
controlled by the military it has a significant weak points in its Security
1:18:04
bhagama on the other hand had a completely secured Air Field that would require a massive military presence in
1:18:12
order to breach General McKenzie went on to say quote
1:18:18
the Bagram operation or the Bagram option went away when we were ordered to
1:18:23
reduce our presence to 650 Personnel in Kabul end quote
1:18:28
all of them recommended leaving a minimum of 2500 troops in Afghanistan in
1:18:34
fact Congress passed a law during the previous administration that troop level would not fall below 2500.
1:18:40
when the country saw the images of people falling off planes in the chaos and suing in Kabul they started to ask
1:18:46
questions or why weren't there enough troops over there to handle this catastrophe the
1:18:52
president went on stepanopoulos early in August because the Taliban were videoing
1:18:57
from our Embassy and had taken over 80 percent of the country and at this time and was asked the same question he lied
1:19:05
and said none of my generals ever told me that I should keep 2500 troops
1:19:10
General McKenzie stated that he was in the room as well as with General Miller General Miley and Secretary of Defense
1:19:17
Austin when they gave the president of the United States their recommendations and gaslit the president's course of
1:19:23
action by saying well we can only give the recommendations but it's up to the president to take those recommendations
1:19:29
I also thought it was a responsibility of generals to threaten to resign as a last measure of persuasion
1:19:36
they didn't do that but they did do an excellent job of convincing the American people that the
1:19:43
only way that we could have prevented the loss of 13 service members
1:19:49
was to have extended our stay in Afghanistan and that would have caused more deaths
1:19:54
than just the 13. but the only reason why we had got to this point was because Biden administration had an enormous
1:20:00
Afghanistan in January in February in March and in April realized that the
1:20:06
deadline of May 1st was right around the corner General milley at this time was
1:20:12
coercing with our adversaries on a meteor tour promoting himself and giving
1:20:17
our secret secrets and protocols to the authors for it for their books
1:20:22
the administration had no other option but to try to renegotiate and extend the deadline which they did to September
1:20:29
11th when they asked General McKenzie if the military was paying off the Taliban to
1:20:35
go search for people or to do some crowd control he replied no but Tyler Vargas Andrews stated he
1:20:41
witnessed that happening when they asked McKenzie did your guys have any opportunity to kill the suicide
1:20:48
bomber before August 24 26th he stated no we now know that they were tracking
1:20:53
him for up to 30 days before the incident and even acid Taliban to go where he was staying at and raid it
1:21:00
which they didn't upon the moment of attack Tyler Andrews
1:21:05
stated that he had watched the bomber from way back at the beginning of the line early in the morning which have
1:21:10
taken hours before he had reached his authorization point and continually asked for engagement Authority which he
1:21:17
never got five days prior they had made a recommendation to that dispersion and
1:21:24
it was put up for 300 meters to protect them some leader on the ground the morning of

1:21:31
the 26th had that dispersion collapsed total of three times we had the
1:21:37
opportunity to take out this threat and we didn't and Tyler a hero of ours
1:21:45
living the rest of his life knowing that he had the opportunity in his sight to
1:21:51
take out the man that could that took away one arm and one leg because he couldn't get the authority of
1:21:57
Engagement from his Commander Colonel Whitehead I don't know what better
1:22:04
test of character
1:22:12
for your service where they're were there gunshots fired
1:22:18
at our military we all got letters question and answers from the Marines telling us that if any service members
1:22:25
say that they heard gunshots or seen gunshots that they were disoriented from
1:22:30
the blast and were confused on what they had perceived but Tyler Vargas said that Christian
1:22:36
Sanchez was shot through the shoulder and returned fire and killed that Isis
1:22:42
attacker he said that David Traylor was also attacked and I personally have talked to
1:22:48
many of the Marines that were on the ground there that day and they all say that they were being fired upon
1:22:56
we taught our children to honor the title not the man and we asked that this
1:23:01
country that this Administration does the same these kids need to be honored at the White House in the Rose Garden by
1:23:09
this administration because denying their service and their sacrifice doesn't lessen or waive the mistakes
1:23:15
made but it divides us and weakens us on the world stage
1:23:21
thank you
1:23:29
thank you Steve I I think these families do deserve to be honored at the White House in the Rose Garden
1:23:36
and the president needs to apologize for what happened and show remorse for the deaths of your
1:23:43
children with that I want to recognize Brian Mast who will read a statement of
1:23:50
Shana Chappelle this is the correspondence
1:23:56
from the mother of Lance corporal Kareem M nikui killed in action August 26 2021
1:24:05
my son Kareem was the most amazing human being you could ever meet
1:24:10
his heart was so beautiful and he was so kind he loved life so much and he lived it to
1:24:15
the fullest on August 26 2021 my family's World changed forever
1:24:21
three Marines in dress uniform notified us that my son Marine Lance corporal
1:24:27
Kareem M nakui was killed at Abby gate during the chaotic and botched
1:24:33
withdrawal from Afghanistan that day still seems like yesterday and
1:24:38
every waking moment is filled with the pain that my son was murdered senselessly and unnecessarily
1:24:46
I want to honor my son's Sacrifice by speaking honestly about what happened that day
1:24:51
and what has happened since from a mother's heart my son my Kareem
1:24:58
was the most amazing human being you could ever meet his heart was so beautiful and he was so
1:25:04
kind he loved life so much he lived it to the fullest he loved our country and wanted to make
1:25:10
a difference he knew this was his calling since he was a child he lived out his dream and
1:25:16
became a United States Marine on August 28 2021 our family flew to
1:25:22
Dover to bring Kareem home in a casket under this nation's great
1:25:28

flag on August 29 2021 with only four hours

1:25:34

of sleep since the day Kareem died I met with the person who holds the position of the so-called

1:25:40

commander-in-chief of the United States military President Biden and his wife walked up

1:25:46

to shake my hand and I declined I was clear to Biden that I didn't care

1:25:53

to talk to him I was there for my son then I changed my mind

1:26:00

I wanted him to know Kareem my son he was just 20. he would never have a

1:26:06

chance to get married or have a family he would have made an amazing Daddy I know this because he was so amazing

1:26:13

with his niece and nephew I wanted to show Biden the human being and the hero who lost his life serving

1:26:20

next to his fellow Marines instead he interrupted me twice to talk

1:26:25

about his son Beau who died from cancer saying he knew how I felt

1:26:32

he never thanked us for my son's service or told us he was sorry for our losses

1:26:39

on August 9 2022 three weeks before the one-year Mark for Kareem's death

1:26:45

my oldest son took his own life while grieving his little brother Kareem

1:26:52

he wanted to be with Kareem and the pain in his heart was too unbearable

1:26:58

this is called the ripple effect my heart cannot find Comfort or peace

1:27:04

because I am grieving for two sons for two years I've tried to avoid

1:27:09

watching the news hearings Etc because every time I do it feels like

1:27:15

I'm being punched in the Heart by this Administration my life will never be the same

1:27:22

I will never be who I was before my son was killed I'm still trying to find out who I am

1:27:29

and move forward with my life and that's something that I struggle with every day because all I feel is

1:27:36

pain in my heart I miss my sons so much

1:27:41

they should still be here what happened in Kabul was preventable avoidable and should never have happened

1:27:48

when you know you're guilty of doing something wrong you don't talk about it and if you get caught you blame someone

1:27:53

else that's exactly what Biden has done for two years he refuses to say our 13 fallen heroes

1:28:01

names and blames everyone else for his failures I want accountability

1:28:09

will it bring my sons back no it will not

1:28:14

but it will bring me some comfort and I know my sons will look down on me and smile and be happy that finally

1:28:20

something was done about their lives being lost

1:28:27

keep in mind there was a description of the bomber

1:28:32

how come the person who gave the description didn't take the bomber out right then

1:28:37

and there

1:28:47

we thank you Shannon for that powerful statement next I'd like to recognize the

1:28:54

family of Corporal Degen page his father Greg

1:29:00

thank you I'd like to start by thanking this committee for allowing us to be here today to speak and for the families

1:29:08

for the families of these 13 Heroes that we have pictures up behind us for everybody that's here for

1:29:13

all of our service members all of our veterans all of our wounded all of our gold star families thank you all

1:29:20

my name is Greg Page I'm the father of Degen page Degen was a Corporal in the Marine Corps

1:29:26

and was killed on August 26th at Abby gate I'm going to talk about my son and what

1:29:32
has happened since that day I'm not able to go back beyond that and live in the what ifs
1:29:37
is I'm sure you can understand trying to play out all the things that could have kept my son alive is a dark place to go as a gold star parent
1:29:46
something that has become obvious to me since then is that has become forgotten that my son is more than just a marine
1:29:51
he was a son a brother a boyfriend a grandson a cousin an uncle he was
1:29:58
everyone's best friend he was not just a number so I thought it'd be appropriate to start by telling you about my son before
1:30:04
his service again or day as we called him was always an adventure Seeker even as a toddler he
1:30:11
loved adrenaline not just your normal excitement from going down a slide or getting swung around he was always going a little further than
that
1:30:18
he was always going full speed this caused a lot of laughter in him and a lot of panic in US
1:30:23
as he got older he kept his love of adrenaline Adventure he began playing hockey and skateboarding when he was
1:30:28
very young and he dressed the part long hair skater clothes and always going 100 miles an hour
1:30:35
he didn't quit he had no fear and was all about Adventure experience and pushing himself
1:30:41
we now have a term for this we call it live in the day way
1:30:48
he proceeded to carry that attitude the rest of his life
1:30:54
he lived without fear he didn't worry what people thought of him and he was true to himself in high school he played defense for the
1:31:01
West Side hockey team they won the state championship his senior year his teammates described him as a team
1:31:06
player who pushed everyone to get better and pushed even harder when times were down we heard the same thing many times
1:31:12
throughout his life and through his military career whether his boot camp instructors or his seniors in his battalion
1:31:17
as we have realized now Dagan always found Adventure that included Brotherhood to be a part of
1:31:23
something bigger than himself whether the Marines hockey boy scouts or his Circle of Friends
1:31:29
I say all of this because he wasn't just the Marine that's on the news he was our son we ate turkey at Thanksgiving and
1:31:35
watched football we'd go out to dinner and go bowling he liked to put Ranch on everything
1:31:42
you like to go hunting sailing and wakeboarding he loved to hang out with his friends he loved to golf he would
1:31:48
keep track of the speed on his skateboard by the radar that was by our house we watched him play hockey and do things
1:31:54
that most kids do as they grow up he was my son
1:32:02
needless to say the knock on our door on August 26 turned our world upside down this day I can't describe the emotion
1:32:09
that I felt when I saw two marines at our door in the shadows you know why they're there when you see that
1:32:15
it's an emotion I hope to never experience again we were thrown into a world that we
1:32:20
never imagined and I can't even begin to explain after going through that and knowing
1:32:25
that those killed and wounded were nothing short of Heroes today that day imagine how all of
1:32:33
those families feel when we see an Administration military leadership and politicians First Response be how can we
1:32:40
spin this how can we limit our damage or flat out ignore the events and the
1:32:45
requests that come their way apathy including those who don't show up to hear the family speak is a slap in the
1:32:51
face to families like mine it shows that they don't see the human side of what happened that day
1:32:58
as a father I often think is there something I could have done in those 23 years to change this path and change
1:33:04
what happened as I mentioned it's a dark place to go as you can imagine
1:33:09
and being a father that has thoughts like this and then hearing the leadership that had the ability to make changes say things like I have no
1:33:16
regrets in the way the withdrawal was handled or I didn't see any chaos from my perch

1:33:25
I continue to see Senior leaders literally turn their back and walk away from those who are trying to support the families and share the story
of the
1:33:31
events yes that's really happened due to service members members speaking about that day
1:33:36
publicly we've been lied to about what happened that day as well as to what happened to
1:33:42
our children we have been lied to about our relationship with the Taliban who by the way
1:33:50
have done more to take out the leaders of this attack than our own leadership has
1:33:56
we have been hidden away to sweep this entire situation under the road today I asked this committee to remember
1:34:02
this is not just a group of service members that were killed or wounded they are loved family members and friends who
1:34:07
deserve more get the truth hold people accountable and show respect to the affected
1:34:12
families there are a lot of physically and mentally wounded from that day that we owe it to to make it sure that the truth
1:34:18
is heard and acknowledged our family has started the Corporal Degen page Foundation to support our
1:34:23
veterans community and turn a tragedy into good but all of that starts with our country's leadership doing the same and
1:34:30
recognizing that these are not just numbers but loved ones thank you for your time I ask for you
1:34:36
all to find new ways to grow make yourself a little uncomfortable in this process and live the day way
1:34:50
next we have the family of Corporal Humberto Sanchez represented by Coral
1:34:56
basino good afternoon uh my name is eno
1:35:04
mother of Corporal Roberto Sanchez first I want to thank you guys again the
1:35:12
committee for stand up for us and
1:35:18
do what we cannot do we can be here and testify we can be here and talk about our kids
1:35:24
but there's things that we cannot accomplish without you thank you very much
1:35:30
and then I want to attend this is my biggest probably
1:35:36
to Taylor
1:35:41
after March he give me the courage to be here I wasn't planning on doing anything of
1:35:48
this but he's a bright man remember it wasn't
1:35:56
me I want to make them proud
1:36:04
let's go 20 26 years ago I came to this country
1:36:10
to give my little girl a better life a life that with all my efforts I will
1:36:17
not be able to afford one year later I give birth to my handsome gray night
1:36:24
boy I raised those kids to love and respect
1:36:30
this country and foremost to appreciate the opportunity to live in the land of the
1:36:37
free and the home of the brave it was never ever in my plans
1:36:44
to lose my kid at the age of 22. today
1:36:50
two years ago yesterday we flew to Dover
1:36:55
with my husband and only my oldest daughter to the dignified transfer
1:37:02
my son and a flag drip casket
1:37:08
and 12 of his brothers and sisters
1:37:13
I will never get another hug or be able to tell my love you
1:37:20
that day to be honest with you I was numb I still cannot believe bear was inside a

1:37:27
plane I truly want to run to his casket open
1:37:33
it and kiss him but instead I have to help my daughter
1:37:40
standing next to me her legs were giving now from underneath her as she had just lost her best friend
1:37:48
in life I remember Alan and myself were holding
1:37:54
her the pain Abby was feeling was unexplainable
1:38:01
bird protected his old sister
1:38:07
they were barely close growing up she loves he loves her
1:38:14
I'm sorry she loves her little brother and want him to be alive
1:38:21
and that moment it's when I understand that I didn't have another option but to
1:38:27
be strong even when my pain was probably worse
1:38:33
than my daughters I still have to be a mom for my three kids and my granddaughter
1:38:38
that she was only one year old she was not ever going to be able to raise that little girl
1:38:44
somebody needs to step up I learned how to smile during the day
1:38:50
and cry at night when no one was looking my wounds were healing slowly
1:39:01
use learning to live with the emptiness every day I tried to live my life until this past
1:39:09
March when this here in cesarea and I listened to Tyler testify and something
1:39:14
click on me I had studied my grounds for over 18 months I was not gonna get involved in
1:39:22
anything politically however something never felt right in my heart
1:39:30
I am the type of person that likes to listen now likes to talk and fight
1:39:36
I was being told too many things that that didn't match
1:39:42
and the story did not add up what it really happen
1:39:48
was I even told the truth about my son's death wasn't
1:39:54
something I learned about my son after he got killed it was that he always stood for the
1:40:00
people and he stood and defend the ones getting bullied at school the ones cannot defend
1:40:06
themselves he was the great defender who was going who was going to defend my
1:40:12
kid now who was going to defend the when did who was gonna go who was gonna go to
1:40:20
defend the ones serving along his side in Afghanistan
1:40:25
where it was gone I understand he was teaching me a lesson
1:40:31
after his passing I had to finish the work he was doing
1:40:37
he was helping helping women and children to have a better life
1:40:44
here in the United States and I remember going to Camp Atterbury
1:40:49
in Indiana and I see all those kids with sandals and shorts
1:40:54
and the weather was going to change really fast so I went home I started Gathering clothes shoes in the community
1:41:02
buying it with my own money I just make sure that those kids have
1:41:07
what they need to succeed in life in the United States this past two years I have been working
1:41:14
on healing my own winds and to be honest I really feel selfish
1:41:21
because I am not the only one her in suffering if we don't demand this Administration
1:41:28

to tell us the truth if we don't get out of our comfort zone and overcome my grief to fight for our

1:41:35

kids and their battle brothers and sisters no one is gonna do it

1:41:40

our kids deserve answers we deserve to know the truth and why the

1:41:46

government sent our kids to their dead are when they return in their Futures

1:41:52

now alter it forever soldiers Sailors and air men and women

1:41:59

fighting their own demons inside their heads feeling guilty for not being able to

1:42:06

help their brothers and sisters we need closure as appearance

1:42:11

we need this Administration to apologize for the awful decisions that lead to the

1:42:16

death of our kids admit the mistakes they made their name of our kids needs to be read aloud

1:42:25

and remember and never be forgotten

1:42:30

13 beautiful lives were lost on August 26 2021

1:42:39

.

1:42:46

next we have the family of parents of Jared Schmidt's Mark and Jacqueline

1:43:00

thank you chairman McCall and other members that are in attendance today we really appreciate it

1:43:06

my name is Jacqueline Schmitz I'm the stepmother to Marine Lance corporal

1:43:11

Jared Schmitz who was killed just at the age of 20 on his first deployment to

1:43:17

Kabul Afghanistan at the Abbey gate

1:43:22

sorry at the Abigail bombing on August 26 2021 I'm going to share a little bit about

1:43:29

Jared first um I remember the day I first met Jared a shy six-year-old walked in to greet me

1:43:35

with a white stuffed bunny he never spoke a word that day but when

1:43:40

I thanked him his smile melted my heart and his shy eyes gleamed

1:43:46

at me and it's that smile even in New Or uncomfortable situations that has warmed

1:43:53

the hearts of so many people and that's a smile now that we can only dream of

1:44:01

Through The Years Jared knew no string stranger he was an easy going kid and embraced friends from all walks of life

1:44:09

he never had any judgment and always found commonality growing up he had a stepbrother that was

1:44:16

one year younger than him and two little sisters all of which annoyed him regularly I'm sure

1:44:22

it wasn't always peaceful or easy being the oldest in our home but Jared knew

1:44:27

just how to balance the scales of Chaos he did it without complaint and keenly

1:44:33

knew just how and when he was needed even though the Marines was a perfect

1:44:39

fit for Jared's personality we challenged him about that reality you

1:44:44

know this is not the Call of Duty this is real life Jared was persistent and dedicated in

1:44:51

his path since sophomore year of high school he always saw the positive in everything and told us that this is exactly what he

1:44:58

was meant to do by this time Jared had a different demeanor

1:45:04

it was as if his confidence took on a new form still childlike innocence but that shy

1:45:11

timid Jared was nowhere to be seen he had found his calling

1:45:18

before he even turned 18 Jared enlisted in the U.S Marine Corps with the parent

1:45:23

permission program but even prior to that he trained religiously runs in the snow workouts in

1:45:31

100 degree temperatures and when he was done he always smiled than infectious

1:45:37
smile barely an adult Jared could not have been more excited to move on to the next steps of his life the few
1:45:45
proud the Marines in fact Jared's favorite song was hero
1:45:51
of war and it blasted non-stop for nearly a year before Jared was sworn in July 8 2019
1:45:58
little did we know a song would take on a whole new meaning
1:46:03
when we got that knock at the door at 2 40 A.M
1:46:11
Jared a hero that wanted to help people and he looked to our military to make a
1:46:18
difference a hero that trained countless hours and weeks to be pulled into a
1:46:24
messy and unnecessary evacuation being called to handle government
1:46:30
paperwork and stand guard to keep order as chaos continued to grow at the Abbey
1:46:36
gate Mark and I have met a few Afghan families that Jared had personally
1:46:41
helped and that leaves us Beyond proud that he
1:46:49
changed the lives of so many and died doing exactly what he intended helping
1:46:54
those that couldn't help them stop themselves but what I still struggle with most is
1:47:02
how this was all avoidable and the continued lack of information help and
1:47:08
accountability and justice from the government
1:47:14
I know from recent testimony that the suicide bomber had been identified for days yet our men were ordered to stand
1:47:20
down I also find it very frustrating that since day one our family was lied to
1:47:27
we were pitched a well-executed defense and evacuation and ultimately spit in our face by
1:47:34
referencing the evacuation as an extraordinary success is losing 13 of our service men and
1:47:41
women successful is Success ending a 20-year War where veterans feel they fought for nothing
1:47:48
they lost their brothers and sisters in arms for nothing is Success hundreds of other people
1:47:56
seriously wounded as more information has unfolded from Frontline military I Now understand why
1:48:04
the Pentagon sat in my dining room and tried to persuade us of details that at
1:48:09
the time made no sense they touted full medical treatment locations scheduled
1:48:14
timings of shifts and the level of security measures taken with barriers of
1:48:20
protection and the reasoning for the chosen Abbey gate our last call with Jared was that he was
1:48:27
going on break and then heading out to the airstrip that's not what happened at all
1:48:34
he never got that break and was actually pulled to The Abbey gate that was supposed to close hours prior
1:48:42
all our family ever wanted was answers and nothing has ever added up
1:48:47
one piece of information would conflict with another and ultimately there was never any physical evidence
1:48:56
I've never been one to follow politics much but unfortunately when we lost Jared we were thrust into a political
1:49:02
situation and I could see clearly that everyone had their own agenda all we wanted were answers we leaned on
1:49:10
our local politicians that spoke outwardly on our behalf but nothing ever came of it
1:49:16
here we sit two years later the general public recognizes the sacrifice and unnecessary loss we
1:49:22
endured yet Biden continues to play ignorant to hour 13 as it stains his
1:49:30
reputation the military has values much like our Christian family those of integrity
1:49:37
societal generosity person of principle belief in something bigger than yourself
1:49:43

being a leader being valorous taking responsibility for your actions never
1:49:50
forgetting those that were killed and never let rest those that killed them
1:49:57
as a grieving family I repeat we just want answers
1:50:03
why is it that two years later we still don't have any information in fact more questions are being raised
1:50:10
again I'm not a political expert but I only see much Beyond
1:50:16
this committee that not both sides
1:50:21
of our political parties are helping our 13 families
1:50:31
I don't understand what they are trying to protect why some politicians are so afraid to dig into the Abbey gate
1:50:38
disaster why is it so hard to get answers from the president and top military leaders
1:50:44
after all many of those leaders took the military oath and are missing the values I just
1:50:51
mentioned earlier especially being responsible for your actions and never let rest those that killed them
1:50:58
don't you think it's time for answers Jared David Nicole
1:51:05
Taylor Ryan Hunter Riley Dylan
1:51:12
Kareem johanni Humberto Max and Deegan
1:51:18
are not just casualties of War they are Sons and Daughters brothers and sisters
1:51:24
that were Pawns in some agenda and we deserve some information and
1:51:30
collaboration from all political parties it may not be easy or on your specific
1:51:36
schedule or docket but neither was any of this for all of us
1:51:42
until it was our military was created to protect us but leading up to August 26 2021 they
1:51:51
were not given that opportunity the deck was stacked against them by agendas and decisions we still don't fully
1:51:57
understand and many of our politicians are leaving us to die of absolutely no
1:52:03
closure no information and no accountability
1:52:09
thank you
1:52:16
thank you Jacqueline you do deserve answers and Mark
1:52:22
thank you chairman McCall and other members of Congress who are respectful enough to be here today
1:52:27
my name is Mark Schmitz from Wentzville Missouri I'm the gold star father Marine Lance corporal Jared Schmitz who was
1:52:33
killed at the age of 20 at the Abbey gate in Kabul Afghanistan on August 26 2021
1:52:40
I identify as a father a husband a pissed off Fed Up American Patriot and
1:52:45
now thanks to this Administration a gold star dad a title no one ever wants to
1:52:50
have from the age of three Jared has always dreamed of being a marine
1:52:56
once he made it into a sophomore year of high school he was hard set on becoming a Marine his
1:53:02
next move after graduation little did he know or I know that would end up being his final major decision in
1:53:10
his life 2021 rolls around quickly he says he's
1:53:16
getting to come home to see us and his brothers and sisters because he's finally getting to go home on his first deployment to Jordan
1:53:22
I could see the excitement and nerves in his eyes similar to when he left for boot camp
1:53:28
the unknown could always be a scary thing but the thrill to see the world also drove the excitement
1:53:33
he felt like he was finally getting the chance to make a difference he felt by becoming a Marine he would
1:53:38
make that difference a reality to know Jared meant you knew he always looked out for the little guy he was the

1:53:45
type of young man who looked out for everyone especially those not capable of looking out for themselves
1:53:51
while in Jordan he trained with his fellow Marines as they honed their skills to Perfection he earned the right
1:53:57
to shoot and train with the designated Marksman so I again reminded him of the opportunity that he could be a sniper
1:54:03
someday he says no to add too much math little did we know at that time that a
1:54:09
sniper of all people would be the first and biggest asset that we would meet later on named Tyler Vargas Andrews
1:54:15
thank you again sir for being here Jared reached out to me in mid-august and said they were sending him somewhere
1:54:21
he couldn't talk about I knew it had to be Afghanistan we followed the news back home about
1:54:27
what was going on and knew that had to be the place ever since Biden decided to ignore all reliable intelligence from
1:54:33
his top advisors and closed Bagram Air Force Base anyway in July July 1st 2021
1:54:39
which directly and immediately led to the talibans taking back most of Afghanistan that our Warriors previous
1:54:46
had fought so hard to control we knew somehow Jared and his Marine Brothers wouldn't have that would end up
1:54:52
there having to help clean up this mess that never should have been created in the first place
1:54:58
after landing in Afghanistan a few days went by before I heard from him when he finally had a chance to call he told me
1:55:05
he has he was at the Abbey gate he said he thought he was going to die there those first couple of days due to
1:55:11
the absolute chaos he said Dad the look on these people's faces was that of utter human desperation and there's no
1:55:18
way that we can save them all he said he was exhausted and needed to get some rest before going back on the
1:55:25
post he told me they were shifting his post and he would be heading out on the airstrip that never happened the next
1:55:31
day the explosion happened the next day my
1:55:37
someone's gone forever fortunately I was able to tell him I loved it one last time
1:55:50
Jared would have made a wonderful husband a father he wanted to go into law enforcement
1:55:56
after the Marine Corps but changed his mind after seeing how our police have been being treated the first year of
1:56:02
Biden's Administration he had mentioned taking over the family business someday
1:56:09
and that couldn't make me happier
1:56:15
all these things have been stripped from us now and none of them will happen
1:56:22
you will never have the sun shine on his face again
1:56:30
you will never have the chance to get married he will never experience the joy of being a father and he would have been
1:56:36
one hell of a dad we will never meet our grandkids
1:56:43
our family name died that day
1:56:50
two years has gone by and where are we to be frank
1:56:56
we're knee deep in [] is where we are everyone who held a key position in the
1:57:03
military still has that position or has been promoted John Kirby still sits on his perch which
1:57:09
apparently faces the opposite direction from where all the action was Lincoln continues to delay key evidence
1:57:16
By ignoring delay or delaying subpoenas not a single General slapped down their
1:57:22
Stars which should have happened two years ago when Biden ignored his reliable intelligence
1:57:28
not a single person has been held accountable our so-called leader can't seem to even utter their names in public
1:57:34
not even once Mr Biden has run his entire political campaign for 50 years as the family man
1:57:42
well I've got news for you sir the curtain has been lifting and that campaign slogan will never work
1:57:48

again we have seen what's going on in your family and even worse we've seen how
1:57:54
you've been treating us as gold star families and there couldn't be anything more disgusting and cowardly than the
1:58:00
way you have treated us you are a disgrace to this nation you have no business having ultimate command
1:58:07
over our military and I regret not saying that to your face when I had the opportunity in Dover
1:58:13
I felt it more like more important to bite my tongue but I also had more important things on
1:58:18
my mind at that time like receiving my son's lifeless body stateside
1:58:25
well I stood there on the tarmac watching you check your watch over and
1:58:30
over again all I wanted to do was shout out it's 2 [__] 30.
1:58:36
[__] but out of respect to the other grieving families I bit my tongue once again
1:58:44
well as you could probably tell by now I'm done biting my tongue you sir stole their lives their Futures
1:58:51
their dreams and have ripped apart 13 families you
1:58:56
cannot even man up and admit that you sir gave us all the title Gold Star
1:59:04
Family you sir discredit honor and integrity two years later there are things I find
1:59:10
myself thinking about where and what was Biden's logic sneaking out of Bagram in the middle of the night before ever
1:59:15
getting a single Afghan partner or American civilian out this is the purest
1:59:21
definition of intel intentional negligence this is just one of many irresponsible
1:59:27
and negligent decisions coming from the White House in addition leaving behind billions of dollars our finest military hardware has
1:59:34
led to the biggest International free black market free market in history
1:59:40
unfortunately this will undoubtedly lead to more American Military lives lost in the future
1:59:46
between what has happened been happening here domestically for example the Border over the last two and a half years and
1:59:53
all your failed foreign policy decisions I would venture a guest that you have more American blood on your hands Mr
1:59:59
Biden than any president in U.S history while in Florida I was approached by CIA
2:00:05
operative who connected me with several more operatives on a secure phone call I was told if the Pentagon DOD and state
2:00:12
or state tries to tell you that they had no idea Afghanistan would collapse so fast after a withdrawal they are
2:00:19
completely and utterly full of [__] they kept telling me to follow Bagram so
2:00:25
I did and so I have closing Bagram was a sole responsibility of Joe Biden
2:00:31
it was also the lead Domino which led to the demise of all of Afghanistan its women its children 170 Afghans 13
2:00:39
American servicemen and for what intelligence given to Joe demonstrated
2:00:44
Bagram hands down was the most effective in and secure place to undertake a mass
2:00:50
evacuation you chose to ignore all that instead you chose H Kyle a public
2:00:55
airport surrounded by a chain link fence in an urban environment without even a usable air traffic
2:01:02
control tower one thing I do know though Mr President China certainly is enjoying our Fortress
2:01:08
known as Bagram now I'm often asked what accountability looks like simply put what is most
2:01:14
important to me is that the history books are written accurately and honestly
2:01:20
and truthfully about what happened to our the to our fallen 13 the fall of Kabul and for the
2:01:27
truth to be told about those who failed to perform their duties should be identified and should be held
2:01:34
appropriately accountable lastly I have prepared a short list of answers I will not stop fighting for
2:01:41
there's a bare minimum for the unnecessary and avoidable sacrificial offering of our 13 Brave children on

2:01:47
August 26 2021 I'm requesting that chairman McCall the Foreign Affairs committee subpoena the
2:01:53
inspectors general office to review the complaints that were filed prior to the bombing of Abigail and why those
2:01:59
complaints went disregarded and who failed to follow up on them I'm requesting an investigation of
2:02:05
President Joe Biden Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin Secretary of State Anthony blinken as it pertains to article 3
2:02:12
sections 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution for their involvement in intentionally leaving Bagram and all of
2:02:19
its assets by knowingly aiding known terrorists all while abandoning U.S civilians and Allied partners
2:02:26
I'm requesting chairman McCall The subpoena Whoever has the Stills and video footage from The Abbey gate
2:02:31
surveillance cameras The Sniper Tower rifle scope SD cards any drones that
2:02:36
were flying that day as well as all SD cards seized from cameras worn by our military on the ground that day at Abbey
2:02:43
gate and any other surveillance equipment used not already mentioned so that the committee can see for
2:02:49
themselves exactly what happened over there and finally answers to the questions from Tyler's entire testimony
2:02:55
why did NCIS or FBI never interview him he was easy to find a wall to read
2:03:02
how could you send Pentagon officials to Gold Star Family living rooms to present your conclusive investigative reports
2:03:09
How could a thorough investigation possibly even exist when key witnesses to the events were never even
2:03:16
interviewed including not a single Afghan or the sniper who could have ended it all before it even started
2:03:23
how can it just be acceptable that our snipers cannot get an immediate and straight answer from their commanding
2:03:28
officer at such a crucial moment this bombing did not come out of thin air we had
2:03:34
Intel the bomber was in the area Lieutenant Colonel Whited and Generals on the ground were aware of this and did
2:03:40
absolutely nothing to prepare our sniper teams which relied on their leadership in closing Mr Biden and secretary Austin
2:03:47
secretary blinken if trusting and supporting our military is too difficult for you then I suggest you pack a [_]
2:03:53
and enjoy your retirement because from where I sit on my perch the new surround your double down notion that this was an
2:04:00
extraordinary success looks like it's tightening a little bit more each and every day thank you
2:04:13
thank you Mark let me say as a former U.S attorney I will follow up on these requests that
2:04:20
you've made and I will be I will not stop until we get answers
2:04:25
um let me just say thank you to all the family members I know how difficult this is and nothing we do or
2:04:33
say here today will bring back your children but we can get answers that they deserve
2:04:39
that you deserve and the American people deserve in my judgment history will
2:04:44
record this as a disaster of epic proportions
2:04:50
and probably the hardest thing is that it could have been prevented as we heard from Tyler's testimony it was so
2:04:56
powerful and we will get to Colonel Wyda to find out why permission denied
2:05:02
why was permission denied why was permission denied for an airstrike on
2:05:07
Isis K they could have taken them out before this bombing occurred
2:05:13
you know real leadership means when you make mistakes you own it
2:05:20
you know Harry Truman said the buck stops here he didn't pass the buck he said the buck stops here true leaders
2:05:28
own it they take responsibility and there's accountability what I would like to ask all of you very
2:05:35
briefly well the nation is watching right now
2:05:40
and the Pentagon is watching and the state department and the president this Administration is
2:05:47

watching this right now what is your message to the president of the United States we'll start with
2:05:53
Christy
2:06:00
I would like to know why the red flags were ignored the
2:06:07
The Descent cables the sniper requests the air support requests I think it's to
2:06:12
have put transparency in all of it is really important to me yeah Darren
2:06:20
for me I want them all to be grown men like our
2:06:27
son was come forward admit those mistakes
2:06:35
rectify the problem we owe it to our sons and daughters
2:06:42
that will come up through the military to know that their
2:06:47
leadership has their back this cannot and should not happen ever
2:06:53
again thank you Kelly
2:06:58
um as my son I want the president to do the next right thing
2:07:05
I want him to admit what he did what he ignored
2:07:10
I want him to say their names and I want this to never happen again
2:07:20
I too want accountability from the executive office I would also like to say that
2:07:26
anyone that is running for office right now make sure that they never make the same mistakes that this current office
2:07:33
has made Americans expect accountability
2:07:39
honesty and to be able to trust our leaders to do exactly what they are told to do by
2:07:45
the people and that's what we expect on this next Administration
2:07:55
I personally will pose a challenge to the president I think our children our sons and daughters had more courage
2:08:03
in their little fingers than this man has shown while he's been in office so my
2:08:09
challenge is tell the truth all the truth to all of us or get out of
2:08:15
the way Alicia
2:08:22
as mother to Hunter and mother to a current
2:08:30
son who is serving in the army a request accountability
2:08:38
and I request for this not to happen again because God forbid
2:08:45
without the planning and plans in place
2:08:52
that I receive another knock on my door for a mistake that they have already
2:08:59
caused thank you Steve
2:09:07
um yeah I would like the um I would like all other
2:09:12
evacuations of this type to be held from the defense department instead of the
2:09:18
state department in the White House and I don't think we could change
2:09:25
to be honest with you I think they had to do it again they do it the exact same way I don't think
2:09:31
we've changed or we would change their chain of thoughts but I would I would reiterate that you know they they need
2:09:38
to have 13 of these pictures in the Rose Garden at the White House and be honored by this Administration
2:09:44
period thank you I agree all right Greg
2:09:51
acknowledge what happened that day we have a lot of mentally physically wounded servicemen and women that need
2:09:59
support that we're not getting because we haven't acknowledged that day we need to acknowledge that the second part is

2:10:04
say their names they've earned it thank you Coral
2:10:10
I don't think a gold star parent needs to be sitting in the sea in us for the answers
2:10:18
since the beginning we should not they should not lie to us we deserve to know the truth and not ask
2:10:25
for the truth and I want to hear Biden saying our kids
2:10:31
names and I always said our kids because they were our kids
2:10:38
mark
2:10:43
as Darren mentioned I would love to see the president man up
2:10:49
admit this was a more political move on his part than it was a military this is not a game it's cost our kids
2:10:56
their lives it changed 13 families and a nation of veterans forever
2:11:02
and if he's honest with himself and he feels he can't do this job because we have active
2:11:09
military in place right now that scares the crap out of me for those guys to be under this leadership if he can't be a
2:11:15
leader step aside and let somebody else do it thank you Jacqueline
2:11:24
again as I had mentioned I would ask him to you know accept
2:11:30
accountability um and help those
2:11:35
other veterans that we are close to that are really struggling or who have
2:11:41
already taken their lives because of what happened we don't need any more
2:11:46
of that and he needs to own up and acknowledge
2:11:52
exactly what happened thank you and I know the nation's
2:11:58
watching I know the administration's watching and I know the president will hear your
2:12:04
voices and I hope that he does respond to each of you because you deserve it
2:12:10
after everything you've been through over the past two years so with that I'd like to recognize
2:12:16
mistine for her questions
2:12:27
I think it's working yeah yeah
2:12:33
in so many ways I've been sitting here thinking what in God's name can I possibly say to any of you
2:12:41
your loss is unimaginable you so generously say you don't want any
2:12:46
other parent to go through this same hell
2:12:53
and we're here for that same purpose I will say that we want to learn
2:13:00
we want to understand we want accountability we want the facts and the truth
2:13:08
it's been pointed out that I'm a Democrat sitting here but I'm not alone
2:13:14
Democrats want answers to this was a grievous end
2:13:20
to a 20-year war that represented so much pain and sacrifice for families
2:13:26
you think of it some of your children and their kids there are kids too 20 years old
2:13:33
as old as the war only 20 years old so please please know that in my heart
2:13:41
and I know I'm not alone we know you deserve the truth
2:13:48
it's really at my core in my job I believe we all deserve the truth
2:13:57
I don't see this as a political game I see this as life and death and much
2:14:03
more importantly it is about service to Country what your children
2:14:08

did who they are and were what they stood for and continue to
2:14:15
stand for as we say their names over and over again is the very best of us
2:14:22
I never served in the military I'm an extraordinary awe of our veterans
2:14:29
of our gold star families of those we've lost
2:14:34
so please please no You are not alone in your search for the truth
2:14:40
chairman McCall after our set of hearings I have spoken with the administration
2:14:48
directly about the truth and the Gathering of the facts and making sure there is
2:14:53
accountability for what happened for the chaos at the end of this war at the withdrawal at Abbey gate
2:15:01
to better understand it for the very purpose that we never go through it again but certainly to honor what you are here
2:15:08
doing so I I have
2:15:15
very little to ask because you've been so abundantly clear but I guess I do
2:15:20
want to reflect to you your losses your extraordinary losses in some cases two children
2:15:29
and what you bring to this table sadly what you have to bring to every day
2:15:35
the strength to make sure we know your children's stories
2:15:41
I think it was you who said your son had taught you a lesson As you move forward in life
2:15:48
your children are continuing to teach us all lessons we honor their service
2:15:55
we are compassionate to you and I say that not as a Democrat
2:16:00
or as a politician or as a member of Congress but as an American
2:16:06
we honor you and I think in the little bit of time I have left in each one of your sons and daughters
2:16:15
you talked about their Drive their absolute commitment to service
2:16:21
so that America better understands where does that come from in a young person maybe a couple of you might offer to me
2:16:28
and to really those who are watching where does that passion for service come
2:16:33
from would anyone like to tell me about that
2:16:42
I would let to come forward on that we taught Ryan to make a difference
2:16:49
and from a hour old he did a push-up we knew he was going to be something
2:16:57
so all I can say is is that Ryan fulfilled our family's wishes to finish well and to make a
2:17:05
difference thank you
2:17:10
mark we raised Jared
2:17:18
with morals and dignity with the faith and belief in God
2:17:25
and he knew the difference between right and wrong
2:17:32
he understood the difference between David and Goliath
2:17:37
I guess he always kind of thought himself pictured himself as David but
2:17:44
what other place could you ever
2:17:51
take that mentality and live it out to its fullest and then I was gonna say
2:17:57
Marine Corps but military in general um so that's why he when he went that
2:18:02
direction I know my time has expired was there anyone else who wanted to speak to the
2:18:08
question of service Carl I vote really fast
2:18:15
I I raised my son with balius and I teach him

2:18:24
to Loth and I think the he did a wall until the last minute
2:18:30
and that's why he was that person because he loves and he
2:18:37
respects thank you very much I yield back
2:18:44
um thank you Marilyn and I know that you and I can work together
2:18:49
regardless of party labels to get answers for these families and so Mr
2:18:55
Mast has graciously deferred his time and now we will go to Mr Wilson
2:19:05
thank you very much chairman Mike McCall for your leadership and having this meeting today with such wonderful people
2:19:12
uh and I want to thank the courageous parents and family members here I'm
2:19:18
grateful to be a fellow Afghanistan veteran parent myself my son Hunter
2:19:23
Taylor Wilson I served for a year in Afghanistan as an engineer and I'm just
2:19:29
so grateful for his service and we know that the American and Allied troops have been successful in keeping America
2:19:34
unsafe from terrorist attacks for 22 years your families will always be
2:19:40
American Heroes for the ongoing global war on terrorism I also identify as a
2:19:46
veteran myself of the South Carolina Army National Guard two eighteenth Brigade led by General Bob Livingston
2:19:52
during their year-long deployment in Afghanistan I visited four times to
2:19:57
learn of their Devotion to their Afghan Brothers for freedom Biden's shameful political decision
2:20:05
ignored military advice Mr nikoi and Mr Smith's you are right Biden has no
2:20:12
letters he falsely claimed to the contrary Biden's political decision is
2:20:18
the worst military and foreign policy decision in American history putting American families at risk worldwide with
2:20:26
this in mind I indeed Mr Ms Lopez I too
2:20:31
have a son named Hunter so I I just I hey we together and I'm just so grateful
2:20:38
for his service and what he's has meant to our country with that in mind what
2:20:44
records and information does the administration have that you would like to see
2:20:53
well I think overall as far as records go would be the as I mentioned earlier the complete investigation on a more
2:20:59
personal note there's some debate on whether
2:21:05
some of Hunter's property was was ever recovered and it was mentioned earlier that there's some SD cards and digital
2:21:11
media that's perhaps missing from several families and I've always been curious as to why
2:21:18
those items weren't returned to us I definitely understand National Security I definitely understand the need for
2:21:24
intelligence but once that has been accomplished those are items that rightfully belong to each of us
2:21:31
so that that'd be one thing
2:21:42
that none of his property was located or
2:21:47
it was misplaced via Instagram messages and pictures
2:21:55
posted by the Marines that were there we found a picture of all our kids black
2:22:03
vest laying on the ground discarded and picked through
2:22:10
we found his kill patch months after
2:22:16
the Marines had returned a junior Marine had collected my son's
2:22:23
kill patch and it was given back to us months after he had been laid to rest
2:22:33

so forth the military to tell us that
2:22:38
their items were discarded or lost
2:22:46
I I just can't explain how in the nation that claims to be the best
2:22:57
that they failed to collect our children's belongings
2:23:02
the last of what we have of them is lost
2:23:10
and indeed um this should be bipartisan working together for each family of anything
2:23:16
that should be recovered we're happy to all uh participate and Mr Hoover this
2:23:21
should be a bipartisan and I want to join with you it's not political from my side I asked two years ago from Mr Biden
2:23:30
Miss Harris to resign and I knew at that time that meant that there would be a Democrat succession and so it's not
2:23:36
political but sadly we see he's still in office and the consequences worldwide of
2:23:43
a weakness by America additionally I agree with myself that with the open Southern borders families who are at
2:23:50
greater risk today of an additional terrorist attack than ever in history and the borders should be secured and I
2:23:56
know Mr Smith's too the American people are at risk thank you for alerting us God bless each of
2:24:02
you I yield back uh thank you Mike Waltz is uh he wanted me to relay his flight
2:24:08
was delayed because of the hurricane in Florida um but he will be at our dinner this
2:24:14
evening and he served in the U.S military with distinction I next recognize Chris Smith thank you thank
2:24:21
you very much Mr chairman for calling this important important Roundtable I do want to thank Daryl Isa too for doing
2:24:28
this a few weeks ago I think a lot of us were moved almost to tears because I had to hear all of it but I saw some of it
2:24:34
but today you have just touched all of our hearts in the most profound way and the American people so thank you for
2:24:40
doing this um you know words are inadequate to express our condolences we all feel uh inadequate to say that
2:24:48
because you have suffered so much and the cover-up that has followed for the last two years just adds salt to the
2:24:54
wound and makes it that much harder for you I'm sure to process this so again I
2:25:01
apologize on behalf of our government especially the executive branch for it not being candid with you and for
2:25:09
engaging what I consider to be a gross cover-up you know I I saw the president's statement that he put out on
2:25:14
the 26th when she said we will always continue to support them talking about you uh you know words are cheap in
2:25:21
Washington and it seems to me that these kinds of words there needs to be an independent comprehensive investigation
2:25:28
ig's do a good job sometimes GAO does a good job most of the time but there
2:25:34
needs to be a truly independent investigation into all of the very valid
2:25:39
questions you have asked and my colleagues have put forward in their with regards to our concerns as well I
2:25:46
think that the Biden Lincoln Austin and Millie ought to meet with you just like this a Roundtable
2:25:53
discussion no timetable don't they say oh you got an hour you got 45 minutes as
2:25:59
long as it takes for you to convey to them uh the horror that you have faced
2:26:04
and of course the horror that your loved ones endured because of this yes we had
2:26:10
a hearing we heard from Tyler Vargas Andrews Sergeant thank you for that and and we were all moved he had
2:26:16
clear line of sight could have taken out uh the perpetrator of this horrible crime and yet he could not get
2:26:22
permission uh so thank you Sergeant for for that and and that is you know it
2:26:28
just shows such a breakdown in the chain of command uh so again I I my my final thought would be to all
2:26:35
of you uh an independent investigation I think that has to be done it has to be done well outside people we can't turn

2:26:42
to the Pentagon which unfortunately has vested interests in in perpetuating myths uh we need to have honesty here
2:26:49
and we need outside people on perhaps even a blue ribbon commission uh to investigate this high level people who
2:26:56
know how to ask hard questions uh this committee will do it you know the chairman has clearly indicated that he's
2:27:01
doing it we're all behind him on that uh but we need answers we need it now and for it not to happen again uh hopefully
2:27:09
God willing we do need a a next steps so this kind of of charade and this kind of
2:27:16
spin uh Greg Page spin uh it just ends it's got to be the truth and nothing but
2:27:21
the truth I yield back gentleman yields Mr ice is recognized thank you Mr
2:27:26
chairman and congresswoman Dean I want to thank you for being here your words and your presence says a lot toward the
2:27:34
importance of what the families have to say here uh Paula I'm a fellow Army person so
2:27:41
please understand in my uh 20 plus years of representing Camp Pendleton
2:27:47
a little bit of the Marine has fallen off of uh you know me and one of them
2:27:52
unfortunately I'm going to show right now which is from A Few Good Men
2:27:58
it said we didn't join the corps because we felt like we joined because it was a
2:28:04
life we didn't because it was a life decision we wanted to live by a code
2:28:10
we live by another quote we live by a code sir either we were right or we were
2:28:17
wrong we don't make deals one of the challenges that we face every
2:28:23
day now is that our country has begun making deals and you hear it every day here
2:28:30
so one thing that I think is important for us all to understand today is we've got
2:28:36
to stop making deals I'm going to ask a question at the end of this quick statement
2:28:44
Cheryl I want to let you know that I've been honored to at the end of this
2:28:49
all to present you a flag that flag was flown over the capitol two years to the
2:28:54
day on Saturday that was an unusual day because at the behest of the speaker the
2:29:01
flag of the Capitol was lying at half mast in honor of all of your family
2:29:06
members that doesn't happen very often it is truly a unique event to have that happen
2:29:13
and it did so because the speaker knew the importance so each of you will receive a flag flown that day over the
2:29:21
capitol a day in which in honor of your Fallen we flew at half Mass
2:29:28
now a lot has been said about what the president did or didn't do and I think I'll just leave that where it's been
2:29:34
well said but I'm going to ask a question which is a question I think that all of
2:29:40
us will go away with because your your children your siblings for some in the back
2:29:49
they died before a cause they believed in they died for a code they lived by
2:29:55
I'm going to ask just one question that's been bugging me
2:30:01
two years ago had the Taliban become so strong we could not defeat them had Isis
2:30:07
become so strong we could not contain them and it had Al Qaeda a Boko Haram
2:30:13
become people that we had to compromise and negotiate
2:30:18
or had we become so weak we could no longer defeat them if the answer is yes then there was a
2:30:25
reason to leave Afghanistan the way we did but we still stand with our allies in
2:30:32
Europe against a threat from the East we still stand in the Pacific
2:30:38

against any aggression there we still stand at the north-south Korean
2:30:44
border with our colleagues in the Republican of Korea Army to prevent
2:30:51
the kind of aggression has occurred in the past so I'd ask you as people who have paid a sacrifice that
2:31:00
we can only imagine in horror of losing a child a loved one
2:31:05
should we quit standing because we are too weak or because the others are too strong
2:31:12
or should we continue to stand up against aggression the way your loved
2:31:17
ones did and paid the price for it
2:31:27
we stand up for aggression
2:31:32
we have to continue to stand up we just need to do it better
2:31:39
my family continues to stand thank you for their service
2:31:45
no uh to that to answer your previous question we're strong where it counts
2:31:52
we're or the boots on the ground you know there's a lot of all these
2:31:58
families signed up they continue to sign up there's a lot of young men and women out there
2:32:03
continue to sign up unfortunately it looks like where we've become weak or some of the decision makers
2:32:10
I concur with that also and I also went to recant one statement I've made today there was only six of us
2:32:16
sent from the Army to help out those extra Marines so uh
2:32:23
you know it doesn't take but a Few Good Men Paula
2:32:28
thank you thank you all for the the answer that I knew I would get from the
2:32:34
families who serve and whose children serve and that is that they serve for a reason
2:32:40
they were raised to believe in this country thank you I yield back you know Neil's chair recognizes Miss Wagner
2:32:48
I thank the chairman very much for bringing us together today all of us
2:32:53
together to commemorate sadly this
2:32:59
I can't believe it's been two years since this tragedy um this terrorist attack
2:33:06
at Abbey gate and to each of the families here
2:33:13
as a proud Army mom out of an Afghanistan
2:33:18
veteran I want to know how much I want you to know how much I thank you for your witness for your courage for your
2:33:26
strength you are a blessing to us your blessing to this nation as
2:33:36
we hear your stories and we will continue to
2:33:43
seek truth and accountability truth
2:33:48
answers and accountability um to the Schmidt's family
2:33:56
who live just outside of the second district in the Greater St Louis area and from Wentzville
2:34:01
Missouri and Saint Charles I know we've we've spoken
2:34:07
uh before young Jared was only 20 years old and if I
2:34:13
understand the story right he had to ask your permission at 17 to enlist early
2:34:20
just so that he could serve and fulfill that mission that he
2:34:27
had grown into um our our prayers continue to be with you
2:34:35
and your anger I think
2:34:42
we are all emboldened by that and feel the same

2:34:49
anger as you do as we seek answers and accountability here I would submit to
2:34:56
all of you there was an article put out today it's a new account it's a reporter
2:35:03
a writer from the Atlantic uh his name is Mr Franklin foyer
2:35:11
and it details President Biden's horrific failure in Afghanistan and it
2:35:18
confirms in just an excruciating and painful heartbreaking detail what we
2:35:24
knew from the the very beginning that President Biden's commit commit was committed the United States to just a
2:35:30
deeply flawed and bad plan and uh it was obvious from day one that
2:35:39
the shameful flight from Afghanistan was going to be a disaster
2:35:44
and a humanitarian tragedy and in fact it was
2:35:50
and what is amazing about this is that the president refused again and again and again to recognize the reality on
2:35:58
the ground and fix his mistakes
2:36:06
against the advice many experts and advisors as hubris
2:36:12
complete and total incompetence and humorous
2:36:21
it was a dishonorable flight from Afghanistan and was a betrayal of our service members
2:36:29
and the brave Afghans who lived and worked and fought alongside us our allies
2:36:35
and the administration needs to own what they did
2:36:43
again and again we have directed The State Department in the strongest possible terms to
2:36:50
cooperate with our investigation I want you to know that and I've been as all my colleagues have
2:36:56
been uh to the state Department's woefully
2:37:01
inadequate readouts and classified briefings and I've read the overly
2:37:07
redacted documents that they've grudgingly provided with disgust
2:37:15
um they have done their best to hide the incompetence but know this this
2:37:21
committee's not going to stand for it we are not going to stand for this we will not rest
2:37:29
until this Administration takes responsibility for its failure
2:37:36
to see this Mission through to say your children's names
2:37:45
we will get that accountability I'd just like Mr chairman to go around
2:37:51
the room one more time and have each of you say your child's name in a word or two that describes who they
2:37:59
are
2:38:05
Sergeant Nicole lean G was an encourager for life
2:38:15
staff sergeant Darren Taylor Hoover fearless leader and great protector
2:38:29
my Taylor Taylor Hoover champion of people
2:38:34
a lover of human Army's staff sergeant Ryan Christian
2:38:41
canals Brave influencer
2:38:48
full of joy
2:38:56
Hunter Lopez United States Marine Corps corporal Noble Warrior
2:39:09
Lopez Jedi Warrior
2:39:17
Lance corporal Dylan Ryan merola lovable strong Marine
2:39:24

honorable Kareem M nikui born again Christian
2:39:34
Degen William Tyler page huge heart tough outer shell
2:39:42
Corporal Humberto Bert Sanchez he was a great defender
2:39:50
Lance corporal Jared M Schmitz passionate Warrior and honorable
2:40:00
Jared Marcus Schmitz was humble and dedicated
2:40:07
I thank you Mr chairman I yield back thank you our next member is a veteran of the Vietnam War and I was reminded of
2:40:14
the administration's comments that this will not be another Vietnam that we will
2:40:19
not see helicopters flying off the top of the embassy yeah that's exactly
2:40:26
what we saw and I would submit it was worse it was worse in Vietnam
2:40:31
but Mr Baird
2:40:38
thank you Mr chairman and uh ranking member appreciate I really appreciate
2:40:44
having this opportunity for all of you to be here and share your
2:40:49
very compelling stories and Polo for whatever it's worth my
2:40:55
background is the Army too so and I only tell you that so these marines can congest to what I'm gonna
2:41:01
what I'm gonna say but anyway um uh I think the most important thing that
2:41:09
I would like for you to know is that your sons and daughters
2:41:17
are really appreciated this country appreciates you and even though you haven't had the kind of response you
2:41:24
would like to have had from your government I can tell you the American people appreciate it and I think you should be
2:41:31
very proud and I can say this with with with integrity
2:41:36
I think you should be very proud of the sons and daughters that you've raised and that end up serving the military
2:41:43
because I had the opportunity to command them while I was in Vietnam
2:41:48
and our gun trucks we ran with convoys our job was to protect that Convoy and
2:41:55
whenever it was hit we had we had to go try to protect our drivers and never once
2:42:03
never once did I see one of our our members of the gun trucks
2:42:08
hesitate that's the kind of Courage and the kind of young people that you raised
2:42:13
and so they they they fit very well with your concerns here and I think the
2:42:22
last thing I would just say is uh uh by you being here
2:42:27
by you telling your compelling stories about your family
2:42:32
I think that makes us all stand up and take notice of what we might need to do or do better
2:42:38
in future situations and so um I can tell you this [Music]
2:42:44
um I can tell you this for those young people that I serve with
2:42:50
I could call the ones of us that are left today and they'd be here as quick as they
2:42:55
could be here and they were they were given an award they were they were inducted into the
2:43:02
Transportation Hall of Fame because of their courage and the work that they did and so I take my hat off to them and I
2:43:09
take my hat off to all your families and I want you to be very proud and I want you to be very proud
2:43:15
of the kind of young men and women that you raised and I thank you for being here that's great our final member is a
2:43:24
veteran of the United States Army Mr Mills thank you Mr chairman
2:43:31
accountability transparency

2:43:38
transparency accountability two words I keep hearing from every
2:43:44
single person here but we sit here two years later
2:43:51
but not a single person having resigned
2:43:56
having been transparent having been held accountable
2:44:01
even though we know that it was willful dereliction of Duty
2:44:07
and you can call it what you'd like maybe it's a vote of no confidence maybe it is articles of impeachment whatever
2:44:13
it is deemed Worthy but I look at this
2:44:19
at the highest level you have the right to call yourself the commander-in-chief
2:44:26
or the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State then the accountability stops at you
2:44:36
and not a single one has had the honor
2:44:42
of standing up and saying this was on me
2:44:49
I have an issue with that and to answer former Ambassador Wagner
2:44:55
representative Wagner's question of description of your sons and daughters
2:45:01
simple it's a hero I had the honor of serving
2:45:08
the United States Army as a army combat veteran of the 82nd Airborne Division where I know that staff sergeant can
2:45:16
also also served and I can remember in my time of service
2:45:24
one of the things that we used to always look at was ensuring that we completed
2:45:29
our missions and our objectives to the greatest extent possible
2:45:35
now I want to be clear on something with why saying that
2:45:40
the failures that occurred in this Afghan botched withdrawal had everything to do with the suits
2:45:47
and nothing to do with the boots our men and women carried out their
2:45:53
missions their objectives their purpose With Honor with Integrity within courage
2:45:59
and they don't deserve to have the feeling as if all that they had fought and lost was for nothing
2:46:07
so to everyone who had served over the 20 plus years in Afghanistan or
2:46:12
Iraq their Heroes and your service meant
2:46:17
something you know when I asked secretary Austin
2:46:24
about what the definition of their election of Duty is he acknowledged my questioning when I asked him if someone
2:46:30
could be removed for dereliction or willful der election of Duty he acknowledged it
2:46:35
not realizing that I was talking about him and I stand by my articles of
2:46:43
impeachment that I've put forward against Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and I do find
2:46:49
that whether he found there was credible Intel or not and I'm utilizing his terminology where
2:46:55
he talked about the identification of whether it was credible and actual Intel and whether or not could have been
2:47:01
prevented we all know that it could have I've seen the Intel reports how detailed
2:47:07
they were up to the day how they were planning the attack how they were readying the attack how
2:47:14
they were entering the city how the planning is now completed how the attack
2:47:19
is imminent and then I looked at secretary blinken who actually received something the
2:47:26
woman who was irresponsible for these descent cables had 20 or had 16 years plus a time where she had been reviewing
2:47:33

these cables and I know that Ambassador Wagner had put her on the spot because she knows about these having served as
2:47:39
Secretary of State and when we asked her whether or not there's been cables who's ever had 23
2:47:45
Diplomat sign it she said never during my career have I seen that
2:47:53
the idea that this was political Optics over military strategy is the reason that we have 13 gold star families
2:47:58
sitting amongst us and I'm honored to be here I haven't been in Congress long
2:48:03
but one of the things that I pledge is that I would get accountability and answers and transparency I think that those descent cables as
2:48:10
well as for those Intel reports should be Declassified for the families or for the American people so we can get one of
2:48:16
those two words which is transparency and Tyler let me just tell you
2:48:23
you're a hero and I'm honored to call your brother I'm grateful that you're here today
2:48:30
your testimony is one of the strongest and I was nearly looking like I was cutting
2:48:37
onions because you had me tearing up so bad on that one
2:48:45
there should have been clear escalations of force and rules of engagements that were set forth so that you could have
2:48:50
carried out your job and have identified the bolo and stop this from happening and not even during the State of the
2:48:57
Union did President Biden once acknowledge your children or acknowledge the failures
2:49:03
but I won't stop fighting whether it's just change policy whereby families do not have to come out of
2:49:09
money first and be reimbursed or have non-profits step in to replace and get
2:49:16
them to where they need to be for their final resting as they did with Nicole or whether it be for making sure that
2:49:23
those who are responsible hold their hand up and try and be a dignified and honorable
2:49:29
individual to acknowledge what happens so it doesn't happen again I think chairman McCall
2:49:36
I think my brother Brian Mast I thank Miss Dean for being here and for acknowledging the
2:49:43
sacrifices so that we cannot just look at this from a partisan perspective but so that we can get accountability
2:49:49
that guarantees that we don't see this again whether it be in Iraq whether it be in Syria or any other future
2:49:56
operations but I'll tell you the most successful
2:50:01
and Victorious battle is the one that we don't get ourselves into to begin with
2:50:07
we have to start prioritizing our nation our people our borders and make that our
2:50:13
priority and not the borders and the lives nine thousand miles away our American lives must come first and I'm
2:50:19
honored to be here and thank you so much for everything that you did with that I yield back thank you Corey let me just
2:50:25
say in closing that we are behind you in the nation is
2:50:31
behind you and we will seek Justice and we will hold those accountable
2:50:37
for you but most importantly for your children they deserve that
2:50:44
and every veteran who served in Afghanistan deserves that so at this time we will have a flag
2:50:51
presentation of a flag flown over the United States capital in honor of your child
2:50:59
they were flown on the second anniversary of the terror attack at Abby gate maybe we never forget them and their
2:51:06
sacrifice so I would ask that each family rise and stand beside the photo of your loved one
2:51:12
and the members here will present a fly to each of the families
2:51:27
thank you
2:51:36
very much
2:55:34
foreign

2:57:16
foreign

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

8 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 8 November 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. Because multiple interviewers were responsible for asking questions, the following abbreviations will be used to capture the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b: Tell us a little about your current job and how you got here?

(2) Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b: Aside from HKIA, any Combat deployments?

(2) Answer. None prior to this deployment.

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d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b (b)(6) Walk me through the train-up?

(2) Answer. It's important to distinguish that we 'deployed' from the deployment. We deployed ADVON March of '20. We knew as early as August that we would be on the (b)(1)1.4a January of 2020 was the preparation start and all the work-up and ITX 1-21. We found out that the deployment had been cancelled with likely the 31st MEU taking its place, so then our assigned METL was taken away, however since it was so back and forth, I kept the training on the books for TRAP, HADR, NEO, and others. Once the (b)(1)1.4a got reinitiated on FEB28th 21, we still had everything covered because of the building blocks and CGRI. Once deployed, I think the first indication for Afghan involvement came in a white letter from the Whitehouse to CENCOM. Something like "as the drawdown occurs, we're monitoring the situation". That would've been March. Pretty sure it was the first week of May when I was leaving (b)(1)1.4d to go to ODR 3, and we went up there to link up in (b)(1)1.4a and got this call of "hey, we're sending a small team to HKIA". That was the first time it got serious. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went on that. We had a mixed team to go out there and take a look at it to do some analysis. But they had no direct task yet. They came back with an understanding of NEO-light. We knew it was BN HQ with Companies minus to keep it light. That was our Echo Company. It was set up conceptually as a NEO Light with one entry point and some light security and cordon tasks. We ended up doing two full MRX at (b)(1)1.4d Full meaning live role players – displaced unit – full comms suite – Expeditionary CoC, all that. The BN did two separate CoC exercises in expeditionary conditions. At the BN level we pushed three separate WARNO's. Details grew and we added to them. Kept adding to it and ended up pushing a full OPORD. We ended up focusing on TPFDD and Strat MOBEX to try to match the TPFDD. We ended up working it all in through exercises but I don't remember the specific dates. (b)(1)1.4a had the mission as the main effort through July and then the MEU would have come in behind. In terms of specific Company Capabilities, we trained Non-Lethal weapons, and had everyone worked through Riot control agents, escalation, and tactics. We used the Infantry immersion trainer built around the Embassy type area. Fox was assigned to the Baghdad embassy complex and so they were the most robust company for that specific mission set and instructors. The other companies had the ability to work that, but were not necessarily as in depth as Fox.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b (b)(6) Can you talk Rules of Engagement (RoE), training, and what your understanding was?

(2) Answer. Every MRX had associated RoE. Hostile Act and Hostile Intent was the baseline standard even without a specific mission. The phased release of that was intended as situational application including get off the plane into combat. I don't remember anyone specifically briefing us RoE. We did from the top-down pass Hostile Act / Hostile Intent – I don't remember specifically who talked it, but I know I remember

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that we had each formation run through it deliberately. There was no time – it was straight into it at HKIA.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did that not happen at the CO and PLT level?

(2) Answer. I do not know what happened below the BN level specific to that once things got started. But I do know we had those conversations. I remember the JAG being available while we were still in (b)(1)1.4d I know they had those detailed conversations as much as possible knowing that before we left there was no specific detail of what we were walking into. I know it was consistent thing that was brought up. “we observed this” – and I know I personally told Marines that if they saw HA/HI then it was clear they could engage.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you know it would be NEO?

(2) Answer. We found out AUG 14th, and landed on AUG 15th. We knew before we took off that the tower was compromised. I landed in the front of the C-130 and we knew the airfield had been breached so they landed with no tower. That environment was known going in and we got a few updates that I briefed on the way in, but we landed condition 1 and got off the plane.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When were you told you were headed to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The first few days was not an ‘Abbey Gate’ issue. It was establishing a perimeter. It was bringing any Marines we had in to establish the perimeter and get control of the airfield. We ended up establishing control around the 17/18th, and we got sectors established even while we were still receiving forces coming in. By the time we needed to reinforce the Battalion, we ended up getting the area around Abbey too. It wasn’t just Abbey. We had from the international terminal up through East Gate. We inserted on the Morning of the 17th and then the 18th, the 82nd came in and (Relief in Place) RIP’d out on the inner portion, then on the 19th, we ended up taking over Abbey.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Talk through Operations centers and information flow?

(2) Answer. We were in a room just off the JOC. It was 10 steps and almost collocated. We were able to run NIPR/SIPR. We could see everything flying, cameras on gates. Green Gear, comms, and as a BN CoC we were very capable of communicating back and forth on HKIA as well as higher HQ all the way back to (b)(1)1.4d

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It took a few days for the JOC battle rhythm to get going. It was about the 18th where we had Ops and Intel briefings. I don't know that steady state was ever achieved by my definition. We fought to try to gain steady state, but it was so dynamic and changing all the time. Because of the crisis with the airfield, our TPFD got messed up and I didn't end up having my (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was covering watches and ended up going down to the gate to make sure I had awareness of everything. The amount of traffic – name the country – Abbey became the most popular and easiest workable platform for everyone. Additional tasking and different problem framing events, the MEU, the 82nd, and we were also simultaneously planning the Exfil and everything on the other side. The (b)(6) was on RBE and because of that I ended up picking up some of the non-normal duties there too. Would have loved to have him there and have another (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on ground. It's relevant to this discussion because talking to the Marines, we knew we had to be nested and tied into the JOC and higher, but we're still in the perimeter in an incredibly dynamic situation operating at the gate. I did not have nearly the standard staff. I know Marines were frustrated with information flow.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How were you structured?

(2) Answer. Myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Our S4A was fantastic, but we didn't have our S4. It was Ops, Log light, Intel full, and even though we were moving quick, they had access to everything they needed, but Air we had none.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How did you stay tied in and aligned with higher?

(2) Answer. My AFSC (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was very capable. I employed him as my rep at the gate. He went with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) so we had presence there all the time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was certainly at the CoC sometimes, but he spent most of his time at the gate with Marines. I don't remember the name of the FSO, but we always had people present on the floor and on watch.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How involved were you with the Intel Process?

(2) Answer. Specifically related to higher? They were two doors down from us. I think it was 2x daily sync in their SCIF. One of the intel analysts was on the watch floor at all times. Synched with daily battle rhythm and in our CoC we had up all the MERC chats going. It was a consistent pull and monitoring. UAS, and live feed. Whatever higher was seeing and saying, we were monitoring also. At the gate, the sniper teams are crucial. They came up twice daily and brought pictures and we worked with them on info coming back from the gates. The green gear was up all the time. If it was important enough to call back up – we were practiced with hard written copies and reporting.

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m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You said they brought you photos?

(2) Answer. They brought camera to GTAC right in the COC. They would either bring the SD's back or send them through the GTAC.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was your knowledge of the intel coming in?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was very well read in on that. He monitored everything and maintained and briefed the picture as they progressed.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Threat streams?

(2) Answer. I never had great clarity on the ground about what was coming in. I know there were rockets, indirect and suicide bomber reports coming in all the time. I don't even remember how many different vehicles. It was constant. On the 26th, it was a little bit more specific. There was clearly a more focused intent towards Abbey Gate. General descriptions though of individuals.p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You said the snipers did debriefs?

(2) Answer. I was never there for any of the sniper debriefs. I know they went back and passed info to the team members once our S2 would give them info.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember any pictures or specifics provided by the snipers?

(2) Answer. I don't remember any one specific thing they brought up. They for sure tried to come to the CoC nightly.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were there any other entities that would be around? (b)(1)1.4a

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(2) Answer. No. None of those guys were around. Our S2 provided information up and down. I don't remember any other of those groups you mentioned being around for the reporting or receipt of our briefs. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tried to maintain as much of a common picture as possible, but I do NOT remember any specific individual being named and brought up or analyzed for a specific identified one person.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything other than that?

(2) Answer. We got so many pictures from them. I never observed one specific picture that I remember being run through a database and come back as analyzed and cleared. That's what it would have taken to engage. I think it's obvious to most, that picking someone out of the crowd especially that crowd, was not an easy task.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there a concern overall about the Taliban? Was there concern about them turning on you?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was concern about that, but it was a future concern. We did receive some reports. I think it was the (b)(6). I remember he went out and even Gen Sullivan talked about it – there was some kind of stand-off and basically they said something like “wait until the 31st” Our greatest risk to force was the crowd. If we lost control of that, then there was no way to control the airfield. I don't think most people grasp that piece. In that scenario, we had to analyze that constantly and if we lost control of the airfield, there was nothing we could do. We could have lost a company of Marines to the crowd any time.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember Taliban killings?

(2) Answer. I do not remember any radio calls about that. I do remember conversations about it. It would have been between me and a Marine on the ground but I do not remember the specifics.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever see any pictures or videos of the Taliban killing?

(2) Answer. Not that I saw.

w. Question and Answer 22.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you feel like you had an adequate ability to receive and disseminate info to the gate?

(2) Answer. I would have loved to have had more, but under the conditions, I felt that the infrastructure was adequate for what we needed to operate.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember any IED test runs?

(2) Answer. No. I do not remember anything like that.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Between the 21-22, when the gates were closed, it would have been in that timeline?

(2) Answer. *Map discussion* (DESCRIBED HERE) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explains that the lane had to stay open between Barron and outer gate. You could shut inner gate if required. "none of those corridors could truly close. The outer gate could physically close, but because the (b)(1)1.4 were in the Barron – we had to keep it all open. The Chevron was emplaced to help alleviate that. When the ISB's were full, the backup was created between the inner gate and the outer gate.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So yes, around that time, it would have been when it was all backed up – from the parking lot area and around the outer gate area – do you remember any specific reports or incidents where there was a bag, and EOD came down there to clear a bag?

(2) Answer. I remember EOD coming down to clear something. I do NOT remember the specific incident or report you're asking about, but I know that IEDs were the threat and we're specifically working to try to mitigate that at all times.

a. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What about comms and reporting?

(2) Answer. We had comms all the time with (b)(6) Anywhere the commander was on the ground. Information would be relayed if necessary, but green gear worked as much as can be expected in the area of the gate while operating (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g I do remember relay having to happen from time to time. I think it comes back to the lack of personnel on the Battalion staff. I would have loved to have our full set of people and gear. I worked as much as I could with as many people as I had at all times. I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to shoulder some of that also.

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b. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So how often were you at the gate?

(2) Answer. There were a few days early on where people around the airfield were just chasing good ideas. I remember being told early on that we would blow a hole in the wall to open another access point. There was some plan to pull people out of (b)(1)1.4d I did some planning on that. It became a necessity to just identify where priorities came in and what we had to work the problems with. As frequently as possible, I was there on hand directing traffic. Early on at the gate, it took a lot of effort to clear the corridor. I know that was a terribly difficult task to ask them to do, so I was there the whole time with them. One group of Marines had cleared all the way to the Barron, and I never explicitly told the (b)(6) to CLEAR and HOLD, and because of that, it took a lot of effort to regain that space when it filled back in behind them. I'd gone days without sleep, but I tried to brief them in person and be available as much as possible. It would have been near the end – like the 25th or 26th where I finally had enough space and time to work on future planning, and we ended up doing a bit of planning ahead of the RIP and the tasks to move and turn off everything for EXFIL.

c. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So leader huddle? Leaders talking to Leaders? What did that look like?

(2) Answer. Every day we did an Ops and Intel sync. 0800 after the meetings – it was always leader to leader trying to make sure that concerns and operations were heard and synched.

d. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) What about with the (b)(1)1.4d? Meetings?

(2) Answer. I did not. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did and I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did. They had a presence in the JOC. SO they were plugged in with us

e. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) What about Taliban? What was their role?

(2) Answer. Theirs was to secure outside the chevron and corridor. It was theirs outside the airfield. I think I would have looked at the terrain much different had we been responsible for or even had the manpower to control, but that was not the mission I ever heard. Taliban had the outer perimeter.

f. Question and Answer 31.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So as you assess capacity and terrain and the mission, did you ever feel that you lacked capacity to do the task?

(2) Answer. Yes. That and the risk to force was growing constantly. The MEU S4, and some others and I ended up going up to (b)(1)1.4d. It became the discussion about the JTE, the problem of the backfill of Abbey. The problem of the 82nd RIP, then timeline and closure. My recommendation was to close on the 25th. That recommendation made it all the way up the chain. I don't know necessarily why the decision was made to continue to operate. The uniqueness of the gate was a blessing and a curse. It made it so that we could see people and they could see us. Abbey became the primary venue to evacuate even before the 25th.

g. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Any discussion about obstacles and planning?

(2) Answer. Unfortunately, after July 28th, we lost our assets due to the sequencing and the higher need. So our Combat Engineer Platoon was not with us. The BLT 1/8 Platoon, and an Army Engineer Platoon assessment. Delay obstacles. Defensive Obstacles. The BLT Platoon Commander walked and talked through this with me several times. We did everything we could in the space and time knowing that that area was constantly occupied and operating. The engineers did work things inside the plans and resources we had available. I look at it as: we never operationally planned for something this bad. We always look at areas we want to control and plan for how to phase these things in with preparation and availability of time and resources. We did not always have that here and that's just a fact of how we operated.

h. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Approaching the 25th, North and East gate are closing or closed, now Abbey is the only game in town, so please talk to me about the atmosphere and tenor of the crowd?

(2) Answer. It got worse. So, the day prior, Echo company was on the outer corridor. They did an amazing job and got aggressive and got control of the crowd and pushed out to the foot bridge. It wasn't a difference in company or personnel, but it was a different situation on the ground. I was seeing the SUAS and cameras about how much the crowds grew. It was insane. More than any estimate could say a number. I had an operational picture by that time and was starting to feel like I understood it, but the size and desperation of the crowd was just different by then.

i. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were the threat streams and what was their frequency?

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(2) Answer. There was an increase in frequency and specificity towards Abbey but not an increase towards detail or specificity.

j. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What about (b)(1)1.4a? What was their role?

(2) Answer. Calming the crowd and talking to them with the loud speaker. Also the messaging. The (b)(1)1.4b were supposed to be done on the 25th. Every hour that didn't happen, it became a new problem. We're limited on the engineer solution and we're very concerned about the IED threat. I became worried about getting behind the gate and getting the (b)(1)1.4c out. It was communication to try to help get this thing wrapped up.

k. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Who approved their messages and info?

(2) Answer. I helped them with some themes, but they used their team to message basically to stay calm. They worked with us for probably 12 hours. It wasn't often.

l. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you work with (b)(1)1.4a elements at the gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. At any one point in time, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and any other Intel or other nation had some presence at the gate. I def talked to a plain clothes Marine down at the gate. The (b)(1)1.4a guys I interacted with were there to extract folks at the gate. I know it would have been possible but I did not see those interactions with the snipers.

m. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So somewhere throughout that day, who made the decision to collapse the outer perimeter.

(2) Answer. I did not get that discussion at my level, but I think he would have discussed that with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I did not task Echo to go out their either. It would have been Golf understanding their sector to control and their specific ability to control what he had been tasked to control, I don't know that I felt he needed to ask. I just don't remember that discussion coming back to me personally.

n. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: When you heard or saw that the canal control collapsed?

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(2) Answer. I don't think that was their call. They didn't have a choice. The crowd was nuts. At that point in time they had no choice based on what they were seeing at their perimeter.

o. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about a suspicious person report?

(2) Answer. I don't remember anything specific. I do not remember any calls coming back about anything specific.

p. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you describe any BOLO's you would have heard about coming down?

(2) Answer. I remember something coming down. Something like: Man in black garb with a shaved head would have been as specific as I heard.

q. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about changes and working at the gate?

(2) Answer. I remember talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the hood of the car about the situation. It would have been 0330 on that morning.

r. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would more than one person in the crowd match that description?

(2) Answer. Hundreds. I do NOT remember any specific calls back calling out Hostile act either.

s. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) relay to you anything about a request to engage any specific individual?

(2) Answer. I do not remember that.

t. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) And you had a radio with you at all times?

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(2) Answer. My side SAPI plate, with radio pouch and radio was ripped off in the crowd on the 19th. Most of the time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with me with a radio or I was near someone with one.

u. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Was there any emphasis on Abbey gate from the intel side or support offered or given to your intel section? This is specific to the increased threat.

(2) Answer. Not that I'm aware of. We asked to have a dedicated ISR asset to us. We were not granted that. Not denied, just not dedicated to us for control.

v. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Any awareness of (b)(1)1.4a being in the area at that time?

(2) Answer. No.

w. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How often did you review the Yellow Canaries?

(2) Answer. I don't remember reviewing those.

x. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you ever go in the tower on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No.

y. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you recall any specific discussion with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about Snipers requesting clearance to Engage?

(2) Answer. No. I do not remember anything like that. I didn't specifically know anything about that until after I saw the HFAC testimony.

z. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: About that version?

(2) Answer. I think he should be heard. I love that we live in a nation where people are interested in his version. It's possible that his version of the events skipped me, but I don't think his version of the events is accurate. I think there's some level of post event fantasy recreation.

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aa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So let's talk about the event?

(2) Answer. I was here at the point of the blast. I thought it was gravel kick up or something. I saw a (b)(6). I helped drag him back by the tower. Then Golf company guys are trying to come back and help while also working through triage of what I'm seeing. I have also run through MC TC3, and I'm bringing all that back up. I assessed two more Marines and helped transport one of them. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about establishing security. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about bringing up the STP ambulance. I remember we had staged medical support right outside the main gate area and we had Role 1E and STP staged. I knew I needed to talk to higher and fast. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) found me with the radio and I immediately began reporting to higher. Initially (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the hook. He handed me off to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I estimated 30 ground casualties. They brought up the (b)(1)1.4 and as I keep seeing all the Marines pointing out at the Water Tower area. I remember being pissed and I'm on the radio and I remember seeing the ambulance coming down towards me. I remember the trauma nurse starting to work on the Marines there. Once I saw Marines on site addressing wounded and knew higher HQ was aware and I know security has been established, and I remember that's when I started (b)(6) (b)(6) and by that time the Corpsman is working on me. I get in the vehicle with the STP. That random white 15 pax van moved me to the Role 1E stop. We had done a bunch of rehearsals for evacuation, and determined that going around was faster. We stopped their because (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when he was (b)(6) (this was relayed to me by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and She treated him on site at the Role 1E and I believe that's why he was one of the last ones into Role 2. He was (b)(6) there. He was (b)(6) I remember seeing some of it. I remember him (b)(6) between the Role 1 and Role 2.

bb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any contact with the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Not until later in that evening.

cc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything that we haven't asked you, or that you feel like you need to talk about?

(2) Answer. Nothing comes to mind.

dd. Question and Answer 55.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): This is two years removed and the Social Media space has now projected events and the things surrounding the happenings. Here we are today – and was there a moment that you ever told yourself that you didn't agree, or you could talk to people, or say some things to clarify, what would that be?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I spoke after the briefing. I remember thinking that that briefing was the most factual version of the events. I can't even account for time properly based on how dense things were. I thought that the investigation covered things very accurately. I saw HFAC and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony. I hope that Marines don't feel like their higher headquarters abandoned them – but when I heard his testimony about having the bomber in his sights, and all the details that he relays – my view of all this was just not the same. I don't remember any picture. I don't remember being able to identify any specific person in the crowd. It wasn't in ROE to being able to engage. Just shooting someone in the crowd off a description is incredibly difficult. I hate that my interview has caused some grief towards the families. I know that felt weird. I wanted to tell the Marines stories and they cut out 30 minutes of that conversation. I am glad that I told them what I heard then, but I think that was specifically told the version that we saw. I think that the Taliban could have sent some rounds and I can tell you that people were seeking cover and it was a strange place and space and time and events.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 14 . I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

16 NOV 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16NOV23

DATE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

7 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 07 November 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Because multiple interviewers were responsible for asking questions, the following abbreviations will be used to capture the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How familiar are you with the original investigation?

(2) Answer. I have read the full unredacted report.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What did you do when you were in 2/1?

(2) Answer. Victor 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Switched over to the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and was the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Can you talk about RoE and RoE training?

(2) Answer. It started before we went to Afghanistan. It was all the support folks, and we trained that together. I remember they called it hostile act/hostile intent. We did all that in (b)(1)1.4d before we went.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) When did you leave (b)(1)1.4d and arrive in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I was there for just under two weeks. Would've been nighttime 16/17th. When we got off we expected the chaos and our logistics chief was there and just kind of said 'hey'. The first flights were dealing with the civilians, but by the time we got there all that had calmed down. It was security and getting passports through.f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) First day doing your actual job?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already there for 2 days so I showed up to the JOC and went on shift a few days later. I met with the MEU S2 (don't remember her name). They were in charge of all the ISR assets. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were ISR trained before the deployment and we were in the actual JOC. We started in V 2/1 and the next day we started working on the JOC floor. Massive room (draws on the white board). Monitors had chat surfer and drone feeds running all the time. This was a combined space and was a mix of units and people. LNO's from every element on HKIA had reps there. We worked in this space with tons of different units. (b)(1)1.4d one of our air officers, the 1-star worked here. It was a Joint space. Out the back door, you could access the 2/1 CoC. It was a smaller space and our SgtMaj and others worked out of there. Comm Marines were all there and they would meet and pass intel via radio. That space was used to run Abbey gate. This space was all set up before I got there, so I just started working into the rotation.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Who would you say was in charge of the CoC?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When he would step out it would be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). If they were both gone, it would be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was also there. Our XO was still in (b)(1)1.4d, so he wasn't there for the normal succession of command stuff.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Debriefs, where? When?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. It stayed in 2/1 spaces. I was on morning shift, and the handoffs would usually happen when we were leaving. Our main focus was the ISR assets.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Talk about the information flow process. Info in or down?

(2) Answer. There was a GySgt that would be at the gates. Myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reps. Sometimes we would go down the gates, but usually it was them coming back or reporting it over the net. I usually wasn't on the net when they would send those reports. Pushing info to the gates would have usually been done over radio. I don't remember a logbook, or anything like that.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Pre-deployment, did your team work on CoC operations? Was there a logbook in training?

(2) Answer. ITX in 29 palms, that was our main function. We did that in (b)(1)1.4d also. For us, we did have a green logbook with the correlating intel reports. Because of how we occupied the space and were operating at HKIA, we kept logs for the ISR observations, but I didn't have the S3 logbook. There were means to capture and display information everywhere. I wouldn't say that we were doing a lot of intel management or analysis. It was receiving reports and sending them down. Both in the JOC and in the 24th MEU, there was an intel picture that was managed in their own areas. The threats were specific to the areas the units operated. VBIED for North Gate. Taliban were the outer security at Abbey Gate. I don't remember the specifics of the intel process. Anything that came in we would brief to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he would brief it down. We used mostly analog systems and couldn't rely on SIPR/NIPR.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were there any specific products developed by your team?

(2) Answer. I know they were developing products. Specifically, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had products developed for intel and how the flow would come in and be briefed down. We had templates that were based on the expectation, so we had been briefing Afghanistan daily.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you utilize the snipers to disseminate info or task them?

(2) Answer. I personally did not, but I remember seeing a significant amount of data being pushed through them. Biggest RFI was about people acting suspicious. There were those that were out of baseline. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that happened. I

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 Marines, [REDACTED]

remember the individual that he said we know that the person was the bomber – and that was NOT the bomber. I don't like that because I keep seeing him saying that in the public sphere, and I don't think he understands. I just disagree with what he's saying. The reason I disagree is because the attacker was on OSINT and it wasn't the guy. The person was not the same and they do not match.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You've started working, the gate is being opened, and the Marines are working to gain control of the crowd. Where are the reports coming in?

(2) Answer. Chatsurfer. HUMINT, SIGINT. Tons of info coming in all the time. Our guys were ready just in case because our guys were constantly seeing and hearing the threats come through. A lot of them did not have viable actionable info coming with it, but we always passed what we received.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you remember any of the threat streams specifically?

(2) Answer. Some of them would be BOLO's for MAM's wearing specific clothing. That would have been SIGINT. HUMINT would be ISIS-K fighters in the area and you need to look for specific vehicles. It was a silver Camry. Every time a silver Camry would come around we would follow it with ISR. We would get fuel trucks and lone wolf ISISK threat reports with a specific time and date, but those never came to fruition.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When received, how did you pass it?

(2) Answer. Right away, we would receive threats for specific areas and those areas being threatened would get the info directly. The security at Abbey was better than other areas because of the physical structures. I would write the specific threats and send them to [REDACTED] and he would push the info to the Commanders on the ground. I don't remember ever passing the info directly to the Marines at the gate. I did not talk directly to the CO CDRs. My S2 did that. I was concentrating on ISR assets. The MEU folks were focused on their areas and we were too. We were constantly just monitoring and reporting what we got. Most of the info came from the 24th MEU, but the [REDACTED] pushed a lot of their info through us too.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So from the MEU O6 headquarters, the flow of intel came through the O6 HQ, and how did the information get sent around the JOC floor?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. The displayed information and the 2/1 Marines would get their info from us. The JOC floor operated as a space where info was mostly displayed all the time, but that info would have come in and been grabbed by people working in the JOC. If we saw or heard something we would grab it if it's specific to our own units. At the beginning and end of the day, we would do an intel debrief. We would specifically talk ISR and what was happening outside the walls. We would send our folks to different locations around the airfield, so we kept a picture of what was happening around us. Where we sat in the JOC kept us out of the main CoC floor while the day-to-day hour-to-hour floor that 2/1 was operating. I would get called off the JOC floor if 2/1 needed anything. I would come off the JOC a couple hours per day for that stuff. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was always trying to make sure the info was getting down to the gates.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Talk us through your average day?

(2) Answer. Mostly benign threat reporting which were assessed to be not real and we had to work through what everyone was sending and receiving. First few days were very hard. Lots of info. Before the 22nd, the threat reporting was generic. The closure of the gate created a larger problem. I didn't see the origin of the reports. Whatever the source of the reporting, they became a lot more specific to the gates, method of attack, that type of thing. We would create and try to pass the timelines for these threats too.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Inside the JOC, was there ever a tactical pause?

(2) Answer. Because of there being no planes, there was a decision made to take a tactical pause. I don't remember who was the one who made the call to close the gate whether it was Marine, Army, SoF.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Threat reporting about Taliban specifically?

(2) Answer. We saw a lot of reporting specific to Taliban not letting people in or screening for Blue Passports. There was a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c that was created and we were passing threat reports to them. We didn't really get info from them, but they were constantly firing guns around us. They would not be targeting anything in particular, but it was Taliban firing in the air, not at civilians. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c through. We were not tasked to look for Taliban shooting people, and because of the limited ISR assets, we did not really monitor the Taliban trying to kill people. I never saw the Taliban shooting anyone on ISR. We were trying to use ISR assets to work through

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines, [REDACTED]

talking people onto the airfield and passing info to get specific individuals onto the airfield.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were you aware of any reports of Taliban attacking the airfield?

(2) Answer. Various reports did come through about that. I remember specifically that it was about the day we needed to be gone. It was a consideration across the JOC that the Taliban were possibly going to flip on us. The Abbey Gate snipers were focused on the Taliban on the chevron. It was a concern from everywhere that the Taliban would attack us.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED] With shifting timelines and priorities, did you feel like you had a good understanding of partnership and timelines with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. It was unnerving. The Taliban very much started building up in numbers. They were maybe 10 in number day 1, and they would keep coming. There would be more coming in and then they would stay, so the Taliban numbers kept building there at the gates.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So the Taliban built up?

(2) Answer. Yes. The closer we got to the timeline to leave they were clearly massing forces. They were in the city already but started getting increasingly aggressive leading up to the days of the blast. The interpreters relayed info about the Taliban telling people to go away and they would tell us the civilians were told that if the Americans turned away people, they would be killed. It created a lot more panic. Because they were trying to push in and people were massing at the gates, when the other 2 gates closed, it all turned to shit. When observing this all from ISR, I never saw any of the murder that was being discussed, but I know there were a ton of reports coming in about all kinds of things. Abandoned orphanage kids. Sexual assault in the crowds. To the best of my knowledge, I don't remember anyone coming into the JOC floor and watching ISR that was showing Taliban killing people. They for sure got more aggressive though.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did the threat streams get more specific?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines, [redacted]

(2) Answer. It would have coincided with the original gate closure. It became much more clear towards which gate, what they were looking to do. It was specific initially to the VBIED. I remember a Toyota Camry in gold or silver. I remember seeing a car that matched the description, but since a lot of it came from HUMINT or other sources, it was hard to track the amount of

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [redacted]: Talk about the development of the intel and the timeline of what you saw leading up to the attack?

(2) Answer. Day of the attack, I came on shift, and there was a specific time that came from ISIS twitter. It was specific to Abbey Gate and had a time. We counted down with them to make sure they knew the timeline. There was a Marine who blew his hand up cooking off a flashbang. That created a bunch of issues, but once we realized that it wasn't the key it was the morning of the blast that the sniper team started reporting the suspicious individual, not moving, smiling and not trying to gain access. They reported him and they said this was the bomber. Once we got that report, we told them to keep an eye on the suspicious individual, but a couple minutes later they lost him. [redacted] was there with me in the CoC. It was confusing that they couldn't find him so quickly since they said he was so suspicious. When the blast went off, I was watching the ISR and slewed over to Abbey Gate. I could see the Marines running towards the gate at that point. They were reporting all kinds of stuff. Gunfire from the marketplace. Marines were working to recover each other at this point. I didn't see any gunfire when I was looking.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [redacted]: Do you remember the specific report that caused the Snipers to queue in?

(2) Answer. The snipers pushed us the bolo about the specific individual. They used prior reporting, but it was his behavior. I saw the picture off the camera. They brought the camera into the JOC, and we took a picture of the picture on the camera and we pushed all this out. I took that picture at 0606 and sent it out over Signal. They took the picture and brought the camera to us to confirm or deny the individual. He stood out. His behavior was different, but we pushed it out to everyone saying we don't know if he's the actual threat. He didn't have a backpack or anything. I could not confirm anything based off that photo. They wanted to kill that individual.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [redacted]: Did intel help support that?

(2) Answer. Both intel cells were working on that and they would not confirm anything based on what we had. This was probably the second time that people had

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

serious concerns about a specific person. The other one was from people on the ground.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Were you in the CoC when call came about engagement?

(2) Answer. I heard it but I didn't take any action. I was in the CoC when this came in, but it came over the radio. I believe that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in there when it came in as a request to engage. I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said no or told them they needed to get permission.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How did you normally see these reports coming back to you?

(2) Answer. Runner or radio. Usually radio. They pushed info up and down all the time.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Do you remember Army (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. I did meet SSG Knauss the day before. We didn't even talk work at that time. We got to know each other, but he didn't give me any info related to threats or anything.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a: in the JOC?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was (b)(1)1.4a and State and others in the JOC all the time.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So just to confirm, do you remember any of the (b)(1)1.4a guys talking to snipers?

(2) Answer. No.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. AD: So backing up a little, was there ever a report in the 20-22 when the gates opened back up?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines, [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. Very few. I remember a report coming from the gate about ISISK scanning the gates trying to target the gates with an IED. I don't remember anything specific to the days of- but I do remember there being a lot of descriptions of IED probes and that matches with everything we knew before going in. We knew ISISK was the bigger threat and we knew it was IED. I do not remember anything specific related to an IED test run on those days though. I don't remember anything different than the normal scenarios of generic descriptions.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you remember the snipers calling into the JOC with reports of killing of civilians? Any pictures of killing of civilians?

(2) Answer. No. I don't remember anything that. I know we destroyed a lot of SIPR Hard drives. I was responsible for destroying the S2 Hard drives and that was frustrating for [REDACTED]

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Understanding that you weren't at the gate, but knowing that you were in the area, by your firsthand knowledge, do you believe that the BOLO description would have applied to any number of the crowd?

(2) Answer. It would have applied to most of the crowd because the descriptions were not specific. Maybe one or two of the descriptions that came in later on would have helped be specific.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Without HI/HA, there would have been no way to pinpoint a single person?

(2) Answer. Correct.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you ever go in the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No. I went down there and was in the area a lot trying to help take care of the Marines at the gate, but I never went into the tower.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What did you observe post blast via the ISR camera?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2/1 Marines, S2 NCO

(2) Answer. I remember trying to focus the camera on Abbey immediately. I saw them running down the corridor. You could tell where the blast had happened. It was a lot of chaos. From then they posted security. I received multiple reports of gunfire coming from the market. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] had me move the camera to the market and once I couldn't see any gunfire in that area, I tried to keep an eye on the gate as much as possible. CENTCOM gave us 9 assets at that point and I watched it for like 3 hours before being forced to get off the JOC floor due to the amount of time I was on shift.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)]

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)]

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (no question captured)

(2) Answer. I was very concerned why we were not interviewed in the initial investigation.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Is there anything else you need to talk about related to anything we've asked here? Anyone else we need to speak to?

(2) Answer. Have you spoken to the [redacted (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Do you pay attention to social media or consume things related to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Not anything more than we've already talked about.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] It goes back to your question about 'why didn't anyone talk to me'? Since that time, it's up to you to

(2) Answer. Some of the biggest things are talking to my wife. Seeing it through my eyes and knowing that some of the things they said were not true. I remember one of the reports and Marines said they shot someone. I don't remember that and I never

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 Marines, [REDACTED]

heard that. It's one of the main reasons I got out because I didn't want to be around that. There were a ton of reports of people saying it was a complex attack. That's not true and I know that because I pushed back then and now. I didn't like having to hear that and stand up against that against my buddies. They say it happened but from my view, I didn't see that. [REDACTED] spoke about all that too. I saw the medical files. I know that there was no complex attack. It was a rough time for me personally. I didn't like talking about this with my peers for this reason.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How long were you with 2/1?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was the intel actionable at your level and what did you do to clarify and add detail to intel?

(2) Answer. In the beginning, it was frustrating how vague it was. It got a lot more specific as it went along. I remember even BG Sullivan getting upset because we couldn't do anything with the info we were getting. I know that the leadership treated our safety as a top priority. Everyone was seeking clarity and actionable intel picture and I know it felt hard to hear a lot of the same stuff over and over that wasn't actionable, but I know that people were seeking to clarify.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Review

1. Throughout the Supplemental Review of the Abbey Gate Investigation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided a statement on 7 November 2023. The statement was transcribed contemporaneous to the witness providing the account of events.
2. At the conclusion of the interview the witness had an opportunity to review the written statement and agreed that statement made was accurate and given freely and willfully.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

13 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. (CUI) On 10 November 2023, I conducted a phone interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) formerly an Intelligence Analyst for 2/1 Marines deployed to Hamad Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August of 2021. The below is a summary of our conversation. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave a statement for the Supplemental Review on 7 November 2023.

2. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) clarified that the time he took the photo (exhibit S052) was not actually 0606, which is in his statement. He agreed that time is based on whatever time zone his phone last registered. He was unsure what time zone, but recalled he took the photo around 1200. He remembered there was a significant injury to a Marine's hand that morning and he took the picture after that event.

3. (CUI) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also clarified that a sniper from (b)(6) brought the actual camera up to the COC and that's why he took a picture of the digital display. He could not recall which sniper brought the camera, but was certain it was not (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

08 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1
Marines

1. On 08 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [redacted] and [redacted] conducted an interview of the above personnel via SIPR Video Teleconference from [redacted] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [redacted] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] answered verbally. [redacted] recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from [redacted] will be [redacted] questions from [redacted] will be [redacted] and questions from [redacted] will be denoted by [redacted]

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [redacted] When did you get assigned to 2/1?

(2) Answer. It would have been, I believe, April of 2018. Around that time. I remained there up until September of 2022. I was with the Scout Sniper Platoon from January of 2020 until I left 2/1 in September of 2022.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [redacted] Do you have an opportunity to attend Scout Sniper School?

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Marines

(2) Answer. I did have an opportunity, but I had a [REDACTED] from a run, so I didn't get to go. I was going to go after the deployment, but then I got orders to Marine Security Forces, so I did not attend Scout Sniper School.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Which [REDACTED] team were you with and who was your team leader?

(2) Answer. I was with [REDACTED] but then going into Afghanistan I moved to [REDACTED] since we had extra guys, and they had a smaller team. I moved over to them in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] was my team leader while I was in [REDACTED]

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Where were you prior to going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When and where were you when you found out you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. There were rumors going around and we heard what was going on, in country, but I don't think we actually got official word until about 4 days prior to actually going into Afghanistan.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Prior to leaving [REDACTED] did you receive a Rules of Engagement (RoE) brief?

(2) Answer. Yes, and we received RoE cards as well.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you remember what the RoE was?

(2) Answer. I was trying to find my RoE card, but I must have lost it since. I do remember it was very generic. It covered defense of self, property, and others.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Would it have required hostile act/intent and positive identification (PID) to engage?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(2) Answer. That is correct. Also, regarding the defense of others, it was specified that only included American personnel.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. You had to confirm it was Americans in order to engage, and you understood that prior to going into theater?

(2) Answer. That is correct, sir.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you remember which date you departed for Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. We left (b)(1)1.4d on August 16th, but didn't take off until about 0100 on the 17th. We landed in HKIA in daylight, late morning or early afternoon on the 17th.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were you still with (b)(6) at this point?

(2) Answer. I was still with (b)(6) when we landed. Later that afternoon, they pushed out to do recon and surveillance. I moved to (b)(6) bivouac site at the cafeteria, and then later that evening I linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and melted in with (b)(6)

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Had you deployed to CENTCOM before this?

(2) Answer. Negative, I had not.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What was the environment like when you landed?

(2) Answer. I remember it not being how I expected Afghanistan to be. I remember arriving and seeing a little coffee shop with some, what I assume, were State Department dudes in civilians lounging and drinking coffee. I looked at them and thought this wasn't how I expected it to be.

The airfield was under control at that time. We knew the civilians had rushed the airfield the day prior, and we were assuming it would still be like that when we landed. We

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expected to be rushed by the crowd when we were getting off the aircraft and we were prepared for that, but the airfield was cleared by the time we landed.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your tasking with (b)(6) prior to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Just Recon and Surveillance. Overwatch at different areas. Our first location was on top of a radio tower, overlooking a section of the airport and observing Taliban and civilians walking around the area.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. JN: When were you tasked to go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I believe the third day we were there, the 19th. It may have been the 18th though.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was it the same day the chevron was emplaced, the 19th?

(2) Answer. It was, so that would be correct.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your team's purpose going down to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We weren't sure what we were going to be doing over there. We knew they were pushing the crowd back to open the gate. A platoon from Fox was trying to push out to the Barron Hotel, in order to secure it so the (b)(1) 1.44 could use that as their Combat Operations Center (COC). When we showed up, Fox was getting ready to push. We could hear the crowd outside the closed gate. We pushed up to the sniper tower, but it was a small tower, so we didn't all need to be up there at the time. I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went into the tower, so the rest of us went to help open the gate. As soon as the gate opened the crowd flooded in, but we held them back, just kind of linking arms. The crowd tried to force through for about 15 minutes until some ODA dudes threw smoke into the crowd which dispersed them a bit.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We understand it took hours to clear the crowd until the chevron was emplaced; did you help with the crowd the whole time?

(2) Answer. We were down there, helping with the crowd. A car was used to block the gate in such a way that only one or two people could get through the gate. We

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pointed out people we saw holding up correct papers, and we tried to get some of them through. We did that for a while, until Fox company took over that spotting role from us. After that, we went to the tower and figured out our rotation on the gun and the camera and the scope. When we got there, we didn't have a plan or a task of what we would be doing. We knew we would provide overwatch and collect intelligence. Some State Department dudes had told us to help vet guys and get guys through, but we didn't know what the right documents looked like, so we had to just figure that out on our own.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned your rotation, did you have an SOP for how many people needed to be in the tower?

(2) Answer. We didn't have an actual breakdown. It was big-boy rules. We had worked together before; the understanding was that if you were too tired to focus, you needed to get someone to cover for you so that you could nap or take a walk. Sometimes, we would all be up in the tower, one guy on the gun and one guy on the scope. Sometimes, it would be one guy in the tower with the gun and the radio while the rest of us would work or rest. Sometimes, we would be on the gun for an hour, and sometimes it would be four hours.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So there were times that only one man was on the gun and the radio at the same time?

(2) Answer. Yes, that is the case. More often than not, there were more than two people in the tower though.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your role on the team?

(2) Answer. Since it wasn't my team, I didn't have an assigned billet. I was an extra slack man, helping do whatever needed to be done. But I think we all covered that role since this wasn't a traditional sniper mission. We all understood we needed to pass information and provide overwatch, but the rest of us would help get people out or get some rest.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you guys work in buddy pairs at all?

(2) Answer. No, it was just rotate on and off based on who was tired and who was available.

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x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did the RoE change while you were at the gate?

(2) Answer. Negative, we asked for updated RoEs throughout the week we were there but they remained the same throughout. When we had PID'd the individual that we had a be on the lookout for (BOLO), and we were requesting to engage that individual, that was really the only time that we were looking for updates.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did your team request any updates in regards to how the Taliban treated civilians?

(2) Answer. I believe we did ask, because we did witness them beating and executing people. I personally did not request that, but I am willing to bet that other guys did request that.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you personally witness the Taliban execute civilians?

(2) Answer. I did, sir.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Can you describe what you saw and how they mistreated or killed civilians?

(2) Answer. One I remember the most, is that the Taliban would beat the civilians with garden hoses folded in half. On the first night, super late in the night, I first watched the Taliban shoot someone. If you are looking toward the chevron, past the chevron, there was a wall that they would go behind where they thought they couldn't be seen. But we could see there from the tower. The first night I watched them hit a guy with a hose, then shot him with an AK (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was awake with me at this point. I told him what I saw, and we passed that up.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Was that the only time that you saw them kill somebody?

(2) Answer. There were other times. If I had to put it at a number I physically saw, I would say it was probably 3 to 4 times.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

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(1) Question. C1: That was physically, with your own eyes, that you saw the whole event and the individual fall after being shot?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, and it tended to be in that same spot that they thought they couldn't be seen. It was consistently in that spot. I knew it was going on over there, so I tended to watch that area even though I knew I couldn't do anything. It was like watching a train wreck.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Why couldn't you do anything, because you couldn't confirm they were U.S. citizens?

(2) Answer. That is correct.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Was that frustrating for you and the team?

(2) Answer. It was, sir.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Did you request any change to the RoE from higher based on what you saw?

(2) Answer. We had passed it up that civilians were being executed, and I think that we were just reminded that we needed Hostile Act/ Intent and we could only defend Americans. Actually, there was something that also applied to NATO. I think we could also protect coalition forces/NATO partners.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Did you ever interact directly with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I was close to them. One time there was a Taliban member that came along the nearside walkway. He was walking that way and got near the T-Wall. He was walking around, we yelled at him to go somewhere else since we didn't want him around. He was armed and had grenades. He was right by the foot of our tower, and we yelled at him to go away. He gave us some hand gestures. I think he understood that he was unwanted. He stayed there for a little bit, and then left a few minutes later.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Do you have any pictures or videos of the Taliban being violent toward civilians?

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(2) Answer. Not on my phone. We tried to capture that on our team's camera, so those pictures would be on that SD card.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We understand that your team had a MAGTF Secondary (b)(1)1.4g camera with SD Cards, how would you share those photos with higher?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would go drop off the SIM card; I don't know if that went to our platoon commander or the company commander. We had two SIM cards, so he would take one to show higher and we would pop the other one in to use in the meantime.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When the SIM card came back would the photos still be on there?

(2) Answer. They would still be on there.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you ever tasked to take the SIM card to higher?

(2) Answer. I was not sir.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever witness an 'Improvised Explosive Device (IED) probe'?

(2) Answer. There was an old man and a younger man who we saw constantly. They were carrying either a backpack or a duffel bag, some kind of bag. I remember watching them for a while, then someone else getting on the gun and watching them. They moved through the crowd. The older man stayed by the parking lot. The younger man would go into the crowd. In the observation log (OBSLOG) I think we named the individual 'shot-caller'.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any details about what he was wearing?

(2) Answer. I don't, but it was obvious that he was telling the younger man what to do, pointing and telling him where to go. I wasn't on observation when this specifically

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happened, but someone saw him drop a bag and leave. At that point, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or somebody notified Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). I can't remember all the dialogue and details, but we planned for an IED to go off. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed down and told people to back off the gate and get down a bit; they didn't really say all the details because they didn't want to cause a panic or a possible IED detonation. So all Marines and [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 took cover, and stayed like that for a little bit. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back to the tower after it was over.

There was another scenario where someone had placed some sort of electronic device on the wall by the outer gate; it almost looked like an old tape recorder. We looked at it through our spotting scope, but we couldn't figure out what it was, so we called EOD. That was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I looking at it originally. EOD deemed it safe to inspect, so [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) climbed up on the wall to look at it. He offered it to EOD. They didn't want it, so [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tossed it.

Those are the only two events I could consider to be a probe.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Alright, so you were not in the tower during the duffel bag event?

(2) Answer. I was, but not on the gun or the scope. I think I was just eating some chow.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did your team ever find the bag?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, I can't remember.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what day that would have been?

(2) Answer. I do not.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did that happen before or after the 'tape recorder' incident?

(2) Answer. I think the duffel bag happened first; I don't know how much later the second event was.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b How far from the tower was that 'tape recorder'-like device?

(2) Answer. It was on the wall with the flightline on the backside of it where people would have been walking past. We don't know how or exactly when it got up there, we assume someone threw it.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b You mentioned OBSLOGs, do you have any copies of those?

(2) Answer. I do not.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Did you have a Rite in the Rain notebook or anything that you kept notes in?

(2) Answer. I'm sure I still have that somewhere, but it's not out here with me in (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Those first few days you're at the gate, how much time do you spend on observation or on the gun?

(2) Answer. I gravitated toward being in the tower at night, I'm not sure why. I would be up most nights, I would take a two-hour nap after the sun came up then help bring people in during the day, find some work. I would be on the gun for a while during the night, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be up with me at night a lot of the time as well.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b What was the crowd like at night, initially?

(2) Answer. It was almost like a festival. People would play with lasers in the crowd. They weren't super unruly at night. They were almost just like a bunch of people in line for a concert. I don't remember too many times that it got super unruly. The Taliban would still beat people here and there, it kind of stayed with the baseline of chaos, but nothing that we couldn't handle.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Earlier, you referenced a BOLO that came later, but between the 19th and the 24th do you remember any kind of threat or intel reporting about threats at Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. Yes sir, I think day one we were told of a possible Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) threat about a gold Toyota Corolla, or something along those lines. We knew there was a VBIED threat from day one. We never saw that, but that VBIED threat would come up every once in a while, and it was usually about that same vehicle.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you get that VBIED threat multiple times before the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was always about that same vehicle. I don't know the source of those BOLOs, I assume someone saw it in the area and called it in.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Any BOLOs about people?

(2) Answer. The gentlemen with the shaved head, black garb, clean shave. I don't remember any other details.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [REDACTED] That's the BOLO on the 26th. Any BOLOs prior to that?

(2) Answer. I think what made us pick out the old man and the young man that I mentioned was because we were told to be on the lookout for an old man and young man with a duffel bag, which is why we were looking for them.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How did your team receive intelligence?

(2) Answer. We got information over black gear radios or 153s, but green gear struggled at the tower. We were mostly using black gear. You'd check the observation book when you got on the gun in case you missed anything, and we'd also pass information we received within the team.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you receive intelligence via Signal or face-to-face interactions as well?

(2) Answer. We were using Signal for a lot of things. I remember using it to talk to my platoon commander; I know [REDACTED] used it to talk to company command. The [REDACTED] would come up to the tower and see how we were doing or pass us intel. EOD or intel guys would come in the tower as well, either to try and see something or tell us something.

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Marinesccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was that Marine EOD? Would anyone else come up into the tower and pass you information?

(2) Answer. Yes, that was Marine EOD. Sometimes Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) would be up there as well, but not to pass us info. 'Special guys' would come up there sometimes to get a vantage point over the crowd, trying to spot certain individuals that they wanted to pull out of the crowd.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Who were those ODA and "special guys" that would come in the tower?

(2) Answer. There were some ODA guys we knew that would come up occasionally. Army Green Berets would come to get a vantage. State Department guys would come up and look at things.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you know any of those guys names?

(2) Answer. I do not. We just knew them from being around the gate. Day one, we started chatting with them and established some kind of relationship that we would help each other out if we needed it.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you know what ODA or special forces group they were a part of?

(2) Answer. I do not know which ODA. I know there were some PJs and some Green Berets. I think there was one PJ named [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but he didn't come up in the tower for anything.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you remember their patches at all?

(2) Answer. Not that I can remember.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Would these guys getting observation ever share intel with you?

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 Marines

(2) Answer. All the BOLOs we got came from intel or EOD. The guys trying to get a vantage were usually looking for a specific person to get through the gate. There were a lot of people with signs with like a unit motto from a unit that they had been an interpreter for. We were getting Instagram direct messages or other kinds of messages telling us to look for people like that. A lot of those guys were getting the same kind of messages, so that's what they would be looking for.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You mentioned intel guys would come into the tower to pass intelligence, who was that?

(2) Answer. I don't know what exactly they were, they might have been Counter-Intel. I just knew they had some intel job. I know they were Marines, wearing woodlands, so they would have been with 1/8 or someone else.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you know any of their names or ranks?

(2) Answer. The one I saw the most was a [REDACTED] but I don't remember their names or anything like that. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you ever interact with [REDACTED] Soldiers or Marines?

(2) Answer. That might be who I was thinking of. A lot of guys came in and out of the towers, so I mesh a lot of the details. I remember getting BOLOs and threat streams, specific stuff like that.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When you say BOLO, do you mean information passed via intelligence channels from your S2, or are you referencing guys coming into the tower looking for guys to pull out of the crowd?

(2) Answer. If we called it a BOLO, we were only referring to persons of interests that were possible threats. People trying to get to the gate, we would just describe that and how to identify them. BOLOs were a possible threat.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any BOLOs from outside of your chain of command?

(2) Answer. That SSgt would come up to the tower and tell us about BOLOs. The VBIED threat came from him, and the shaved head, black garbed individual on the 26th came from him as well. We would pass that intelligence back over the net to our company and platoon leadership as well.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The only individual outside of your chain of command that shared any BOLOs was that SSgt in woodland camos?

(2) Answer. Yes, that is correct.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you know of any Marines with the (b)(1)1.4a team out there?

(2) Answer. I can't remember sir.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever meet a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. That name doesn't ring a bell.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone show you photos of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Not that I saw. There were times, like with the VBIED, that I remember hearing about it from the that SSgt's mouth. Another time I remember just coming back and the rest of the team mentioned that the VBIED threat was back.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember an Army (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. That doesn't ring any bells.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would that SSgt that you mentioned come up with an Army Soldier?

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(2) Answer. He would usually come up with someone else, but that detail of who it was is totally out of my mind. I do remember he wouldn't usually come alone.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Prior to the attack, did you identify any suspicious individuals in the crowd?

(2) Answer. 'Shot caller' and the younger guy that I mentioned. East, down the outer walkway, toward the parking lot, there was a building that we called the 'crack house', because it was shady. We would see military aged males, by themselves or with other guys, going in and out of there. They looked like they were congregating and acting suspicious. We would pass that up to higher. We made a point to keep an eye on that in case anything weird went on over there.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Who on your team would relay information over the radio?

(2) Answer. Whoever was on observation would pass info over the radio, Usually, they would give it to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for him to disseminate to company command. He acted as re-trans since our radio couldn't reach the COC.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were you ever on the radio when an intel threat came over the radio?

(2) Answer. Negative, what I got would usually be about finding an individual with a specific sign to get through the gate.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Leading up to the 26th, was there ever a time you felt you could have engaged someone based on the RoE?

(2) Answer. I don't remember which day this was, like I said I was kind of nocturnal. There was a squirrely Taliban member in the crowd, on top of the roof of a vehicle. He was probably 20-30 meters from the (b)(1)1.4a position. He was angry about something. We don't know what. He kept racking his AK and swinging it around. We did, for a while, keep a very close eye on him in case he fired toward the (b)(1)1.4a. We were locked on and ready, but nothing came of that. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gun, I was on the scope, but we never had good enough reason to engage.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was that outside the chevron?

(2) Answer. Yes.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So other than that Taliban member, any other occasion that you felt you had the criteria to engage?

(2) Answer. The tower was shot at, at one point. We never spotted an individual with a weapon, but it came from the south side of the tower, from the other side of the chain link fence. From there, we could see some roof tops (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gun, and I was in a chair next to the window. We heard something; we thought someone threw a flashbang next to our window. But the window was all spiderwebbed around a perfect circle. Our 1stSgt was with us in the tower; he has been in combat, and he told us he thought we had just been shot at.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you wearing PPE in the tower? Do you remember what day that occurred?

(2) Answer. Typically, just helmets, since the wall protected everything below the neck. After that shot, we would wear full PPE just in case. I think it was the morning of the 26th.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned being nocturnal, were you on post the evening of the 25th into the 26th?

(2) Answer. I'm sure I was. I don't remember anything standing out about that night. Most nights the crack house would get some kind of business going, people coming in and out, but I don't remember anything out of the baseline.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was the crowd any different since other gates were closing?

(2) Answer. I can't remember if it was the morning of the 25th or the 26th. I think it was the 25th. The crowd had completely enveloped the inner walkway, they were a lot louder and a lot more distressed. We had a jersey barrier right at the base of the tower with concertina wire (C-wire) and there was a lady stuck in it. She was getting sliced up by the C-wire due to the pressing of the crowd. From that point on, the crowd felt more desperate for those whole last two days.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. We know that sometime in the afternoon of the 25th, Echo conducted a relief in place (RIP) with Golf at the gate. Echo had security positions pushed out to the footbridge. Once Golf Company assumed the gate, they pulled those positions in due to threat streams and the crowd size. Did you witness that process on the afternoon or evening of the 25th?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, I remember them crunching back in. That's when the crowd took over the inner walkway. They condensed in and the crowd followed suit.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. To clarify, earlier you said you didn't know if it was the 25th or the 26th. We know the position collapse happened on the afternoon of the 25th and that's when the nearside walkway filled up. So, on the morning of the 26th, did anything else stand out as unusual?

(2) Answer. Outside of the inner walkway being enveloped and the crowd being much louder, no. It just seemed more desperate. Marines were working harder to keep people from going where they weren't supposed to be going.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you remember any timelines for closing the gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember hearing about when the gate was going to close, I just remember some guys from the Army were supposed to RIP us out of the gate, sometime around 1800-1900. I knew we were being pulled off the gate that evening.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. At what point on the 26th did you receive a BOLO?

(2) Answer. I don't believe I was in the tower when that BOLO was received. I remember going up there and the guys explaining what we were looking for and to keep an eye out. I don't know who spotted him, but I got a look at him. I vividly remember his face. We passed it up that we had a guy that matched the BOLO perfectly (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought some guys to confirm that this was the BOLO. I think it was (b)(1)1.4a that confirmed it. They confirmed it was the BOLO. We requested permission to engage, we talked about who was going to engage, we decided (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be the one to engage. We were a little excited, kind of like buck fever. We were standing around (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hoping we would get the authority to engage. We stood around, some more guys came up. We showed them and they confirmed it was the BOLO.

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While they were dealing with that, me, [REDACTED] I think, went back to the rear to get our packs situated so that we would be ready to go. I wasn't there to see follow-on requests for authority to shoot or the team bringing any further individuals up there to get PID.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: To clarify, you were not in the tower when the BOLO came in, but you were briefed when you came in the tower. Roughly what time was that?

(2) Answer. Late morning, probably around 1000-1100.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Do you remember who told you about the BOLO?

(2) Answer. I think it was [REDACTED]

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Do you remember hearing where that BOLO came from? From Battalion or from someone who came into the tower?

(2) Answer. I am not sure on that.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: What exactly was the BOLO, as it was told to you?

(2) Answer. The only thing I remember was black garb, I don't remember if it was all black, but it was black, traditional garb. The man-dress. What stood out was that he had a clean shave and a clean-shaven head. It was perfectly shaved with a razor blade. All his hair had been cleaned off.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: Was that BOLO on the 26th for one individual or for multiple individuals?

(2) Answer. I just remember one. I was eyes-on with that guy, and it looked like we had an opportunity to take out that target, so that is what is burned in my head as far as BOLOs go.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question [REDACTED]: How long did you observe that individual?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(2) Answer. Probably 20 minutes. I was staring at him as he was moving through the crowd. I remember when I got eyes on him, he was probably less than 90 meters away in the direction of the footbridge, I think on the outer walkway. He was probably about halfway between our tower and the footbridge, so maybe 50 meters. He was very close.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the rifle, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the scope, I was looking at him with my naked eye. I didn't want to use my rifle to spook him, so I only looked through my rifle once, but you could see his details with my naked eye.

m m m m. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Did he stay there, or did he move closer?

(2) Answer. When I observed him, he looked like he was moving in our direction, heading west. But when I left the tower, he was still around there.

n n n n. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Were you in the tower when anyone came to look at this BOLO?

(2) Answer. One time. I don't remember who it was, or who they were with. I remember they confirmed that this was the BOLO.

o o o o. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Did they confirm that this guy matched the description or that he was an individual they were looking for?

(2) Answer. I remember one guy saying, "that matches the description," but I don't remember if they said anything like, "that is him." The guy said, "to a T, that guy matches the BOLO." It was a service member that said that; I can't remember who it was or what they were wearing though. Just that he was in uniform.

p p p p. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Were you in the tower when anyone from your battalion came to look at this individual?

(2) Answer. I was not, no sir.

q q q q. Question and Answer 94.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear any conversations with battalion leadership about that individual?

(2) Answer. Only after the fact, talking to the team about what happened. I wasn't there for any conversations with company or battalion leadership. I remember hearing something about the (b)(6) being up there. I think I heard that within the first couple days of leaving HKIA; the rest all came out over time. The whole story kind of came together as I texted buddies and we all talked about it over a few months, so I pieced together what happened while I had been getting the packs.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you didn't hear any conversation between battalion and (b)(6) about this individual?

(2) Answer. I did not.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you or anyone from your team go to the COC while you were back getting packs?

(2) Answer. I did not go to the COC. I grabbed my packs, shaved my face, and went back. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may have, but I don't remember. I was getting my stuff situated.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone take photos of that suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. I think with the camera. I don't remember seeing those photos.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know if those photos were passed to higher?

(2) Answer. I am fairly certain that the photos we took with the (b)(1)1.4g were passed up and made their way to the (b)(6) but a lot of this is what I heard after the fact, since I wasn't at the gate when most of this was going on. I saw the start of this, and I saw us getting excited to engage a target, but after that I was back in the rear.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember if this individual was with anyone?

(2) Answer. I can't remember sir.

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www. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did you leave the tower to get your gear?

(2) Answer. Probably around 1200.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question [REDACTED] To recap: you saw this guy around 1000-1100, looked at him for 20 minutes, then left around noon to go to North HKIA?

(2) Answer. Correct.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were you in the tower when someone requested to engage the BOLO?

(2) Answer. Yes, we requested that at the battalion level. We said we had PID on the BOLO and we had confirmation from an outside entity, those guys that I said I can't remember who they were. We asked over the radio. I think [REDACTED] was on the radio, and he asked if we had permission to engage, based on what we were seeing combined with the BOLO. We got a hard no at that point, I think. I left the tower shortly after that.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Would that request have gone to [REDACTED] prior to going to battalion?

(2) Answer. Yes, I think so.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So you're in the tower [REDACTED] probably radios up to engage, and the response you get is no?

(2) Answer. Correct, sir.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When your team radioed up, you mentioned that you had confirmation of positive identification. Do you understand positive identification vs a BOLO match?

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(2) Answer. I do sir. PID is that you have the specific individual that someone is looking for.

III. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was this individual exhibiting hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. Negative, he was just outside of the baseline of the crowd. He was moving in a way, as if he didn't have somewhere to be. He was moving without any real urgency. The way he looked with his clean-shaven head and face didn't look like anyone else that I had seen.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Okay, he was out of the baseline and he didn't exhibit hostile-act or -intent. Did he have any indication that he was wearing a suicide vest like a bulge or wires?

(2) Answer. No sir, nothing along those lines, but he was wearing the full garb with long sleeves, and it was all black. I imagine it must have been hot for him. Everyone else, even in traditional garb, was not as covered as he was. Most other people were in whites, tans, and browns.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question [REDACTED] His demeanor, combined with his grooming and garments, coupled with the BOLO, let you home in on him as a suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. That is correct sir.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Is it still a defensive RoE at this point?

(2) Answer. That is correct, sir.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Knowing that, what was your hope in requesting to engage?

(2) Answer. It was our understanding that we were looking for a suicide bomber or someone dropping off an IED. So, with that information and him matching the description, we felt that we had reason to put him down.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that would have been a change to the RoE, making it an offensive RoE?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you have determined this was a declared enemy fighter, like a member of ISIS-K? Or did you just have the matching description of the BOLO?

(2) Answer. I 100% believe that he was the individual.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You think that individual in black was the bomber?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) If we showed you a picture, could you confirm that it is the same guy?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Shows picture of suspicious individual in black, sitting on the wall* Does this look like the individual you saw?

(2) Answer. Yes. He looks like the individual that I was looking at, but there is something on his chin that I don't remember seeing on him. I'm not sure, the hair on his chin doesn't quite resemble what I remember, but it could just be the grain on the photo. Everything else about it looks like the guy that I saw.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Are you believe that the individual in black was the bomber?

(2) Answer. I do, sir.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where was he when you left the tower around 1200?

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(2) Answer. Still within 50m, making his way up the outer walkway. He was just southeast of us.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So, then you were at North HKIA for several hours, is that correct? When did you go back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. The bomb went off at 1736, I had just gotten to the gate at 1724.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] We know you left with most of your team, but on the way back some of the team stayed at the inner gate and some folks walked from the inner gate. Who was at each of those locations?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] had been pulled aside to help with something. Me and [REDACTED] our corpsman, walked to the outer gate. I went up to the tower, he went out to the crowd to assist.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You arrived at the outer gate at 1724?

(2) Answer. The inner corridor [REDACTED] had been pushed back and I was walking to the tower. I know that because immediately after getting out of the vehicle to get back, I asked our corpsman to take a photo of me and he took a picture of me at 1725.

aaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How long did it take you to get back to the tower after that?

(2) Answer. Two or three minutes. We were right in front of the outer gate when we took that photo.

bbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Who was in the tower when you got up there?

(2) Answer. Just [REDACTED]

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you see anyone leave the tower when you got there?

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(2) Answer. Negative, I got up there and asked where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was. He told me he was in the pit helping out. I asked about an update to the BOLO engagement. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me that they had ended up losing him in the crowd.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) still trying to find that guy?

(2) Answer. He was. Everyone else had moved back with me or moved down into the pit to help bring people in.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was pulling people out of the canal something you were tasked with?

(2) Answer. Us personally, no. But you felt useless if you weren't. You only need one or two people in the tower to pull observation, so everyone else was just trying to find work.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many windows were there to observe from in the tower?

(2) Answer. There were 4 windows total, two that we would typically use. One facing west in the outer corridor, from there you could see the queue of people and the chevron. The best vantage of the crack house was from that south-facing window. From the east facing window you would primarily just look at the inner corridor. The one to the north was looking at the airfield, and there were some Army dudes in a tower in that direction.

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What window did you see the suspicious individual from?

(2) Answer. The window to the south, kind of looking out to the left.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you have looked out the east window to see that guy?

(2) Answer. You could, but the angle of the tower and the way the wall sloped meant you had a better vantage point from the south window.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

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(1) Question. [REDACTED] Could you have had the whole team looking out of all the windows?

(2) Answer. You could, there were points we had the whole team in there.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Okay, so you were in the tower for 7-8 minutes prior to the blast, what was your role?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] was on the gun. I had just come up and asked for updates and where [REDACTED] was. I was just going to head down to the pit to help [REDACTED] out.

kkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you do any observation while you were up there?

(2) Answer. I took a quick look around the windows, took a photo out the front window, then got ready to go help [REDACTED]. I remember we talked about how we were leaving in four hours. I was just trying to do as much work as we could before we left.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You took a photo from the south facing window?

(2) Answer. No, the west facing window looking down the outer corridor. The photo is almost the exact moment of the blast. If it had been a live photo, you would have seen the explosion. I was holding the phone, focusing it to take another one, then the blast went off.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Can you see the canal area in the photo?

(2) Answer. You can see a lot of it, you can see all the Marines that were hit by the blast. You can see a lot of the canal.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Okay, so you are taking a photo out of the western facing window. Where was [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. He was to my right.

oooo. Question and Answer 118.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember happening right after the blast?

(2) Answer. I remember it was a split second. My head was out the window a bit. There was a very bright flash. I thought it was a very big flash-bang. I immediately fell from the shock of it. I felt it all in my face, it felt like I was punched in the nose. The tower was full of dust and smoke. There was a lot of screaming. My ears were ringing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I are on all fours, inches away from each other, yelling at each other to make sure we were okay. We had other peoples blood covering our face, we started feeling each other's neck and head to see if we were hit. We realized we were good. We heard rounds cracking the whole time and our tower was being hit by rounds. Specifically, the east facing window. From that window, you can see the crack house, and that was the window getting pelted by rounds. The window was spiderwebbing from all the rounds. It was only for maybe 30 seconds, but we were taking rounds.

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who else was in the tower when you were taking rounds?

(2) Answer. At this point, I believe it was just me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The rest of our team came up quickly. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up to make sure the team was okay. I think the order of people coming to the tower was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He didn't stay up there since he was the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and went to help with the triage. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up. Me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had immediately posted security, looking to see if there was anything else going on, making sure that it wasn't a complex attack and that there was no VBIED. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was posted up out the west-facing window, and I was out the south-facing window.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long after the blast did the tower take rounds?

(2) Answer. Right after the blast, while me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were still on the ground. The rear window was open a couple inches for airflow, so I crawled over to close it. That's the window facing east.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How could you hear that with your ears ringing?

(2) Answer. It sounded like flash bangs, they were hitting the glass hard, so it was echoing in there. We could still hear. We heard the crowd screaming. Rounds were hitting concrete and hitting the glass, you could hear the impact.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) This is before anyone else comes up into the tower?

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(2) Answer. I am pretty sure.

tttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see the source of those rounds?

(2) Answer. No. I thought they were coming from the crack house, but by the time we looked for the shooter our tower wasn't being hit anymore.

uuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When your teammates came into the tower, you were looking west toward the chevron?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was that way, I was looking out the south window, facing east, down the canal.

vvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were your teammates doing?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He came up, covered in someone else's blood. He grabbed a SASR and pulled security out the east window. We told him to put the SASR down and he carried on security with his M4. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Went out to help with victims.

wwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you take any more rounds while you had security set?

(2) Answer. I can't remember. At this point we realized that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was unaccounted for. I was laser-focused, getting tunnel-vision scanning the crowd and trying to find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's all that I was focused on.

xxxx. Question and Answer 127.

(1) Question. C1: Were you able to find him?

(2) Answer. I just recently told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) this. He thought that I was the one that spotted him, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the one that spotted him. I was looking for him, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw him crawling on the ground. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pointed him out and I saw him then. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) yelled that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was hit, he asked for the bolt cutters, then he ran out there. The initial hole in the chain link fence was about 50 meters, so that was a ways away. All the casualties were at the base of the tower, so he ran down with the bolt cutters and cut a hole so that he could get to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and shorten the CASEVAC.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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yyyyy. Question and Answer 128.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) cut the hole?

(2) Answer. Yes, I could see him cut the hole in the fence. He was the only one I saw cutting a hole.

zzzzz. Question and Answer 129.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as well?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing him moving. He was trying to crawl toward the hole in the fence. I remember thinking that he was crawling, so he must not be injured that badly. I thought (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would get him out and he would be fine. Once I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) get to him, I went back to scanning to see what else was going on and what the rest of the picture looked like.

aaaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see anything else that stood out to you during this time period?

(2) Answer. The Marines were cleared out of there very quickly. I remember looking at the sea of the injured civilians as the corpsmen were trying to help them, too. I saw a guy with his shirt off, his chest peppered with shrapnel, looking up at me as blood bubbled out of his mouth. There was a little girl standing in the canal, covered in blood from head to toe. Just totally shocked. Those two stood out in my head.

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much longer did you pull security and observation for?

(2) Answer. Casualties had been taken out quickly. Time was moving quickly; it was getting dark before I knew it. We were told that we were going to break down and pull back to the inner gate. We figured we would be the last to break down and hold security while everyone else pulled back. We sanitized our area, packed up our (b)(1)1.4g weapons, gear, and OBSLOGs. We didn't want to leave anything sensitive behind. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) accidentally set off a pen flare in the tower which freaked us all out. We got out and went behind some jersey barriers and pulled security toward the canal while we facilitated movement. Then we went to the inner gate, and after that we went back to the airfield. I'm not sure why we went to the airfield, I think it may have been since we had so many casualties, so we were trying to get accountability. We laid on our packs for a while, then we moved back to the inner gate. I pulled security with (b)(6) for a while, then pushed out to a small shed with a corrugated metal roof that was overlooking the corridor and the outer gate, making sure that no VBIEDs were coming from that direction during the night.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
Marines

ccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive medical treatment at any point during this period?

(2) Answer. We sat on the airfield for about 45 minutes [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did a quick pupil dilation test on us to check for any signs of concussion. Outside of that, we didn't have any visible wounds, so he just moved on.

ddddd. Question and Answer 133.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6) Around that time, I had to go from California to Virginia to go through [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I had to PCS, so I put all of that off.

eeeeee. Question and Answer 134.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

fffff. Question and Answer 135.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you pull security all night on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yeah, me, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We did hourly cycles on the gun, then slept for two hours while someone else was on the gun on the roof. At that point I had assumed my role back in [redacted] (b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 136.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you depart HKIA?

(2) Answer. We departed on the morning of the 28th. We went back to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d and spent the rest of our time in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) went back to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

hhhhh. Question and Answer 137.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1
Marines

(1) Question. [redacted] event?

(2) Answer. I saw a [redacted] for a while,
[redacted]

iiiiii. Question and Answer 138.

(1) Question. [redacted] Have you given any kind of interviews or spoken publicly about events at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I have not. All I have done is spoken to my friends. No public speaking or anything to strangers about this event.

jjjjjj. Question and Answer 139.

(1) Question. [redacted] How often do you consume social media, news, podcasts, etc. about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The only thing I have listened to is [redacted] podcast on the Shawn Ryan Show.

kkkkkk. Question and Answer 140.

(1) Question. [redacted] How often do you see members of 2/1?

(2) Answer. We had [redacted] out here for our ball last weekend. I get together with the guys from [redacted] occasionally; all of us are in Virginia except [redacted] I have had the guys over to my house twice. We are still tight; we have a group chat and talk daily. Abbey Gate comes up, but not as much as you would think. A lot of the topic of discussion is about what [redacted] is doing because he is a busy man now.

llllll. Question and Answer 141.

(1) Question. [redacted] Anything you want to add?

(2) Answer. There was a weird interaction that me, [redacted] had [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d was around midnight, we got in there and got to a vantage where we could take pictures [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d was up there taking pictures. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked if we are their

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], 2/1
Marines

friends. We often saw that interpreter talking to the Taliban, the amount of time he spent talking to the Taliban was a little odd.

Separately, the State Department had a lot of weird rules. There came a point that they were only accepting green cards or American passports, and to stop accepting people with U.S. working visas, even though those guys could get on a flight. We kept bringing in work visas, since we didn't want to kick those guys out if they had a right to be on a flight. We let State kick them out. State also had weird hours. Everyone else is working nonstop, the State Department from like 0200-0600 would stop working. It was a block of 4 or 5 hours where they wouldn't process, and that created a backup that we had to control until State resumed.

mmmmmm. Question and Answer 142.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I do. [redacted (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)]
He was on the chevron with the Taliban more often than not.

nnnnnn. Question and Answer 143.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Anyone else that we should talk to?

(2) Answer. The rest of [redacted (b)(6)] Maybe some of the guys from [redacted (b)(6)] to get their perspective – [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] he was in their tower a lot and was on the receiving end of information that we were passing back.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] at [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)].

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Review

1. Throughout the Supplemental Review of the Abbey Gate Investigation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided a statement on 8 November 2023. The statement was transcribed contemporaneously to the witness providing the account of events.
2. At the conclusion of the interview (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcript but was unable due to operational requirements.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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02 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

1. On 02 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [REDACTED] conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED], to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. [REDACTED] recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. Due to there being multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be noted as C1, [REDACTED] will be noted as [REDACTED] will be noted as [REDACTED] as [REDACTED]

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1 Please explain your pre-deployment training, to include NEO.

(2) Answer. In Jan 2021 we did infantry immersion training where they bring trainers in, as well as probes for suicide vest in a marketplace. First time dealing with pop and a threat. Feb 21, the commander I replaced talked to him about an early turnover. I was pinged for a court-martial jury, so I wasn't there. He was the first to key us into looking at Afghanistan. What I got from most leaders is that he said no one is talking about Afghanistan and we need to talk about it. We deployed April 1st, then May 4th/5th was the 1st day that we, as a battalion, got pinged to look at Afghanistan. [REDACTED] and our [REDACTED] actually didn't go on that trip. We sent to [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed back to look at the withdrawal. We relocated 2 weeks later, around the beginning of June to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a we started getting intel briefings on Afghanistan for evacuation. On Aug 15th I believe we did three mission rehearsal exercises. The first was how do we break this thing apart and our role. We started to utilize enablers and prowords for possible bombs or VBIEDs. We thought we would be checking cars. We had enablers; Female Engagement Teams (FET), EOD teams, as well as, we had organic engineers and sniper teams. They were attached to my company. We had role players with a bag or two. We practiced how to set up lanes and tied up with evac center from the MAGTF. Beyond that this was the extent of our NEO specific training. We were still sending people to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. In hindsight an absolute godsend. Each one went thru MASCAL simulation training multi wounded, moulage, blood chits, audio affects all that stuff. We finished this training between Aug 1st-3rd.

Then we were getting a lot of clarity on what our role could be. We were the main effort then it switched to the MEU, and we became supporting effort #2. We were to go to HKIA as a supplement, our second option was the fly away evacuation. Leap frog to Bagram possibly, fly to remote area to pick up SIV or others meeting the criteria and get them back to Kabul or Bagram, which ever.

Aug 4th or 5th I got called in with [REDACTED] (b)(6) to look at possibly deploying 48 hours from now to reinforce the embassy in Kabul. Didn't happen because they reallocated Army forces, 10th MTN, to support.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1 What were you guys doing to communicate ROE?

(2) Answer. Two iterations of ROE. It was coupled with what the planned ROE was for the evacuation. Obviously, we are doing the priority one straight from CENTCOM then into Allied Refuge. The first iteration was presented to us by the MAGTF SJA, started getting changes based on RFIs. Went back to the SJA to provide updated or answers to the question. I wanted to do it with smaller sections. One or two sections at a time so that they would feel more comfortable asking questions. The biggest contention point for myself and others was the lack of clarity of collective self-defense. We received an image of index card that listed who was acceptable. It listed US Citizens, foreign nationals with green cards and one category of individuals that was not on there was Special Immigrant Visas (SIV).

Leading up to my departure, I continued to ask about additions to SIV holders and collective self-defense. The biggest failure on my part was prior to departure. We had a general idea of who we were going to evacuate. For a lengthy amount of time evacuees were showing the documents to the Marines, a green card or Special Immigrant Visa. But as soon as we got there, every kind of document was presented from IDs to certificates for working in the chow hall or something like that. If a document was accepted, they would send a copy to others, and you would see people trying to

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

use this for access. For a while Marines would ask if this was legit. But DoD did not have any personal info.

I can't report a ROE brief or update once we were boots on ground. Last one was the 13th or 14th of AUG.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1 Verbally leaders were talking about the SIVs as being difficult to assess and frustration with the document being accurate. Was this your experience?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. As the days went on there was a general frustration with the general population that was there trying to get evacuated and had been allowed through the chevron or the gate. 70-85 % were Military aged males, people who had worked as interpreters. 15-20% are families of a SIV holder or for example, the little girl of a family is the SIV holder, or the kid had a passport but not the adults. *Department of State* told us only immediate family. I get it, but we started making State be the bad guys. They either weren't there to help process or the info they were giving us was unclear. Like, do they include grandparents? The answer would change: some days yes, somedays no. It was never clear to what extent a US citizen was able to pull their family.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1 If you are one of the Marines on the ground, are you seeing the Taliban beat people on a routine basis? How are they reconciling? If they knew it was US citizen? How would they know that?

(2) Answer. Yes. 100%. The Marines were never itchy to pull the trigger based on what they saw, they were frustrated. If they were, it never got to the point where it was close proximity to a Marine pulling the trigger. Were they frustrated, yeah, I was frustrated. Were they itchy to engage, maybe, but nothing ever went terribly wrong.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1 Did you witness executions?

(2) Answer. I did not witness, I heard of it, of course. When I went to the Abbey Gate to see the nature of what it was, a lot of times I went the sniper tower. I'm gonna check on my guys. So, looking through their spotting scope a lot of times, it was pretty bad. You didn't have to wait long to see someone get hit by a stick, a rifle, canes, a long stick, rifle butt. If you spotted through the scope, you see an instance within 10 secs. I got a picture through the scope myself. I witnessed it quite a bit.

g. Question and Answer 6.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

(1) Question. C1 Did anyone tell you they saw executions?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Each of those guys because they were up there 7-10 days straight. I haven't seen any pic of executions. It was primarily individuals that were kicked out. So, we had a couple different exit avenues, down around the chevron. Then the second exit was to the north fishhook along the canal. The primary observation of people getting kicked out from evac were immediately grabbed, beaten, and put to their knees was just south of the chevron.

I went down there a couple times just observing what's going on. I don't feel comfortable with them being elevated and armed. They owned the place, and we could tell that. When I walked down there, there were gunshots. You heard screams that was par for the course.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1 Discussion of a test run (IED probe) around Aug 21st -22nd. At least one, potentially two vehicles that pulled in the parking lot. (BG Curtis pointed out foot bridge and other key locations leading to parking lot). Potentially 1-2 vehicles pull up, take bag out, move towards sniper tower area, get lost, they see the bag in the vicinity of the u-shape jersey barrier, maybe further down. They see the bag and believe it is a IED test. EOD checks it out, most tell us it is a bag of clothes, and the Marines took a knee for as long as an hour. Do you remember anything that resonates with that?

(2) Answer. Uh-uh. [REDACTED] was there at the point. The only part that stands out as a test run was when we held the corridor on the 24th, maybe the 25th. (Pointing to the sniper tower). About 5-10 meters back the HESCO barriers and CONNEX was, in between were cases of water. A black backpack, which was one of our intel indicators, got thrown and caught in the C-wire at the top of this wall (pointed at jersey barrier). Myself and others moved away, then [REDACTED] grabbed a metal rod and poked at it to get it dislodged from the C-wire. He got it dislodged it dropped like a rock. It was heavy, not filled with clothes, something more substantial. Did not know what it was. A potential other probe, we felt that way since the blast went off.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1 How were intel channels working and how were you disseminating to your Marines? Daily intel dumps during the morning and/or night?

(2) Answer. Intel threats. The most solidified battle rhythm that we had was when we controlled Abbey Gate corridor. Controlling from the outer gate back to inner gate and then outer gate down to the chevron. Closer to it when we started intermingling with the [REDACTED] 1.4b Marines were pulling 8 hour shifts. Myself and my [REDACTED] were on a 12-hour shift and relieved by the [REDACTED]. Shifts were overlapped so

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that I could go to the BN COC to get the intel update. Talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if he was there, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if he was there, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) My four priority POCs. Prior to going on shift, we went to the BN COC, then down to the gate to disseminate info I had.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1 Any particular threats stand out?

(2) Answer. Most significant BOLO that I remember: early on the 19th or 20th was [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c We never got clarification on what type of [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c It was good info, but how was I gonna spot the backpack when everyone has a backpack? The 2nd and 3rd BOLOs came sequentially. A gold sedan, it was always discussed in the manner of an IED but nonspecifically, including IED transfers, spotters, VBEID. From where we were we know that VBIEDs were less of a threat because of the chevron. We know that VBIEDs were less of a threat at our location. So, our assumption that it was a transport vehicle.

3rd BOLO which brought everything together, 25-35 y/o male, shaved face, black/brown man dress, not sure but more than likely black. They gave an age range. If it is indeed a suicide bomber, he would be carrying his backpack on the front.

The first bolo was the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c then the sedan, then the description of an IED was on the 22nd or 23rd and we got that through BN intelligence. I remember we were in control of Abbey Gate when that one started gaining more credibility.

The biggest thing for us was looking for the clean-shaven part. Studying the culture and rituals of suicide bombers, we knew they were cleaning themselves. So, we were looking for clean clothes, not soiled clothes.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember hearing anyone who points out, "I see someone that matches the BOLO"? If you find someone that matches the BOLO, you fire on them?

(2) Answer. Specifically imminent threat. Unless you see the vest itself, you don't know.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1 How are you messaging this with your formation? Are there discussions taking place? Great to have a description but you have to have something to go with it?

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(2) Answer. A little bit of both, as well as discussions we had ahead of going there. For example, what do you do? What is collective self-defense? Potential actions under certain threat, we had those discussions prior and then when we were there, we had a lot of questions. What are we truly calling hostile act and hostile intent? We see beatings with no way to confirm who they are beating. Because we were seeing on a daily basis, yet it wasn't specifically targeted towards us.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1 What was the general understanding of ROE?

(2) Answer. I think there was a high level of fear of escalating without getting multiple levels of authority because it was all unclear.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1 If Positive Identification and Hostile Act/ Hostile Intent meant clear to engage? But Marines know they don't have all the elements of the ROE.

(2) Answer. Correct. Hostile Act/ Hostile Intent. After I did an interview, some of my guys asks if I've seen the [REDACTED] interviews? One of my Marines said "I fired my weapon at the Taliban after the blast. I was afraid of doing my job because of what may happen." [REDACTED]

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1 ((BG Curtis describes an overarching scenario unfolding over time and space of Marines witnessing someone not reacting expecting to the blast)) How did Marines respond to this situation?

(2) Answer. I raised my weapon towards two individuals myself, 1-15 minutes after the blast, maybe sooner. I was coming back south towards Abbey Gate. A lot of Marines were already oriented towards the canal. A bunch of Marines pointed out that there were heads peaking over the wall from across the canal; asking what we are doing about it type thing. I pushed one of my Marines down and yelled at them to get down; they were nonchalant since they didn't see any weapons because of elevation. One of the guys across the canal, adjacent to our location looked over, saw me and dropped down out of sight. He then tapped another guy on the shoulder, who sees me and then drops down.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1 Leadership presence. What was being done to enforce leader presence at the gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. At the company level it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) making decisions on what we are doing and what our PltSgt's and Plt CDRs are actually doing. At the BN level, maybe every day, every other day BN leaders would pass through. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came every day. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came once, BGen Sullivan, MG Donahue came down once. The plan was for me to brief him on our security situation with the expectation that the 82nd would take over because we weren't sure when it would shut down. He just walked by, took a picture, and went to talk to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1 Did you have daily interactions with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c Military operating out of the Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer. 0800 meetings. I would go there. We would discuss their focuses: their numbers that they were evacuating, expectations for the day, security concerns, threats they had. Closer to the 24th, they started being able to narrow down when they would be done. Let me know that they have 2-3 days of evacuation, and they would be done. By the 23-24th Aug, the completion time would change between the morning meeting and that evening meeting [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were going to the morning meeting, and I was going to the evening meetings. The completion estimation was changing 12 hours one way or the other. Not 48 more hours, 12-hour increments.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1 Tell me about interactions with the snipers. I understand there are periods of time that they stay there. What conversations are you having with the snipers?

(2) Answer. They are a lot more focused on big picture observations.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1 What was the role of the snipers? Overwatch, threat mitigation protecting individuals on the ground or more focused on finding people in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Because of the BOLOs they were focused on the crowd. They were constantly looking at the crowd. Maybe they saw the observation of the crowd as threat mitigation. That sniper scope and a rifle, it was never shifted off of the chevron. The sniper scope was always focused on the chevron.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1 Was there ever a time you were at the sniper tower and they asked if we find someone on the BOLO?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

(2) Answer. Not any time that I was up there. We were away from Abbey Gate from 1700 on the 25th until 1045 on the 26th.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1 What happens after you did the RIP with G Company? What was the situation?

(2) Answer. Calm. We got into a battle rhythm. A lot of times at night they would go home anyway. Not as loud or chaotic. So I say calm.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1 What was your understanding of your RIP with G Company the next day?

(2) Answer. During the RIP, I told him I didn't want to give you my words and views, that he would make his own assessment. I talked about my platoon rotation, utilization of snipers and the perimeter we established in the canal out to the walking bridge. Then his comment to me was "you guys are pretty stretched far out there". I responded, "You damn right we are, you are thinning out the crowd, you can see better into it the canal now where we were pulling from."

If something happens, we are taught that dispersion is key. He responded, "I don't know if I'm that bold". My recommendation would be to collapse the line a little if you want to, but do not go pass the foot bridge.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1 Are there people down past the near side of the canal?

(2) Answer. No, they are in the canal and down the far side. When the RIP is complete, we were told to go help with the closure of Abbey Gate. Then I get hear that [REDACTED] needs to see you, [REDACTED] When he told me, "You need to get to Abbey Gate right now", we had the first Marines down there in 45min -1 hour. The crowd was in more of a frenzy than I had seen it at Abbey. They were all the way up to the jersey barriers. I knew east gate had closed; I knew that north was close to closing. I saw the [REDACTED] and asked what the hell happened. He said there was a wave of humans that pushed them back and now this is how it is. I dispute that. Post blast, I found a notebook on the inner corridor near the casualty collection point. I opened a page it said 0200-0330 on 26th noting that G Company collapsed in order to increase Force Protection. It may have been a sea of people, or it may have been a deliberate decision and the people just rushed them. By the time we showed up it was bedlam at the jersey barrier. We had been using it as an exit route for people who were rejected by the State Department.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. What we know is that updated pictures and chat info through Afghan civilians is that the situation from the RIP was very different than anyone expected. The closure of East and North Gates, plus Afghans civilians sharing information on ways to bypass the Taliban checkpoints, resulted in flooding the zones around Abbey Gate. Would you have had potential concerns with how you had the Marines arrayed for CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. CASEVAC more so, as far as the crowds that were showing up. I still think we could reinforce our perimeter based off the size of the canal itself. You weren't jumping from the inner to the outer wall, so the only access point was the footbridge or further up the canal. Had the suicide bomber denoted with the array my company was in, there was the potential of 5-6 of my Marines would have been outside of friendly lines. Instead of getting off the X, I would have to bring these guys back through.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1 Did you and [REDACTED] talk about it at all?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No. When I talked to [REDACTED] and heard that there was a wave of people, they could hold back that was enough.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1 How would you describe your task and purpose?

(2) Answer. Control the outer gate through the inner gate to the chevron. The area was ours to maintain security and enable evacuation of British citizens and then secure the gates upon Fox and Golf Company collapsing and then roping through the outer gate.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1 There are 250m in the inner corridor. Would that be tied into a closure?

(2) Answer. I had two QRF platoons in the inner corridor because I didn't need that many Marines in that small of an area. And then there were the platoons inside the airport.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

(1) Question. C1 How were pictures of suspicious persons or concerns elevated through the chain of command? Anything that you wanted share?

(2) Answer. I prefer to do it in person having the photos to pass them up. Sometimes the green military radios weren't working, we were in a corridor itself that was not good for radio signal. Primarily I reported concerns at my BN battle rhythm at the COC or if they came down to the gate.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1 Are you just inside the outer gate at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. Yes. I am talking with [REDACTED]. It's been a few calls over the radio of IED about to go off in "5 min", "2 min". It was increased Force Pro without giving up ground we had. The Marines from Golf and Fox that were along the canal never left the walls, they just ducked behind them. Ceased operations until we got an all clear and then got back to evacuation. Call it a gut feeling, when I saw the mass of people and intel updates and multiple calls of IED about to go off, you know something was going to happen and you knew that was the enemies most likely course of action. As I was standing and talking, I was rehearsing what I would say when the bomb goes off, but my immediate response was of "fuck."

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1 Where did you think it would've happened?

(2) Answer. Not the chevron. Dang near where it did because it was the highest concentration of our people.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C It appears there is a push to get as many people out and mitigate threats. It is a tough position.

(2) Answer. Even leading up to the bomb it was still changing of when we going to shut down the gate.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1 Did you know that there are 1,000 people at the Barron? Looking at the crowd you still see people visually.

(2) Answer. Yes. Leading up to the blast we needed to shut down. But the [REDACTED] have more evacuees and push an hour, then its ok let's push some time because the [REDACTED] still have people to evacuate.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1 At the time of the blast, what do you see?

(2) Answer. I had to shake the cobwebs out and look at where it came from. I was in the gate and saw a smoke cloud going up 30 feet in the air. That's when I blurted out. Moved to outer gate. My body and brain needed visual confirmation. I saw a stack or pile, is a better description, of Marines. At that time, I didn't take any note of civilian casualties or anything like that. I just saw a stack of bodies. I didn't observe any movement. Immediately I see Marines running past me, running against traffic (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was just inside of the search areas inside Abbey Gate. I held them off in case of a secondary attack; an SVEST or gunfire. No secondary goes off, some individuals already made it to the blast to start treating people. I ran north towards inner gate maybe 50m or so. I know that shock trauma platoon just inside inner gate. Got on the radio call shock trauma platoon. "IED MASCAS, send help to outer gate". And again, (b)(6) job wasn't outer gate and beyond, so my focus was on inner gate and the canal and Golf was focused on the casualties. So, we focused on some level of security. That was my focus. At one point I interacted with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) make sure no one is coming over the gate. Pull security. 10 minutes post blast, I went to the sniper tower to see what they were able to see. Fear that one of our guys was hit and fell into the canal. Make sure our gear didn't fall into the canal as well. It was just Afghans on the inner wall on the ground or on the far side of the canal in their last throws of life. Didn't observe anymore American casualties. I came down the sniper tower, closed down our gate, had to open to get the (b)(1)1.4a vehicle back in then closed and locked the gate.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1 Were Afghans still trying to gain access?

(2) Answer. They had either dispersed or were threatened to stop rushing us. I don't know of anyone from the far side that actually came across. The crowd moved toward the baron. The blast parted the red sea, the crowds moved and then had to head back because of being stopped at the baron.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1 Remember any casualties?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Hoover, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As I came out of the sniper tower, I came out and went around him. He kept trying to sit up and take his Kevlar off to see or help the guys that were treating him. I remember vividly; I assume it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was being buddy carried toward the casualty collection point; (b)(6) (b)(6). He had to hold his hand against his face (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He ran back nearly post blast; he took a ball bearing. And a young Marine. He was able to put his tourniquet on.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1 Have you seen anything on social media? What social media outlets have reached out to you?

(2) Answer. One with the AFGHAN project podcast, I think it is. Then I did a phone interview with ARIE. I think an investigator with HFAC. There were others that tried to get me to do interviews.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1 Have you watched any of the podcast?

(2) Answer. Quite a bit. [REDACTED] has done a couple; I watched his on Pressing Forward Podcast and then [REDACTED] HFAC testimony and his interview with Shawn Ryan's podcast.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. Did you agree or disagree with anything you heard? Why?

(2) Answer. I agree with the level of confusion since the start. I have the pics on my phone from the 15th or 16th of 3x5 notecard with scribbles of classifications of who is good to be evacuate ([REDACTED] agrees to share the picture)). I disagree with a few of the comments of how certain guys were in certain situations.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1 What about the certainty of the ID of the bomber?

(2) Answer. Yeah, as an example that could be one. Hey, I didn't identify him. The description is matching up. It definitely could be the same description of dozens of others in the crowd. Is there 100 percent certainty? From my perspective. I am just uncomfortable with the certainty because nothing was certain in those two weeks.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1 If you looked into the crowd could you see anyone that fit the description?

(2) Answer. Yes. The only thing that stood out was the older gentleman coaching the bomber.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1

(1) Question. C1 Did you see that?

(2) Answer. I did not and I don't remember a BOLO with a coach. If they are standing there conversing and pointing at us, you can speculate hostile intent. But is it? No.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1 What happens if you take someone out without HI/HA based on the description?

(2) Answer. With the amount of people that were there, it would turn into bedlam.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1 What is bedlam?

(2) Answer. The walkway towards the Barron gets breached, the foot bridge gets breached because something just happens because of freaking out of an individual closer to the gunshot.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1 Was there potential to get into a gun fight with Taliban if we retaliated to a murder?

(2) Answer. Definitely possible they had two locations that we knew of. I was aware of a .50 Cal position. And how many individuals in the crowd. I was not aware of a murder.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1 Is there potential for a gun fight with Taliban and potential flooding the airfield?

(2) Answer. The chevron was there but if they were able to push that aside, then it was a bad day.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b Was collateral damage a part of the calculation?

(2) Answer. Not really. Even in ROE discussions or just discussion on what do you do in a scenario. There was a comment on trying to limit it, but not in-depth discussion.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b After the blast, as Marines are being moved to Shock Trauma treatment and Role 2 facility, corpsmen are removing equipment for treatment. How is that handled? We are asking to help identify and get back some of the missing kit.

(2) Answer. The morning of the 27th the rifles and kit and Kevlar and pieces of uniform that were recovered were in a stack next to my sleeping are, in the back and covered in tarps. I wanted it there so it was out of sight of the rest of the Marines and then throughout the 27th-28th, we, Golf company started doing serialized checks. They would come take a weapon or kit if it belonged to them. Prob the 28th or 29th...not the 29th, someone from BN came to gather the rest to take to HAZMAT or base to take care of it.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Who?

(2) Answer. I don't know. All the weapons, I don't know about all, but about 20 rifles and a hodge-podge of plate carriers, trousers were all stacked together.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1 So, serialized equipment were recovered but bio-hazard kit was destroyed?

(2) Answer. Unless another Marine came to recover it from them.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Do you meet with other Marines to share your feelings?

(2) Answer. I do but not as much as I should, because I don't like talking about it. Over time, I felt more comfortable talking to my wife about what wasn't as severe as the 26th.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b How many combat tours do you have?

(2) Answer. First close up engagement. My 1st two deployments were to Al Asad for counter ISIS. Apr-Oct 2015, and 2017. We took rockets. This was the 1st up close and personal.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. With all the chaos, afterward and you get back to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a. The awarding of ribbons and purple hearts; were there check and balances? I've fought for people to get retroactively awarded purple heart. Do you know of who, if anyone received the purple heart?

(2) Answer. One [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was awarded one [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We were told that was a discriminator, the 24-48 hours of bed rest for a TBI.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have the notebook?

(2) Answer. I mainly wanted to give it back to who it was. I realized it was Golf Company.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember any threat streams and were able to identify a BOLO?

(2) Answer. Where I am able to identify, no. Yes, I remember and yet I never heard that called over the radio. I heard about it after the fact.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember hearing about it from Intelligence channels?

(2) Answer. No.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1 Did any [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a guys try to clue you in on or one of the leaders in the tower leaders what they'd seen?

(2) Answer. I had a conversation with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about using [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, because it was multi-purpose. Try to calm the crowd and also try to gather the intel they could. The only thing I remember was that the IED was going to go off in a couple minutes.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1 Is there anything else you would like to share or that you want us to be aware of?

(2) Answer. Department of State. Their lack of presence and then initial photo of a back of a note card with a note scribbled on it. And just the instructions being non

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

precise way that it happened. The evening of the 16th, morning of 17th, I had an interaction with a New York Times reporter who said they were authorized to get out. He said he had NY Times credentials. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to check to see if he was good. The reporter then held up his phone and I was FaceTime-ing with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the CENTCOM PAO.

I explained, "Sir I have specific area on what I can evacuate."

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got back with me. I didn't like telling a Navy CAPT that I wasn't going to help you. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me it came directly from Gen Mackenzie, but it still didn't meet the criteria I was given from the Ambassador/State.

Hours later I get a radio call that Taliban is bringing a cleared individual, meet up with [REDACTED] (b)(6) to do the hand off. We walked up pass the "I heart Kabul" sign and talked up to three Taliban. 26hours later, the same group I rejected came up the main corridor to be evacuated. The reporter and their families passed us.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis,

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer



~~GUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 2 November 2023, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 56. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

2 Nov 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

2 Nov 23
DATE

~~GUI~~

Page 298 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S064 (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

14 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 14 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1 and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present via SIPR Video Teleconference (SVTC) along with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is there anything you would like to start with?

(2) Answer. It took a lot for me to decide to do this interview. At the end of the day the most important thing for me, is knowing that I have done everything I can to aid the situation following the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It's important for me to honor the memory of the fallen and my friends who have also been wounded.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your Marine Corps background?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I went to bootcamp in August of 2017. Then I went to SOI-West, Infantry Training Battalion in December of 2017. Then I got sent to training in January and February. I got to Victor 2/1 in the first week of March 2018. They were still on the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) for two more months, and the ADVON was getting back and overseeing our physical training.

I went to Echo Company right away when they returned. I held every billet from rifleman through squad leader over the next couple years. I was a team leader as a Private First Class and Lance Corporal. Shortly after that, we went on our first deployment [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), he went to Infantry Small Unit Leader's Course, and we deployed with 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). I was, at the time, the only young Marine in the platoon that was a team leader. I was tasked to be the squad leader for the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation and felt like I knocked it out of the park.

On the deployment with 31st MEU, I was meritoriously promoted to Corporal. We went around to Okinawa, South Korea, and Australia. I was promoted in South Korea at the camp Rodriguez Live Fire Facility. I received nonjudicial punishment (NJP) coming out of the School of Infantry (SOI) as a Pfc, I think, because my buddy scratched out the birthdate on my ID card to try and get into clubs underage, but I never actually tried to use it. A lot of people were doing it. No one is a fan of young Marines right when they hit the fleet. They pulled all the junior Marines into a circle and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pulled all our IDs to check them. The SSgt tried to lookout for us and was handing mine back, then Gunny checked them again and pulled mine. After that, the other 7 Marines accepted their NJPs and I went to try and find a lawyer. I received a fresh Lieutenant as my lawyer. He said I should deny NJP since I hadn't personally scratched out the date the way that the NJP said I did. I was chewed out by First Sergeants (1stSgt) and the Battalion Sergeant Major (SgtMaj). The Sergeant Major told me that I should have some integrity and tell him what happened. I told him. He told me he would push for me not to get NJP'd. I still got NJP'd at the company level and I received a couple weeks of restriction.

That kind of set me on a path that I felt like I couldn't screw anything else up. I thought my career was over, but it was the best thing for me. I knew I couldn't make any mistakes after that. It pushed me to be the best version of myself that I could be. It could only go up from there. I was the first junior Marine to pick up Corporal. I picked it up ahead of about two thirds of my seniors too. I got honor graduate at my Corporals Course, then I had to be a part of the cake cutting ceremony in Okinawa. After that I went to Advanced Infantry Course. That was easy, it felt like checking the box honestly. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and my other leaders had prepped me for it over the last two years, so everything I was learning at the school, I had already been taught. All the basics of being a young leader in the infantry. I had always had an interest in the sniper platoon.

When I enlisted, I wanted to be a Marine Raider from the start. My NJP prevented me from going to scout sniper selection during my first 6 months, so I focused on being a squad leader. At this point I was speaking to the Marine Corps Forces Special

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)120b, (b)(6), 2/1 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Operations Command (MARSOC) recruiters and training on my own. I had two buddies in the sniper platoon trying to get me to run a screener. I realized that I wasn't getting better in the line platoon, so I realized it was time to go. We were at the Infantry Immersion Trainer running scenarios. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the acting platoon sergeant at the time. He told me that he was putting in a packet to run the sniper screener the following week. That inspired me to put in a packet as well. He is a great leader and one of my best friends to this day. That's when I realized I wasn't gaining anything in the line platoon. That was a hard decision for me to make, because I had 13 guys in my squad and being a good leader for them was important to me. But I had given them the tools to be successful and run a good squad.

I knew the deadline was over for me to turn in my package, but [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) knew who I was from the Corporals Course where he was an instructor. He told me if I could complete the package for the screener on that Friday, then I could run the screener the following week. I went to that screener at about 2am on that Sunday or Monday. I pride myself on training harder than what you will experience, so running the screener was a challenge, but it wasn't ridiculously hard. It was a steppingstone for me to go to MARSOC. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I each ran a team for the screener, then we finished. We did an interview. They told me they wanted me to come to the platoon. I told them I wanted to join them, but only if I could still go to assessment and selection (A&S) for MARSOC since I had already applied. I told them it wouldn't stop me from working any harder, but I had heard that going to A&S could stop you from being accepted. But they agreed, so I joined the platoon.

I went to the basic pre-sniper course for a couple weeks, shooting long guns, learning the trade/billets, and building ghillie suits. To add to my previous statements, earlier in my first deployment I had gone to the combat hunter school as well. But going back, it was just the how-to-snipers for dummies. I was the most competent with radios, it was something I wanted to be proficient in. So I was billeted as the teams Radio Telephone Operator (RTO). I was offered to go to sniper school. I turned it down since it was the same time that I was supposed to go to A&S. A week before I was slated to go to A&S, I went home for the Fourth of July. I had been running heavy and lifting hard, probably harder than I should have been. I did a lot of driving that weekend, and I woke up with a hemorrhoid so bad that I couldn't walk or drive. I went to our Corpsman, I showed him. He checked it out, he told me that I couldn't go to A&S. I could barely walk at the time. I talked to my MARSOC recruiter, then I went to the hospital and got put on light duty for about a month. It took me like 5 weeks to start jogging around again. I participated in training as much as I could. I healed up and kept training. We had an 0621 comms guy in the platoon who spun us up on some in depth comms info for the RTOs.

After that we went to 29 Palms at the end of 2020. We received the Mobile User Objective Systems (MUOS). We didn't have anyone to teach us how to set it up, but we figured out how to use that system ourselves. We went to 29 Palms. I was slated to go to A&S again. I had to do a new package since so much time had passed and I ended up failing my depth perception test. I wanted to fix that and get special glasses from optometry. While at 29 Palms the MARSOC recruiter told me that he would come to

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

pick me up and get those glasses. I had told the platoon leadership for weeks that I needed one day to get out of the field and get those glasses. I got thrown on as an observer/controller while we were at 29 Palms. The day before I was supposed to get my glasses, my [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sat me down while we were doing stuff on the radio. He told me that he wanted to put me up for a meritorious sergeant board. I didn't think too much of it at the time, but I told him that I could handle it.

Anyway, I was the only one qualified for observer/controller, so I couldn't get away to get my depth perception glasses. The whole platoon wasn't there at the time, but despite how important it was to me, they couldn't find a way to let me go. I had turned down sniper school again for this, and then I missed A&S again because I didn't have those glasses. I was torn up about that, but knew I was going to try to go to Sniper School and A&S when I got back. It looked like I was going to Sniper School and then A&S back-to-back when I got back from deployment. That was the plan. I went to Nonlethal Weapons Instructor Course in January of 2021. We were told that our team, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) might go to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. There was a plan to get to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and RIP (relief in place) out with the 3/1 Snipers there. We knew that our team might get a brief about that from the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). In the last couple weeks of Nonlethal Weapons Course, I knew I was graduating at this point, I was at a range [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up to me and congratulated me on my promotion. He ruined the surprise they were planning. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) and SgtMaj came and promoted me at the range on 02FEB2021. That was cool. Something I didn't plan on happening since I wasn't really chasing promotions.

After that we deployed. Around 01 April of 2021. We got to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. Myself [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were the team at this point. Then we went to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d for a month. We were training and shooting at the ranges over there. We were teaching fundamentals and spinning up the other platoon radio operators (ROs) on how to be a little more proficient. How to use the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) and some of the more useful technology that we received. After that, 3/1 ripped out of [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. Their team met us at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and back briefed us on the situation. We understood that we would be the last remain behind element as every unit we were with moved. After that, we went to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d to be a show of force against [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. When we moved over there, we saw the news about the Taliban encroaching over Afghanistan.

In [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d we went to the short ranges out there a lot and practiced our field craft. We worked on our knowledge and our PT. Being on the sniper team, it was cool to see the difference versus being in the line platoon. Having a small team of guys that cared about what we were doing was awesome. We did a lot of training and it was important for all of us to be proficient at our jobs.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you're attached to Echo at this point, when do you get word that you're going to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We had gone to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d a few times for training. On our second rotation there, about a month before we left for Kabul, we started getting some back and forth about going and not going. About 2 weeks prior to deploying, we got a brief from some Weapons Company guy in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d that we were absolutely going to go to HKIA and to keep it lowkey. We were stoked. That was probably the first couple of days of August or the very end of July that we knew for sure that we were going.

Prior to that, we had a good relationship with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The E5s and above would pull watch, and he would always pull us in. He would talk to us about what we were seeing in the news about Afghanistan. He made it apparent that he was trying to get us over to HKIA. I don't know when he first mentioned that to us, but it was weeks to months before we actually did. We kept asking [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and others why we weren't going. We started hearing rumors about stateside units being spun up. At this point, we were right next door and we had already done some small Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) training at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. Obviously, that was cleaner, but we had role players from the base come over and help us practice. We practiced mobile hide sites in a van and some other observation.

When we were doing that training, it was becoming more obvious that we might go. So, at some point we are in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and we are told we are going to go. When we got back from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d we prepped our gear. We never really got an answer on why we weren't going earlier, obviously that was above us. We were eager to go, at least our team was. We had been training for years. For me, it was 4 years of training to do my job. More for some guys, less for some others. I was familiar with Echo Company since I had come from Echo Company, I was close with them. When I first joined the fleet, none of my platoon in Echo Company had been to combat.

We were stoked to deploy. As far back as 29 Palms in 2020, we were preparing for a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and the whole battalion was consolidated. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) talked to us back on that occasion and told us that we were no longer going on that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a rotation to CENTCOM. Everyone was stunned and disappointed by that. December of 2020, right around when we were doing our last screener for the platoon, that's when we were put back on the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a.

So, that whole time in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d it was training and getting our gear ready to move. We were cross training on everything. The week before we went, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came into the tent from whatever aid station he had been at. He had his med pack, and he showed us where all the legitimate med packs and drugs were at in case we needed to use it. That's when I realized that we were absolutely going, since they don't let corpsmen have that outside of combat or the hospital. We were still wondering why we hadn't gone earlier. It felt like anyone with common sense would have sent us earlier to get civilians home and push out a defensive posture.

So, anyways, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and 4th Platoon of Echo got out there on August 15th. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was our team rep out there, someone said we needed to have a rep. We tried to send Bravo Element of our team with them since we operate in elements, but we sent

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only (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) against our own will. He got out there when chaos broke loose in the airport. He worked for like 36 hours to battle the crowds and get that situation under control.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have a video or drone feed from (b)(1)1.4a of the airfield at that time?

(2) Answer. Yeah, when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was going, we went into the Crisis Response Command Center and would look at the drone feeds. We saw planes landing at HKIA. It was a pretty clear feed and showed footage of the Taliban outside the gate, hitting and beating civilians. Stomping on cars, shooting, and creating chaos. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was heading out on his bird, so we knew roughly when he was going to land. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and I stayed to watch the feed. We were hearing that incoming planes might be taking fire, we heard about chaos on the ground. I don't think we saw the Taliban kill anyone on the drone feed, just shoot recklessly, beat people, and throw grenades. That amped us up to get on the ground.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get any kind of Rules of Engagement (RoE) brief?

(2) Answer. We did get an RoE brief in the same Command Center that we watched the drone feed out of. Recently, I have seen pictures of RoE cards that were handed out. The whole hostile act, defense of others, standard escalation of force, the right to self-defense. It was the standard RoE. I don't remember if I had one of those cards, but it had the (b)(1)1.4a emblem on it.

We got on the bird, blacked out going into Kabul. We were being told we would take contact coming into Kabul. We were stoked. I think that's normal; we were excited to finally get some. That might be naïve, but that's just how it is. We landed, then we ran onto the tarmac and set up 360 security. Some female Army Officer comes up with no Kevlar on, greets us and says welcome to Afghanistan. After that, we moved to our pallets of gear and moved that stuff straight to the gym. The first brief we got inside that gym, maybe from Echo Company or with the rest of Weapons Company, almost immediately we were told that we could only fire if fired upon. That was probably within the first 24-48 hours of us being on ground. This was while we were figuring out how to do whatever mission we were tasked with.

As soon as we got there, we dropped our gear and grabbed our weapons and asked our leadership where they needed us. We got a bunch of black gear and green gear. Extra batteries. We had ammo and pyro. We got in on the 16th I think, maybe the 17th. That morning we were tasked to observe the Taliban, across the runway on the other side of the Air Traffic Control tower and the civilian terminals to the south. Our guys were doing a RIP with 1/8, I think they were the ones on line. We RIP'd out with the 1/8 sniper team at the radar site that we were taking over. Right before we punched out to

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head there, we saw that there was a Combat Operations Center (COC), right next to the Joint Operations Center (JOC), where the [REDACTED] and our platoon commander were set up. Right before we were heading out, we were told that we were allowed to use Signal, no one said we couldn't have our cell phones. We asked to clarify and be sure. I know the battalion had a large footprint on Signal. We communicated with Counter Intelligence (CI), [REDACTED], and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) on Signal. There were a lot of comms issues, and that was an easier form of communication. We used Signal while we were at the radar site, but I also had Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Integrated Waveform (IW) working. I didn't have any issues with comms there.

We continued to conceal our position and observe Taliban and other suspicious individuals pointing with weapons or their phones. We saw Taliban throw civilians around out there. We got reports that some guys in 2/1 got shot at but didn't shoot back since they didn't think they were allowed to. I don't know what to say about that, but it kind of followed the track of the RoE being hazy for us out there. We continued to observe, but nothing crazy happened while we were there. After that, we pulled back and swapped out batteries. We started getting a pattern on where we would go for intel, the area where intel officers and Marines were. So, we got into a routine of resupplying, getting our intel, then heading to Abbey Gate on August 19th.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] Prior to heading to the gate, did you know that the US was working with the Taliban forces for security?

(2) Answer. Yes, prior to us heading out to the gate. It became clearer when we got to the gate. I remember hearing it over the net that the Taliban had checkpoints. Ground force commanders and task force commanders were going back and forth to meet with the Taliban. Getting eyes on and seeing US forces shake hands with the Taliban made that clear. The night that we got off the radar tower, we pulled our other sniper team off the other side of the airport. We saw the Afghan National Army (ANA) roll around the airport that whole time.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] What was your tasking at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] was tasked to provide overwatch, observe, report, and surveil Taliban activity. We looked for any hostile actions at or around Abbey Gate. That was prior to the embassy being evacuated, I believe. We knew we might move locations, but we were also providing overwatch to the Barron Hotel and the crowds in between.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] Who were you working for at that time?

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(2) Answer. We were tasked to and fell under Echo Company. The platoon tried to pull us back, but there were some issues with the platoon trying to task us elsewhere. [REDACTED] talked to us and told us that we worked for him, and he wanted us to come to the gate with him. We had a great working relationship with him. There was a point, right before we went to the gate, that the sniper platoon told us we needed to go report to them. We brought it up to [REDACTED] he told us that we were attached to him and that's not how it was going to work. That's what made the most sense to us. The platoon had two teams already doing nothing, because you don't need 20 guys at their position. That's when we were tasked to actually go to the gate. The gate was still closed when we got there, the [REDACTED] were still working in that area.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED] We understand there was a huge crowd initially to clear out and establish the gate area. Once the gate was established, what was your daily battle rhythm for your team and what were you doing?

(2) Answer. We interacted with the [REDACTED]. They pulled down and went back to the Barron around the 21st. [REDACTED] was the most competent medical provider at the gate, so he was dealing with a little bit of everything, triaging civilians down on the ground the whole time. He would come up sometimes to look through the scout sniper telescope to get a break from what he was doing. We would always have one guy on the gun and one guy on the telescope or camera. There usually would be one more guy watching the ground and the crowd, keeping eyes on the other members of the team down on the ground. About every 12 hours Echo and Golf would swap at the gate. We stayed at the tower 24/7. That's our job. We stayed there and did a pretty good job. During the day, we were almost all awake. I would catch a nap in the late afternoon, then I stayed up in the evening. I figured if anything was going to happen, it would probably happen at night while it was hardest for us to see them moving through the crowd to sneak in an IED. So, usually we would have a few guys in the tower and a few guys on the ground helping to process. We also had [REDACTED] at this point, he joined our team within the first 48 hours of being on ground.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How much sleep were you getting those first few days?

(2) Answer. I'd say like around 4 hours or so per day. Some nights more, and some nights less. Some nights guys in the crowd or from the Taliban checkpoint would laser us. There would be gunfire in the neighborhood sometimes. I would say 4-5 hours of sleep per 24 hours.

l. Question and Answer 11.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

(1) Question [REDACTED] How often did your team leave the gate to resupply or conduct rest and refit?

(2) Answer. Rest and refit, I think there was only one time. We went back for chow and water as needed. We brought a hefty amount of water and MREs to the gate with us. We tried to stay at the gate the whole time.

[REDACTED], with two of the other guys on the team, would normally run back to do that. We went back to get supplies or intel. I went sometimes. We probably went back about every 24-36 hours to get intel. Obviously, as we got closer to the 26th, things were ramping up so were going back more frequently, maybe once or twice a day to pass back our SD cards and get new ones from the either the COC or the intel guys in the JOC. I don't remember which. We would go back and get batteries and turn in our SD cards. I would imagine that we would give them to the intel guys since they were the ones giving us our information on threat streams and actions occurring around the airport. I made it back a few times.

At one point, on the 24th or 25th, we were forced to go back. Our [REDACTED] forced us back. We didn't want to go, we had a good rotation, we knew that we were only going to be there for another week or so. We wanted to do our jobs. We were good.

To recap it all, I know the chevron was emplaced on the 19th. Initially it was [REDACTED] guys on top of it along with Marines. Overall, there was a large footprint of allied troops. Over the next few days, and I don't know why, the Taliban started plussing up their position quiet heavily. They were bringing a lot of vehicles and gun trucks to the checkpoint. We documented that and passed it on. At some point, they overtook the chevron. They had pushed from their checkpoint to the chevron. They were pulling kids up there with them. At one point there were as many, or more, kids than there were adults. We felt like they were using the kids as shields against us, and, also, for photo ops with any media that was out there. They wanted to look like the good guys. We would see that, pass that up, and report on that and the dead bodies that we had seen. We witnessed the Taliban beating and killing people. Not just hitting them, breaking their faces, and bashing their skulls in. We saw Afghan civilians coming in with those wounds.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED] From the tower, could you see the Taliban shoot anyone?

(2) Answer. I saw them shoot at/around people. I saw them severely beat people, to unconsciousness or what I believed was death. I saw that and passed it up. We obviously have been going back and forth with the Taliban for decades, they are good at working around our RoEs. They would hit civilians with buttstocks and pipes until they fell and didn't get up. That prompted me at one point, since I was routinely radioing this up to the chain of command, to ask if we were allowed to do anything about it. I was told

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that only if we saw Americans or ourselves being physically harmed, we were not allowed to do anything.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Regarding the Taliban, had you received RoE instructions about defense of others?

(2) Answer. We had been told that we were working with the Taliban and to avoid interacting with them unless they were shooting at, or trying to physically harm, us. We were told that we could act in defense of US citizens or other allied forces. You can't tell a US citizen from 155 yards away when they are getting beaten, which is why I continued to ask if we could do anything. I continued to be told only if they were American citizens. I would see people get through the gate with blue passports that had been beaten, but that was too late.

One night got pretty bad. I watched 8-9 civilians get beaten to the point of immobilization, I counted out all of them over the radio net. I was told to clear the net of radio traffic. I don't know exactly what night it was. I have some time stamped and dated photos in regard to some of those actions. At the time I talked to [REDACTED] and wanted to push a recon patrol to the Barron Hotel so we could get photos of what the Taliban were doing. We got photos of the Taliban, the gear they were holding, and what they did to the civilians. Those pictures were on SD cards. The photos I took on my own phone were through the lens or of the camera. I don't have any photos of the PID. I have photos of the Taliban on the chevron.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So you would radio the Taliban's actions up to higher, what were your comms like at the gate?

(2) Answer. Black gear, we didn't have any issue with. We had issues with green gear. The 19th and the 20th maybe, I was able to get comms just fine with green gear.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

We had a relationship with the [REDACTED] team at that point. I don't know if it was one or two teams. I know that [REDACTED] and Ryan Knauss were out there. We had them come into our tower frequently, they wanted to get eyes on and feed us information. We had info about vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at this point, they were getting the same info we were about white or gold Corollas.

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We would talk to battalion directly on black gear or to our sniper team at the inner gate. I don't know if it would have to be retransmitted, I would imagine so since black gear wouldn't reach to the COC. I continued to try and make green gear work the whole time we were there, but we were kind of forced to stick with black gear.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How did you turn in the photos of the Taliban's actions?

(2) Answer. We personally brought them back ourselves. There were a handful of times when [REDACTED] would come and see what was going on and took the SD cards back for us, but 95% of the time we took it to the COC or to the intel Marines at the JOC. I don't remember who exactly.

It was the guys with intel officer, [REDACTED] I think. I don't know who they were with, I know that they were in desert cammies as well. Wherever Rosario came from, I know that she was in deserts too, so maybe from 51/5. I don't remember the names of anyone we passed info to, other than [REDACTED]. In terms of talking about threats, that was to the platoon commander, the COC, or the [REDACTED].

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You mentioned seeing drone footage of the Taliban [REDACTED], did you ever see something similar from the COC at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I don't remember seeing any drone footage while we were operating at HKIA, it was all word of mouth or the briefs that we were receiving.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you hear about a possible IED probe at the gate?

(2) Answer. I believe on the 22nd of August, we had received word from our other team, or maybe from [REDACTED], that an SUV or van was found with all the same make or model backpacks. We saw an individual moving in the crowd, an anomaly in the baseline, moving through the crowd suspiciously. Doing something with ill intent, looking nervous, looking up at our tower. He had a black or dark blue duffel bag or large backpack. He went into the crowd with it. We lost sight of him but caught sight of the bag. That was probably right around the hole in the fence on the far side of the canal.

We immediately called down to the gate and halted operations as discretely as we could. We called EOD. Everything kind of froze, everyone got down and took cover. [REDACTED] went to show EOD where the backpack was. EOD cleared it out. This probably all happened in about an hour or two, that's a pretty quick response for them, they were at the gate frequently. I don't know if they picked up the backpack, but they decided it was nothing. I don't remember what was in it, but it was just kind of fluffed up.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

To us, based on our training, it felt like it was someone trying to see what our response would be to an IED. Not ever seeing him again confirmed that. [REDACTED] agreed with us too. They had heard about those either from our other team or from some other asset, about an SUV found in the neighborhood with all those same types of backpacks. After that, it was getting back to work.

Then on the 24th or the 25th of August, I was at the base of the tower. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] came by the tower to see what was going on. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and maybe [REDACTED] were in the tower. [REDACTED] was leaning against the southeast window with the camera. I started to climb up the ladder, and I heard several loud cracks. It sounded like we were shot at. When I got up there, I saw and took a picture of several impacts to the ballistic glass, which you can compare to the videos from days prior where there is no impact to ballistic glass. I asked if [REDACTED] had been shot at. [REDACTED] looked at me wide eyed, then I told him that we weren't opening that window again unless we needed to. I know that [REDACTED] were in the tower, I don't remember for sure who was on the gun.

I want to say, that at the same time [REDACTED] were coming back from a supply run or talking to the intel guys. Regardless, [REDACTED] and I were there. Other than that, we didn't see any activity of the Taliban outside of the norm other than bringing in gun trucks with DISHKAs around the 24-25th. We went back on the 24th on a resupply and grabbed our SASR and had it loaded in the window and aimed at the gun trucks, just matching their posture towards us.

s. Question and Answer 18

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How was your team receiving threat streams?

(2) Answer. From the intel Marines. It was an intel officer. Likely [REDACTED] and not [REDACTED]. They would give us Red Bulls. We would talk to them face to face in the COC or the JOC. The little courtyard up there, we never really went inside. We gave them our SD cards and what we reported. They gave us their info.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you ever bring your camera to show them pictures?

(2) Answer. I don't know if we did or not. Normally when we showed pictures on our camera it was to our command or the [REDACTED] guys coming up into the tower.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] To be clear, your primary method of receiving intel was face to face at the JOC or COC?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. That is correct. We would give them the SD cards as well as notes from our observation logs about what to look for on those SD cards.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any specific threats that you were told to look out for?

(2) Answer. The gold Corolla and the VBIED threat was the big one. We felt pretty protected from a VBIED at Abbey Gate, but we were looking down the corridor for that. We were being told that the Taliban and ISIS were in the area and to look out for suspicious activity. The whole time people had kind of said this was a great place for a suicide bomber. On the 25th, we heard reports that there might be a suicide bomber, but early morning on the 26th that intel Captain and his Marines told us like, "hey, this is who you are looking for."

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From who, and where, did you receive that information?

(2) Answer. This was one of the times we went back to the CoC. Myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and at least one more guy from our team were there. This was pretty serious, so we were all in the courtyard at the JOC. We passed our SD cards and our obslog info. They told us there was a PBIED in the area, a known suicide bomber. I don't know if they said it was ISIS or not. They told us that he would likely come in the next 24-48 hours, clean shaven with brown or black garb. Some type of black vest. Likely with an older companion to guide him to the point of impact.

We were told to be on the lookout for that. We were never told about a specific bag, it was just told to be look out for a suspicious bag or vest and someone acting like they had the intent to blow up 200 people. We received that info, and that word started going out over black gear, Signal, and green gear. The be on the lookout (BOLO) was live. The Battalion and the Companies were tracking. As soon as we got that intel, we started asking when we would be allowed to shoot if we had PID. I think we asked that right away in front of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d We asked, "If we need to shoot an individual with long range precision fires, what do we need in order to do so?" and we were kind of told to pass what we were seeing up to higher, and they would provide the go ahead with their initials. Obviously, the RoE changed to not doing anything unless you were getting shot at. I don't remember who answered our question about this at the time.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did they have a name or photo of that individual before you went back to the tower?

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(2) Answer. I don't remember a name. I know we asked for pictures, just like we did for the VBIED. I think we were met with a no at the time. I asked if we knew who this guy was, didn't that mean we had eyes on that individual and why hadn't we done something about that sooner? The Captain, or one of the intel Marines, told us that that information was classified above the secret level. That frustrated all of us, but our job was to try to deal with the threat left of the bang, which obviously didn't happen.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. That description still sounds vague, did other people match that description?

(2) Answer. Yeah, at one point I pulled up the interpreter I was helping to the canal wall. All of these guys look pretty similar in the crowd. Maybe the description we received at the time was more precise, but it was the actions of the individuals we saw that made them stand out. We could tell when there were Taliban in the crowd, because they were trying so hard to be covert that they were overt. They weren't trying to get out of the country, everyone else there is trying to get out and get our attention. Babies were getting trampled and thrown, men and women were being trampled and beaten.

But the individuals we saw on the morning of the 26th, around 1100 give or take an hour or so, there was an older individual in his 50s-60s traveling with a late teen or early 20s individual. He was clean shaven with similar outer wear. He had a brown garment and black vest. They had a bag or satchel that they were carrying.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [REDACTED]. So for timeline clarity, you got that info about the BOLO around 0200 on the 26th, when do you get back to the gate?

(2) Answer. We probably get back to the gate like 45 minutes later.

Let me jump back to the recon patrol before I forget. I took everyone except for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to the Barron Hotel with some cameras in our flatpacks. We got to the entrance over there. One [REDACTED] guy asked what we were doing, I jokingly said its classified and he let us through. We kept walking and saw a bunch of [REDACTED] higher ups. I planned to go to some connex boxes inside the Barron and across from the checkpoint, so we kept moving there.

We got there, there was a tower there that the [REDACTED] were trying to use for comms. We talked to a [REDACTED] that was working on the radio there. [REDACTED] Every military is a little different, the [REDACTED] Obviously, it shows the difference of what the Americans are used to after 20 years of war. So, then we kept moving, set up security, and I climbed into the radio watch tower. I used the windowsill as a tripod to

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take pictures of the checkpoint. At this point the chevron was probably 15 yards away. I got close up photos of the Taliban and their vehicles there. Up against the wall, they had 12-15 individuals flex cuffed against the wall. We saw the Taliban moving unconscious or lifeless bodies around. We got pictures of that as well. At that point, the ANA interpreter that was with the [REDACTED] who I am sure was Taliban as well, came up and started questioning us on what we were doing. He told us we didn't want to make the Taliban angry. I told him I didn't care about pissing off the Taliban, my goal was to get pictures of the Taliban and what they were doing to civilians out there. I was trying to get pictures to either let us engage or get the task force commander to talk to the Taliban about what they were doing. The amount of brutality we saw over less than a two-week period, it was unsettling to see people get beaten senseless for no reason.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: When was that recon?

(2) Answer. The 24th or the 25th. At least two days prior to the 26th.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] We appreciate you sharing that anecdote about the Barron Hotel. Jumping back to the 26th, you got the intel and went back to the tower about 45 minutes later. What happened next?

(2) Answer. We got back to the tower. I hopped straight on the gun or behind the glass for observation [REDACTED] brought in copies of his obslogs to his interview. I wrote IED threat imminent in there, I wanted to make sure that was annotated. We kind of just stayed on higher alert for the rest of the morning, scanning the crowd even more in depth, as much as we could. Around 1100 or so we saw those two individuals. An older gentleman in his 50s or 60s with white/gray facial hair. The younger individual was clean shaven. Both were in blackish clothing. They were moving down the far side walkway together. We spotted them about as far back as we could see, still east of the footbridge. Right around the footbridge probably, on the far side walkway. At first, they were acting a little odd. Definitely an anomaly to the baseline. Stopping and staring at our tower and the inner gate tower. Handing out little cards or pieces of white paper to people in the crowd. Then when they were between us and the footbridge, we started passing up through our chain of command what we were seeing and how they were acting suspiciously. Specifically, that it was an older and younger, clean shaven gentlemen. I think [REDACTED] saw them first. I was on the gun, and I oriented on to those two individuals. After that, [REDACTED] got on the gun and I got on the camera and we started taking more pictures of them. We zoomed in and saw them acting suspiciously.

We kept radioing up that they were acting suspiciously, like an individual who was coaching a bomber. They would stop routinely against the wall to hand out white sheets of paper/pamphlets. At one point they sat down on the canal wall. The older gentlemen would touch and talk to the younger individual. We were asking what our engagement

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 [REDACTED]

authority was, because to us, that was positive ID. The younger guy looked nervous and was profusely sweating. I was trying to get all of our means of communications up. We were using black gear and Signal to pass it up. We were asking about our engagement criteria over the radio. We weren't allowed to do warning shots, but we asked about that or shooting them. But we were told no, over the radio. We passed up the details and that we could easily take the shot.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did they exhibit hostile act or hostile intent at this point?

(2) Answer. Hostile intent, yes. To us, it was very clear that the older gentlemen was coaching the younger gentlemen to get closer and closer to the tower. That canal area was packed, they were the only ones acting differently and stopping often. I perceived that as hostile intent.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you see any kind of device or wires on him?

(2) Answer. No, no device or wires. We blew up those photos, seeing if maybe there was a bulge. On the net we kept requesting engagement authority and kept being told no. At some point I requested that the [REDACTED] come directly since we work for him, and he needed to see what we saw. To us, as trained observers, this was a credible threat that was getting closer and closer to US forces.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So you were told no and then requested the [REDACTED] to come directly to the tower, roughly when was that?

(2) Answer. We had been observing them for at least an hour. I kept asking over the radio if anyone was going to come to the tower. We didn't want to take the SD card back because we were so close to these guys at this point. At some point we were told the [REDACTED] was coming. The [REDACTED] probably got to the tower about 2 hours after the fact. At some point before he arrived, the [REDACTED] guys, 2-3 of them came to the tower. We showed them photos of the guys. They had the same intel that we did.

The [REDACTED] guys agreed that this looked like the threat and positive ID of the threat. So, at that point, we had two units that agreed.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Had the [REDACTED] team seen these guys prior to coming to the tower?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. I don't know if they had seen pictures of the bomber at a higher level, but as far as I know we were the first ones to show them on the ground. We were the ones that spotted them, I don't know if anyone else had seen them. The 82nd had a sniper tower nearby, but we had no comms with them as far as I can remember.

Another group of guys came up, some Marine CI/HUMINT guys I think, came up to the tower. I think there was one E7-E8 in uniform, and one guy who wasn't in uniform. I had one of those guys give me their number on Signal since they had been checking in with us routinely. I asked them to come up, I think.

So ultimately, [REDACTED] and I think CI/HUMINT came and confirmed. I can get his name when I get my phone. (Confirmed following the interview that he was referring to [REDACTED] [REDACTED])

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) an hour after you see the guys, you request to engage or you request the [REDACTED] to come to the tower?

(2) Answer. We requested to engage within the first hour and were told no unless you see deliberate hostile act. Then we requested the [REDACTED] to come. After that, those two groups came to the tower and saw what we saw. They both agreed with us that this was the threat. By the time the [REDACTED] got to the tower they were probably within 20-30 meters of the tower before we lost sight of them. Before we lost sight of them, we radioed up that we should halt operations due to the threat.

I don't remember if it was that day, or the day of the IED probe, but I think we may have stopped operations at the gate for about 15-20 minutes. That happened sometimes. But after some point operations kept on. There is a video floating around, I don't know from who, of the green gear 152 call about the [REDACTED] report of a suicide bomber imminent at Abbey Gate. I don't know who has that video, but I can find that video. I think it has a time stamp, it was on Northern Provisions, and I can send that to you as well. We aren't really sure who has that video, but there is a time stamp of when that call comes over the net.

I think that video came out right around the same time as your team's initial investigation. I think it's significant because it shows that [REDACTED] let everyone know what was going on and that we passed that threat up.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did the [REDACTED] come up to the tower?

(2) Answer. Sometime between 1230-1330.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did you lose sight of the individuals?

(2) Answer. I want to say around noon. It was a concern for us, because we knew they were close at this point, and we couldn't find them anymore.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How did you end up losing sight of them, how did that play out?

(2) Answer. The whole time we were observing them, they would dip in and out of that enormous crowd. It was easy to blend in and get lost in the crowd. We would normally pick them back out, but it felt like they were intentionally trying to get lost in the crowd.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How long did you personally observe these guys?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2 hours, or a little more, over the gun and the glass.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When the [REDACTED] came up, was he with anyone else?

(2) Answer. I don't remember anyone else coming up to the tower. [REDACTED] came up to the top floor of the tower. Myself, [REDACTED] were up there. We showed him what we had seen [REDACTED] was still on the gun trying to observe the crowd. We showed the [REDACTED] our photos and told him that [REDACTED] and CI/HUMINT agreed with us. We told him that we thought it was a credible threat and that they had disappeared into the crowd. We asked him what he wanted us to do if we found them again.

I have tried to explain this before. I am not throwing his name out there to slander him, but I know who it started with. We got intel and we passed information to the ground and the chain of command above us. We told him what we saw and how they acted, how the younger guy was sweating and looking at us. How they were being shady and looking like the older guy was coaching the younger guy. How they fit the description that we received that morning. Just overall how they were an anomaly and seemed like a threat of some sort. Regardless, they were there with ill intent.

We made that clear to the [REDACTED] and asked him if we could engage if we saw them again. He told us, "I don't know." [REDACTED] asked him what he meant, he said, "What do you mean, you don't know?" I followed that up with asking him if he doesn't know, who does. He said he doesn't know. The words may have been different, but that's generally how it went. We gave him the SD card to bring back to the JOC with him. Implicit communication at this point was that he would get back to us, but we talked to him

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

about how this threat was still in the crowd and how we should halt operations at the gate. No decision to pull back inside the gate was made.

We never saw those individuals again. We had guys looking out all three outward facing windows. We thought we saw them a few more times, but we never got a full glimpse again. I was still asking for info and updates over the net and asking if we would halt operations at any point.

At this point, it had probably been 5-6 hours since we had spotted these guys. We were still hyper alert in the tower, but the ground had fallen back into regular operations.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did operations at the gate halt at all? Do you remember a countdown to an IED?

(2) Answer. I think there might have been for a short time, that's what I was alluding to earlier. I do remember a count down and everyone getting down, but nothing happening.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Who was in the tower when the [REDACTED] guys came to the tower?

(2) Answer. Me, [REDACTED] I think. I don't remember which [REDACTED] guys came up. Definitely one Marine and one Army guy. One of the guys may have been [REDACTED]. The Army guy was probably either Ryan Knauss or [REDACTED].

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Any other leadership from the Battalion come to look at what you were seeing?

(2) Answer. There may have been. The only other individuals that I remember being up there were [REDACTED] I believe they both came up as well.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] To recap, you see the individuals mid morning, request engagement authority later morning, lose the individuals around 1200, then talk to the [REDACTED] around 1330?

(2) Answer. Correct. I want to reiterate that I didn't just radio this issue up one time. I called it up every 5-10 minutes for the duration that we had eyes on the guys.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was there any way to identify these individuals as being a part of a declared hostile force, like Al Qaeda, ISIS-K, or anyone else?

(2) Answer. Nothing overtly descriptive on them, nothing like that. We knew that the Taliban were around, working with us. We know that ISIS was around, looking to hurt both us and the Taliban. I think we understood that it would be ISIS attacking us. The Taliban wanted us to leave the country. We knew it would be ISIS, but no we didn't have a way to identify that they were ISIS-K.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You mentioned that you gave the SD card to the [REDACTED] and that you don't have photos of the suspicious individuals. Are any of the people in this photo, the suspicious individuals that you saw? *Shows photo of individual dressed in all black in the canal crowd*

(2) Answer. Yes. This individual in black is the older gentlemen. I don't remember if the younger individual is in this photo, I don't remember exactly what he looks like. I remember the older individual because we had spoken about his facial hair. Also, how they would switch around wearing their clothes like the individual wearing black in the photo with his hood up.

Looking back at my notes, I know that the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) spoke with [REDACTED] I have a close working relationship with them. They have kept me in the loop about updates. I believe that conversation happened at the Pentagon at the secret level. Chairman Ari Wish and the Author of Kabul, Jerry Dunleavy, were in that conversation. They made it clear to me that he gave some answers that corroborated my account. I would imagine that he corroborated that he saw and received those photos. I think it's important that you pull information from that conversation. I don't have all the details, but it sounds like there was some important information in that interview. I think that is important to check on, because [REDACTED] would be the one to say who he gave those photos to. Because we have no clue.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Do you think this individual in black is the bomber?

(2) Answer. It could have been. Obviously, we have seen the video of the guy in black stepping out and blowing up. The younger individual was wearing brown garb when we saw him. Obviously, he could have had a different color on underneath. I don't remember all the details, it has been two years since then. I don't think I can remember more details on that.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 [redacted]

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [redacted] We know that at some point, the rest of your team went to north HKIA to prep gear, when was that?

(2) Answer. There were two elements we sent back from our team. I think that was somewhere between 1600 and when the blast went off [redacted] and I, he and I were the more senior professionally instructed gunmen (PIGs) in the platoon. We were competent, so everyone else went back [redacted] stayed on the gun, I was on observation. [redacted] came back at some point before I went down to the canal [redacted] went to help at the casualty collection point (CCP). I was out, facing toward the chevron. Hoover came over and hollered up to the tower. At the time, tons of people were reaching out to get interpreters and their families out of the country.

In this instance, someone had reached out to [redacted] and said that there was an interpreter they needed to get out. Right as Hoover was talking to us [redacted] saw the sign with [redacted] name on it. Hoover said that is why he came over. At the time, [redacted] was either at the base of the tower or in the tower. So [redacted] took over for me so that we could keep a shooter/spotter pair in the tower. This is sometime after 1700, probably about 30 minutes before the blast.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [redacted] Was anyone else, like [redacted] in the tower?

(2) Answer. Not at the time, to the best of my knowledge.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [redacted] When you left, who was in the tower?

(2) Answer. To the best of my knowledge, [redacted] were in the tower. I grabbed my stuff and walked to the hole in the fence with SSgt Hoover. We went to grab the individual with the sign, who was right near the point of detonation. That individual had started on the far side of the canal, and by the time we got there, he was in the canal.

Actually, [redacted] would have been in the tower at the time or just shortly after the fact. He showed me a picture at my retirement ceremony of the sign that we saw. He took that picture from the tower.

I went up to the short wall, took the sign and put it in my pocket. I asked them for their documentation. He had a blue passport, so I pulled him out. He was with his brother, who I think had a visa or something else. Hoover and I searched them. I was going to bring them both to the main search area, but he spoke decent English and told us we needed to wait for his wife and 4 kids. We were annoyed because he had been told to

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2/1 [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

show up with his whole family. He showed us their 4-5 more blue passports. I looked at them, and realized I wouldn't be able to spot them on my own unless I was close to the crowd. I told those two guys that I would look for like 20 minutes. I told him to call his wife and find out where they are out. He said she was at the bend in the canal. In my head, I thought they wouldn't make it out. We had heard that the gate was going to shut soon. We were told that operations would stop at 1700. Obviously, that wasn't the case.

For us, knowing that there was a credible threat, coupled with the fact the gate was closing soon, that only made the threat more credible. It was now or never for the terrorists. I told the interpreter that he needed to tell his family to get in the water in the canal and move toward us to move faster. He relayed that info to them. I stood one of them next to me on the canal wall so that we could try to spot their family.

I was standing completely next to the short wall for 5-10 minutes. Then there was a loud flash and a bang, and it was like I had been slapped by the hand of God. Initially I tried to open my eyes. My [redacted (b)(6)] which makes sense, I had a [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)]. I heard screaming. [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] I was trying to move, still fighting to open my eyes. I remember hearing snaps and cracks of bullets over and around us. It sounded like it was coming from in the neighborhood on the other side of the canal.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b] How long did that gunfire go on for?

(2) Answer. Maybe 30 seconds to a minute before I heard our forces fire back. It sounded like bullets impacting and kicking around us while I was lying there. That kicked me into fight or flight mode, I wanted to get back to the tower. I tried to stand up. I have had this back and forth with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] he doesn't know if I crawled at all, but I know that I tried to sit-up and crawl. [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] I remember trying to crawl [redacted (b)(6)]. I realized that was why [redacted (b)(6)] didn't work, and I know [redacted (b)(6)]. So, I was just trying to crawl. If I crawled, it was a couple feet. After that I couldn't move anymore. I looked up to the tower and saw someone there. I now know that was [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] since the other guys had just pulled up to the tower.

The whole time at HKIA I had a set of bolt cutters on my ruck [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] into the tower and asked where I was apparently. Everything I could see within 30-40m of me was flattened. I could see some people running on the far side of the canal. It didn't look like anyone was moving around me. I couldn't move or yell or anything. I started to fade, but I felt like I was there for an hour or two. I know it was a couple minutes before I heard [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] scream my name which snapped me out of it.

He ran out to me without a second of hesitation. He had the bolt cutters and was screaming my name, telling me he was coming. It kept me awake. I don't remember him

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

actually getting to me, but I remember opening my eyes and seeing him stare at me. Next thing I know, he was dragging me 20-30 feet to cover. He told me he thought I was dead. I told him to take my belt off, (b)(6). (b)(6) He immediately started triaging me. I was screaming and mumbling at the time. I remember seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) above me. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) cut the hole in the fence which cut down the casualty carrying distance significantly. He has never been recognized by anyone in the Marine Corps for his actions that day.

He got the blanket NAM that everyone on our team got, but nothing specifically about that. I brought that up to Gen Smith and he said that he would try to do something about that, but it seems to have fallen under the rug. That is one of the most important things to me now, he deserves to be recognized for that.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. So, you remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) standing there and triaging you. Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I don't remember seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) face, I don't remember if he was right over me or kind of further off. I remember opening my eyes again when I was set down at the CCP in the inner corridor. I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) getting to me and slapping me awake. I remember seeing him and realizing he had

(b)(6)

I have done a lot of (b)(6) about the things that happened. A lot of that (b)(6) has brought back some pretty significant memories about things that I kind of saw, kind of like flashbacks. I remember being thrown into a vehicle, originally, I thought it was an ambulance. After that (b)(6) I remember it as the back of the SUV that we had acquired. I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being back there holding me down, that's one of the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Echo. I saw him recently and he confirmed it. I don't remember distinguishing that it was him, just someone being there to hold me down and me screaming as I asked for drugs and if we were there yet.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Alright, you remember being put in an SUV. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

zz. Question and Answer 51.~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. You need to talk to the (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a
 they were directly supporting. It was a (b)(1)1.4a that treated me. I don't feel comfortable sharing his name to protect his privacy.

I think that team is so necessary to talk to. I think that team had the same intelligence that we did as well, and you need to talk to them. I think there were two teams out there. You need to talk to them and the individuals that they were there to support.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Have you been in touch with some of the units that they had been supporting?

(2) Answer. Yes, I have sat down with them and discussed events with them. A lot of it was showing my face and what they had done for me. Being brought into their community and being welcomed into their homes. Being able to build relationships with them.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Have you spoken to them about the individuals you saw on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, and they said they had the same intelligence that we had. The same description of the bomber, and I believe they said it came from them. I don't know if they had a photo, but I would imagine they did. I don't know at what capacity that would have been, if it was his prison mugshot.

To add to that, HFAC declassified some Department of State (DoS) documents, the DoS dissent cable, I think. It came out at the most recent hearing that I sat in on, at the Gold Star family hearing, it was brought to the nation's attention that there were two airstrikes and a personnel raid requested on where the bomber was believed to be prior to the attack.

One other thing I want to hit (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I am sure that you have heard his name. A decision was made to collapse from the foot bridge down to the tower on the near sidewalk way. Our team had been pushing to increase dispersion starting on the first day which led to the companies pushing out. When Golf Company took over, they got rid of all that dispersion. I am not sure who that falls on, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the (b)(6). (b)(6) I think he needs to answer why that dispersion had collapsed. I think if the IED had exploded down there, it would have only been two or three casualties and a lesser damage to American lives than it was.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 [REDACTED]

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you ever make your way to the position that Echo held at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. One day, I don't know when, I walked all the way to the footbridge to try and gain SA. Plenty of times I went past the jersey barrier.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you see how many Marines were down there interfacing with the crowd?

(2) Answer. There were Marines spread out every 15 or so meters holding the line, maybe 3-4 were at the footbridge at the time that I was there.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question [REDACTED] I will say, that was a complex decision. The crowd had swollen to an extent that over a squad of Marines were needed to hold the crowd at the footbridge, along with [REDACTED] forces. The crowd swell, combined with IED threat, lack of cover, and the potential casevac distance led the [REDACTED] and Golf Company to make a joint decision to collapse that position.

(2) Answer. Okay, I understand that decision then. That makes clear sense as to why you would collapse that position, I appreciate you sharing that information. I still don't understand why we didn't halt operations for longer though when we radioed the threat that we were seeing, and why that threat wasn't taken more seriously. To us, it was clear hostile intent.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [REDACTED] But would that hostile intent have held up, if those guys turned out not to be the bomber and you had shot them?

(2) Answer. Maybe not, that's why we asked, and we didn't take the shot. I would like to add to that, post blast [REDACTED] found the [REDACTED] behind the sniper tower. He had no clue what to do [REDACTED] checked him and handed him off to the [REDACTED] to takeaway after the fact, since he had no clue what to do after the fact.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were you aware that the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were both 15 meters from the blast and were hit?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I was not aware of that. Being an E5 at the battalion level, there is definitely a lot that I was not privy to at the time. Being here today, I appreciate getting some of those answers that I wouldn't have known at the time.

One question I have, is have you talked to any of the Afghan civilians that were there at the gate?

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We did not. It wasn't within the scope of the initial investigation or this review, or our timeline requirements.

(2) Answer. I hear that, sir. I remembered everything right when I woke up and told [REDACTED] (b)(6) everything. [REDACTED] (b)(6) did tell me that your team and had reached out and was told no, [REDACTED] (b)(6) was routinely curious why there was no follow up. But so much time has passed since then. [REDACTED] (b)(6) were there with me, so we kept asking the Wounded Warrior Regiment what was going on with this. I would ask about it every time a Marine would come into my room, and I kept being told they would get to me. Then with recovery, this was kind of put out of my mind for a while.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone else that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. Primarily [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a. The element that they were there to support. They had an eye into the intelligence that was passed down, potentially at a higher level. The same with the supposed airstrike or raid that was requested and denied. I don't know what level that would be at, but Gen McKenzie went on 60 minutes and said he had never heard about a person borne IED threat before the blast. I know that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a that they directly supported know otherwise and would corroborate. That is probably the last step in the chain of events and people. Following up on what was discussed in the HFAC interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his lawyers.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Anything else that you want to add?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6).
 [REDACTED] (b)(6). Physical effects from being through this as well. [REDACTED] (b)(6).
 [REDACTED] (b)(6) that have been ignored by his command. [REDACTED] (b)(6).
 I may be biased, but I have worked with a lot of junior Marines. He is extremely capable, but he has been shut down by his command at [REDACTED] (b)(6). He hadn't had the opportunity to get [REDACTED] (b)(6) so he got pulled out of his course. Now he has been stuck in an S-Shop. He wants to be part of the course. He is fighting his command on some [REDACTED] (b)(6).

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

At the end of the day, nothing will make up for the lives lost in America's history. I just want to do what I can, to make sure that something like this never happens again. We are going to go to war again, we have shed a lot of blood and paid the price for mistakes that we have made. I am not trying to point out that people are at fault, but at the end of the day the State Department was not prepared. There were some decisions on the ground that could have been made better and information that could have been taken more seriously. I don't want to see American lives wasted. Service members should feel like their service was fulfilled and their time was worth it and it is up to them to find their why and sense of fulfillment. I'm proud of what I have done and the people that I have helped. I have helped kids and I have helped families. I will proudly show my tears for the brothers that I have lost. I just want answers, and I think that it is important.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 2003 11 14, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 6. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (S _____) (Signature) _____ (nt) _____

2003 11 14
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) _____

2003 11 14
DATE



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) have reviewed the statement resulting from 10/2023, which begins on question 7 and ends on question 67. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

14 Nov 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

20231014
DATE

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Page 328 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S066 (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)