



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

6 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines, 6 October 2021

1. On 06 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered in a conversational manner. An [REDACTED] (b)(6) will depict [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking, while a [REDACTED] (b)(6) will depict that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded this interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) When did you get to 2/1 and what have you done since arriving?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I reported in October of 2018. I did a 6 month work up as a Weapons Company Platoon Commander (PC). I deployed with 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in 2019. I took over as the [REDACTED] (b)(6) for Weapon's Company in January of 2020 when we returned.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How was the MEU?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I did time on a ship and was part of Task Force [REDACTED] (b)(6) before heading up to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

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d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did you pick up [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] A few weeks ago, in September.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you extend to stay at 2/1 longer?

[REDACTED]
(b)(6)

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What did you do for pre-deployment training? Was it curtailed due to COVID?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We were the track company, the amphibious assault company, for the MEU. We had to test and evaluate their amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) in July of 2020. So we trained when most of the Marine Corps was shut down due to COVID. We did small team ranges and platoon supported attacks by walking onto ranges at 29 Palms while we were testing them. We also did mechanized infantry testing for 2 weeks for the Marines. In August we did 3 or 4 weeks of amphibious testing.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Then you went to the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) from September to November. How did you do?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I think we did well. We were set up for success with the ACV testing. It gave us a lot of reps of company planning and rehearsals that the other companies didn't have the chance for. That definitely led to us doing well, which I think led to us getting assigned the mission that we had on our deployment.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Post-holiday season 2020-2021, what's your company doing?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I was in A&S in January of 2021. They had done some certification exercises with the SEALs in Coronado and did some Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) exercises. My commander wouldn't let off the gas prior to deployment. Just not the way we operate, we would train hard whether we will or will not deploy. In February, we got the actual order to deploy.

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i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] When did you get back from A&S?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] The first or second week of March.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] When did Fox deploy?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] Late March or early April. I went in the last wave in April so I had time for leave before I deployed.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] Once the whole company deployed in April, what was your mission?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] We were the security force for the [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d]
 [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] The Company spent 72 hours in [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] before flying into the helo-pad next to the embassy.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] So your focus is security on the compound, are you hearing about a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) at this point?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] Yes, pretty early on, definitely by June we started having some discussions about what a NEO would look like. Fox was a bit in the dark, we didn't think we would get lifted out of the [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] for this because we needed to maintain the security posture we had. When the CJTF-OIR planning team came in May or June, they assessed we could do the mission with about half of the force that we had in place.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] So in June, you get some indications that some element may be lifted from [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] and go elsewhere?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] It was possible. We were fairly busy discussing the drone threat that was developing throughout the area of responsibility. That took most of our time and energy.

n. Question and Answer 13.

[REDACTED (b)(1)1.4a]

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[REDACTED]
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(6) Were you doing any crowd or riot control from the (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Good question. We were set up for success going into Kabul. We basically did weekly crowd or riot control training. At the (b)(1)1.4d it was 3 days on security, then 3 days as the quick reaction force (QRF). During that time we would prep for riot control. We would use nonlethal 40mm foam rounds and shotgun bean bags. We practiced riot control formations on blocking positions, or rounding up and cordoning groups of people. This stemmed from the December 2019 riot videos that we had seen and we would practice formations with mock rioters out on the landing zone.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(6) When you are training on the riot control measures, what are you using?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We had a full escalation of force kit. Shields, face masks, shin guards, batons, and the State Department's fire department had hoses we could use.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(6) Is it safe to assume, that when you and the two platoons left the (b)(1)1.4d you left that equipment there?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, we left it all there for the Army as they were going to need it as they completed the RIP.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(6) So two platoons from Fox went to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). They sound uniquely qualified for that mission, is that fair?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I'd say so.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(6) When you get word that you're going to (b)(1)1.4d with your two platoons are you tracking that you are potentially going to support the NEO in Kabul? What do you think your follow on mission is?

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(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] I honestly didn't think that Fox would get called to go. The indicators prior, and during planning, was all for executing a NEO light package. We were told be ready to go, but the understanding was that it probably wasn't going to happen. When we went to [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] it was a "be prepared to go" and we had some individual skill ranges locked on for any training we hadn't done at the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d]. Other than that, we were just preparing our gear for redeployment.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] About when did you arrive in [redacted (b)(1)1.4d]

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] Around the first week of August.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] When did you hear you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] I think it was the 16th. When it became evident that the NEO was going to be conducted Fox was told that we would be on the 5th wave, the last wave in. There was still a lot of doubt that we would even go, we thought the 5th wave might not make it in. That was what we were hearing from the 12th to the 15th. We busted out anything we wanted to carry, because we knew we were going light. On the 16th the battalion XO told us that we would be going that evening, we had about an 8 hour heads up.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] What do you do in that 8 hour window before you depart?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] and I made a quick timeline. Ammo, chow, weapons draw, and packing as much water as possible. We issued out 3 days of chow. We had our Marines ready to go in 6 hours and hopped on some busses to go to [redacted (b)(1)1.4d]. We found out that the MEU was taking our flight. [redacted (b)(6)] and some of the Weapons Company guys hopped on the flight with the MEU Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) to link in with the OPSO and get some eyes on. We left the platoon commanders and the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)] to follow on.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] any attachments?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] No sir.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] When did you arrive?

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(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) My guys arrived in 2 waves, around the evening of the 17th and the morning of the 18th.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) What did HKIA look like when you arrived? What did you do?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I immediately linked in with the Battalion OPSO then I went to the command post next to the Joint Operations Center (JOC). We bedded down in the Turkish dining facility. In [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d we thought we would do security on the western sector of the compound. When we arrived, we learned that we would establish a security posture on the south of the airfield when forces arrived. I got an intelligence brief [REDACTED] (b)(6) that I felt like was lacking information on rules of engagement (ROE).

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Was this an ROE brief or were these questions you were asking?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) These were questions I asked the OPSO, there was no legal brief.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) You linked up with your battalion leadership, learned that you would secure southern HKIA, and received an intelligence brief. Did you get the run down that you would work with the Taliban?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) We were tracking that they were helping with the airfield clearance. We were told this from some of the Echo Company guys who had been there for 24 hours already. We also learned that the National Strike Unit (NSU) was involved on the airfield.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) What did you do the rest of the 17th?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Mostly just final coordination and planning. We got the guys settled, distributed radios and did communications checks. When it was time to assume security on the perimeter, we walked over there.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How long did the walk take and where did you go?

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(2) Answer [REDACTED] We linked up with some of Echo and the 2/1 Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoon. We went just south of the airstrip and replaced the CAAT platoon from 1/8. We got on line and established a security perimeter with our other 2/1 elements.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Who else is there?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] The Turks are tied in with Abbey Gate to our left, Echo Company was 200m on our right. The task was to screen for any refugees trying to hop the fence and get on the airfield. We were on line with about 10-15m between each other, the purpose was to avoid a mass of people entering the airfield. We had a handful come through a hole in the fence about 100m to the south.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] If I can back up a bit, I want to bring up that when we arrived to replace the CAAT from 1/8, they heard pop shots from Abbey Gate. They thought they were being shot at, and started shooting at some civilians that were running away. They didn't hit any.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How long were you there?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] About 18 hours. From the night of the 18th into the 19th until we were relieved by the 82nd. Then we went straight to Abbey Gate and got there around 0100.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Have you picked up any attachments yet?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] No, we never did.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What does Abbey Gate look like when you get there?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We arrive at the inner gate and get a couple hours of sleep there. The British were still operating at the outer gate. I linked up with the OPSO and the Battalion Commander there and saw the vehicles that the British were using to get from the Barron. Our original task was crowd control and QRF for CAAT from 2/1 that was taking over the inner gate.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What did Weapons' force array look like?

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(2) Answer (b)(6) My understanding is the 2 CAAT platoons rotated 24 hours on, 24 hours off at the gate.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(6) When you get there on the 19th, the Marines bed down, you link up with battalion leadership and see the situation there. Then you're told you will do crowd control and QRF for the CAAT that was working the inner gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, we believed the CAAT would relieve the British at the gate and that we would support that. When we woke up on the 19th we learned that we were tasked to make a route to the Sullivan Compound. There were two triggers that we needed for that: confirmation of American citizens at Camp Sullivan and coordinated help from the Taliban. Neither of that happened, so that plan was scratched and we moved 2 platoons to the outer gate. We linked up with the Brits, Air Force Para-rescue Jumpers (PJ), and the section from CAAT by the outer gate.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(6) Is anyone from Golf there yet?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I think their commander may have been there, but they showed up a bit later.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(6) When were you staged?

(2) Answer (b)(6) About 0800-1000 we were waiting for those conditions to clear to Camp Sullivan. When those conditions weren't met, we were told by the Battalion Commander to open the gate and begin processing. We got a short brief from the Department of State (DoS) representative describing what documents they were looking for. He had no handouts. He told us American passports, green cards, embassy badges, and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications. That was about 5-10 minutes prior to opening the gate. I passed that information to the Platoon Commanders, but I know not all the Marines got that info or the word that we were no longer going all the way to Sullivan. With the assistance of the Brits, we opened the gate and pushed the crowds back from the gate all the way to the piss shack. I realized quickly that we were overextended. We had a bunch of evacuees between us and the gate. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d We pulled the lines back in to try and consolidate. This is right by the piss shack, and we stayed there processing for the rest of the day, just looking for documents and pulling the appropriate people out.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(6) How many of your guys were you using?

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(2) Answer [REDACTED] We used both platoons all day. Golf arrived that evening, around 1900, and replaced us. We didn't know what the evening would look like, if the gate would shut. I left the Marines to rest just inside the outer gate. There was discussion about shutting the gate. We got a warning order that we would open the corridor all the way to the Barron Hotel that night. I pushed back hard on that, I wanted to wait until the morning.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How much visibility do you have at night?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] There was a fair amount of ambient light from the buildings around there. There was lighting from the Barron Hotel, and we put some floodlights in by the gates that night. We had PVS-31s, which are fairly good night optics, but they weren't that helpful because there was too much ambient light.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You're told that you'll push passed the Barron Hotel, around 1900?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] That's earlier than I remember, but it was shortly after we got relieved.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How many people do you think are in the crowd that you'll need to push through? Did you assist?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] A few hundred to a thousand. Yes, they were on the left and we were on the right of the jersey barriers. We pushed the crowd passed the Barron Hotel. We ended up with a holding area on the wall side across the street from the hotel. The Taliban initially had a checkpoint right in front of the hotel, but Golf got them to move so we could emplace the chevron (blocking obstacle).

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [REDACTED] The chevron was placed the morning of the 20th, what's next for Fox after that?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] At this point, all friendly forces are inside the chevron. The Taliban checkpoint is just beyond it. The next 48 hours are processing and crowd control.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were people coming through the chevron with documents?

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(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, and also through the canal. We put some jersey barriers with concertina wire in place to control the amount of people coming in through the canal. Our task was to process and maintain the line by the chevron which was easy as that gap was only about shoulder width. We had a line of Marines along the jersey barrier of the holding area, and Marines along the canal crowd to look for document. Then we had a search pit, outside of outer gate before moving them to the DoS folks.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(6) That takes you up until some point on the 22nd?

(2) Answer (b)(6) That sounds right, but I couldn't say for sure. We were out there for about 3-4 days.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you have a rest plan?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Not for the first 24 hours. After that we would do a 6 on, 6 off rotation to the inner gate.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(6) When do you get pulled off the line or have your mission changed?

(2) Answer (b)(6) On the evening of the 21st or 22nd we got replaced by the British for crowd control. We moved inside the gate and they were trying to take some pressure of that. We started just watching for people slipping through the lines and watching the crowd inside the gate that was waiting on transportation. We just pushed people toward the inner gate.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(6) On the night of the 21st how many people were waiting to get on busses?

(2) Answer (b)(6) About 200-300.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(6) How long were you there?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Just that night and the next morning, about the 22nd. We had 3 Marines go down with Viral Gastroenteritis (VGE), the intestinal bug. Our bivouac was next to the open sewage canal that cut under the wall. I got sick as well, I stayed at the gate and we continued inner security at the gate. It seemed like the situation was

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deteriorating. I went back to North HKIA for about 12-18 hours that evening since I was sick and dehydrated. I came back about the morning of 23rd. That afternoon we were relieved, then we pulled security for the evacuation control center (ECC) at the PAX terminal for about 24 hours. We went back to the gate about the morning of the 25th after getting some rest.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Where are you assigned on the 25th?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We were manning the holding area just outside of the gate. Throughout the day on the 25th, Golf had pushed some of the evacuees up along the wall. We had a squad or two helping. We had a platoon on rest or QRF up by inner gate. One platoon was at Abbey Gate.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What was the reasoning for pushing people out passed that sniper tower?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] The British were trying to use the bridge as a way to push people out. Throughout the week, getting rid of the unqualified was a challenge. The Taliban wouldn't let us push people out. We were using the bridge to push the rejects out.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When you arrived on the 25th, what did it look like?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] It looked deteriorated from when we left. We initially had a slow but steady flow of civilians get through the gate and the holding area. The crowd was calm as long as there was a steady flow. If there was no processing they got frustrated and started to press against the lines. When we arrived on the 25th the crowd was out of control.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Why do you think that is?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Probably because they hadn't been processing that night, due to either State or transportation not being available.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What was State's presence like?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Inconsistent, they would usually show up between 6 and 8 in the morning. They would work a couple hours with one or two personnel. They didn't have much urgency and would leave sporadically. They almost always left by nightfall.

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bbb. Question and Answer 53.

- (1) Question (b)(6) Is it fair to say they didn't work overnight and that had an impact on the crowd?
- (2) Answer (b)(6) Absolutely, evenings were more difficult for that reason.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

- (1) Question (b)(6) Were you hearing about an increased threat on the 25th?

(2) Answer (b)(6) When we first arrived, we were told to look out for a yellow Corolla vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED). When we went out the gate we received some mixed reporting that it had been spotted from the sniper tower. We weren't concerned because the chevron blocked off that approach. A VBIED was not a viable threat at Abbey Gate. The suicide vest became a concern at some time on the 25th when we still had personnel extended along the canal up the bridge. We were told that the suspected individual was shaved clean, had a beige dress, and was carrying a man bag. We took some force mitigation procedures, reduced troops on the line to the bare minimum to reduce personnel in one spot.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

- (1) Question (b)(6) Was that your company or the battalion?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The battalion, but those measures only lasted as long as the crowd allowed it to. If they got rowdy it forced a surge of forces. It was not a perfect mitigation, and there was no real way to maintain standoff from the crowd. During the period of darkness (POD) from the 25th to the 26th we received reports that the Taliban would engage us from the chevron in 10-30 min. At that time, we reduced number of troops and pulled as many troops in from the gate. The Marines we left outside took cover and monitored the Taliban closely. No clue where that report came from, but nothing happened.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

fff. Question and Answer 57.

- (1) Question (b)(6) So POD 25-26, your Company is on the line throughout the night?

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(2) Answer [REDACTED] Yes, we processed throughout the night. Eventually we moved passed the Taliban threat.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was there a change in the crowd that evening, could you keep them pushed back?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] As the week progressed the crowd grew more and more desperate. They knew we were leaving on the 31st. That last night we were there, they were pretty hectic, but it was no major shift of what the baseline behavior was.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [REDACTED] 2/1 force posture that night is Fox and Golf, right? Did you all maintain that eastern buffer that Echo had established along the canal?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Yes sir. We had collapsed that earlier, maybe during the suicide vest threat. It was too far if we needed to casevac everyone.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How did you feel about collapsing back in?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I supported it, bringing the guys closer to consolidate forces. It was too spread out. The morning of the 26th we got an imminent threat report saying there was an attack or bomb. We stopped processing altogether and didn't let the NATO forces through. We pulled as many folks off the line as possible, those outside hunkered down. That lasted for about an hour.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED] About when was that?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Around the 0700 time frame. After that, there were no more significant threats throughout the day.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question [REDACTED] On the 26th, talk us through where you and your Marines were at and what you were doing?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] There was still a platoon on QRF and a platoon outside the gate on a 6 hour rotation. We continued to process throughout the day at a lower rate. We were really just looking for U.S. passports at this time, but there weren't many by this point. We still had about 200 people in the holding area just outside the gate and we

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were using interpreters to confirm there were no U.S. passport there. By midday, we were confident we had found any that were present.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How much pressure were you and your Marines feeling from higher or from looking the civilians in the eye because the gate is closing?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) It definitely varies from Marine to Marine. Drastically. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was at one end of the spectrum and [REDACTED] (b)(6) was on the other end. [REDACTED] (b)(6) had worked with interpreters in the past and he was trying to get as many through as possible. [REDACTED] (b)(6) was hardline and followed only paper work and DoS guidance. The Marines fell anywhere in between. Throughout the week everyone was desensitized. By the 26th, it was emotionless to kick people out. By that point we weren't using the bridge, we were just sending them back in to the canal.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) So by midday you think you have any passport holders pulled out, where are your Marines operating then?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) We knew the 82nd was going to come relieve us and shut the gates some time that evening. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had discussed timelines to put a hard stop on processing so that we could do a handover and safely shut the gate. We knew we would need to clear the crowd inside the gate around 1600, but we pushed that timeline. We started clearing the crowd around 1500 with the platoon that I had on line. We pushed the people in the holding area or those left by NATO or by the chevron back in to the canal. The 2 hours prior to the blast was just focused on clearing them out to safely close the gate. [REDACTED] (b)(6) were in and out between the two gates.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Where were you at this time?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Usually between the outer gate and the hotel, assisting with removing people there.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) The blast occurred around 1743, where about are you located at that time?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) There was a jersey barrier in a U shape near the hole in the fence to the canal. Fox Company, 3rd platoon had already cleared between the outer gate and the Barron Hotel about 30 minutes prior to the blast. Our company was really just pulling security along the fence line tied with the British. A handful of our guys were exterior, next to the canal to the west. Personally, I was next to the jersey barrier.

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ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(6) What do you see when the blast goes off?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I saw the flash, I just happened to look that direction towards Golf's position. There were hundreds of people in the crowd and up against the sniper tower jersey barrier at that time. I got knocked down with a couple Marines near me. I looked up and heard some shooting. I got up with the Marines near me and ran to the gate. I figured the Taliban were shooting at us from behind. I didn't know where the shooting was coming from. I took cover by the gate and looked at the Taliban by the chevron. I saw one Taliban waving his arms and determined they probably weren't shooting at us. I heard some sporadic cracks over head for the first few minutes after the blast. I couldn't tell where they were coming from. I wouldn't be surprised if the Brits or 82nd were shooting from their locations, but I didn't see any rounds impact.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(6) Alright, so the bomb goes off, you're on your back with a couple other Marines, and you move to cover inside the outer gate. Then what?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yea, I push those guys inside the gate. The shooting ended pretty quickly. I took cover behind the PSYOP truck and I ran in to the OPSO there. He told me to get the shock trauma platoon (STP) and start the casevac. They came from the inner gate and we established a casualty collection point (CCP).

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(6) Were you the first to call in the casevac?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Probably not, it was probably the OPSO, but I couldn't say with certainty.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(6) What happens after you make that call?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I started pushing Marines to assess casualties. The CCP was just inside the gate and we pulled wounded in to start triage. The Marines were hopping in any vehicles available to bring the casualties up to North HKIA.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(6) And where were you?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I was between the spot of the blast and the triage. I was helping get guys from the blast to the CCP. I was one of the last guys out there, me and a handful of Marines. We cleared the canal and made sure that there were no Marines in

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the water on the other side. Once we established that we pulled inside and closed the gate. I had already received full accountability from our platoon basically as soon as the blast went off, our platoon sergeant and platoon commander did a good job of that.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) There were no casualties from Fox? Have you been evaluated for TBI?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Just a handful with TBI. One Marine got grazed by some shrapnel and one Marine got hit in the kit. I have been evaluated.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Alright, you get all casualties in and you do one last sweep in the canal before moving in. What are the Brits doing during all of this?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I couldn't tell you. I couldn't remember seeing any of them right after the blast. I know following the blast they moved from Barron to HKIA by vehicle convoy through Abbey Gate. I linked back in with the OPSO, who was bleeding from his arm, inside the outer gate. We sat him down, I took the radio from him to speak with the

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a There had been a report of one guy who kept poking his head out of the alley nearby. The OPSO and I determined we needed to pull back and clear the area. 3rd platoon moved to just inside of the inner gate, with our forces oriented east. Echo was on the outer gate. After that they pulled all forces inward to the inner gate and we covered Echo moving in.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) How long do you think it was until all casualties were brought in and taken to the next echelon of care?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) About 5 min to get all casualties off the objective. About 15 min to get them to Role 2. We maintained security for the next hour or so while accountability was completed and planned with the British to get them in from Barron. We acquired a bus to take us up to north HKIA after that.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Alright, 15 min post blast, all casualties make it to the next echelon of care, you began rearward passage of lines, pull security for an hour, and then the British come through the gate. When do the 82nd arrive?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) They arrive the next morning to relieve Weapons who had security at the inner gate since we had departed and reduced forces.

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yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question [redacted] Can you speak to the specific locations of casualties?

(2) Answer [redacted] The majority were between the jersey barriers on the exterior of the fence, the majority of 1st Platoon from Golf. There were some casualties near the PSYOP truck just outside of outer gate, near where the OPSO was. Some were arrayed between the sniper tower jersey barrier and the opening in the fence.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [redacted] When you pull back, what does that look like?

(2) Answer [redacted] After the blast, after we established security, I linked up with the 2nd Platoon Commander and told him to remain in place. After the rearward passage of lines we pulled everyone in and we linked in with the Battalion Commander and OPSO. We moved our forces back to North HKIA in 2 waves. We collected up all cellphones so no information was leaked. That lasted for 24 hours. Then we gave phones back so that our Marines could let their families know that they were okay. On the 27th we had no taskers. We were told to be prepared to return to the gate to bolster security. The Marines were resting. We had updated the ROE and linked up with the [redacted] at JOC. Any non-uniformed or DoS personnel would be detained on site.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question [redacted] Is that based off a potential insider threat?

(2) Answer [redacted] We received that insider threat about the PAX terminal when we got back. We were told that it would probably be a bomb thrown over the wall and collected by someone inside, the other threat was the VBIED at the North Gate. The only real tasker on the 27th was the dignified transfer at about noon.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question [redacted] What does the rest of your time at HKIA look like?

(2) Answer [redacted] I sent some Marines to medical to get screened by medical about 24 hours out. Then on the 28th we were tasked to clear some sectors of sensitive item and demilitarize some items on the north side of the compound. That was cathartic. We left on the afternoon of the 28th. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was requested on the 27th by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to escort the casualties back to the States. He probably didn't want his Marines to escort them, but also because he knew that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had put in a ton of effort to casevac guys out of there. He put in an exceptional effort, he was disappointed to leave, but he knew it was an important job.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

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(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] You depart the afternoon of the 28th and fly back to [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] before going stateside?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] Yes. We were there for about a week before the rest of the company came back from the [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d]

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] Anything you think I'm missing?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] The involvement of the Female Engagement Teams (FET), which I think were coming mostly from the MEU, were absolutely necessary to the execution of the mission. I don't remember when they first arrived, probably within 24 hours of establishing the search pits. They were very helpful to search females. If Marines attempted to search females, family members and anyone who saw and the women would get upset. Easing that frustration was very helpful. It was also very useful to bring female Marines in to assist with kicking Afghan females out. I had an instance where a couple of women were holding my leg crying because they'd be kicked out. It would be a bad look if I grabbed them, but they were much more willing to be convinced by the female FET NCO to get out.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] Why do you think the FET were out by the jersey barrier and not the search area when the blast went off?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] I heard they were there to help with pulling a child or woman out of the crowd. It was not uncommon for them to help with the crowd or kick people out.

(3) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] I also wanted to talk about the [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4d] They slowed things down for us. I mentioned it in my after action. We needed unity of command. I wasn't sure who was in charge, us or the British, especially in regards to calling shots about gate opening or processing. We would sometimes halt processing, but then international forces would pull people out which would cause a surge and make things harder for us.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question [REDACTED (b)(6)] Were you ever getting calls or texts to get individuals in to the airport from people stateside?

(2) Answer [REDACTED (b)(6)] From one guy I went to school with. He had a prior service background and somehow he heard I was in Afghanistan. He sent me a message about 24 hours after I got there to try and get some guys out. I told him I would try, but I never did find them. [REDACTED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]

[REDACTED (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]

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gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] How are your guys? Are you talking about this?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] They're glad to be home. When we were in [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] we did some downloads and talked about it in the after action review. The rest of the company regrets not being there. Fox Company not taking casualties is attributable to the randomness of war. There was no way anyone was going to see the bomber in that crowd, even if that description was accurate. On the morning of the 26th [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] and I had talked about force mitigation strategies. We talked about having a squad doing crowd control, and a squad behind them scanning the crowd. We didn't really have enough forces available to do that until we cleared the crowds out, and to be honest it wouldn't have helped much.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

[redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c]

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] What is good contact information from you?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)]

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

07 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 07 October 2021

1. On 07 October, 2021 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered in a conversational manner. An [redacted] (b)(6) will designate that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking and an [redacted] (b)(6) will designate [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded this interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) When did you get to 2/1, and what have you done while you have been in 2/1?

[redacted] (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Can you speak to any training that you feel like uniquely prepared you for what you did at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) I think the bulk of the training that was relevant happened during the months prior to HKIA while we were already deployed. The best training that was

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applicable was a non-lethal weapons instructor, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the company that was adamant about working with guys on riot formations. We went to a range on (b)(1)1.4d to employ non-lethals like the shotgun rounds, some of the 40mm foam rounds, and some of the British riot shields that we had access to. We weren't part of the group that cleared down to the Barron Hotel, but some of the crowd control aspects were still applicable. We were doing platoon rotations, so we would send a platoon up to (b)(1)1.4d to do a week of simulations at the arctic facility there. They had medical simulators there, and from what I gather those were extremely beneficial. They would do a week of that and work from squad live fire to a platoon supported attack. All the platoons except for 1st platoon worked their way up there. 1st Platoon didn't make it due to HKIA kicking off. They were doing ship security on the (b)(1)1.4d for 3 months over in the Arabian Gulf. We had a couple Crisis Response Exercises (CREX) and two mission rehearsal exercises (MRX) while at (b)(1)1.4d and those were noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) oriented. The CREX was a simulated forward operating base (FOB) seizure that was less applicable. It was more focused on a forcible entry. The MRXs were applicable. The first one had a small expeditionary airfield on (b)(1)1.4d they loaded up C-130s, went up and flew around, offloaded, setup an entry control point (ECP) in the desert with the evacuation control center (ECC) behind us to process people. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) platoon from Golf Company was the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) force supporting (b)(1)1.4d they came in as role players. That was useful for crowd control aspects, they had their guys act a little crazy. It taught us search procedures and how to control unruly individuals. Only 1 platoon got to do that, 1 was on the ship and the other 2 were transitioning to and from (b)(1)1.4d

It was good training for the ECP, but not great training for the ECC. There wasn't much paper work. The second MRX happened at (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) coordinated a couple hundred Air Force personnel which got the guys more reps on searches but also processing people through the ECC. The MRXs and the practical applications that we did were the most applicable.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(6) When was MRX 1?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The first MRX was in the middle of July and the second was the end of July. We were doing security for the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force's (SPMAGTF) ECC site.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(6) Echo was the crisis response company and you were collocated with the SPMAGTF command element, at what point were you notified that Echo would deploy to HKIA?

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(2) Answer (b)(6) I want to say that we started making preparations for the 96 hour tether during the last week of July. It was the NEO light package on that tether. We would be going in as that first foothold. The medium package included Golf and elements of Weapons, but indicators were that only that NEO light was needed. I don't know the exact date that the MEU became the main effort, probably around the 4th to the 6th is when that shifted, after their brief to BGen Sullivan. We were thinking that we could focus more on the retrograde actions. Then the night order came out, maybe around the 10th or the 11th from CENTCOM, and it said that the MAGTF and the MEU needed to be on a 24 hour notice to move. After that, things really kicked up. We were aware of the order but, we waited until the morning to see what was going on. The Joint Task Force (JTF) talked to CENTCOM, and we were told to move to an N+48 tether. We packed up the quadcons for our comms and weapons to go in. Once those preparations were made, the next day on either the 12th or the 13th it was certain that we were going within 48 hours. Then we started slicing and dicing what the manifests would be based on C-17 or C-130 availability. That was constantly changing, based on who we would want in first. That ended up being 4th platoon, with part of HQ, and mortars, the javelin team leader, and scout snipers during the period of darkness (POD) on August 15-16. We were being told that a lot of the MEU and the battalion leadership were already getting on deck. I was on the wave after that on the POD 16-17 with 2nd platoon and the rest of our scout snipers. As we departed on the 16th we were watching the crowds on the feeds of the air field.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(6) As you're departing on the 16th, you see the breaches on the perimeter and anticipate that you will be pulling security when you land?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes sir, when I started pulling ammo for our wave I was trying to pull enough for us and the wave already there. I brought all the non-lethal I could. Shotgun rounds, the 40mm foam rounds, CS gas, and flashbangs.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(6) Are you in communication with you Company Commander after he lands?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yea I'm talking with him and the company [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that also went with him. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(6) When you get on ground at HKIA what happens?

(2) Answer (b)(6) flight brought in all the communications gear and the Equipment Density List (EDL) that we packed out. When we got off the plane we pushed to the building, dropped our stuff, and went to where our quad cons moved from

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the C-130. We busted those open and got our stuff out. Once that was done it was about 5 or 6am on the 17th. We pushed out to where 4th platoon was on the line and apron on the north edge of HKIA, oriented south. We went out there with them and held our portion of the perimeter. It was really a supplemental position because 1/8 pushed forward to the southern side of the airfield. We were still taking tasking from them at that time, and that's where they had us take security.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(6) What about the rest of your company?

(2) Answer (b)(6) 1st and 3rd got delayed in (b)(1)1.4. They got in the night of the 17th. When I got back to the gym around 0200-0300 on the 18th they were there.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(6) You just held that position all day?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yea, we stayed there all night. In the morning we pushed across the airfield and linked up with 1/8. Fox Company minus showed up as well at that time. We set up the perimeter on the southern side of the airfield.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(6) When do you push to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We did that southern perimeter for maybe 36 hours, that's when Golf showed up. We had an internal rest cycle, basically a company defense. We pulled out on the 19th, Golf was already in the gym. They were pushing out to Abbey Gate about mid-morning. We had some time to rest and refit, then that night we pushed to a holding area on the eastern side to work one of the comfort areas with the MEU.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(6) The comfort area was an intermediate area after the gate and before the terminal?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yea, we just pulled security there as busloads came in and out. After we left that area on the morning of the 20th we went back to the berthing area. A group of us including the commander, company guns, some of the platoon commanders, and myself did a recon at Abbey Gate. Then we got tasked with ECC security at the PAX terminal. We had 2 platoons on that from the evening of the 20th. On the evening of the 21st we went with 2 platoons to Abbey Gate. While there we conducted a relief in place (RIP) out with Golf and Fox. We were RIP complete early on the 22nd with 2 Platoons of Echo, the 81s, and the Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoon. CAAT was at the inner gate. They were pulling security, on the gun trucks and

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turrets there. We worked a rotation with one of our platoons with them. We had one of our platoons and the 81 platoon working the holding areas between the inner and outer gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(6) How many people do you estimate between the inner and outer gate on the 22nd?

(2) Answer (b)(6) There were 300-400 people, in multiple holding areas. When we got there, Golf had been stretched really thin. We were confused as to why they had the set up they did, why they had the holding areas set up if State wasn't there to process people. Our first order of business was getting State out there, then processing everyone from outer gate to inner gate to clear that area. The Marines are responsible for the evacuees in between the two gates, for getting them food and water which was limited. They were also a manpower drain since we had to pull security on them. We got State there to clear that area, we had to call battalion and pester them until State arrived. Once we cleared that inner area, we brought State up to the outer gate. We had our small holding area right outside of outer gate and we tried to keep that manageable since we had to take care of them. The search area was right inside the outer gate, and the State processing area was right behind that. They would flow from the holding area, to the search area, to State for processing. One platoon had the search area and the escort group for red and green groups. One platoon was security on the fence along the canal going up to the chevron and then pushed down past the bridge along the canal on the nearside. We would push the rejects out and send them along the canal down to the bridge.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(6) So when you got there on the 22nd, people are in the canal and people are pressed up against the jersey barrier by the sniper tower?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes and the canal had people in it, but it was not full. That came later when the word came out that it was a route in and our NATO partners had not started to fully utilize that yet. There were some people on the far side of the canal, I couldn't tell you confidently how congested it was.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(6) How long does it take you to clear between the inner and the outer gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) State showed up eventually with a small team and processed people, in the afternoon of the 22nd maybe the holding areas were clear. We pressed down to the outer gate. They left and didn't come back until POD 22-23 and joined us back out at the outer gate.

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p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(6) When do you start creating space and pushing the crowd back between the canal and the concrete wall?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I think that was around the same time, throughout the day and night of the 22nd. That was in tandem with the British as well. The folks were around the jersey barrier, but not pressed up the way they would eventually be. We were able to work them back gradually so that by the 23rd through the 25th we were at our peak and had Marines spread out along the length of the canal.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you ever get your entire company to the gate, since you had 2 platoons at the ECC?

(2) Answer (b)(6) They were still working there until the evening of the 22nd. When they got to the gate they were tapped. They did some internal rest at the terminal, but they had done a lot of work to get the ECC organized. When they arrived the plan was to rotate them and the CAAT at the inner gate to get some rest. 4th, 1st, and the 81s kept working along the canal. 1 platoon was on line, 1 platoon was on QRF, 1 platoon was on react which doubled as a rest cycle. Those were 8 hour rotations. The inner gate was also on 8 hour rotations, but because of how much manpower was actually needed at the inner gate we rotated the inner gate platoons back for 16 hours of rest. The other CAAT platoon was working as the QRF at the inner gate.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(6) Was it safe to say that Echo had more manpower than Golf and Fox?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Our 4 platoons plus the 81s were the same size as Golf's three and Fox's two together.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(6) The 22nd you clear the holding area, you get dispersion along the canal wall, you establish a rest plan as the other 2 platoons come off the ECC, and you start to get in a rhythm. From the 22nd to the 25th what are the atmospherics of the crowd and what crowd control measures are you employing?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The crowds ebbed and flowed. During the night time hours they tended to relax a little bit, it was time to get some rest. That's also when all the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d units would leave and not cause disruptions. They would show up a bit after first light which would excite people. I had to talk to foreign reps a few times to establish

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some guidelines to get their help clearing their areas since they would just drop the folks the pulled right behind my Marines pulling security on the canal. They would leave them to go grab more and not communicate to us what they were doing with them. We told them, they must have a rep with them or we would push them out. We had to do that a few times. We talked to foreign nations, they were reasonable, and they understood they couldn't leave groups sitting there unattended. NATO countries each created their own little holding areas, they kept security and processed there, and got them out by their own means. Eventually they became efficient enough that it became less of a disruption, but things would always pick up in the morning. Desperation levels definitely played into it as we found out about timelines. The chevron gates would close a lot, and people would ask if we were leaving or if the gates were closed for good. You could tell the crowds felt the urgency to get picked up. The canal grew more crowded and by the 24th and 25th we had a good feeling of how to extend our lines so that the crowds were less built up and more spread out. There was some clustering near the Barron Hotel where the British hopefuls would go. When we spread, the crowds also spread out and were easier to manage.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(6) What crowd control measures did you use? Were you firing warning shots?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We weren't using any less than lethals on them. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a We were using flashbangs when the crowd would get unruly or too condensed. There was a big HESCO barrier north of the sniper toward the chevron that had some 240s on it. They would lob a flashbang occasionally, but it was infrequent. Most flashbangs happened after the blast to get everyone out of there. At night, if people were getting clustered, past the end of the bridge and difficult to push out, the snipers would shine their white lights on them to get them to back off.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(6) What's the situation like when you leave on the night of the 25th?

(2) Answer (b)(6) It was pretty stable, especially because it was night time hours. We felt like we could have continued to be there and have it under control for a while. We had fatigue to a manageable level from our rest plan. State was coming more frequently. When they weren't too busy in the processing area, they would come out to the canal and help our guys with uncommon paper work to check it right away. The holding area ebbed and flowed. Sometimes the chevron would have a random release and it would swell, but we tried to keep it pretty small. There would be little pockets of stragglers throughout the day that we would have to check. A lot of times it would be other countries' personnel. We would try to consolidate them in a little international pocket by the chevron, and we would get the NATO partners to take another look at

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them or clear them out. We had a couple representatives from the security platoon working with the British at the chevron to screen for anyone who met the American guidelines.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What are you hearing in terms of threat reporting over this span?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] After we left the gate, we started to hear the suicide vest threat reporting. It flowed from the Brits, to Golf, to Battalion, to the rest of us. It became more definitive on the morning of the 26th. I'd have to see who pushed the initial warning, but it was imminent on the morning of the 26th. Prior to that it was standard, nothing we'd alter our force posture over.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Is it fair to say you had no threat reporting that would concern you about stretching your forces so far along the canal? How far is that?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] That's fair to say. I'd say it's a little over 100 meters. Our thought was that we had dispersion, and that we were exposed the whole time we were there. We felt the only thing that could help us is dispersion.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You RIP out on the 25th, you go back to the building area, then what?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] The plan was rest for about 24 hours, then go back and turn it over to the 82nd. The following morning on the 26th, we started hearing about the threat and the situation changed. We were told that we needed to go down sooner to shut the gate sooner than planned. Our first wave of forces got there around noon, I think I got there around 1300 with our trailing guys. The threat reporting was really spinning up at this point.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Where were you located at this time?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] Between the inner and outer gate. We were prepping to shut the gate. We were handling the search area, our engineers were seeing what types of blocking or disrupting obstacles they could emplace to assist the 82nd if they needed to collapse and fall back.

z. Question and Answer 25.

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(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you go out of the gate after that? What was the situation like when you got there?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I flowed up to the chevron and spoke to the PSYOP, OPSO, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to try and figure out what happened. The crowd was very different, they were pressed up against the jersey barrier. I spoke with the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they said it got crazy overnight. They mentioned that they collapsed down along the canal in conjunction with the threat reporting and the surge of people. From what I gather, they collapsed shortly after we left, I don't know if it was preemptive or not.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Is the crowd more aggressive or desperate?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] At the barrier, yes. I saw a guy slipping through a spot where the fence broke open next to the barrier. One of the PCs and I saw it and decided to put more concertina wire there, but that's one of the only actions I took outside of the outer gate.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You're there for about 4 and a half hours before the blast, what are you seeing, are you inside or outside?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I was walking from outside the outer gate to the search area until about 1700. When the PSYOPs vehicle showed up I pulled back, it was loud. I was inside the outer gate from 1700 onwards. The Battalion Commander and OPSO were out by the PSYOPs vehicle. I don't know exactly where the Sergeant Major was. All of [REDACTED] (b)(6) were inside the outer gate, with the exception of the company Gunnery Sergeant and SSgt Hoover. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was giving guys out on the line some guidance and mentoring. SSgt Hoover was trying to find a former linguist of his in the crowd. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in front of the tower maybe with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to help with some of the minor injuries from the crowd.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was SSgt Hoover on the friendly or the canal side of the fence?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I believe he was on the canal side of the fence.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What time are you tracking for the bomb? Where are you, what do you see, hear, and do?

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(2) Answer (b)(6) At about 1740. I was with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I was looking through the gate towards the chevron at the time. The bomb went off, I saw the smoke from the blast as white or clear smoke came across, as well as some body parts. It was in slow motion. I was a bit dazed from it, I felt the concussion from the blast, like I had my bell rung a little bit. I was diagnosed with TBI from that. Then I start hearing the bodies come back down. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was right next to me, I heard him swear and that brought me back. My first thought was a secondary device. I started yelling for everyone to get back behind the jersey barriers on the western side of the road to orient to the east. We started to hear some small arms fire and it gets foggy for me there. Everyone gets back and takes cover. I scan the area, and I wait for what I thought was coming next. I look south and the wounded are starting to come through the gate. People are screaming for aid and litter. I think we should wait, and once a minute or two go by we send our guys. The aid and litter teams started pushing out. Some civilians were just starting to come through. I was worried, they weren't being searched so I grabbed 3rd platoon and told them to pull security to keep the civilians out. We were looking for bags and worried about another blast. We stopped one guy and he dropped his bag, some brave bastard grabbed it and threw it over the wall. A few made it through and they got detained and searched. The hole in the fence was too far down and I heard someone calling for bolt cutters, I ran and grabbed the engineers to cut a closer hole in the fence to get to the casualties. I followed them, and a casualty got pulled through near there. It was Sgt Rosario, and I pulled her the rest of the way in. She was unresponsive by this point. I and a couple of other Marines brought her to the CCP to the left of the gate when you come in and I handed her to one of the docs there.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you see her wounds at this point?

(2) Answer (b)(6) No, her kit had already been stripped off and someone had done the blood sweep. I didn't see any visual wounds on her front side. I suspect it was the blast and not the frag that got her, she was one of the Female Engagement Team Marines (FET) Marines with the MEU. After I brought her in, I turned back to the barriers. Guys were behind cover, but very clustered. I told the guys to push along the jersey barriers and spread out. I remember doing that a few times. When I turned back around I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) one of the 81s Marines, carrying a small child. I went out to meet him and grabbed the child from him and handed the child off to the CCP. The child was unconscious and covered in blood. After that I turned around and saw that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was still in the fight. He pointed to one of the vehicles and I handed him off to the docs there. Then I head back to the gate to assess the situation, the security posture, and see if there was anyone else to bring in. At some point I task 3rd again with readjusting their posture and getting up on the concrete slabs near them to set security on the gate so we could start closing the gate when we had to. From there, I found Gunny, the Commander, and Platoon Commanders, and started to get accountability.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

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(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you see SSgt Hoover or [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after the blast?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I remember looking over at one point and seeing [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on a stretcher going the opposite way as me. I might have seen SSgt Hoover, but I don't know, you couldn't tell who all of the casualties were due to the injuries that they sustained.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED] It takes about 20 minutes to gather and clear everyone out of there. Where are you when the last casualty is out and the gate gets closed?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I'm back by that search area, with the Platoon staff and trying to plan what the next actions were and how we were going to get out of there. We didn't know if the 82nd was still going to come. Radio chatter indicated to fall all the way back to inner gate, so we echeloned and did a peel back. Golf had fallen back, some of Fox and Recon from the MEU were still there. This was around sunset, right around when we start pulling back to inner gate. 3rd continued to work closeout around the outer gate and we peeled back. Golf was out, then we got Fox out, then we peeled our guys back to our new QRF area where 4th platoon was. That area was just inside of the inner gate by the apron, near the foot gate and connex boxes there. That's where the company assembly area ended up being. [REDACTED] (b)(6) got there from the berthing and took over the accountability process, then he, the Commander, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to the Role 2 to check out the casualties there. Gunny may have gone with them as well. I stayed with the personnel and did the gear accountability process.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What did you do when you pulled back on the 26th? Did the 82nd relieve you?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We started getting word of the 13 fighters that may already be inside HKIA. We made a little 360 security perimeter and had the guys disperse and take cover. We hunkered down there and kept a look out. It was mostly CAAT at the inner gate, they were relieved very late by the 82nd. We kept asking if we needed to relieve them instead, since we didn't have a purpose. Early that morning on the 27th we heard that the RIP was complete, and we headed back to the berthing area.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What happened when you went back to the gym?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We got our gear together and had the ramp ceremony at 1200.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

We started

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getting everything packed. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) We finished that day. We thought we would fly out on the 28th, but we flew out early morning on the 29th after staying out at the apron the night prior.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you have to police call the passenger terminal? How did that come about?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes. While we were waiting for our flight, Gunny came back from talking with the Battalion Commander. We found out we were tasked to clear the area near the flag pole and the area around it. We were unhappy about it, and we didn't get a lot of reason for doing it. From what it sounded like the Battalion Commander didn't have one at that time either. Afterwards we went back to waiting for our flight, and then we were told to police call more, so we swept through for more trash and clothes. We didn't bring the whole company, we left some guys on security by our gear. Everyone was pretty pissed off about police calling. We ended up leaving on the morning of the 29th, around 0100 maybe.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(6) Anything else you want to add? Did you hear small arms after the blast? Did you see anyone return fire?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I heard them, but it was hard for me to distinguish. We had been hearing gunshots all week. I didn't hear any snaps overhead, but I can remember hearing a couple of blasts, a few short bursts, maybe from the northeast across the canal. I didn't see anyone return fire. After that I continued to hear just random warning shots from the area.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(6) What kind of pressure were you under to get as many people through the gate as possible?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We were definitely getting some chatter from battalion about why we weren't processing people. Anytime State left, we would start getting asked why we weren't getting people through. We told them why. At the time we got some guidance to let through the "for sures" (passport and green card holders) on our own, but those were very rare. We pushed through some on our own, but we knew we were screwing our own guys who were working the ECC if we let the wrong guys through. When we were initially there on the 21st, out of the whole group we cleared from the holding area about 70% were rejected.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

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(1) Question (b)(6) What impact do you think that had on the Marines, having to do that?

(2) Answer (b)(6) It certainly wasn't what we are taught to be as Marines. Having people beg you to kill them instead of pushing them out of Abbey Gate makes you question what you are doing.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(6) Have you talked to the Marines about that?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I spoke to them about it. They understood that it was their orders, but the frustrating part was the guidance constantly changing and shrinking down who could be let in. It definitely threw in doubts about whether you're doing the job correctly, and if you're still clean on your side. There were nuances of documents that we didn't even know about, and we didn't feel prepared to deal with that. In the perfect situations we rehearsed, we didn't deal with paperwork. It ended up being that we were both security and decision makers. The pressure to get that many people through forced us to turn into the processors because we didn't have enough State Department folks. We were also trying to avoid the buildups in the holding area that would cause heat cases.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(6) Contact information?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

07 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 07 October 2021

1. On 07 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the Golf Company Platoon Sergeants often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What was your perspective on pre-deployment training? Was there anything outside the normal rhythm that you conducted that you feel prepared you for what you did at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Two significant things that come to mind, the ten day [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d training and the preplanned package with a lot of gaps in time to have more white space training with the platoons. I had a couple Marines in the platoon that wanted to train the team more on Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations and searching operations. I think this helped a lot and carried over to HKIA. This definitely helped build the morale and cohesion. It really helped make the connection to get us in the mindset that we do more than stand at a post.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(3) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – At the beginning of the deployment, in February, my team got cut to a 25 Marine platoon to support joint operations. I was in (b)(1)1.4d During that time it was identified that the most likely task we would get is quick reaction force (QRF) and medical evacuation (MEDVAC). We were heavily focused on this so we got Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) certified and had an established Valkyrie program, which is a blood transfusion program ran by the Navy. It's considered a walking blood bank. We operated with a 16 man Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) platoon. It was indoctrinated down to the Corporal level. It was unusual for the junior Marines to go do a task like that so that greatly helped our ability. We were doing things that were considered non-doctrinal actions that ultimately helped.

(4) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Our package was set differently. We focused more on sand table exercises and Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) at (b)(1)1.4d We used our past experiences from COIN operations to help develop the team. We had our guys think critically and think through problems. The squad package was great to fine tune operations at the end.

(5) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We talked along the same training points. When we got to the squad package, we did a lot of reporting at the squad level. We enforced it a lot at the team level. Our job was to provide security for the flights. It also helped to be detached from the company because it allowed us to develop our team internally.

(6) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We did a lot of tactical field care. This played a lot in to the mass casualty (MASCAL) situation

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 17 August, we all came together.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What happened between 17 - 25 August? What were the key points? What were the challenges?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Desperation of the locals made the job the more difficult. Other than that it was also very uncomfortable for guys, especially those that have done prior deployments, to work with the Taliban. It was so unexpected. When we got there the company leaned heavily on us to help. We may have inadvertently affected the team prior to going. The logistics aspect was the most difficult because it was hard to get food or water for my Marines. I think that we were the only ones with prior Afghanistan experience so it was expected of us to make decisions due to us having been there before.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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The biggest issue at HKIA was the other countries that worked with us. They were understandably trying to get their own people out. However, they would screw us over because of how they conducted operations. We had argued with them a few times because of how they were doing operations. I was talking to someone from (b)(1)1.4d about when you pull someone out it would cause 20 more people to rush the gate. This was the most difficult thing to work with besides the human factors.

The outside factors were the agencies, which were very hard to work with. It would have been smoother if we knew how people were getting pulled out and what credentials were needed. This was really hard for the Marines manning the Evacuation Control Center (ECC). In regards to controlling the crowds, other Marine units were doing different things than what we were doing. The end state was the same but they were doing things differently (using flash bangs and firing warning shots).

(3) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The most difficult thing we ran into, besides the logistical nightmare, was the documentation. The Department of State (DoS) would change the requirements of people getting in. It would change multiple times throughout the day. Just having a DoS processor there would help alleviate it, but they would leave randomly every day. This would cause us to have to leave the families outside. That was really annoying. We also had to send the Headquarters element back to scavenge water and food. It was actually sitting on the airfield for a few days, which was terrible. Transporting the people back and forth would cause a big delay. I had also gotten into physical altercations with other countries over how they were handling business.

(4) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The biggest thing for me, while I was at the inner gate, was the DoS. They would show up whenever they wanted to and leave when they wanted to. They wouldn't give any authority up to us to help when they were gone. They would just stop. Interactions with them were terrible. The requirement for documentation wasn't always clear. The documentation could have been embassy staff worker badges or Special Interest Visa (SIV) applications. This would have been required for the person and their immediate family to be let in. The requirements would change a few times throughout the day.

It seemed, more or less, that we would beg borrow or steal transportation from Abbey Gate to get to the passenger terminal. It was for a lack of better terms, due to a lack of planning. It was just Marines getting things done. I don't think anyone anticipated the amount of injured Afghans, not by us, but in general. The biggest thing about that for me was the pregnant lady who gave birth while in flight to Germany. We didn't anticipate the medical needs and logistical needs that the Afghans would require. We didn't have diapers and baby formula. Locals would have to bring it in for us. None of this was thought about when we showed up. It was up to us to figure it out. It goes back to DoS integration. If they would have asked for help sooner it would have been easier. We could have come more prepared.

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(5) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There was one guy with us from the DoS that tried to help push Afghans back and it didn't go well. He then wouldn't come within 50 meters of the gate. Even when we pushed the people back the second day he wouldn't go near the outer gate. I believe his name was (b)(6). Bottom line is these guys wouldn't interact at the Afghans unless they were away from the line.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What were the general atmospherics at Abbey Gate? Did you feel any pressure to get people out, either from higher or personally?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We did two separate visits, the first one was more emotional because we didn't expect or prepare mentally for what we saw. People were throwing their kids over the concrete walls hoping for the best. We had to establish an orphanage. We would take the children to a corpsman who would take care of them and move them to the orphanage.

The most desperate moment I saw was when we just opened the outer gate. It was me, a few British soldiers, and paratroopers from the 82nd in civilian clothes. (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d Only thing I can compare it to was a zombie movie. The pushing was so intense that there were NCOs that didn't want to do that again. Marines would get pulled into the crowd by themselves, people would reach through the crowd and grab Marines' weapons. We were condition three (magazine inserted, no round in chamber, bolt forward, weapon on safe) so it was fairly safe. I saw people try to grab a Marine's weapon and shoot it into the crowd.

There were large concrete barriers near the right side of the outer gate where locals were throwing their kids over the gate. This is when reality set in for me. We had a bunch of people pretend to be sick, pass out, become heat sick, whatever means they had to get seen and moved forward. We would use the chest rub to get to wake them up. They would just pop back up and start moving again. There was a man using his kid as a shield. There was one time I jumped into the crowd to save a man that was being crushed. This all showed me the desperation. The locals didn't show any care for anyone but themselves. They didn't care about women or children.

(3) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Between the outer gate and inner gate people thought that they were just starting from scratch again due to the process being so slow. People would be so fed up with standing around waiting on the process that they would ask to leave. It was exponentially more so with the women because of the harassment from the Taliban. It was a few days before I could get them in the inner gate to talk to DoS. When you would find people with bad credentials it was hard to calm them down

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enough to talk to them about how they would exit. I would tell them that the Turkish would come get them so that it wouldn't make the crowd crazy.

(4) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – When I was on canal duty I got about 250 people out.

(5) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The younger people would take the family passports/green cards and push their way up to the front. We had to explain to them that we could only take them. If their family wasn't present, we couldn't go get them. Right after the chevron there were two Taliban in trucks. If you were a military age male, they would take you into a building and you wouldn't come out. If you were a woman and prior police/educational/department worker they would beat them up.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Question. Could you talk me through the 26th? Were there any increased threat streams?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – On the night of the 25th rolling into the 26th about 0200, we saw three individuals that were very suspicious. We knew that there was an IED threat at the time so we had taken a different security posture where we would take a knee, trying to not expose ourselves. There were three males right where the blast had taken place. A team leader pointed out that they were making the situation feel weird. I walked over to the three guys and asked them for their passports. Typically someone would get really excited, but the three males didn't seem interested. This happened roughly around 0230 on 26 August. We were relieved at 0300 by another section and I told the next crew about them. When I returned they were gone. There was a woman with them that would point at various spots. One man would visibly check those spots. They wouldn't acknowledge anyone that talked to them. When the blast went off it was my platoon manning the ECP. We were all next to the jersey barrier (next to the sniper tower).

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Was the crowd noticeably more desperate on the 26th? Was there anything out of baseline?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Psychological operations members told us that they were only taking certain passports/green cards that day. This happened about an hour before we got out there at 1500.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Where were you when the blast went off? What did you see?

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(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I had one squad against the jersey barrier because of the rush of people. I had another next to the canal and a squad in reserve behind them escorting people through the exit or approved people to the American line. We were trying to consolidate our forces. I was along the wall trying to utilize COIN techniques because there was certain type of paperwork we needed. At times there was just too many people. [REDACTED] (b)(6) would take turns managing this. I took off my helmet to let the people know I was in charge at the time and tried to relate to the people. This was when the blast went off. I was about 15 meters from the blast. I was dazed like someone threw a flashbang. I was a little upset with my platoon because I thought they were throwing flash bangs when there was a strict control on riot control agents. I scanned the area, but didn't see anyone shooting. I didn't hear anyone shooting, but I couldn't hear anything because of the blast.

(3) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I had walked out to the outer gate and moved a Marine in front of the sniper tower. When the blast went off I ran to the psychological operations truck and found SSG Knauss. I rendered aid with two chest seals and did a needle decompression right at the blast area. I had two Marines take him to the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). After that I kept looking around the area and saw that Marines had to go around the fence to get people, so I cut multiple holes in the fence to get people out faster. The majority of my platoon ran in to help extract the rest of the team. We bounded back to get accountability. We grabbed all the gear and ran to the inner gate. Once it was clear we got on the blue van to go back to the staging area. The next day we did the ramp ceremony. Sometime after that we occupied the passenger terminal.

(4) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We were staged behind the outer gate. I had two corpsmen assisting in the processing area. At the time I was near a white parked car. I was replaced by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) platoon. As soon as the blast went off we had a few guys run up to the outer gate and go into the blast area. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were the first guys through. I ran in and saw them run in as well, but we got knocked back out by the CS gas. I grabbed it and threw it in the canal. I remember the team getting back and asking what the priority of getting people out was. I loaded a few Marines on to a stretcher and got them out. We were doing this by priority. We got Corporal Sanchez and Lopez out. I saw the team cutting holes in the fence and we started loading Marines on to riot shields as we started to run out of stretchers. It was about 30 meters to get them through the gate.

We collected all the weapons and body armor and brought it back to the staging area, put it in the truck and got it sent off. The rest of my platoon started to establish security behind the outer gate. There were reports of a shooter in the area, but I don't remember hearing or knowing about any pop shots in the area. We started loading the Marines back out the inner gate and staged on the air strip to get sent out. The following day we were sent to watch the terminal for a while and then attend the fallen hero

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ceremony. I was told that there was a random local that stole a bus so we had to up our security posture. None of my guys were wounded.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. What did the evacuation procedure look like?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) My first instinct was to find cover and get my helmet. Once I got it on I saw my Marine's neck bleeding. I took him to the CCP. The secondary CCP was at the sniper tower and the primary was farther back. I went back to grab another Marine that had collapsed. This was when we found out that the IED had ball bearings. They had punctured the CS gas on our vests. I was trying to find people to pull security, but also to get people to help with wounded. I was trying to get the Marine to urgent surgical down to the CCP, but found out he was already dead. Once we got everyone out of the area I found one of the squad leaders to consolidate the platoon down at our gear while I did another sweep of the area. I was trying to get a good grasp on who I should have, but there wasn't a clear answer. I had to hope for the best due to the situation. I did a recheck for injuries. I sent one Marine with shrapnel to his stomach and a squad leader that got hit in the head with a ball bearing to medical. My platoon commander was hit in his arm, but by this point he was already MEDEVAC'd. We got a count of who we had left and confirmed with the team. We had 18 left. We re-tasked the squad leaders with security due to the alarms going off. We had heard at this time that bad guys may be in the area. When we got back to HKIA proper we saw people without kits walking around so we lowered the threat posture. That night I validated all the KIA and visited the guys in the hospital. I lost nine (8 Marine and one Navy enlisted) in my platoon. 1 Navy enlisted, 17 enlisted Marines, and 1 Marine Officer were wounded, but only 14 were sent back to Walter Reed Medical Center.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. How much time do you think it took to evacuate? Where were the corpsmen location?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) About 30 minutes, I think it went very well. It was all due to QRF being on site quickly, our senior corpsman was stationed at the CCP. All corpsmen were at the CCP. We had planned that the Plt Sgt and Plt Cdr were not to be on the line at the same time. The hero ceremony was at about noon the following day.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Anybody we should talk to that would have good input?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was directly in control of the CCPs. At one point even the shock trauma platoon. I have a corpsman [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that was

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wounded. He was mobile, and when we were at the hospital he was helping the wounded.

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



ACTS-SCK-DO

7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Regiment, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answer collaboratively. It is annotated accordingly when answers are given individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: When did you arrive to 2/1?

(2) Answer:

[redacted] (b)(6) July 2020

[redacted] (b)(6) October 2020

[redacted] (b)(6) April 2020

[redacted] (b)(6) March 2021

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Were you all present for the pre-deployment training conducted by Golf Company (G Co)?

(2) Answer: Yes

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d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Beyond the established pre-deployment training, what training did you do with your platoons?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We reinforced the pre-deployment training.

(b)(6) We had the opportunity to conduct rehearsals on vehicle control point (VCP) and entry control point (ECP) operations in preparation for possibly going to the (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(6) We reinforced the pre-deployment training.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Did you all arrive to HKIA/Abbey Gate on 19 August?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) 2nd platoon was re-directed by BGen Sullivan to provide escort security for the C-130s flying to and from (b)(1)1.4a. We stayed on the tarmac the entire time we were at HKIA. We were only on HKIA for hours at a time.

(b)(6) I arrived the morning of 20 August.

(b)(6) Most of G Co arrived at 0100 on 19 August to Kabul. By 0800, the leader's recon departed for HKIA. By 1200 G Co consolidated at Abbey Gate. 3rd platoon secured the inner gate. I understand that 1st platoon secured the outer gate. CAAT Red was there when we arrived, as well as Fox Company (F Co) and the British Military (Brits) all supplying security.

(b)(6) 4th platoon showed up last. Abbey Gate was closed when we arrived.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Talk us through the first day you were there.

(2) Answer:

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) The first day was so hectic. Around 1200, 3rd platoon began processing paperwork at the inner gate. We observed riots past the outer gate and CS gas in the area. Most of the day was spent processing paperwork. I was trying to link up with (b)(6) to figure out the next steps.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Was the Department of State (DoS) present for screening paperwork?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) No DoS people were present, we were just working with CAAT Red. The paperwork needed at the time was the easiest it ever was. We were accepting authentic documents, SIVs, AMCITs, Green Card Holders, Embassy worker's families, anyone that we could tell clearly worked with Americans. We even accepted letters saying they worked with the US in the past.

We would screen them, our platoon would search them, and then we escorted them to get on the bus.

(b)(6) I was working COC operations at the time.

(b)(6) From when 4th platoon arrived, we took over the holding area with about 300 personnel present. We held security of that. The inner gate wasn't taking anyone so they were still waiting there. It was about midnight when we cleared people back to the Barron Hotel. I think this was to allow the Brits to be able to drive through and prepare for establishing the chevron. It helped create a buffer for us.

(b)(6) By 20 August, there was no change to our operations. We were still on security of the inner gate.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Can you talk through the clearing of personnel in preparation for building the chevron?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We were about 50 m west of Abbey Gate. We were about five Marines deep and an interpreter with us on the wall talking to the crowds for us. We were having to push the crowd lightly and the interpreter guided them back. It wasn't a tense situation. It stayed under control. It took about six hours to clear them back. The Brits kept

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[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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wanting us to clear people further back. Once we got to the Barron Hotel, there were some weird situations with the Taliban. The Taliban weren't tracking that we were pushing back that far. They eventually helped us clear vehicles from the road as well. The next morning, they starting bringing in the containers from the East and West of HKIA to start building the chevron. It took about two to three hours to get the containers in place.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: How was the chevron set up?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) The Taliban didn't communicate how they wanted the chevron set up to us. My team was helping establish the chevron. It wasn't clear who was in charge of the chevron. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d in or what they were doing. Eventually, we pulled our presence back and the Brits mostly ran the vetting of paperwork. There were huge crowds waiting around the chevron waiting to be processed. Initially, there were hundreds or thousands of people there getting injured/crushed. The Brits pushed out a line past the chevron to get rid of the bottle neck. This helped a little bit in the crowd. These operations occurred from about 0600 to late afternoon on 20 August.

(b)(6) At 0800, the DoS arrived and we resumed vetting paperwork. There were two DoS agents and two personal security detail (PSD) people. The DoS kept changing the required documents needed to get through the gate almost hourly. They'll say they are only taking blue passports and green cards, then change it to Special Interest Visas (SIVs) and embassy worker families, This happened all morning. They left around midday without telling anyone. We realized around 1500 that the crowd between the inner and outer gate had swelled to a few thousand because the DoS didn't notify us that they were stopping processing and we were still letting people in.

(b)(6) We would ask them to close the gate every once and a while to limit the crowding. But the crowd would stay calmer when they saw people flowing in.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What is general atmosphere at this point?

(2) Answer:

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[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) Around 1200, we transitioned to crowd control operations. We were replaced at the inner gate and were now responsible for controlling the flow of traffic between the inner and outer gate. There were three distinct riots that occurred between 1500 and 1800 when people would try to push past the Marines. We let the first riot settle itself. For the second riot, we used flash bangs to stop it. One flash bang was thrown improperly and killed an Afghan. For the third riot, Psy Op brought out a speaker and an interpreter was talking on it to calm the crowd down. Around 2000, 4th platoon left us.

(b)(6) I arrived to HKIA on the morning of 20 August while the chevron was being established. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d As groups came in, the Brits would pull people into the Barron Hotel to do their screening. There was no American presence in the Barron to screen, so (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did it for a while and then had me replace him. We would screen in the Barron Hotel and then the personnel would get sent out between the inner and outer gate area to be screened by DoS. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) intent was to screen everyone to ensure it would be easier once the DoS showed up to process people. On the night of 20-21 August, we screened everyone in between the gates to help weed out people that had slipped in. About ¾ of the way through screening, we were told that Afghan passport holders could now remain in the gates.

(b)(6) 2100 to 0400 on 21 August was a rest cycle for us. And then we were vetting people for documents. If they didn't have them, we would escort them out. This helped lower the amount of people in the crowd.

(b)(6) We had a rest cycle as well. It was all coordinated internally.

(b)(6) No DoS personnel were present. Sun up to sun down, we were improving security positions along the perimeter, providing aid, food, and water to Afghans.

(b)(6) We did the same as 3rd platoon.

(b)(6) Flights were frozen from 18-20 August. They started back up at 1600 on 21 August for the C-130s. We would typically fly out from HKIA at 1400 or 1600 and land at 0000. We would be wheels up again by 0300. We were usually transporting evacuees, but sometimes transported Marines and equipment. This was our daily flow until about the 28 August.

(b)(6) There were too many people in the PAX terminal at this time.

k. Question and Answer 10.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(1) Question: What happened after this, from 22 August and beyond?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) During a period of darkness on 22 August, E Co sent a group to relieve us. We were on a rest cycle from 0100 to 0600. At 0700, we sent a squad to the outer gate to help control a riot. At 0800, the DoS arrives with about three agents and three of their PSD. From 0800 to 1200, the 82nd was handing off wall jumpers to us. We helped escort them past outer gate to the chevron. At 2030, E Co arrives to relieve G Co. At 2130, G Co arrived to the gym for a rest cycle.

(b)(6) 22 August was the first day that we had adequate DoS and bus support. They screened several hundred people and we cleared most of the crowd between the gates.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: During this period, has the canal began to fill up?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) There were civilians on the other side of the chain link fence, but I didn't know the canal was even there.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: When do you come back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We come back to Abbey Gate on 25 August. We did a leaders recon before occupying because we were tasked to control the canal. I had not seen the canal yet so I went with the XO, the CO, and two Sgts. At 1345, the first BOLO for IED threat was pushed out to us. The description was: fresh-trimmed hair and beard, IED in in laptop case with yellow arrows. At 1530, 3rd Platoon was notified to depart gym. At 1630, 3rd Platoon arrives at Abbey Gate.

In the evening, 1st Platoon, G Co was along the canal. 4th Platoon was along the south side. We showed up and cleared out the civilians along the walkway. Then for about an hour and a half, 3rd platoon retrograded back to the sniper tower. We collapsed down because of the threat and how isolated we were in our location.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) By 1900, we were in line with the sniper tower.

(b)(6) We received another threat in the evening from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's why we collapsed down

(b)(6) During a period of darkness from 25-26 August the platoons kept their rotation and watching civilians.

(b)(6) 1st Platoon went back to gym to rest, we were on QRF. 1st Platoon came back to Abbey Gate around 0200 on 26 August.

(b)(6) We left at 0900 on 26 August for the gym for a rest cycle. At 1600 on 26 August, we returned to Abbey Gate

(b)(6) We rested from 0200 to 1000 on 26 August and then returned to Abbey Gate. We were told that no more people were coming in and that the gate would be shut down at 2000 on the night of 26 August. People were very desperate at this point.

(b)(6) Starting 25 August, the atmosphere definitely became more violent and hectic. The crowd wouldn't listen to the interpreters anymore. They wouldn't listen to flash-bangs. We weren't using mace, but we had to be violent to control the civilians because they were pushing in to us.

(b)(6) The civilians in the canal weren't threatening, but the ones near us by the barriers were violent. The people touching the barriers couldn't move because of the number of people pushing against them and they were being crushed and injured. We couldn't even pull them up to help them. We would grab women and children and muscle through the crowd to help them. Everyone was very desperate at this point. It was like this throughout the day of 26 August.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Since they couldn't get through Taliban areas anymore, were more people coming through Abbey Gate now?

(2) Answer: Yes

(b)(6) We had Taliban helping pull security before but we didn't now.

(b)(6) It was so packed that people could crawl on the crowd and would launch themselves over the barrier. We had to remove them. Our guys were emotionally and physically smoked at this point. They were angry and frustrated. We were maybe more

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callous than we needed to be [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I decided to start rotating the guys off for a break to mitigate this. 1st Platoon arrived to rotate with us around 1630 to 1645.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We arrived at Abbey Gate around 1700 and were going to rotate in at 1800. At approximately 1736 the IED went off. We were positioned by the sniper tower, inside the outer gate. 4th Platoon was right next to us. I saw one Marine running, holding his injured hand. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) running. My PSG was with me. I check him and he was fine. They asked for QRF. I grabbed one of my squads, ran through outer gate, and paused by the T-barrier. I observed the Taliban to not be a threat at this time. My squad leader and I moved in to establish a position.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Was there gunfire after the blast?

(2) Answer:

[REDACTED] (b)(6) No one in 3rd platoon fired their weapon or heard shots. We ran in and were supposed to set security. My Marines and I first saw the US casualties and it took us about 20 seconds to snap out of it. We started grabbing our guys and setting up along the wall. We were getting the civilians out of the way. There were so many elements in the area, to include E Co and F Co, helping us pull security on the line. The rest of the Marines were pulling out and treating casualties.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) Brits were firing warning shots.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I heard a lot of shots

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I couldn't see anything, but I could hear shots, unsuppressed.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I initially told my platoon to hang on because I heard a lot of unsuppressed gunfire coming from the Brits. I thought it was the Taliban, initially, so I ran up to see what was going on past the outer gate.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We set up and scanned the area. That's how we saw that the Brits were shooting.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Are you aware of any 82nd sniper position? Did you observe any firing from them?

(2) Answer: We wouldn't have been able to see any.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Do you recall a water tower? Did any threats come from this area?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) Yes. My guys were all under cover behind the T-wall interior. One of my team leaders swears that there was an individual with an AK-47 in a two-story building near the water tower, sighting in. My team engaged this guy. 1/8 was shooting back as well. They said that they neutralized the threat after 5 or six rounds.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Do you have anything clarifying to add?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We had a CCP staged between the two gates. We had vehicles staged here, ready to go. I think 1/8 was up by the hesco barriers near our sniper tower. It was mostly HQ Marines from 2/1 doing the driving of casualties. Corpsmen quickly jumped up into action and started providing aid. I didn't see the initial triage because I was helping with security. When I came back, triage was in full swing. The Corpsmen and Sgts were crushing it.

(b)(6) Casualties would be dropped off and the Corpsmen at the CCP immediately started triaging and treating and exfilling to the role 2.

(b)(6) We had 3 vehicles organic to G Co. Other units brought some over and we had excess available.

(b)(6) We removed all of the casualties. There was an unspoken agreement to not bring in any Afghan casualties. A few made it in. I conducted a final sweep with my PSG, came back in, and then the outer gate closed.

Many Marines from 2/1 were along the barriers between the gates. It was decided that G Co would draw back to move toward the airfield to stage to leave. One of my squads secured the gym. Throughout the night, all of G Co moved back.

We were briefed intelligence information that there were 15-20 ISIS armed individuals within HKIA. That's a large reason why we sent the squad to the gym to pull security.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) During a period of darkness on 26-27 August, we heard some sniper fire. We heard only one or two shots and I don't know where they came from.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Back to the day of 26 August, do you recall any DoS present?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) I didn't see any.

(b)(6) They were at the interior at the inner gate. There were four or five agents present and no PSD. This was the first time they were in this area, directly behind our initial screening area.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Is there any other pertinent information that you think that we should know?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) From the perspective of the screening effort, we needed more DoS support and bus support. When we didn't have these things, we would get backed up with personnel and the atmosphere of the crowd drastically worsened. This led us to take action to stabilize the crowd.

(b)(6) The forward progress of personnel through the gate was what helped the atmosphere the most

(b)(6) Getting through the first gate made people relax a lot more. When they were in the interior the process was pretty smooth for them.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: During periods when not accepting people through the gates, did partner nations move in and start pulling people in?

(2) Answer:

Yes, this would make people really angry and worsen the atmosphere.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) By the time we came back on 25 August, the partner nations had a better system in place. They put up pictures of their flags on the walls in order to help sort and search people.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Was there anything else that led to the increase of pressure to leave for the crowd? Were they aware of President Biden's statement and timeline to leave Afghanistan? Did you notice a change?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) The news hit while we were on a rest cycle. When we came back to the gate it was more aggressive

(b)(6) The change from 22 to 25 August was drastic. The atmosphere changed from desperate to aggressive.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think we need to know?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) At 0200 on 27 August, I was on the tarmac and witnessed a huge explosion.

(b)(6) It was a VBIED away from the complex.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: When did you depart HKIA?

(2) Answer: On the afternoon of 28 August.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Do you have any other comments? Is there anyone you think that we need to talk to?

(2) Answer:

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Regiment, 7 October 2021

(b)(6) We already provided names of TLs/SLs to be interviewed later today.

[redacted] (b)(6) the firer mentioned with the water tower. It might help to meet with the entire fire team.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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
7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Marine Squad Leaders, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 7 OCT 2021

1. On 23 September 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at 1st Marine Comms Area, Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the group often answered collaboratively. For the sake of recording responses, the following marines made statements and their statements are correlated to the below enumeration throughout the below transcription:



3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided the Marines an Introduction – explained that we are here to get your insight into the events at Abbey Gate. The investigation is taking a top to bottom approach from the top of leadership on ground down to the lowest level. We will be synchronizing effort to put it all together. This is a group interview and the expectation is to have multiple persons providing input to the same questions from multiple perspectives.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. You arrived on the gate on the 19th, talk to me about the arrival, what you saw, and what you did in the days following.

(2) Answer. 4 - 1st Platoon took the first shifts at the gate. We got to the Gate in the afternoon.

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SUBJECT: Interview with Marine Squad Leaders, Golf Company, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 7 OCT 2021

8 – Leaders recon with my squad. We made linkup with CAAT red at Abbey proper – the rest of the platoon was being shuttled. We went back to get the rest of the platoon. We got back to the gate as a platoon and moved among Brits to the outer gate. My squad was the QRF. We staged inside the outer gate on the Northern side. We got called as QRF almost immediately.

4 – I got called in and we formed a line between the tower and outer gate.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. There's a lot of civilians in the gate area at this time, Was Fox Company there with you yet?

(2) Answer. 7 – Fox was pushed to Barron.

8 – We were the furthest forward. We were trying to push the Afghans back to get standoff. The side closest the gate and sniper tower was getting thin and afghans were getting behind us. We were getting trampled. We eventually got everyone out. Maybe 10 minutes. At that point they took a tow strap to attach it to the gate and a vehicle.

4- We consolidated inside the gate. In the inner gate area there were jersey barriers and we were trying to keep the road down the middle free. We weren't even processing yet.

8- this turned into a holding area. On the NW edge closest to the airfield we isolated and contained them there.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. So Department of State (DoS) was on the ground?

(2) Answer. 8 – the RSO was there. We were outside the gate and he was observing, not processing. I don't think anyone was getting vetted. 1st platoon was tasked to hold the initial area. A couple hours later people were getting vetted. Maybe 1-200 at a time was getting processed. We sent ten at a time to clear out the inner gate for 5-6 hours.

4 – Outer gate stayed closed that whole time so it was just clearing out the inner area. I don't remember who RIPPed out.

6 – 4th Platoon RIPPed out and we did the push a few hours later.

5- 3rd came in later. We had security at Abbey proper. To clear up the DoS thing – they were back behind the gate. CAAT red had search pits. 4 different pits. They would get

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screened three times. This created a lot of frustration because Germany, France, Belgium, UK, Turks... they were also there and they had their own process.

1- If they were trying to throw anyone out, they would get us. We were constantly being told to be the ones to reject people.

5- we didn't have to deal with foreign nation passports, but we were still responsible for getting them through the gate

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. We're still on the 19th, and you get told you had to clear to the Barron hotel?

(2) Answer. 4- When 4th RIPPed out with us we started pushing everyone back. Around midnight. 1,4,Brits, 10th mtn, and us all pushed online to get them back.

8 – We split it evenly on each side and got shoulder to shoulder online. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was directing the line. We went step for step. We got a couple terps and the terps were helping. Seemed to help. Step for step – down parallel with the NE edge of the Barron. We held there for a while and got word we had to push to the Barron. We pushed past the U-turn into the Barron and we held there for 2-3 hours. Started coming into contact with Taliban members. We could see them. The PJs went down and had a KLE with them. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came and had a KLE. We were told the Tali would help by 0800 but that was the timeline. We cleared down 100 more meters and the Tali moved vehicles. The MEU brought in the crane with the connexs.

2 – After the push, they had the guys online. The Golf CO went and talked to the Brits. He was talking to them. He told us the obstacle plan. I don't think the Chevron was a plan. The 1stLt came up and put in said put in Cwire. We put the Cwire out and they asked if we could move concrete barriers. I moved half of them. Then they took over. The 1stLt was saying they could put connexs here. I don't know if that was planned, but it worked a lot better.

5 – I remember they were bringing the connexs up and we had no idea they were coming through. We had a CAAT vehicle in the gate. I don't know how they were getting through.

8 – midway through the push the PJs went out to get a woman and they brought her back through. They sent 2 vehicles out and came back.

6 – morning of the 20th at 0600. The Tali was controlling the crowd 200 meters past the chevron.

1- slowly as the day went on the crowd kept moving forward.

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6 – it was like 06-0800 and they slowly started coming through. If they had papers we would let them through. The Tali were controlling the crowd pretty well for a while. They were controlling everyone with sticks and pipes. And at 0800 they just let everyone through.

2- They let people through and they were looking to see how we handled it.

1- they just laughed and knew what they just created.

6 – State Dept came out and told us what 'proper paperwork' was supposed to look like. But they changed day to day, hour to hour.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Did you notice any difference in the way the Afghans reacted seeing the change in the speed or processing of individuals?

(2) Answer. 1 – Afghans would get mad at us and every time they changed the requirement the crowd would get so mad. Going from outer to the Barron there was just a craziness for who and what went when and where.

5- That inconsistency was horrible. They would see the inconsistency. They would say we can take these 5 things. Then we would have to pass on to the security what was currently being accepted. There was no solid word on who or what we could take. It was DoS and they switched out all the time so we had day to day adaptation.

2- It changed hour to hour. Towards the afternoon they would shift. It would be ANA, then SIV, then back and forth.

4 – There were a couple times the paperwork requirements would change between the time we would pull them and get to the gate for processing.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you all RIP out off the gate?

(2) Answer. 1,2,8 – (all answered) the 23rd

h. Question and Answer 7.

(b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4d

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. So you RIP out on the 23rd and end up coming back in a few days later. What changes did you notice in the crowd when you came back in?

(2) Answer. 1 – Huge growth. Other gates were closed and the Afghans said that they knew this was the only way in. The crowd all understood this was the way to get in.

4 – That happened around the 20th. We plugged two holes in the Barrier at the top of the inner gate. There were two holes we plugged. They could get through a little bit but we got that plugged up and that stopped the squirters from getting through.

2- I saw ladders pushed up against the gates. I didn't want the ladders against the fence. It was American looking dudes. It was SoF dudes having people jump over the Concertina wire (c-wire). The crowd of 300 people back behind us. This was inside.

10- The snipers in the back tower. It was Taliban. They were inside. The jumpers came out when the MaMs would try to jump the fences. The Taliban would send their dudes in to see how we reacted.

1 – The reason they put snipers over there... they had dudes jump the fence and then try to walk back down the inside of the fence and walking with their hands up. We saw them jump the wall and realized we had a breach point.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When did you come back to the gate?

(2) Answer. 4 – So myself and (10) did a leaders recon.

10 – you gunny and smith

4 – so we do that, and it looked like there was less control. Now there were sections all lining the outer to inner all the way to peopper. As you're looking at it there were

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sections of people and we saw it was different. We found out where we would go and started shuttling guys in.

4- I RIPPed with E Co. They had an element out past the bridge. We didn't understand why they were out there. We started retrograding. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there too.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Was there any discussion about controlling the outside area?

(2) Answer. 4 – We didn't understand why they were out there and so we stopped trying to hold it. They had security all the way down the creek. And we didn't need it and the crowd was getting way more dense. When I RIPPed out with E Co they talked about that challenge and it was like 150 m linear that we couldn't control and there was the choke point behind us.

6 – So we were out past the bridge. We dropped back about 25 meters at a time and 3rd showed up. We never consolidated away from the bridge. The CO came out and said we had an IED report. It was dark. That was later. So that time kind of blended together.

5- We blocked and walked the shields back. We had dudes behind the canal wall. At that point we were looking for a backpack. BOLO was super bland and non-specific. The crowd was mobbing us. The (b)(1)1.4d SF had given us 9 bangs. We would drop those so we could drop back. They had c-wire at the jersey barrier and the crowd was trampling each other. The people were really pushing. Even with non-lethal we couldn't push back. So they pushed us back to the Tbarrier.

4- Talking SL to SL – we decided that holding the outer area was not necessary and the increased threat... it just made sense to move back and consolidate.

2- By the time we had come back. The crowd was different.

6 – The crowd knew we were closing the gate

2- The CO told me the North gate was officially closed. They crowd had some kind of tweet or something and everyone knew that the Abbey was the only way in. Sense of urgency was WAY different.

6 Desperation.

5 – There was a huge backlog. There had to be 3000 people in and around the gate.

4 – The Chevron was a blocking position and the Brits kind of manned that with the Taliban but no one was passing there.

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8 – the 25th and 26th were crazy. Dead kids, all kinds of shit. People weren't even trying to get in all the time they were just there to watch.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Were there more Military Aged Males (MaMs) on the 25th? What did the crowd look like?

(2) Answer. 5 – in the front it was all MaMs. The Families were on the far side of the canal

2 – seemed like the really desperate families would mix in with the MaMs. The dudes didn't care. The moms were trying to give away their kids. They would throw the kids to us. We didn't have a choice then because the kids would be hurt. You'd be surprised how many people threw babies. You have no idea.

5- That's people throwing babies. They would throw the kids over the fence. Hitting the ground. Throwing like baseballs. It was crazy.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. So it's now the 26th. We've consolidated. You're back at the gate. What else has changed?

(2) Answer. 8 – So 1st PLT was going on the 1 hour rotations. We had squads on the canal. Then we got another IED threat. The Jersey barrier was our stop point. So we'd have guys out front and then they'd rotate back but it never really stopped. The Afghan non-US passports were there and they knew. They had a comms stream that told them to be there and they would come out and pull people out. There was an Italian General who kept coming back.

4 – I saw it with the 82nd. They would create a signal. They kept changing the signal and the crowd noticed. The crowd would mimic the signal and it all got messed up. The Comms from DoS was horrible. It came down

8 – The timeline changed. The Afghan Civs knew that the gate was closing at 1800.

5 – all foreign nations were still processing people. 4th Platoon wasn't taking anyone 1630 was the change out.

2- On the 26th around the time I had to go get vehicles. It was like 1430 on line in the canal, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said we have a timeline for the IED. At 1436 he said the IED was going to go off in 10 minutes. We were all down and trying to control the crowd.

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Because they didn't know what was happening, We stayed on a knee for 15 minutes. At that point the IED threat seemed like bad intel. In hindsight it was probably the right time and intel but he saw us react and chose to delay.

8 – PSYOPS came down and they were saying over the loudspeaker what documents were being taken. I didn't see any DoS people.

1 –it was weird that we didn't see anyone and then the DoS RSO shows up.

8 – The PSYOPS showing up seemed like it riled up the locals because they felt like something official was changing because the PSYOPS message. So we had an L shaped position set up and we were just essentially holding the line by where everyone was. We were pushing the crowd back down and they would surge. We stayed in that position until the IED went off.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. So now we're at that point. Blast happens. Talk about actions and reactions after the blast?

(2) Answer. 6 – 4th Platoon was on the QRF

5 – When we showed up to the gate and we walked up at 1700 and they pushed us an hour so there was a little confusion because we thought 3rd was on QRF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

1 – When the blast went off, everyone was surprised and confused. Me and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were going in. They were telling us not to. We said fuck that and went in. As soon as we went in the CS cannisters had gotten hit and we had to come back out because the CS was so bad. We ran towards the stack of bodies near the fence. I ran towards the stack of bodies and we were trying to figure out where the fuck everyone was. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in and were helping. They were establishing security. We were grabbing guys and taking them out towards the inner. They were pushing guys out and bounding back.

6 – When the bomb went off the gate was way down. The Engineer and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) cut another hole in the fence. We ran out of stretchers so we started putting dudes on riot shields. Everyone was pitching in and that hole helped us so much. There was an initial few minutes where things were changing.

4- There was always another team.

6 – Yes, everyone was just working together and getting guys out.

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5- We got stopped from running in by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We set the initial security inside the gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there. We got set and then some officer was stopping everyone from coming in. I'd never seen him before. We told him to fuck off and move. We didn't know who he was. He was by the PSYOPS truck – he was a Maj... maybe the PSYOP officer. He was telling people they couldn't come in. We ignored him.
2- it was confusing.

5- Talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he said we had everyone off the X in 7 minutes.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. So you heard gunfire? Audibly identified gunfire?

(2) Answer. 1 –Hear gunfire, sounds close, can't tell where it's coming from. It wasn't suppressed

5 – We thought we were hearing snaps of shots. Everyone took a knee. We could see the Taliban and they were sitting in lawnchairs.

4 – We heard something and took cover

8 – Gunfire from the south. The Brits we shooting warning shots by the tower.

1 – I thought they were basically trying to control the crowd to keep the crowd back.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. So in the vicinity of the water tower, past the hotel, did anyone see that? Hostile Act identified?

(2) Answer. 6 – Some of my guys posted security. There's a building back off the perimeter. I wasn't shooting but I know there were guys inside the Inner gate area shooting at an elevated water tank on top of a building straight South East outside the perimeter.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Is there anyone who hasn't spoken or has something else to say?

(2) Answer. 2 – Part of the evacuation – there were a lot of guys taking people into the inner gate. Foreign forces were dropping guys off at the gate. There were SO many people coming from everywhere. The Foreign guys didn't know where the hospital was. Not everyone knew where the role II was. So they had a lot of friction trying to figure out where guys were and should've gone.

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6 – The Tali shut down the entrance from the Chevron. The Canal was packed when the chevron was shut down because it funneled everyone into the canal.

5 – The Recon guys fucked up the inner gate. They screwed up the process.

2 – [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

END OF INTERVIEW

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(6) and
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021 [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(6) often answer collaboratively. It is annotated accordingly when answers are given individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Did you complete any pre-deployment training that was either typical or non-typical pre-deployment training that helped prepare you for HKIA?

(2) Answer:

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I didn't feel prepared for the HKIA situation. I don't think it's possible to prepare for something like that. I didn't feel completely unprepared. I think the Infantry Immersion Training (IIT) helped a little bit. IIT training was at a much smaller scale than what we were faced with at HKIA.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I think the same thing. Not a lot of training that we did focused on dealing with crowds and civilians. It was more of a humanitarian mission. Our leadership definitely put us in the right mindset to deal with civilians.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) We were constantly told by our leadership that we would be helping people, not shooting people. There's a large psychological effect dealing with humans in desperation. It's hard to prepare yourself for that.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

(b)(6) When we were at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a we played as role-players hiding contraband during E Co's Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX). This helped us learn places that we would need to check and be aware of when conducting searches. We were hiding things like TNT, wires, and detonation cord, and new good places to look when we were searching people.

(b)(6) We did a lot of mass casualty (MASCAL) training and I think that helped us out a lot after the blast on 26 August. We worked on MASCAL training almost every day. We did a lot of training on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and some of our junior corpsmen completed Valkyrie walking blood bank training.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Was this your first deployment?

(2) Answer:

(J, Ma, W): Yes

(Mo, V): We deployed together before.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Have any of you worked with foreign militaries before?

(2) Answer:

(Mo, Ma): We trained and worked with the British military in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a This helped us out a lot. We ran in to some of the people that we had trained with and this helped a lot. We worked with some [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a locals on base while we were in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a but there was not a lot of interaction.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: You arrived 18-19 August to HKIA. What was happening then and what was your experience?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We received a few different COAs before we landed. We knew there could be some riots and large crowds. Once we arrived, the crowds had calmed and we were

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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able to deplane without an issue. We saw a lot of Afghan refugees when we landed and other Marines pulling security.

(b)(6) We had a pretty good idea where we were going when we landed. We were told that we were going to the Southeast Gate. I was pretty disoriented when we landed.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: G Co moves to Abbey Gate on the morning of 19 August. What did you first think when you arrived?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We were kind of told that we were going to see things that no person should have to see. We were told that our morals would be tested. Right when we got there, we saw a Department of State (DoS) person running with a baby that had just been exposed CS gas. We linked up with Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) Red right way. They were already at Abbey Gate pulling security. 3rd platoon was at the inner gate, with CAAT Red. We helped them search, process, and vet people. My squad helped bring people through, putting them in groups of ten. Toward the middle of the day, some of us went to help out the rest of the company by the vehicles.

(b)(6) My squad assisted with searching personnel.

(b)(6) We reinforced 1st platoon. We were there vetting people and their documents all day. The accepted documents changed three or four times throughout the day. Some people would show us random documents and photos.

(b)(6) We talked to the DoS right away and they told us to look for American passports, those with a stamp on page 46 of their passport, SIVs, or the blue or yellow embassy badges.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: On 19-20 August, were you all a part of the push to move people back toward the Barron Hotel to build the chevron?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) 1st platoon was assigned to do this. My squad also helped. It took like six hours and was very hard.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Tell me your general experience over the next few days. Did anything stick out to you?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) People didn't seem too desperate until the second time that we had duty on Abbey Gate.

(b)(6) Many people were very annoyed with us because they wanted us to provide water for them and we didn't have any to give. They got very irritable during the hottest hours of the day.

(b)(6) The DoS would only come out for an hour or so every day and this led to the desperation of people trying to get through.

There were so many heat casualties at this time. Some people had already made it through to the inner gate with the proper documents and would ask to leave because they were so sick of waiting.

(b)(6) The DoS left for a very long time. We vetted them ourselves to try to expedite the process for when they returned.

(b)(6) Things ran more smoothly after the third day.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: How were you guys dealing with the heightened desperation?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We had a few Marines that are very religious and it was very challenging to them to separate the job they had to do and their personal morals.

(b)(6) 4th platoon and 1st platoon worked up by the chevron for most of the time. The Taliban had a checkpoint up here and were doing their own vetting. They would let a ton of people through and this would hinder our established processes. The (b)(1)1.4 also did this.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) The Brits helped us the most. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6) This really upset the crowd. This fatigued them and it really screwed us over. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d could often pull people that shouldn't have made it through and then would leave them behind us. This was bad for our security posture and it really upset the personnel when we had to kick them out.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Was there any threat reporting at this time?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We would receive the threats from our Platoon Commander, who would get it from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who got it from battalion, who got it from [REDACTED] (b)(6)

(b)(6) We heard pop shots every once and a while. I think they were warning shots. We would get warnings that guys with AK-47s would be trying to get in the gates. This worried us. We also received some IED threats. No threats were enough to stop us from doing our jobs.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: You came off the line for about 36 hours and returned the evening of 25 August. Walk me through that.

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) On 24 August we were at the PAX terminal pulling security and escorting people. This was nice for us to see our efforts going to use. It was good to see people departing.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: What changed at Abbey Gate when you returned on 25 August?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) E Co had been pushed back pretty far and we were spread very thin. E Co had more assets than us.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(6) We held the ground throughout the night but were told by our leadership to tiptoe back due to increased threat reporting. We had our riot shields up while we did this. There was a threat of an IED and they didn't want us so far away.

(b)(6) We received the information of the IED threat. (b)(1)1.4 said the bomber was clean-shaven, and had a bag with yellow arrows. It took us about 4-6 hours to tiptoe back to the jersey barrier near the sniper tower.

(b)(6) Other countries were pulling people out of the canal at this time so we had to move them as we tiptoed.

(b)(6) This was the first time that we were alerted about the

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(6) We had actually had a positive identification for the threat and reported it. This also led to us collapsing back.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Did you do anything else to increase your security posture on 26 August?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We pushed out a squad at a time to pull security along the jersey barrier next to the sniper tower. We would keep one platoon on duty and one would be on rest back at the gym.

(b)(6) As far as our security posture, we had our guys up on the barrier pulling security and then some of us would roam and be on lookout.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Did you feel like you were under more pressure to get people in because you knew that the gate was closing on 26 August?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) I didn't, personally, because the threat level was so high and we weren't really trying to pull people at this time. We were taking a knee behind the barriers at this time.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

(b)(6) We created a small hole in the C-wire and people were trying to come in or throw themselves over the barrier and we had to keep escorting them back out through the hole.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: What time did the blast go off on 26 August?

(2) Answer: 1740ish.

(b)(6) We were relieved after a 16-hour duty.

(b)(6) We went to the gym around 0800 to rest and came back around 1600. 15 minutes before we were to replace the other group the blast occurred.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Walk me through what happened during the blast on 26 August.

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) We were right by the casualty collection point (CCP0) when the blast went off. I was laying on my back. I remember that I looked up and saw a guy pull out a phone as if he was taking a video or photos. I looked toward the sniper tower to see if they had eyes on him. The blast went off immediately after I saw this. I was slick, got up, put my gear on, and then grabbed my guys and took off toward the gate. Myself and another Marine posted security toward a building that we were receiving fire from. I could hear rounds over my head. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had pulled out Cpl Paige. Another Marine, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was dragging (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was injured and passed out while pulling her. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was pulled out to the CCP and I provided care and got her on the MEDEVAC. She had some shrapnel above her left eye, right eye, bicep, and in her back. Me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) applied a tourniquet on her leg and arm at 1756. Next, I got handed another person to put on the MEDEVAC. Then, I went out to the gate to get more people. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stopped me on my way and said that everyone was out. The gates were shut and we made a wall of security behind the jersey barriers, got accountability, and began retrograding back.

While on security, there were people running back and forth on a half-wall near the water tower. We couldn't get any IDs. This is where we were taking fire. I definitely think they were trying to ambush us when we got to the blast site. One of our guys fired back. I heard that a recon guy dumped around three magazines of ammo that way.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

(b)(6) I was also laying on my back looking toward the sniper tower when the blast went off. It was very loud. I could see flesh/body parts come up over the wall. I grabbed my gear and started moving toward the blast site. Someone yelled to get behind the barriers due to the shooting coming from the building. I was by the guys from 2nd Recon at this time. There were about six of them. I don't have their names. They were from the MEU. I know one of them was a SSgt and one was a GySgt. They were firing at the building that we were receiving fire from. There were definitely rounds snapping around us at this time. After I had gotten my team together, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked for (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g I think asking for a casualty evacuation bird.

I got accountability of my guys and we posted up security near the barriers and the CCP. We stayed there the whole time. I moved around to talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but that was it. Once the gates were closed, we retrograded back.

(b)(6) 3rd platoon was waiting behind the sniper tower. We heard the blast and also saw the body parts and debris. We grabbed our weapons and ran toward the blast site. We were stopped by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he had us pull security behind his team, oriented toward the chevron. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his guys went in to pull out casualties from the blast site. They started bringing them out and asked for help. I went in and ended up helping carry (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I dropped her off and went back in to grab more. I was looking on the ground to see if I could see anyone. Near the hole in the fence, I saw Cpl (Humberto) Sanchez on the ground. Some Marines had already taken his kit off and people were yelling at us to get him out of there. We brought him to the CCP. I stayed with Cpl Sanchez and a corpsman and I started working on him immediately. He had major head trauma and there was a lot of blood. The doctor checked his pulse and it was very faint. The corpsman was working on his breathing. I was packing holes in his body with combat gauze to try to stop the bleeding. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up and cried him. We put combat gauze all over him and also did a chest seal. There were about five of us working on him now. I worked on Cpl Sanchez for five to ten minutes. We got him on a litter, found a vehicle, cleaned it out and threw him in the truck for CASEVAC. The gate was now closed and I linked up with my platoon. We got word of a possible VBIED right next to us. We moved away from this area and eventually retrograded.

(b)(6) 3rd platoon was all in the same area. I was talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We were looking toward the wall and talking when the blast went off. We saw body parts and debris. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed us through the gate and went to the site through the hole in the fence. I grabbed a casualty, LCpl McCollum, and brought him to the CCP. I think he was still alive but he wasn't conscious. He was still breathing at this time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from 1st Platoon began working on him right away at the CCP. They assessed him as urgent. They completed a few minutes of work before we loaded him

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

on a litter and we loaded him for CASEVAC. He had a lot of shrapnel wounds and they packed him with a lot of gauze.

I went back in and grabbed one more person. I brought him to the hole in the fence and put him down there. We realized there wasn't any security so I grabbed my guys and we posted security along the canal wall. It was me, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had us post security near the initial blast sight. By this point, all casualties were out of the blast site and the gate was closed. We started peeling off. I helped a guy carry Sgt Gee off. It seemed like she had passed already. There was an officer freaking out and a gunny had to tell him to be quiet and calm down. It looked like she had a lot of swelling due to cranial pressure. We put her down and an Army guy put a blanket over her body.

I linked back up to pull security along the jersey barriers. I found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with blood all over him. It wasn't his blood. I could hear sporadic rounds snapping overhead for about 5 minutes. I didn't see any tracers but saw sparks when bullets would impact things. We heard about a possible VBIED when we were breaking down. We were given the order to be ready to shoot if we heard a vehicle start. We also heard to alert for an IED. Our squad went straight to the gym and pulled security for the other platoons to come in.

(b)(6) I was in the same area as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I heard the blast and looked over at my guys. We saw the body parts and smoke. We ran to the outer gate where our Platoon Commander stopped us before we pushed forward. He sent us out after he made sure the Taliban wasn't a threat. He pushed out 1st Squad and kept my squad back. I was put in charge of the CCP area. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was assisting me. Doc Soviak arrived to the CCP right away. I was trying to help him. A Marine came up asking (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for help. There was a Marine that they were helping and he ended up being urgent. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) put an NPA in him and performed a needle decompression. We threw him on the Casper (CASEVAC) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went with him. They brought him to the Role 2 where he eventually passed. After this, we were told to pull security along the barriers and clear another small CCP area. After a while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had us start retrograding back. 1st Squad pulled the initial security of the gym and each squad pulled rotations throughout the night.

(b)(6) was trying to call in to the JOC. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) used our JTAC to call in a chinook. By the time the chinook arrived, all casualties were evacuated. All were evacuated within 20 minutes.

q. Question and Answer 16.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Leader, 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 7 October 2021

(1) Question: Did anything else happen on 26 August that you think we should know about?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6) At 0200 on 27 August, my guys and I were on security and we saw a green laser from a possible IZLD. We heard a small boom and then shortly after a larger boom. I called this up to my squad leader and he told me not to worry about it because it was the US doing drone strikes.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Can you please provide a contact number?

(2) Answer:

(b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

19 October 2021

SUBJECT: Interview with 2/1 G Company Marines from Inner Gate, 8 October 2021

1. On 8 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA 1 Marine Regiment Comms facility to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the Marines answered collaboratively. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) US Army recorded the interview. Based on the topic and depth of the discussion, the following annotations were observed. The majority of the conversation repeated the statements made by (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in exhibit 86.

3. Discussion.

a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are all members of 2/1 Marines, G Company, 1st Platoon, 3rd squad, 1st fireteam. The entire team was located inside the Abbey gate corridor just back from the outer gate when the SVEST went off. This area was protected from the blast by a wall and the sniper tower. The discussion surrounded the specific observation and engagement of an individual they all identified to be located on the roof of the 'water tower building'. The Marines engaged the person who they identified as a threat due to the presence of an AK-47, which was raised towards Marines, with perceived intent to fire. All the Marines fired at the individual and none could identify the status of the individual after they fired. Nothing of note came after the acknowledgement of the Marines firing at the perceived threat. No record of the incident can be found which would validate or invalidate their observations.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)




ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 8 October 2021

1. On 07 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.
2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the group of Marines often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. For the purpose of the interview recording, the following Marines are identified in their responses:



3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explaining the purpose of the discussion and interview. The purpose of the interview is not to seek out wrongdoing, but to find facts and provide context to reports and information from the available sources of information. The Marines several times throughout the interview referenced personal pictures and information which they provided to the interview team. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took notes and the below dialogue is the captured comments and information as it took place in the interview:

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Golf Company inserts into HKIA on 19 August, who is the first element?

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Platoon. We were first to insert. We got told we are QRF. We got told to secure the Outer Gate and we met with A Co of the British. This was all about 1100 on the 19th.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was the Platoon order of movement into the Abbey Gate corridor?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Order is 1/3/4.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. So you pushed through the Outer gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes. So many people. The whole crowd was trying to push through outer gate.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The whole crowd was pushing. It got to a breaking point and we could not hold them back.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Once we got there and got our staging areas set up. There had to be about 150-200 Afghans still inside the gate holding area. They were basically left behind when we pushed through to gain standoff.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - There had to be 200 in the inner gate. We came through inner gate to help 1st platoon and we got on line to prep to push out.

(b)(6) Was 4th Platoon present yet?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - Not yet.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - There was a line of pax along the airfield wall. We got them pushed to the wall so we could operate in the middle and just to get them out of the way. We took over from 3rd Platoon who went to Abbey Gate proper, at the inner gate. 3rd Platoon held security and started searching and processing pax. Busses stopped taking the processed Afghans though sometime after that. There were no busses again until the next morning (20 AUG 21). That initial group there were a ton of Afghans with no paperwork just because they'd gotten stuck in the gate area when we pushed through so they hadn't gotten pulled by us for an initial screening.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 1st Platoon needs to be on standby as QRF – sustain the middle gate around 1100 on the 19th

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - Order of Movement, 1 /3 /4

(b)(6) So Fox Company is in

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Fox Company is in now. 1630-1700 1st Platoon RIPped out with them.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – During the entire night 1st Platoon replaced 4th and 4th ended up coming up to the front in the morning to establish the line at the barrier.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Talk me through the push to the Barron Hotel and the area that would become the Chevron.

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Pretty much the entire front line was 1st Platoon. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was using the PEQ lights to coordinate the movement. The Brits were behind us.

(b)(6) So between Elements of G co, F co, and Brits, during Period of Darkness 1900-0300?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The chevron got built sometime between 0500-0600 behind us.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Middle of the night, chevron gets established.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – People were **always** getting checked. Over and Over and Over. The groups bringing people in would be 10-15 people. When we would be told to reject them we would take them down past the Chevron.

(b)(6) Were you coordinating with the Taliban?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Higher coordinated between the Taliban. The Taliban said the crowd would be let go to move forward by 0800 which meant the chevron had to be complete.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – They were smashing people over the head with a rifle.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – There were multiple heat cases in the crowd that first day. Right below the Tower we had a little check point where they would get treated.

(b)(6) At what point did DoS show up?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – About 0800 the DoS folks would show up.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – There was a PBS reporter who showed up at the gate. She was taking videos and she wasn't the DoS. She kind of walked around on her own. We didn't talk to her

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 0800 on the 20th of August the DoS arrived at Abbey gate proper.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. So now you're processing. Talk me through the clearance and the crowd and the initial observations you made as things kind of hit steady state with the first groups to process.

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Chevron to the gate was about 48 hours of pushing and it was slow.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Once they set up the chevron the c-wire was set up on the side of it by 1600-1700 on the 20th and that created a solid structure for us to know what was happening.

(b)(6) – So did the flights stopping create friction for you?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – They stopped all the flights on one of the days and it was a hot day, maybe the 21st?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – It was the 21st.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We were told to stop by DoS, but there was confusion. It caused an issue because we got bum rushed in the inner gate because the backlog of people were just confused. The terps got that under control.

(b)(6) So external factors... What about partner nations?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – (b)(1)1.4d
(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – There would be like 10 people sitting inside the gate because the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d would come out and grab them, line them up inside the gate in a separate area, then leave them. So we were just like, babysitting these random other civilians who weren't even processing through our DoS contacts, so then we wouldn't know who they were or when the (b)(1)1.4d were coming back to get them.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So then there were the other guys, the (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) who would just randomly show up and say that they needed to grab a guy who held up a sign with (b)(1)1.4a That signal would then cause us to have to go through and wade to get the guy or group out of the crowd. Then other people would try to mimic the sign, but the random people would already be gone so we couldn't tell if it was supposed to be another grab or if they were just mimicking the thing they saw. But that just made it worse.

(b)(6) So this would be random and odd times and the crowd would be calm and then these things would go down and the crowd would go nuts

Everyone: YES

g. Question and Answer 6.

(b)(1)1.4d

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. What day did you get relieved off the gate?

(2) Answer. All: Evening of the 22nd Order of movement 1 / 4 / 3

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. On the evening of the 22nd as you're coming off the gate, what did the crowd look like?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – when we left the canal was a dividing line and nobody was really in the canal. Before we left the Chevron was controlled by the Brits and the Taliban.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – It was pretty much a mosh pit at the Chevron. At some point people stopped coming through the chevron but that was after we left.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When do you go back out on the gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 25th in the morning we got back out to the gate

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 25th because we had 1 day down, then we were at the pax terminal, then we ended up back out on the gates.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The team leaders would know by text message.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Def the 25th.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We (1st Platoon) were the first back out there and late morning we got there. They'd moved the barriers, and there was a vehicle now. The crowd was fucking huge now.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Crowd was now all inside the canal, and they were just stacked on top of each other.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – On the 25th, the other platoon had been holding all the way up past the bridge. 1st Platoon was there. Our squad was there and the Brits were kind of up there too.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The Brits were moving rejected people out off the bridge.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The XO came out and said that the IED threat was imminent and we needed to get back.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We inched back between 1700-1830.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 1st platoon was the ones all the way out there. We were told to take cover but the IED never happened. It didn't make sense being all the way out there. Unless we were in a place they (the crowd) was in complete control.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – That day the crowd started getting way more bold. They would start jumping the wall. They were trying to jump up and get into the compound.

(b)(6) – Was anything coming through the Chevron?

All – NO

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – When we got out there on the 25th we were told we would be taking more people in but that varied by squad.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We started seeing all these weird TTPs where they would have a picture of a (b)(1)1.4a

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(6) So what about the crowd?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The crowd was getting desperate. They were throwing water bottles.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – People started grabbing at rifles. Things got kind of testy

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – It was nuts.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was the makeup of the crowd on the 26th?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – A lot of military aged males (MaMs), but a pretty even balance. There was an IED threat but the description kept changing. Brown duffle, Laptop case with an arrow, Shaved, Bald

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – They had PID on that guy. I was told we found the guy. But the (b)(1)1.4 kept popping shots and warning.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – To their credit though they helped a lot because they could do things we couldn't. Warning shots, they had sticks.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – It was all over social media. The Afghans knew where to go and were being coached by Marines not on ground. People were informed about what gates were open and processing.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. It's now the afternoon on the 26th. Pre-blast. Was there increased threat reporting?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – the warnings grew over the days. More warnings more frequent, but it kept being a warning that didn't happen, so we'd get a timeline and a description, but we never saw anything fitting the description and we never were hit before the blast so we got a little numb to that.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We got told VBIED, SVEST, Indirect

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 3rd Platoon stayed inside the gate. We were told to go back to Proper but CAAT Red was there so we didn't really have anything to do. Night of the 25th 4th Platoon ended up getting to go back to the gym.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 1000 on the 26th we ended up going back to the gym. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said 1st and 4th were needed back at the gate. We got pulled out at 01-0130 to go back to the gate.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We ended up being inside the inner gate area.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We took a knee at one point because an IED was imminent.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We were all along the wall and the fence and when they told us the IED was going to happen. Once it didn't, we started getting folks moving again. They kept trying to get people to disperse. 1st Platoon was QRF inside gate, 4th is on canal, 3rd was en route from gym, Brits are in canal at the Chevron, and Fox was down there too. The crowd was seriously insane. The kids were getting pushed up to the barrier and crushed at the barrier. Guys hanging over the side. Human wall and craziness.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We RIPped out at 1530. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got us to RIP out.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – They had a PSYOPS truck pull up. It was like 30 minutes before the blast. The truck pulled up and it was loud as hell. The speaker was supposed to help us push them back.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We were working the orphanage inside the gate with 3rd platoon. (Short discussion from others, the 'orphanage' was a group of children without parents to claim them who'd been thrown or abandoned to the Marines by their parents)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Just before the IED goes off – we saw a kid with a phone videoing the gate area on top of the house with the water tower.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. So that brings up the blast. Anything to add before? (Nothing heard) Okay, let's talk about the IED explosion.

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – So 2nd squad was main effort, 1st squad was supporting them, 3rd squad was inside when the blast went off.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – Blast happens and some guy claiming to be Afghan SF was getting pushed away. I realized it wasn't a flash bang.

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SUBJECT: Interview with G Co, 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoon Junior Marines, 2/1 Marines, SPMAGTF, GCE, 08 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I was 25 feet from the concrete barrier down the canal. It kicked up the dust and debris and I couldn't see anything. Took a second to figure out what was going on.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – The CS grenades got punctured and it was nuts.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I was running to help triage. I saw ricochets but didn't hear any gunfire

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I was directly across from the blast when it happened. I heard gunfire. While I was applying tourniquets I saw ricochets. Never saw a shooter

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I saw a guy. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw two guys with AKs at the water tower. You can see it from inside the gate. I saw someone shooting from the Water tank.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – About 10 min prior to the blast we had a bunch of guys replaced the ones at the wall. When the blast went off we got kind of shoved back. The blast wave hit us. Everyone from 1st platoon was in front of us. I remember the Brits were shooting off. There was shooting from somewhere over at the connexs (chevron). I remember running and screaming SVEST. There were so many Marines trying to get through the gate. I got pulled back in through the barrier.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I saw the shots hitting around us. I saw the guys on the water tower with guns. I was running into the blast zone though.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I hear the rounds going off. I saw the Recon guys shooting. I saw the guy in the window next to the water tower shooting. I know what I saw and had PID.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – I saw the gunman in the doorway.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – If there were only 2-3 shooters and the amount of our guys shooting back, they would've been done. I got

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – It was maybe 10 minutes after the blast (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabbed Smitts. We got him back to the checkpoint and through middle gate.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We were just grabbing bodies. As we were running in, we took cover behind the concrete block. It was me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We picked up Smitts and checked on him and drug him back.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – 3rd Platoon was holding security behind some car. I heard the gunfire coming from the chevron.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – We had picked up Schmidt and were carrying him back in through the gate. After that I turned and saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came running out. Myself (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went towards the shitbox to hold security. We stayed there for a few minutes. CO had called for Brit medics. I moved back and held security on the canal. That was pretty much it in the immediate aftermath.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Anything to add? What should we know that we haven't asked about?

(2) Answer. Marines all indicate no intent to add any further info

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)