

08/21

OBSERVATION LOG: REAPER 2 POSREP:

TIME	LOCATION	EVENT	ACTION TAKEN
0600	BLK runner	Three individuals seen w/ shot caller	
0745	↓	Partial CI 200 F 171	
0745	↓	Des of Elder, white car, brown vest, long white beard glasses/phon	
0800	Parking lot	POI ID, 3-4 man Entourage	
0805	Moving canal	3-2 man detail accompany shot caller calm side of canal	
0810	Moving canal	Group observed, walks away when R2 spotted.	
0811		Walks back towards A runner	
0815	Parking runner	Makes multiple phone calls once back	
0820	A runner	POI ATB IN BLACK & runner	
0827		A runner moves / no direction spotted	
0920		Elder / milage clean cut male w/ shot caller team across	
		Blue duffel, one carries coyote back pack	
0930-		Team observes two walkers move through	
Pres		crowd to ECP. Descrip: Elder white man dress,	
		NAVY blue vest, black shoe tan tongue, silver	
		brace let on right wrist, watch on left.	
		Description: bowl cut	
1031		two men back at vic, no bags.	
1032		two right of tan vic by brick wall.	
1034		Pancake hat makes call.	
1039		Esds a n shot caller	
1039		Eyes on shot pancake hat.	
1041		TAN/NIKE BAG spotted walking towards R 3 pos	
1044		Shot caller phone call	
1048		Shot caller phone in vic to passenger	
1053		shot caller speaks w/ pancake hat / Bowl cut	
1054		Shot caller calls pancake w/ him, makes phone	
1054		call w/athes R 2 post	
1054			
1054-11		Shot caller moves back and forth to Orange/black	
		umbrella	
1223	TALIBAN CHPT	Taliban technical w/ mounted 240 on back - Two pos	
		Truck white/TALIBAN Bag	
1227		Multiple copies of brown, black, blue, Duffel bag	
1223	HOTEL	Gold carola 1 "GET AWAY FROM ME"	
1225	HOTEL	FANATIC in a back pack	
1305	left hand/canal	Man runs from camera when seen by team	
		Observing. Blue Shmoo	
1318	shot caller moves	Shot caller moves towards our position	
		Stops at an umbrella then returns	
1322		pancake head gets into a red car	
		and somebody starts to talk to shot caller	

~~1330~~
1330shot caller returns ~~to~~ to the umbrella

08/22

OBSERVATION LOG: REAPER 2 POSREP: Abbey gate Brit tower			
TIME	LOCATION	EVENT	ACTION TAKEN
0640	Conex	TB assist children up 707 help find families	obs
0655	Canal (note)	The locals start to use the moat to walk back and forth and across canal road,	obs
0708	Conex	TB observed wearing light blue gorb and navy blue vest, turban, chest rig & radio on chest rig. - obs, pic	
0730	Back post canal	ATB Afg male wearing ANA/ANP uniform walking to parking lot. - obs-pic	
0745	TB VCP	(1) AM, ATB TB w/ a 40mm on M16.	-obs, pic
0810	Conex	TB ATB taking credentials to Brits to be verified, then taken back to families, then bringing families through to the Brits.	obs
0933		taliban were observed selling water to the crowd	
1045	Conex	(1) AM, Blue gorb w/ black vest, tan hat & dark green head dress w/ flowers, wearing CBU under vest, semi concealed w/ close toe shoes!	
1100	Gate to Barron	Brit Convoy (8 vics) to hotel.	obs
1104	Gate to hotel	Brit Convoy (8 vics) to hotel.	obs
1122	Conex	(1) AM, ATB TB, orange gorb w/ brown vest and cross draw pistol holster, has red pin (oriental vertically)	obs pic
1130	TB VCP	ZD (1) AM w/ radio or sat phone	obs, pic
1145	Far CCTV post right	2x Spotters, ATB TB, 1x AK74U, 1 not armed @ parade rest looking at crowd w/ unique hats Thick muffin hat, white & black.	obs & pic
1150	Barron to gate	Convoy of 8	
1228	CCTV Post	MAM ATB TB, sighting in w/ weapon towards crowd, appeared to have red dot & bipod on AK style weapon.	
1234	Conex	TB w/ 40mm HE on belt on waist w/ plate carrier, weapon, M16 w/ 203	
1250	Conex, right side	ATB by KLE w/ TB members. KLE was w/ Brit. End time: 1255 1255	
1308	Conex	11 TB on containers	
1510		observed a guy whos face was bandaged and bruised	
1520		observed 2 taliban violently beat people. it appeared as though they thought they were hidden or were attempting to hide	
1535		a man wearing a plate carrier and military uniform with an AK was seen with the taliban	

1539 the previously mentioned man seemed to be giving hand & arm signals to someone in the crowd outside the perimeter

1223 - we observed a child on the comex boxes who had 2 bandages on the back of his head

1435 - we observed a taliban member wearing a tin plate carrier and a desert camo military uniform also carrying an m16

1438 - the taliban seemed to have almost doubled ~~there~~ their numbers over the course of approximately 15 minutes

1613 - The TB have removed them selves from the comex, (1) br + on top. - obs

1645 - TB ATB re-occupying the comex

1653 - 2 TB, Tri color cammies w/ m16 & some type of red mark. - cel pic.

1655 - 9 TB on comex - pic taken, all seem to be of importance. Gathered and looking toward gate to talking.

1705 - TALIBAN speak to one interpreter on ground. 11 TALIB

1718 - Taliban spotted w ICOM, picture taken

1734 - Large crowds running down side street TBAN SIDE, BEATINGS AND Shootings follow. Left before camp Sullivan.

1837 - Blue books, green cords, yellow embassy badges, immediate family members, no m16

2048 - a taliban was seen in multi cam uniform with plate carrier holding an m4 with PEG, optic, foregrip.

2118 - Belligerently flaunting PKM around on Comex box

0005 - Taliban personnel - very fat - white garbs. No firearm just to their feet and started following orders. Imm. they jump

0830 - Frequent / Excessive amounts of firing from T-ban Checkpoint

0921 - 2nd flag has been put up on CCTV tower (Taliban flag)

1036 - UP armored MRAP/MATV X 2 from Taliban with 1 mounted 50 cal, 2 AT4s

08/26

OBSERVATION LOG: REAPER 2 POSREP:

TIME	LOCATION	EVENT	ACTION TAKEN
0210	Tower	payops passed: Confirmed UBIED, green moped possibly a convert/coc	Passed
0247	Tower	BN Passed: Conto svest @ Abbey gate	logged
0258	TBWP	TB truck arrives w/ 4-6 pass, possible shift change. 3 move E: down road	log
0615	FBW/canal	suspect handed out notes	reported/recorded
0630	TB CP	All comm' indiv. on top of canal gears	
0647	TB CP	100s of civs running towards TB CP	
0723			
0823		LARGE groups of TB form on left side brick building roof.	
1028		possibly took a shot from the canal side, hit the window	
1035			
1035		british interpreter was seen talking to the taliban on the boxes	
1039		TB began firing shots into the air	
1108	Caney	3 TB on canex. 1 w/ PKM	
1133		possibly spotted a guy on a motorcycle near TB check point	
1400		TB wearing old Army desert uniform with plate carrier, kevlar, and goggles also had elbow pads and an AK with a bayonet	
1410		two guys spotted walking on the far side of the canal one with an AK and grenade launcher the other hitting people with a stick	

8/24

OBSERVATION LOG: REAPER 2 POSREP:

TIME	LOCATION	EVENT	ACTION TAKEN
1040	TB CP	2x up armored Vics / 1 Tan 1 grn / Tan one having mounted M2 50 CAL and 2x AT4's on L side / GRN one having nothing / confirmed both Vics are HMV's	Note taken for S2 brick
1110	TB CP	observed TB fighter w/ night optic on rifle	passed to RA
1115	TB CP	observed TB fighter w/ what ATB rifle w/ flashlight bipods and mounted laser.	
1134	TB CP	Extensive amounts of smoke 50 CAL oriented in our direction - 2 shots fired from M2.	
1145		taliban appears to be pushing civilians away	
1151	BC cage	2 obser. spotted	action noted
1230	iso container	taliban seemed to be watching and pointing at our position	
1242		5 wearing tri-color, 1 in multicolor T-BAN	
1251		TBAN CHECKPOINT CAMERA	
1312		MEDIA LEFT	
1334	TB CP	TB fighter w/ light cut, AS14 S13, muti-com, pink headress, AK47	
1400	L of TB CP	TB fighter waving red flag 3 gold stars	noted
1925	# of TBAN	On wall and trucks behind, 15-20 fighters	
0224	TB CP	Consistently firing rounds into air w/ at least 6-7 firearms	
0238	ISO's	PKM brought up top. At least a few (kids) hit on back side. (Brits sections picked up)	
0300		taliban fires several bursts from the SO into the air	
0700	TB CP	1x TB soldier carrying AK PKM w/ multiple belts of ammo dropped around waist and chest	
0718	Connex	TB light blue garb, green vest, white head dress, baseball cap. Beating kids on top up boxes	
0759		MORE ABERT AND VIOLENT beatings occur behind and on connex box. Younger TB whipping civs at entrance feet away from british personnel.	
0842		TB w/ white/black based shmeeg, Tri-col or cammies gold rank = makes calls, communicates back to cage	
0827		TB w/ full brown garb Digital plate corner cancels TB	

8/25

0831
0839
0942-JED



(b)(1)1.4d

KIDS OFF CONNEX
Two T-ban in matching woodland tri color

SECRET

V21 EXECUTION MATRIX {working}

	1930Z 25 AUG 0001R	0130Z	0730Z	1330Z	1930Z 26 AUG 0001R	0130Z	0730Z	1330Z	1930Z 27 AUG 0001R	0130Z	0730Z	1330Z	1930Z 28 AUG 0001R	0130Z	0730Z	1330Z	1930Z 29 AUG 0001R	0130Z	0730Z	1330Z								
E CO																												
F CO																												
G CO																												
CAAT																												
81s																												
H&S CO																												
STP																												
CLD																												
MWSD																												
PAX REMAINING	786 pax				CHALK 1 (74)				CHALK 1 (117)				595 pax				462 pax				50 pax				2 pax			
	ICW UK PROCESS EVACUEES AT ABBEY GATE				SUPPORT TO EVACUEE OPERATIONS				ABBNEY GATE CLOSED				ABBNEY GATE RIP w/ UK				ABBNEY GATE RIP w/ 2-501				ABBNEY GATE RIP w/ 2-501				ABBNEY GATE RIP w/ 2-501			
	SUPPORT EVACUATION OPERATIONS																											
	COMMAND AND CONTROL EVACUATION																											
	PROVIDE ROLE 1E CAPABILITY																											
	OPERATIONS AT RAMP 8 PAX TERMINAL																											
	RAMP 8 PAX TERMINAL/REFUELING OPERATIONS																											
	CHALK 6 (192)																											
	CHALK 5 (50)																											
	CHALK 4 (133)																											
	CHALK 5 (113)																											
	CHALK 6 (17)																											
	CHALK 7 (48)																											

1. End of Life Support
2. Chalk 1 Departs HKIA
3. Chalk 2 Departs HKIA
4. Close Abbey Gate
5. Initiate RIP of North and East Gate
6. Chalk 3 Departs HKIA
7. Initiate RIP of Abbey Gate
8. Consolidate JTF-CR to JOC Floor
9. Complete RIP of North & East
10. [REDACTED]
11. Chalk 4 Departs HKIA
12. Complete RIP of Abbey Gate
13. Chalk 5 departs HKIA
14. Chalk 6 departs HKIA
15. Complete Demil/Destruction
16. Chalk 7 Departs HKIA
17. Featherweight ECC established at Ramp 8
18. Chalk 8 Departs HKIA
19. Chalk 9 Departs HKIA
20. JTF TAC established at Ramp 8 Pax terminal

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

08/22

OBSERVATION LOG: REAPER 2 POSREP:			
TIME	LOCATION	EVENT	ACTION TAKEN
2140	CONNEX	10 TB IN GREEN GARB W WHITE HEADBAND AND CLEAR AK	
2220	CONNEX	FIRE STARTED ON BACK SIDE OF CONNEX	
2230	CONNEX	CONVOY OF BUSES	
2336		a taliban member was seen with what appears to be an AK styled rifle but more modern with attachments such as a white light and a possible PEQ	
0105		White bongo truck w/TB Personnel and objects covered by white sheets moves back and forth just beyond TB CHKPT.	
0146		Large groups of people moving north on canal	
0557		A PKM was seen unattended on top of one of the connex boxes	
0559		a taliban member pulled a bunch of children onto to connex box the put them into a group and set a chair up and seemed to be guarding them	
0605		the man gathering children was seen hitting someone with a belt then pulling up a child	
0640		20-30 total children on top of Connex boxes w/TB	
0720		TB w/ ALL black Garab brandishing what ATB are FAR weapon	
0724		CIV Crawled on top of connex box to grab his children. One TB attempted to take a stick from the new TB member in all black however he wouldn't give him the stick and pointed in our direction and back towards the TB side of the Connex	
0740	CONNEX	TERR ENGAGES WITH TALIBAN IN CONVERSATION, INCREASED AMOUNT OF KIDS ON CONNEX BOXES	
0900	Connex	Confo RPK - TB shoots in air	Pic
0955	Balcony cage	man occupies balcony stand	Obs
1008	Balcony cage	man has departed balcony stand	Obs
1012	Parking lot	Sheet placed in front of green vil	
1029	CONNEX	TALIBAN PUSHING all children to right side of connex.	

1051 Connex Pat in white garb, beard, black head dress w/ brown vest + 3
 Phone-pic taken

1100 Connex Same person ↑ ATB Controlling/directing ppl. Kicked man off of the connex,
 1105 ↓
 ↑ Po I ↑ Gets down from box,

1143 - a man with blue min dress pointed his AK at a child's head

1344 Spotted a coyote tan like bag within the perimeter. we talked to EOD and kept eyes on

1349 lost eyes on shot caller due to cars shifting positions

1600 taliban was observed pulling children on top of the conex boxes as well as a single father with a new born - next to the barin hotel 08/29

(22nd)
1710 2x "new" TB on comm w/ BLK garab, chest rig, AK's, Camo 4025 -pic 188

1800 From foot patrol ID TB w/ ATB AKM, Aimpoint & Res on right side of garr. POI wore chest rig & had some type of Pyro, baseball hat on.

At same patrol key leaders in cage balcony pointed @ 3-4 us standing together & walked away cause we were staring @ them.

8/25

- 1119 - a truck drove through the crowd. the bed of the truck was full of what looked like oxy/acetylene tanks for welding
- 1154 - TB have almost 0 presence in the area, I.E. no longer in crowd or on top of cond boxes
- 1419 - 2 white pickups with TB flags pulled up
- 1438 - the taliban started to do a lot of shooting into the air and proceeded to hit people. it looked like they were moving people around.
- 1434 - a black truck with blue sirens and a TB flag drove through the crowd and left
- 1550 - (man/electrician) starts working on telephone wires on top of tele pole to the right of bird cage.
- 1724 - 12 Taliban brought on top of container - aggressive/angry
- 1733 - 18 total TB gather on top of the containers. the talk to a british interpreter and point and stare at us
- 1754 - 12x optic on TB rifle, clean shave, clean cut TB SF
- 1801 - 2x TB spotted w RCO, PR on M4
- 2310 - ~~entr~~ trap house was brought to our attention with at least 4 guys sitting on the wall
- 2314 - guy at trap house peeks around corner and talks to somebody then makes hand gestures back to his group. immediately after 4 individuals could be seen moving behind the fence.
- 2318 - guy on cell phone at trap house looking around.
- 2323 - there is a paper with writing that looks taped to the wall surrounding the trap house
- 2326 - a green laser was shined from the crowd near the cond over the wall
- 2333 - guy at trap house was talking on phone and seemed to be doing light signals the phone was ~~given~~ given to him from someone in the crowd

1738: TB approx. indiv. 10x indiv. w/ distance blind bldg

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten notes on lined paper, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side. The text is mirrored and difficult to decipher.]

~~10 go boy~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

6 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was accompanied by his legal counsel, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below and sign a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy. In the event of three interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (C1), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: The last time we spoke, we were in (b)(1)1.4d at your headquarters. I would like, as a stage setter, to ask if you are attuned to social media on this topic?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. As far as social media, I don't have Facebook, twitter, or Instagram. Anything that I see or hear, comes through my wife who has a Facebook account. She doesn't see a lot on there. I gain most of my information through friends who have those accounts. As far as the withdrawal, I have seen the testimony on C-SPAN and YouTube on events that have transpired over the last couple of years. I have

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(6)

seen some podcasts that have been done, but I have not seen anything on social media.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Have you seen the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) hearing that took place with individuals at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. This past March, I believe, I saw one of my previous Marine Snipers give testimony on his account of Abbey Gate. I saw that, and I know some gold star families have given testimony. I know how to access that information, whether it be YouTube or online, but I haven't listened to all of them.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: Are you aware that some of that testimony is counter to our original findings?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: Review, to the best of your ability, unit events by dates tied to your unit's arrival. We will then walk those time and events up to the 26th of August, when the Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) blast occurs. We know from overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) that the blast occurred at 1736 and 52 seconds and that reporting begins at 1738. Then I'd like to talk post blast, leading up to our last discussion. Start with training your unit conducted pre deployment.

(2) Answer. I'm going to anchor on the exact dates we previously discussed. I remember in late May, or early June, that we started receiving warnings that we may intervene and conduct operations in Afghanistan. In the months of June and July we focused on training for that intervention. Whether it was an orderly withdrawal or a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), we trained to that mission. I remember two or three exercises, definitely two exercises around crisis response evacuations. We went to the extent of loading C-130's on an adjacent base in (b)(1)1.4d to work on timing. Some of those exercises lasted two to three days at a time. In the beginning of August, we saw the security in Afghanistan deteriorate. We got this through reports and through open-source reporting on the news.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Tied to the evacuation, which evacuated over 120,000 people, it would be impossible to replicate to scale what occurred through training. What NEO centered training occurred?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We trained from security ops and conducting entry control point (ECP) operations and we tried to mimic the processing of American citizens and what that would look like to the best of our ability. We focused on security and ECPs at the Infantry level and used our enablers to facilitate the medical support. We tried to replicate that and used the full base to support us as role players. We had a couple of hundred people to help us, and I recognize that what we faced when we deployed doesn't even hold a candle to that. But we did attempt to maximize participation in those rehearsals.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: It is your belief, that the attempt to train to a NEO was made as appropriately as possible?

(2) Answer. I believe we did everything in our power and that the O6 in charge of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) did everything he could to enable us for our mission.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: Some individuals on social media said they did not feel prepared. Why do you think that is?

(2) Answer. I think that some may feel that way because it is near impossible to replicate the situation which we were given.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Did the conditions on the ground change frequently?

(2) Answer. Every day, sometimes over the span of a few hours.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: What are the types of situations that were encountered on any given day if you look at Hamid Karzai International (HKIA) writ large?

(2) Answer. We had external and internal threats. External were obvious. The Taliban had HKIA surrounded and had mortar locations aimed at our positions.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: You feel confident the Taliban had your positions bracketed with mortars?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

(2) Answer. The Taliban confiscated weapons from Afghan security forces and were preparing them to engage us. We received reports of mortar positions around HKIA. We had a Taliban up armored Humvee at the end of our access lane that had a .50 cal mounted on it the entirety of our time at Abbey Gate. We got reports and we saw direct fire weapons systems aimed at us every day. You could see Taliban from Abbey Gate where they had marksmen positions that they tried to conceal and kept pointed at us the whole time.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: Was that clear to your Marines on ground?

(2) Answer. It was without a doubt, obvious that they were well armed and had us surrounded. It took a great deal of restraint from my Marines to act with that threat present.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Any examples?

(2) Answer. The conversations I had with them. They recognized those threats. Therefore, we had conversations about Rules of Engagement (RoE). The weapons were a threat and could be identified as hostile act and intent. But we were working with them to evacuate out of country.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Why were the Taliban willing to work with US Forces at the time?

(2) Answer. My assumption is twofold. They wanted us out of the country, which is clear from higher level negotiations. Two, and this is my speculation, they wanted international credibility, so they were facilitating this.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: Is it fair to say that the Taliban were aware that if there is kinetic activity between the US and the Taliban it would disrupt the timeline?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, they recognized that fact. They knew it would delay our exit from theater.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: Was there kinetic activity between the US Forces and Taliban prior to partnership?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I believe there was, but not from my specific unit. But I believe there was.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: Marines showed incredible restraint. Do you agree there was kinetic activity on any given day that was occurring around HKIA? What other activity was taking place at HKIA and specifically Abbey Gate? To clarify, the NEO was occurring as kinetic activity was happening around HKIA on the same day?

(2) Answer. I believe so, but I can't fully remember.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: That's fine, it's a unique situation.

(2) Answer. This was my fourth combat deployment and I have never seen anything like it. I've deployed to Fallujah, Baghdad, and Helmand province. I have never seen anything like that.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: How did the Service Members on ground exercise restraint in the face of these threats?

(2) Answer. Leaders were present with their Marines and Sailors who understood the gravity of the situation. You can achieve that through training, which we strove to do, but even I didn't think we would work with the Taliban like that. So only leaders being present with their Marines and Sailors can make that kind of restraint.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: Do you believe that, according to the rules of engagement, there were times when Service Members would have been authorized to return with kinetic activity and not exercise restraint?

(2) Answer. I believe there were times when my Marines and Sailors would have been authorized to use lethal force. I believe that they chose not to because they understood what we were trying to achieve. They also understood that if they had chosen to use lethal force the situation may have worsened.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: What do you think would have happened if they used lethal force?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(6)

(2) Answer. The ECPs were like a tinder box, like a house full of natural gas. One spark could have sent it all up in flames.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think, that if there had been a kinetic event, the airfield may have been overrun again?

(2) Answer. I believe it would have been worse. It would have been hard to de-escalate what had been started and would have put many more lives at risk.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: Talk to me about mitigation efforts that were in place, and why? We know there are risks of our chosen profession, please talk to me about the mitigation efforts on the ground to conduct the mission and protect the force?

(2) Answer. As we discussed, the security situation changed daily. It was very fluid. As we processed individuals at Abbey Gate, it was chaotic, but it was controlled chaos. It got worse every day and we adapted to that. We used the canal and jersey barriers to keep the civilians separated. The chevron was emplaced to mitigate the vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) threat. We dragged concrete barriers into place closer to the canal to try and create standoff there. As we were nearing the end of the month, and as more people came to Abbey Gate, we couldn't get the equipment to create more standoff. So, we used c-wire to try and achieve some of those effects, which was ineffective due to the hordes of people at Abbey Gate. Every day we tried to improve our positions, but it got to a point where we could only try to continue to achieve our mission by putting Marines and Sailors right there to prevent the crowds from coming into the gate.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g We were broadcasting to the crowd to calm them down and convey to the population that women and children were being hurt.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Was there any overwatch? I know there were Snipers.

(2) Answer. There were two sniper teams in two separate towers assigned to Abbey Gate. I visited each of those positions daily, if not several times a day, so I remember those.

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y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: What was the tower like? What was the tower itself made out of?

(2) Answer. The Sniper towers were elevated maybe 15-20ft off the ground. If I recall, they had ballistic windows that they could use as a protective measure against any projectiles. They had large thick windows that I believe were movable. The tower was in a better position to be protected from anything that may occur. The tower was made of 15-inch-thick cinderblock, concrete material. Very sturdy.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: The sniper tower is better protected?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, my degree is in civil engineering, so I am very familiar with those materials.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: Okay, so those events are taking place around HKIA. We were trying to conduct evacuation efforts for Afghans and potential evacuees. You had Service Members on the ground who were dealing with a unique situation that continued to change very dynamically. There were mitigation efforts being taken. I'd like to talk more about the Rules of Engagement. What was your main source for the RoE?

(2) Answer. I believe it was Central Command (CENTCOM) standard Rules of Engagement that we received before we came into theater. The same ones I had on my previous deployments. We received a brief on that from a Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer prior to us even deploying into HKIA. I didn't see anything abnormal with those rules of engagement.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Everyone received that brief?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, yes sir. I had discussions with Marines and Sailors about RoE as we walked the lines daily. I know my subordinates were having the same conversations. Specifically, about the Taliban, and the visual threat they posed daily. Those discussions were a necessity for us.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have a conversation regarding RoE with each one of your companies as you circulated?

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(2) Answer. Generally, yes, sir. I don't remember each conversation. Whether it was a random Lance Corporal or anyone supporting on the perimeter or some of our Marines supporting processing with the Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB), I would have conversation with them in a relatively safe spot. Regardless of where they were, we had conversation across our formation.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think snipers had conversations about the RoE?

(2) Answer. I am confident. I visited their positions several times. As did my assistant operations chief, who was my sniper a few years ago. That's why I had him walk the lines, due to his combat experience and his experience as a sniper. They had that conversation.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: Were there individuals that you were especially cognizant of messaging the RoE? Why?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. The complexity of what they were assigned to do mattered. I would have a deeper conversation with the Sniper Team as opposed to a Marine conducting searches at the ECP. Their job was to look for things that were abnormal, so that needed to be a deeper conversation. Conversely, my conversation with the Marine doing searches would be deeper than my conversation with my admin clerk. I certainly took that into consideration, which is why my leaders walked the line and had those conversations.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: What training do snipers have on Positive Identification of Targets (PID)? Specifically, what a sniper would understand is required?

(2) Answer. They were looking for specific descriptions of whatever they were given. They were looking for certain things that stood out to them. Hostile act and Hostile intent were certainly required. That's the conversation I had across my formation. If Marines felt their life was in danger, they were authorized to use lethal force, regardless of who they were. Hostile act and Hostile Intent. That's not always readily clear, which is why it was passed down to each shooter. They had the authority to engage if their judgement was that their life or their comrade's life was in danger.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: Could snipers see the potential Taliban positions we talked about earlier?

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(2) Answer. Yes. You could see them with the naked eye. Hostile intent was displayed every day as we worked to complete our mission.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: So, according to the RoE, every day the Service Members could have engaged but exercised restraint? Why, if it is clear?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Absolutely. Every single day. Potentially because they understood the situation was a tinderbox. Women and Children were also packed front to back. There could have been grave collateral damage that would have hurt our achievement of the mission. I think they recognized that, and that some Marines recognized that not using lethal force, even while allowed, was better than using lethal force and potentially worsening the situation.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1: Is it ever a consideration that engagement could have led to collateral damage?

(2) Answer. Absolutely.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: Were you concerned with threat streams at this time, how specific were those threat streams that you were receiving?

(2) Answer. No threat stream that I can recall was surprising to me, sir. I reflect back to my days in Iraq or earlier in Afghanistan. You'd receive a 'be on the lookout' (BOLO) for a white Opal with military aged males. Those are everywhere. The threat streams changed day to day, sometimes within an hour or two of the same targets on the same day. We tried to pass that info to our Marines as frequently as possible. Mostly by radio. With the Snipers specifically, a leader would go to the Sniper section to receive a brief back to ensure the info was clear.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: That was a Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) that you used?

(2) Answer. Roger sir, we were making sure the information made it from our S2 cell to the Marines. My subordinate leaders did the confirmation briefs.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

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(1) Question. C1: Do you remember suicide bomber threat streams?

(2) Answer. I remember VBIED threats, and potential suicide vest threats, backpack threats, and brief case threats. It changed frequently. I think that it changed frequently because the way we received info was either unclear or unreliable.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: I would like to specifically talk about PBIEDs. Do you recall ever receiving a photo or hand drawing or anything that gave you very specific individuals?

(2) Answer. We were never given anything like that. It was always a narrative description.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Were those descriptions general enough that, in that massive crowd of people, there could have been multiple individuals in the crowd that fit that description?

(2) Answer. It was like where's Waldo or a needle in a haystack. There were hordes of individuals.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: If you had a description of a bald individual with a beard and tan man jama would multiple individuals have fit that description?

(2) Answer. 99% of males fit that description, sir.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: If you look at those individuals in the crowd, paired with that description, what kind of positive identification are you looking for? How can you be sure?

(2) Answer. I argue that it's almost impossible to gain enough justification to use lethal force in the situation that you just described.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: If an individual matched that description, and acted in a way that was outside the norm, is that enough to use lethal force?

(2) Answer. Not unless my Marines felt like their lives were endangered by those specific actions.

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rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think the individuals in the crowd were acting normally in this situation?

(2) Answer. Most, if not all were agitated. As we got closer to the end of the month, which was our deadline, it got more chaotic and hectic. The feel and the climate amongst civilians became more desperate and agitated.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Did you routinely see people act abnormally?

(2) Answer. Every day. A lot of people seeking refuge would hold up signs, some had call signs of our units or specific names. They would claw at our Marines. I remember seeing one woman and her two children being crushed against a chain link fence and my Marines reaching down to save them. That was the situation in the two days before the attack occurred.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: If there was an individual that matched the description you had been given, and that individual was not acting like those around him. Say that they are blankly staring off into space. Is that enough PID to engage?

(2) Answer. I would not be able to justify lethal force for a situation like that. Because I would not feel like the lives of myself, or my Marines, are in imminent danger.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned a Master Sergeant Talking to the Marines?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

now.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear about Taliban misconduct, specifically any killing?

(2) Answer. No, we saw what everyone else was seeing on national television. We saw the beating and the shoving, but never a report that the Taliban had just killed someone.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

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(1) Question. C1: What could you have done if the Taliban had killed someone?

(2) Answer. I don't know. It was an odd situation in that they were the external security outside the chevron. They were not within our ability to affect anything that they were doing. Barring us escalating the situation, and trying to abide by the RoE, there is nothing that we could do there.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: To clarify, when you say that you don't know, you mean that it doesn't fall within the RoE?

(2) Answer. Correct, intervention there wouldn't fall within our RoE. There is nothing we could have lawfully done in a situation like that.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Let's talk intel for a second. Top-down intel comes from the S2/J2 and is general in nature. It can be bad and incomplete. Then there is bottom-up intel, every Marine is a sensor. The world today is digitally connected, did the Marines from the bottom up ever call you forward to show you a potential threat?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall, I don't remember a photo on a phone or device and being shown that. It may have occurred with the Sniper team because they had the ability to take photos with the equipment they had been given, but I don't remember being shown any photos or the details of any of those photos. Those photos would have gone to the S2, the Snipers had a channel directly to the S2 officer and chief that was sitting in my combat operations center (COC). We also had, kind of a recon cell, with the sniper leadership in the COC. I don't remember ever receiving anything like that back there.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you never got an update from your S2 in your updates about anything like that?

(2) Answer. No, we had updates every day and I never remember receiving any kind of intelligence update like that.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned a (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, I can't remember exactly who (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would know, he was tied at the hip to the sniper team that entire time.

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bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember, from your snipers or other elements, a specific request for engagement authority? Would they have needed it based on the RoE?

(2) Answer. No, I don't. No, they would not. It was within their purview to make that decision to engage.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1: Did the (b)(6) have the authority to authorize offensive operations?

(2) Answer. I did not have the authority to authorize those operations or to change the rules of engagement. I simply did not have that authority.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: For clarity. No one ever asked you for engagement authority and pointed out a specific individual and asked you to engage?

(2) Answer. Nobody personally asked me if they could engage a target.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1: Based on our discussion, and the fact that it was fully within the RoE if there was PID, the Snipers were authorized if they met those requirements?

(2) Answer. Correct, they were authorized to engage if they met those requirements.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1: Would a request to engage have gone to anyone other than you?

(2) Answer. It could have gone to my combat operations center. My Sniper teams had direct connectivity to my combat operations center and could have asked them directly.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1: If that had occurred, would you know about that? Did that ever occur, where an element called and requested engagement authority?

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(2) Answer. I would eventually know about it, but that could have been a minute or an hour later. I don't recall ever receiving a request to engage, I don't ever remember that. I do remember the Snipers requesting that I come to their position after that.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1: Did you adhere to that request?

(2) Answer. I did, I am sure because I visited that position routinely.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: That request wasn't tied to an engagement authority request, was it?

(2) Answer. I don't remember specifics of that engagement, but I am sure that I visited.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b. What was your connectivity, did you have a radio or a radio telephone operator (RTO)?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4a so I had direct comms with my COC.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b. To be clear, your COC could always contact you?

(2) Answer. Right. (b)(1)1.4a
 (b)(1)1.4a I can't remember if every element had them.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. C1: So, when the sniper team asked you to visit their position did you receive that in person?

(2) Answer. Yes, the COC had requested that I come back. I received the request there, and I know I went to them after. But I can't remember that time lag. I was meeting with BGen Sullivan, individuals processing, coordinating with the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d at the edge of Abbey Gate. When I was with the (b)(1)1.4d communications were very sporadic.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Based on all conversations on suspicious persons at the gate, the personnel acting outside of the norm, would that conduct support seeking approval for offensive operations?

(2) Answer. Absolutely not, I would be in Leavenworth now.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1: Is it factual to say, that if you were a sniper in 2/1, and you had a positive check mark within the Rules of Engagement. Meaning there was hostile act or hostile intent, and you had positive identification, then they had the authority to engage the threat?

(2) Answer. Absolutely sir. Not just my sniper teams, that goes for any of my Marines or Sailors across the formation if those conditions existed.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1: If you are any Marine in 2/1 and you have positive ID and a justification under the RoE do you need to ask the chain of command for permission to engage?

(2) Answer. No sir, you are justified as an individual to make that decision without approval.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. C1: Okay, so the night of the 25th. North and East Gate are closed. North Gate has the VBIED threat and East Gate has people leaking through which threatens to flood the airfield. Abbey Gate becomes the only opportunity. People find alternate ingress routes to Abbey Gate and the crowds grow exponentially in a short period of time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) makes the decision to collapse along the canal as a force protection measure. There are individuals who have asserted that decision placed the Marines at greater risk. Do you agree?

(2) Answer. I don't think it placed them at greater risk, it just placed them at a different risk. The area controlled on the 25th was a greater area, but there was a lesser number of people. When the other gates closed, more of the population tried to come in the area that we secured. It was a math problem. It became apparent to the (b)(6)

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(b)(6) that he didn't have enough Marines to hold it, so he collapsed his Marines into a position they could control and still use the area. Now they had less risk of being trampled and losing control of the crowd, but a greater risk of being close to the crowd. It was just a different risk.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was there ever an assessment by your team on the ground to reinforce your position with additional personnel? You just went from three to one egress points.

(2) Answer. I can't speak to that, sir. I know we were preparing to conduct our relief in place (RIP) with the 82nd on the 26th. I don't remember a conversation about extra forces to reinforce our position.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). You could see the difference in the number of people though, did you make an assessment to request for additional resources and personnel?

(2) Answer. I don't remember doing that, sir. I know that we used more of our own personnel. I felt that we had sufficient forces to complete the mission. (b)(1)1.4d was right there, and we were integrated with them. I felt like our force was sufficient. We had a working relationship with (b)(1)1.4d and had trained with them the month before.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have a reaction drill discussed with (b)(1)1.4d if you needed additional forces?

(2) Answer. No, but it was understood within our relationship.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. C1: Can you discuss what occurred in your leader meetings and specifically the meeting on the 26th of August that had the Taliban, 82nd, and (b)(1)1.4d present to discuss airfield security?

(2) Answer. The meeting with the Taliban on the 26th was the only meeting that I was in during the deployment with Taliban commanders. It was an hour before the attack occurred. That was the only meeting I was ever in. The (b)(6) from the 82nd was there and the (b)(1)1.4d was there. A linguist was there with the (b)(1)1.4d. Then there were 5 or 6 Taliban commanders. We discussed the collapse of the coalition position and the closure of Abbey Gate that evening. Because the Taliban were going to pick up additional security to facilitate the closure. We discussed closing the (b)(1)1.4d position outside the chevron and collapsing inside the

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Abbey Gate, then we would hand off Abbey Gate security to the 82nd. We were trying to make clear that the Taliban had immediate security outside of the Abbey Gate and the sequence of when that would happen. When we left that meeting, everyone's roles were clear.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was BGen Sullivan there for that meeting?

(2) Answer. Not to my recollection, he was out there earlier on the 26th with MG Donahue I believe. I don't really remember. That meeting was just the three (b)(6) (b)(6). I recall MG Donahue and BGen Sullivan having separate meetings, but I don't want to speculate as to when those occurred.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1: Could you layout for me an understanding of the sniper team, the members, and their roles and responsibilities?

(2) Answer. Within the Marine Corps the composition of the sniper team has changed over the years. From my experience, it's really left up to the (b)(6) (b)(6) on how they want to shape it. Whether it a team of 4 like the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), or a team of 8. But generally, you want as many school trained, qualified snipers as possible. That is a Marine that has been to the sniper school in Quantico or California and is a school trained sniper. They gain a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) when they graduate that school. Pre-deployment you want as many qualified snipers as possible. That's not always possible. I think the Marine Corps TOE has 17 positions for snipers, but a Marine Battalion is lucky to deploy with eight. That's due to qualified candidates, washouts, etc. Within our Battalion, we had teams mostly of six. I think we had a team of seven. We had four teams of six. Not every member was a qualified, trained sniper. The jargon with the Marine Corps is that a qualified sniper is a HOG, and a PIG is a non qualified member of the sniper platoon.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1: Please clarify that, and explain for me: HOG is a hunter of gunmen and a PIG is a professionally instructed gunmen, correct?

(2) Answer. Correct, sir. The HOG is a school trained sniper. PIG is an individual that is in the sniper team but has not qualified as a sniper and has not completed the proper training to become a qualified sniper.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Which members in the sniper team would have been at Abbey Gate and what was their hierarchy?

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(2) Answer. I can't remember everyone on the team, sir. I remember the Team Leader was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was a HOG, a school trained sniper. The senior most member on that team, and the senior most sniper on that team. He was in charge of that team.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have any Battalion Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that applied to the Snipers?

(2) Answer. We did not have a written SOP applying directly to snipers. I would have had to ask the (b)(6) if he had a written platoon SOP, that was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. C1: What interaction would the Snipers have had with the (b)(1)1.4a elements?

(2) Answer. There was no chain of command relationship between the Snipers and the (b)(1)1.4a team. The only relation they would have had is being in the same geographic location. The (b)(1)1.4a team was at Abbey Gate almost the entire time, and that is the only relationship they would have had.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. C1: Would the snipers have used the (b)(1)1.4a team as a source of intel or pictures?

(2) Answer. No sir, that wouldn't come through the Sniper team.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. C1: Would the snipers pass the be on the lookout information to the (b)(1)1.4a team?

(1) Answer. No sir, that had nothing to do with them.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. Where did snipers get info from and who did they give it to?

(2) Answer. Either their platoon commander or the Battalion S2.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: To the best of your recollection, do you remember an order on what equipment was being redeployed and what was being destroyed?

(2) Answer. We received formal guidance. I don't remember what it was. A lot was left up to commander judgment on what specifically would need to be destroyed or extracted.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall how much of the combat operations center came back to (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. The (b)(6) would know better than I, but not a lot came back with us. A lot was destroyed.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you feel that was justified based on space?

(2) Answer. Yes, we destroyed crew served weapons and ammo. Large equipment was disabled. That was the guidance we received from the Joint Task Force Crisis Response (JTF-CR).

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else you would like to mention?

(2) Answer. You may be aware sir that I sat down with the HFAC a few weeks ago. Within that meeting the House Armed Service Committee and Marine Office of Legislative Affairs had members present. I was there with my counsel and was questioned on specifics regarding the withdrawal. We discussed the events leading up to the withdrawal, the training we did prior to insertion into Afghanistan. I couldn't recall a lot of things day by day and defaulted to the investigation. I was asked many questions about the offensive and defensive rules of engagement. I was asked about my Sniper teams reporting, the things they say, and other questions tied to information presented during congressional testimony. Specifically, events on the 25th and 26th of August and some questions about our roles there, and our actions surrounding that time were important. I was also questioned on whether I felt that I was restricted (b)(6) (b)(6), in regard to decisions being made as they pertain to Abbey Gate. I was also questioned on if I ever saw pictures of the suicide bomber. I don't remember pictures ever being tied to any of the BOLOs, it was always a narrative description that was passed to us.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

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(1) Question. C1: Anything else? Anybody else we need to talk to lend clarity to this discussion?

(2) Answer. No, sir, nothing else to add. I think you should have a conversation with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Our previous working relationship is important, he understood what was happening, and made his rounds. He may be able to lend some clarity.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. C1: If I have any follow up questions, I will reach out to you. We will send you this transcription for your review.

(1) Answer. Understood, Sir.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance G Curtis,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lance Curtis
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

From: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted]
Cc: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: Memo for Abbey Gate interview
Date: Friday, November 17, 2023 8:12:31 AM

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) thanks for the email. Unfortunately, I have attempted to gain access to the document through multiple venues with no joy. However, I approve of the transcript. I am comfortable with the work that your team has done in this endeavor.

If this email does not meet the requirements of what you need to proceed, then please advise and I'll re-attack.

Thanks again.

Semper Fidelis

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From: [Redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2023 1:20 PM
To: [Redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Cc: [Redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 [Redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Memo for Abbey Gate interview

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Sir,

I am a member of the Abbey Gate supplemental review team. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reached out to you for the approval of the SIPR transcript. Once you've seen that, and are ready to approve it, please sign this and send it back to me. I will pair it with your statement on SIPR. The interview ends on page 20.

Please let me know if you have any issues.

V/R

[Redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Release



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Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

07 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 07 November 2023 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(1)1.4a, Battalion Conference Room, (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you arrive?

(2) Answer. The second week of Aug, the transport left from Ft. Bragg to the PAX Terminal in Charleston, SC. We met up with the 82nd Airborne Division and flew to Germany, then flew to (b)(1)1.4d where we broke ties with the 82nd. We were told to find a space in a transient tent and stand-by. We didn't want to just sit in a tent with our skillset. We found a ride through a relationship (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made with an Air Force major and boarded a C-130 loaded with medical and water supply to HKIA. We landed around 0130L in the morning. Met with the individual receiving the medical supplies and let them know we were from Fort Bragg and here to help. They were essentially like, "who are you guys?"

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Met up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the palette yard. We retrieved our equipment and went to the JOC where (b)(1)1.4a and 24th MEU, some (b)(1)1.4a and some recon elements that set up their JOC. We were introduced to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the Marine PAO with TF 51/5, who had a relationship to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

In about 20-30 min, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave us a rundown of the environment and roles and responsibility of every gate. It seemed like a mess. Tracers and shots were flying from the second we landed until we left. Rounds skipped across the JOC wall or in front of your vehicle. Thousands of individuals walking around the airport looking lost. Transports had to stop because the runways were overrun. Very chaotic, just how you saw on the news.

The following morning myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Knauss met up with a Marine EOD that had an up-armored vehicle. He took us to a bone yard to get a vehicle. Previously we decided we needed Abbey and Black Gate access with the (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g Black gate we were told was seldom open. We determined that we needed a vehicle. Found a Land Cruiser that did not have a battery. We pulled a battery and hotwired the vehicle. We zip tied the (b)(1)1.4g to the front bumper, grounded it with the frame of the vehicle and stowed the battery to power the (b)(1)1.4g. We had to be savvy to understand how the vehicle and electronics would work.

That was our bread and butter, to influence at the gate and comfort zones.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Describe your shift change procedures?

(2) Answer. Shifts ran between 12 and 18 hour shifts. PM shift was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) AM shift was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Ryan, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) occasionally, the shifts would overlap. Very common to overlap because of a riot at the gate, for example.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were the times of the shift change?

(2) Answer. 1630-1700 and 0900-1000 the following morning. Sometimes PM team didn't get off until 1500, knowing we would be relieving the AM team a few hours later. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were close. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was previously an instructor of mine. Ryan Knauss was my best friend.

Our first interaction. We were coming back from the bone yard to the comfort zone. We noticed a group that was rambunctious. And noticed what looked like a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) with a moderately sized speaker and nothing was happening. We immediately found the Ground Force Commander (GFC). We asked if we could conduct a loudspeaker operation. At the time the Lt on the ground was ready to pepper spray the crowd and other nonlethal tactics. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was skilled with

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understanding women, children and the elderly. We did a quick interpreter vetting; letting them know that “we can’t promise anything” and within a few minutes we had the crowd sitting quietly. We were at the comfort zone for 30 min and got the crowd to the point where Marines were able to pass out MREs, in comparison to the previous point where the crowd wanting to harm the Marines. We were able to provide this same kind of help at any of the Gates and at the Role I and II facilities.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What does Shift Change look like?

(2) Answer. We would come back to the JOC to get Intelligence updates. Talk to the Recon element for VBIED threats, updates on High Value Individuals (HVI) and refit with water. We stayed near the JOC. The relief team would walk to the JOC. So, by the time we finished rounds we would meet at the JOC for updates. Not having comms was difficult, so we used [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g, without encryption. We attempted to get the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a but we couldn't. Our cell phones didn't work. We went to using a dirty Wi-Fi, so that we could update our families and get on WhatsApp. That was the only communication, so we had to sync at the JOC. The radio communications that were established, was through the snipers at the gate. They had comms back to the JOC. So, we could see who else had comms back to the JOC when we were at the gate.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was the quality and quantity of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. Accurate. Based on our comms with the recon element. The reports from intel were accurate. Same with VBIED threats. Those were corroborated by the EOD that were tasked to go out and compare with information from other partner nations. Without revealing our intel, by talking to the Canadians we could confirm the Intel was the same.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What organization gave you your intel updates?

(2) Answer. The individual from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Anytime my team interdicted fence jumpers, we detained and did tactical questioning, and we relayed all that information back to the JOC to that individual (referencing [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)).

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was that your main point of contact?

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(2) Answer. Him and a major with dark hair. Kind of in shape, meathead version. We gravitated towards each other. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would know who he was. It was not just getting Intelligence from them, but we relayed things we observed like behavior, sentiment, and Taliban behavior toward the crowd. Observing sentiment after reports of VBIED or threat reporting. Trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle. From the changes in sentiment, it was obvious that the crowd understood there were threats.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. What about BOLOs - what did that look like?

(2) Answer. The threat stream we took very seriously whether it was said once or repeated or through the PAO. But mainly through [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That BOLO threat continued; it didn't just end on our shift. It seemed to compile up like we got the VBIED reports, it was a Corolla or Camry, and we would see that, because they deterred the threat. If a VBIED did pop off, we would hear it. The VBIED threat was taken care of, and they were going out to secure the vehicle and confirmed that it was the Corolla we saw from the JOC.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. How about on the 26th? What do you know about the BOLO?

(2) Answer. Previous to that threat, everyone was doing the private news net campaign that everyone is pulling out on the 25th. We were clearing the JOC today, August 24th, while the 26th is the last man in the Afghanistan and the Taliban were taking over. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d After that, we noticed the shift to Abbey Gate when messages went out that the other gates were closed. The number of children that we pulled out was significant. Word got out that individuals with children were going to be let through first. From the sniper tower we would see men snatch kids and move to the front saying, "let me in". That elevated act may have been elevated to Suicide Vest (SVEST) reporting. Word went out that if there is anyone trying to evacuate from the North Gate, don't even talk to them. From where we stood in the sniper tower, there was so many people you couldn't see the horizon. Non-validated ID cards, we would conduct a Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and tactical questioning, and then put them on a bus with other detainees and they were shipped out of the North Gate.

We went out to the Abbey Gate. There was a chaos of people. The concrete barrier had been shifted. This was the first time we pulled our vehicle up to the sniper tower. The GFC asked if we could turn the vehicle to face the canal. We found an interpreter and once we saved his family, then he started to help us. There were pictures taken. At that time, we told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) of a bomber [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I asked if they had heard of the IED threats. They said no. Another individual radioed back asking. We told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the buzz around the JOC and that there was going to be some SVEST individual, we confirmed.

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We told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that it was a clean-cut, clean-shaven, nicely dressed individual [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us that his wardrobe would be better maintained than individuals who had been at the gate for days. The JOC, the POC and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made me aware of the suicide threat. We didn't get a description of the testers; we just knew they were going to test the ability to get in the gate before the suicide bomber.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you gave the information to Marines in the tower did you share that with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or did he already have the info?

(2) Answer. He said he did not have it. He wrote it down in his notebook.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. When did you get the info about the suicide bomber threat?

(2) Answer. August 24th or the 25th. Maybe the evening of the 24th.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. When you have the conversation with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), what time was that?

(2) Answer. In the morning, the sun was up. At this point everyone in the tower began looking for the individual. That became our main focus. Looking for an individual that is standing out. This was the day before or the morning of the bombing.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That was the main BOLO? Were there any others?

(2) Answer. That was it. That was the last piece of information as far as what to be on the lookout for. All the VBIED BOLOs circled the North Gate. Because there was a lot of traffic activity before everyone migrated to the Abbey Gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. That day before they go off shift was that August 26th?

(2) Answer. Didn't circulate within a day and a half. Because we gave threat information to the team before going on shift. We were able to relay that BOLO to the tower and then [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was able to relay the same BOLO. I remember pulling the truck past the tower. I saw the effectiveness of our support. Ryan and I always talked about what did and didn't work. We never pulled the truck up that far. I was the one who told him that he should pull the truck up to where we did.

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p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. How often per shift would you talk to the snipers at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Dozens of times. We got to know the people at the other gates and at the comfort areas. We would talk to the GFC and see if we could help. Conduct loudspeaker operations or help guide people to the comfort zone.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Did they see you as a good source of information or intel and ask for updates from you frequently?

(2) Answer. I think so and, yes, they did. When they saw we had transportation and went to the JOC frequently. Because they didn't leave the gate for days. They were happy to see new faces. They were very receptive of everything we were doing. We told them how to use the equipment if the crowd changes behavior. It was a very symbiotic relationship.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Did they understand what the role of [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a was?

(2) Answer. I believe so. We were very respectful of the GFC. We were not just meatheads with beards and suppressors who weren't here to contribute. One of the ground force commanders was very accepting. His was the team that suffered the most casualties. I remember talking to him at the PAX terminal and him saying what it felt like when we were not here two days ago. There was a level of trust that was there.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. On the morning of August 26th, did you see anyone that fit the BOLO description?

(2) Answer. Yes, I did. It's pretty obvious, the desperation and despair. In the crowd there are people that were trampled and then there is a person who is just perfectly serene. Those people stuck out. Any time we saw someone like that we thought of how to handle that situation. I could probably flip through pictures and show you the same people in the same spot that hadn't moved for days while they were waiting to be evacuated. So, when you look at people who weren't there the day before and you come back 8-9 hours and they are at the front, they stick out.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Were there a lot of that type of people?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2-3 of that type of people.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Any indication to you beyond looking indifferent? Were there any indication of hostile act/hostile intent? Anything peculiar?

(2) Answer. I don't know about hostile intent, but I can pick out abnormalities in situations and crowds a lot. My (b)(6) picks on me because of it; I can't go to a restaurant without picking out some abnormality. As far as hostile intent, one could say that someone showing no despair when everyone around them is trying to escape for their lives conveys that. And it's not just them, but the people around them suddenly gone and why are the people in the windows not out taking pictures. All those things started to connect that this is happening soon. There wasn't ever a decision of what to do, just keep doing your job. But my loudspeaker is not going, and we could've used it to influence the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Did you see anyone that fit the description.

(2) Answer. They did fit the description. There was one who was older who looked like he just got out of a salon, clean skin, very relaxed posture. There were other men present, at the gate, about his age, that looked the complete opposite. Why is it that every other middle- to late-age man looked like they'd been ripped at for days and you look so clean and relaxed.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Could you have shot that person based on what you saw?

(2) Answer. My ability, yes, but legally, no. That does not abide by law. Our ROE was very specific. I don't agree with the ROE at all. I don't believe in murder, but I do believe in my friends coming home. I don't feel like the identification of suspicious persons was handled quickly and appropriately.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What do you mean?

(2) Answer. It seemed like the people at the tower and relaying information that could corroborate with intel was just received and actions not followed through on. We talked a lot about how to employ our skills. We could've been given orders. Like "at this time, we need everyone to do something that would reveal if someone was concealing a suicide vest," But we were not given any direction on how to handle things. We know how to conduct a loudspeaker operation in the presence of an IED threat. We have done that with dozens and hundreds of people before. A conversation happened between (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Guidance for us was to just stop riots. However, I have a

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loudspeaker. I can talk to everyone. I could give orders to the crowd. It worked at the comfort area and at the other gates.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b What time did he feel like he saw the person that fit the BOLO?

(2) Answer. Towards the end of my shift.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Where were they in relation to the tower?

(2) Answer. On the other side of the wadi (canal). There was a wall that ran down the side of the wadi, then there was a row of houses and a big brick wall that had a downward facing slope. This individual was a few feet from the wall near the top of the slope. If you were looking out the tower facing east. This individual would be to my 10-11 o'clock facing east out of the tower (points on map to where the blast occurred).

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Do you recall the appearance and behavior of the individual?

(2) Answer. No hat, light beige man robe, not sitting; there were a couple other individuals that were sitting on their butts hugging their knees. Why were they sitting while everyone was up waving papers. I remember an individual in black sitting for about 20 min. Before we returned, he had left. He exited toward the foot bridge. I told that to the EOD personnel after the blast. They said it could've been the spotter. I would never forget the face of the two individuals that looked like they did not look like they belong there.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Were you able to reestablish visual contact?

(2) Answer. They were looking at 3-4 individuals based on the last time we were there to give them an update. We asked if that was Taliban, but the Taliban were gone from where they had been prior.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b Were there Taliban throughout the day on the day of the blast?

(2) Answer. No, the day prior they were walking closer to the foot bridge, closer than we had ever seen them. To the point where I could reach out and touch the Taliban's face. Previously, they had been closer to the Chevron.

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(2) Answer. Around 10 or 11. Our shift change had been running late. When we got back to the JOC, the only place the oncoming team had gone was the Abbey gate. We went to the Passenger terminal, Black Gate, North Gate, the comfort zones enroute to Abbey Gate. When we did a relief-in-place (RIP) that was the first place that we went and nowhere else.

ee. Question and Answer 30.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Since the shift was running late, how did you meet up with the rest of the team to do a RIP?

(2) Answer. While my replacement team made their way to the JOC, we left the Abbey Gate to go back to the JOC and they were there. Our meeting location to RIP was the JOC.

ff. Question and Answer 31.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Tell me about the suspicious persons and the tower conversation where they agreed it meets the BOLO, did they show you a picture?

(2) Answer. Yes. they had a picture on their high-resolution camera. They had pictures of every suspicious person that they were sending back to the JOC. We would take a picture of an individual down at the canal then go up to the tower and say, "did you see this individual?" So, two independent pictures taken of the suspicious person and then there was one individual that was kneeling. We did not see him again, but they had a picture of him – probably the spotter. The individual that was close to the walls, they had pictures.

gg. Question and Answer 32.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) If I show you a photo would you recognize the person? (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shows (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) picture EX S066 - Sniper picture, 26 August 21).

(2) Answer. Yes sir. With the thin grey chin hair and bald head. ((b)(3)130b, (b)(6) refers to the central figure in the photo). That was the individual that I did not see again. That was the man that was closest to the wadi. ((b)(3)130b, (b)(6) points out a figure next to the central figure). No, not the individual next to him. At one point he was doing a squat and holding his knees and walked toward the foot bridge. We noticed how clean his robe was. It was almost shiny it was so clean. The other suspicious individual was further up the wall.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

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(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Were the other individuals of concern you mentioned in that picture?

(2) Answer. No sir.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. What was concerning about the other individuals?

(2) Answer. Their demeanor. They were relaxed. They were not constantly trying to get someones attention to get help. They were almost careless of our presence. We saw 2-3 that fit that posture or mannerism in addition to that individual (in black). At first the BOLO was one. We were told that they may be traveling on a motorbike or scooter. We knew about the abandoned vehicle. We saw dozens of mopeds and scooters. Later [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us he may be traveling with an older man. We started looking for someone that is traveling with another man and was clean shaven. It was strange to see a man traveling with another man. They would normally have been with their family.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Was the individual you were keeping an eye on an individual or were they with someone else, together or separated?

(2) Answer. They were separated in time and space. I never saw them together, but it was easy to pick out in a crowd who didn't belong based on attire and demeanor. We ran up a request to conduct a call out and detain this individual. If they were a passport holder, then we could send them back. I think it was the first time we requested to do an individual call out; it was at the base of the tower it was a LtCol. I was not there. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, that we need to do a call out. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, came back and said that was a negative, a big no. I don't know how that came back. I did not see [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, interaction with the (Marine) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Did you have any exchange with the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. I was in the tower when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, and maybe [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, said that this guy meets the description, what can we do? And there was silence. So, I wasn't around for the end of that conversation. But I did hear [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, and someone else ask for permission. Words were not spoken, "can we shoot him," but words were spoken about what can we do. It was with a Marine LtCol.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Was this during the morning of the 26th, towards the end of your shift, when you and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, left?

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(2) Answer. Yes, Sir. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and me, we did our RIP with Ryan and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, and told them what they should and shouldn't do for their shift. If they got back out to the tower and the conversation continued, that's possible. But that was the last time that we talked to them before the blast.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Was the pictured individual still down there? What about the other individual being observed?

(2) Answer. To be honest, we stopped focusing on them because they started moving down the canal, towards the Chevron.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. Did the snipers try to make a case to the [REDACTED] (b)(6) of positive identification (PID)?

(2) Answer. I was not there at that point. We did have a conversation before the LtCol got there, that this person checked every box of what was being described earlier. From our capabilities, we could've helped with an [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a escalation. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. What guidance were you given? What did you believe you were allowed to do?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a We could've said screw it because the international forces would've been doing it. But it would not have been coordinated with GFC. I feel like the BOLO wouldn't have been as relevant. I didn't do intelligence dumps. If I did, I would've called out something that was more of an anomaly. I will credit my team to say that. You guys are seeing things through a drone, we are seeing people getting pulled through crap water. It will be easy to see if anyone was standing out.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b. When did you get anything from higher that there was a threat?

(2) Answer. Not in the JOC. I feel like I believed that before anyone had to say it. I feel like if this individual was there days prior which they probably were, nothing was done different from normal operations. It was business as usual of riot control and American citizen (AMCIT) vetting.

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qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The individuals you observed personally, the BOLO came out the day before, you were looking at them that morning, had you observed anyone prior to that morning? After the BOLO coming out do you remember anyone saying that was the individual?

(2) Answer. No, we definitely started to see people that fit the BOLO. The BOLO could be fake or a threat from another network to get us to change our TTPs. But then we started hearing the BOLO circulating through other sources.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. Prior to the 26th, it was fair to say that you did not see anyone that, you felt, met the BOLO decrsctipon?

(2) Answer. Correct.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much time do you spend on social media, on this topic?

(2) Answer. At first, I had a very hard time. I got off social media in November 2021, cold turkey. I stopped being active on social media, when I got on and it was people tagging me in posts and sending requests. So, I have not been on social media in two years. [REDACTED] (b)(6) is on social media and people started asking her questions and asking about what is going on with me? She just has to brush it off. As far as my involvement, I don't need any more recognition than I am already getting.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you done any other DoD- or media-related interactions?

(2) Answer. No media relation, not that I am in fear of repercussions. It was hard enough coming here; I don't need to make a documentary about it. I don't need to watch a documentary about it. I know you have people that will write books. I'm afraid if I really shared, no one wants to hear about the dead babies I pulled out of mothers' arms. If I make a documentary to tell people that I saw Taliban execute people. I don't follow anyone that does, it is not going to serve a purpose for me.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. Because you made your rounds, we've gotten varying reports of Taliban actions and violence, did you personally observe any?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. I saw it once. Out by the Chevron. It was a young man. It's tough because we are trained to interdict, and we were denied the ability to do so. There was a small entrance gate out past the connexes that the Taliban would temporarily let people come through. We thought if there were people coming through a gate, we should take a peek out there. That was my first time seeing a Taliban that close, with mascara, nice clothes, chains. They were pulling people from each other. Firing their guns in the air and burning women on their face with the barrels. I did not want to go back to say, "can we shoot these guys because of what they were doing" when it was pretty clear that we had to work with the Taliban. We would park around this footbridge and walked down to the Chevron and walk back. We were at an angle set up to conduct loudspeaker operation.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you keep in touch with anyone from Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, and I text everyone once and while. The Doc that worked on Ryan. When I met up with Ryan at the hospital, I stayed with him until he passed away. I helped in the Role I and Role II with tourniquets and bandages. When they started to move Ryan to surgery. There was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When Ryan passed away, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came out to see me. He stepped away from the table to see me and my team who just came down from where they were being treated. And then I remember seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got home on August 27th to the 28th. One night, as my (b)(6) was sleeping, I was talking

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We later got together over coffee, and he tells me that if Ryan hadn't passed away when he did, and he hadn't able to move on to a new patient, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would not be here either. So, I reached out to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on social media. I told him the guy that got to save you was able to do so because of my friend. I'm ok with that. We got to talk (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) follows (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on social media (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tells me things like that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) achieved a new fit PR today. That's my extent of keeping in touch. I talk to Ryan's parents and family every week. I talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Occasionally, I will run into an operator who was at the Abbey Gate who would recognize me.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about this, as well?

(2) Answer. We don't really talk about our times at the Abbey Gate. I'm sure he gets that from everyone under the sun. He's not someone I feel I need to vent to. In cases where he is testifying, I offered help. He is just a friend. We share that in common but that's not why I reach out. I talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a lot. If I get a text at 0100 in the morning or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wants to call in on a Monday, it's probably because I want to call in on a Monday too. We're there for each other, always.



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SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 07 November 2023, which begins on page ____ and ends on page _____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of person making Statement)

09 Nov 23
DATE

(
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

7 Nov 23
DATE

~~CUI~~

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

17 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 17 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via SIPR Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Please tell us a little about your Marine Corps background.

(2) Answer. I joined the Marine Corps in 2012 as an 0311 (Infantryman) and started out with 1/7 in 29 Palms and was there until 2018. I then laterally moved into the (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) and was slated to be part of Objective Afghanistan with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was my OIC. My Team Chief was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We were also with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We were in theater together, but when everything kicked off at HKIA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were the

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

only [REDACTED] (b)(6) from our team who went to support there. The rest of the team was distributed across the CENTCOM AOR. We were supplemented by some Army folks at HKIA.

c. Question and Answer 2

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you got to HKIA, who were you working for?

(2) Answer. My OIC was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and my Chief was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who had been working out of [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. We supported the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a the entire deployment but would have fallen under the MEU and ultimately the JTF-CR at HKIA.

d. Question and Answer 3

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Who was tasking your team at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Most likely JTF-CR, but I'm unsure who was tasking my OIC and Chief. I took my tasking directly from them.

e. Question and Answer 4

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you arrive at HKIA?

(2) Answer. We arrived 17 August. I know we arrived after the people had mobbed the airport and a few people had fallen from planes. The perimeter was in place when we arrived.

f. Question and Answer 5

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you arrived at HKIA, where was your team operating from?

(2) Answer. We shared a building with either the Finns or the Swedes, they had the downstairs, and we had the upstairs. Building 200, the building was the one closest to North Gate. That's where our team's COC was. Our team operated out of there the entire time. My battle rhythm was wake up, get briefed by my leadership, then go to whichever gate wasn't already being manned by HUMINT personnel. We would go to gates to help pull people out of the crowd, mostly based off information our 2X was providing from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c. Under the supervision of my team OIC and Chief, guys from the team would choose whatever gate they went to, and everyone else would fill in as necessary. Some gates were more hectic than others, and personally, I think guys chose what gates they went to based on how comfortable they felt about being there. Although we didn't know the Army HUMINT guys very well upon arrival, we sent them to the appropriate gates for maximum coverage.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

g. Question and Answer 6

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. When your name came up in another interview, I looked you up and found your award from your time at HKIA. The award said you were operating primarily out of the Barron Hotel, is that accurate?

(2) Answer. Yes, it is. I operated out of the Barron Hotel and Abbey Gate area quite a bit. I worked at other gates around HKIA as well, but Abbey Gate I remember pretty well because I probably spent 25% of my time there, and 25% at the Barron Hotel gate which (b)(1)1.4d on how big they were, and the fact they were wearing masks and didn't talk much.

h. Question and Answer 7

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What were your primary duties at Abbey Gate and Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer. Generally, I was collecting on atmospheric at first and coordinating with the (b)(1)1.4d, which is what I called him anyway, to identify US personnel coming through the Barron gate. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

i. Question and Answer 8

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. During your time at HKIA, what kind of threat reports were you aware of?

(2) Answer. I was aware the Taliban were posting up at intersections trying to identify and apprehend people who had worked with the Afghan government. I was told they were allowing US persons through, but not Afghans who had worked with the US government. I never witnessed Afghan government workers being killed. I was also aware of the possible SVEST threat inbound to Abbey Gate. I think a day or two after being informed of a BOLO, I met a couple Afghans who claimed to be Afghan SOF. I met the guys at the gate and asked them to help apprehend the guy matching the BOLO description before he got to the gate. The description was a guy with a black backpack and wearing a tan man dress. I worked with those Afghan SOF guys for about two days; I gave them my source phone and they had their phones. They sent me a bunch of videos and photos, but I couldn't obtain positive ID of the BOLO based on the images sent to me because I couldn't tell what they were. They would text me saying they scared a guy away. They didn't give me much anything to work off of.

j. Question and Answer 9

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember when the SVEST threat came down, and was it specific to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember when it came down, no. I think saying the threat going towards Abbey is incorrect, I'm just saying that because that's where the attack happened, we just knew there was a SVEST going somewhere towards HKIA.

k. Question and Answer 10

(1) Question. C1: Do you speak Dari or Pashto, is that how you were communicating with the Afghan SOF guys?

(2) Answer. No, I don't, I was speaking English to them, and I don't think their English was very good. Most direction I provided was met with questions. I think that language barrier and sub par photos was part of are the reason why their information wasn't very helpful.

l. Question and Answer 11

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is it accurate to say that, at least early on, the threat reporting was not specific to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Based on how threat reporting was provided to me, I'd say yes, it was not specific.

m. Question and Answer 12

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You mentioned a BOLO for a man in a tan man dress, do you remember when you received that BOLO?

(2) Answer. I don't remember a specific day, maybe two days prior to the attack, but I'm not sure. Two, maybe four days, honestly, I don't remember. I was not getting much sleep while I was out there, although I realize that was the case for everybody.

n. Question and Answer 13

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember either seeing suspicious individuals in the crowd or Marines pointing anyone out to you while at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No, anytime I went out there and asked the Marines if they saw anything suspicious, they'd say, "no," or, "this entire thing is fucked." To be fair to them, everyone looked suspicious, because they were either super scared or super angry. The BOLO I received; it seemed like any number of people could have matched it. There were a lot of people wearing brown man dresses and carrying black bags. To answer your question, no one ever came to me and said, "we think that's the guy."

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you ever engage with or work with the (b)(1)1.4a team?

(2) Answer. No.

p. Question and Answer 15

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you ever speak with the snipers at the tower by the outer gate? Specifically, do you remember going up to the tower to speak with them on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I checked on them a few times throughout my time there to see if they had any useful information, but they never really had anything. I think I went up in their tower twice. I did not go up there on the day of the attack. The day of the attack I was primarily in the Barron Hotel. I was picking up a retired Marine SgtMaj who may have owned the hotel and had been there a long-time working security, and I was helping get him out to be evacuated.

q. Question and Answer 16

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. To confirm, you had limited interaction with the Marines at Abbey Gate, and they did not provide you with any useful information?

(2) Answer. Correct; I interacted with the Abbey Gate Marines as much as I could.

r. Question and Answer 17

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. They never showed you a suspicious guy or a guy who matched the BOLO description you had?

(2) Answer. No, never.

s. Question and Answer 18

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were there any other HUMINT personnel at Abbey Gate while you were getting the SgtMaj from the Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer. The day of the attack, I had our team's Army HUMINT Soldier attachment with me helping retrieve the SgtMaj. The Army HUMINT Soldier was based out of (b)(1)1.4c.

t. Question and Answer 19

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know the HUMINT Soldier's name and are you still in contact with him?

(2) Answer. No, we went our separate ways when we got back to (b)(1)1.4d. I don't have any contact information for him and don't remember his name.

u. Question and Answer 20

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know if anyone else from your team would have gone up to the sniper tower at the outer gate on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I believe it's possible, as anyone from my team who'd gone down to Abbey Gate that day could have gone into the sniper tower, but that's just an assumption.

v. Question and Answer 21

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the time of the attack, where were you located?

(2) Answer. Probably a quarter mile north of the gate, heading back to our COC to drop off the SgtMaj we'd gotten out of the Barron Hotel. The Army HUMINT Soldier was with me.

w. Question and Answer 22

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the attack, did you hear about Marines having identified the possible bomber prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. No, I didn't hear that.

x. Question and Answer 23

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) While you were at HKIA, where were you receiving your intelligence updates?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were providing updates daily before going out to the gates and whenever I returned, they'd inform me of what was going on. Sometimes there would be no cell reception at the gate, so if they needed to pass something it would need to be face-to-face, usually back at our COC (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked out of the COC, our office, or he'd be at one of the gates.

y. Question and Answer 24

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You described having the BOLO 2-4 days prior to the attack, to get more clarity on that, would it help if you considered how long you were running your sources? Does that help with clarifying when you had the BOLO?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I believe I was working with those guys a day or two prior to the attack. I was talking to them over the phone, asking them if they'd be willing to find the guy, and told them that I'd bring them to the front of the line in the airport if they got him. I'm a little hazy on exact dates because I was doing a number of things at that time. I was working with those guys 1 to 2 days prior to the attack.

z. Question and Answer 25

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did anything at Abbey Gate stand out to you as a possible threat?

(2) Answer. Besides everything going on constantly, no. I was always looking for Hostile Act, Hostile Intent, and BOLOS, but could never get a positive ID on anything. To be fair, the entire time it was hectic. I don't know if how hectic and chaotic it was masked my ability to identify the BOLO.

aa. Question and Answer 26

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were the ROE clear to you at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Yes, but it was weird because I'd never experienced anything like the situation out there before, because the Taliban had always been our enemy, but were now working with them. The ROE was the standard, defensive ROE, don't fire unless fired upon, or if there was Hostile Act, Hostile Intent, Positive ID.

bb. Question and Answer 27

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you witness the Taliban beating or killing civilians?

(2) Answer. No, I didn't witness it but heard about it. Although, I heard that it was happening outside of HKIA, away from the perimeter and the gates.

cc. Question and Answer 28

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. As you were coming and going to the Barron Hotel, did you ever witness Taliban violence against civilians near the chevron?

(2) Answer. OK, yes, now that you mention that, I do remember the Taliban hitting people outside the chevron and shooting their guns into the air to either scare people or control the crowd, but didn't see the Taliban shoot anyone or beat anyone to death.

dd. Question and Answer 29

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you remember hearing about any other descriptions about possible bombers or attackers while at HKIA, besides the one BOLO?

(2) Answer. No.

ee. Question and Answer 30

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What did you do post blast?

(2) Answer. I didn't know it happened until I got back to my COC. The Army HUMINT Soldier mentioned on the drive back from the gate that he had heard something, but I was so tired I didn't really think anything of it, plus I'd been hearing gun fire and explosions the whole time, so I was kind of desensitized to it. After we got to the COC, we were on lock down.

ff. Question and Answer 31

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. When did you redeploy from HKIA?

(2) Answer. 28 August. A day or two after the explosion. I believe they shut down all the gates after the explosion. We were on lock down after the explosion and went through our destruction policy, burning and destroying our info.

gg. Question and Answer 32

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Since redeploying, have you paid attention to social media posts or podcasts discussing Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yeah, I pay attention to it when it's discussed in the news and listen to some podcasts. I think I listened to one with Tim Kennedy and maybe Joe Rogan. Tim Kennedy was at HKIA. I was at the Black Gate working with the Army commander there trying to get some people in, and I turned around and Tim Kennedy was there. A bunch of other people showed up to the gate, and I was unable to get my people in after that. I was doing vehicle control trying to facilitate vehicles transporting people in. After that group had gotten there, it seemed like they were going to be there the entire time, and started to seal up the gate and not let anyone else in. I showed them the Afghan SOF guys waiting for me, but the guy in charge told me, "Sorry, we can't let them in." I'm not sure who the guys at the gate were, they were in civilian clothes and could have been (b)(1)1.4 or someone else.

Besides that, I've heard about the snipers saying they had the bomber or an individual matching the BOLO description in their sights, but just hearsay, through third parties. To be honest, I just try to stay away from all the social media stuff.

hh. Question and Answer 33

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is there anyone else you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. No, I'd just be guessing. A lot of the MEU intelligence guys were working at a different gate.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 9. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

2023 11 20
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2023 11 20
DATE

~~CUI~~



(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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ACCG-SR

17 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 17 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at his personal residence in [redacted] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions asked by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: How did you find yourself in your current unit?

(2) Answer. I had deployed with a former [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) We had a couple patients from Syria, the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a dropped them off. I met the surgeon for them, and that piqued my interest. I wanted to be a military surgeon, not a surgeon in the military. I didn't love my conventional deployment; it was just playing too many games. I went to assessment and selection. Then while I was in DC, I had my first son. I was always gone doing trainings, so we moved down to Bragg.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

That was the same year that the (b)(1)1.4a became owned by (b)(1)1.4a instead of being augmentees. We moved in July of 2021 and my first trip was to Afghanistan in August. They always tell you that you will have time to settle in, but my pager went off in orientation and it was time for me to go.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: What is your medical specialty?

(2) Answer. Vascular and general/trauma surgery. Vascular surgery is an augmentation of being a general surgeon.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: When did you first find out you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. I found out on August 14th, give or take. It was very short notice, we were on the plane within 12 hours. We took a direct flight, other than refueling in Germany, I think.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: When did you arrive on ground at HKIA, 15th or 16th?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. We didn't stage anywhere for over 8 hours, so we got there very quickly.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: What did you experience when you got on ground?

(2) Answer. There were a lot of questions. As an (b)(1)1.4a we didn't really know what was going on. We set up and were ready for any contingency or possibility. We had a mini-operating room (OR) in a garage off a litter, we were up for 36 hours getting reports about what we might need to do and adjusting our equipment in our bags accordingly. The first three days, we were just on alert that whole time.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Did you go to the Role II-E at all?

(2) Answer. We went there the next day to introduce ourselves. When we landed there it was daytime, late morning or early afternoon. We had a contact at the Role II-E and we wanted to introduce ourselves and see their capabilities. We met the teams and then went over there once a day at least.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: Alright, so you had your garage area and you also interfaced with the Role II?

(2) Answer. Yes. Our primary mission is to take care of our customers. We were looking at the Role II capabilities to see if we could provide better care there instead of working out of our bags. We wanted to understand what we could do and build relationships, so we weren't stepping on anyone's toes in case we needed to take over some space to provide treatment to one of our guys.

When we first got there, there weren't really any traumas just yet. It was just familiarizing ourselves since we didn't know how long we would be there. Also, one of the surgeons at the Role II-E was a former [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a guy.

The Role II-E had the capability to conduct computed tomography (CT) scans, had two operating rooms, had six trauma bays, lab capability, x-ray capability, a lot of blood products, like 80 units, and an intensive care unit (ICU) and ward. There were four general surgeons on the U.S. team, then there was the Norwegian team with two more, and the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d with two more, then a compliment of techs and nurses.

We had an organization of workflow, trauma bay to operating room (OR). We understood where everyone was, like the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Would you agree that the assets there saved lives?

(2) Answer. Yes, the amount surgeons we had there was the most I had ever seen in an environment like that. On the 26th, I think we had ten surgeons providing care. Three or four organic surgeons, two [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a surgeons, two [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) surgeons, one [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d surgeon, two [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d surgeons. It was the most robust facility I had seen in a field environment, for sure.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: What kind of intel reporting did you hear at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Leading up to it, probably around August 19th-24th, the most we were getting was people coming through the fences and gates. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, so we were getting ready to help those people and assist the Role II-E as they received those patients for treatment.

k. Question and Answer 10.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: As docs, were you getting any threat streams about vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) or improvised explosive devices (IEDs)?

(2) Answer. I think we got a warning about a VBIED sometime the day before the blast, and we were on alert from that point on.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: How would you receive those threat streams?

(2) Answer. I would get that information second or third hand. Our team leader would go and get daily briefs, then they would disseminate that info to us. The info was pretty general until it was something relevant to us. A VBIED or suicide vest IED wasn't relevant to us, the suspected casualties were relevant to us. We were translating it into what our medical reactions would be.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you on the 26th?

(2) Answer. We were back at our unit location, our main base in our garage. We were on sleep cycle. I was awake in the garage, I alerted everyone else that the blast went off. Usually, we need to get clearance from our senior medic to assist in case there was conflict with our supported customer's mission. Right off the bat, they said yes. Our customers were in vicinity of Abbey Gate anyway. I'm not sure what their mission set was, but they were all around. So, we wanted to make sure our guys weren't there, then to help as we could. Our two (b)(1)1.4a went over there. I think it was at 1734, that's the time that is always in my head.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Okay the blast happens, where are you at the time?

(2) Answer. In the garage.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: How far was that garage from the Role II-E?

(2) Answer. It was like a 10-minute walk, so like a quarter mile. We had a truck and we all jumped in that pickup truck. We had a route that we would take. We came out of our compound, then there are two ways to get there. Our normal path is to come out and make a left to get to the Role II-E. When we were on that main road, it was probably like 1742, there was a gator behind us with a guy doing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a casualty. They were behind us, so we changed our route to a

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

longer route to get to the Role II-E. That's when we knew that things went bad, you don't normally expect to see CPR in a vehicle like that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: Could you hear the blast?

(2) Answer. Yea. But we could hear a lot of things. I don't know if we knew that was it though, there were a lot of noises. It wasn't obvious.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: So, at roughly 1745 your team got to the Role II-E?

(2) Answer. Yes. We got dropped off at the back of the building and ran all the way through. We knew there was a blast, but not what to expect. We saw the line of CASEVACs. We had a side entrance that we normally used. We went through there and walked into the trauma bay. We didn't have a clear role, but we knew the 10 of us from the [redacted] could do something. One team is a surgeon, an emergency room (ER) doctor, a Physician's Assistant (PA), a radio telephone operator (RTO), and a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA). We had two teams there.

What we saw off the bat was that all the trauma bays were full. That happened fast. The [redacted] had come out to us on the 21st, and that was part of the plan in the evacuation. The [redacted] was better incorporated with the Role II, so they stayed there. Each [redacted] team had a trauma bay, the [redacted] had one, and the organic team had one. They were all full. They had done two thoracotomies on people that didn't survive by the time we showed up. [redacted] and I went outside to find somewhere better suited to our skill set.

We went out the front door. Patients were lined up on the floor, on litters or not. Those first minutes were chaotic. One person at the door was like a shuttle triager. He was giving everyone directions on where to go. Locations for expectant, urgent, and routine treatment in a mass casualty had already been denoted. Right when I went out, I saw a casualty being place on the ground. I started assessing him, then we picked up the litter and we took him inside. They guided us into the expectant area, which was in the back front corner, past the trauma bay. That was the expectant area. We put him down, and the ER doc was there running the whole area. The ER doc started taking over, I asked him if I should start doing my assessments down there too.

I knew that patient had [redacted] (b)(6). I knew he would

[redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: Would this individual have died otherwise?

(2) Answer. Technically yes, [redacted] (b)(6) The mortality rate of that was probably like 95%. I think he only needed [redacted] (b)(6) The speed of that treatment was what saved him, to make sure he got what he needed as soon as he could. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

After him, I went to the next operating room [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the next operating room working on another patient. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At that point, I got called out to

treat a civilian that had been transferred from the Role I.

I had to go in and help restore blood flow to that [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. Then another patient was deteriorating in the ICU. [redacted] (b)(6) He had an atrial injury, and we couldn't save him.

After that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was still working on his patient. We started trying to prioritize individuals for the Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT). [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Fresh, warm blood is better than refrigerated blood. It has to do with the preservatives in stored blood, so he needed fresh blood to get his potassium and lactate under control, in combination with the fact that he never stopped losing blood. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: What did you see in terms of abdominal injuries?

(2) Answer. For the first patient,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b: Did you ever see or hear about a bullet in a patient?

(2) Answer. The records might say gunshot wound (GSW), but that's a point of reference. Its just faster to say GSW. From a trauma scenario, you don't care what the projectile was. We care about entry and exit wounds. For the first patient, the entry points were definitely small. What it looked like to me, was the haphazard entry and exit wounds on that first patient. There were (b)(6) and to me, I never suspected it was a bullet. I suspected it was shrapnel and associated projectiles. I didn't find anything though.

Same thing with several other patients, I saw the holes but no projectile. For (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) patient, he looked like he had been through an IED blast. I did not think there were any gunshots that I had treated, it was not something that I thought about either.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Did you treat gunshot wounds before the blast?

(2) Answer. Yes, I think I treated 2 with bypass surgeries on national force on the previous days. They were caused by ricochets from warning shots around HKIA. Those were more distinct events. When we were doing my last surgery on the 26th, we were told that there was the possibility of another explosion, but that was debunked later.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Did you receive information about the bomber post blast?

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)],

[redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

(2) Answer. I think so, probably 3rd hand information. Someone said that one of the pickup trucks at Abbey Gate was one of the targets. I don't know how they knew that.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever receive any information about a bomber with a suicide vest?

(2) Answer. That's what they said it was, that the individual with the suicide vest was going to detonate it at the truck or try and navigate to get near the truck. The day before the blast, we did get information that I received second-hand of the description of the bomber, but I don't remember the details. At the end of the day, we all believed it was a suicide vest. No one mentioned gunfire and we didn't have any additional injuries following the blast.

If you haven't spoken to [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] she was our trauma director during the event. Maybe she could say if there were any secondary injuries better than I could.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Were you treating Afghans affected by the blast?

(2) Answer. Some of the others treated a 9-year-old girl. The Norwegians tried to save an infant. I treated one Afghan who later died in Germany, we received him from the Role 1. That was all ball bearing wounds as far as I know.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: Have you had any contact with individuals you treated following the blast? Have you spoken with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]? Has anyone else in the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] spoken with him?

(2) Answer. Yes, for closure. I haven't spoken with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], but I know that [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] has and went to his retirement ceremony.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer. Not really.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: When you were working on [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], was he conscious?

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Not that I remember, but [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would know better. I think he was awake, but his Glasgow Coma Score(GCS) was low. It wasn't anything meaningful.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talks to him the most of anyone in the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 17 November 2023, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 26. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

17 Nov 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

17 Nov 23
DATE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

17 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 17 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference (SVTC) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions asked by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: We are speaking with you today because [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recommended that we speak with you, have you met him?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were two of the primary surgeons on him from the time he arrived at the Role II-E. We took care of him until he was medically evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. When we got home, the Marine Corps arranged for the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a to travel to Walter Reed to visit the patients we treated. So, the team went up about 10 days later, and we met all the patients including [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). About 10 of us went up to meet them, and we have remained in contact with some of those patients intermittently. The last time I talked to him, was at his [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

He came down to Fort Liberty last year in December. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a brought him out as a guest, and he visited the senior medic there who had worked on him at the Role II-E in Afghanistan. While on that trip, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also came to my O-6 promotion and the reception to follow.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: What is your medical background and how did you get to your current position?

(2) Answer. I am a general surgeon. I have been at Bragg/Liberty for most of my career. I deployed in 2006 in Iraq, then came to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a in 2007. I did that for 6 years, then took a break in service until 2016. Then since early 2017 I have been an [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a trauma surgeon. In 2020, I did a one-year surgical critical care fellowship at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. When I finished my fellowship, I returned to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a as a trauma surgeon in early August 2021. Then we did the 18-day response to Kabul. So, all together, I have been with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a for 12 years.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: When did you first hear that you were going to deploy to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a We found out we were leaving for Afghanistan that evening since the Taliban had broken into the greater Kabul area and that we were going to defend HKIA. That was at about 1200 EST at Fort Liberty North Carolina (FLNC). We left that night. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d I believe, then refueled. We hit the airfield the night that Kabul fell. The next morning was when the media showed the thousands of people on the airfield.

We had about an 8-hour window of peace when we hit the ground. We linked in with the Role II-E there, and one of the surgeons was formerly [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a so that was an easy integration.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: To confirm, initially you were working out of your own area and then you also were familiar with the Role II-E as an additional area to operate out of, is that accurate?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. We had two surgical rickshaws set up on our compound. There were several small surgical teams that had shown up. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d surgical team was there, and we knew several of them. The 82nd team was at Camp Alvarez and we knew several of them. They were initially short equipment, but as stuff flowed into the Role II-E we were able to take that and even everyone out to create fairly decent coverage. One thing that helped was the fact that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a vascular surgeon. There were a handful of cases that needed surgery at HKIA since we didn't think we could evacuate them at the time, so we were able to do definitive repair of vascular injuries. That culminated on a day, we called it a mass casualty (MASCAL), when some Afghan commandos were shot we operated on them at the Role II-E. But the basic answer, is that most of our care, other than on some of the Afghans that were treated directly on the flight line, was at the Role II-E since it was so much more robust than our garage bay area.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Leading up to the attack, did you receive any threat streams?

(2) Answer. We did. I can't recall the exact nature of the threat, two years later. We had the general idea. There was relative consensus that an attempted attack would occur at some point, at either North or Abbey Gate. We had our equipment on a pickup truck, the Role II-E was 600 meters away. We had the two teams working in day and night ops, 12 on and 12 off in an alert posture. But when the blast happened, I was asleep since I was on the reverse cycle. One of the team members woke me up and said that a suicide vest went off at Abbey Gate and we headed to the Role II-E.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: To be clear, you were tracking a nonspecific threat to the HKIA area, but nothing specific?

(2) Answer. That's right.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: When you first arrived at the Role II-E, what was the situation?

(2) Answer. We pulled the truck up to the side of the Role II-E facing the airfield. There were improvised vehicles bringing in patients as we arrived. There was a partially enclosed area, with a little shelter, that was used as a triage area. It was probably half of a basketball court size, and it was filling with patients. I took my aid bag, and we went in through the side door. I believe there were six trauma bays, and all six trauma bays were already full of patients.

The first wave of patients, I would say that three out of six of those first patients died in the trauma bay. My first patient was an Afghan girl. I don't remember how we got her

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

inside the Role-II E, but we got her to the first open bed. She had extremity injuries, but no truncal injuries that we could see on ultrasound. I left that patient with another trauma surgeon. I went back out the front door. At that point there were Marines at the front and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), one of the head triage medics, was working there out of his aid bag. The first casualty was a Marine with no outward signs of life, he had a

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

He had no cardiac activity, so we called him as deceased and moved on as there were multiple severely injured patients nearby. I am not sure who that patient was.

Then I moved on to my third patient (Patient 3). He was the next adjacent patient. He had obvious surgical injuries. He had too many wounds to count on his trunk, both legs, and both arms. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Going back, there was also a different young Afghan girl (Patient 4) that had fragmentation to her femur and abdomen and I had to do surgery on her, in the OR, next to Patient 3 while patient three was receiving ongoing care, [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

That's the best memory I have, at this point.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Tied to events on the 26th, we understand that surgeons often called gunshot wound (GSW) as a point of reference during treatment of casualties. Did you see any evidence of gunshot wounds?

(2) Answer. No sir. The consensus from us from us was (and the injury patterns were consistent with this) that the fragmentation wounds were from a suicide vest made with ball bearings. We didn't find any kind of metallic objects that would have been consistent with small arms fire or fragmentation that looked like small arms munition. I don't know how many ball bearings I saw, but I saw ball bearings in Patient 3 and also the young Afghan girl (Patient 4).

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: We heard that Patient 3 had as many as 150 ball bearings, does that sound accurate?

(2) Answer. That's probably accurate.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: How long from the time that Patient 3 was stabilized, to the time that they were evacuated?

(2) Answer. He was the last patient on the 3rd CCATT aircraft, so I believe that was a total of about 18 hours.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: Have you seen any of the media events, podcasts, or testimonies of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: What about his testimonies do you think he would say that you are the best source to corroborate?

(2) Answer. Just his injury patterns. As his primary surgeon at HKIA, I think, from the injury patterns that he has had, I know a fair amount. I also prepared a talk for the Joint Trauma System (JTS) in the fall of 2021. I had already talked with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) prior to that and also to one of [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) patients. In the process of that talk, we were touched by the fact that when [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) woke up, the first thing he did was ask about [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). So, I talked with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for JTS talk that I did. I think they all understood that their injuries were from being near a suicide bomber.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: What was Patient 3s mental lucidity when under your treatment?

(2) Answer. He was unresponsive during the duration of my contact with him. I didn't know who he was. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: Could you give some more details on your other interactions with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. The day prior to my promotion, they had him out at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a for a day. He was able to meet the medics who helped care for him the day he was injured. I wasn't present for that. They took him to the range. They did a little bit of shooting with him. Some of their senior NCOs and their senior medics hosted him.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: He came to your promotion as well?

(2) Answer. He did. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a contacted me prior to my promotion and asked if I would be comfortable with him attending, since the events of HKIA were still a fairly emotional event for me. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), when we met at Walter Reed, that one day, when he was better, we could talk about how his injuries were managed. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: Did he ask you any nonmedical questions at that event?

(2) Answer. Not that I remember, no sir. I think that he knew from when we met him at the hospital with the Commandant that there was a surgical team that had treated him at the time. At the initial time we met, he was too sick to discuss the details of his surgical care. We made contact again the following year. I know that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a reached out to him during his treatment at some point for him to visit the medics who initially treated him.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone else that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. Multiple [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a members at HKIA. From the medical standpoint, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would have details on the specifics of Patient 3's resuscitation. I could get a hold of him and get you his contact information. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I will say that doctrinally, what we did at HKIA should not have worked. We had 3-4 nationalities taking care of patients at the same time. That was one of the worst days,

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

but one of the proudest things that I have been a part of, to see what the medical personnel were able to accomplish on that day.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 18. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

21 NOV 2023

DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20NOV23

DATE

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

07 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

1. On 08 November 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the transcription below, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) referred us to you. From your personal recollection, when did you join the Marine Corps and what is your background within the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. In October of 2017, I went to Parris Island. It snowed for the first time. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) then I got orders to 2nd Marines and went straight into a field exercise (FEX) We trained in Bridge Port in 2019. We deployed to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in Okinawa and did its time afloat. Then we went to Korea and did training with the Army and Korean units. We got prepared for a (b)(1)1.4a in the Central Command (CENTCOM). We did a couple FTXs and went to 29 Palms. We got to (b)(1)1.4d on Apr 14, 2021 and went to work with Golf Company, their Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) team. (b)(1)1.4c

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d We started getting general threats including Iraq and then Afghanistan. Mid-June and July we focused on the noncombatant evacuation (NEO) in Afghanistan. I became the leader on Taliban and Afghan intel, focused on major significant acts (SIGACTS) based on intel reporting. I created a Google Earth slide that depicted provinces throughout Afghanistan, green was not taken, yellow was contested, and red was areas that the Taliban fully controlled. The Afghan National Army (ANA) pulled out and we started switching to Kabul reporting. I would build out a map based on police HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting and scouring Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) for other products. I briefed the [REDACTED] (b)(6) weekly and built products on Google Earth. Once the Taliban took Bagram, we focused on Kabul with rumors of 1/8 going to support. They pushed into Kabul the day the Afghans stormed the airfield. I arrived 2200 the day after the airfield was stormed. It was a quick 2-3 hour turn around before we were set to go.

I got off the bird and went to the Joint Operations Center. It was fluid. I didn't know where specific units were. At that point, we had designated who was going to be at what gate. 1/8 would go to the northern portion of the airfield. We, 2/1, assumed Abbey Gate.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What did you do in the Joint Operations Center (JOC)?

(2) Answer. I am an [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a I was able to control ISR that was focused on support to the Marines. When we got stuff from our guys, we pushed it out.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What happened before 2/1 assumed Abbey Gate Operations?

(2) Answer. We were focused on intel gathering. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d We started a running excel that had anything to do with Kabul and HKIA of day by day reporting. It was being shared on chat surfer. We also had reporting on ISIS-K. We heard they had plans of coming into Kabul. There was always misinformation about whether the Taliban would stop or support ISIS from coming into city. At this time the Taliban set up their cordon, and we could see them setting up roadblocks.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Did you have an understanding of the Rules of Engagement (RoE)?

(2) Answer. None. If they shot at us, we could shoot back. We couldn't stop any of the civilian killings. A lot of times Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or ANA

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

were operating in the crowds, and we were holding the lines. I know that the ANA was shooting at the ground or shooting in the air. I saw the U.S. shooting into the air.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Were you invited to a ROE brief?

(2) Answer. Not that I could recall. My interaction was bringing interpreters (terps) and talking to them. I would get a hasty debrief, just getting the mood of the crowd at Abbey.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. When you were at Abby Gate did you personally observe Taliban killing?

(2) Answer. No, but I heard of it and saw somethings on social media.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did anyone show or take pics of it?

(2) Answer. I never heard of it; of the killings.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did you go to the gate on regular basis?

(2) Answer. It mostly depended on (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I worked 1700-0600 (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did the day shift. When I got on there was changeover with the terps. A lot of them didn't want to come off. I went down to Abbey Gate 5-6 times.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. A story we've heard is of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) probe. Do you remember that coming to the COC/Joint Operations Center (JOC) or any threat reporting of an IED probe?

(2) Answer. I wouldn't say probing. The snipers were our biggest collection asset since they could see everything down the canal. I don't now if they were trying to probe. I never heard of them probing. Before that, East Gate and Abbey were still open. We deduced that, if they were going to do an attack, then Abbey Gate is the only option.

Specifically about the BOLO. I found the final preparation. Clean cut, had a picture.

l. Question and Answer 11.

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question. Was the general flow of threat reporting from the JOC to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We started trying to bring stuff down. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the main guy because I stayed in the JOC. Eventually it turned to signal and radio (b)(1)1.4g as well. Main comms was the (b)(1)1.4g

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. You didn't personally go down to the gate to distro intel. It was mostly (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who would bring updates?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. If I saw someone chilling, I would tell them. But not briefs. I never briefed the JOC. I was in during the Commander's Update Brief (CUB) and it was mainly the Major. Me and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have our turnovers. In the COC where the (b)(6) was, they were doing briefs. Each shift we would send our reports to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) If I had a report I would walk over to the COC from the JOC.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What about the line units?

(2) Answer. I'm not too sure.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. How did info come back from the gate?

(2) Answer. Radio. When snipers got off shift, they would come into the COC and give an update. I remember them coming in and brief the (b)(6) or one of the senior level officers.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. What kind of info would you receive?

(2) Answer. The majority were pics. I worked with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) a lot. I don't remember seeing written reports, but I remember they would give a daily sum of what they saw at the gate. I saw a few of the snipers come in but I didn't interact. I was staying busy. I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) for sure. I don't know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I remember sniper platoon members by Abbey Gate and another by where the planes were.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. How did they get pics?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. SD Card. We used one of our commo kits. We could use our USB to download onto our computers and away they went. Mostly (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Was there a clearing house singular computer where it went?

(2) Answer. Idk if we set up our computers in the COC. Most was saved locally on the desktop. We destroyed all of our computers. SD Cards were the main thing. All of our units intel assets were destroyed there.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. How often are you dealing with (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Only EOD because they were situated with us.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Would (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) work during the day?

(2) Answer. Yes, but he worked all the time. We had to make him go to sleep one day (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was up for 24 hours.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. What was the primary method for information sharing?

(2) Answer. We set up chat rooms for cohesion. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) one. A lot of the reporting would go back in forth between chat rooms.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. How many were you watching?

(2) Answer. Between six and ten, including my ISR.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. How much did you hear about suspicious persons?

(2) Answer. That happened quite a bit. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) said this guy looks like the guy you gave us a pic of. We communicated a pic down to the gate. I don't know if it was through us. I believe it was a video saying good luck, that this was the bomber coming back. It was a bald, chunky face wearing all white. Arabic and music and people saying goodbye. There was reporting saying that this guy was the one

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [redacted (b)(3)130b] (b)(6)

coming down to Kabul. There might have been a name to it. It was his martyrdom preparation.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. As the intel section, where did you get that information?

(2) Answer. I was scouring intel and came across a report saying that. It was more of just him wearing white. And it was passed down to the gate.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Who was available to get it to the gate?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] I don't know if the pic was circulating. I didn't see the pic, but I know that a picture got down to the gate. I found it was unclassified that got onto video SIPR. Once that happened, I said "hey Sir, take it with a grain of salt" and somehow that pic made it to the gate. If there was a report I found significant, I would walk over to bring it to their attention.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Do you remember the written interpretation?

(2) Answer. I don't remember.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Do you remember, besides the video, any other threats that stood out as more pressing or more urgent leading up to the blast?

(2) Answer. No, sir, it was just that one person we were looking for.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Do you remember seeing a pic of the guy they were requesting to engage?

(2) Answer. I was in the JOC, not the COC, so I only heard about how they were able to engage a guy. A lot of the decision were made in the COC by [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I was more intel gathering, more operational focus was [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)].

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. You pointed out [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] Did you talk to him between this all happening?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No, I don't remember seeing him. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and another guy I never remember, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. To your recollection, to you remember anyone in relation to any Be on the Lookout (BOLO) indicating that they had positive identification (PID)? Did you hear anyone say they had PID?

(2) Answer. I didn't, but the word came from the gate, that the tone of the guys on the ground, they thought it met the description, but it was all kind of vague.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. What was their take on the request. Did you get any feedback from them then or after the blast?

(2) Answer. Keep an eye on it. We are getting a progression of the same guy moving through the city. I didn't get to hear their assessment on the request of what was done about the request. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. There is a rumor about someone going to retrieve an interpreter the day of the bombing but did not want to do it because of a bad feeling. Are you familiar with this?

(2) Answer. No.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Another rumor we have heard. Some folks were hanging out post blast; they attributed this to intel that the person the snipers saw was the bomber and we missed it.

(2) Answer. I don't know about that. I know the discussion was that it would be taking this guy several hours to get there. I never saw any of the snipers from the ground. Mostly the intel and the senior leaders in the JOC. I was in the bullpen.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Do you remember an individual named (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. I know there was a female SSgt. I was a Cpl. Actually situated, if you walk around the door, we had two desks with the (b)(1)1.4 there. My interactions with the MEU never happened. I would go talk to the tactical controllers. 24th MEU was in the front. 1/8 was in the corner. Our interactions were minimal.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Did you hear who denied the request?

(2) Answer. I did not hear directly. From the grapevine, I heard that snipers had possibly identified the guy, but they requested to engage, but it was denied. Maybe from the (b)(6) or DoS.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Someone denied it? Who?

(2) Answer. I heard that it was the DoS said no, not the (b)(6)

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Regarding SD Cards, does anyone talking about the cards come up and mention having a suspicious person at the gate?

(2) Answer. I got off of shift around 0700-0800 and walked back into the JOC at 1740, right after the bomb, to try to figure out what was going on because people were scrambling. I don't remember anyone bringing back SD cards. I never heard that any pic got back.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. Generically, if the SD cards came back. One from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) one from 2/1 that is all ISOPREP. Do you remember what happened to those?

(2) Answer. I destroyed Common Intel Workstations (CIW) and SIPR printers. I didn't destroy any SD Cards. I remember we did destroy, or we didn't come back with three (b)(1)1.4g. If the cards were in there, I don't know. It may have gotten put in the pile with everything else (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told us what to destroy whether that came from higher or the MEU. All that you can bring is you assault pack and your weapons.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Were you pulled to do any other tasks. Who was involved in your other efforts?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [redacted (b)(3)130b] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I helped to get barriers to send down. 2-3 hours later we got an intel report that a member from ISIS-K had jumped the wall. I was paired with a Sgt from the 24th MEU and we posted guard on the back gate of COC for 45min-hr. They locked the gate and then we went outside of an exterior gate to observe.

I sorted peoples gear that was brought back, the effects of the Marines that had been killed. I assisted in the inventory of the personal effects. I believe it was the 27th-28th, there was a line of main packs and assault packs. We took out tarps and did one pack at a time. We wrote down on a sheet of paper whatever was in that pack. We would put it in an area. We would tell the [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)].

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Were you part of the process to match names to equipment?

(2) Answer. No we just inventoried what was actually in the bags. Sometimes we would find a notebook with their name in it. FLAKs were included. If stuff was on FLAKs we put it back on the FLAK. If there was a cell phone we put it back in the pack. It was about 50/50 on if someone had electronics in their kits, like go-pros overall. [redacted (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)].

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Who else was there processing the recovered equipment?

(2) Answer. It was just Corporals and junior enlisted. There was no senior supervision. It was all the gear they were able to recover a day or so after.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. In regard to [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] cases, what happened to the pile for destruction?

(2) Answer. We took sledge hammers and destroy it so none could put it together. I didn't burn anything but I heard there were fires. Pretty much whoever was on shift. [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] was there. I don't remember the specific people that were there. Including CIW, digital computer systems, screens. I almost 100% remember an [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] case begin destroyed. The destroy list was on my NIPR computer.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. Things were hasty and moving quickly with destruction. Who is giving direction?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes sir. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was giving us our instructions. We were responsible for the COC. There was another room down the hall with a civilian guard, we were not allowed to go into that room. We were responsible for the area we worked in the JOC and the COC. All the comms gear got put back in the boxes. I left on the 29th the day before the last guys left.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. What gear were you able to bring out of country?

(2) Answer. Everything we brought in came out. The direction changed from only your assault pack.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. What happened to the equipment you thought you wouldn't be able to bring out of country?

(2) Answer. All the stuff was destroyed. Radios were the only thing that made it out. There were mixed small arms that we took firepins from and someone took them to make sure they couldn't be used.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. The battalion ammo stockpile, did that get carried out or burned?

(2) Answer. I don't know.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. How much time do you spend time on social media looking at this topic?

(2) Answer. I did at first and during the anniversaries. Not to say that I was angry about it. I don't go back and read up on stuff. I read part of the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) stuff.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. Have you engaged with any media or done public speaking, have you spoken to any journalists?

(2) Answer. Nope, you are the first ones to ask me about it besides my friends.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. Did you see interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)?

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ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [redacted]

(2) Answer. Yup. I think the majority was true. It's hard to make the determination because you are hearing so much. It's crazy that you can be in the same situation and different person could assess it completely differently. I watched the Shawn Ryan Show, even before he was on it.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. [redacted] showed the photo of the suspicious individual* Did you ever see this individual?

(2) Answer. I've never seen this picture. The guy that I saw on the video didn't have a beard, he was completely clean shave. That guy doesn't look like anything. The guy could've changed clothes from all white.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. [redacted]

(2) Answer. Yeah.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. Anything else that you want to add or think we should be aware of?

(2) Answer. We got a call from the 82nd about collection and intel products prior to leaving for Kabul.

I never really worked with signal intelligence. We knew there were teams out on the airfield in areas collecting. I was never directly in contact with them.

ISR prioritization would change suddenly. One second a unit would have it and the next someone else would need it. It couldn't have helped with spotting individuals, but overall checkpoints/points of entry to areas around the airfield.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] at [redacted].

[redacted]



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 8 November 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 18. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

8 Nov 2023

DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

8 NOV 23

DATE

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(b)(1)1.4c

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(Report Date: 23 Aug 2021 2020Z)

(U) Executive Summary:

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(b)(1)1.4c

(U) Analysis:

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(U) Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA):

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

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~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Bagram Airfield:

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(U) CLOUD COVER

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[3]

(U) SENSOR COVERAGE

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(U) Notes & Caveats:

(U) Increases/decreases in number of observables do not necessarily correlate to increases/decreases in activity due to non-standardized collection times, viewing angles and atmospheric, et al.

(U) Recommendations:

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

(U) **Observations:** Positive EEI (6 observations) [KML](#) | [Shapefile](#) | [MAP](#) | [CSV](#)

(U) **Graphic Products:**

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFG: 20210820-23 Hamid Karzai INTL Airport: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c (.png) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFG: 20210820-23 Hamid Karzai INTL Airport: Events GIS Data (.zip) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFG: 20210820-23 Hamid Karzai INTL Airport: Events Spreadsheet (.csv) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFG: 20210820-23 Hamid Karzai INTL Airport: Events (.kmz) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
- (U) AFG: 20210820 - 20210823 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c (.zip) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

(U) **References:**

[1] ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Origination Agency: 513th MIB IGD;
 Source ID: CENTCOM-GETS-20210818203220-25868-FTG;
 Date of Publication: 23 August 2021;

Report Title: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c VO Kabul AFG 23 Au 2021 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~
 URL: [redacted] (b)(3)424

[redacted] (b)(3)424
 Source information is classified ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~.

[2] ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Origination Agency: Army GEOINT Battalion - Colorado;
 Source ID: AGBC-GETS-20210818164244-26460-HAW;
 Date of Publication: 19 August 2021;

Report Title: AFG: Kabul / Bagram [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c - 01 August 2021
 Throu h 19 Au ust 2021 ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ;

URL [redacted] (b)(3)424

[redacted] (b)(3)424

Source information is classified ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~.

[3] ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Origination Agency: 2nd Weather Squadron/Weather Intelligence Flight;
 Date of Publication: 20-23 August 2021;

Report Title: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~;

URL: Available by request from 2nd Weather Squadron/Weather Intelligence Flight [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Source information is classified ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~.

(U) **Source Summary Statement:**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Sources: DoD, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

(U) This product was not coordinated and represents only the views of AGB-Colorado (AGB-C).

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The information contained in this product is based on time sensitive GEOINT analysis. AGB-C may publish follow-on reporting on the subject should continuing analysis or additional information discovery warrant. GEOINT is the primary sources for this AGB-C intelligence report. AGB-C analysis of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c and/or geospatial information, combined with target and subject matter knowledge, form the basis for the judgments in this report. The degree of confidence in the GEOINT-derived statements and analytical judgments is specifically addressed in the

narrative.

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

AGB-C uses collateral information to provide context for the issues discussed in this report; collateral information is not used as a basis for this report's analytic judgments.

- [\(U\) Target Analysis Map](#)
- [\(S//REL TO USA, FVEY\) RFI AGB-C-HAW-2021-00031 - AFG: CRISIS SUPPORT](#)

(U) Report ID: AGBC-GETS-20210823162557-4673-FTG

(U) Requirement Number(s): GIMS: T-OXUC1509872:T-EXPS1355979

(U) Date/Time of Report: 23 Aug 2021 2020Z

(U) Date/Time of Last Revision: 23 Aug 2021 2020Z

(U) Date/Time of Collection: 20 Aug 2021 through 23 Aug 2021

(U) Country Name/Code: Afghanistan (AFG)

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA) Area Of Interest: Afghanistan

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Target: (b)(1)1.4c

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Target: (b)(1)1.4c

(U) Target: (b)(1)1.4c

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Target: (b)(1)1.4c

(S//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA) Coordinates: (b)(1)1.4c

(U) Geodetic Datum: WGS84

(U//FOUO) Analysis Type: (b)(1)1.4c

(U) Produced By: Army GEOINT Battalion - Colorado

(U) POC: (b)(3)424, (b)(6)

(U) Contributing Authors: (b)(3)424, (b)(6)

(U) Derived geographic coordinates should not be utilized for targeting or for any purpose requiring a high level of positional accuracy.

(U) Bold & italic text denotes information of significant intelligence value or a new AGB-C derived GEOINT analytic assessment.

Classified By: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Derived From: (b)(1)1.4c v4.1.0, 20201215

Declassify on: 25X1, 20711231

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFG: 20210820-23 Hamid Karzai INTL Airport:

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

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~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Page 97 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S089 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Page 98 redacted for the following reason:

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Page 100 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S090 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Pictures from [redacted (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)]
[redacted (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)]

1. On 26 October 2023, Marines from [redacted (b)(6)] submitted the contents of an [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] SD Cards. The SD Card was associated with equipment transferred to [redacted (b)(6)] Marines from 2/1 Marines, following their redeployment from HKIA.
2. The [redacted (b)(6)] identified that the SD Cards contained pre-deployment images of Marines from 2/1. The [redacted (b)(6)] Marine [redacted (b)(6)] sent all photos in the original format from those SD Cards to the Supplemental Review team. The total volume of the photos was over 5GB of data.
3. Upon receipt, the Supplemental Review team checked every photo available in the file transfer. The photos contained in the SD Cards were not applicable to Abbey Gate, the 2/1 deployment to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) nor anything associated with the Supplemental Review.
4. The photos contained on the SD Cards showed Marines firing at a range and conducting leader engagements in [redacted (b)(1)1.4d]. The majority of the photos showed non-deployment activities that 2/1 Marines participated in, including ISOPREP photos with PII and a unit holiday party with families.
5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] at [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)].

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



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ACCG-SR

09 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Extraneous Individual in Image with Suspicious Person, on 26 August 2021

1. During the supplemental review, the image depicted in "Exhibit S066 - Sniper Picture 26AUG21" was obtained. The person of interest (POI) described by (b)(6) Sniper team members as being suspicious person. Two of the sniper team members claimed that the bald man shown in S066 was "coaching" a "younger individual" who is not fully visible in the photo. At least one of the sniper team members identified the person with 'blue sleeves', as the possible younger man.

2. (b)(3)3024(i) was able to analyze S066 photo. A 1:1 Facial Image Comparison between an image of the known bomber and an image of suspicious person in S066. On 24 October 2023, (b)(3)3024i assesses the images to have sufficient facial characteristic detail for a comparison; resulting in a comparison score of "-3," almost certainly not the same person. Facial Image comparison analysis (Exhibit S034) assesses that the bald suspicious person was not the known bomber.

3. (b)(3)3024i was not able to analyze S066 photo for a 1:1 Facial Image Comparison between an image of the known bomber and the partial image of 'blue sleeves.' On 24 October 2032, (b)(3)3024i assessed the image lacked sufficient facial characteristic detail for a comparison of anatomical traits. (b)(3)3024i analysts assess insufficient facial characteristic detail to determine the identity of 'blue sleeves' (Exhibit S066).

4. The Supplemental Review team reviewed more than 700 pictures submitted depicting hundreds of individuals, during the Abbey Gate Investigation and the Supplemental Review. Whenever possible, the review team identified notable pictures of people and events and (b)(3)3024(i)

(b)(3)3024(i)

5. Analysis by the (b)(3)3024(i) (b)(3)3024(i) at Abbey Gate between 20-26 August 2021 and any personnel associated with ISIS-K in any record or database.

6. The supposed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) test run incident on 21AUG21 included three individuals, all of which were analyzed for matches to known ISIS-K members. No matches to any known individuals or association were found in the

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SUBJECT: Extraneous Individual in Image with Suspicious Person, on 26 August 2021

pictures, meaning that the pictures taken of the supposed IED test run do not show any known association with ISIS-K.

7. After reviewing 25 pictures of the crowds at Abbey Gate taken between 20-26AUG21, (b)(3)3024(i) team has not identified any pictures which contain photographs of the ISIS-K Abbey Gate Suicide Attack Bomber or any person known to be associated with the ISIS-K Plot Cell.

8. The points of contact for this memorandum are (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at


(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Orientation to Abbey Gate 20 – 26 AUG 21





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20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: SD CARD PROVIDED BY (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. During the Supplemental Review, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the (b)(6) (b)(6) provided the Supplemental Review team with a SD card which he found in his tactical web gear some time after the AGI. He provided this SD card to the Supplemental Review team and stated that he did not know the content on the card, nor had he manipulated or removed anything since finding the SD card.

2. The Supplemental Review team has included in the Supplemental Review documents all 225 images found on the SD Card. The SD Card images are dated 22 August 2021. The images depict pictures taken from the Barron Hotel complex, overlooking the area just outside the chevron, during period of darkness. The images also depict pictures taken from the (b)(6) sniper tower towards the chevron. Furthermore, the images depict a mix of civilian and non-standard dressed military personnel (likely Taliban). However, the images do not depict active documentation of violence, dead bodies, or acts explicitly showing threats towards people at the chevron.

3. The SD card contains images likely taken by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during his trip to the Barron Hotel, which he and several (b)(6) personnel describe in their statements (exhibit S010, S011, S029, S030, S031).

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

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Exhibit S101 (b)(6)

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20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

1. On 20 November 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(1)1.4c was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you have any recollection of how many bombers the ISIS cell had in the area? Do you remember a bomber backing out due to concerns of women and children at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. What we knew through traffic, and what we shared, is three-fold. Firstly, ISIS had the intention to conduct an attack in vicinity of Abbey Gate. Second, there was a series of suicide bombers they were going to bring in. There was not just one, we didn't know how many. Third, we did not know the method, mode, or timing of the attack. I don't remember any report before the attack of a bomber that was hesitant due to the presence of women and children.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

We certainly weren't tracking that at the time. Per the org chart Counterterrorist Intelligence Center (CTIC) was the lead for the ISIS targeting line. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Analyst in CTIC had access to reports, as did our SIGINTer forward, probably. But our intel folks shouldn't be making decisions off of single raw reports, so I know we did not get passed that info to action.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your info like on the cell prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. It wasn't targetable. There wasn't enough pattern or name recognition to drill down the definitive location of the cell prior to the attack. They are pretty good at using codenames, the only info we had on the attack was also using codenames. We had nothing targetable; I will leave it at that.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To confirm, do you remember if the ISIS cell that you were tracking that lead to the bombing, was also the one with [REDACTED] (b)(6) as the lead?

(2) Answer. I don't recall that.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said you were tracking a number of bombers?

(2) Answer. The original traffic didn't seem like it was one bomber. I think it was 2-3. Definitely more than one. To reiterate, CTIC oversaw that targeting line. The info they passed us was solely for force protection.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you have a recollection of events leading up to the bombing on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No, I don't.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you aware of any bomber backing out due to women and children, necessitating a switch to an alternate bomber?

(2) Answer. I do not recall that.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection, did you have any ISR collection of the attack? Either Full Motion Video or Geospatial Intelligence?

(2) Answer. We didn't have anything additional from CTIC, 82nd, or the Marines. No special ISR that they did not have.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you have a point of contact at CTIC that we should talk to?

(2) Answer. Go directly to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a I don't know who their S2 is right now.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To recap, you were tracking an ISIS element planning to attack Abbey Gate. You were tracking, what you believe was more than one bomber. You were not aware of any bomber backing out. There was nothing targetable in the intelligence you received and shared. You created reports for force protection at HKIA. Is that all accurate?

(2) Answer. Yep, you said it better than me. Thanks.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know of any interaction between your element and snipers at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No. Nothing that was reported back to us, and we are all on a small compound.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would it have been common for your personnel to be at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have any specific information on the bomber?

(2) Answer. We definitely did not have a picture or true name prior to the event. We did not find out that he was a Bagram Prison escapee until after the bombing.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you describe the level of intel coordination occurring at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I think his name was [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the Marine S2. We would try to see them physically every couple of days since they weren't up on TS like us. From a sync point, we all got the same daily intel email, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made sure that happened. If we had something time sensitive, we called [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) immediately. Sometimes we would call straight down to [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They would do the same for us. Based on my 20 years, the intel collaboration was pretty solid. CTIC was linked with us the whole time we were there.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 13. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

21 NOV 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

21NOV23
DATE



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ACCG-SR

20 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 20 November 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I was not asked this question.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have information on the number of bombers in the ISIS-K cell and, if so did you have any information on their timeline?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I was not a unit member at the time of the event, but based on searches I conducted after being asked about this, we did not have that specific information prior to the attack.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did you have any information on the bomber after the attack?

(2) Answer. The sensitive reporting that I have discovered from our records, and the information I have now, is in line with the USFOR-A developed bomber intelligence summary and TS Intelligence serial reporting that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sent me earlier today. I discovered in our holdings a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a product that has placeholder sketches of faces, for the network laid out in the sensitive reporting that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sent. I would defer to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a for the veracity and authenticity of the product. It looks like it lines up with the information [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided of the three [REDACTED] (b)(6) I sent you the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a product on 20 November 2023.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Do you have any Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection of the attack, at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. I do not.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Do you know if elements within [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a on Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) were at Abbey Gate and conversing with Marines?

(2) Answer. I am not aware of any, I was not a member of the Unit at the time of the event, nor was I present for the event.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). To conclude, from your perspective did you have any intel other than what I have presented about the ISIS cell in Kabul?

(2) Answer. Based on my search and the information available [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a did not have any intel other than what I presented about the ISIS cell in Kabul.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Can you describe the level of intelligence synchronization and coordination that happened at HKIA during the operation?

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I am not able to answer that question.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else that you would like to add?

(2) Answer. I still have a (b)(1)1.4a product that I am trying to send to you. Comparing it to the product that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sent me, I think they are t is it the same or similar. I would default to the (b)(1)1.4a as to the veracity of this report, a it is not confirmed, and its source is not cited. Regardless, I do not think this product will be a curve ball from what we have discussed.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: Did intelligence over the last year indicate there was a missed opportunity to eliminate the potential bomber?

(2) Answer. Based off my search and the informati available, no sir.

I'd like to note, the information that I am providing is available to the (b)(1)1.4c and a (b)(1)1.4a roduct. I will say that this is the perspective of (b)(1)1.4a but these products are not (b)(1)1.4a products.

Additionally, I would request that in the e ent f any declassification of products, please protect the association of this organization with the Operation in question and the

[redacted] (b)() .4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4. The point of contact or this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b) 3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI
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THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 9. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully

I request that, in the event of any declassification of product, please redact my name and any association with my unit in order to protect the association of my unit and the names of unit members. I request that my transcript be classified SECRET NOFORN, in accordance with the Security Classification Guide.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

DATE

(b)(3) 30b, (b)(6)

21NOV23

DATE



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ACCG-SR

21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review - Intelligence Assessment

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The Supplemental Review included an extensive examination of Intelligence reporting, analysis, briefings, threat assessments and information available to personnel during Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), as well as before and after the IED attack on Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021. The Review explored the considerations associated with bomber identity and is comprised of reporting from across multiple classifications and platforms. Further, the Review team collected numerous statements and reports representing information from all intelligence capabilities in support of operations leading up to the Abbey Gate attack. Statements and reports from USFOR-A; JTF-CR; 24th MEU; 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1); Task Force 82; Marine Operations Group Central (MOG-C); (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i) 75th Ranger Regiment, Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC); FBI; and (b)(1)1.4c as well as others with access to intelligence, concur that there existed no name, associated physical description, imagery or photo of the bomber that would have provided a discernable level of positive identification (PID) prior to the attack on Abbey Gate. Moreover, reports relaying suspected bomber descriptions lacked the specificity for reconnaissance assets or aerial ISR to obtain PID on a single suicide bomber in such a large, fluid, condensed crowd (exhibits S014, S023, S034, S035, S038, S039, S040, S041, S042, S043, S057, S060, S061, S083, S087, S088, S090, S102, S103, S109, S110).

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Consolidated intelligence reports indicated the (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

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SUBJECT: Supplemental Review - Intelligence Assessment

3. ~~(CUI)~~ Additionally, the Review team requested [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] on other suspected suspicious persons against multiple known photos of Abu Rahman al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber. The analysis returned a strong negative result, the lowest possible comparison assessment [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] assesses images for sufficient characteristic detail and anatomical traits for comparison. [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] Comparison Assessment References range from [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] [redacted (b)(3)3024(i)] (exhibits S034, S035, S093).

4. Significant Activity Reporting of IED Attack Planning:

a. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i), (b)(6)]

b. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

c. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

d. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)]

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SUBJECT: Supplemental Review - Intelligence Assessment

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i), (b)(6)

f. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

g. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

5. Statements collected during the Supplemental Review reflected that intelligence sharing and coordination among organizations in support of the NEO and JTE were effective and well executed at the command level. The USFOR-A Senior Intelligence Officer ensured routine intelligence synchronization across the services and interagency at HKIA (exhibits S023, S046, S060, S083, S087, S102, S103, S109, S110).

6. The points of contact for this memorandum are

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Information Release

1. On the morning of 26 August 2021, Marines at Abbey Gate received information from their chain of command regarding an individual wearing loose clothes, having groomed hair, and carrying a black bag of explosives. The information passed to the Marines was according to reliable intelligence reporting.

2. According to intelligence reporting and analysis, ISIS K had greater aspirations for attacks against HKIA, including multiple bombers. However, the ISIS K terrorist cell eventually activated only one bomber, later known to be Abdul Rahman (al-Logari), on 26 August 2021. Abdul Rahman al-Logari moved to the vicinity of Abbey Gate just prior to the attack. Upon arrival at Abbey Gate, al-Logari had a short amount of time to navigate through the crowd of many thousands of civilians to reach a position at Abbey Gate, which greatly reduced the possibility of detection and enabled him to conduct the attack at 17:36:52L.

3. The points of contact for this memorandum are [redacted] at

[redacted] b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)



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21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] PHOTOS AND VIDEOS

1. The Supplemental Review team interviewed [redacted] on 14 November 2023. During the interview, [redacted] talked about photos and videos he still had in his possession which he would be provide to the Supplemental Review team interviewers. After the interview, [redacted] confirmed that he intended to send between 20-30 photos and 2-3 videos to the team.

2. On 20 November, [redacted] attorney contacted BG Curtis and stated [redacted] would provide the photos and videos to BG Curtis directly later that day. On 21 November, [redacted] attorney contacted BG Curtis to inform him that [redacted] elected not to provide photos for the Supplemental Review, and added all relevant photos were on SD cards [redacted] had submitted to his chain of command.

3. The Supplemental Review Team has reasonably exhausted all measures to locate the referenced SD card without avail. All relevant pictures collected are included in the Report of Investigation.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] at [redacted]

[redacted]

Approved for Release



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ACCG-SR

21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. The Supplemental Review Team received numerous pictures taken at HKIA in August 2021. Specifically, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided an SD Card he found in tactical equipment he wore during operations at HKIA. He stated had not reviewed the content of the SD card and that it had not been altered in any way since he discovered it.

2. The Supplemental Review team viewed all content from the SD card, which generally contained pictures from (b)(6) sniper team, and included pictures from sometime between 21 August period of darkness and the morning of 23 August.

3. After a careful review of the evidence provided, the relevant pictures were identified and labeled with individual exhibits numbers. The remaining pictures are deemed relevant, but not necessary, to the scope of the investigation and are included as a single exhibit containing 225 pictures (See exhibit S106 – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SD Card Folder).

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. The Supplemental Review Team received numerous pictures taken at HKIA in August 2021. The Supplemental Review team maintained a policy of non-attribution for any photos or videos submitted to the team by interviewees who wished not to be named.

2. All photographs and videos submitted to the Supplemental Review team which were deemed relevant and necessary have been assigned individual exhibit numbers. The remaining pictures are deemed relevant, but not necessary, to the scope of the investigation and are included as a single exhibit containing 45 pictures (See exhibit S107 – MFR – Pictures Submitted by interviewees FOLDER).

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. The Supplemental Review Team received numerous pictures taken at HKIA in August 2021. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), a member of (b)(6) sniper team, provided a USB storage device containing pictures taken during the HKIA operation to the Supplemental Review team. The pictures were taken using government provided cameras and compiled by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) following 2/1 Marines returning to Camp Pendelton, CA.

2. All photographs on the thumb drive were analyzed and those relevant and necessary were given exhibit numbers. The remaining pictures were deemed relevant, but not necessary to the scope of the investigation and are included as a single exhibit containing 434 pictures (See exhibit S108 – MFR – Pictures from (b)(6) FOLDER).

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



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ACCG-SR

21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

1. On 20 November 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your relationship to the intel community and the situation at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I was the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We deployed to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) as the Division IRF o/a 12 August and arrived shortly thereafter, a few hours before masses overran the airfield. During the Abbey Gate bombing, our tactical operations center (TOC) was where state department used to be set up and I was located at the TOC at the time of the attack. Our BCT S2 shop provided early warning and indication to both the BDE CDR and the Paratroopers on the ground, receiving threat streams, and pushing any of those out to our units that were operating around HKIA. At the time of

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

the bombing, the Marines at Abbey Gate were about 2 hours out from conducting final Relief in Place (RIP) with one of our Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) BNs. Prior to and after the explosion, myself, my NCOIC and my AS2 went out at different times with our Human Intelligence Tech and CI Agent who were previously working the HUMINT mission with USFOR-A to all vulnerable points around HKIA in order identify best locations to array our organic ground collection assets to provide early warning and indication in support of force protection. Before, during, and after the attack at Abbey Gate occurred, we were inundated with unfiltered reporting from a multitude of sources on multiple mediums. We knew attacks were pending everywhere, and being able to filter and pass down that info to Paratroopers at the gates was a 24/7 job for us. The Joint Task Force Crisis Response (JTF-CR) was still the lead for force protection when the attack happened, at least for another couple hours. The Marine's intelligence cell was with the JTF-CR, so we worked with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and other JTF CR intel elements closely until Division arrived and took over the mission. We were in contact with units who had control of aerial ISR assets via chat surfer. One of the other collection assets were the raid cameras around HKIA which we used to tip and cue some of our Paratroopers, pushing out that information so that they could be informed when conducting their operations and receiving information from Paratroopers to move the cameras as necessary. We had control of some of the cameras at our main Brigade TOC, one of the subordinate PIRs had control of cameras at their TOC, 82nd ABN DIV HQ had control of less cameras at their TOC, and we were aware of a control center that was immediately outside the boundaries of what we controlled at HKIA, but did not have access. We also had organic SIGINT Collection Teams which we arrayed around HKIA with the Radio Recon Teams (RRTs) IOT collect any indications of attacks. We had good indication that an attack was going to happen for the Abbey gate attack specifically through SIGINT based reporting tearlines passed down to us from (b)(1)1.4c. We passed the information that we had through radio comms to the Paratroopers and when able visited gates and security points with verbal BOLO information to increase awareness both for the Marines before we replaced them, and to the Paratroopers.

Prior to the explosion Abbey Gate in particular had at least 1000 people crowded both on the street and inside the canal. Even if a credible report were received, it would have been highly unlikely that a Marine or any other person could pick that person out of the crowd before an attack unless there was significant identifier that distinguished them from the crowd.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. You mentioned raid cameras, was there one focused on Abbey Gate at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. The cameras that we had access to, and could control were not arrayed in a way that faced Abbey gate, most of the cameras were at the North and West of HKIA.

d. Question and Answer 3.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To clarify, there was such a high volume of intelligence about threats pre-attack. However, there was no one particular cell or threat stream that stood out?

(2) Answer. I believe the most clear Abbey Gate intel was from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 tearlines that were relegated down to our level. The be on the lookouts for (BOLOs) could have applied to many of the people or vehicles around the gates. For example, one of the BOLOs was a commonly colored sedan. Paratroopers worked diligently, as the Marines did, to identify individual threats, but ultimately anyone charged with control at the gates had to also worry about overall crowd control which was a significant threat to internal security at HKIA as we learned during the gate/wall breach previously mentioned. The 1st BCT S2 ops scoured reports for threats about the gates from chat surfer and received reporting from our HUMINT tech, SCTs and other sources on the ground. Anything specific enough to be actioned or that warranted awareness was passed to Paratroopers on the ground via radio comms and on any additional chat rooms with JTF CR intel or otherwise. We weren't solely in charge of force protection at that time as we hadn't completed JIB. Ostensibly the JTF-CR would have also passed that info to their units on the ground after receiving the threat info.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were any of your 82nd personnel in vicinity of the gate at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. Division had a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Soldier attached, who died in the attack. He was not OPCON to our Brigade so I don't have any additional information about his duties at the time. Other than that, none of our 1/82nd Paratroopers were close enough to the blast to be injured or killed in the attack.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No one that could provide any witness accounts?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the 1/82nd HUMINT tech and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was our CI agent on the ground. They were working HUMINT operations in vicinity of the gates and later worked to identify AMCITS and SIV holders in order to bring them through the gates. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were often at the gates but were not ultimately at the Abbey gate at the time of the attack.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I want to speak you about a chat entry in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) entry chatroom [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, the screenshot I sent you suggests there was ISR over the gate. Do you recall any imagery of the attack?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

(2) Answer. No, our early warning and indication came through Signal Intelligence channels, ISR couldn't provide that level of specificity. There was so many people and items at the gate, it is not likely that available A-ISR would have identified a suspicious individual or item prior to the blast. Specifically, putting a backpack down in a crowd of thousands of people with backpacks and luggage wouldn't have been seen as a threat, there were so many people and personnel effects that the items littered the ground to almost a foot high.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). To summarize, precisely, we talked about the raid camera. To your knowledge, there was no raid camera or full motion video footage of the abbey gate at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. That is correct- I confirmed with the team that was with me on the ground today, and none of us recollect any raid camera facing Abbey Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How are you able to confirm?

(2) Answer. I am still in contact our teammates that could view/had control of the raid cameras, and they confirmed that the cameras did not face Abbey Gate. I confirmed this today with at least 3 teammates that were forward with me at the time.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Can you describe the level of Intel coordination and synchronization that was happening?

(2) Answer. I would say the intel coordination with other DoD intel entities at HKIA was great initially. We linked up with other intelligence entities as soon as we got on the ground to include JTF-CR intel, TF (SOF) intel, 10th Mountain DIV intel, National Guards intel leads, and USFOR-A intel leads. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) on the ground, and after he arrived from the embassy, and before he left HKIA, he held twice a day intelligence syncs to address the ground collection picture. We talked tactical ground assets and the emerging intelligence picture. I spoke daily with JTF CR intel and we worked directly with their RRTs to coordinate collection until they left theater. We coordinated with TF intel initially, but they were not on ground long and likely provided support remotely. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 did not provide any support to intelligence coordination and were not synced with our ground collection or otherwise. State Department was not on the ground and did not attempt to reach out to provide any support or information about a base defense plan or otherwise. Disparate security elements were spread across HKIA and as elements left theater, it was up to the BCT

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

and other ground units to fill in the locations with Paratroopers or other supporting elements.

Our BDE S2 ops was also in contact via chat with other intelligence organizations providing support throughout the operation.

I believe that all organizations would have benefited from conducting link up prior to crisis or as the crisis emerged and that this is possible going forward. The JTF CR or regional CR teams, SOF elements and conventional units all maintain an alert posture, there is no reason to hold exclusive intelligence syncs without all the elements involved. I have reached out to XVIII ABC and Division from my current position at to ensure that there is an intelligence understanding prior to forces deploying for emerging crisis situations.

Of note, we submitted detailed collection requirements which outlined in space and time where vulnerable points would be during the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE) due to the collapse of ground forces on exfil aircraft. I do not know that these collection requirements were honored in totality as we did not receive a positive response back as the requesters. That was well after the Abbey gate attack, however, and did not contribute to any lack of intelligence at the gates in that moment.

I also believe that elements with a primary mission of targeting (TF-SOF) are not necessarily best postured to support force protection with I&W LOEs for events like an embassy evacuation for a few reasons. Again, this would not have affected any attack at Abbey Gate as the A-ISR would have been unlikely to pick up on any indications or warning as mentioned above.

Of note, however, prior to crisis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was an exceptional SIO at the Division level and was instrumental in providing all requested assets to our BCT as we started our alert posture- he also championed our request for native speaking linguists, SI assets and more, communicating with other elements and leverages relationships to bolster our intelligence posture before we left.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is there anything you would like to add?

(2) Answer. If there is an opportunity to help the families of the fallen by putting their thoughts at ease, I would love to be of any assistance in person or otherwise. I did meet of the Marines that died, as I recognized their pictures after the explosion. I worked with and stood alongside their comrades at the ramp ceremony and responded to some of the civilian casualties that made their way to our end of base to the aid center amongst other interactions with that event and otherwise. Every Marine on the ground that I met carried him or herself with exceptional bravery, fortitude, and devotion to duty- may their families have some peace knowing that on the ground we did everything we could to provide early warning and indication to those who were at the front lines of gates from the moment that we hit the ground.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
FORT LIBERTY NC 28307-5000

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 10 . I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

 21 NOV 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

 21NOV23
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

21 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4c

1. On 21 November 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference and Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol (SVOIP) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). To start, what was your role at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August of 2021?

(2) Answer. I was the (b)(6), located in (b)(1)1.4d

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did you say you were with the targeting cell in (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. I was in the targeting cell in (b)(1)1.4d as the (b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

At this point, the conversation switched to SVOIP due to poor connectivity

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Prior to the attack at HKIA, were you tracking the ISIS cell that conducted the attack?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was it an intelligence trail you were developing and or targeting?

(2) Answer. We were looking at targetable individuals because we had information about an attack, but we had no way to get positive identification (PID) for a FIND and FINISH.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall any specifics about the cell?

(2) Answer. Location was difficult, we assessed that they were in Kabul.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you doing any targeting in Jalalabad?

(2) Answer. Yes.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was it related to the cell?

(2) Answer. Yes.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you target the cell at all?

(2) Answer. Prior to the attack, we did not conduct any lethal action, that I recall.

j. Question and Answer 9.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To be clear: There was an intelligence connection between the ISIS cells in Jalalabad and Kabul?

(2) Answer. I'd have to go back and reference the reports, it has been two years.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have understood that the planning effort was from Jalalabad in order to direct threats around Kabul, is that fair?

(2) Answer. I would have to go back and reference the reports.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall the number of potential bombers in the cell in Kabul?

(2) Answer. No, I would have to reference the reports to provide an accurate number.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Approaching the 26th, the intelligence became more specific. Do you remember any timeline leading up to the attack?

(2) Answer. The most specificity we had was the attack would happen on the 26th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember how many bombers were potential prepared for the attack?

(2) Answer. No, I would have to go back and review the reports.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall any full motion video (FMV) assets or collections that were done around Abbey Gate prior to and up to the attack? Did you have any assets looking there?

(2) Answer. Yes, lines from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g However, we did not have FMV sensors observing Abby Gate at the time of explosion. Recommend coordinating with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. SW: In the same vein, were you tasking the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]

(2) Answer. I honestly cannot recall [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] being in theater. [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] could tell you timelines on [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and I would refer to them.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b]: Did you have any more specificity on threat streams about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Nothing that would get us to a FIND or a FIX on a target.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b]: Just to clarify and confirm, you were tracking the cell. Any information or intelligence was not targetable, but that was a mission you were trying to complete at that time. Is that accurate?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b]: Can you describe the level of intelligence synchronizations and coordination occurring between different elements at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I thought it went really well from an intel sharing standpoint. I don't know who you have talked to, but the Marine element and others did a great job sharing information there. It was a pretty flat intel line of communication.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] at [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 18. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

11/21/2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

21NOV21
DATE

EXHIBIT S111 – AR 15-6 Investigation attack at Abbey Gate (Original digital library)

The Abbey Gate investigation is available at the following link:

(b)(6)

FOR ACCESS CONTACT:

1TSC Knowledge manager:

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit S112 – S113

Redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c; (b)(3)130b, (b)(3)424, 50 USC §
3024(i), (b)(6)

Page 151 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit S114 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Page 152 redacted for the following reason:

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CASE ID:
1278548

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT Exhibit S115
The Privacy Act Statement for information on this form is contained in NAVMC Form 11000, Privacy Act Statement for Marine Corps Personnel and Pay Records.

PERSONAL AWARD RECOMMENDATION

FROM: (Title and Address) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2DBN 1STMAR 1ST MARDIV BOX 555442 CAMP PENDLETON CA 92055 5442		TO: (Awarding Authority) COMMANDING GENERAL NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, TASK FORCE 51 / 5TH MEB	
		14. EXP. OF ACTIVE DUTY:	IF RETIREMENT, NUMBER OF YEARS:

1. EDIPI: (b)(6)	2. DESIG/NEC/MOS: 8404	15. EST. DETACHMENT DATE: 02/21/2022	
		<input type="checkbox"/> Retirement	<input type="checkbox"/> Terminal Leave
		<input type="checkbox"/> Transfer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Impact Award

3. NAME (Last,first,MI): (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	4. COMPONENT (USN,USMC,etc.): USN	16. NEW DUTY STATION (Home address if separation anticipated): N/A	
---	---	--	--

5. GRADE/RANK: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	17. UNIT AT TIME OF ACTION/SERVICE: 2D BN 1STMAR 1ST MARDIV	18. DUTY ASSIGNMENT: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
---	---	---

6. WARFARE DESIGNATOR (Navy Only):	7. RUC:	19. PREVIOUS PERSONAL DECORATIONS AND PERIOD RECOGNIZED:
8. RECOMMENDED AWARD: C1 - NAVY AND MC COMMENDATION W/ C	9. SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENT: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	

10. TYPE:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Heroic	<input type="checkbox"/> Heroic Posthumous	<input type="checkbox"/> MIA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Meritorious	<input type="checkbox"/> Meritorious Posthumous	

11. NUMBER OF AWARD OF RECOMMENDED MEDAL: 1	20. PERSONAL AWARDS RECOMMENDED-NOT YET APPROVED: CR - 08/26/2021
---	---

12. ACTION DATE/MERITORIOUS PERIOD: 08/19/2021 - 08/27/2021	21. OTHER PERSONNEL BEING RECOMMENDED FOR SAME ACTION:
13. GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF ACTION/SERVICE: OCONUS	

22. I certify that the facts contained in the summary of action are known to me a matter of record

NAME, GRADE, TITLE OF ORIGINATOR (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	DATE 12/02/2021
---	--	---------------------------

23. FORWARDING ENDORSEMENTS BY VIA ADDRESSEE(S).				
VIA COMMAND	RECOMMENDED AWARD	COMBAT "V"	SIGNATURE & GRADE	DATE FWD
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/I 1ST MARDIV (R/U)	C1 - NAVY AND MC COMMENDATION W/ C	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	12/02/2021 17:13:17
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/I 1ST MARDIV (R/U)	C1 - NAVY AND MC COMMENDATION W/ C	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No		12/07/2021 18:51:01

24. TO BE COMPLETED BY AWARDING AUTHORITY				
DISPOSITION OF BASIC RECOMMENDATION	COMBAT "V"	EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM	SIGNATURE, GRADE, TITLE	DATE APPROVED
C1 - NAVY AND MC COMMENDATION W/ C	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For Farrell J Sullivan BGEN, COMMANDING GENERAL	02/13/2022 08:05:19

Citation

C1 approved as C1 on 02/13/2022 08:05:19

MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT WHILE SERVING AS (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) GOLF COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, SPECIAL PURPOSE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE-CRISIS RESPONSE-CENTRAL COMMAND FROM 19 AUGUST 2021 TO 27 AUGUST 2021 IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. DURING NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS AT THE HAMID KARZAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT'S ABBEY GATE, AND IN THE FACE OF A SURGING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TIRELESSLY WORKED TO AID AND CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF HUNDREDS OF ILL AND INJURED CIVILIANS. IN THE MIDST OF CHAOS, FOLLOWING THE DETONATION OF A SUICIDE VEST, HE FEVERISHLY WORKED TO STABILIZE AND EVACUATE FIVE MARINES EXPERIENCING MASSIVE HEMORRHAGING, UNDOUBTEDLY SAVING THEIR LIVES IN THE PROCESS. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) UNSWERVING DETERMINATION, WISE JUDGEMENT AND DEDICATION TO DUTY REFLECTED CREDIT ON HIM AND WERE IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SERVICE.

Approved for Release

Summary of Action

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is enthusiastically recommended for the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with 'C' device for professional achievements under combat conditions as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command from 19 August 2021 to 27 August 2021 in support of Operation ALLIES REFUGE. During this period, he is credited with the following significant accomplishments:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is recommended for the Combat 'C' device based on his exposure to the detonation of a Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device while conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations at the Abbey Gate aboard Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan, on 26 August 2021.

From 19 to 23 August, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked tirelessly to serve, care for and aid 250 civilians and service members. Upon his arrival to the Middle Gate on 19 August, he immediately established his platoon's Casualty Collection Point (CCP) and prepared to receive casualties after a stampede of civilians nearly overran the Entry Control Point, during which (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d where he quickly provided life-saving care before conducting a rapid hand-off with the Battalion's Shock Trauma Platoon. For the next 72 hours, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked to provide care to a crowd that often swelled to upwards of 3,000 civilians. During this period, he treated over 200 civilians for heat related injuries, illnesses and other maladies. Recognizing a critical need of basic supplies for infants, he coordinated directly with the Shock Trauma Platoon to acquire baby formula, hygiene items and water, which he promptly issued to civilian families. Lacking members of the Female Engagement Team in the immediate area, he took on the delicate task of coordinating the search process for female civilians as they came through the Middle Gate, greatly enhancing the speed and efficiency of the Battalion's efforts at Middle Gate by processing 300 females over 72 hours. Additionally, he coordinated with adjacent platoon corpsman to evacuate 12 minors who had been separated from their families to the orphanage aboard the airport. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) determined efforts during this period, impacted not only the hundreds of civilians he treated and saved, but served as a key source of inspiration and motivation for his fellow Marines.

Returning to the Abbey Gate on 25 August, after a brief respite, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was confronted with the threat of an imminent terrorist attack. In response, he immediately assisted senior leadership in the establishment of a CCP 25-meters to the rear of the Middle Gate while working to acquire and consolidate medical supplies in preparation for a mass casualty event. At 1732 on 26 August, the Company was attacked by a member of Islamic State-Khorasan, who detonated a suicide vest that instantly killed and wounded scores of civilians and dozens of American service members. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would work feverishly to save the lives of five urgently wounded Marines. The first casualty he received was a Marine with massive occipital trauma and a critical jugular wound. After rapidly packing the wound with combat gauze to stop the bleeding, he, along with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), moved the Marine to the Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) vehicle. His rapid assessment and treatment ensured that the Marine reached the hospital within 17 minutes from the time of attack. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then began to treat a Marine with severe facial trauma which was compromising his airway. In response to his assessment, he cleared the Marine's airway and packed two wounds with combat gauze on his jaw and neck, stopping the severe venous bleeding that was compromising his breathing. During the evacuation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved from casualty to casualty, balancing triage and treatment as the wounded flooded into the CCP. Specifically, he focused his efforts on three more casualties suffering from massive hemorrhaging, effectively stopping the bleeding for each before moving them into multiple CASEVAC platforms to ensure they were rapidly transported to the next echelon of care. Due, in part, to his steady leadership as a senior corpsman and precise and rapid medical contributions, the Company was able to evacuate all urgent and priority casualties with 20 minutes of the attack. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) rose to the challenge and assisted in saving the lives of five Marines while coordinating the treatment and evacuation of many others.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) superior performance of duty reflected credit upon him and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He is enthusiastically recommended for the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with 'C' device.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAS AWARDED THE

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS COMMENDATION MEDAL

(WITH COMBAT "C" DEVICE)

TO

[Redacted Name] (b)(3)(130b), (b)(6)

FOR

MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT WHILE SERVING AS [Redacted] GOLF COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, SPECIAL PURPOSE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE-CRISIS RESPONSE CENTRAL COMMAND FROM 19 AUGUST 2021 TO 27 AUGUST 2021 IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. DURING NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS AT [Redacted] MID KARZAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT'S ABBEY GATE, AND IN THE FACE OF A SURGING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, [Redacted] FREELIQUIDLY WORKED TO STABILIZE AND [Redacted] FIVE MARINES EXPERIENCING MASSIVE HEMORRHAGING, UNDOUBTEDLY SAVING THEIR LIVES IN THE PROCESS. [Redacted] UNSWERVING DETERMINATION, WISE JUDGEMENT AND DEDICATION TO DUTY REFLECTED CREDIT ON HIM AND [Redacted] WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SERVICE.

(b)(6)

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)



FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
F. J. SULLIVAN
BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING GENERAL, NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
TASK FORCE 51/5TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE

GIVEN THIS 31ST DAY OF JANUARAY 2022

CASE ID:
1234831

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT Exhibit S116
The Privacy Act Statement for information on this form is contained in NAVMC Form 11000, Privacy Act Statement for Marine Corps Personnel and Pay Records.

PERSONAL AWARD RECOMMENDATION

FROM: (Title and Address)
ADJUTANT
2DBN 1STMAR 1ST MARDIV
BOX 555442
CAMP PENDLETON CA
92055 5442

TO: (Awarding Authority)
COMUSMARCENT MARCENT (HQ MARFOR CENTCOM)

14. EXP. OF ACTIVE DUTY:
01/04/2025

IF RETIREMENT, NUMBER OF YEARS:

1. EDIPI:
(b)(6)

2. DESIG/NEC/MOS:
0369

15. EST. DETACHMENT DATE: 09/30/2022

Retirement
 Transfer

Terminal Leave
 Impact Award

3. NAME (Last,first,MI):
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. COMPONENT (USN,USMC,etc.):
USMC

16. NEW DUTY STATION (Home address if separation anticipated):
N/A

5. GRADE/RANK:
(b)(6)

17. UNIT AT TIME OF ACTION/SERVICE:
Ground Combat Element (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

18. DUTY ASSIGNMENT:
(b)(6)

6. WARFARE DESIGNATOR (Navy Only):

7. RUC:
13210

19. PREVIOUS PERSONAL DECORATIONS AND PERIOD RECOGNIZED:

8. RECOMMENDED AWARD:
CR - COMBAT ACTION RIBBON

9. SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENT:
 Yes No

NA - 08/01/2020 NA - 05/15/2015 NC - 03/14/2015
CR - 09/22/2011 PH - 02/20/2007 CR - 12/25/2006

10. TYPE:

Heroic Heroic Posthumous MIA
 Meritorious Meritorious Posthumous

11. NUMBER OF AWARD OF RECOMMENDED MEDAL:
4

20. PERSONAL AWARDS RECOMMENDED-NOT YET APPROVED:

12. ACTION DATE/MERITORIOUS PERIOD:
08/26/2021 - 08/26/2021

21. OTHER PERSONNEL BEING RECOMMENDED FOR SAME ACTION:

13. GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF ACTION/SERVICE:
OCONUS - OPERATION FREEDOMS SENTINEL

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

22. I certify that the facts contained in the summary of action are known to me a matter of record

NAME, GRADE, TITLE OF ORIGINATOR

SIGNATURE

DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
USCENTCOM FOIA 24-0171

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

10/05/2021
1190, 4/26/24

23. FORWARDING ENDORSEMENTS BY VIA ADDRESSEE(S).

VIA COMMAND	RECOMMENDED AWARD	COMBAT "V"	SIGNATURE & GRADE	DATE FWD
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	CR - COMBAT ACTION RIBBON (Event# 1)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	10/07/2021 02:51:19
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	CR - COMBAT ACTION RIBBON (Event# 1)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	10/15/2021 08:14:31
Cdr, JTF-CS NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, TASK FORCE 51 / 5TH MEB	CR - COMBAT ACTION RIBBON (Event# 1)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For Farrell Sullivan BGEN, Cdr, JTF-CS	12/21/2021 04:01:46

24. TO BE COMPLETED BY AWARDING AUTHORITY

DISPOSITION OF BASIC RECOMMENDATION	COMBAT "V"	EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM	SIGNATURE, GRADE, TITLE	DATE APPROVED
ZZ - NO AWARD (Event# 1)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For Paul J Rock JR MAJGEN, COMUSMARCENT	07/12/2022 06:49:29

Approved for Release

Summary of Action

Action Dates: 08/26/2021 - 08/26/2021

Unit (At Time Of Action): Ground Combat Element, (b)(1)1.4a 21.2

Geographical Location:

Operation:

Summary of Action:

From 15 to 29 August 2021, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines participated in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in support of Operation ALLIES REFUGE at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in Kabul, Afghanistan. The battalion's mission was to first provide airfield security but as additional US Forces flowed into HKIA, it transitioned to conduct Entry Control Point (ECP) Operations at the Abbey Gate, located on the southeast side of the airfield. Inherent to the mission was to identify, screen, and process American Civilians and other persons of interest (U.S. green card holders, embassy badge holders, special immigrant visas, etc.) and prepare them for evacuation out of the country.

The threat level during this time was high as the Taliban converged upon Kabul and surrounded the city, including HKIA. The battalion began ECP Operations on 19 August 2021 at the Abbey Gate, the airfield's main ECP, and as time progressed the threat level incrementally rose each day. Various collection methods confirmed multiple credible threats from Islamic State ' Khorasan (ISIS-K) in the forms of suicide vehicle and personnel borne improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

Additionally, aggressive posturing from Taliban militants gradually increased around HKIA as well in the form of mounted vehicle crew-served weapons and indirect fire weapons pointed directly at the airfield and the ECPs. These extremely high threat factors coupled with the close proximity that troops had to interact with tens of thousands of civilians created an exceptionally dangerous operating environment.

On 26 August 2021, an ISIS-K insurgent detonated a suicide borne improvised explosive device (SBIED) directed at U.S. Forces, Afghan evacuees, and other coalition forces at the forward edge of the Abbey Gate. The explosion resulted in an instantaneous mass casualty event as ball bearings and shrapnel ripped through the densely packed crowd, ultimately killing 13 U.S. service members, wounding more than 16 Marines and Sailors, and killing upwards of 160 Afghans. Marines and Sailors throughout the Abbey Corridor immediately began evacuating casualties and secured the outer perimeter, ensuring no follow-on attack could occur.

Without regard for their own well-being and as a testament to their selflessness, Marines from the entire battalion on site immediately began retrieving killed and wounded personnel from Zone A as small arms fire continued for two to three minutes following the detonation. As the casualty evacuation continued for 15 to 20 minutes, Marines formed a security posture along the drainage ditch adjacent to the Abbey Gate to ensure no follow-on attackers could breach the perimeter. Likewise, Marines within the Abbey Gate oriented their security east towards the perimeter wall, ensuring no insurgents could maneuver over the barrier.

As soon as the battalion completed the casualty evacuation, Marines withdrew from the outer most edge of the Abbey Gate and closed the gate. The battalion maintained security over the Abbey Corridor until relieved by elements of the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division who assumed security of this area.

Zones are outlined below to provide context and a clear image of the outer most gate in the Abbey Corridor where the attack occurred. At the time of detonation, the majority of Company's E, F, and G and a few personnel from Weapons Company were far enough forward to respond instantaneously to the attack. All personnel on site took action and responded appropriately.

Blast Zone A: Direct impact area of the fragmentation from the SBIED from point of detonation out to 50 meters. This zone is located just south of 'middle gate.' Middle gate is the outer most gate in the Abbey Corridor. Within this zone is the (b)(1)1.4a Truck, sniper tower, canal, and canal zone.

Blast Zone B: Uncovered position exposed to the pressure from the point of detonation out to 50 meters. This area is adjacent to Zone A and south of Zone A. Within this zone is the canal.

Blast Zone C: Covered position within 50 meters of the point of detonation, only exposed to possible refractory blast pressure. This area is adjacent to Zone A and north of the middle gate and Zone A. Within this zone is the search area, the base of the sniper tower, and casualty collection point (CCP).

The following Marines and Sailors were located to the north of Zone C at the time of the blast:

1. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation of the improvised explosive device, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved immediately to the sniper tower and organized his platoon. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved with one squad towards Zone A and began establishing local security and overseeing the movement of casualties from Zone A to the CCP.

2. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation of the improvised explosive device, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved immediately towards Zone A and moved the Company Commander to the CCP. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to Zone A and began triaging casualties and moving them to the CCP.

3. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Prior to detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked with the company (b)(6) to establish the CCP location (CCP). Upon detonation,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) prepared the CCP for the arrival of casualties. As casualties arrived to the CCP, he began conducting triage and providing treatment.

4. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Prior to detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked with the company (b)(6) to establish the CCP (CCP). Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) prepared the CCP for the arrival of casualties. As casualties arrive to the CCP, he began conducting triage and providing treatment.
5. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his squad. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his squad moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw the movement of casualties from Zone A. Upon security being set (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) linked up with (b)(1)14a medics to bring them to the CCP.
6. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his fire team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his fire team moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
7. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his fire team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his fire team moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
8. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. He moved (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to cover behind the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
9. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to Zone A and established local security. Upon security being set (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped to move casualties to the CCP.
10. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) immediately provided treatment to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at CCP I. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then directed his team to help provide security. After treatment was rendered (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to Zone A and moved two more casualties to the CCP.
11. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the sniper tower and organized his fire team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his fire team moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
12. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
13. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
14. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the sniper tower and organized his fire team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his fire team moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
15. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his fire team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his fire team moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
16. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
17. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
18. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
19. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his squad. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his squad moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
20. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.

21. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
22. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
23. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower and organized his squad. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his squad moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
24. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
25. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
26. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security.
27. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security.
28. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security and oversaw and participated in the movement of casualties from Zone A.
29. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Upon detonation, moved to the base of the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then moved to Zone A and established local security.
30. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Prior to the attack, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was posted at the CCP with the quick reaction force platoon. After the blast (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved to the CCP and immediately began treatment of casualties as they were brought to the CCP. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) treated seven total casualties. He provided tourniquet, chest seals, and nasal pharyngeal adjuncts to patients.
31. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
32. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, He held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
33. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
34. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
35. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
36. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
37. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
38. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
39. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
40. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he assisted in moving two casualties. He then held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
41. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
42. USCENTCOM FOIA (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the

CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.

43. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed. He moved 1 casualty from Zone A to the CCP.
44. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
45. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he ran into Zone A and began pulling casualties behind cover. He handed casualties off to other Marines that then transported them to the CCP. He pulled 4 Marines out of Zone A.
46. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
47. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
48. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.
49. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Immediately after the blast, he held security on the CCP, Zone A, and Abbey Corridor until the retrograde was completed.

Per SECNAV M-1650.1, the above listed Marines and Sailors were directly exposed to the detonation of an IED and are therefore recommended for the Combat Action Ribbon.

S117. ABBEY GATE SUPPLIMENTARY REVIEW TOP SECRET ANNEX TABLE OF CONTENTS

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(b)(1)1.4c

S113. (~~S//NF~~) (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

S117. (~~TS//NOFORN~~) Abbey Gate Supplementary Review Top Secret Annex
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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S120. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S121. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S122. (~~TS//~~) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S123. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

Classified By: (b)(6)

(b)(3) 3024(i)

Declassify On: 25X1, 20741231

S124. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
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S125. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
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S126. (TS/ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S127. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S128. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S129. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
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S131. (TS/ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S132. (TS// (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S133. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S134. (TS// (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S135. (TS// (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S136. (TS// [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S137. (TS// [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S138. (TS// [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S139. (TS// [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i) **ISIS-Khorasan Focusing Attack**
Campaign on Taliban [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S140. (TS// [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S141. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [redacted] (b)(3) 3024(i)
[redacted] (b)(3) 3024(i)

S142. (S//NF) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S143. (S//NF) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S144. (S//NF) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S145. (S//NF) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S146. (S//NF) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

S147. (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) (b)(3) 3024(i)
(b)(3) 3024(i)

S148. (TS/ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S149. (S/ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S150. (TS/ (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S151. (SECRET//REL TO US, FVEY) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)3024(i)

S152. (S//NF) (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

S153. (S//NF) (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

S154. (U//FOUO) (b)(3) 3024(i)
(b)(3) 3024(i)

Exhibit S118 – S154

Redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4c, 1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(3)424,
50 USC § 3024(i), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
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ACCG-SR

16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

1. On 16 October 2023, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Hansen, Japan to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. They stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You were unavailable during the original interview, correct?

(2) Answer. Correct, I believe I was at [redacted] (b)(6) at the time.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. KM: How are you recovering from your injuries?

(2) Answer. I am back to full steam. Sometimes I get a little sore where I was injured, but no real physical hindrances. I got [redacted] (b)(6) an inch and a half above [redacted] (b)(6). The other was in my [redacted] (b)(6) and is still there to this day.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 2/1 Marines

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Have you received the care you need?

(2) Answer. Yes, I was in [redacted (b)(6)]. I was able to walk when I left [redacted (b)(6)]. I remember there was about a week I couldn't walk on my left leg, but no range of motion limitations. Both ball bearings were close to arteries, I got lucky. [redacted (b)(6)].

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Any memory issues?

(2) Answer. Only the period when they hit me with [redacted (b)(6)] sir.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Okay, so you're deployed in 2021. You're doing some training in [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] when did you find out you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. We had seen the news in the chow hall, statements saying they were readying troops to assist in the withdrawal. We had finished a squad level attack range in [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] a few days following that, we were going to do platoon attacks. A buddy said it was a good thing since we would be in Afghanistan during that time period. We were on the night shift to pull guard, at about 0600, and a rover came out with breakfast chow and told us that after changeover we had to go pack our bags and get ready. I believe Golf Company had only found out from a news article at the time.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you start receiving any briefs or training to go to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. They spun us up on the situation and what had happened until the current time frame at HKIA. There wasn't any specific training that we hit while we were preparing and packing.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you ever receive any training on Rules of Engagement, self-defense, shoot don't shoot?

(2) Answer. We were quizzed everyday on RoE for our camp guard cycle. Every Marine knew it by heart. It was in a notebook we had to have. I still have it actually, so we all understood that.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What would allow you to escalate force, what would you have to see?

(2) Answer. It's been a long time, I can't say exactly what it was at the time that we had set as acts of aggression.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did any of that change while you were in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. No, it was all the same, as far as my understanding was. We were one of the only forces that was entirely peaceful to the other side as far as not firing weapons systems. The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d were notorious for firing into the sky as a scare tactic. I saw that very often. Never at the civilians, but nine bangs, flash bangs, pistols in the sky. Anything that would get attention was a tactic they would use. Marines occasionally used flashbangs and nine bangs, but I never saw that. I know we had them and CS canisters.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who quizzed you on RoE?

(2) Answer. Squad leaders and team leaders. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Pretty much all of our leadership.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay you find out you are going to Afghanistan, when did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. I remember it was dark when we landed. We took off in the afternoon from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d I think it was about a 4 hour flight. Maybe longer, I chose to stand the whole time so that some of our other guys get could some sleep.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the airfield like?

(2) Answer. Quiet when we landed. I had seen when the civilians rushed the airfield from the drone feed in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d It was nothing like that when we landed. We got off the plane, shuttled over from the taxi area to where we set up. We waited around, then shuttled our bags to the gym where we were going to live.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) When were you first on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The morning after we landed. I don't remember the exact date. We got about 4 hours of sleep. My squad was the first squad to the gate. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was driving a captured vehicle. First squad went first, but once the whole squad was at the abbey gate wall we gathered up. This was by the inner gate.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) guides a brief discussion of the unclassified Abbey Gate map to establish a common lexicon. The terms ranged from the inner gate to the chevron.

First platoon waited by the inner gate, then set our packs down next to an x-ray vehicle area. Everyone else had set up probably a few hundred meters behind the gate where we set down the crate of CS grenades that I carried. The gate was shut when we showed up, the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d were in charge at the time. We moved up to assist them in opening it. They sent first squad up, as soon as they started to open it we called for assistance from second and third squad to control the gate area.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How did the first day go?

(2) Answer. It was hectic. There were a lot bodies. The whole section in the outer corridor was people outside the gate trying to push in. Initially we had taken control, then it started to get a little rowdy. CS gas was employed, the crowd cleared, we closed the gate. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up with a plan on how to peacefully make a way forward to use the outer corridor as an additional screening area. That evening was spent with every Marine from Golf Company on line. We had specific orders not to be violent, just one step forward at a time.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you feel like you had the authority to protect yourself still?

(2) Answer. Yes, but there was no need at the time. If we had the proper engagement conditions, it would have been acceptable. But we were just managing to move the crowd back, one step at a time.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Was the crowd getting desperate yet?

(2) Answer. There were peaks. The first day the crowd was active, once we established our area the crowd calmed down. Once the crowd found out we were leaving they got excited.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you see any difference with the crowd between when Golf Company and Echo Company had it?

(2) Answer. I think it was pretty common that the crowd would be different from when we left it. I can't say with any specifics if they were more rowdy or violent. I did always feel like we had to fix something that Echo or the (b)(1)1.4d had done.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Talk us through what your task and purpose were at the squad level when you were getting out to the gate?

(2) Answer. I was just a generic rifleman, the team leaders and squad leaders were told to look for credentials to bring to the platoon leadership. Riflemen just had the job to control the crowd and keep the calm. Keep them from acting out against the credential search.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did you interact with Department of State reps at all on how to process?

(2) Answer. By the time I had to look at documents, it was the last three or four days. I was only looking for US visas. If I saw one, I would bring it to higher and they would determine if it was real or fake. That was team leader, squad leader, platoon command team. Once they okayed it, we would echelon them back and bring them through the hole in the gate to escort them to third platoon's area in the inner gate where we would do a battle hand off. It was mostly third platoon that dealt with Department of State since they were in the inner gate. I know that DoS would often leave or stop processing. The time of the day that happened often varied.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: You mentioned the (b)(1)1.4d were the Taliban also there?

(2) Answer. Yes, down by the chevron and also the far side of the canal. They would tap on someone with a big stick and tell them to go to the front. I remember they would do that and have documents for us to check. That would sometimes work. My team leader told me to be aware of the Taliban guy standing there with guns.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: To be clear, you didn't interact much with the Taliban?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. No, no verbal interaction.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever physically see Taliban harming civilians?

(2) Answer. I did not ever see it. I heard about it on the second day, but I was on pack watch that day. When the platoon came back, they said that day was graphic, talking about executions and throwing babies. I didn't see any of that.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you receive any threat streams?

(2) Answer. Quite a few. If we received one while we were helping another squad, we would get pulled off the gate. One night specifically we were on the wall, and told to get down behind the wall and don't do anything other than poke our head up to maintain awareness. We just tried to keep big gaps and expose ourselves as little as possible.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Would those mitigations usually follow a threat stream?

(2) Answer. That is my understanding. I never had access to a radio, but we would move into cover.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Describe what a threat report coming down would do in terms of your squad and team's actions?

(2) Answer. I was a rifleman at the time, with no leadership billets. When it came to my level, it was more of the team leader emplacing us in specific spots. It was about being told what to do, because the team leader had better SA. They would tell us where to go and what to do. You didn't have to understand why, you knew it was important.

Best example, one evening we received a tip. It was sunset time frame, moving into darkness. I was beyond the fence, deep down the canal toward the Baron hotel. I was keeping my head down, my next buddy was 15 meters away. It was just about keeping your head down and observing to ensure the crowd was passive. The crowd was usually passive at night when they understood we weren't processing. They were nice in that sense.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], 2/1 Marines

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: What threat reporting would you get?

(2) Answer. IEDs and I remember one IDF threat. It was prior to the north end of base actually taking some mortar fire.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: What were your interactions with platoon and company leadership?

(2) Answer. Personally, I didn't see too much of the platoon commander. He was constantly moving about, checking credentials. I had seen [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I had seen [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] All of them moving around. I had seen a lot of the commanders actively in the working area with us. Making moves to assess civilians. They were present.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did it seem like they were concerned with safety?

(2) Answer. Consistently, but that was a 24/7 battle of checking your boys and making sure you had water. I remember my platoon commander doing that, making sure everyone was in the best shape that they could be at the time.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: What was your sleep rest cycle like?

(2) Answer. Not much. I called that first four days the 100 hours of hell. We had been told we would be there for two days. We were there for over four before Echo company relieved us. After that, we started with a day or two on then a day or two off. Then it changed to just a day, then you could sleep at night. That first week, certainly that first 100 hours, was sleeping within the outer gate. The next few days would be sleeping in the gym, probably.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you ever get any specific BOLOs?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], a team leader, told us we were looking out for something. I don't remember the clothing, but it was a [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I believe it was something to look for, typical suicide wear. The issue was, your typical suicide bomber wears proper clothes to look their best. The whole populace looked like that though because they were trying to leave the country. There were hundreds of people like that. I think there was a tip on clothing color and a hat, but I don't remember.

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ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: So even with a description, would multiple people match?

(2) Answer. For clothing, yes. For baggage, I think that could be much more singled out.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you see anything that matched those descriptions?

(2) Answer. I don't think I did, I would have passed that up and I don't remember doing anything like that.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you interact with the snipers?

(2) Answer. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] was a good friend of mine. He helped me bring a family out of the canal. I didn't know the rest of the snipers, so I wasn't eating MREs with them or anything like that.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: What was it like the day before the blast?

(2) Answer. It was a normal day. They didn't start the audio. We woke up, stood in the awful chow line, went to the gate for however long our shift was, come back. I have a video of all of us eating dinner together on the night of the 24th, so I know I was on the gate on the 25th. It's funny to look back and remember that.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Day of the blast, what was your job and where were you located?

(2) Answer. That day we went out there around 0800, our shift was supposed to be until around 1600. I know the blast happened around 1735. I think that day we got a tip from EOD, so we needed to pull back into safety because of a bomb threat. I know it was a bomb threat from the way that we were positioned. We did that for maybe 45 minutes until it was deemed clear. After that we moved to the wall. LCpl Nikoui was on the corner. I was next to him, a few feet away. I know that a few Marines were on the Jersey Barrier. There were more Marines going down the wall to the right, but I didn't remember the exact order. I remember Kareem specifically. He was my buddy, and he

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was a smaller guy. I asked him if he needed me to swap to the corner a couple times since I'm bigger, but he wanted to stay.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question on [redacted]: What were you doing at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I can't remember the exact reason why, there was an issue behind me. I got off the wall and turned around. I was about 4 or 6 feet away from the wall. I took a step and put my head down, and all of a sudden my hearing dropped out and I felt the shockwave, like I just been punched in my SAPI plate. When I looked around it was dust and you couldn't see anything. I instantly checked myself, swept for blood. I saw I was bleeding through my left leg. Then the dust cleared and I could see again. Just people laying on the ground. I knew there was a walkway behind me. I pivoted, and fell behind me so people could walk through. I went to put my tourniquet on. I was in the process, when [redacted], who is CLS qualified came over, and he came to put the tourniquet on instead. At that point, he was working on tightening that tourniquet. At that point I heard one of the members of the FET, from my 1200 position. She said something about not being able to feel her legs. I tried to look over, but I couldn't see her.

When I turned my head, I saw my left sleeve had turned red. I looked up at [redacted] and told him we needed another tourniquet for my arm. We applied that, then he went to take me out of here. He leaned back for me to stand up. I tried, but my left leg locked up. I said I couldn't stand. He says that when he leaned back a gunshot went between the two of us, then he pulled me up and we walked and came through the initial hole in the gate.

There I saw [redacted] and [redacted] dragging Merola back. At that point the tourniquet on my leg gave out, it was a tourniquet I had used for training, so it was not freshly unpacked. As we were walking, there was some none infantry Marine. We told him to prep a tourniquet. We could tell he didn't know what he was doing, so we kept moving me within the gate to get us out of any lines of sights or lines of fire. I was placed down by the building behind the sniper tower. I think I was one of the first casualties there, that's when the other corpsman went to work.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question on [redacted]: How long were you there before you were moved to the field hospital?

(2) Answer. I was undressed, checked for other injuries. I laid there for a time frame, I don't remember exactly how long. I'd like to say around five minutes, but there it too much adrenaline to gauge time well. After about no more than five minutes, I got put in the back of a Toyota Hilux with an Afghan girl and a [redacted] some supervising corpsman from 2/1. He was making sure we made it conscious to the hospital.

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mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] told you about that round? Did you hear anything like that?

(2) Answer. He told me about that after the fact, hearing it and seeing a puff of dust. I didn't hear or see anything like that. I know that my team leader [redacted (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)] was shot through his shoulder. I know that, because the round didn't go through my thigh but it went through his shoulder. A rifle has a lot more kinetic energy. I know that doctors found that three other Marines were shot as well.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] After you were treated, what happened?

(2) Answer. I was casevaced from the casualty sight to the hospital. A lot of [redacted (b)(6)] I woke up around 1900-2000 and saw [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I spoke to him. He also had a lot of ketamine, but was conscious and speaking. They moved all the WIA into the same room. At that point, some people went to use the rest room and got our phones for us so we could call our families. I called my mom, it was a short call, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I let a couple other guys use my phone to call home.

At 0045 I was conscious, they're combat gauzed my leg. That was painful. Around 0100 I was on a bird to Germany. So we were off pretty quickly. That was a long cold flight. I remember moving from my litter to the rest room, and feeling like I had just run 15 miles even though it was just 30 feet.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Do you have anyone that you talk to about that day, anyone that was there?

(2) Answer. Not specifically. Sometimes Afghanistan comes up in conversation. Last weekend my roommate asked me what was going on at Abbey Gate, he was somewhere else, and I told him I didn't know that was elsewhere at the gate.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Do you absorb any social media on this topic?

(2) Answer. A couple interviewers contacted me on my return to the west coast. Propublica quoted me in an article. That was pretty much the last time I dealt with any media. Also, I was roommates with Nikoui's [redacted (b)(6)] back in the [redacted (b)(6)] area in early 2023 before we deployed, so I spent a lot of time with [redacted (b)(6)] was good friends with [redacted (b)(6)] and had moved in with [redacted (b)(6)], which is why we were kind of roommates. I

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know [redacted (b)(6)] has some extremist views, but [redacted (b)(6)] is a [redacted (b)(6)] so that is understandable.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(6)]: Anything else that you want to talk about?

(2) Answer. I just know that the controversial thing between the unit and the reports is the gunshot thing. I know some guys saw people in the second story by the water tower, and that gunfire was received. I don't think Marines sent any rounds. My only personal experience with that was when [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] was giving me aid.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Can we see your notebook with notes on the RoE? We would like to take pictures.

(2) Answer. Yes, I have it in my barracks room. It has a hole throughout with a ball bearing through it. We had that, I remember having the inherent right to defense and all of that memorized at the time, all the Marines did.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: What would your actions have been if you had positive ID?

(2) Answer. I remember a scenario four or five days before the bombing. I had received a document from a person in the canal, I brought it to my higher. I remember that was just beyond the fence, I don't remember if it was yes or no. As I turned around, there was person that jumped over the wall. I immediately did shout, then show. He ran about 20 meters, then jumped back in the canal. That was my only instance to do something like that. Never had to bring my rifle off of safe.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: We have heard a lot of great things about Golf Company during the NEO.

(2) Answer. We called ourselves Ghost Company. 2/1 Ghost Company was that guy. The example. One of the most capable units the Marine Corps could have sent at the time.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]: Did you feel you had medical training?

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED], 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Yes. At the time I even said calmly, we trained for this. I knew from my training I had to get a tourniquet on and stay awake.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] about the 21st or the 22nd of August, did you hear of or see an IED rehearsal or a route recon of any kind?

(2) Answer. We had a reaction to bomb threats, that sort of deal. Being at that level that I was, if there was a drill we wouldn't have known the difference.

ww. Question and Answer 48

(1) Question: [REDACTED] It may have just been a report of them gathering intel, anything like that?

(2) Answer: Not that I can recall, sir.

xx. Question and Answer 49

(1) Question: Anyone that you feel we should talk to for a recollection of the events that day?

(2) Answer: I think you have an interview planned with [REDACTED]. He was hit in [REDACTED] and pulled security. He had a longer visual than I did, with a different viewing angle.

yy. Question and Answer 50

(1) Question: [REDACTED] When did you say you received the RoE?

(2) Answer: While we were training on [REDACTED] We had five security posts across the base. When we did typical PCI/PCC we would get quizzed on that knowledge.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED] at

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question ONE and ends on question 50. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

2023 10 16
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16 OCT 2023
DATE

~~CUI~~