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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG

19 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM),
7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621-5101

SUBJECT: Action Memo – Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation,
Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

1. **Purpose.** This memorandum responds to your directive, dated 20 August 2023, to conduct supplemental interviews with wounded Servicemembers not interviewed as part of the investigation into the attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), on 26 August 2021. Included is my summary of the new information not previously considered during the Abbey Gate Investigation and my assessment of whether the new information materially impacts the findings and recommendations.

a. I approve the finding that none of the new information materially impacts the findings of the Abbey Gate Investigation.

b. I concur with the conclusions and assessments made by the Supplemental Review team.

c. I approve the recommendation that no modifications be made to the original findings or recommendations of the Abbey Gate Investigation.

(b)(5)

2. **Background.** In November 2021, USARCENT completed the investigation into the Abbey Gate attack. Since the completion of the investigation between September 2022 and August 2023, some Servicemembers made assertions which were not in line with the Abbey Gate Investigation. In June 2023, you directed USARCENT to conduct a review of the public testimony to determine whether it contained any new information. USARCENT completed its review of public testimony in August 2023. In September 2023, USARCENT appointed then BG Lance Curtis to lead the Supplemental Review.

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3. **Assessment.** The Supplemental Review concluded that none of the new information materially impacts the findings of the Abbey Gate Investigation. There are no recommended modifications.

a. **Directed Assessment.** The Supplemental Review, considering new public testimony and statements, as well as additional evidence collected during the review, drew the following conclusions in three topic areas I directed:

(1) The suspicious individual observed by the call sign (b)(6) sniper team on 26 August 2021 was not the Abbey Gate bomber, Abdul Rahman al-Logari.

(2) The suspicious individual observed by the call sign (b)(6) sniper team did not commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent. Additionally, offensive engagement authority was not warranted.

(3) The Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility there was an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) test run on 21 August 2021, but it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban.

b. **Additional Assessment.** The Supplemental Review, assessing new information not considered during the initial review conducted by USARCENT and evidence collected during the review, drew conclusions in two additional topic areas:

(1) Leaders were routinely present, actively engaged, and made a sound tactical decision to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower, 25 August 2021, to protect and sustain the unit.

(2) The Taliban used excessive force resulting in the death of civilians in the vicinity of Abbey Gate.

c. **No Recommended Modifications.** I do not recommend modifications to the AR 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, HKIA, 26 August 2021.

4. Summary of Evidence in Support of the Assessment

a. The suspicious individual observed by the call sign (b)(6) sniper team on 26 August 2021 was not the Abbey Gate bomber, Abdul Rahman al-Logari.

(1) On 8 March 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) that he saw the suspected bomber near Abbey Gate and provided the following description: "clean-shaven, brown dressed, black vest, and

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traveling with an older companion,” an older gentleman wearing “a black silky hijab that was covering his face most of the time.”¹

(2) Several Supplemental Review witnesses saw two suspicious individuals described by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in his HFAC testimony; however, only (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described both individuals as a perceived threat. Multiple individuals who saw the bald male in black on the morning of 26 August 2021 believed the bald male in black (not any other individual) was the suicide bomber. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the man as bald with “a trimmed beard.”² (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went on to state that, he “was stone cold calm and everyone else was yelling/screaming.”³ (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) noted the suspected bomber “looked like a villain out of a Star Wars movie.”⁴ On the morning of 26 August 2021, the (b)(6) sniper team reported only the bald male as a person of interest.⁵

(3) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) circulated a photo of the suspicious individual in black, on 26 August 2021.⁶ Upon seeing the photo during the Supplemental Review, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sniper team leader, said “this bald guy in black” was a match to the previous threat reporting.⁷ Intelligence based threat reporting disseminated to the units at HKIA on 25 August 2021 described the potential ISIS-K bomber as wearing (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c (see enclosure 2).

(4) The Supplemental Review team obtained the circulated photo and coordinated with the (b)(3)3024(i) to conduct facial recognition analysis. (b)(3)3024(i) determined that the suspicious individual was not Abdul Rahman al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber, who, according to post-blast intelligence reporting, did not arrive at Abbey Gate (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August 2021. The (b)(3)3024(i) image comparison feedback returned the strongest (b)(3) rating⁹ (see enclosure 3 and 4).

¹ House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, March 8, 2023 (Statement of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (last visited Dec. 4, 2023) (hereinafter *HFAC Hearing*, March 8, 2023).

² BG Lance Curtis, Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021, 22 November 2023, Exhibit S006 (on file with author) (hereinafter *Supplemental Review*).

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Id.* at Exhibit S025.

⁵ BG Lance Curtis, Army Regulation 15-6, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021, Exhibit 115 (on file with author) (hereinafter *Abbey Gate Investigation*).

⁶ *Supplemental Review*, Exhibit S060, S061.

⁷ *Id.* at Exhibit S029.

⁸ *Abbey Gate Investigation*, Exhibit 115.

⁹ *Supplemental Review*, Exhibit S034.

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b. The suspicious individual observed by the call sign (b)(6) sniper team did not commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent. Additionally, offensive engagement authority was not warranted.

(1) In his HFAC testimony, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated that he and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw both suspicious individuals. One individual “was consistently and nervously looking up at our position through the crowd. The older of the two wore a black silky hijab that was covering his face most of the time.”¹⁰ According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) both individuals “had obvious mannerisms that go along with who we believed him to be.”¹¹

(2) After identifying what he believed was the suspected bomber (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) requested engagement authority “over the communication network.”¹² He later received the response that, “leadership did not have the engagement authority for us. Do not engage.”¹³

(3) The observation of the suspicious bald male by the (b)(6) sniper team was reported at 0717 on the morning of 26 August 2021.¹⁴ Other Supplemental Review witnesses observed the two suspicious individuals and tracked their movements on the morning of 26 August 2021, and recalled losing sight of them around 1000 local time, before the PSYOP shift change.¹⁵ During his interview with the Supplemental Review, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recounted his request for engagement authority to include the two suspicious individuals observed by members of the call sign (b)(6) sniper team. According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at approximately “1100 or so we saw those two individuals.”¹⁶ The (b)(6) sniper team described the bald man as “acting calm, not rushing towards the gate.”¹⁷ According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), the team’s Joint Fires Observer, “he wasn’t doing anything that could have rated an engagement.”¹⁸

(4) In accordance with the applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE), U.S. Forces retained the right to self-defense, the ability to engage individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent against U.S. Servicemembers or coalition military forces.

(5) Interviews conducted during the Supplemental Review consistently confirmed that, within the 2/1 Marine formation, ROE training was conducted, and that the ROE

¹⁰ HFAC Hearing, March 8, 2023.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Abbey Gate Investigation*, Exhibit 115.

¹⁵ *Supplemental Review*, Exhibit S006, S007, S082; *Abbey Gate Investigation*, Exhibit 62.

¹⁶ *Supplemental Review*, Exhibit S065.

¹⁷ *Id.* at Exhibit S057.

¹⁸ *Id.* at Exhibit S011.

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was understood. Evidence collected confirmed that [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] / [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team's request for engagement authority lacked a sufficient basis for any use of lethal force.

c. The Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility there was an IED test run on 21 August 2021, but it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban.

(1) [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] testified to the HFAC that, on 22 August 2021, either ISIS-K or the Taliban was responsible for the execution of an IED Probe / Test Run.¹⁹

(2) During the Supplemental Review, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] elaborated on the testimony provided to the HFAC. He recalled that on 22 August 2021, his sniper team received word from the call sign [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team "that an SUV or van was found with all the same make or model backpacks."²⁰ In addition, the sniper team saw a suspicious individual moving through the crowd with "a black or dark blue duffel bag or large backpack."²¹ When the sniper team observed the individual exit the crowd without a bag, the sniper team called Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). After EOD arrived, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Sniper Team Leader, and [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] showed EOD the location of a backpack matching the description of a bag carried by a previously observed individual, and EOD cleared it. According to [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] it felt as though someone was trying to find out "what our response would be to an IED."²²

(3) [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] stated that, "if we saw backpacks, we would push it up, EOD would come out and check it out, and nothing would come from it. I felt that this was an Afghan testing what we would do with an IED."²³

(4) In response to the IED Test Run question, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] said, "I have no idea what you are talking about. I know that some platoon sergeant mentioned a bag flying over a fence, but that happened a billion times. I don't know what that dry run is."²⁴

(5) The Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility there was an IED test run on 21 August 2021, but it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban. The Supplemental Review found no evidence of intelligence reporting supporting the conclusion an IED test-run occurred.²⁵ Further, [redacted (b)(3)3024(f)]

¹⁹ HFAC Hearing, March 8, 2023.

²⁰ Supplemental Review, Exhibit S065.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.* at Exhibit S031.

²⁴ *Id.* at Exhibit S014.

²⁵ *Abbey Gate Investigation*, Exhibit 115.

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conducted facial recognition of the three males against databases and found no known affiliation with ISIS-K or the Taliban.²⁶ Numerous Servicemembers interviewed during the Abbey Gate Investigation and the Supplemental Review recalled bags being frequently abandoned or discarded.

5. Additional Assessments

a. Leadership and Consolidation of Near-Side Canal. Consistent with the Abbey Gate Investigation, the Supplemental Review reinforced the evidence of present and engaged leadership. The Supplemental Review also collected evidence which supported the tactical decision to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower.

b. Taliban Excessive Force. The Supplemental Review discovered additional evidence that the Taliban used excessive force resulting in the death of civilians in the vicinity of Abbey Gate. The Abbey Gate Investigation limited the finding to Taliban use of excessive force and the impact on the flow of evacuees and gate operations; however, this new additional evidence regarding civilian deaths had no material impact on the Abbey Gate Investigation findings and recommendations.

6. Point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4 Encls

- 1. Photo from [redacted] (b)(6) Sniper Tower
- 2. Suspicious Person at Abbey Gate
- 3. Abbey Gate Bomber
- 4. Facial Image Comparison with Bomber

PATRICK D. FRANK
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

²⁶ Supplemental Review, Exhibit S093.



21AUG21 Photo from
(b)(6) Sniper Tower




Directed Assessment: Suspicious Person at Abbey Gate on 26 August

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“Bald Man in Black”

- First identified ~0700 conflation
- 0717 – The call sign (b)(6) sniper team’s spot report of suspicious individual entered into Chatsurfer as a “BOLO”



- ~0800 – (b)(6) snipers request to engage “BOLO” via radio
- ~0830 – COC denied request to engage
- ~0930 – (b)(6) snipers request engagement authority from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- ~1000 – (b)(6) snipers lost visual
- 17:36:52 – Attack at Abbey Gate



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
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Directed Assessment: Abbey Gate Bomber- Abdul Rahman al-Logari

- **BLUF: No specific individual identified as the bomber prior to the attack**
- Eight hours after the attack, on 27 August 2021, (b)(1)1.4c reporting first identified the bomber as Abdul Rahman al-Logari
- ISIS-K identified the bomber with a photo in a *Telegram* post on 29 August 2021
- (b)(1)1.4c confirmed the bomber identity in an April 2022 report
- (b)(1)1.4c USCENTCOM / USFOR-A assess that al-Logari was the bomber

(b)(3)3024(i)




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Directed Assessment: Abdul Rahman al-Logari ≠ Bald Man in Black

- [Redacted] (b)(3)3024(i)
- al-Logari and "Bald Man in Black" received the strongest negative result on [Redacted] (b)(3)3024(i) spectrum of identification
- Post attack intelligence reporting indicated al-Logari did not arrive at Abbey Gate [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August
 - ~0700 – "Bald Man in Black" spotted
 - ~1000 – [Redacted] (b)(6) snipers lost visual observation
 - [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
 - [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
 - 1736 – Blast occurred at Abbey Gate



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11 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review Assessment of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

1. On 22 September 2023, you appointed me to conduct a Supplemental Review of the October 2021 Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Abbey Gate at Hamid Karzai Airport (HKIA) attack of 26 August 2021. Specifically, you directed me to conduct additional fact-finding to assess whether new information not previously considered exists, whether that new information materially impacts the findings of the original Abbey Gate Investigation (exhibit S111, hereinafter AGI), and, if so, to recommend adjustments to the findings, as appropriate.

2. Supplemental Review Team Composition

a. MG Lance Curtis, USA

- b.
- c.
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3. **Methodology.** The below assessment evaluates new information disclosed through various open-source media platforms, events, and congressional testimony that came to light after conclusion of the AGI and includes information from Servicemembers not previously interviewed due to their medical evacuation or treatment following the attack. In support of this review, 12 of the 19 wounded warriors present during the Abbey Gate attack agreed to participate in the supplemental interviews. Many of those who elected not to participate are now civilians and have exercised their right to not participate. As part of this assessment, the Supplemental Review team interviewed all willing wounded Marines and Navy Corpsmen; both the Echo and Golf (b)(3)130b, (b)(6); the 2nd

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Battalion (Bn), 1st Marine Regiment, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6); all members of the call sign (b)(6) sniper team; key personnel from the 2/1 Combat Operations Center (COC); and key personnel involved in the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence during evacuation operations. We have evaluated the information and evidence collected using the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether new facts emerged when comparing previously known information and evidence. Further, the Supplemental Review team evaluated whether any new facts resulted in material changes to the AGI findings. The Supplemental Review accounts for the inconsistencies in information and statements – specifically, information provided during interviews – given both the passage of time and the nature of the injuries many of the Servicemembers sustained.

4. Focus Areas I have carefully reviewed the AGI and focused the assessment efforts on the new information that you have directed:

- (1) Alleged Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) test run by Islamic State Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Taliban
- (2) Confirmation and description of the suicide bomber
- (3) Possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber

Based on the review of new information disclosed in public testimony, additional assessment was conducted regarding:

- (1) Command decision to consolidate the near-side canal
- (2) Taliban excessive force

The three directed assessments and the two additional assessments are addressed by the following focus areas, which are discussed in a logical order to enable full understanding of the situation at HKIA within the scope of the AGI and the Supplemental Review:

a. Directed Assessment

(1) **Improvised Explosive Device Test Run.** The Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility there was an IED test run on 21 August 2021, but it's more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban.

(2) **Confirmation and Description of the Suicide Bomber**

(a) Threat Reporting. The intelligence regarding threat streams lacked the specificity necessary to positively identify the suspected suicide bomber in the dynamic crowd at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. Servicemembers frequently disseminated threat reporting verbally and face-to-face out of necessity (which tended to unintentionally increase the ambiguity of the already vague, nonspecific intelligence reporting). Members of (b)(6) sniper team and some (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a NCOs conflated their observations of the suspicious persons they identified

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on the morning of 26 August 2021 with a BOLO [be on the lookout] description derived from actual intelligence reporting. **They drew their conclusion based on nonspecific intelligence, unintentionally ambiguous threat reporting, and the conflation of threat reporting. Ultimately, they blended their observations with nonspecific intelligence reporting to generate an entirely new description of the suspected bomber – this became known as the suspicious ‘bald man in black BOLO’, developed from the ground up, that got shared across HKIA.**

(b) Suspicious Person at Abbey Gate and Description of Bomber. The suspicious individual photographed at Abbey Gate on the morning of 26 August 2021 was not the Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) bomber. Members of (b)(6) sniper team and (b)(1)1.4a NCOs asserted this man was the bomber. However, the (b)(3)3024(i) conducted facial recognition analysis on the suspicious male against multiple photos of Abdul Rahman al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber, and the analysis returned the strongest (b)(3)3024(i) result on (b)(3)3024(i) spectrum of identification. Furthermore, intelligence reports published after the attack indicated the bomber did not arrive at Abbey Gate (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August 2021. Although Servicemembers believe they identified the bomber around 0700L on 26 August, this is incongruent with al-Logari’s timeline as revealed in intelligence reporting after the attack.

(3) Possible Request for Authority to Engage the Suicide Bomber

(a) Rules of engagement (ROE) and self-defense. Servicemembers at Abbey Gate had reasonable understanding of the ROE and the standards for assessing hostile act or hostile intent sufficient to employ use of force in self-defense. Based on the evidence reviewed, Servicemembers were not authorized to use lethal force in self-defense based merely on suspicious conduct without additional demonstrations of hostile intent or hostile acts in accordance with the ROE.

(b) Offensive engagement authority. Authority to attack lawful military targets was provided in the USCENTCOM ROE during evacuation operations at HKIA. However, no individual at Abbey Gate, and specifically the suspicious individual observed on 26 August 2021, met the criteria for attack or offensive engagement. U.S. Forces at HKIA lacked sufficient intelligence to establish to a reasonable certainty any individual was a member of a declared hostile force. Individuals who are not members of a declared hostile force are civilians and protected from attack or offensive engagement. The 2/1 Marines (b)(6) was correct to not authorize the request to engage with lethal force a civilian protected from offensive engagement. Further, the (b)(6) (b)(6) appropriately exercised his professional judgement to not request authority to engage at target he determined would have been inconsistent with the ROE and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

b. Additional Assessment

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(1) **Leadership and Consolidation of Near-side Canal.** The AGI and the Supplemental Review verified, through numerous Marines' accounts, that leaders were present, actively engaged, and took proper measures to ensure force protection. Evidence collected also supported the tactical decision to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower, 25 August 2021, to protect and sustain the unit.

(2) **Taliban Excessive Force.** The evidence is sufficient to conclude, based on independent accounts across ranks and services, that the Taliban used excessive force resulting in the death of civilians at Abbey Gate. This conclusion does not materially impact the findings of the AGI.

5. Overview of Personnel, Units, and Locations.

a. The focus of this review were U.S. units operating in vicinity of (IVO) Abbey Gate during the U.S. and NATO evacuation from Afghanistan, 13-31 August 2021. On 26 August 2021, at 17:36:52, ISIS-K attacked Abbey Gate with a PBIED. The attack killed 13 U.S. Servicemembers and an estimated 170 civilians, and wounded dozens of others. The Supplemental Review provides basic, but essential, background information on command relationships and command structure to help facilitate a clearer understanding of this assessment. This review also considers the ranks of the Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers at the time of the evacuation and attack, vice using their present-day ranks.

b. 2/1 Chain of Command

(1) [Redacted]
(2) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(3) [Redacted]

c. 2/1 Bn Combat Operations Center. The Bn COC was in the military area of North HKIA. The Bn COC was a small room connected to the Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR) Joint Operations Center (JOC), which the combined staffs of JTF-CR and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) operated (AGI exhibits 53, 54, 76, and S014, S024, S025).

(1) [Redacted]
(2) [Redacted]
(3) [Redacted]
(4) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(5) [Redacted]
(6) [Redacted]
(7) [Redacted]

d. Echo Company. Echo Company was the initial combat power for 2/1 that arrived at HKIA on 15 August. They conducted airfield security and provided direct support to

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evacuation operations, 15-21 August and 26-28 August. Echo Company performed gate security and evacuation operations 22-25 August at Abbey Gate. Following the attack, Echo Company relieved Golf Company at the gate. Bravo Company, 2/501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division, then relieved Echo Company during period of darkness (POD) 26-27 August (AGI exhibits 56, 57, 59, and S005, S017, S059, S063, S078).

(1) [Redacted]
 (2) [Redacted]
 (3) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (4) [Redacted]
 (5) [Redacted]

e. Golf Company. Most of Golf Company arrived at HKIA after 16 August and initially established security and control of Abbey Gate. They performed gate security and evacuation operations at the gate, 19-22 August and 25-26 August (AGI exhibits 77, 78, 80, and S018, S037, S059, S078).

(1) [Redacted]
 (2) [Redacted]
 (3) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (4) [Redacted]
 (5) [Redacted]
 (6) [Redacted]

f. Fox Company. Fox Company was a reduced-force unit due to a portion of the unit executing other missions in the USCENTCOM AOR. The [Redacted (b)(6)] did not deploy to HKIA with 2/1. Often, Fox Company (-) teamed with Golf Company to provide additional combat power to execute gate security and evacuation operations (AGI exhibits 79, 81).

(1) [Redacted]
 (2) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

g. Weapons Company. Weapons Company's various capabilities (anti-armor, scout-snipers, and mortars) were in direct support of units performing gate security and evacuation operations (AGI exhibits 53, 76, and S026, S056).

(1) [Redacted]
 (2) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (3) [Redacted]

h. Scout Sniper Platoon. The snipers who deployed to HKIA were divided into three teams for the majority of operations. [Redacted (b)(6)] sniper team occupied the outer gate tower (also known as the sniper tower) and provided overwatch of the outer corridor. [Redacted (b)(6)] sniper teams occupied the inner gate tower and provided

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overwatch of the canal and parking lot south of Abbey Gate. During their deployment to the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), (b)(6) sniper team was in direct support of Echo Company. At HKIA, all sniper teams were in direct support of 2/1 battalion operations at Abbey Gate (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 62, 76, 77, and S010, S011, S014, S024, S026, S029, S030, S053, S054, S055, S056, S095).

(1) Scout Sniper Platoon HQ

- (a) [Redacted]
- (b) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- (c) [Redacted]

(2) (b)(6) Sniper Team

- (a) [Redacted]
- (b) [Redacted]
- (c) [Redacted]
- (d) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- (e) [Redacted]
- (f) [Redacted]
- (g) [Redacted]

(3) (b)(6) Sniper Team

- (a) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(4) (b)(6) Sniper Team

- (a) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

i. (b)(1) 1.4a Team. The (b)(1)1.4a team was primarily four members of (b)(1)1.4a who deployed from Fort Liberty, NC, to support the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). They joined one member who was already forward at HKIA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and worked for the 24th MEU Information Operations (IO) Officer. The (b)(1)1.4a team supported evacuation operations at all gates with day-shift and night-shift teams of three each, and by 25 August they focused almost entirely on Abbey Gate (AGI exhibits 105, 111, 129, and S006, S007, S012, S027, S032, S082).

- (1) [Redacted]
- (2) [Redacted]
- (3) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- (4) [Redacted]
- (5) [Redacted]
- (6) [Redacted]

(7) SSG Ryan Knauss, (b)(1)1.4a day shift

j. 24th MEU Intelligence Section. The JTF-CR and 24th MEU Command Element (CE) combined to operate the JOC watch floor. Members of the 24th MEU intelligence section operated on the watch floor in shifts, processed intelligence reporting,

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disseminated reports to units on HKIA, and provided intelligence briefs to various organizations (AGI exhibit 102 and S045, S046, S057).

(1) [REDACTED]
 (2) [REDACTED]
 (3) [REDACTED]
 (4) [REDACTED]
 (5) [REDACTED]
 (6) [REDACTED]

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

6. New Information Disclosed. Several Servicemembers provided public statements and testimonies between September 2022 and August 2023 asserting information inconsistent with the AGI (exhibits S001, S002, S003, S058). The Supplemental Review evaluates these new assertions.

a. During the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) testimony, provided on 8 March 2023, the following assertion was made concerning Taliban actions towards Afghan civilians: "Countless Afghans were murdered by the Taliban 155 yards in front of our position, both day and night. With only shipping containers between us, the Taliban would routinely murder people under our observation at their checkpoint. We communicated the atrocities to our chain of command and our intel assets, but nothing came of it" (exhibit S002). In other public statements expounding on Taliban violence toward Afghan civilians, it was recognized that U.S. Service members intervention in Taliban violence was a difficult decision because it risked open combat with the Taliban, which would have compromised the NEO (exhibit S001). Senior leaders decided not to intervene in such events for two key reasons: (1) The ROE only permitted defense of specific groups of people directly tied to the U.S. mission, such as U.S. citizens and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders, and not the general Afghan population at large, and (2) open and direct combat with the Taliban would have jeopardized the evacuation mission and increased the likelihood of loss of life of all personnel engaged in the withdrawal operation (exhibit S002). Additional public statements claimed the Taliban killed civilians in the commercial airport terminal, 16-18 August 2021. The ROE did not allow U.S. forces to engage the Taliban for executing civilians unless they were AMCITS or SIV holders. Some observations by U.S. Service members include Taliban executing civilians against a wall, as well as piles of dead bodies near the Taliban checkpoint, and the Taliban aiming weapons at civilians' heads (exhibit S003).

b. Additional public statements alleged "an IED test run took place down the canal running along the perimeter of HKIA. This was ISIS or the Taliban performing an IED test run. We reported this to our chain of command" (exhibit S001). Statements also described "guys" were executing IED test runs by coming into the crowd and dropping the same "make and model" backpacks. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) would "check the bags and find no explosives" (exhibit S003).

c. Regarding the description of the suicide bomber, public assertions included the following: "Around 2 a.m. on August 26th, intel guys confirmed the suicide bomber IVO

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Abbey Gate, described as clean-shaven, brown dressed, black vest, and traveling with an older companion. I asked the intel guys why he wasn't apprehended sooner since we had a full description. I was told the asset could not be compromised" (exhibit S001). Additionally, in reference to the suicide bomber, one Servicemember claimed he had positive identification (PID), and the bomber was an Afghan captured abroad and subsequently detained at Bagram (exhibit S001). There were also public claims (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a provided the intelligence on the "bomber," that were transmitted to specific Servicemembers at North HKIA. The description of the alleged bomber included, "a younger individual, probably clean-shaven, wearing a brown man dress with a black outer garb of some sort, and a black bag, and traveling with an older individual" (exhibit S003).

d. One witness publicly claimed that between 1200 and 1300 on 26 August 2021, snipers spotted an "anomaly" in the crowd at Abbey Gate who they believed matched the description of the alleged bomber exactly, traveling with an older man. The alleged bomber was "...consistently and nervously looking up at the [sniper position], and the older man wore a black silky hijab covering his face most of the time," and "they handed out small cards to the crowd periodically" (exhibit S003). The sniper team disseminated the information over the "communications network," concluded an IED attack was "imminent, and that this was as serious as it could get" (exhibit S003). However the same witness stated he was not given a picture of the alleged bomber to help him identify the threat (exhibit S001).

e. A witness also publicly claimed personally requesting engagement authority to use the team's M107 Special Application Scoped Rifle (SASR), but leadership denied his request and ordered him not to engage. This same witness also understood they did not have the authority to engage unless he saw a vest or grenade, or someone was actively shooting at them (exhibit S001). However, this same witness also stated publicly, "if it wasn't the guy, the f*****g bomber in the crowd is going to think twice about f*****g doing what he's about to do, because he watched some dude's f*****g chest get caved in" (exhibit S003). He claimed he requested the (b)(6) come to the tower to observe the suspicious person. While they waited, he recalled (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers came to the tower and confirmed the suspicious person met the alleged suicide bomber's description (exhibit S003). This same witness also stated (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers confirmed the latest intelligence reporting and Counterintelligence (CI) came to the tower and confirmed, "yep, fits the description, that's who we think it is too" (exhibits S001, S003). When the (b)(6) allegedly arrived and observed the photos of the man, the snipers assured him they could easily make the shot, and then asked for engagement authority. According to the witness the (b)(6) stated he didn't know if the snipers could engage, to which the witness claimed he and his team leader harshly asked, "well, who does, because this is your responsibility, sir" (exhibit S001). The (b)(6) allegedly replied that "he did not know, but would find out" (exhibit S001).

f. On 29 August 2023, the HFAC hosted the *Gold Star Families Roundtable: Examining the Abbey Gate Terrorist Attack*, which included the Families of the 13

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Servicemembers killed in action on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S058). During this roundtable, one parent gave a statement assessing the leadership of the (b)(6) (b)(6) (exhibit S058). After criticizing the (b)(6) (b)(6) leadership, he specifically took issue with the (b)(6) (b)(6) alleged lack of physical presence at Abbey Gate, and asserted he was "in his hotel" while his Marines were on the line (exhibit S058). He then criticized the same (b)(6) (b)(6) decision on 25 August 2021 to consolidate his Marines on the near side of the canal, which he believes ultimately allowed the crowd to surge in on the gate. The parent was upset that the Marines were consolidated to an area in front of the gate when he believes they should have been spread out instead of consolidated in a single location (exhibit S058). He then lauded Echo Company for establishing order at the gate over a period of three days of hard crowd management (exhibit S058).

7. Assessment.

a. Directed Assessment. Improvised Explosive Device Test Run.

(1) **While the Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility an IED test run was conducted**, there is limited evidence an IED test run occurred on 21 August 2021 at Abbey Gate. Based on the prevalence of abandoned and discarded bags, lack of established affiliation of persons of interest with ISIS-K and the Taliban, and lack of supporting intelligence reporting, **it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban.**

(2) Prior Evidence. **There was no evidence in the AGI indicating a suspected IED test run occurred IVO Abbey Gate (AGI exhibits 13, 15, 56, 76, 77, 102).** There was evidence that bags were discarded regularly and thrown over the walls (AGI exhibits 57, 100, 115). There was no evidence, from the series of interviews, suggesting bags tossed over the wall were IED test runs. The AGI concluded that **Marines remained vigilant and were disciplined in treating unaccompanied bags as possible IEDs.** All unaccompanied bags Marines identified were exploited by either Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (b)(1) 1.4a or (b)(1) 1.4d EOD. All bags of interest contained either clothes or food (AGI exhibits 100, 115). U.S. Forces Afghanistan Forward (USFOR-A FWD) Chatsurfer [Intelligence Chat Room] included a report of an explosion 1-2 km northeast of Abbey Gate at approximately 0300L on 21 August 2021; however, (b)(1)1.4c sensors located the explosion nearly 25 km away from HKIA (AGI exhibits 115 and S088).

(3) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) On the morning of 21 August 2021, (b)(6) sniper team specifically took note of three civilian males remove a duffel bag and two backpacks from a vehicle in the parking lot (exhibits S053, S068, S094, S095). The (b)(6) sniper team notified (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who then immediately informed the (b)(6) sniper team to create awareness and ensure sustained observation as the males carried the bags up the far-side walkway towards the Barron Hotel (exhibits S018, S029, S030, S053, S062, S065).

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(b)(6) sniper team's Observation Log (OBSLOG) (compilation of snipers' observations and reports) dated 21 August 2021, 0600-1330 hours, identified the three males as "persons of interest" (POIs) and affiliated them with a white Toyota Corolla, black Toyota 4Runner, a "red car," and a gold Toyota Corolla (exhibit S068). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) alleges he observed the elder of the three males talking on a cell phone and walking around the parking lot. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he observed the POIs walking past (b)(6) sniper team's position later that morning; however, snipers lost observation of the POIs in the crowd and later saw them leaving the area without the bags (exhibits S029, S030, S053, S062, S065, S075). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) justified his concern with these individuals, because they are out of the "baseline," based on the number and size of the bags they were carrying and the inordinate amount of time they were in the vicinity of Abbey Gate (exhibit S053).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) walked to the outer gate and linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (exhibits S029, S030, S053, S065). As the group walked toward the outer corridor near the canal, they saw a tan/coyote backpack lying on the ground (exhibits S029, S030, S053, S054). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) began directing people away from the area and the (b)(1) 1.4 employed their working dogs to inspect the bag (exhibits S029, S030, S053, S054). U.S. EOD arrived shortly after and examined the bag. They found no evidence of explosives and rendered the bag and area safe (exhibits S030, S053, S054, S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated snipers would report unaccompanied backpacks and EOD would investigate. Though explosives were never found, he felt "this was an Afghan testing what we would do with an IED" (exhibit S031). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to this event as an IED test run during his testimony to the HFAC (exhibit S002); however, he later described this event during his Supplemental Review interview as feeling "like it was someone trying to see what our response would be to an IED" (exhibit S065).

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Exhibit S094 – 21AUG21. The three males observed by the (b)(6) sniper team from the inner gate sniper tower on 21AUG21. One individual is behind the blue duffel bag, wearing a white head covering and a gray vest. Two are in the center of the photo carrying a blue duffel bag and wearing a tan/coyote backpack. A tan/coyote bag that matches this description was later examined by EOD.

(c) Other Marines at Abbey Gate vaguely recalled the event, and the COC personnel interviewed did not recall any reported IED incidents or EOD clearing a bag(s) at Abbey Gate (exhibits S020, S024, S025, S061). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did not recall this event (exhibit S078). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled EOD clearing a bag during this period, but they did not recall reporting of an IED test run (exhibits S059, S087). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) heard the report and deemed it normal behavior for evacuees to have and to pass bags throughout the crowd (exhibit S018). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) dismissed it being an IED test run, pointing out the bag was filled with personal items only (exhibit S005). Several Marines recalled bags thrown over the fence or abandoned, some of which EOD cleared (exhibits S004, S005, S014, S026, S027). **Multiple Marines recalled everyone had a bag, and the bags examined by EOD only contained clothes or children's toys (exhibits S017, S026, S055, S063).** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he had no idea why the snipers referenced this event as an IED test run, because bags were regularly thrown over the wall and abandoned (exhibit S014). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was unsure why this event would be considered a test run (exhibit S087).

(4) **Conclusion. Evidence collected during the Supplemental Review could not establish that the adversary conducted an IED test run.** Relying on the (b)(6) (b)(6) snipers' observations and statements as the only positive evidence, the supplemental review could not eliminate the possibility there was an IED test run on 21 August 2021, but it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban.

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(a) During the evacuation, numerous bags were abandoned, grounded, or thrown over walls by potential evacuees, and many were treated as potential unexploded ordnance or IEDs (AGI exhibits 57, 100, 115 and S004, S005, S014, S017, S026, S027, S055, S063). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled in his statement that even during this event he was overwhelmed by the number of bags at Abbey Gate (exhibit S029). The OBSLOG entries recording the events observed by the sniper teams on 21 August 2021, demonstrate the snipers sincerely believed, at the time, this was an IED test run (exhibits S068-072, S074-077). However, facial recognition analysis by (b)(3)3024 found no database matches for the POIs photographed by (b)(6) to establish an affiliation with either the Taliban or ISIS-K (exhibit S093).

(b) There is no intelligence reporting to support either the Taliban or ISIS-K were conducting probes to test U.S. Forces' capabilities in this manner (AGI exhibit 115). There were no specific observations by the snipers that would have identified the POIs with other intelligence reporting, supporting their conclusions about the individuals' motives and intentions (AGI exhibit 115). Despite the sniper's observations of inconsistent behavior, there is limited evidence to support the POIs were conducting an IED test run at Abbey Gate for an adversary on 21 August 2021.

b. Additional Assessment. Leadership and Consolidation of Near-side Canal.

(1) **Through multiple Marines' accounts, the AGI and the Supplemental Review verified that leaders were present, actively engaged, and took proper measures to ensure force protection.** This was evident from the pictures received from Marines during both the AGI and the Supplemental Review. This was also supported by the fact that several leaders sustained wounds during the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August, to include (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) **Evidence collected during the AGI and Supplemental Review reinforced that tactical-level leaders made sound tactical decisions based on the information they had on 25 August 2021 to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower.** Though several Marines recounted during the Supplemental Review that they either did not know why the decision was made or they questioned the decision, most ultimately agreed the decision was timely and necessary based on the existing threat variables, coupled with the responsibility to protect and sustain the force. Some Marines expressed appreciation for the explanation regarding the decision to consolidate the perimeter and said it made sense (exhibits S056, S063, S065).

(3) Prior Evidence

(a) Statements regularly cited persistent leadership presence at the gate and leaders continually shared hardships with Marines (AGI exhibit 88). Nowhere in the AGI was leadership presence throughout gate operations questioned (AGI exhibits 61, 63, 86, 88). Senior NCOs rarely left the gate area and junior officers were consistently present and engaged (AGI exhibits 60, 61, 63, 76, 79, 80, 83, 85, 88).

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(b) The AGI and Supplemental Review collected statements and pictures of gate operations and of the crowds, 25-26 August 2021. Many statements discussed the decision to consolidate Marines at the jersey barrier near the base of the sniper tower, from the footbridge on the near side of the canal, which was approximately 100 meters east of Abbey Gate (AGI exhibits 077, 079, 081, 084, 110 and S004, S005, S010, S011, S016, S018, S022, S024, S026, S029, S030, S032, S037, S053, S055, S056, S059, S062, S063, S078, S084, S095). The statements justified the decision by stressing the distance created by the original posture posed serious risks to Marines. **The decision to consolidate the perimeter on 25 August was based in large part on imminent threat reporting and the challenges posed in the event of a casualty assistance/evacuation (AGI exhibits 77, 115). The increased size and desperation of the crowd exacerbated the risk to U.S. forces and the risk to mission (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 77, 83).** Marine and (b)(1) 1.4d leaders on the ground also assessed that consolidation facilitated a seamless retrograde of the (b)(1) 1.4d from the Barron Hotel once informed the gate would close in the next 12 hours (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 77, 83). During the AGI, Marines, notably the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) disagreed with the decision to consolidate the perimeter to the base of the tower. He stated the standoff from the extended near-side security position was more beneficial (AGI exhibits 56, 58, 59). However, during the Supplemental Review, he ultimately agreed with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to "collapse the line if desired," but recommended "not going past the footbridge" (exhibit S063).

(c) Threat reporting throughout operations at HKIA consistently indicated a potential VBIED or suicide vest IED (SVIED) as part of a complex attack (AGI exhibit 115). Reporting further indicated two SVIEDs as part of an imminent complex attack on 25 and 26 August (AGI exhibit 115). Threat reporting played a significant role in the decision to consolidate at the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower.

(4) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) Statements from the Supplemental Review generally follow those taken during the AGI. **There was near universal agreement among Marines that leaders at echelon remained present and engaged throughout gate operations (exhibits S004, S013, S016, S021, S022).** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) noted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the gate constantly and only at the Barron Hotel to conduct adjacent unit coordination with the (b)(1) 1.4d (exhibit S026). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during the entirety of the evacuation (exhibit S037) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was always at the gate with his Marines and he was proud of how all unit commanders performed (exhibit S056). Like (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Marines remembered (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) constantly being at the gate when his Marines were on duty (exhibits S026, S029). **Marines at the COC said both (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) operated from the gate for large periods of the evacuation (exhibits S014, S020, S024, S025).**

(b) The Supplemental Review explored the considerations associated with consolidating the perimeter from the footbridge east of the gate to the jersey barrier. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), mutually agreed to the

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consolidation due to an imminent IED threat at Abbey Gate on 26 August. Additionally, **the increased risk of the crowd overrunning Marines, exposure to a VBIED or complex attack from the parking lot, which offered clear observation and fields of fire to the Marines' extended position, and distance created by the dispersion that would complicate casualty evacuation were significant concerns for leaders** (AGI exhibit 127 and S011, S016, S018, S026). The Marines and the (b)(1) 1.4d had no physical barriers against the crowd prior to the consolidation other than riot shields (exhibit S018, S037). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **described the Marines' posture as a human wall formed in an L-shape, with a leg on the bridge and a leg on the canal pathway (exhibit S018, S067).** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) concurred with the consolidation and use of jersey barriers to reinforce force protection and to reduce the burden on the Marines and (b)(1) 1.4d tasked to manage the crowd near the footbridge (exhibit S026). Marines, combined with the jersey barriers, only required 3-4 personnel to hold the crowd back (exhibits S018, S026). Additionally, the canal wall near the footbridge was only 12 inches high, which offered Marines no cover from direct fire (exhibit S018). Finally, the dispersion split Marines and (b)(1) 1.4a amid the crowd of evacuees and multinational forces, and severely degraded command and control (exhibits S018, S037).

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Exhibit S067 – 25AUG21. This photo, taken directly behind the footbridge and to the east of the (b)(6) sniper tower, shows the number of Golf Company Marines needed to hold back the crowd at the footbridge, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described as a human wall. A similar number of (b)(1) 1.4d Soldiers are not pictured in this photo and are directly to the right of the Marines, holding back the crowd on the footbridge.

(c) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he recommended the consolidation because he was concerned that the amount of manpower required to hold the footbridge exceeded the Marines' capacity. He also noted that at one point the risk increased when there were over 40 unvetted, panicked evacuees sitting on the near side of the canal that ended up between the Marines and the gate (exhibit S037). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered the consolidation, but only from the perspective of Marines being "way out there" with riot shields to hold the crowd back, and that people kept jumping over. At one point, 10 Marines were cut off from the rest of their element and had to fight their way back toward the sniper tower to link back up (exhibit S004).

(d) Several Marines disagreed with the decision to consolidate forces at the jersey barrier, stating the original posture offered greater stand-off and dispersion and increased survivability (exhibits S005, S056, S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was initially "angry" (exhibit S056) after learning of the consolidation, but after hearing the explanation and

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recalling conditions at the footbridge, he stated, "I understand the decision more now; it definitely could have been worse if the blast had occurred out at the footbridge. It could have been horrible if guys had been trapped down there" (exhibit S056). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **initially had questions about the consolidation. However, after hearing about the threat considerations that led leaders to make the decision, he stated, "okay, I understand that decision then. That makes clear sense as to why you would collapse that position. I appreciate you sharing that" (exhibit S065).**

(e) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) concurred with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assessment to consolidate the perimeter and recognized the crowd was significantly larger and more desperate on the evening of 25 August into the morning of 26 August (exhibit S078). In his view, consolidating Marines from the footbridge was the right decision based on the accelerated timeline for closing the gate (exhibit S078). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) agreed with the decision to consolidate from the footbridge to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower due to the size and attitude of the crowd. He remarked they did not have a choice based on what they were seeing at the perimeter (exhibit S059). He also offered that **the largest risk to force was the crowd, and Marines would have lost a company if the crowd had breached the gate (exhibit S059).**



Exhibit S081 – 26AUG21. This photo, taken from the (b)(6) sniper tower facing east toward the footbridge, depicts the larger and more desperate crowd present at Abbey Gate on the morning of 26AUG21. This growing crowd led to the decision to consolidate from the footbridge to the jersey barriers at the base of the sniper tower.

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(5) Conclusion. The Supplemental Review evidence is consistent with the AGI evidence that military leaders at Abbey Gate were present, engaged, and **made a sound tactical decision based on the information available at the time** to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower.

(a) **Evidence from the AGI and the Supplemental Review does not support assertions that leaders were disengaged at Abbey Gate.** In the AGI, (b)(6) (b)(6) were asked about challenges to evacuation operations between 17-26 August. The group provided their perspectives on Department of State failures, logistical difficulties with food and water, the complex relationship with the Taliban, the burden of leadership under the circumstances, foreign forces' activities at the gate, and an inability to provide for evacuees without a heavy reliance on Marine ingenuity. **Notably absent from their responses was negative commentary on the presence or performance of leadership (AGI exhibit 83).**




Exhibit S079 – 26AUG21. This photo of the outer corridor at Abbey Gate was taken seconds before the blast from the (b)(6) sniper tower, facing west toward the chevron and the Barron Hotel. In this photo are the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) . Out of frame are the (b)(6)

(b) **The decision to consolidate Marines from the footbridge to the jersey barrier on 25 August was the logical decision based on resources and conditions.** The AGI findings did not directly comment on this decision, but cited related facts and evidence to support concluding the attack was not preventable at the tactical level (Abbey Gate Findings and Recommendations para 3.c.(3).(c)). The Supplemental

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Review found no additional facts or evidence to dispute this conclusion. Several leaders and Marines interviewed during the Supplemental Review provided additional analysis and facts (exhibits S014, S018, S029, S031, S037, S059, S063, S065, S078). **Marines lacked the capacity and resources to maintain dispersion and properly secure the canal pathway and footbridge. This, coupled with both internal and external threats, greatly increased the risk to U.S. forces and the risk to mission (exhibits S018, S026, S037, S056, S063).** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made a conscious, risk-informed decision to consolidate the perimeter, which increased the survivability and efficiency of evacuation operations (exhibit S018). The decision to consolidate the perimeter was tactically sound based on the time, resources, and dynamic threat conditions.

(c) Marines universally agreed that maximizing the number of evacuees was the mission; however, leaders constantly and effectively balanced complex demands and competing priorities with force protection (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 58, 59, 63, 76, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, and S004, S013, S016, S018, S022, S024, S059, S078). Junior Marines interviewed in the Supplemental Review, most of whom were injured during the attack, lauded leaders' concerns for their safety (exhibits S004, S009, S013, S016, S021, S061). **Leaders' decision to consolidate Marines from the footbridge to the jersey barrier was underpinned by concerns for force protection of Marines (exhibits S018, S037, S059, S078).** Leaders bore the tough responsibility of constantly scanning the environment, evaluating risks and opportunities, and making decisions to accomplish the mission, while minimizing casualties and damage to equipment.

c. Directed Assessment. Threat Reporting.

(1) The intelligence regarding threat streams lacked the specificity necessary to positively identify the suspected suicide bomber in the dynamic crowd at **Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. Servicemembers frequently disseminated threat reporting verbally and face-to-face by necessity (which tended to unintentionally increase the ambiguity of the already vague, non-descript reporting).** Members of (b)(6) sniper team and some (b)(1)1.4a NCOs conflated their observations of the suspicious persons they identified on the morning of 26 August 2021 with a BOLO description derived from actual intelligence reporting.

(2) Threat Streams. Throughout the NEO, the USFOR-A J2 Chatsurfer web-based chat room was a primary tool for the dissemination of intelligence (AGI exhibits 13 and S057). A review of the J2 Chatsurfer revealed a significant number of varying threats ranging from complex attacks, indirect fire, VBIEDs, suicide IEDs, internal HKIA threats posed by evacuees, adversary planning, and Taliban preparations around HKIA (AGI exhibits 115, 142). The USFOR-A J2 posted a Chatsurfer update at 1922L on 25 August 2021. This post synchronized known threats against HKIA at that time (exhibit S057). The threat reporting relevant to individuals seeking to attack HKIA are as follows (entries were originally in Eastern Standard Time but have been converted to local Kabul time, which may change the date):

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

(3) Prior Evidence

(a) Statements taken during the AGI revealed a wide range of non-specific information about the description of the potential suicide bomber. Leaders at Abbey Gate received information regarding threat reports either verbally, over military radio, or by cellphone via WhatsApp or Signal messenger applications (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 86). The threat reports Marines received at Abbey Gate prior to the attack on 26 August 2021 consistently stated an attack was imminent, and the method of attack would be either a an SVIED or a bag with explosives. Most Marines interviewed 30-45 days after the attack do not recall a description of the attacker, only the threat being imminent and the method of attack being a suicide vest (AGI exhibits 54, 59, 60, 61, 76, 80, 82, 88, 89). Several Marines remembered the description provided included a black bag, laptop case, or a man-bag, either with (b)(1)1.4c or other markings (AGI exhibits 56, 76, 81, 84, 86, 88). Some of these Marines included additional details about a potential attacker's physical appearance, mainly regarding hair, beard, and clothes. A company commander stated the description was bald, with a tight beard (AGI exhibit 77). Another Marine, a company executive officer, alleged the bomber would be clean-shaven, with beige clothes (AGI exhibit 81). A platoon commander claimed the BOLO report described the potential bomber as having a freshly trimmed beard and hair (AGI exhibit 84). A Marine NCO recalled intelligence reporting that described the bomber as clean shaven (AGI exhibit 86). A junior Marine remembered the description as shaved and bald (AGI exhibit 88). Bottom line, the description of the possible bomber varied greatly.

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(b) When [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team was asked during the AGI about threat reporting on 25-26 August 2021, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] described a single person of interest along the canal that the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] team had pointed out. They reported watching this person for hours and passing pictures “up” (AGI exhibit 62). The snipers described the POI as having a shaved head, a closely-trimmed beard, and clean clothes (AGI exhibit 62). Chatsurfer logs indicated [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team reported this suspicious individual to the COC around 0700 on 26 August 2021 (AGI 115). During the AGI, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] recalled the threat reporting about a possible attacker describing a bald male with a well-kept beard, wearing tan man-jams, and carrying some type of bag (AGI exhibit 129). **Of note, during the AGI, [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team only expressed concern about one individual, the man with the shaved head whom they photographed on the morning of 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibit 62).** [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team’s recollection of this event changed sometime between the AGI and the Supplemental Review.

(4) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) The evidence collected during the Supplemental Review is generally consistent with the evidence gathered during the AGI. Leaders primarily shared threat reporting with Marines at the gate verbally, in person, and via Signal (exhibits S004, S013, S016, S017, S018, S021, S026, S063). As an example, the [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] disseminated the following threat report to his Marines via Signal on 25 August 2021: “BOLO, IED Threat, [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] individual with freshly-trimmed beard, groomed hair to blend in; outfit unknown” (exhibit S018). [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] stated there were multiple people matching that description, and estimated half the crowd was carrying bags (exhibit S018). Marine leaders received threat reporting from the COC via radio or during COC visits/shift changes, and from other leaders via Signal/WhatsApp or verbally/face-to-face (exhibits S005, S014, S017, S018, S019, S025, S059, S060, S063, S078). [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] recalled a threat report from 26 August 2021, but with significant variations from [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] remembered threat reporting describing a man with a shaved face, wearing a black or brown man dress, more likely black, carrying a bag on the front, with clean clothes (exhibit S063). Most Marines, if they recalled any description, remembered the black bag with either [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] (exhibits S005, S016, S017, S021, S037). [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] stated hundreds of people in the Abbey Gate crowd matched the BOLO description (exhibit S059). Marines in the line companies provided numerous variations of the BOLO description, but there was nearly universal agreement the description was non-specific, and it would have been difficult to identify anyone in the large, hectic crowd **due to a plethora of people matching that description** (exhibits S005, S009, S012, S013, S016, S017, S022, S024, S027, S028, S029, S037, S059, S065, S078, S083).

(b) When asked to discuss threat reporting they received during their time at HKIA, members of [redacted (b)(6)] sniper team noted an alleged BOLO regarding a possible attacker they believed they identified the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibits S010, S011, S029, S030, S054, S062, S065). [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] recalled receiving a BOLO, either via radio or in person, from [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]. According to [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] the BOLO described a younger, clean-shaven man, possibly traveling with another person

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(exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled the (b)(1)1.4a team allegedly provided a BOLO description for an older man and a younger, clean-shaven man in a black man dress (exhibit S010). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated his team received a BOLO from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with a description of a bald, clean-cut male who did not look like anyone else at the gate; the inference being the man would be clean and not appear to have been there for days trying to get evacuated (exhibit S011). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he received a description of a possible suicide bomber from intelligence Marines outside the JOC. He stated the suicide bomber would likely come in the next 24-48 hours, be clean-shaven, wearing brown or black garb and some type of black vest. He likely would be with an older companion who would guide him to the point of impact. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) added, **“all of these guys look pretty similar in the crowd”** (exhibit S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was out of the sniper tower when (b)(6) sniper team received notification of the description of the bomber, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) informed him they were searching for an older man and a younger man, and that the bomber would have a shaved head, be clean-shaven and wearing black garb. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated the team received that description from a (b)(1)1.4a NCO (exhibit S062). Similarly, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) attributed the threat reporting to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and described seeing a bald male in black with a second male wearing a tan vest and brown garb, who had his head in the bald male's lap (exhibit S030). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the BOLO as a clean-shaven man wearing black garments (S054).

(c) Other members of the 2/1 Scout Sniper Platoon allegedly recalled receiving threat reporting with a description of a possible bomber but did not personally see anyone they believed to match the description. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered receiving a description of a bald, Middle Eastern male carrying a backpack, but **added that description matched the entire crowd outside the gate** (exhibit S031). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled a description of an individual with a shaved head wearing brown or black, but noted, **“how do you identify someone based off of that?”** (exhibit S053). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered receiving the suicide bomber description from a **“Sgt in Battalion S6”** with the bomber described as a clean-shaven male wearing a brown man dress, carrying a black bag, and being escorted by an older man (exhibit S019). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described an alleged BOLO for a bald male, with a clean trimmed beard, and tan clothes (exhibit S055).

(d) Other Marines who reported their threat updates came from (b)(6) sniper team stated the description they received of the possible suicide bomber included a man with a bald head, clean-shaven face, wearing clean clothes, carrying a backpack, and would be someone who looked like they did not belong (exhibits S015, S017).

(e) Two of the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs recalled little or no details about the threat reporting description of the bomber (exhibits S012, S032). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) only recalled an alleged BOLO as clean-shaven and a clean look as part of the description, before stating **a lot of people at the gate matched that description** (exhibit S027). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could not remember specifics provided in the threat reporting, besides a man wearing Afghan garb. He did not recall the description including bald or wearing tan clothes (exhibit S032). In his first Supplemental Review interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered the threat

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reporting described the bomber as wearing common clothing, either bald or with short hair, a low-cut beard, and carrying a backpack (exhibit S006). When interviewed a second time, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated the description was a bald man, with a well-kept beard, dressed in generic Afghan clothing (exhibit S007). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he received the description of a possible suicide bomber from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and that the bomber would be a military-aged male, clean-cut, clean-shaven, and nicely dressed (exhibit S082).

(f) In his interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to a “supposed airstrike or raid against an ISIS-K cell leader associated with attack planning against HKIA” (exhibit S065). Although this assertion is outside the scope of the Supplemental Review, a separate investigation into this matter showed the requested target was ISIS-K IVO Jalalabad, which is over 200km away from Kabul. **The strike was not directed against the ISIS-K cell in Kabul who planned and conducted the attack at HKIA. The strike intended to target a separate cell, in a different province of Afghanistan; it would not have prevented the attack at Abbey Gate** (USCENTCOM report of investigation, Civilian Casualty Incident, Kabul, 29 August 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) statement, exhibit 24).

(5) Conclusion. **The Supplemental Review draws three conclusions about the description of the suspected bomber. First**, the intelligence lacked the specificity necessary to positively identify the suspected bomber in the dynamic crowd at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. **Second**, Servicemembers frequently disseminated threat reporting verbally and face-to-face by necessity (which tended to unintentionally increase the ambiguity of the already vague, non-descript reporting). **Third**, multiple individuals operating at Abbey Gate, to include members of (b)(6) sniper team, some (b)(1)1.4a NCOs, and some Marines who received updates from (b)(6) sniper team, have conflated their observations of the suspicious persons they identified on the morning of 26 August 2021 with a BOLO description derived from actual intelligence reporting. This small group of individuals at Abbey Gate became convinced the suspicious bald male in black was the bomber. They drew their conclusion based on nonspecific intelligence, unintentionally ambiguous threat reporting, and the conflation of threat reporting. Ultimately, they blended their observations with nonspecific intelligence reporting to generate an entirely new description of the suspected bomber – this became known as the suspicious ‘bald man in black BOLO’, developed from the ground up, that got shared across HKIA.

(a) Numerous Marines provided statements during the AGI that indicated the information provided by intelligence personnel to aid in identifying the suspected bomber was unhelpful under the circumstances (AGI exhibits 54, 59, 60, 61, 76, 80, 82, 88, 89). **The Supplemental Review supports the conclusion the intelligence available lacked the specificity necessary to identify the suspected bomber** (exhibits S005, S012, S013, S022, S024, S027, S031, S032, S037, S053, S065, S083).

(b) Multiple Chatsurfer entries, derived from various intelligence reports, provided a vague description of the bomber, summarized as follows: (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c (AGI)

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exhibit 115). The description of a bald head and varying levels of grooming are a product of observations Servicemembers reported to their respective chains of command, which were then entered into Chatsurfer and shared with units across HKIA (AGI exhibit 115). There was one intelligence report that referenced a five-person group comprised of two suicide bombers, a leader, a driver, and a media individual, but it did not provide descriptions of their appearance, and there were never any reports of a team of two (AGI exhibit 115). The above summaries of information Marines at Abbey Gate received and understood indicated leaders and intelligence personnel were somewhat successful in disseminating threat reporting to the lowest levels (AGI exhibits 54, 56, 59, 60, 61, 76, 77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 89, and S005, S016, S018, S021, S024, S037, S063). The methods leaders employed for disseminating threat reports to Servicemembers operating at Abbey Gate likely contributed to some of the inconsistencies in what they alleged was the description of the bomber. 2/1 Marines relied on a combination of face-to-face verbal communication, phone messaging applications, and military radios to disseminate information from the battalion to the company level, while company-level leadership relied upon face-to-face communication or Signal to provide information to small-unit leaders (AGI exhibits 53, 56, 76, 77, 86 and S004, S005, S013, S014, S016, S017, S018, S021, S025, S026, S031, S059, S063, S078). **The reliance on face-to-face** communication reduced the quality of the threat reporting that Servicemembers committed to memory and passed on.

(c) Given the aforementioned threat reporting provided by various intelligence elements on HKIA, there is clearly a conflict with what (b)(6) sniper team, some (b)(1)1.4a NCOs, and some Marines provided as the description of the bomber. **The most likely explanation for this inconsistency is that (b)(6) sniper team and the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs received the same non-specific reporting and conflated their observations of the suspicious person on the morning of 26 August 2021 with the actual intelligence reporting they had received.**

(d) **Intelligence reporting does not describe the suspected bomber, or any other suspicious individual, as a bald male.** (b)(1)1.4a personnel and (b)(6) sniper team consistently reported a bald male in black, with clean clothes as part of the BOLO description, but diverge on the existence of a second participant, which some of the snipers introduced in their Supplemental Review statements (exhibits S006, S007, S010, S019, S029, S030, S062, S065). This is in contrast with the AGI, in which the (b)(6) sniper team only recounted a single suspicious individual as part of the threat. Notably, the description of a bald male was introduced into Chatsurfer threat reporting logs as a BOLO, stemming from (b)(6) sniper team's spot reportin (AGI exhibit 115, exhibit S057). According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) indirectly, the snipers learned of the suspicious bald male in black after (b)(1)1.4a NCOs climbed the tower to point him out in the crowd (exhibit S011, S019, S030). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **attributed the snipers' knowledge of the suspicious bald male in black to the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs in his AGI interview** (AGI exhibit 62). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) corroborated this in their statements (exhibits S007, S027, S082). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) specifically remembered the snipers stating they had not yet heard the reporting when (b)(1)1.4a NCOs informed them of the BOLO on the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibit

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S082). Further, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) indicated he relied heavily on the knowledge of the (b)(1)1.4a team to confirm the suspicious person met the BOLO description, but claimed he received the BOLO from someone else in the chain of command, though he could not recall from whom specifically (exhibit S029). **It is important to note that the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs' primary mission was messaging and calming the crowd, which they did very effectively, but they were not intelligence professionals and would have received the same non-specific threat streams as the rest of the Servicemembers at HKIA.** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered hearing the BOLO from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and believed it came over the radio (exhibit S062). (b)(6) sniper team had established an understanding of civilians' 'baseline' behavior while conducting operations at Abbey Gate. Both the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs and (b)(6) sniper team heavily emphasized the suspicious individual's behavior and appearance as inconsistent with the baseline that their team had observed at Abbey Gate as further confirmation they matched the BOLO description. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated, "the actions of the individuals we saw made them stand out" (exhibit S065).

(e) During his interview and public statements, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referenced other individuals who either provided information about the identity of the bomber prior the morning of 26 August or mistakenly confirmed the identity of the bald man in black as the bomber (exhibit S065). He referenced a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Marine Staff NCO came to the sniper tower on 26 August and concurred that the bald man in black matched the BOLO description for a possible bomber (exhibit S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided the contact information for the Counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT NCO. **During an interview with CI/HUMINT Specialist (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), he stated he never went to the sniper tower on 26 August, and never heard anything about a possible bomber being identified that day (exhibit S083).** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also asked the Supplemental Review team to speak with the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6) to corroborate his statements (exhibit S065). **When the Supplemental Review team interviewed both (b)(1)1.4a surgeons who treated him, they indicated that they could corroborate his medical treatment and condition, but nothing more (exhibits S085, S086). Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(6) indicated that intelligence prior to the bombing was non-specific and insufficient to support targeting (exhibits S102, S103).** Notably, only the (b)(1)1.4a night shift shared the snipers' assessment of the suspicious individuals they identified during the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibits S006, S012, S027, S032).

(f) This small group of individuals at Abbey Gate became convinced the suspicious bald male in black (who, according to some of the snipers, was with a younger companion) was the bomber. They arrived at this conclusion **based on a limited understanding of the threat reporting and unsupported assessment of the man's identity and intentions. They relied almost entirely on physical appearance and behavior** they saw as inconsistent with the baseline, with little reference to the intelligence-based description of the bomber. The next section of this Supplemental Review demonstrates that the bald man dressed in black, who was the subject of (b)(6) sniper team's BOLO, was not the bomber.

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d. Directed Assessment. Suspicious Person(s) at Abbey Gate and Description of the Bomber.

(1) **The suspicious individual photographed at Abbey Gate on the morning of 26 August 2021 was not the bomber.** Members of (b)(6) sniper team and (b)(1)1.4b NCOs asserted this man was the bomber. However, (b)(3) conducted facial recognition analysis on the suspicious male against multiple photos of Abu Rahman al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber, and the analysis returned the strongest (b)(3) result on (b)(3) spectrum of identification. Furthermore, intelligence reports published after the attack indicated the bomber did not arrive at Abbey Gate (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August 2021. Although Servicemembers believe they identified the bomber around 0700 Local on 26 August, this is incongruent with al-Logari's timeline from that day. Based on the (b)(3) analysis, intelligence reports, and evidence collected during the Supplemental Review the snipers at Abbey Gate did not identify or photograph the bomber (exhibits S034, S035, S066, S104).

(2) Prior Evidence. During the AGI, there were several instances when Servicemembers referenced suspicious persons they had seen at the gate. Throughout the AGI, photos and other visual evidence of these individuals and events were only available from Service member's personal devices, and not from official sources.

(a) The first comes from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) concerning three males in black and one female who were on the far side of the canal at approximately 0200 on 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibit 83). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) corroborated this incident when he recalled identifying three males in black clothing and black turbans on the far side of the canal during the early morning of 26 August 2021. These individuals were reportedly in a staring contest with Golf Company Marines and, after (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked them to show paperwork and cross the canal to be searched for processing, the individuals reportedly ignored him (AGI exhibits 78, 83). The three males departed the gate roughly an hour later (AGI exhibit 78, 83).

(b) The second suspicious person noted was the man in black clothing, detailed previously, who (b)(6) sniper team and the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs observed during the morning of 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibits 54, 62, 129). The individual referenced in these statements was sitting on the wall on the far side of the canal to the west of the outer gate sniper tower (AGI exhibits 62, 129). The male was dressed in a black garment, had a shaved head, trimmed facial hair, and wore clean clothes. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) specifically mentioned he had a beard. He showed no interest in being evacuated, was talking to people in the crowd, and hugging his friend (AGI exhibit 62). (b)(6) sniper team mentioned a picture of this individual they passed up at 0800 on 26 August 2021, but they reportedly did not receive a response about the individual's identity. The snipers lost visual of the bald male in black at approximately 1000 that morning (AGI exhibit 62).

(c) Marines from 24th MEU who were extracting evacuees at Abbey Gate on the afternoon of 26 August 2021 recalled another suspicious individual in a baseball cap

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with Brazil flag logo and clean clothes (AGI exhibits 106, 184). This individual, like the three males in black earlier that morning, showed no interest in being evacuated and did not try to gain the Marines' attention to check his paperwork or gain access to Abbey Gate (AGI exhibit 106). Following the explosion at Abbey Gate, this individual seemed unsurprised at the time of the attack and Marines observed him attempting to view the inner corridor (AGI exhibit 106). Marines fired warning shots at this individual and he departed the area, unharmed (AGI exhibit 106). These same Marines took several photos of this individual on the far side of the canal late in the afternoon of 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibit 184).

(d) It became clear early in the AGI that digital archives of tactical activity at HKIA (SIGACTs, OPORDs, Photos, Videos, Timelines and Schedules) were not available and the investigative team had to rely largely on Servicemembers for photographs of Abbey Gate. The AGI collected evidence concerning the demilitarization of equipment in preparation for exfiltration of all forces from HKIA (AGI exhibit 243). Statements from the investigation indicated there was extensive destruction of equipment, prior to exfiltrating from HKIA, primarily to decrease the requirements for airlift and deny the use of equipment to the Taliban (AGI exhibits 18, 53, 54, 56, 76, 77, 125, 243). This demilitarization is partially the reason digital archives, specifically photos and videos, were not available.

(e) The snipers also provided their locations immediately before, during, and after the attack (AGI exhibit 62). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) returned by vehicle to Abbey Gate moments prior to the attack (AGI exhibit 62). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the outer corridor prior to the attack and remained there treating casualties following the explosion. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the sniper tower at the time of the attack, while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the near-side canal walkway IVO the sniper tower (AGI exhibit 62).

(3) Supplemental Review Evidence.

(a) The Supplemental Review focused largely upon events surrounding the suspicious person the (b)(6) sniper team referenced above. During his interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided further details regarding the three suspicious individuals with whom Golf Company Marines engaged at approximately 0200 on 26 August (exhibit S037). Additionally, many Marines commented that so-called suspicious persons were identified every day at Abbey Gate (exhibits S018, S024, S029, S037, S053).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he could see three individuals, two males dressed in all black, with black turbans and one female wearing a black hood in the illumination of the moon at approximately 0200 on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S037). He estimated the males were in their twenties and stated one male had a partially shaven face and the other had facial hair. The female's face was exposed, and he estimated she was in her mid-twenties (exhibit S037). They were approximately 12 feet away when he and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) attempted to speak with them (exhibit S037). When shown a picture of the suspicious, bald male dressed in black that (b)(6) sniper team took on the morning of 26 August

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2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) confirmed he was not in the group of males he had seen earlier that morning (exhibit S037, S066).

(c) During the Supplemental Review, the picture of the bald male wearing black taken at Abbey Gate at approximately 0800 on 26 August 2021 that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referenced in his original statement, was discovered (AGI exhibit 62 and S066). The only picture of the bald male in black recovered during the Supplemental Review was a picture of the digital display of the camera (b)(6) sniper team used at the Abbey Gate sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), recalled taking the picture in the COC, at around 1200 on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S060, S061). The same picture was recovered from multiple unattributed sources, who would have had access and knowledge of the photo required to corroborate the date, time, and context of the photo. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) all confirmed the photo contained the suspicious, bald male in black the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs and (b)(6) sniper team identified on the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibits S006, S007, S010, S011, S029, S030, S060, S062, S065, S082). Additionally, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) confirmed he was shown the same photo in the COC on the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibit S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to the bald male in black as, "a villain from Star Wars," when shown the picture, which alludes to why Marines grew fixated on this individual (exhibit S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled sharing the photo in the command and staff Signal chat group and showed it to the (b)(6) on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S014). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) specifically recalled the picture being sent over Signal after it was brought to the COC (exhibits S060, S061). (b)(6) sniper team provided the description of the man which was entered into Chatsurfer at 0717L as the BOLO previously mentioned in the "Threat Reporting" section of the Supplemental Review (AGI exhibit 115 and S057).

(d) During his interview as part of the Supplemental Review, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to a male in blue, who was with the bald male in black, as the bomber. Later in the interview, when asked if he thought he had identified the bomber, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to both males (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) expressed high confidence that (b)(6) sniper team had the bomber in their sights, based on the BOLO description, but referenced only the older bald man in black (exhibit S010). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referenced both the "older" male and the "younger" male when discussing the observations at the canal, but he always referred to the older bald male in black as the person of interest (exhibit S030). He claimed he was "100% sure" the older bald male in black, whom they had pointed out to the (b)(6), was the bomber (exhibit S030). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also limited his identification of the suspicious person to the older bald male in black and did not mention the second younger individual (exhibit S011). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) however, rejected any certainty this was the bomber, and only stated he met the BOLO description (exhibit S011). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referenced two individuals in his recollection of the description of the bomber, but only referenced spotting the older bald male in black when discussing the suspicious person (exhibit S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referred to two males traveling together, one older and one younger, with the older male being in his fifties or sixties and the young man being in his late teens or early twenties and clean-shaven. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated the members of his sniper team were the first to observe these

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two individuals and took note of them because their mannerisms and behavior were outside of what some of his team considered to be the baseline behavior for people outside the gates at HKIA. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled seeing the two men on the far side of the canal, east of the sniper tower late in the morning on 26 August 2021, which contradicted his teammates' description (S011, S029, S030, S065). **When asked if he thought the man in black was the bomber, he stated, "it could have been" (exhibit S065). Regarding the younger male traveling with his older companion, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), "I don't remember if the younger individual is in this photo, I don't remember exactly what he looks like. I remember the older individual because we had spoken about his facial hair" (exhibit S065).**



Exhibit S066 – 26AUG21. This is a picture of the (b)(6) sniper team camera depicting the "bald male in black" observed at Abbey Gate from the (b)(6) sniper tower on the morning of 26AUG21. Members of the (b)(6) sniper used this photo to request engagement authority from the (b)(6) on 26AUG21.

(e) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the process for capturing pictures at the gate and providing them to the COC (exhibits S029, S031, S053). The snipers of (b)(6) sniper team used cameras from the (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g to take pictures from the sniper tower adjacent to the

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outer gate (exhibits S010, S014, S029, S031, S053, S060, S087). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took the Secure Digital (SD) memory cards containing the pictures to the COC or passed them to the COC through (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who would take them to the S2 at the COC (exhibits S010, S014, S029, S031, S060, S087). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled (b)(6) sniper team having two SD cards with their camera (exhibit S062). Either (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would review the photos (exhibits S014, S031, S060, S087). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was located at the inner gate tower during the evacuation, was responsible for compiling the photos from the SD cards at HKIA. He never handled the SD cards or downloaded any photos from (b)(6) sniper team (exhibit S019). Following the deployment, in December 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or to compile all the (b)(1)1.4g pictures for training. He never found any pictures from (b)(6) sniper team at the outer gate tower but did find pictures from (b)(6) sniper teams taken at the inner gate tower (exhibit S019). **Only one SD card with sniper team's photos was recovered during the Supplemental Review and contained photos from 21 August 2021. No SD card from (b)(6) sniper team containing photos taken on 26 August 2021 was recovered.**

(f) **No one interviewed among the snipers, COC personnel, or (b)(6) could recall what happened to the SD cards used at HKIA, except for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (exhibits S014, S020, S025, S029, S031, S053, S060, S061, S065, S087) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) specifically remembered one (b)(1)1.4g being put in a pile for destruction at HKIA as part of the demilitarization process and remembered being short three total kits when the unit redeployed to (b)(1)1.4d (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was personally involved in demilitarizing equipment at the COC before departing HKIA (exhibit S087).**

(g) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated that an unidentified Marine Sniper NCO brought a camera to the COC on 26 August 2021, where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took a photo of the camera's digital display (exhibits S060, S061). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled seeing the picture that morning at the COC (exhibits S014, S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided an SD card he found in his gear to the Supplemental Review. A review of that card showed images taken pre-deployment for Marines in personnel recovery reference photos, live-fire training in USCENTCOM prior to their arrival at HKIA, 2/1's NEO training they conducted in July 2021, and photos of the crowds and Taliban beyond the chevron on the night of 21 August (exhibits S031, S096). The Supplemental Review team interviewed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), to discuss the continuity of equipment and data, post-redeployment, from HKIA. He stated that equipment remaining from the (b)(1)1.4a deployment in 2021 had been transferred to (b)(6) at Camp Pendleton (exhibit S046). A member of the (b)(1)1.4a section searched the (b)(1)1.4g 2/1 transferred to their battalion and found SD cards (exhibit S046). The intelligence Marines from (b)(6) sent the images from all SD cards to the Supplemental Review team via DoD Safe on 27 October 2023; however, the images were primarily Marine personnel recovery reference photos and photos of a Key Leader Engagement somewhere in the USCENTCOM AOR. There were no photos of HKIA or Abbey Gate (exhibit S046, S091).

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(h) The Supplemental Review also clarified the extent of demilitarization 2/1 conducted prior to departure from HKIA in late August 2021. The (b)(6) explained most of the equipment from the COC was not returned to (b)(1)1.4, as units destroyed crew served-weapons and ammunition, and disabled all larger equipment in accordance with orders from JTF-CR (exhibit S078). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled all intelligence was shredded and most of the equipment they used (and fell in on) at HKIA was destroyed. He was unsure about laptops (exhibit S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled all the hard drives for computers were destroyed before the battalion departed HKIA (exhibit S020). Both (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were involved in the destruction of COC equipment, and both specifically recalled destroying classified hard drives (exhibit S060, S061, S087). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) added that the only equipment that made it home was personal gear and radios from the COC (exhibit S087).

(i) Determining a timeline related to the suspicious person was challenging for many individuals interviewed, which is reasonable given the passage of time and pace of operations. There are no entries in (b)(6) sniper team's OBSLOGS from Abbey Gate documenting these events (exhibit S068, S069, S070, S071, S072, S074, S075, S076, S077).

(j) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could not commit to a timeline, but he recalled that all activity occurred in the morning, and he went back to North HKIA to refit and prepare equipment at approximately 1300 on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated that after spotting the two suspicious males "around mid-morning" (b)(6) sniper team requested via radio "to shoot them" and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to the tower (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) claimed he discretely pointed out the two men to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), explained how he would engage them, stated it would probably cause collateral damage, and "asked him where the engagement authority for that was" (exhibit S029). According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) responded, "good question," and left the tower (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could not remember when the snipers first spotted the suspicious person, but he recalled watching him through the rifle scope for 20-30 minutes, followed by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) watching through the scope for another 20-30 minutes, and then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took over the scope. During that time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) departed for North HKIA to refit and prepare equipment for retrograde (exhibit S010). Based on statements of others, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) believed the rest of (b)(6) sniper team watched the suspicious person for 2-3 hours total (exhibit S010). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) left near mid-morning for North HKIA and was not there for a conversation with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (exhibit S010). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered receiving the BOLO between 1000 and 1100 and spotting the suspicious individuals shortly after. He stated (b)(6) sniper team requested engagement authority from the Bn COC, but **"we got a hard no at that point I think"** (exhibit S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalls his entire sniper team observing the two suspicious males after (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to the tower to point them out "no more than four hours before the attack," and added, **"he wasn't alarming to me. He just fit the description of the BOLO but he wasn't doing anything that could have rated an engagement. I mean, I would have gone to jail if I shot him"** (exhibit S011). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also remembered (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pointing out the two suspicious individuals to (b)(6) sniper team shortly after waking up on 26 August. He stated the (b)(6) came to the

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tower later that day, at which time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained the situation and requested engagement authority. **The (b)(6) responded, "No, I am not risking that"** and before leaving the tower allegedly said he would get back to them, but never did (exhibit S030). According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sniper team first spotted the two suspicious males around 1100 on 26 August IVO the footbridge on the far-side canal walkway. They allegedly observed the two men moving through the crowd until they made it to a location just east of the sniper tower. He stated they continued to observe the two men while **the team requested engagement authority from the Bn COC via radio but were told "no."** (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) added that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to the sniper tower two to three hours after they first saw the suspicious individuals, but (b)(6) sniper team had lost visibility of the two men by the time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) requested engagement authority from the (b)(6), but that he did not know if he had authority to approve the engagement. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) claimed he gave the SD card with the photos of the suspected bomber to the (b)(6) before he left the tower (exhibit S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the radio operator who passed the request to engage to the COC and relayed the COC's response back down to (b)(6) sniper team. He remembered the request and COC response as **negative** and occurred around 1200 on 26 August 2021, at least five to six hours before the attack (exhibit S019).

(k) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled, in his first Supplemental Review statement, that the (b)(1)1.4a team spotted the suspicious individual at approximately 0900 on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S006). In his second statement, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) referenced the event began after sunup, before he went off shift in the morning (exhibit S007). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered the entire sequence of events, including spotting the individual matching the BOLO description, the snipers requesting engagement authority, and the snipers' conversation with the (b)(6) all occurring before he left the gate at the end of his shift, between 1000-1100 (exhibit S082).

(l) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he took the photo of the (b)(6) sniper team's camera's digital display at 0606 on 26 August 2021, but in a follow-up interview explained the time stamp on his picture was tied to another, unspecified time zone. He recalled meeting with the sniper who brought the camera at approximately 1200 on 26 August 2021 (exhibit S060, S061). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled being on shift when the request to engage occurred. His shifts were generally 1700-0500, but he did not leave the JOC until 0800 the morning of 26 August 2021 (exhibit S087).

(m) While it is difficult to establish a timeline surrounding these events based on the recollection of Servicemembers, Chatsurfer logs indicate (b)(6) sniper team reported a BOLO some time before 0717L on 26 August 2021, at which time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) posted: "Snipers at Abbey Gate identify individual in the crowd acting suspicious, clean shaved, bald head, not rushing towards the gate, but is instead sitting along the wall. The individual has a backpack and another clear bag he has kept with him" (exhibit S057). Based on this Chatsurfer entry, (b)(6) sniper team identified the suspicious individual, whom they believed to be the bomber, approximately 10 hours and 20

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minutes prior to the attack that occurred at 1736 and 52 seconds on 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibits 72, 115).

(n) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled an exchange he had in the JOC with someone whom he described as a (b)(6), post-attack on 26 August 2021. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled this conversation included the Navy Petty Officer commenting on the reported suspicious person at the gate, and stating that this person was seen multiple times, and was the bomber. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) admitted this conversation greatly influenced his conclusion the suspicious person he spotted on the morning of 26 August 2021 was the bomber (exhibits S006, S007). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was deployed to HKIA and provided a statement during the Supplemental Review. She explained that the JTF-CR and MEU intelligence sections were combined for the evacuation and most of the personnel on the watch floor in the JOC were from the MEU. There were no Navy personnel in the MEU S2 or JTF-CR J2 at HKIA (exhibit S045). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) confirmed he was unaware of any Navy personnel in any of the adjacent intelligence sections (exhibit S046). Both (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained the MEU intelligence section provided the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs and Information Operations Officer intel updates as they came on shift. They also recalled the reports from the gates and potential multiple sightings of suspicious persons. However, they did not recall anyone saying anything about the bomber's identity and the attack. Both found any statement would have been without facts or information. The 24th MEU S2 personnel never received photos from 2/1 Marines, so they never saw what the suspicious person looked like (exhibits S045, S046). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled other personnel from the gate, post-attack, were in the JOC/COC area and were talking about the suspicious person. She did not know who they were, but understood they were from 2/1 (exhibit S045).

(o) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) verified that **all intelligence related to the identity of the bomber was produced post-blast** (exhibits S057, S104, S113, S114). USCENTCOM J2 corroborated intelligence regarding the identity of the bomber based on public martyrdom postings on social media sites by ISIS-K (exhibits S033, S041, S042). Additionally, a known associate of the bomber corroborated the bomber's identity online (exhibits S038, S039).

(p) On 26 August 2021, (b)(6) sniper team rotated back to North HKIA in elements to prepare for redeployment (exhibits S010, S011, S029, S030, S031, S053, S062, S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), initially departed Abbey Gate with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to return to North HKIA to prepare gear for possible departure (exhibits S010, S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) rotated back to North HKIA at approximately 1300 (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) departed North HKIA for Abbey Gate around 1700 but stopped at the inner gate to retrieve some gear from Echo Company Marines staged there (exhibits S010, S029, S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) exited the vehicle at the inner gate and walked the rest of the way to the outer gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did not return to the outer gate until 1725, at which time he took a photo of himself, then returned to the sniper tower shortly thereafter (exhibit S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated he visited (b)(6) sniper team's sniper

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tower after 1700 and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were on overwatch. Approximately 20-30 minutes before the attack, SSgt Hoover visited the tower and asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to help him retrieve an interpreter in the crowd (S011, S065). At that time, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), SSgt Hoover, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) departed the tower, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remained in the tower alone (exhibits S056, S062).

(4) **Conclusion. The suspicious individual that (b)(6) sniper team described and photographed was not the bomber.**

(a) It is likely the SD cards containing the pictures from Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021 were destroyed at HKIA. The recovered photo is in fact a picture of the camera's digital display depicting the suspicious person that the (b)(6) sniper team and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) believed was the bomber. The three individuals in black Marines saw at 0200 26 August 2021 at Abbey Gate were not the same individuals as those observed by (b)(6) sniper team at approximately 0700 the same morning on 26 August 2021. During the AGI, (b)(6) sniper team referred to a suspicious individual, matching the description of the individual photographed. (b)(6) **sniper team did not refer to the existence of a second suspicious individual until the Supplemental Review.** The first Chatsurfer entry referencing the sniper's observation on the morning of 26 August only described a single person of interest, the bald male in black (Exhibit AGI 115). The (b)(1)1.4a NCOs directed (b)(6) sniper team's attention to the suspicious individual in black (exhibits S006, S007, S010, S011, S027, S030, S062, S082). The (b)(1)1.4a NCOs never mentioned or raised concern over a potential second individual in the photo (exhibit S006, S007, S027, S066, S082). Simultaneous discussions about the observation on 26 August 2021 in the 2/1 COC and over the radio did not mention a second individual (exhibits S014, S019, S025, S053). The discussion in the tower with the (b)(6) only centered on the older, bald male dressed in black (exhibits AGI 62, AGI 115, S011, S029).

(b) **Servicemembers at Abbey Gate did not identify the PBIED bomber.** Intelligence reporting, published after the attack, indicated that ISIS-K's Kabul cell transported al-Logari to an area IVO Abbey Gate approximately an hour before the attack. After he arrived at the Abbey Gate corridor, al-Logari had approximately 30 minutes to wade through the crowded mass of potential evacuees to reach his final position, which minimized threat of detection, and enabled him to conduct the attack at 17:36:52L. Later intelligence reporting corroborated the identity of the bomber as al-Logari (exhibits S112, 113). **Marines from (b)(6) sniper team and some (b)(1)1.4a NCOs believe they identified the bomber around 0700L on 26 August. However, PID of the bomber at Abbey Gate prior to (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August 2021 was incongruent with this timeline (exhibit S104). Furthermore, (b)(3)3024(i) conducted facial recognition analysis on the suspicious bald male dressed in black against multiple current photos of al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber, and the analysis returned the strongest (b)(3)3024(i) result on (b)(3)3024(i) spectrum of identification (exhibits S034, S035, S066).**

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Exhibit S034 – The two images above are from the (b)(3) comparison of the ISIS-K bomber (left photo), Abdul Rahman al-Logari, and the “bald male in black” (right photo) photographed by the (b)(6) sniper team on 26AUG21. The analysis returned the strongest negative result on (b)(3)3024(i) pectrum of identification.

e. Directed Assessment. Rules of Engagement and Self Defense.

(1) Servicemembers at Abbey Gate had reasonable understanding of the ROE and the standards for assessing hostile act or hostile intent sufficient to employ the use force in self-defense. Based on the evidence gathered, use of lethal force based merely on suspicious behavior out of the norm without additional demonstration of hostile intent or hostile acts would have been inappropriate and inconsistent with the ROE.

(2) The ROE in effect in August 2021 were established by the USCENTCOM Commander, consistent with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSCI) 3121.01B (2005), through Operations Orders and Execution Orders (AGI exhibits 46, 116, 117, 119, 245). The ROE was established in accordance with Annex A, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), from CJSCI 3121.01B, and Appendix 7, Annex C to USCENTCOM Operations Order 25 MOD 6 (Operation Freedom Sentinel), which is incorporated into USCENTCOM Operations Order 31 MOD 1 [Operation Allies Refuge] (AGI exhibits 46, 116, 117, 119, 245).

(a) As of 13 August 2021, the Taliban were a declared hostile force that could be attacked if their activity threatened Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF), or U.S. forces operations (AGI exhibits 117, 118). The same ROE indicated U.S. forces could defend specific civilians during the evacuation, to include U.S. Persons, U.S. Contractors, Afghan Government Officials, Contractors or Civilians in support of U.S. Operations, Non-Governmental Organizations, U.S. Embassy-Kabul Host Nation Civilians and Contract Employees, Coalition Embassy Personnel, Designated Evacuees, and Civilians assisting in the NEO (AGI exhibits 117, 118). The ROE directed commanders to

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consider the assigned mission, current situation, higher commander's intent, and other guidance to determine the use of force required to accomplish the mission (AGI exhibits 117, 118).

(b) As late as 15 August 2021, USFOR-A FWD was still conducting lethal strikes against the Taliban to prevent their activities from threatening the evacuation at HKIA (AGI exhibits 13, 21). On 15 August 2021, Gen McKenzie met with Taliban political and military leaders in (b)(1)1.4c and negotiated the Taliban's support of the evacuation (AGI exhibits 13, 21). On 16 August 2021, Taliban forces were considered a temporary and tactically expedient partner force and gradually became part of the outer security perimeter of HKIA, securing the outside southern perimeter IVO the International Terminal of the airport and helping clear the airfield of civilians (AGI exhibits 13, 18, 21, 53, 104, 121).

(c) During the NEO, the ROE remained unchanged even after the Taliban was deemed a temporary and tactically expedient partner, as it pertains to the inherent right of self-defense as a response to hostile act, hostile intent. Leaders were aware of this change in status and notified Servicemembers of Taliban checkpoints located in key positions to assist (AGI exhibits 18, 53, 104, 121). The ROE defined hostile acts as, "An attack or other use of force against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital USG property" (AGI exhibit 119). The ROE defines hostile intent as "The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated persons or property. It includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital USG property" (AGI exhibit 119). Imminent threat is described as, "The determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous" (AGI exhibit 119).

(d) The ROE consistently emphasized the commander's inherent obligation and duty to exercise unit self-defense in response to hostile acts and demonstrated hostile intent (AGI exhibits 116, 245). The ROE also addressed the concept of Positive Identification (PID) in relation to self-defense, labeling it as "Balance between PID and Self-Defense" (AGI exhibits 116, 119, 245). PID requirements, as described, do not remove or detract from a Commander's responsibility and authority to take reasonable action in self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Although PID requirements do not apply to engaging a target in self-defense, the legal framework of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is applicable, including principle of distinction, which requires forces to identify the threat against which they are exercising self-defense and distinguishing between lawful military objectives and protected persons or objects (AGI exhibits 116, 119, 245). (See U.S. Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, updated December 2016).

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(3) Prior Evidence. The AGI findings did not identify concerns with the ROE or the use of force in self-defense during the NEO (AGI exhibits 54, 77, 81, 87, 100, 104, 121, 123, 124). Statements provided during the AGI accounted for minor initial confusion about the ROE upon arrival to HKIA, but nearly everyone interviewed articulated a reasonable understanding of the ROE (AGI exhibits 54, 77, 81, 87, 100, 104, 121, 123, 124). They described the use of force being authorized in response to a hostile act or hostile intent as the baseline ROE while conducting the NEO (AGI exhibits 77, 81, 87, 100, 104, 121, 123, 124). Leaders understood CS Gas/Riot Control Agent release was withheld to O6/COL commander level (AGI exhibits 77, 81, 100, 104, 121, 123, 124). Servicemembers also understood warning shots were authorized, but either judged them to be ineffective at the outset, or quickly discovered their utility was limited and ceased using them (AGI exhibits 77, 78, 81, 83, 88, 100, 104, 121, 123, 124).

(a) The evidence collected in the AGI and the Supplemental review demonstrated that throughout the NEO, leaders constantly discussed the use of force with Servicemembers regarding the Taliban, with the understanding their cooperation was temporary (AGI exhibits 13, 18, 21, 77, 102, 104, and S005, S018, S024, S037, S063, S078). On several occasions, leaders emphasized restraint to maintain the tenuous relationship with the Taliban (AGI exhibits 104, 123). The Taliban were armed and near Servicemembers, but leaders stressed the Taliban could only be engaged if they took hostile action against Servicemembers or verified AMCITs, or displayed hostile intent (AGI exhibits 77, and S005, S018, S024, S037, S059, S063, S078).

(b) Despite the atypical nature of this arrangement after 20 years of combat against the Taliban, **U.S. military leaders at HKIA recognized they could not simultaneously defend HKIA against the Taliban and conduct a NEO with the available combat power** (AGI exhibits 13, 54). Taliban were included in the security force, specifically securing the outer perimeter of the gates and the southern air terminal to prevent civilians from overrunning the airfield and halting the evacuation (AGI exhibits 13, 18, 21, 53, 76, 104). U.S. forces shared operational information and intelligence with the Taliban to enable synchronization of efforts starting on 18 August 2021 (AGI exhibits 13, 125). Tactical level engagement with various Taliban small unit leaders began on 18 August 2021 and continued throughout the NEO (AGI exhibits 18, 53, 54, 56, 64, 76, 77, 83, 104, 121, 123, 125). The Taliban were part of the initial operations at Abbey Gate, assisting with crowd control and moving vehicles to support the installment of the chevron, creating an obstacle against VBIEDs (AGI exhibits 53, 76, 77, 88). At several gates in HKIA, the Taliban actively participated in extracting specific persons from the crowd and were directly involved in large group vetting when moved by bus through the gates (AGI exhibits 56, 77, 102, 123).

(4) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) Statements taken during the supplemental review to clarify individual and leadership understanding of the ROE demonstrate a universal grasp of the basic principles of the ROE. Nearly every Marine was present for a ROE briefing before deployment to HKIA, and most recall small group discussions with leaders emphasizing

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the application of ROE during the operation (exhibits S004, S005, S009, S011, S013, S014, S015, S016, S017, S018, S019, S020, S024, S025, S026, S027, S028, S029, S030, S031, S037, S055, S059, S061, S062, S063, S065, S078). Marines who have no recollection of being present at the pre-deployment ROE brief were able to articulate the inherent right to self-defense in response to hostile acts or hostile intent (exhibits S005, S020, S021, S053). Many Marines specifically cited a right to defend others if they were AMCITS and their understanding warning shots were not authorized at Abbey Gate by 2/1 Marines (exhibits S005, S010, S017, S025, S029, S031, S037, S053, S055, S062, S065). Everyone interviewed during the supplemental review stated the ROE never changed while working at Abbey Gate except for one Marine (exhibit S030).

(b) **During the Supplemental Review, Servicemembers did not indicate the alleged suspicious persons at Abbey Gate were committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent on 26 August 2021, nor did they recount an event that factually supports engaging the suspicious persons under individual self-defense or collective self-defense.** (exhibits S005, S009, S011, S014, S015, S017, S018, S024, S025, S026, S027, S029, S030, S037, S053, S055, S056, S062, S078). The most definitive evidence is no Servicemember engaged a suspected threat at Abbey Gate (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(6) sniper team described the suspicious persons seen at the gate as sitting on the wall, not attempting to gain entry to HKIA, and not seeking Marines attention to be screened (exhibits S30, S011, S029, S006, S007, S027, S065, S082). The snipers stated they could not engage these individuals because they did not pose a threat (exhibit S010, S011, S029, S030, S053, S055, S062, S065). Their basis for requesting to engage reportedly suspicious persons was inconsistent behavior and appearance (exhibits S006, S007, S010, S011, S029, S030, S062, S065, S082).

(c) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **stated any use of force against the Taliban to intervene in their treatment of civilians outside the gate would most likely have resulted in open combat, killing numerous civilians in the crossfire, and changing the mission to defending HKIA from further Taliban attacks** (exhibit S078). This assessment is **supported by intelligence reports** which indicated the Taliban had taken positions surrounding HKIA to gain tactical advantage should their cooperation with U.S. forces end (AGI exhibits 76, 115 and exhibit S061). The USFOR-A FWD J3 and JTF-CR J3 were both concerned they lacked the combat power to simultaneously conduct combat operations to defend HKIA and execute the NEO (AGI exhibits 13, 15). The primary mission for U.S. forces 13-31 August 2021 was to conduct a NEO (AGI exhibits 116, 117). A final consideration for Commanders was closure of the gate due to a lack of Taliban support would have prevented the evacuation of numerous American Citizens still trying to reach HKIA on 26 August 2021 (exhibits AGI 18, S024, S026).

(d) The ROE authorized offensive engagement of Taliban as a declared hostile force; however, before the arrival of most of 2/1 to HKIA, the Taliban became a temporary and tactically expedient partner force, armed, and near Servicemembers at Abbey Gate (AGI exhibits 13, 18, 21, 53, 83). This temporary and expedient partner used excessive force against the civilian population which was observed by certain Servicemembers attempting to conduct a NEO. The commander's constrained the

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Servicemembers' authority under the ROE to stop the violence due to justifiable concern of jeopardizing the mission and potentially incurring additional civilian casualties in what would escalate to open combat at the gate. Under the ROE, Servicemembers understood they had the right to defend others only if they were verified AMCITS or coalition military forces (exhibits S005, S010, S017, S025, S029, S031, S037, S053, S055, S062, S065). Servicemembers could not identify the status of civilians until they passed through Taliban screening/check points and could present some evidence they were AMCITS, designated evacuees [i.e. Special Immigrant Visa Holders], or host nation employees of the U.S. Embassy.

(5) Conclusion

(a) Commanders at Abbey Gate adjusted the use of force and appropriately constrained their units' actions in defense of others to maximize the number of evacuees. It is reasonable to conclude that some Servicemembers personally disagreed with the application of the use of force, but still had a clear understanding of the ROE.

(b) Servicemembers' understanding and strict adherence to the ROE contributed to mission success without unnecessary escalation of violence. **No Servicemember in the Supplemental Review articulated the suspicious person identified on 26 August 2021 committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent amounting to a threat of harm against U.S. forces.** No Servicemembers, either snipers or those in the line companies, had authority to use lethal force in self-defense against those exhibiting merely suspicious behavior with additional demonstrations of hostile intent or hostile acts.

f. Directed Assessment. Offensive Engagement Authority.

(1) Servicemembers were authorized to use lethal force to engage any person at Abbey Gate in August 2021 if they could positively identify with reasonable certainty that person was part of a declared hostile force, through direct observation or vetted intelligence. (b)(6) sniper team and other U.S. military personnel failed to meet this standard of certainty to conclude the bald man in black at Abbey Gate was part of a declared hostile force, and a legitimate military target, subject to an offensive engagement in accordance with ROE. The (b)(6) appropriately used his professional judgment to not request authority to engage a target that was clearly inconsistent with the ROE.

(2) Under USCENTCOM OPORD 31 MOD 1, and more specifically Appendix 7, Annex C, USCENTCOM OPORD 25 MOD 6, offensive engagement authority under the ROE was initially delegated to the USFOR-A FWD Commander and only delegable to the Commander, Over The Horizon-Counterterrorism Task Force, so long as the casualty estimate was "0" and declared hostile forces were threatening viability of GIRoA, ANDSF campaign success, or U.S. objectives (AGI exhibits 117, 118). Hostile Forces included Al-Qa'ida, ISIS-K, persons taking a direct part in hostilities, and Taliban/Haqqani members (AGI exhibit 118).

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(a) The ROE provides a definition for persons taking a direct part in hostilities as: Activity that is aimed at attacking or directly causing harm or destruction to U.S., Afghan, or Coalition Forces, Persons, or Property, or undertaking actions preparatory to an attack; or Activity that substantially contributes to an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain operations (AGI exhibit 118). (See the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and Customary International Law). Examples of attack or actions preparatory to an attack include the following: activities aimed at directly harming; deploying to a position of attack; exfiltrating from an attack transporting, manufacturing, or preparing IEDs, or other munitions in an anticipation of an attack; and planning, directing, or approving adversary operations. Examples of activities substantially contributing to an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain operations include training, funding, or supplying an adversary with material, including homemade explosives (AGI exhibit 118).

(b) The ROE also provides a definition of PID relative to attack of a target. Except in Self-Defense, PID must be established prior to engaging a target. PID is defined as a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict and USCENTCOM ROE (AGI exhibit 118). PID must be based on current vetted intelligence and/or direct observation. PID must be established and maintained prior to engagement. PID is based on intelligence collected from more than one source [multi-source intelligence] except when U.S. forces establish single-source PID based on direct line of sight, unobscured observation (AGI exhibit 118).

(3) Prior Evidence

(a) During the AGI, Servicemembers of (b)(6) sniper team identified a bald man in black and deemed him as a suspicious person, at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021 (AGI exhibits 54, 62). They recount taking pictures of the individual, passing the pictures to higher, and never "hearing anything back" (AGI exhibits 54, 62). No member of (b)(6) sniper team requested permission to engage with lethal force (AGI exhibit 62).

(b) A review of the AGI shows several instances where the offensive engagement authority under ROE was utilized in Afghanistan in August 2021. For example, RADM Vasely provided a statement recounting approximately 10 lethal strikes on 14 August 2021 to prevent the Taliban advance on Kabul and the collapse of GIRoA (AGI exhibit 21).

(4) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) Additional statements point out that (b)(6) sniper team requested to engage, with lethal force, a suspicious, bald man dressed in black who matched a BOLO description (exhibits S029, S030, S062, S065). Unless he had displayed hostile act or hostile intent, they could not engage him under the applicable ROE, but instead would have required approval for engaging with lethal force under the principles of offensive engagement and the ROE.

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(b) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled observing a bald man in black that looked suspicious sitting on the far-side canal wall. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) claimed he discretely pointed out the suspicious persons to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), described the individuals as a match with the BOLO, and explained his method of engagement to kill the individuals (exhibits S029). When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pointedly asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if there existed authority to engage, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reportedly responded with words to the effect, "I don't know, good question" (exhibit S029). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated the (b)(6) left the tower without giving a decision, and (b)(6) sniper team subsequently lost the suspicious person in the crowd (exhibit S029).

(c) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the bald man in black or "suspicious persons" as **fitting a general description of the population; "All of these guys look pretty similar in the crowd.** Maybe the description we received at the time was more precise, but it was the actions of the individuals we saw that made them stand out" (exhibit S065). When describing the suspicious persons, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained, "the younger individual was wearing brown garb when we saw him. Obviously, he could have had a different color on underneath. **I don't remember all the details;** it has been two years since then; **I don't think I can remember more details on that**" (exhibit S065). He also stated, "**I don't remember if the younger individual is in this photo, I don't remember exactly what he looks like**" (exhibit S065).

(d) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being asked for engagement authority and responding with words to the effect, "I am not risking it, I do not know what to do" (exhibit S030). However, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) also recalled the (b)(6) later saying "**no to the engagement authority request before departing the tower**" (exhibit S030). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as referenced earlier, describes his interaction with (b)(6) during HFAC testimony and Podcast appearances in a much more confrontational tone and engagement (exhibit S001-S003). **Multiple senior leaders of the battalion were beyond skeptical that junior Marines would talk to the (b)(6) using those words or in that tone, and equally skeptical (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would allow such a lapse in discipline (exhibits S005, S017, S024, S037).**

(e) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did not recall any leadership visiting the tower or being asked about engagement authority (exhibit S011). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were unaware of a meeting with the (b)(6) to request engagement authority (exhibits S053, S031). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), who some of the snipers recalled being present in the tower for this meeting, claimed to not have been present, but did hear about the visit afterward on the morning of 26 August (exhibits S006, S007, S029, S030).

(f) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being shown the photo at the COC (exhibits S014, S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembers the (b)(6) stating words to the effect of, "if that guy does anything fishy, drop him" (exhibit S025). This is consistent with his recollection in the AGI (AGI exhibit 54). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **recalled the (b)(6) looking at the photo, with the understanding that the snipers at Abbey Gate were requesting to engage, and concluded the basis of the request was insufficient (exhibit S014).**

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(g) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recalled (b)(6) sniper team asking him to come to the tower on the morning of 26 August, which he did (exhibit S078). He did not recall being shown a picture of the suspicious person, either at the tower or at the COC. Based on what the snipers described, **he determined their basis would not support use of offensive engagement under the ROE because one could not determine whether the suspicious person was a member of a declared hostile force (e.g., ISIS-K) based solely on his appearance** (exhibit S078). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated the description of the suspicious individual matched many of the people in the crowd and the behavior was odd but **did not demonstrate a threat sufficient to engage in self-defense** (exhibit S078). The (b)(6) could not recall what was specifically said when he spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (exhibit S078).

(h) The description of the suspicious individuals was not specific and multiple Marines stated any number of individuals at the gate on 26 August 2021 fit the description (exhibits S005, S006, S011, S012, S014, S018, S024, S037, S078). The description of the suspicious individuals was very generic and not coupled with behavior that would have provided U.S. forces with reasonable certainty the suspicious individuals were part of a declared hostile force, either ISIS-K or persons taking a direct part in hostilities (exhibits S006, S010, S012, S029, S030, S065). The observed conduct of the suspicious persons was not consistent with a person taking a direct part in hostilities as defined in the ROE (exhibits S006, S010, S011, S012, S029, S030, S065). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **stated he laughed when he heard the request to engage, which provided only a description of an individual and no presence of hostile act/intent; he found the request baseless and ridiculous (exhibit S053)**. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **said that the suspicious individual “wasn’t doing anything that could have rated an engagement, I mean, I would have gone to jail if I had engaged him” (exhibit S011)**. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), when asked if the conduct of suspicious persons at the gate warranted offensive engagement stated: **“Absolutely not, I would be in Leavenworth now” (exhibit S078)**.

(i) It is a reasonable conclusion that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to the sniper tower on the morning of 26 August to discuss engagement authority under ROE (exhibits S029, S030, S055, S065, S078). The exchange between (b)(6) sniper team and the (b)(6) (b)(6) is not clear, including who was present for the conversation, and the recollection of the individuals present varied. Notably, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) indicated the suspicious bald male in black was no longer visible at Abbey Gate when the (b)(6) was in the tower (exhibit S065).

(j) Under the circumstances, the (b)(6) was under tremendous pressure to protect his Marines from the increasing threats at Abbey Gate, despite a lack of actionable intelligence or identifiable threats (AGI exhibits 76, 77, 115, and S004, S005, S018, S024, S037). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did not authorize (b)(6) sniper team’s request to engage due to a lack of the required criteria under the ROE. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated later that morning or in the early afternoon of 26 August 2021 that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) commented the current basis was not sufficient to engage, but if the alleged suspicious person did anything “fishy,” the snipers could engage (AGI exhibit 54, and S025). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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categorization of “fishy” behavior could most likely be constituted as hostile act or intent, and therefore, in line with the ROE.

(k) Regardless of how the (b)(6) was confronted with the request to engage the suspicious persons, the evidence clearly supports (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assessment of the situation; these individuals were not legitimate military targets and could not be attacked (exhibit S078). **While some have categorized his inaction to request engagement authority from a higher commander as a failure, the (b)(6) appropriately exercised his professional judgment to not request authority to engage a target he determined would have been inconsistent with the ROE and LOAC (AGI exhibits 118, 119 and exhibit S078).**

(l) (b)(6) sniper team and the (b)(1)1.4a team were unable to establish that the suspicious individuals were members of a declared hostile force (exhibits S006, S007, S010, S011, S027, S029, S030, S062, S065, S082). **The mere confusion about who in the picture was a member of a declared hostile force demonstrates the lack of any degree of certainty in accordance with the ROE.**

(5) Conclusion. The authority for U.S. forces to use lethal force against any person, not in self-defense, is based on a determination of whether the person is a legitimate military target. Declared hostile forces are legitimate targets because they are considered combatants, and participants in armed conflict. For Servicemembers to engage any person with lethal force at Abbey Gate [not in self-defense], they would have needed to positively identify that person as part of a declared hostile force, to a reasonable certainty, through direct observation or vetted intelligence. (b)(6) **sniper team and other U.S. military personnel failed to meet this standard of certainty to conclude the suspicious persons at the gate were part of a declared hostile force, and legitimate military targets, subject to an offensive engagement in accordance with the ROE.**

g. Additional Assessment. Taliban Excessive Force: The evidence is sufficient to conclude the Taliban used excessive force that resulted in the serious injury or death of civilians at Abbey Gate. This new fact does not materially impact the AGI findings.

(1) AGI Finding. The AGI made a limited finding that the Taliban used excessive force which resulted in civilian evacuees seeking alternate routes to Abbey Gate to avoid Taliban checkpoints. The change in routes dramatically increased the number of evacuees in the canal area at Abbey Gate between 25-26 August 2021 (AGI Findings and Recommendations, para 3.b.(7)(f)(i)).

(2) Prior Evidence. Numerous statements in the AGI referenced the Taliban using excessive force against civilians attempting to evacuate (AGI exhibits 62, 64, 76, 83, 88, 123). One statement inferred the Taliban killed civilians but provided minimal details (AGI exhibit 62). Leaders were aware of the excessive force and some Taliban members' use of force possibly killing civilians (AGI exhibits 53, 64, 83, 104). Most interviews provided few details about use of force resulting in the death of civilians, and

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many Marines did not provide accounts of Taliban killing civilians (AGI exhibits 53, 64, 76, 83, 88, 123). When Marines were pressed for additional information about the excessive force resulting in death, they would soften on certainty and details. **Some statements concluded, through implication, inference, or hearsay, the Taliban killed civilians** (AGI exhibits 62, 83).

(3) Supplemental Review Evidence

(a) Statements collected during the Supplemental Review largely followed the same theme as the AGI. Marines knew about the Taliban using excessive force (exhibits S004, S017, S018, S020, S024, S029, S031, S056, S059, S063). Several Marines, working near the chevron, stated they personally witnessed the Taliban shoot civilians (exhibits S004, S015, S030, S056, S062, S065). **While conducting a site reconnaissance IVO the chevron, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said he witnessed the Taliban shoot a young male** (exhibit S082).

(b) The (b)(6) sniper team provided generic information during the AGI on civilian deaths but then stated during the Supplemental Review interviews that they allegedly witnessed executions nearly daily IVO the chevron (exhibits S029, S030, S062, S065). Snipers specifically described a vantage point from the west side of the sniper tower, looking down the outer corridor toward the chevron, where they could view an area controlled by the Taliban. Allegedly, it was at that location where they observed these shootings occur (exhibits S011, S030, S092). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered a location where he believed the Taliban thought they were out of view, so they would take civilians there to beat or execute them. He recalled seeing killings three to four different times at that location, all of which, he said, were visible from the west window of the sniper tower (exhibit S062). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) noted, **“We witnessed the Taliban beating and killing people. Not just hitting them, breaking their faces, and bashing their skulls in. We saw Afghan civilians coming in with those wounds”** (S065). Other Marines described a similar vantage point in the limited time they worked at the west end of the outer corridor near the chevron (exhibit S004). Leaders who checked on the snipers in the outer gate tower concurred that the vantage point provided observation past the chevron (exhibits S005, S056, S092).

(c) **The COC received reports describing violence and excessive force that resulted in the death of civilians** (exhibit S020). Leaders throughout Abbey Gate were aware that violence occurred but explained the tactical problem with intervening. If U.S. forces engaged the Taliban, leaders assessed the situation would devolve into a firefight between U.S. forces and the Taliban; this almost certainly would have caused military and civilian casualties and jeopardized the mission to maximize the number of evacuees. (exhibits S005, S010, S018, S024, S026, S031, S059, S078).

(4) Conclusion. The AGI established the Taliban used excessive force IVO the chevron (AGI Findings and Recommendations, para 3.b.(7)(f)(i)). The corroborated new evidence expands on that finding and supports the conclusion the Taliban used excessive force that resulted in the death of civilians but has no material impact on the

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outcome of the Supplemental Review. Regardless of whether the Taliban used excessive force or force resulting in death, the civilian evacuees would have still sought alternate routes to avoid the Taliban checkpoints. Based on the mission to maximize the number of evacuees, any escalation by U.S. forces to intervene in Taliban use of excessive force would have created an unnecessary and definite risk to mission and risk to U.S. forces (exhibit S078). **Notably, none of the Servicemembers interviewed were able to provide any photos or videos that showed the Taliban killing civilians, or photos of dead civilians IVO Taliban checkpoints.**

8. Material Impact on Abbey Gate Investigation Findings. I find by the preponderance of the evidence the new information disclosed and not previously consider in the AGI does not materially impact the findings. I have carefully reviewed the AGI, public testimony referencing the findings of the AGI, statements and evidence provided by additional individuals not previously interviewed, and all relevant and available evidence. New information not previously considered consists of: (a) an alleged IED test run by ISIS or the Taliban, (b) the alleged confirmation and description of the suicide bomber, and (c) a possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber.

9. Overall Conclusion

a. Directed Assessment.

(1) An alleged IED test run by ISIS or the Taliban. Evidence does not support the conclusion that an abandoned duffel bag left on the near side of the canal on 21 August 2021 was an IED test run. While the supplemental review could not eliminate the possibility an IED test run occurred, the substantial number of abandoned bags, the lack of affiliation of the persons of interest with either the Taliban or ISIS-K, and lack of intelligence reporting concerning adversary probes, makes it more likely an IED test run did not occur.

(2) The alleged confirmation and description of the suicide bomber. Servicemembers identified a suspicious 'bald male in black' and took a photograph approximately 10 hours before the Abbey Gate attack, 26 August 2021. During the Supplemental Review, Servicemembers provided the photograph of the suspicious person whom they believed to be the bomber. **The suspicious individual was not the bomber. This small group of individuals became convinced the suspicious bald male in black was the bomber. They drew their conclusion based on nonspecific intelligence, unintentionally ambiguous threat reporting, and the conflation of threat reporting. Ultimately, they blended their observations with nonspecific intelligence reporting to generate an entirely new description of the suspected bomber – this became known as the suspicious 'bald male in black BOLO', developed from the ground up, that got shared across HKIA.** However, (b)(3)3024(i) conducted facial recognition analysis determined the "bald male in black" was not the bomber. Furthermore, intelligence corroborated the actual bomber was not IVO Abbey Gate at the time the Servicemembers were observing the suspicious individual.

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(3) A possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber. The evidence clearly supports the conclusion (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **appropriately exercised his professional judgment in not authorizing the use of lethal force** against the suspicious bald male in black on 26 August 2021. The description and behavior of the suspicious individual(s), as reported by (b)(6) sniper team, was generic and did not demonstrate the required hostile act or hostile intent to trigger the use of force in self-defense. Absent the right to use force for self-defense under the applicable ROE, they would need to positively identify that individual(s) as part of a declared hostile force, to a reasonable certainty, through direct observation or vetted intelligence, prior to using lethal force. The suspicious individual(s) observed by the Servicemembers lacked the criteria of positive identification under the ROE.

b. Additional Assessment.

(1) Leadership and Consolidation of Near-Side Canal. Evidence collected during the supplemental review supports the conclusion leaders were engaged and responsive. Numerous Marines recounted the constant presence of their leadership at Abbey Gate throughout the evacuation. Further, this engagement and responsiveness resulted in the correct assessment of the vulnerabilities and risks concerning the extended perimeter down the near-side canal to the foot bridge east of Abbey Gate. Leaders made sound tactical decisions when determining Servicemembers could be isolated by the large and agitated crowd, could no longer disperse by 25 August, had no additional force protection measures, were exposed to greater threat of both a VBIED and complex attack, and the position created greater casualty evacuation distances in the event of an attack. Leaders made sound tactical decisions to consolidate forces to the jersey barrier.

(2) Taliban Excessive Force. Based on the information reviewed, it is reasonable to conclude the allegations of Taliban using excessive force resulting in the death of civilians are substantiated. Credible and sufficiently detailed statements describe events where the Taliban used deadly force against civilians. Though certain individuals have provided testimony claiming to possess photos and videos of Taliban killing civilians, none were provided to the Supplemental Review team upon request. This conclusion **does not materially impact the AGI.** The information pertaining to Taliban killing civilians was accompanied by allegations the chain of command failed to take appropriate action to intervene. This allegation is unfounded. Commanders had the obligation to consider the assigned mission, current situation, higher commander's intent, and other guidance IAW ROE to determine the use of force required to accomplish the mission. Leaders also constrained the use of force to defend others outside HKIA because it was nearly impossible to determine who could be defended, despite being authorized by the ROE. The decision to constrain the use of force under the circumstances was a sound tactical decision to ensure accomplishment of the mission.

c. I find, by the preponderance of the evidence, the totality of the information reviewed has no material impact on the AGI original findings.

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Supplemental Review Assessment, 11 Jan 24

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review Assessment of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

10. Recommendations. I do not recommend modifications to the original recommendations.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

11. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

CURTIS.LANCE.G Digitally signed by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Date: 2024.01.11 21:48:27 -05'00'

Encls

LANCE G. CURTIS
MG, USA
Supplemental Review Officer

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

18 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Cover Memo – Recommendations for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

1. **Purpose.** This memorandum captures the recommendations resulting from the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021 (hereinafter Abbey Gate Investigation).

2. **Background.** In November 2021, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) completed its investigation into the Abbey Gate attack. Since the completion of the investigation, former Servicemembers have publicly testified about their experiences at Abbey Gate. In June 2023, you directed USARCENT to conduct a review of the public testimony to determine whether it contained any new information. USARCENT completed its review of public testimony in August 2023. In September 2023, USARCENT appointed then BG Lance Curtis to lead the Supplemental Review.

3. **Assessment.** The Supplemental Review concluded that none of the new information materially impacts the findings of the Abbey Gate Investigation.

4. **Recommendations.** After a careful review of all evidence gathered, and the Abbey Gate Investigation, I make the following additional recommendations:

(b)(5)

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
Enclosure 01

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

(b)(3)130(b), (b)(5), (b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021



5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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LANCE G. CURTIS
MG, USA
Supplemental Review Officer



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Enclosure 01A

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

INFO MEMO

22 November 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., Commander, U.S. Central Command
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Abbey Gate AR 15-6 Investigation

Mr. Secretary,

I have reviewed the AR 15-6 investigation completed at my direction by U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) and concur with and endorse its findings and recommendations. The investigation was exceptionally comprehensive in its scope, as appropriate to the tragic events that precipitated its initiation. The investigating team, led by BG Lance Curtis, conducted 70 separate interviews, many of which were held in a group setting to facilitate a free flow of information. A total of 139 people were interviewed at seven different locations spanning five countries. Interviews ranged from between one hour and six hours in duration, with the average interview lasting between two and three hours, and the average transcription totaling nearly 11 pages. I specifically concur that:

- The task organization worked. This was in large part due to pre-existing or quickly forged relationships among leaders at the highest echelons and adaptability at the lower echelons;
- By 25 August 2021, Abbey Gate was the main effort for “walk-up” gate operations at Hamid Karzai International Airport;
- There was no complex attack; it was a single suicide bomber not accompanied by enemy small arms fire;
- There is no evidence that Afghans were killed by return fire from U.S. forces in the immediate aftermath of the attack;
- The attack was not preventable at the tactical level without degrading the mission to maximize the number of evacuees;
- The attack was not the result of any act of omission or commission by forces on the ground;
- The wounds sustained by the service members Killed in Action were so catastrophic that none could be saved; and

Classified by: Gen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., Commander, USCENTCOM
Derived from: USCENTCOM CCR 380-14 (12 April 2021)
Declassify on: 2043 105

- Although not assigned as a task to ARCENT or the investigating team, it is my judgment that all injuries sustained by U.S. personnel incident to the Abbey Gate attack occurred in the line of duty and were not due to any misconduct by the killed or injured U.S. personnel.

I further concur with the recommendations detailed in the ARCENT investigation. Accordingly, I have directed the following actions:

- The Findings and Recommendations will be forwarded to all USCENTCOM Service Component Commanders to ensure that all U.S. servicemembers at Abbey Gate during the attack, and present in any of the blast zones detailed in the investigation, are afforded the opportunity to be evaluated for Traumatic Brain Injury (Recommendation (a));
- The Findings and Recommendations will be forwarded to all USCENTCOM Service Component Commanders to facilitate prioritized access to appropriate mental health evaluations for personnel involved in executing entry control point operations from 17-26 August and personnel involved in the medical response to the attack on 26 August (Recommendation (b));
- The investigation will be forwarded to the Joint Staff to inform any efforts that might be undertaken to develop interagency doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Recommendation (c)); and
- Relevant portions of the investigation will be forwarded to U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central for appropriate action regarding the potential serious injury or death of an Afghan civilian on or about 20 August 2021 resulting from the alleged improper deployment of a flash bang grenade by a U.S. Marine from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (Recommendation (d)).

Based on the totality of the facts and circumstances detailed in the ARCENT investigation, I do not believe that any adverse administrative or disciplinary action is necessary or appropriate for any U.S. personnel involved in our operations at Abbey Gate.

The ARCENT investigating team and the ARCENT Commander, LTG Ron Clark, briefed me in person on 11 November 2021 regarding this investigation. The presentation was as comprehensive as the investigation itself, and it included detailed PowerPoint slides, embedded video, and exceptionally well scripted speaker notes that complemented the written investigation and facilitated an informative exchange of questions and answers. I highly recommend you take the brief in person, and set aside two hours to this purpose. If you concur, my headquarters will work with your staff to make the ARCENT team available.

Enclosure: AR 15-6 Investigation (Enclosures and Exhibits available via Sharepoint)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG (RN 15-6b1)

MEMORANDUM FOR BG Lance G. Curtis, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort Liberty, North Carolina 28310

SUBJECT: Appointment as Supplemental Review Officer

1. (U) Appointment. You are hereby appointed as a Supplemental Reviewing Officer (SRO) to conduct interviews and gather additional information in response to recent public testimony regarding the attack on U.S. forces located at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), Kabul, Afghanistan on 26 August 2021. Prior to beginning your review, you must contact your legal advisor as directed in paragraph 4 below. **This review is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties.**

2. (U) Background.

a. (U) In November 2021, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) completed its investigation into the 26 August 2021, terrorist attack at Abbey Gate (hereinafter "Abbey Gate Investigation"). Since the completion of that investigation, several Servicemembers have publicly testified about their experiences at Abbey Gate and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In early June 2023, the Commander of U.S. Central Command directed me to conduct a review of public testimony to determine whether it contained any new information not previously considered in the Abbey Gate Investigation.

b. (U) On 17 August 2023, I provided my report to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (enclosed, hereinafter referred to as "Abbey Gate Investigation Review"). He concurred with my recommendations on 20 August 2023 (enclosed). My review determined the public testimony contained new information not previously considered in the investigation, and also identified additional Servicemembers who were not interviewed due to their medical evacuation and treatment after the attack.

3. (U) Scope.

a. (U) You will interview the individuals identified in my Abbey Gate Investigation Review who were not previously interviewed (enclosed). These interviews will be limited to the same tactical scope as set forth by my predecessor in his appointment memorandum for the Abbey Gate Investigation (enclosed).

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ACCG (RN 15-6b1)
SUBJECT: Appointment as Supplemental Review Officer

b. (U) You may interview additional personnel for the purpose of seeking information related to the statements of those interviewed. However, before conducting those interviews you will seek clarification from me regarding the scope of your investigation based on the additional information obtained.

c. (U) Provide me your assessment of whether the supplemental interviews contain new information not previously considered during the Abbey Gate Investigation, and if so, whether the new information materially impacts the findings of the Abbey Gate Investigation. If so, provide recommended substitutions or modifications to the findings.

4. (U) Legal Orientation.

a. (U) Prior to beginning your review, you will receive a legal briefing from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USARCENT Administrative Law Attorney, at (b)(6) (b)(6). You may and should obtain legal advice from your legal advisor frequently throughout your review.

b. (U) You will consult your legal advisor regarding all aspects of this supplemental review as outlined in the appointment orders for the Abbey Gate Investigation.

5. (U) Procedures. You will use the procedures set forth in the appointment memorandum for the Abbey Gate Investigation to the greatest extent possible and as you deem appropriate. You may request through your legal advisor the appointment of Assistant Review Officers, as necessary, to help question witnesses and otherwise work to gather information. I delegate approval authority for Assistant Review Officers to the USARCENT Staff Judge Advocate.

6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Suspense. Submit your full report, including evidence and associated documentation, to me, through the USARCENT Staff Judge Advocate no later than 10 November 2023. Any extension requests will be forwarded through the USARCENT Staff Judge Advocate to me for approval.

Encls

FRANK.PATRICK.D Digitally signed by
FRANK.PATRICK.D (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
DOUGLAS (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Date: 2023.09.22 23:54:02
+03'00'
PATRICK D. FRANK
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~



ACCG

17 August 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621-5101

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. PURPOSE. This memorandum responds to your directive, dated June 6, 2023, to review the subject AR 15-6 investigation and identify whether the testimonies received by the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) on March 8, 2023, particularly that of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided any new information not previously considered in the original investigation.

2. HFAC WITNESS LIST – MARCH 8, 2023

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Francis Q. Hoang, Executive Chairman, Allied Airlift 21 (AA21)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

3. Witnesses Providing New Information Not Previously Considered

a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **U.S. Marine Corps**

(1) Witness Background. In August 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a member of the sniper platoon in 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1) assigned to Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan, in support of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). While serving as a member of the scout sniper team that was task organized with the Abbey Gate security company, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was severely wounded on August 26, 2021, by an enemy Personally Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) attack. For injuries received in combat, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) earned the Purple Heart.

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SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

(2) New Information Not Previously Considered by Original Investigation

Team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the only HFAC witness, of six (6) total witnesses, who provided new information within the scope of the original AR 15-6 investigation. His testimony addressed matters involving: (a) the alleged confirmation and description of the suicide bomber; (b) a possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber; and (c) an alleged Improvised Explosive Device (IED) test run by ISIS or the Taliban.

(a) Alleged Confirmation / Description of Suicide Bomber. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testified that on August 26, 2021, that intelligence personnel confirmed the suicide bomber near Abbey Gate, with a detailed description. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the suicide bomber as “clean-shaven, brown dress wear, black vest, and traveling with a companion,” an older gentlemen wearing “a black silky hijab that was covering his face most of the time.”¹ This constitutes new information that was not provided in testimony to the AR 15-6 investigation team.

(b) Requests for Authority to Engage the Suicide Bomber.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testified that he and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) identified an individual meeting the suicide bomber’s description. The request from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for engagement authority was denied – as he received word that, “leadership did not have the engagement authority for us. Do not engage.”² (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stated that he “requested for the (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to come to the (sniper) tower to see what we did.”³

As (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived at the sniper tower, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remarked, “[w]e reassured him of the ease of fire on the suicide bomber. Pointedly, we asked him for engagement authority and permission. We asked if we could shoot. Our (b)(6) said, – ‘I don’t know.’ Myself and my team leader asked very harshly, – ‘well, who does?’ Because this is your responsibility, Sir. He (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) again replied, – ‘he did not know but would find out.’ We received no update and never got our answer.”⁴

This constitutes new information that was not provided in testimony to the AR 15-6 investigation team by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Marines assigned to the sniper section, the (b)(1)1.4a NCOs, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

¹ House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, March 8, 2023 (Statement of (b)(6)),

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (last visited Jul. 6, 2023).

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Id.*

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

(c) Alleged IED Test Run by ISIS or the Taliban.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testified that, on August 22, 2021, either ISIS or the Taliban was responsible for the conduct of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) probe / test run.⁵

This constitutes new information that was not provided in testimony to the AR 15-6 investigation team by BGen Farrell Sullivan (JTF-CR Cdr), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or any other witness to the events at Abbey Gate on August 22, 2021.

4. Witnesses Providing Information Not Relevant to the Subject AR 15-6 Investigation

a. Francis Q. Hoang, Executive Chairman, Allied Airlift 21 (AA21)

(1) Witness Background. Mr. Hoang, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, has over 25 years of national security experience. Mr. Hoang served as an Associate White House Counsel and as a Special Assistant to the President during former President George W. Bush's administration.

(2) Witness Testimony. Mr. Hoang testified on the living conditions for Afghans that were not evacuated during the NEO and his efforts to assist with AA21. His testimony constitutes information that was not relevant to the scope of the AR 15-6 investigation.

b. (b)(6) Founder, Task Force Pineapple

(1) Witness Background. As the founder of Task Force Pineapple, (b)(6) assisted with the evacuation of Afghan civilians and Operation Pineapple Express Relief, a nonprofit that provides financial relief to Afghan civilians. He is a member of the Moral Compass Federation, a group of Veterans volunteering to advocate for Afghan civilians. (b)(6) is a bestselling author and regular speaker on major news networks regarding the Afghanistan withdrawal, global terrorism, and Veteran mental health.

(2) Witness Testimony. (b)(6) testimony conveyed his connection to Afghanistan and how the Afghan populace was impacted by the Taliban return to power. He detailed the formation and employment of "Task Force Pineapple." (b)(6) provided his assessment of the national security risk of leaving former and current Afghan allies at the mercy of the Taliban, the national deterioration of trust in the United States by current / potential partner nations, and the

⁵ *Id.*

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

impact on U.S. Veterans of the conflict. His testimony constitutes information that was not relevant to the scope of the AR 15-6 investigation.

c. [redacted] (b)(6) U.S. Army

(1) Witness Background. [redacted] (b)(6) served four years as a [redacted] (b)(6) in the Army. He deployed to Iraq in 2020 and to Afghanistan in August 2021. [redacted] (b)(6) assisted in the evacuation of 200 civilians through Operation Pineapple Express (OPE).

(2) Witness Testimony. [redacted] (b)(6) provided his testimony based on his involvement in the Afghan NEO. His experiences as a medic brought him into direct contact with Afghan citizens at Abbey Gate; he described that environment as chaotic – with Taliban gunfire and families desperately seeking entry to HKIA. [redacted] (b)(6) stated that on August 25, 2021, he received threat warnings on an IED in the vicinity of Abbey Gate. His testimony constitutes information that was described in multiple sworn statements within the AR 15-6 investigation.

d. [redacted] (b)(6) Team America Relief

(1) Witness Background. [redacted] (b)(6) is a former Marine [redacted] (b)(6) who served from 2008 to 2013. He is currently the partnership lead for Team America Relief, an organization seeking to provide information and coordinate resources to assist in the evaluation, relocation, and/or transition of at-risk persons.

(2) Witness Testimony. [redacted] (b)(6) testimony focused on the history of the withdrawal and called for the government to honor our promise to Afghans who are at risk. [redacted] (b)(6) provided a summary of Team America's accomplishments and highlighted the inefficiency of the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. He concluded by requesting greater congressional oversight and assistance to Afghans. His testimony constitutes information that was not relevant to the scope of the AR 15-6 investigation.

e. [redacted] (b)(6) Immigrant ARC (I-ARC)

(1) Witness Background. [redacted] (b)(6) is an [redacted] (b)(6) with nearly 20 years of experience. She previously served as the [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) where she led campaigns to improve laws and policies for the benefit of immigrants.

(2) Witness Testimony. [redacted] (b)(6) testimony focused on systematic failures and the efforts made to soften the impact of the predicted collapse of the government in Afghanistan. She discussed the challenge to obtain a single visa application in a broken system. [redacted] (b)(6) called for the establishment of an Interagency Task Force to

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

ensure oversight / support of Afghan relocation efforts. In her closing comment, (b)(6) (b)(6) pointed out the limitations of the SIV program and how Congress could improve the current system and invest in future programs. Her testimony constitutes information that was not relevant to the scope of the AR 15-6 investigation.

5. Concerns Raised by the HFAC Witness Testimony. The HFAC testimony by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) raised several concerns about (a) the threat reporting; (b) the identification of a suspected suicide bomber; (c) the ROE; and (d) an engagement authorization discussion with the 2/1 (b)(6)

(a) Threat Reporting: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) account of the threat reporting provided specific descriptions prior to the attack at Abbey Gate. For example, he described the vehicle-borne IED threat to be “a gold or white Corolla and a green Mazda convertible.”⁶ However, the subject AR 15-6 investigation described the reporting as “generally non-specific.”⁷ Below is a paragraph from the subject investigation regarding the threat reporting.

Threat reporting during the NEO was continuous and generally non-specific. The USFOR-A FWD and JTF-CR staffs estimated the threat streams to be 60 credible reports during the 10-day NEO. The threats varied from VBIED attacks and Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive Devices (SVIEDs) against gates, to bags in the crowds or aircraft hijackings with evacuees concealing bombs and weapons on flights. 2/1 Marines believed their only means to counter these threats, without degrading the mission, was to increase overwatch and actively search for civilians meeting the descriptions provided. 2/1 Marines attempted to balance the need to continue to interact with the crowd to pull potential evacuees into the outer gate and increase force protection. On several occasions, both prior to and throughout 26 August, 2/1 Marines providing security along the canal pulled back from the crowd, took a knee behind jersey barriers, and stopped the flow of processing based on reports indicating specific times of attack.⁸

(b) Identification of a Suspected Suicide Bomber: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided a suicide bomber description that was not consistent with the description offered by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a (b)(1)1.4a NCO interviewed as part of the subject investigation. Below are the inconsistent descriptions:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a NCO Statement – Suicide Bomber BOLO

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ BG Lance Curtis, Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation, Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021, 22 October 2021, 19 (on file with author).

⁸ *Id.*

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

Report (evening – August 25, 2021): “Bald with well-kept beard wearing tan man-jams, carrying some type of bag.”⁹

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) **Statement** – Described the suicide bomber as “clean-shaven, brown dress wear, and a black vest.”¹⁰

(c) Rules of Engagement (ROE): While the ROE may not have been entirely clear at all times, due to the rapidly changing situation, U.S. Forces retained the right to self-defense, the ability to engage individuals committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent, and the ability to utilize riot-control measures in a defensive posture to protect the force and civilians. Below are two key paragraphs from the AR 15-6 investigation on the subject of ROE.

The most effective method of crowd control was physical presence and interaction by Marines with the crowds. Professional actions, verbal commands, physical force, and riot control shields prevented crowds from breaching the gate. Forces utilized warning shots with varying degrees of success at HKIA. 2/1 Marines did not use warning shots and only used flash bang grenades infrequently. The employment of riot control agents (RCAs), such as tear gas, required O-6 approval for use in defensive situations. 2/1 Marines employed cross cultural engagement and de-escalation with the civilian population to establish calm and decrease aggressiveness. The employment of (b)(1)1.4a capabilities served to enhance the 2/1 Marines' techniques by communicating threat warnings, document requirements, and advisements for safety and temporary closures.¹¹

MEU leadership ensured electronic countermeasures (ECM) were active at the gates, dispersion of personnel was enforced to the greatest extent possible, snipers were in overwatch, (b)(1)1.4a personnel communicated the threat to the crowd and asked people to leave, and medical assets were repositioned.¹²

(d) Engagement Authorization Discussion with the 2/1 (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testified that he requested the authority to engage the suspected suicide bomber, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the 2/1 (b)(6) supposedly did not know if he could authorize the engagement. Yet, senior leaders were available

⁹ *Id.* at Exhibit 129.

¹⁰ *House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, March 8, 2023 (Statement of (b)(6))*

(b)(6)

¹¹ BG Lance Curtis, Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation, Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021, 22 October 2021, 28 (on file with author).

¹² *Id.* at 15.

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

at Abbey Gate on August 26, 2021, to discuss the subject of engagement authority with Marines and Soldiers, as evidenced by the excerpt below from the subject investigation.

On 26 August, just before 1700 hours, BGen Sullivan, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (all of JTF-CR) had visited Abbey Gate and left the area 20 minutes before the blast. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 3/10 IBQT, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/501 PIR, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1/8 visited Abbey Gate on 26 August as well. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) attended a meeting at the Barron Hotel with Taliban and U.K. Forces to discuss the impending closure of Abbey Gate at 1600 on 26 August. As he was leaving Abbey Gate, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was caught in the PBIED blast.¹³

6. Recommended Actions in Response to the HFAC Witness Testimony

a. Confer with the original Abbey Gate Investigation Team regarding the HFAC witness testimony. The original investigation team of 8 officers from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, led by BG Lance Curtis, completed a comprehensive investigation of the facts and circumstances relating to the attack at Abbey Gate on August 26, 2021. The investigation team's familiarity with the findings, the witnesses, and the 259 total exhibits may prove helpful in the process of reconciling the apparent points of divergence between (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC testimony and the subject AR 15-6 investigation.

b. Conduct initial interviews with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the eighteen (18) other service members wounded in action and medically evacuated after the attack at Abbey Gate. Of the 27 total Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines wounded in action by the PBIED blast on August 26, 2021, only eight (8) were available for individual or group interviews with the original investigation team. The remaining nineteen (19) personnel wounded in action, including (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were not available for interviews after their medical evacuations from the blast site. These service members should be afforded the opportunity to share their perspectives on what occurred before, during, and after the PBIED attack at Abbey Gate.

Note - The complete list of the 27 personnel wounded in action is available at Enclosure 5. The personnel previously interviewed are highlighted in red font; the remaining 19 personnel are listed in black font.

c. Conduct follow-up interviews with service members who participated in individual or group interviews with the original investigation team, if necessary to address the concerns raised by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC testimony. At a minimum, conduct follow-up interviews with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (2/1 (b)(6)) and

¹³ *Id.* at 39.

ACCG

Enclosure 02

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Both witnesses should be asked to address the new information provided by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in his HFAC testimony regarding the identification of the suspected suicide bomber, the request for engagement authority, and the IED test run.

d. USCENTCOM CCJA should file this review, along with the HFAC testimonies from March 8, 2023, including the testimony of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with the original AR 15-6 investigation.

7. Point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ARCENT Staff Judge Advocate, at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

- 8 Encls
- 1. Executed COMREL
- 2. Orientation to HKIA Security
- 3. Orientation to Abbey Gate
- 4. Abbey Gate Overview
- 5. Abbey Gate WIA Locations
- 6. August Timeline of Key Events
- 7. 25-27 August Timeline of Key Events
- 8. Key Finding: No Complex Attack

PATRICK D. FRANK
Lieutenant General, USA (b)(6)
Commanding



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

20 August 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army / United States Army
Central, 1 Gabreski Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152

SUBJECT: Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. I concur with your recommendations in the enclosed "Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021," dated 17 August 2023.
2. Please report the findings of your supplementay interviews to me within 90 calendar days from the date of this memorandum. Include in your report an assessment of whether the supplementary interviews contain new information not previously considered during the 22 October 2021 investigation, and if so, whether the new information materially impacts the findings and recommendations of the original Abbey Gate AR 15-6 investigation.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl

MICHAEL E. KURILLA
General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG (RN 15-6b1)

MEMORANDUM FOR BG Lance G. Curtis, Deputy Commanding General – Operational Command Post (OCP), 1st Theater Sustainment Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Appointment. You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 (*Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers*). Pursuant to this duty, you will conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack upon U.S. forces located at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), Kabul, Afghanistan on 26 August 2021. Prior to beginning your investigation, you must contact your legal advisor as directed in paragraph 4 below. **This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties.**

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Background. On 26 August 2021, while U.S. forces were conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) out of HKIA, there were purportedly multiple explosions in the vicinity of HKIA, which resulted in the deaths of thirteen Servicemembers.

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Scope. Your investigation will address the following matters:

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Actions before, during, and after the attack.

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Force protection, specifically including pertinent issues associated with:

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Force posture, and

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Gate operations.

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Readiness.

d. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Leadership.

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Medical considerations.

f. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Chronology/timeline of events.

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ACCG (RN 15-6b1)
 SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

4. (U) Legal Orientation.

a. (U) Prior to beginning your investigation, you will receive a legal briefing from [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He may be contacted at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or by email at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). You may and should obtain legal advice from your legal advisor frequently throughout your investigation.

b. (U) You will consult with your legal advisor regarding all aspects of this investigation, including development of an investigative plan; determining whether witnesses need to be advised of their rights under the U.S. Constitution, Article 31 of the UCMJ, or based on their employment situation; and preparing findings and recommendations. You are directed to utilize and adhere to any templates provided by the legal advisor.

c. (U) Should you determine in the context of your investigation that a Soldier's status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in AR 600-8-2, *Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (Flag)*, you will coordinate with the appropriate officials to initiate the proper flag of said Soldier's personnel file.

5. (U) Procedures. No respondent has been designated in this matter. Accordingly, you will use procedures applicable to administrative investigations set forth in AR 15-6, chapters 3 and 4. Upon completion of this investigation, you will complete a report of investigation that is consistent with guidance provided in AR 15-6 and from your legal advisor. When completed, you will provide this report to the legal advisor, who will arrange for a legal review. This section provides specific procedures you will follow in conducting the investigation.

a. (U) The purpose of an AR 15-6 investigation is to elicit facts. Such facts may be obtained from a number of sources, including witness statements and electronic and other documentary and real (e.g., physical) evidence. You will gather any documents, recordings, videos, or other products or objects that you consider relevant to ascertaining the facts and circumstances you are charged with investigating. Your legal advisor can assist in determining whether you should retain original documents/objects or whether copies, including facsimiles, photographs or videos of such documents/objects, will suffice. All relevant documents and witness statements will be included with your report and reflected on the index described below.

b. (U) Witness statements will be reduced to writing on and sworn to utilizing the DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement. If witness statements are not taken on a DA Form 2823, you may need to provide such witness(es) with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any information. If such an instance arises, you will contact your legal advisor for advice.

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~

ACCG (RN 15-6b1)

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

c. (U) Prior to questioning any Soldier whom you suspect of having committed a criminal offense, you must advise that person of his or her rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Document your rights advisement and the individual's election of rights on DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate.

d. (U) Likewise, civilians cannot be ordered to incriminate themselves. While the DA Form 3881 may also be used to advise civilians of their rights, should you believe that a civilian witness – who is also a Federal Government civilian employee – may have testimony or evidence that would incriminate themselves, you will contact your legal advisor before proceeding with any interview of said witness(es).

e. (U) Your report should address all matters specified in paragraph 3, with reference to specific points of evidence, and should be thorough. Based on your findings, you may also make recommendations as to what changes, if any, are needed in terms of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership to avoid incidents of this nature in the future, as well as recommendations consistent with the findings concerning other facts or circumstances your investigation revealed. Each recommendation will cite to the finding that supports it, and should comport with the guidance in AR 15-6.

f. (U) The completed report of your investigation will include:

- (1) (U) This memorandum of appointment;
- (2) (U) A completed DA Form 1574;
- (3) (U) A memorandum for record with your findings and recommendations;
- (4) (U) An index of exhibits;
- (5) (U) All exhibits labeled in successive order; and
- (6) (U) Any copies of relevant investigations or other written products from sister services or foreign partners, as applicable.

g. (U) If you discover other items of concern not previously known or described in this memorandum, you will make a reasonable inquiry into such items as will provide a clearer picture. If such items of concern appear to be completely unrelated, you will prepare a short, separate memo on the subject and forward to me, through the legal advisor, for consideration.

h. (U) Additionally, you may request through your legal advisor the appointment of Assistant IOs, as necessary, to help question witnesses, take sworn statements, and otherwise work to gather evidence. I delegate the approval authority for Assistant IOs to the Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Central (USARCENT).

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~

ACCG (RN 15-6b1)
SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

6. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Suspense. The suspense date is 1 October 2021. Submit the full investigation, including evidence and associated documentation, to me, through the OSJA, USARCEN, no later than the suspense date. Any requests for extension concerning this investigation will be forwarded, through me, to the Commander, USCENTCOM, for approval. You will include any requests for extension, and any action (approval or disapproval) regarding those requests, in the report of investigation.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

RONALD P. CLARK
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

~~SECRET // REL TO USA, FVEY~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Staff Judge Advocate, Third Army / United States Army Central (USARCENT), 1 Gabreski Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Appointment of Assistant Supplemental Reviewers

1. In accordance with my appointment orders as a supplemental reviewer from LTG Patrick Frank, Commander, Army Central Command, I request the following personnel be appointed as assistant supplemental reviewers:

- a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.
 - f.
 - g.
 - h.
 - i.
- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Digitally signed by
CURTIS LANCE G. CURTIS
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Date: 2023.09.26 16:07:11 -04'00'

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Supplemental Reviewer

With regards to the appointment request, I take the following action:

Approve the request.

Disapprove the request for the following reasons:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

09 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Staff Judge Advocate, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Appointment of Additional Assistance Supplemental Reviewers

1. In accordance with my appointment orders as a supplemental reviewer from LTG Patrick Frank, Commander, Army Central Command, I request the following personnel be appointed as assistant supplemental reviewers:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Digitally signed by
CURTIS.LANCE.GRA
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Date: 2023.11.09
10:35:29 -05'00'

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Supplemental Reviewer

With regards to the appointment request, I take the following action:

Approve the request

Disapprove the request for the following reasons:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

29 September 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Staff Judge Advocate, Third Army / United States Army Central (USARCENT), 1 Gabreski Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Appointment of Additional Assistant Supplemental Reviewers

1. In accordance with my appointment orders as a supplemental reviewer from LTG Patrick Frank, Commander, Army Central Command, I request the following personnel be appointed as assistant supplemental reviewers:

- a.
 - b.
 - c.
- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Digitally signed by
CURTIS.LANCE.GRAY

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Date: 2023.09.29
16:00:15 -04'00'

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Supplemental Reviewer

With regards to the appointment request, I take the following action:

- Approve the request.
- Disapprove the request for the following reasons:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

23 October 2023

MEMORANDUM THRU (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Staff Judge Advocate, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: ARCENT Abbey Gate Supplemental Review – Extension Request

1. ~~(S//REL US, FVEY)~~ On 22 October 2023, you appointed me to conduct a supplemental review of the October 2021 AR 15-6 Investigation into the Abbey Gate Attack on 26 August 2021. The date for completion is 10 November 2023. For the below reasons, I am requesting an extension to **22 November 2023**.

2. ~~(CUI)~~ The supplemental review team has conducted 23 interviews in Florida, California, Virginia, North Carolina, Indiana, and Okinawa, Japan over the last three weeks (5 -20 October 2023). We are planning to conduct an additional 17 interviews in Virginia, North Carolina, Wisconsin, New York, Texas, Missouri, Arizona, Tennessee, Iowa, and Rota, Spain. Given the dispersion of these location and the required travel time to conduct face-to-face meetings with our Abbey Gate and Hamid Karzai International Airport veterans, the review team will need additional time to ensure thorough completion of this monumentally important task. Finally, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has agreed to be interviewed, through counsel, between 14-16 November 2023.

3. ~~(CUI)~~ I anticipate completing the interviews and compiling my assessment, barring any additional material interviews, no earlier than 22 November 2023. A 12-day extension will allow me to conduct the travel and interviews, as well as expend the necessary effort to provide a thorough assessment of the new information referenced in my appointment order.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Digitally signed by CURTIS.LANCE.GRAY (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Date: 2023.10.24 12:20:50 -04'00'

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Supplemental Reviewer



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

30 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army / United States Army
Central, 1 Gabreski Drive, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152

SUBJECT: Extension Request - Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at
Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

1. I have received your extension requested dated 27 October 2023, requesting a twenty (20) day extension from 18 November 2023 to 8 December 2023. Your request is granted.
2. Please report the findings of your supplemental interviews to me by 8 December 2023. Include in your report an assessment of whether the supplemental interviews contain new information not previously considered during the 22 October 2021 investigation, and if so, whether the new information materially impacts the findings and recommendations of the original Abbey Gate AR 15-6 investigation.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

MICHAEL E. KURILLA
General, U.S. Army



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

11 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

1. **Purpose:** This memorandum serves as the executive summary of the findings and recommendations for the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021.
2. **Methodology:** Conduct interviews with the individuals identified in the Army Central (ARCENT) Abbey Gate Investigation (AGI) Review and additional personnel for the purpose of seeking new information and determining whether the new information materially affected the findings and recommendations of AGI. The interviews followed the same tactical scope as the AGI.
3. **New Information Disclosed Leading to the Supplemental Review:** On 08 March 2023, witness testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee included Servicemember assertions provided after conclusion of the AGI. These assertions included an alleged improvised explosive device (IED) test run conducted at Abbey Gate, threat reporting of a suspicious individual on 26 August 2021, a request to engage that suspicious individual, and excessive Taliban use of force that resulted in the death of civilians.
4. **Assessment**
 - a. **Focus Areas** I have carefully reviewed the AGI and focused the assessment efforts on the new information that you have directed:
 - (1) Alleged IED test run by ISIS or the Taliban
 - (2) Confirmation and description of the suicide bomber
 - (3) Possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber
 - b. Based on the review of new information disclosed in public testimony, additional assessment was conducted regarding:
 - (1) Command decision to consolidate the perimeter
 - (2) Taliban excessive force

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SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

c. The three directed assessments and the two additional assessments are addressed by the following focus areas, which are discussed in a logical order to enable full understanding of the situation at HKIA within the scope of the AGI and the Supplemental Review:

d. Directed Assessment

(1) **IED Test Run.** The Supplemental Review could not eliminate the possibility there was an IED test run on 21 August 2021, but it is more likely this was not an IED test run conducted by ISIS-K or the Taliban. Routine behavior by evacuees demonstrated a common practice of dropping bags off to other people waiting for evacuation, throwing bags over the fences, or abandoning bags. The idea of an IED test run likely stemmed from (b)(6) sniper teams' interpretation of three individuals carrying a large duffel bag and a tan/coyote bag into the crowd at Abbey Gate. After observing these three individuals exit the crowd without their bags, snipers observed a bag on the ground, which matched the description of the tan/coyote bag. Snipers informed Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) who interrogated the site and assessed that no IED was present, finding only personal items in the bag. More experienced Marines opposed the assertion there was an IED test run. The Supplemental Review found no evidence of intelligence reporting supporting the conclusion an IED test-run occurred. Further, the (b)(3)3024(i) (b)(3)3024(i) conducted facial recognition of the three males against databases and found no known affiliation with ISIS-K or the Taliban. Numerous Servicemembers interviewed during the Abbey Gate Investigation and the Supplemental Review recalled bags being frequently abandoned or discarded.

(2) Confirmation and description of the suicide bomber

(a) **Threat Reporting.** The Supplemental Review draws three conclusions about the description of the suspected bomber. **First**, the intelligence lacked the specificity necessary to positively identify the suspected bomber in the dynamic crowd at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. The description of the attacker provided in intelligence reporting on the night of 25 August 2021 (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c **Second**, Servicemembers frequently disseminated threat reporting verbally and face-to-face by necessity (which tended to unintentionally increase the ambiguity of the already vague, non-descript reporting). **Third**, multiple individuals operating at Abbey Gate, to include members of (b)(6) sniper team, some (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), and some Marines who received updates from (b)(6) sniper team, have conflated their observations of the suspicious persons they identified on the morning of 26 August 2021 with the be on the lookout for (BOLO) descriptions derived from actual intelligence reporting. **This small group of individuals at Abbey Gate became convinced the suspicious**

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SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

bald man in black was the bomber. They drew their conclusion based on nonspecific intelligence, ambiguous threat reporting, and the conflation of threat reporting. Ultimately, they blended their observations with nonspecific intelligence reporting to generate an entirely new description of the suspected bomber – this became known as the suspicious ‘bald man in black BOLO’, developed from the ground up, that was shared across HKIA.

(b) Suspicious Person(s) at Abbey Gate and Description of the Bomber. The suspicious **individual photographed at Abbey Gate on the morning of 26 August 2021 was not the bomber.** During the Supplemental Review, members of (b)(6) sniper team and (b)(1)1.4a NCOs asserted the bald man in black was the bomber. (b)(3)3024(i) conducted facial recognition analysis on the suspicious male against multiple photos of Abdul Rahman al-Logari, the ISIS-K bomber, and the analysis returned the strongest (b)(3)3024(i) result (b)(3)3024(i) assigns. Furthermore, high-confidence intelligence reports published after the attack indicated the bomber did not arrive at Abbey Gate until (b)(1)1.4c on 26 August 2021. **Although some Servicemembers believe they identified the bomber around 0700 Local on 26 August 2021, that is incongruent with al-Logari’s timeline from that day as revealed by intelligence reports published after the bombing. Based on the (b)(3)3024(i) analysis, intelligence reports, and evidence collected during the Supplemental Review, the snipers at Abbey Gate did not identify or photograph the bomber.**

(3) Possible request for authority to engage the suicide bomber

(a) Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Self-Defense. **Servicemembers identified multiple suspicious persons at Abbey Gate, but many agreed the suspicious conduct did not constitute a threat, hostile act, or hostile intent sufficient to authorize the use of lethal force.** In the Supplemental Review, no Servicemember articulated the bald man in black identified on 26 August 2021 committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent amounting to a threat of harm against U.S. forces that would have authorized them to use lethal force. Commanders at Abbey Gate adjusted the use of force and appropriately constrained their units’ actions in defense of others to maximize the number of evacuees. It is reasonable to conclude that some Servicemembers personally disagreed with the application of the use of force, but still had a clear understanding of the ROE. The ROE was sufficient to allow Marines to defend themselves, fellow Servicemembers, and certain select groups of people, such as American Citizens and Special Immigrant Visa holders.

(b) Offensive Engagement Authority. (b)(6) **sniper team and other Servicemembers could not identify with reasonable certainty whether suspicious persons at Abbey Gate were members of a declared hostile force (e.g., ISIS-K) in accordance with the ROE based solely on their physical appearance or their**

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SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

suspicious behavior; therefore, they did not have authority to use lethal force. The intelligence community's description of the suspected "bomber" was not specific. Most Servicemembers stated any number of civilian males at Abbey Gate fit the nonspecific threat description received on 26 August 2021. (b)(6) sniper team requested to engage the bald man in black and were denied by their Chain of Command. Regardless of how the (b)(6) (b)(6) was confronted with the request to engage the suspicious persons, the evidence supports the (b)(6) assessment of the situation. These individuals were not legitimate military targets and could not be attacked under the ROE. Additionally, the authority to conduct an offensive engagement was retained by the US Forces Afghanistan Forward Commander and was beyond the (b)(6) (b)(6) authority. Given the lack of specific information indicating the bald man in black was a member of ISIS-K or the Taliban, the (b)(6) acted appropriately in not seeking engagement authority.

b. Additional Assessment

(1) **Leadership and Consolidation of Near-Side Canal.** **The military leaders at Abbey Gate were present, actively engaged, and took appropriate measures to ensure force protection given the time and circumstances. The tactical level decision to consolidate from the footbridge east of Abbey Gate to the jersey barrier at the base of the sniper tower was a sound tactical decision given a totality of the circumstances.** Evidence from the Supplemental Review and the AGI **does not support** assertions that leaders were disengaged at Abbey Gate. The vast majority of Marines spoke positively about the presence and/or performance of tactical level leadership. The decision to consolidate at the jersey barrier instead of the footbridge on 25 August 2021 was a sound tactical decision based on the time, resources, and dynamic threat conditions. The number of Marines required to hold both the nearside canal walkway and footbridge without physical barriers was equal to, or greater than, what was required at the jersey barrier. This presented a greater risk of the crowd overwhelming Marines, given the increasing size of the crowd and the lack of physical barriers in vicinity of the footbridge. Additionally, Marines risked greater exposure to a vehicle borne IED and small arms fire near the footbridge due to proximity to the parking lot, surrounding buildings, and lack of cover. The decision to consolidate from the footbridge to the jersey barrier was motivated by concern for the safety of Servicemembers and to reduce casualty evacuation distances in the event of an attack. Leaders bore the tough responsibility of constantly scanning the environment, evaluating risks and opportunities, and making decisions to accomplish the mission, while mitigating risk.

(2) **Taliban Used Excessive Force.** **Taliban used excessive force that resulted in the serious injury or death of civilians. Evidence collected during the Supplemental Review supports the conclusion that, given the mission to**

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SUBJECT: Executive Summary for Supplemental Review of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport, 26 August 2021

maximize the number of evacuees, any U.S. escalation of force against the Taliban to intervene would have created an unnecessary and definite risk to mission and risk to U.S. forces. This conclusion does not materially impact the findings of AGI. Several Marines described working at the end of the Abbey Gate corridor near the chevron and assert personally witnessing the Taliban shoot civilians. Snipers specifically described a vantage point from the sniper tower where they could view an area controlled by the Taliban where these shootings allegedly occurred. Marines on the ground recalled a similar vantage point. Leaders at Abbey Gate were aware violence occurred but explained the tactical problem with intervening. If U.S. forces engaged the Taliban, leaders assessed the situation would devolve into a gunfight between U.S. forces and the Taliban; this almost certainly would have caused military and civilian casualties and jeopardized the mission to maximize the number of evacuees. Notably, none of the Servicemembers interviewed were able to provide photos, videos, or other corroborating evidence of the Taliban killing civilians.

5. **Material Impact on AGI Findings:** After completing the Supplemental Review, I have not found any new information that materially impacts the findings of the AGI.

6. **Recommendations:** I do not recommend modifications to the AR 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, HKIA, 26 August 2021. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

7. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Digitally signed by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Date: 2024.01.11 21:45:37 -05'00'

Encls

LANCE G. CURTIS
MG, USA
Supplemental Review Officer

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

October 3, 2023

The Honorable Lloyd J. Austin III
Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Austin:

The House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees are continuing to investigate the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, including the events surrounding the August 26, 2021 terrorist attack at Abbey Gate, which killed 13 American servicemembers, wounded another 45, and killed more than 170 Afghan civilians.

On March 8, 2023, the House Foreign Affairs Committee heard testimony from former (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was gravely wounded in that terrorist attack. In that hearing, he testified that his sniper team believed they identified the suicide bomber responsible for the attack earlier that day, prior to the attack taking place. According to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they were unable to eliminate the threat due to their leadership's uncertainty as to who held authority to approve engagement.¹ A May 18, 2023 letter by the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees requested additional documents and communications on these events, but questions remain outstanding.²

A September 13, 2023 briefing by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), to the Committees corroborated significant elements of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony.³ He affirmed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony that the sniper team showed him "photos we had of the two men" they identified as suspects, confirming that such a photograph had been shared with him and was transmitted to the Combat Operations Center (COC) for further consideration.

To shed further light on these events and the horrific attack at Abbey Gate, we request the following no later than October 17, 2023:

¹ *During and After the Fall of Kabul: Examining the Administration's Emergency Evacuation from Afghanistan Before the H. Comm. On Foreign Affs.*, 118th Cong. (2023) (statement of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) U.S. Marine Corps).

² Letter from Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Comm. on Armed Servs., & Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., to Lloyd J. Austin III, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Def., & Mark Milley, General, Chairman, Jt. Chiefs of Staff, (May 18, 2023).

³ U.S. Dep't of Defense Briefing to H. Comm. On Foreign Affs. and H. Comm. on Armed Services on events at Abbey Gate (Sept. 13, 2023).

1. All photographs taken by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team prior to or on August 26, 2021 of suspicious individuals, including all photographs transmitted for further consideration. Please include the date, time, and all metadata of the photographs;
2. All documents and communications referring or relating to the transmission of photographs of suspicious individuals taken by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team prior to or on August 26, 2021 to the Combat Operations Center or other higher authority, including, but not limited to:
 - a. All documents and communications transmitting the photograph(s);
 - b. All documents and communications responding to the photograph(s), including any analysis undertaken, and any determinations made;
 - c. All documents and communications pertaining to any request to engage or for engagement authority towards suspicious individuals identified by the sniper team; and,
 - d. Documents sufficient to show what actions the COC or other higher authority took in response to receiving the photograph(s) from the sniper team.
3. All Be on the Lookout (BOLOs), suspect or threat descriptions, and intelligence warnings, whether over text, chat, email, or other communication modalities, pertaining to Hamid Karzai International Airport from August 24, 2021 through August 26, 2021;
4. Documents sufficient to show how:
 - a. The Rules of Engagement in effect at HKIA from August 24, 2021 through August 26, 2021 were communicated to servicemembers on the ground and what guidance they received;
 - b. The Rules of Engagement in effect at HKIA from August 24, 2021 through August 26, 2021 applied to an identified suicide bomber, and what guidance servicemembers received regarding such a potential threat;
 - c. The Rules of Engagement in effect at HKIA from August 24, 2021 through August 26, 2021 applied to a suspected identification of a suicide bomber or other threat actor based on a BOLO and/or suspect description, and what guidance servicemembers received regarding such a potential threat; and,
 - d. The Rules of Engagement in effect during the August 2021 emergency evacuation were changed or modified (including through informal guidance) in response to evolving conditions, including the growing threat of an attack by ISIS-K or other groups.

The Armed Services Committee, under Rule X, clause 1 of the Rules of the House of Representatives (House Rules), maintains oversight jurisdiction over the Department of Defense generally. Moreover, under the House Rules, the Armed Services Committee derives its authority to conduct oversight from, among other things, clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X (relating to general oversight responsibilities), clause 3(b) of Rule X (relating to special oversight functions), and clause 1(b) of rule XI (relating to investigations and studies).

Under House Rule X, the Foreign Affairs Committee has legislative and oversight jurisdiction over “[r]elations of the United States with foreign nations generally,” “[d]iplomatic service,” and “[p]rotection of American citizens abroad and expatriation.” The Foreign Affairs Committee exercises legislative and oversight jurisdiction over “[r]elations of the United States with foreign nations generally,” “[d]iplomatic service,” and “[p]rotection of American citizens abroad and expatriation,” pursuant to Rule X, clause 1(i).⁴

If you have any questions about this request, your staff may contact Armed Services Committee staff at (202) 225-4151 and Foreign Affairs Committee staff at (202) 226-8467. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

We look forward to your prompt reply.

Sincerely,



Mike Rogers
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee



Michael T. McCaul
Chairman
House Foreign Affairs Committee

cc: Rep. Adam Smith, Ranking Member
House Armed Services Committee

Rep. Gregory W. Meeks, Ranking Member
House Foreign Affairs Committee

⁴ *Rules of the House of Representatives: One Hundred Eighteenth Congress*, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. at 9 (Jan. 10, 2023), <https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules118.house.gov/files/documents/Rules%20and%20Resources/118-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf>.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG Patrick D. Frank, Commander, Third Army/United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152-5202

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

DATE (2023)	ACTIVITY	LOCATION
22-Sep	ARCENT Appointment Order is signed appointing Brigadier General Lance Curtis as the Supplemental Reviewing Officer with a suspense date of 10 November 2023	
26-Sep	ARCENT approved appointment of supplemental reviewers (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	
29-Sep	ARCENT approved appointment of additional supplemental reviewers (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	
05-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Team Member	
05-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) BN Team Leader	
05-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Combat Operations Center (COC) Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO)	(b)(6)
05-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) BN Team member	(b)(6)
10-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Co, 2/1	
10-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Co, 2/1	
12-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Co, 2/1	
12-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), E Co, 2/1	
13-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	
13-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Golf Co, 2/1	
13-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
16-Oct	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1	

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

16-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Golf Co, 2/1
16-Oct	Interview with [redacted], 1/4
16-Oct	Interview with [redacted], 2/1
17-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Golf Co, 2/1
19-Oct	Interview with [redacted], 2/1
19-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1
20-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Search Team Member
20-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Echo Co, 2/1
24-Oct	Interview with [redacted], 2/1
24-Oct	Extension request submitted for Supplemental Review to 22 November 2023
25-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1
25-Oct	Interview with [redacted]
25-Oct	Interview with [redacted] G Co, 2/1
25-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1
26-Oct	Interview with [redacted], 2/1
26-Oct	SVTC Interview with [redacted], 2/1
26-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1
30-Oct	CENTCOM granted extension request
30-Oct	Follow-up Interview with [redacted], [redacted] Team Member
31-Oct	Interview with [redacted] Echo Co, 2/1
01-Nov	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1
01-Nov	Interview with [redacted] Wpns Co, 2/1

[Large redacted area]

(b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

02-Nov	Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th MEU Command Element	(b)(6)
02-Nov	Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th MEU Command Element	
02-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
03-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1	
03-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1	
06-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Echo Co, 2/1	
07-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
07-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a BN Team Member	
08-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
08-Nov	SVTC Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1	
08-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
09-Nov	ARCENT approved appointment of additional supplemental reviewer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)	
13-Nov	Follow-up Phone Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1	
14-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Wpns Co, 2/1	
17-Nov	SVTC Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Marine Operations Group - Central	
17-Nov	Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a	
17-Nov	SVTC Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a	
20-Nov	Interview with (b)(1)1.4c	
20-Nov	Interview with (b)(1)1.4c	
15-21 Nov	Compile all transcripts. Develop and refine findings and recommendations. Compile all exhibits and enclosures.	
22-Nov	Supplemental Review Findings and Recommendations submitted to ARCENT	

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Supplemental Review of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Attack at Abbey Gate, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), 26 August 2021

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Supplemental Reviewer



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

23 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Wounded in Action Interviews

1. (CUI) On 22 September 2023, BG Lance Curtis was appointed to conduct a supplemental review of the Abbey Gate AR 15-6 Command Investigation. Shortly after this appointment, assistance supplemental reviewers were appointed. By 26 October 2023, CENTCOM provided the review team with contact information for the 19 wounded in action we were directed to interview.

2. (CUI) Each of the wounded individuals was contacted by phone and offered the opportunity to interview if they were no longer on active duty. Those remaining on active duty were contacted through their unit and appeared for an interview. Of the 19 wounded, 7 declined to be interviewed, most citing a desire to not endure the trauma or they had personally moved on from the event.

a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, no longer on active duty. Contacted on 27 September 2023 and declined the interview.

b. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, no longer on active duty. Attempted contact on 27, 28, and 29 September, as well as 2, 3, and 5 October 2023, with no success. Individual was also texted on 28 September. Individual was left messages, but never responded. Feedback from other members of G Co, 2/1 Marines is that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is most likely not interested.

c. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, no longer on active duty. Attempted contact on 27 September and left voicemail, and individual returned call later on 27 September 2023. He declined to be interviewed.

d. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Servicemember was assigned to (b)(6) at time supplemental review was opened, but on terminal leave before medically separating from the Marine Corps. Attempted contacts, after receiving contact information from unit, on 29 September and 2,3, and 5 October 2023, but no voicemail was setup. Finally made contact on 5 October 2023 and individual asked for time to think over interview opportunity. Contacted again on 8 October and individual declined to be interviewed.

e. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC. Servicemember was assigned to (b)(6) at time supplemental review was opened, but on terminal leave before medically separating from the Marine Corps. Successful contact

ACCG-SR
 SUBJECT: Wounded in Action Interviews

made on 29 September 2023 and individual asked for time to consider participating in the interview. Individual called back on 2 October 2023 and declined to be interviewed.

f. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, no longer on active duty. Attempted contact with individual on 27, 28, and 29 September 2023, and voicemail left. Individual returned phone call on 29 September 2023 and asked for time to consider participation in interview. Called back on 2 October 2023 and declined to be interviewed.

g. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, no longer on active duty. Attempted contact on 29 September 2023 and voicemail left. Individual returned call on 29 September 2023 and declined to be interviewed.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

CENTCOM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

NEO AT HKIA – 13 AUG – 31 AUG 2021

USCENTCOM EXORD – Support to Noncombatant Evacuation in Afghanistan (0229Z, 13 AUG 2021)

ROE: Reference C, R, T
Reference C: CJCSI 3121.01B (SROE, 13 June 05)
Reference R: **OPORD 25 MOD 6 Annex C, Appendix 7, 1307, 15 Jul 21**
Reference T – OPOD 31, 1334, 15 Jul 21

OPORD 25, MOD 6 rescinded MOD 5 ROE; MOD 6 ROE was in effect during the NEO per OPOD 31, MOD 1

USCENTCOM OPOD 25, MOD 6, Annex C, Appendix 7, Rules of Engagement

3.A. Inherent Right to Self-Defense

3.B. Based on Assigned Mission, Commanders determine level of force required

3.C. **Positive Identification:** Vetted Intelligence, Direct Observation

3.E. Minimize Civilian Casualties

4. US Standing ROE for Self-Defense In effect

5.A. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Hostile Forces** - AQ, ISIS-K, Persons DPH, Taliban/Haqqani threatening US/ANDSF/GIROA operations

5.B. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **RCA** – non-lethal in defensive mode only to save lives

5.C. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Entry into AFG and surrounding countries**

5.D. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Collective Self-Defense** – Non AFG/Partner Forces, ANSF (military, paramilitary, police, civilian security, NDS), Afghan Gov Civilian or Paramilitary Security Forces supporting US security or executing mission on US targets

5.E. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Defense of Others** – US Persons, US Contractors, Afghan Gov Officials, Contractors or Civilians in support of US Ops, NGOS, USEK HN Civilian, Designated Evacuees, Civilians assisting NEO

5.F. Supplemental Review (b)(1)1.4a **Defense of Property**

5.J. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Incidental Injury or Death of Civilians** - All military operations will be conducted in a manner to ensure that harm to civilian noncombatants is minimized. USCENTCOM CMD withholds authority for lethal strikes (b)(1)1.4a

RELEVANT CHANGES

USCENTCOM OPOD 31, MOD 1, 13 AUG 2021

3.E.3.A.1. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Hostile Forces** – USFOR-A FWD CMD **can attack** AQ, ISIS-K, Persons DPH, Taliban/Haqqani threatening US/ANSF ops

USCENTCOM OPOD 31, MOD 1, FRAGO 2, 16 AUG 2021

3.E.3.A.1. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Hostile Forces** – USFOR-A FWD CMD has **TEA** to engage Taliban/Haqqani massing for operations in and around Kabul*

3.A.3.A.10.A. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Incidental Injury or Death of Civilians** - USFOR-A FWD CMD can authorize lethal strikes (b)(1)1.4a

*USFOR-A FWD coordination with TB for external security began on 16 AUG 2021 (exhibit 21)

CENTCOM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – USE OF FORCE

NEO AT HKIA – 13 AUG – 31 AUG 2021

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY/RULES TO ENGAGE THREATS AT ABBEY GATE

CJCSI 3121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement (2005)

Enclosure A – SROE - Definitions

Inherent Right of Self-Defense. Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.

Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.

Imminent Use of Force. The determination of whether the use of force against US forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to US forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.

CENTCOM OPORD 25, MOD 6, Annex C, Appendix 7 (15 AUG 2021)

3.C. (U) **Positive Identification (PID).**

3.C.1 (~~S//REL to USA, FVEY~~) Except in Self-Defense, PID must be established prior to engaging a target. PID is defined as a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a legitimate military target IAW the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and these ROE.

3.C.2. (~~S//REL to USA, FVEY~~) PID must be based on current vetted intelligence and/or direct observation. PID must be established and maintained prior to engagement

3.C.4. (~~S//REL to USA, FVEY~~) **Balance between PID and Self-Defense.** PID requirements do not remove or detract from a Commander's responsibility and authority to take reasonable action in self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Although PID requirements described above do not apply to engaging a target in self-defense, the LOAC principle of distinction still requires forces to identify the source of the threat against which they are exercising self-defense and distinguish between lawful military objectives and protected persons or objects.

0098, 4/26/24

USCENTCOM OPORD 31, MOD 1, 13 AUG 2021

3.E.3.A.1. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4 **Hostile Forces** – USFOR-A FWD CMD **can attack** AQ, ISIS-K, Persons DPH, Taliban/Haqqani threatening US operations

CENTCOM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - APPLICATION

NEO AT HKIA – 13 AUG – 31 AUG 2021

SUSPICIOUS PERSONS AT ABBEY GATE

FACTS: Marines describe persons at various times, to include the morning of the bombing, persons in the canal area acting abnormal, not seeking entry, or uninterested in gaining attention for screening by Marines.

Inherent Right to Self-Defense: Use of force to defend self from hostile acts or displayed hostile intent



Hostile Act:

Attack or Use of Force to include use of force to impede the mission



ENGAGE: NO

Suspicious persons were not reported to use force against US forces or force to impede the mission



Hostile Intent:

Threat of imminent use of force against US forces or to impede the mission. Imminent is assessed by all facts and circumstances, can be made at any level, does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.



ENGAGE: NO

Suspicious persons were not reported to display threat of imminent use of force

CONCLUSION

Suspicious persons, as described, were not a threat and could not be engaged under USCENTCOM FOIA 24-0171 ROE or LOAC

DECLARED HOSTILE FORCES – ISIS-K

FACTS: Marines reported observing a male (or two males) in the canal area on 26 August. Descriptions of the male(s) vary, but statements of short hair or bald, clean shaven, or shorter beard, and traditional Afghan dress, either blue, brown, or tan. One Marine sought authority to engage because he believed this male(s) matched the description of a potential ISIS-K suicide bomber provided by intelligence sources/reporting.

Hostile Forces

USFOR-A FWD CMD can attack AQ, ISIS-K, Persons DPH, Taliban/Haqqani threatening US operations



PID:

Must be established prior to engaging a target. PID is defined as a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a legitimate military target IAW the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and these ROE. PID must be based on current vetted intelligence and/or direct observation.



ENGAGE: NO

The above description and behavior attributed to the potential ISIS-K bomber are not a sufficient basis to conclude to a reasonable certainty the observed male(s) were ISIS-K and part of a declared hostile force. The description was vague and many males in the canal area matched these physical characteristics. Behavior revealed no indications they were part of a hostile force.

CONCLUSION

Observed males could not PID as part of ISIS-K and a request to attack would not be supported by ROE or LOAC

0099, 4/26/24

CENTCOM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - APPLICATION

Enclosure 08

NEO AT HKIA – 13 AUG – 31 AUG 2021

CENTCOM
OPROD/ROE
published

Taliban Partner with
US to execute NEO


Taliban Assist at
Abbey Gate

Taliban Occupy
Positions of Tactical
Advantage around
Abbey Gate

CMD Adjust ROE
for Taliban

CMD Constrain
Defense of Others

Taliban Violence
against Civilians



USCENTCOM OPORD 31, MOD 1 13 AUG 2021

3.E.3.A.1. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Hostile Forces** – USFOR-A FWD CMD can attack AQ, ISIS-K, Persons DPH, **Taliban/Haqqani** threatening US operations

3.B. Based on Assigned Mission, Commanders determine level of force required

USCENTCOM FOIA 24-0171

Commanders instruct Marines Taliban are now partners and cannot be engaged except in self defense – hostile act, display hostile intent; can't fight Taliban and execute NEO

5.E. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a **Defense of Others** – US Persons, US Contractors, Afghan Gov Officials, Contractors or Civilians in support of US Ops, NGOs, USEK HN Civilian, Designated Evacuees, Civilians assisting NEO

3.B. Based on Assigned Mission, Commanders determine level of force required

3.E. Minimize Civilian Casualties

Commanders constrain defense of others because intervention with Taliban could result in open combat at Gate and status of persons unclear

0100, 4/26/24



Exhibits Register AGI Supplemental Review – 22JAN24

ENCLOSURE 01 - Recommendation Cover Memo - Supplemental Review (11 JAN 24) Signed by MG Curtis

ENCLOSURE 01A - Recommendation Cover Memo - Supplemental Review

ENCLOSURE 02A - K4 Memo to F3 to On Supplementary Interviews (20 AUG 23)

ENCLOSURE 02B - Original Abbey Gate AR 15-6 Appointment Memorandum, 18 September 2021

ENCLOSURE 03 - Abbey Gate Supplemental Review Extension Request and Approval

ENCLOSURE 04 - Executive Summary - Supplemental Review (11 JAN 24)

ENCLOSURE 05 - Rogers - McCaul Abbey Gate Briefing Follow-Up

ENCLOSURE 06 - Investigative Chronology

ENCLOSURE 07 - MFR - WIA Interview Contacts

ENCLOSURE 08 - ROE Crosswalk

ENCLOSURE 09 – ENCLOSURE REGISTER Supplemental Review (23FEB24)

ENCLOSURE 10- Exhibits Register Supplemental Review (as of 23FEB24)



CUI

Exhibits Register AGI Supplemental Review – 22JAN24

- S001 – (OPEN SOURCE) "The Bridge" Podcast 16SEP22, 1 hour 35 min
- S002 – (OPEN SOURCE) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC Testimony C-SPAN, 8MAR23
- S003 – (OPEN SOURCE) Shawn Ryan Show #68 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 31JUL23, 5+ hours
- S004 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- 2/1
- S005 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S006 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- Member
- S007 – INTERVIEW – Follow-up Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S008 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S009 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Co, 2/1
- S010 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Weapons (Wpns) Co, 2/1
- S011 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
- S012 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S013 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S014 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S015 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Engineer, E Co, 2/1
- S016 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Team Leader, Golf Co, 2/1
- S017 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Co, 2/1
- S018 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
- S019 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
- S020 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) S3 Ops Section Member, 2/1
- S021 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Plt, Golf Co, 2/1
- S022 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Platoon (Plt), Golf Co, 2/1
- S023 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1/4
- S024 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (COC) Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO)
- S025 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
- S026 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (XO), 2/1
- S027 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (IO) SNCO
- S028 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Corpsman, G Co, 2/1
- S029 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
- S030 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
- S031 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
- S032 – INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) BN Team member
- S033 – 220204 Background Info on Abbey Gate Bomber_Final VJ2 Approved_v3
- S034 – 1 to 1 Comparison
- S035 – (b)(3) 3024 Bomber quick look
- S036 – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S037 – INTERVIEW - (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 4th Plt Sgt, Echo Co, 2/1
- S038 – (b)(1)1.4c
- S039 – Picture – (b)(1)1.4c
- S040 – (b)(1)1.4c
- S041 – (b)(1)1.4c
- S042 – Picture – (b)(1)1.4c
- S043 – (b)(1)1.4c
- S044 – S2 Digital Data Recovery and Destruction MFR
- S045 – Phone INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Production and Analysis Chief, 24th MEU Command Element
- S046 – Phone INTERVIEW – (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S047 – Picture – (b)(6)

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S048 – Picture – [REDACTED]
S049 – Picture – [REDACTED]
S050 – Picture – [REDACTED] (b)(6)
S051 – Picture – [REDACTED]
S052 – Picture – [REDACTED]
S053 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
S054 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
S055 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
S056 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Echo Co, 2/1
S057 – 24 MEU S2 Fusion WO Statement
S058 – (OPEN SOURCE) HFAC Goldstar Family Roundtable, 29 August 2023
S059 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
S060 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) S2 Intelligence Section, 2/1
S061 – Follow-up Phone Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) S2 Intelligence Section, 2/1
S062 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
S063 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
S064 – Running Estimate OSJA 13 AUG 21
S065 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Wpns Co, 2/1
S066 – Sniper Picture 26AUG21
S067 – Footbridge late 25AUG21
S068 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG 21AUG21
S069 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG 22AUG21
S070 – (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED] OBSLOG 23AUG21
S071 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG 26AUG21
S072 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG 24AUG21
S073 – V2/1 Outflow timeline
S074 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG 22AUG21 Continued
S075 – (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED] OBSLOG 21AUG21 Continued
S076 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG date unknown
S077 – [REDACTED] OBSLOG date unknown 2
S078 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (Cdr), 2/1
S078A – MFR (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - MFR Interview (15 DEC)
S079 – Sniper Tower Moments before blast
S080 – Sniper Tower 26AUG21 Afternoon
S081 – Sniper Tower 26AUG21 morning towards water tower
S082 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) BN Team Member
S083 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (CHD),
 Marine Operations Group - Central
S084 – Sniper Tower pre-perimeter shift
S085 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a
 [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a
S086 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a
 [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a
S087 – INTERVIEW – [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1
S088 – [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c (OPIR 20-23AUG21)
S089 – Interview Availability - Wounded Abbey Gate
S090 – Chatsurfer ISR Coordination room
S091 – MFR – (b)(1)1.4c picture files from 1/4
S092 – Sniper tower to Chevron view
S093 – MFR (b)(3)3024 (b)(3)3024 photo analysis Abbey Gate Extraneous Individual
S094 – [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c picture of bag in parking lot movement
S095 – Abbey Corridor map with locations
S096 – MFR - SD Card photos from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c
S097 – [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c
S098 – Suspected IED Bag 1
S099 – Suspected IED Bag 2

CUI

CUI

- S100 – Suspected IED Bag 3
- S101 – Past Chevron night 22AUG 0950
- S102 – INTERVIEW – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S103 – INTERVIEW – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S104 – MFR – Supplemental Review INTEL Assessment
- S105 – MFR – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Picture
- S106 – MFR – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SD Card FOLDER
- S107 – MFR – Pictures Submitted by interviewees FOLDER
- S108 – MFR – Pictures from [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c FOLDER
- S109 – INTERVIEW – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S110 – INTERVIEW – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- S111 – AR 15-6 Investigation attack at Abbey Gate (Original digital library)
- S112* – [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c - [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c Overall Classification: (S//NF)
- S113* – [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c Dated 121825Z OCT 21 (Overall Classification: (S//NF))
- S114 – 24th MEU Chatsurfer Log
- S115 – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Navy Comm with C
- S116 – [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Combat Action Ribbon Denied

- S155 – INTERVIEW - [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Co, 21

*NOTE - EXIBITS S112, S113 AND S117 THROUGH 154 ARE AVAILABLE IN TS-ANNEX

CUI

Exhibit S001 – Open Source Transcript

The Bridge – The true story about the evacuation of Kabul, Afghanistan

Located at: <https://youtube.com/watch?v=V24WSED1oHs>

Exhibit S002 – Open Source Transcript

C-SPAN – House Hearing on U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 8 March 2023

Located at:

<https://c-span.org/video/?526440-1/house-hearing-us-withdrawal-afghanistan>

Exhibit S003 – Open Source- Transcript

The Shawn Ryan Show, Episode #68

Located at: <https://shawnryanshow.com/blogs/the-shawn-ryan-show/68-tyler>



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ACCG-SR

10 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

1. On October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel in (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answers (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is used and when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answers a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is used. When both individuals answer, Both is used to denote the answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. Both interviewees were afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Are you guys paying attention to the social media regarding this at all?

(2) Answer. Both: No, sir. We have been trying to stay away from anything like that.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question. C1: Can you give me some background on how you got to where you are now?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Two or three months before I got out, I came and got my dog. Then I went to wounded warrior for two weeks, checked out, then left and got out. After that I started my business training dogs. All different kinds of training, regular obedience, service dog, and hopefully expanding to police and military. The training these dogs we received get is about a year all together, then a month with us. Then we come back 6 months later to make sure everything is still good. We were lucky that this company knew the base commander at Pendelton which trickled down through wounded warrior.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes, I found out through him. I am currently at wounded warrior, and am waiting on my med board to hopefully get out this coming February. I came out last year for the gala to get introduced to the organization, and I met my dog about a month ago so we have been training for the last month. I got the leash handed to me on Saturday and we get the Assisive Dogs International test out soon.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: What's it like the first time you meet the dog?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It's a relief. I haven't been in public since everything happened. I get groceries and everything on base. Even if the commissary is crowded, I go back to the barracks until its less crowded. Since getting my dog I can go in Target and he picks up on cues. He helps me with his energy. The gala last year was one of the worst things, I stayed in the back corner the whole time because I was uneasy.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: Is it hard to be in a room like this?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Just a bit hard since I haven't talked to anyone except my (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about this.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: A lot of service members think this is a bit cathartic for them, getting to speak about it.

(2) Answer. Both: Yeah.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: What was both of your both what position in 2/1?

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Co, 2/1 Marines.

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was Echo company, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was Golf Company, 1st platoon, designated marksmen. My weapon got a bigger scope and suppressor on it. My suppressor broke during training, so everyone knew when I was going.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: So (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tell me about being the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was essentially the (b)(6) until SSgt Hoover was KIA. I had been acting (b)(6) prior to that, during our work up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because SSgt Hoover was at Infantry Unit Leader course. The whole platoon was training and I was helping to run ranges. I had just PCSed back into the fleet after four years in the Marine Security Guard (MSG). Then I was back for a month and a half before being the acting (b)(6) Then after the fact was just taking over and making sure the guys were okay. I always put them first. I knew Hoover from before I joined the MSG.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Talk about training and timeline leading up to this? Starting with indicators you might be going to HKIA?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We deployed in April to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d as a standby/security element. It wasn't until mid-August that everything started happening. We got word on and off that we were going, we weren't going, etc. We did some squad and platoon attacks as training. Then we flew to (b)(1)1.4d and it was the same back and forth about going or not. We were there for two or three days before we went from there to Afghanistan. We were only in Afghanistan for around 7-10 days, so we probably flew in between the 16th and the 18th.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st Platoon was kind of split. We were on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d 1st Platoon was all there, we would get debriefed on the situation of Afghanistan. End of July we got pulled back to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d. From (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d we were on standby, we did an unknown distance range shoot. Once we got the call, we were put on standby. We got everything packed up and just waited, day by day. We watched, I believe it was, 2nd or third platoon leave first. We were the last to push into Afghanistan. It was about 3-4 days after the first group that we left. Once we got to HKIA, we were prepared for chaos based on drone feeds we had seen. When we got there it was relaxed, people were walking around without Kevlars, it almost felt like a regular base moving gear around. There was no one on the Tarmac at the time.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: What was it like when you arrived (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. We landed and figured out where we were going, it ended up being the gym. We brought our non lethals there and left some one to watch it, then found our packs and MREs. We got into it a little bit with 1/8 for trying to steal our MREs. Then we went back to the gym and huddled to figure out our game plan. Then that morning, or the next, we went to Abbey Gate. Inside the airport the tarmac wasn't super chaotic. But then when we got to Abbey Gate it was more Chaotic.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: When do you show up to Abbey?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. If we landed in the 16-18th, we probably slept the first night then the following morning we went to Abbey Gate.

(b)(3)130b. The following day that we showed up to HKIA, we looked around a bit then got pushed into the defense to relieve weapons platoon because they were stretched thin. We sat there for a while, then got pushed to the terminal where evacuees were being ticketed then we would take them to planes. WE stayed there for a while before the company was split, then we would rotate to different areas. There was a comfort area, one time we were pushed out to there to make sure everything was okay before the evacuees were pushed to terminals. From my understanding they were cleared at Abbey Gate, then processed at the comfort area, then they were bussed to the terminals. It was like a giant triangle. Over there by the East Gate there were guys trying to jump the fence line. We would end up catching the guys who would jump the fence and turn them over to the Afghan police. We didn't go to Abbey Gate, I would say, until the 20th or the 22nd. Then Companies would just rotate. We would be there overnight, get relieved, then rotate on and off with Golf.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: East and North Gate end up closing. Did you ever get eyes on North Gate?

(2) Answer. Both: No.

C1: That explains why East Gate was closed because of the geography and difficulty of processing. North Gate was closed due to the VBIED threat.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any RoE training predeployment? Likely from legal staff on the right to defend yourself, hostile act, etc?

(2) Answer. Both: Yes.

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 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(b)(3)130b We did ours, I can't remember if it was in our barracks common area or our classroom, prior to deployment. Then before we went to Afghanistan, we went over it again. The one before deployment, our company received that training. The one before we went into Afghanistan it was a refresher for platoons/companies at the same time. It was examples like "if the Taliban has a gun, you can't just shoot him" because we were trying to work with them.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Why do you think the Taliban wanted to partner with us? It was definitely a weird situation.

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b. Just so we would get out of there. It was hard to watch, like the Taliban beating a pregnant woman. But you just have to turn around and walk away.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: That's a tremendous, professional amount of restraint in an unpleasant situation. That according to the RoE, Marines could have done something but didn't, why do you think that restraint was happening?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b. Because we were told to.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think an escalation would have continued and resulted in a firefight with Taliban?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b. Yeah, we knew they had four or five machine gun positions on hills surrounding the airport. The Taliban didn't like when we would touch the women to move them, so we all had the understanding that if we got into a gunfight, we could get killed quickly between machine guns and mortars around HKIA.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talk to me about your RoE training?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b. We had a company meeting prior to deployment, then we did another meeting with Hoover and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, after that about hostile act, hostile intent, deadly force etc. It trickled down from there and squad leaders did the same thing with their squads. When we were assigned to the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we were pulled in by the ADJ and discussed RoE again, especially on ship. Before we departed, SSgt Hoover and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, interviewed people individually to ensure everyone understood the RoE. Then before we went to Afghanistan we went through the same process before we left, just to make sure everyone understood.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: I like that technique.

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. Yes, everyone we had was pretty young. Our gunny was older than me, but I was the next oldest at (b)(3)130b so we were just trying to be sure about everyone understanding. Essentially, that's what we went through until we departed

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think most people understand what we mean when we say RoE, right to self defense, etc?

(2) Answer. Both: Most people understood when you say RoE.

(b)(3)130b. One thing about RoE, after the explosion, once we got into the defense in the inner gate, the RoEs changed. Once they closed Abbey Gate, and our defense was facing the canal we were told that RoE had changed.

*Brief pause to have an orientation to the unclassified map of Abbey Gate to confirm a common lexicon of geography on the ground. The corridors, the chevron, the baron hotel, were all discussed.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: How did they change?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. They said anybody that came over the wall was hostile. It was no longer shout, show, shove, shoot. It became shout and then if they didn't stop, shoot. The building tops and people coming over the wall was our main focus.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Who did the snipers augment?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. They were our eyes up and let us know what they could see.

(b)(3)130b. They could also see the other side of the canal, people walking around there. I remember a report of a military aged male, an RPG, and an M16 with a M203 slung on his back. I remember that a day or two prior to the explosion.

(b)(3)130b. I remember that too.

v. Question and Answer 21.

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 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question. C1: We have been told of 50-60 threat steams, and at times those were described as imminent. At times there were threats about VBIEDs, SVESTs. Do you remember any specifically?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Oh yeah. In the first few days it was VBIEDs, after that it was SVESTs. I remember the chevron was set up because of the vbied threat and to help with the people pushing in. Then we had several svests, until the one that was believed to have done it. The younger male and the older male with the bag.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember where that report came from?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I think that morning when we swapped out, our [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us about that threat. I just remember it was middle aged man in an orange-ish man dress that was clean shaven. He was with an older gentleman that had a backpack [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. Then after we swapped, we halted and pretty much kneeled behind the wall and kept a low profile, not letting anyone in. We did that for a couple hours maybe, then we went back to normal.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: That was mitigation and lowing your profile because of the threat?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Yes, that wall was about waist high so we took a knee behind that and then didn't move much. Even the guys in the outer corridor got behind jersey barriers.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: Before threat mitigation measures, what does you guys getting info look like?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Before that one big one, from what I know [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were talking to other Platoon Sergeants and Platoon Commanders while we were resting or working in the inner corridor.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Generally, you would hear about threats through your NCO leadership?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Yes, usually it was the platoon sergeant and platoon commander briefing us. We would usually be all huddled beforehand, but if we were working on the

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canal we would push it down the line. The platoon commander and platoon sergeant would go up and down the line to confirm the word.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were you doing the same?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We would get info from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and SSgt Hoover. We were working at the search point along with the FET team most of the time. We had comms on us, but the (b)(1)1.4g was setup on the connex by us so I couldn't get comms whatsoever. Then leading up to that time when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mentioned the low profile, we were also all told to get in. After that happened, I remember a bag tried to get thrown over the c-wire in the inner corridor and it got caught at the top. I pushed everyone away from that and we stayed low profile until EOD came over and assessed that it was nonthreat before pushing it back over.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). That inner area was mostly used for holding, searches, and rechecks before being escorted to the next area.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what are you doing as a leader to keep your Marines protected given the threats at the time?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I would stagger all my guys with the Jersey Barriers. I know my guys always wanted to protect the civilians, so my guys always put themselves between the jersey barriers and the civilians. When I would pull a group to escort back to the inner gate, we would usually do another hasty search and use an interpreter to ask them if they had anything they weren't allowed to have. Then I'd give them a last chance to show us before escorting them in.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Do you feel like leaders were doing everything to protect service members?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Platoon commander and platoon sergeant, yes. Above that, I don't know. The higher were often in the airconditioned room conducting meetings at the Barron Hotel. The platoon commander and PSG were out there the whole time.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Agreed. It was a rare occasion to see them out there. The platoon commander and platoon sergeant were out there checking on us, seeing if the evacuees were getting hostile. Especially the males. If the platoon commander or platoon sergeant saw that, they would usually handle that. Especially if we had to turn a male or family away because Department of State was trash and never showed up. At one point I remember

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 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

the outer corridor was full of people with the correct paper work who we couldn't process because Department of State wasn't there.

G: I remember Department of State would leave every night. We would have it working nice, then they would leave. That's when evacuees would get hostile, even swing at us, and we might have to kick them out even if they had the right paper work.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Would that happen a lot?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We had people grab our muzzles and stick it in their mouth and tell us to shoot them.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) A lot of time we would search them, and take them by the inner gate at which point the Department of State would decide they might be a no go. At that point, the evacuees, especially the females, they wanted us to kill them.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They knew they would be raped and killed.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Taliban had a checkpoint, and they knew to watch for anyone that was kicked back out.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: We hadn't heard of that, so you tried to kick them out where the Taliban couldn't see them?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yeah, even on our side of the horseshoe there was a Taliban guy sitting there. The ones pushed out were either beaten or executed. We had one guy tell us he was going to get caught, then right as soon as he was kicked out he got hit in the head with a metal pole.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Taliban out there would shoot a few rounds in the air, if someone didn't listen the Taliban would shoot them.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Taliban would stand on top of the connexes, and watch who went in and who was kicked out. They had their own comms up there, and you could hear the difference between a three round warning shot and a single shot.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: You saw people executed?

(2) Answer. Both: Yes.

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Multiple, more than one.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There was an area that you could see past the connex and you could see handgun or rifle executions.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the horseshoe, we had an area we maintained so people couldn't just push in. 30 yards out there was a Taliban truck with five or six people on it. If someone didn't listen to them you seem them shoot, you see the splatter, then they drop. You saw that all day long. I worked that spot for about three hours, before rotating. I probably witnessed seven or eight. We couldn't do anything about it except look the other way. The sniper tower was watching them execute people there all day.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Which tower?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The sniper tower. Everyone knows (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he told us all day he had seen people executing people and you don't believe it until you work that spot and you can see it.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: So you would pass info to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)? Did the other snipers talk about it as well?

(2) Answer. No, you would just see it when he would come down and talk. I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from before, so it was mostly just him.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1: Did you hear the same (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes, I heard the same from the tower. I would walk back and forth to talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and SSgt Hoover, and SSgt Hoover always talked to the tower. He would tell me that the tower could see them executing people. Hoover and I were pissed, we didn't know why we were working with those guys.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They weren't just outside, they were also in the canal. There was a guy with a red hat and stick and cane hitting people in the canal by the jersey barrier. We lured him in and took that from him, he was upset about that. Then there was another one or two guys right inside the chevron that would use his AK as a baseball bat and would just smash people with that. Sometimes there would be little meetings, with two or three Taliban present. And we knew sometimes there were more than that around, mixed into the crowd, based on how they would interact with the Taliban around. There would be a group with the right paper work and they would go talk to the Taliban, and if anyone else had done that they would have gotten hit.

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jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me again about the intel with the two males that were together? Did either of you physically see them?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) briefed us on that. I never saw them, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me he saw them, apparently they were far side and further down before they were lost in the crowd. Those two guys were supposed to be together, the older guy was there in case the younger one was too chicken. The older guy was probably the coach, slash the second guy to clack it off if he doesn't.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: Are you tracking that at all (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Not at the time, I was too involved with searching and escorting in and out of the canal to bring them in or out.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever get photos of intelligence information?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For me, no. It was so long ago, I just remember being told the orange man dress and the younger, clean shaven suicide bomber.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any suspicious individuals ever stick out to you?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There were a few we had incidents with. A few in their 20s that would jump in, or out, just to toy with you. They would run along the wall and try not to get caught.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's a dangerous game to play, any one ever tempted to shoot em?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To shoot them? No.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you say highers, you mean the company commanders and up?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes, we didn't see them.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I saw him at least once.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They would come every once in a great while and then they would disappear for a little bit. They would talk to the platoon sergeants or the platoon commanders. My platoon was always working along the canal, we didn't have contact until after the explosion the (b)(6) stopped me from firing at the Taliban on the connexes.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They would disseminate info at the base of the tower. Our (b)(6) would rove up and down and check on all the guys. He would get called to the Barron Hotel sometimes, then come back. That's the highest I usually saw. After the explosion I think I saw the (b)(6), almost frozen.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You had to have, he got a purple heart.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I came out afterwards and kind of collapsed, so I think I saw him in that area by the sniper tower. But that's as much as I saw of him. As far as the BOLO, Golf Company was on the canal and Echo Company was in the inner corridor. My platoon was closest to the sniper tower, before we were rotated to the middle of inner corridor to rest. I was going to go help out, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me about the BOLO so to be careful. We had interpreters with us, we were trying to get their families in but because of the (b)(1)1.4g our (b)(6) couldn't reach (b)(6) on the cellphone. I would walk out to look for them. I remember talking to SSgt Hoover about what a mess it was. The last thing SSgt Hoover and I said to each other was that anyone in that crowd could clack something off and we wouldn't know it.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever hear about a test run for an SVEST or an explosion like a kilometer away?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You wouldn't hear an explosion that far away. It would sound like a flash bang or a warning shot from the (b)(1)1.4d

rr. Question and Answer 43.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sound would echo in that corridor, right?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It would definitely echo. At night the Taliban were firing on the Afghan Police so you would hear those explosions as well.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Was it frustrating when you get a 'be on the lookout for' (BOLO) to see a lot of people fitting the same description? How do you handle that?

(2) Answer. Both: Yes. Definitely.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For me, some people matched the description but weren't clean shaven. Then some people had been there for a day or two and didn't change much. The most change was inside the canal, versus the people sitting on the wall across the canal. It was easier to hand paperwork from the canal, as opposed to someone across trying to show us it so there were more people pushing.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: Would you have taken someone out if they had matched the BOLO?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It depends. I wouldn't shoot immediately, but if I can gauge that it was the correct person and I could see any threat like wires coming out of that bag, I would. As we said, they look the same and dress alike, so you could mess it up. If it had been the pair, the older gentlemen could have still cacked it off, but the projectiles might have gone another direction, instead of directly into the Marines.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: Are you worried about collateral damage?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am more worried about the Marines around me, than I am about a civilian near a threat. It would be better to lose one than the 13 Marines.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was communicated that you could take that shot?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That was my understanding of hostile act/hostile intent. I would have taken the shot.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It would be a personal decision at the time, it would either be me or him. If it was the right call, I would do it every day and twice on Sunday.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think restraint might have prevented the bomber from being removed prior to the event?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I can't really say.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That would be a hard one to decipher.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: But you feel clear that if you saw hostile act and hostile intent, you wouldn't need to ask permission?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Correct.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It would be something you report up, its something you couldn't know one hundred percent unless you saw the bomb or behaviors that looked like the crowd was distancing himself from that individual. A significant anomaly like that in the crowd. But there were hundreds of people in the crowd, it was like looking for a needle in a haystack. I would look for descriptions in the crowd, or things that stuck out like overly cleanliness or if their clothes weren't stained from the canal. That's what I was looking for, but I was also looking for our (b)(6) so we could get her family out.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's the hard part. You're looking for the BOLO but you're tasked to do other things. It stays in the back of your head. They usually teach you that people will clear away from the bomber or you will hear him yell, but nothing like that happened before the explosion. It was the normal sounds, and then after that it was just silence.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1: Did either of you see the bomber?

(2) Answer. Both: No, but we felt it.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I remember looking down the canal, then I just remember being on my back.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: Okay, so both of you didn't see the bomber ahead of time. The night of the 25th we know the crowds swelled due to the closure of other gates. If you're an Afghan, you know that Abbey Gate is the only choice, so they try to avoid the Taliban. The night of the 25th, the Marines along the near side of the canal collapse back from the foot bridge to the jersey barrier, do you remember that?

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I remember that. We worked with Echo during that. We had riot shields at the far end, and we were holding people back way out there, but people kept jumping over. At one point, 10 of us were cut off so we had to fight to link back up. After that, we started to work our way back toward the Sniper Tower.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: Exactly, the crowd was exponentially larger and it became difficult to maintain that line. What was the mood of the crowd at this point, they are becoming more desperate?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. They got very desperate, to the point where men would offer their children to let us in. Some men offered their wives or daughters as sexual favors to let them in. Or someone would jump over, then fight to avoid being thrown back into the canal. Twenty minutes before the explosion I was almost pulled into the canal by someone trying to get up.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: That's hostile act and you could have fired on that individual, but you chose not to?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. At that point, I just didn't want to touch that water. I just used them as stepping stones to get back to our guys.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How often did people get pulled over like that?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. Just me. It was just a weird thing. I was on a knee to help a guy and got pulled from my other side.

T: None from Echo.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Did anyone try to grab your weapon?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b. Not that time, but other times. I remember one guy blindsided me in the face, then when I turned, he was using his daughter as a shield.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you at the time of the blast?

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). On the ground, behind the canal wall near the base of the sniper tower.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I was near the original hole in the fence, near the u-shaped barrier with our (b)(6) (b)(6) at the time.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1: Where are you looking when the blast goes off?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I am looking down the canal, in the direction of the blast. Looking for the dad of the (b)(6).

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). It was weird, at the time there was a family sitting against the fence behind me. A male, a wife, and some children. I turned around and looked at them. Right as I turned back to look at the canal, the blast went off. I was mid turning back, so I didn't see the guy.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1: Have you seen the blast video?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Which one? The drone footage? Where you see everyone running from the blast? Or the one from the go pro by the truck?

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1: If there is a drone video of the blast, I would love to see it. But I mean the go pro video.

(2) Answer. Both: Yes, we have seen it on social media.

*Clarifies in the brief, that the drone video is what was shown during the Abbey Gate Press Brief.

(b)(6) One of our KIA had a go pro, Nikoui, but when we got it back it was wiped.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: Time of the blast, what happens?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Right when the blast hit, I was thrown almost against the fence. (b)(6) so I was confused for a second. Then I got on a knee against the wall, and I saw my squad leader go past with his pant leg on fire from his radio exploding. (b)(6) then I breathed in gas from a CS cannister, and thought it was dirty bomb so I figured I was dead. Then I looked around,

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 [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

and I noticed a guy by the water tower and saw a guy in a green man dress shoot towards us. There were multiple people up there, but I remember his green man dress. He was shooting, but my blood filled my scope and [redacted] (b)(6) so I couldn't get a clear shot. He was up, then down fairly quickly. Then I looked and saw a KIA next to me, I tried to pull him but [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I tried to walk back in then I saw the Taliban on the connex and tried to get my rifle up with one hand before my [redacted] (b)(6) stopped me. I went inside the gate, threw my Kevlar off and went to the tent in there and got patched up. What I know is that a couple of boots were in there, so I walked them through bandaging me up.

Then I went to my CCP, but it was right in the open so, I didn't want to stand there. I walked over to the wall and went to hold security there before being told that I was being medevacked. I was told to stay there.

I took a couple of [redacted] (b)(6) and took some shrapnel in my [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) and some in my [redacted] (b)(6) There was a big one by my [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then three little ones higher up. I didn't see my flak, I don't know if my stuff was ever recovered. My [redacted] (b)(6) is a little messed up from being thrown and my [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6)

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1: Who was the KIA right next to you?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I have been trying to figure that out for two years. It was one of the bigger guys, so I'm guessing it was Sanchez because I remember Lopez and Page were a bit heated with each other right before the blast a little further towards the jersey barrier.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. C1: The guy in green, what do you think he's firing at?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It looked like he was firing at us. I could see impacts, but I only heard a ringing at the time. It looked like the impacts were hitting the ground around the sniper tower and the fence. I remember when I came through the fence, I was the only one there at the time.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was he shooting?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was aimed from the shoulder.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question. C1: Do you know if Marines were firing at that location?

(2) Answer. I did find that out after the fact, and I remember that I saw him impacted by something through my scope. I had blood in my scope, I couldn't get an accurate shot myself.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what do you remember?

(2) Answer. I was in that area by the canal wall near the original hole in the fence. I was with our (b)(6) and we were looking down in the direction by the sniper tower.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what injuries did you have?

(2) Answer. I have (b)(6). I am still recovering. (b)(6)
(b)(6) still. I am at (b)(6)
(b)(6)

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1: You both have a Purple Heart? Do you feel like you are getting good help from the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Both: Yes.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am (b)(6)
(b)(6)

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember anyone around you at the time?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing Rosariopichardo. (b)(6)
(b)(6) Once the blast happened, and I got up, I couldn't believe what just happened. It was like time slowed down, and everything was completely silent. Then my ears started ringing, I got up on a knee and put the (b)(6) (b)(6) behind me. Then I stood up, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked at me and told me to get down, (b)(6) I took a knee, and looked in the direction of the

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

blast. I saw bodies just piled. I saw Marines around me taking a knee in like a half circle. I remember hearing shots. I saw two rounds skip off the ground next to me. Then I saw the CS Gas. Right after I saw the rounds, I called contact and I look and saw what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw. The building with the water tower and the individuals up there, which is the first time we saw people there. That's when I called contact, and I don't know if the Marines returned fire there.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1: We assessed the shots fired post blast during the initial investigation. There was Marine Recon firing at a suspicious individual and the (b)(1)1.4d were firing warning shots.

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I knew the (b)(1)1.4d were firing warning shots the whole time, I didn't know about the Marine Recon.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I didn't know about other shots, other than those individuals I saw firing.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1: Please, continue with your account (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). After I called contact, I saw gas pluming up. I called "Gas, Gas, Gas" so I was yelling and telling people to get out. We all had masks on us, but the gas was affecting everyone so they couldn't carry out their function and I was worried about a secondary detonation. I was yelling at everyone to get out. Marines started running past me to get out of the hole behind me. Then I take a deep breath, and I try to pull my gas mask out while staggering forward. Then I was overcome by the CS Gas and realized I would do more harm than good at that point. As many times as I had practiced putting my gas mask on, I couldn't even get the Velcro open and I was staggering around. Then I turn back around, and see some one lying there so I reach down with one hand and drag them forward with me. My eyes started to water and I keep going out the fence. Once I reach the U-Shape barrier, I take a knee and I think it's the Taliban. I looked and just saw the Taliban laughing on the Chevron. After that I get up and start running back to the outer gate, and it feels like I almost lose consciousness. I fall down half way, and get myself back up. Then I run past the outer gate, and there was a stack of tall Jersey Barriers by the sniper tower and I ran and took a knee there. I saw a Sgt there and he looks at me and asks if I'm okay. I remember seeing someone with an arm wound, but everything was blurry and I couldn't see. I get a bottle of water and spray my eyes and take 30 seconds to gather myself. Then I ran back into the canal to help out.

When I went back to the canal, I went through the original hole. You could just see everything. You had dead kids, there was a mom and a baby. The mom was missing her face, the baby was missing his head. I get into security at that point. Everyone was trying to evacuate, but we didn't have security on the jersey barrier by the sniper tower

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

and canal wall and I put myself there (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came by and told me to get accountability of the platoon. I ran from the outer gate to the inner gate. We originally had some tents where we would muster, I ran all the way there and got accountability. Then I ran back, but I bumped into our corpsman there who told me about Hoover. I began my run back to the Sniper Tower, and at that point I can't remember anything. I couldn't remember the counts, and when I get to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I can't remember. He told me later he looked at me and my eyes were dilated. At the time, he just told me he needs those counts. I ran back again, so I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I grabbed a junior Marine, and told him he needs to remember the count for me since I can't. We run back to the sniper tower, give the count, then we go back to the canal to the same corner and pull security.

Once we are there I called for more security. I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came near my backside and I gave them sectors of fire. I distinctly remember a 40-50 year old Afghan male with a construction reflector vest who was directly across from where I was pulling security, on the far side of the canal. I was wondering why he was wearing that vest at the time, and I remember him pulling out a phone and capturing images of the blast area. I was thinking secondary, and I pick up my weapon and start screaming at him and looking for something to throw at him since he is ignoring me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shows up, and I tell him what's going on and he joins me in yelling. When the Afghan man saw us, he looked surprised, and just left. From there, everyone was doing mass casualty triage. I hear them behind me talking about who's dead and what help people behind me need. I remember just pulling security, and my vision coming and going as I am sitting there. I remember seeing bodies near the jersey barriers, one guy with his entrails hanging out of his stomach, asking for help. I couldn't do anything.

It's one of those things that pisses you off that people don't understand what you go through, but on the other hand its not something you wish on anybody. By that time, the crowd had dispersed, there were bodies floating in the water, and there were bodies near the jersey barriers, but the whole area had cleared out except for the dead, wounded, or a few people trying to pull wounded from the water. They pulled me from the wall, and I was the last one to be pulled because I didn't want to leave anyone there, and I went back through the new hole in the fence before they closed Abbey Gate and we went into the defense.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: Are there times after that blast that you don't remember, but talking to people who were there has helped you put together those memories?

(2) Answer. Both: Yes, oh yeah.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The moments right after the blast I remember, but I'm learning new things about what I did in the corridor. I remember distinctly walking through the guys patching me up, and I remember kicking one guys foot and head butting the back of his Kevlar.

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 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the blast, yes. My roommate, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says he checked me over. I don't remember seeing him. There were periods I remember not knowing things. I remember collapsing by the (b)(1)1.4a truck, and ran in and that's when he asked if I was okay but I don't remember seeing him.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The memory thing is the worst part. For the first month, I had a hard time remembering my own name and had to take out my ID to check if someone asked me.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yeah, at the time after the blast (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted me to get checked out, but we had lost SSgt Hoover and our guys needed a platoon sergeant. I remember our corpsman coming to try and check me out, but I told him to get away from me, because I wasn't leaving. I was angry, I still get angry sometimes.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many times have you deployed?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Once, to Abbey Gate.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Twice with 3/5 to Okinawa and the Phillipines. Once with MSG to Yaounde, Camaroon in West Africa. From there, I had then 10 mini deployments for VIP security to embassies. Then to Afghanistan.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you received the RoE briefs was it all verbal or did you get cards?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was all verbal and PowerPoint.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told you he positively identified someone, when did that happen, after the fact?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes. At the time, he told us about the executions happening. The only time I saw that was when I was working at the Chevron. He told me about the positive ID after the fact, it was a while ago. I don't exactly remember when.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When is the last time you spoke to him? And who else do you speak to in order to help you remember what happened?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I spoke to him probably two weeks ago. After the blast I had received treatment, and I remember we drove to meet them when they got stateside.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

That's when people told me somethings that happened. Then when we got to wounded warrior, we would all have cookouts and talk about what happened. I talked mostly to people from my platoon, about 6-7 of us. We would see each other at appointments and then just kind of talk.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When we talk about RoE, you talked about the individual with the red hat, so you could have acted based on the RoE that you had mentioned. But you just took the cane and the stick from him. Did you radio that in?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): We passed it down, but we didn't have a radio. He didn't pose a threat to us, he didn't ever pull out his handgun. He only hit the civilians, we didn't request or think to engage.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6): A lot of trying to pass it would be hard for us, because we were in the area of that (b)(1)1.4g near the base of the sniper tower so we couldn't get communications.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there an understanding of different RoE at different gates?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): From what I know, the same across the board.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6): It was the same across the board until Abbey Gate had been closed. Once we set into the defense, then the RoE changed as I mentioned.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You mentioned that after the attack your (b)(6) stopped you from engaging?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Yes.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You remember being knocked down after the explosion, then opening your eyes and seeing the man in green, how much time had passed?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): I never went unconscious, it was concussive. Everything was spinning, so it took me a second to collect myself. It could have been seconds but it felt like minutes. Everything was in slow motion.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then after that, you saw the males in the building next to the water tower?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The guy in green was shooting, it seemed to be towards us. I don't remember what the rest of them were doing. I couldn't hear, but I saw the impacts hitting near us.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many shots? What do you think he was aiming at? What did you do?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I don't know, I think he was aiming at us, I couldn't take the shot at the time so I grabbed the guy next to me.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) do you remember seeing that individual? Who was near you at the time?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I remember seeing rounds from him impacting near me. I don't remember who was near me. I remember talking to Hoover near the base of the sniper tower, and talking about how anyone could have cacked something off there. He asked why I was there, I told him we were trying to get the [redacted] (b)(6), he pounded my knuckles and told me to stay safe.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You both mention that, before the attack, you were in the area outside the fence. How long were you there prior to the explosion? During that time, did you ever see anyone out place? Did you go to the sniper tower during that time?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Quite a few hours. No, it was almost the same. For the majority of the time, like I talked about earlier, there were people on the wall on the other side of the canal. You couldn't always see behind them. I didn't go to the sniper tower during that time.

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No I was mostly in the search area that day except for the 15-20 minutes we were looking for our [redacted] (b)(6). Even that was hard, people were shoulder to shoulder, getting trampled and knocked down. By the Sniper Tower, people were pinned to the Jersey Barrier and the fence, which was a spot we were trying to pull people from. I was walking up and down the area looking for [redacted] (b)(6) that whole time outside the fence.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and Cpl

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

(1) Question. C1: How much has social media impacted you about all this?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I stay away from it since the investigation I started. I watched SSgt Hoover's mom and dad's testimony, and even trying to think about or recall those events upsets me. I stay away from anything related to an investigation. I was there. Why do I need to hear from people who weren't there?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I would say not at all. I watched the news when I first got back, and realized they weren't portraying the way it happened. The other guys will send me stuff sometimes. I listened to some of the stories from the gold star families, but that's about it.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. C1: What do you think the media got wrong? Or anything inaccurate from the interviews with the gold star families?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Initially I saw coverage about us playing with children, the only thing I did was escort them to the orphanage or deal with dead ones. That wasn't what we were doing. I don't remember specifics from the gold stars.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. C1: Is there anything else you want to talk about?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was there ever any evidence from that two-story building?

C1: Americans did not exploit that area after Abbey Gate was closed. We think there were three people, but there was no site exploitation as that area was Taliban controlled immediately prior to the departure from Afghanistan and the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 were focused on getting their people from the Barron Hotel and the Americans were focused on the post blast.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was there a secondary device?

C1: No, secondary device oriented at the Americans. Any reason you'd ask that?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Just from seeing that guy in the orange vest after the fact.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. C1: To be clear, is there any potential that those impacts near you were shrapnel and ball bearings as opposed to someone shooting at you?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). It's one of the things that I question myself. I see the impacts near me. I hear some faint gun fire, and I see the impacts. At the time, I call contact, but I

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

never saw someone aim directly at me. I saw those guys on the tower, but not shoot at me. It may have been things falling, bodies parts and shrapnel were falling.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am 100% sure I saw the guy firing from near the tower, it was an AK. I am not 100% sure what he was firing at. There were body parts falling.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you couldn't hear at the time to confirm if there were shots and was the CS gas also affecting your vision?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Correct, I couldn't hear, but I could still see. The CS Gas was affecting my breathing but not my sight.

lll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the time like waiting to get exfilled, were people poking at you? How about that time with the consolidated C5? What was your memory like?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No, it was mostly getting the happy drugs. Once with C5, I was mostly just going to appointments. I had everything written out because my short term memory was ridiculous. I remember the explosion like yesterday, but the days prior I have bits and pieces that I still don't remember.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), you rejected initial treatment, you got redeployed back to (b)(1)1.4d When did you receive treatment?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I wasn't seen until I got to (b)(1)1.4d when my symptoms were getting worse and I couldn't do simple tasks like make a go/no-go roster for something. I would just stare at a screen and wonder what I was doing, or I remember waking up in the middle of the night either dizzy or with a migraine. My balance was off, heading to the gym with my buddy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I would stagger and get tunnel vision. Eventually (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) forced me to get seen by medical and get evaluated.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. C1: Okay. Anything else that you want to share?

(2) Answer. Both: No, sir, that's it.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis at [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231010, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 24. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231010
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

10 OCT 2023
DATE



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 10/10/23, which begins on page 7 and ends on page 26. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

2023 10 10
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

10 OCT 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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ACCG-SR

19 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – E Co 2/1
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

1. On 19 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Because there are multiple interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be referred to as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be referred to as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be referred to as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be referred to as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be referred to as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) reinforced the importance (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) should provide answers based on his personal observation or knowledge and if any information he received was third party.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where are you from and what assignments have you had in the Marines?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and did three deployment to Iraq and three to Afghanistan, one with a MIT team, and I deployed with 1st Light Armor Reconnaissance, and we closed down Camp

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

Leatherneck in 2014. I did one deployment to Okinawa with a MEU. After an assignment at School of Infantry West as a Combat Instructor, I was looking to retire but got orders to 1st Marines and was assigned as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for Echo 2/1. Got to work with a great group of Marines.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What assignments have you had since Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. After deployment I got orders here to Marine Security Guard Security Augmentation Unit. Branch monitor reached out to me because how long I'd been at Pendleton. Basically, told me that if I stayed, I'd be deploying again, so I brought my family and moved here.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you been to Quantico before?

(2) Answer. I came here for a Foreign Disclosure Officer course.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Describe your training and preparation in theater before deploying to HKIA?

(2) Answer. So for Crisis Response, the mission was to be the company to do TRAP missions out of (b)(1)1.4d We were there for three months then moved to Saudi. We got there and started getting word about Afghanistan. Heard it could be NEO. With that we started training non-lethal and working with other elements there in (b)(1)1.4d Trying to figure out what ops would look like. Thought we had a good plan. Obviously, info changed, but the focus was to train the Marines on the basics. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), was to train and make sure they had what they needed. Making sure they had the right ammo and weapons and Pre-packing loads to be on call. That was the focus before we went out there on 15AUG.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Talk about Pre-Deployment at (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. Our gunner at the time tried to help accommodate the ability to simulate the training scenario, so we did non-lethal packages. We went to (b)(1)1.4d We did room clearing and machine guns. Mainly making sure the Marines were trained and equipped.

g. Question and Answer 6.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with [REDACTED] – E Co 2/1

[REDACTED] for MSAU

(1) Question [REDACTED] So [REDACTED] training helped?

(2) Answer. At the end of the day, it was a great baseline. Like anything else you do what you can and try to prepare your people

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So what did that look like?

(2) Answer. We were the only ones at [REDACTED] so we had to simulate working with our other units. We would move out to an LZ near [REDACTED] to communicate back to main HQs. WARSAT was the big comms training

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So when did you go?

(2) Answer. 15th maybe? Everything was pre-staged at the flightline and we issued Marines the ammo and equipment. We had to do the marines in small groups. Intel we were getting was the Civilians were overrunning the airfield and it would be chaotic on arrival. We got on the bird and we landed, but the civilians were already pushed back so we could land. We got off the bird with 1 platoon. We were trying to identify where to stage gear. Me and the [REDACTED] went to make liaison with the JOC and they gave us a basketball court that wouldn't work. We ended up finding a gym and staging there. From there 1/8 needed help. It was the Army that we ended up helping out. From there, on the whole day on the 15th, and into the 16th or 17th, we were just working. Days bled. Once 82nd assumed that spot we were able to pull back and refit. So on the 17th we finally came back, we were able to come back. On the 17th, the civilians were desperate, the 82nd was getting overrun. The civilians were pushing hard to try to get out. The Marines were in deserts and 1/8 was in greens. It was hard because we had to establish a perimeter and be clear with the civilians and we had to push them back past the wire to allow the planes to land and leave. During that time there was a lot of things happening that shouldn't have happened. I told my Marines to let 82nd and 1/8 handle that.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So you were concerned about civilian handling and treatment?

(2) Answer. As a Marine – having been deployed, it weighs heavy on the command to acknowledge that this is different. I don't want to throw dirt on 1/8 but I didn't feel like their Marines were in the right mind-set. No warning shots. Don't put your hands on civilians. Have to use ROE and shouldn't just use non-lethal. There were kids and families. That's why I pulled back my Marines. People were using CS and people were getting hurt.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – E Co 2/1

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

for MSAU

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you thought that they weren't using discretion?

(2) Answer. So we pulled our Marines back and I didn't think that the 1/8 guys were doing it right. There's a way to do things, and if they weren't going to attack us before, now they are. I approached their Gunner and talked to him about it all "hey, sir, I want to make sure you know this is going on". His response: "you see what's going on – you focus on your people, we'll focus on ours". So we pulled back, and later on there was that plane that took off with people on the outside of it. People were real discouraged about that.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Back in the perimeter, what happened then?

(2) Answer. We went back to the gym and there was a delay in the flights coming in. Once we were able to get flights coming back in, we got assigned areas of responsibility. I think 1/8 got North gate and 2/1 got Abbey. We started a rotation. Golf first, then Echo and we kind of absorbed Weapons. Golf had the tower to Barron. Those are the areas we worked with. So basically, Golf Company was on the outer corridor to the Barron. Inner corridor is Fox and weapons.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So what prompted the rush on the airfield?

(2) Answer. 82nd fired a lot of warning shots. There wasn't much of a barrier, and once 82nd started firing, then all the civilians started jumping the barriers and people got spooked. I'm pretty sure it wasn't Taliban, it was 82nd and you could tell by the sound of the 240. Before that we had the people back behind the wire and they were cooperative, but once they heard all that crazy, it just changed to disorder. Combination of desperation and hearing shots. Better to take chances with Marines

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So abbey gate is divided up, what's Echo doing?

(2) Answer. Echo had inner corridor and inner gate. Between E and G, we rotated inner and outer, and the system was established to provide recovery. We were staying in the same gym. So this would have been after the 20th when we set the gate, and I think we rotated on the outer area on the 22nd before we had it for like 3 days. Our job was to provide security, but between the canal and the footbridge, they had people coming in. Our job was to assist with vetting and controlling the people that were already in. SO between outer gate and chevron, the people were trying to avoid the chevron with the Taliban. SO it turned into two locations – basically Chevron and Foot

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[REDACTED] for MSAU

bridge. Once a person was cleared to come through, and they were searched, by the sniper tower, there was an area set up and they would wait there for State to come through and do their process. If cleared they would get on a bus and be taken in to the airfield. Since State was low on manpower, we assisted a lot. That was the hardest part to know what state was looking for. It sucked because we would think they were good, and then State would say “no” and we had to escort them out. That was the hardest part for marines. It sucked but it was the job. Can’t take it personal. A person can only take so much and Marines had to be pulled if they weren’t dealing with it professionally.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You mentioned the chevron – Afghan people avoided that?

(2) Answer. Yeah, so I heard the Taliban got approved to vet people. They were supposed to use some kind of list or be able to help screen. The snipers expressed that they saw people being murdered. I didn’t see it, but I heard that. Snipers talked about that. People were avoiding the Chevron to stay away from the Taliban. The vantage point would have been good, and I went in the sniper tower to see the area past the container. There was dead space immediately past the containers, but past that the snipers could see. The snipers talked to us about violence at the chevron once or twice. The expressed that people are being hurt and shot. They said that and understood that ROE meant that they couldn’t engage.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How’d you feel about working with Taliban?

(2) Answer. Neutral. Enemy changes from day to day. The goal was to get people out. If you didn’t work with Tali, then we would have had a lot of enemy (ISISK) to worry about.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you ever observe Taliban violence towards Marines?

(2) Answer. No

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you hear about that stuff from any particular Snipers?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] did and [REDACTED] in the tower was [REDACTED] also. They had a shift too. So working days and nights. That was for us too. The [REDACTED] worked out night and day shift to make sure people could have some sleep.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – E Co 2/1

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your area of focus during those shifts?

(2) Answer. Everything inside both foot bridges, base of Barron tower and all the way out on the canal. I would go help Marines and check documents. Make sure Marines had what they needed and help Marines figure out issues with documents. I was kind of an intermediary. I would help make sure there were no issues.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In response to the Sniper claims of violence, How did you come to the understanding of the ROE?

(2) Answer. Our (b)(6) briefed them to us. I understood it as: if its not in the walls of the airport and your life isn't in danger, then we cannot engage. You don't know if they're Americans or not. You have non-lethal for a reason, and if you can answer those hard questions and answer for pulling the trigger – then it's okay. The Marines knew that. We did that at (b)(1)1.4d

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ROE Cards? Handed out? Verbally?

(2) Answer. Verbally. It was in briefs. The (b)(6) covered it, and we covered it in large groups and small groups about how to use the ROE and how to employ it.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the gate, did you see leaders? How did you talk about the ROE and what they were seeing?

(2) Answer. There were always questions. For the ones that overran the perimeter. DO they apply different inside? Still about saving lives though. If your not protecting your life or someone else's, then that didn't change. They asked questions all through the day-to-day grind. There was intel and ISIS-K planned attacks and such. If intel did come down the

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was Intel Distributed?

(2) Answer. S2 Marine. Those changes were sent out by the Ops O or CO. We were always looking for guidance. They told us what they knew and passed changes. The radios sucked, so we had to drive out to the COC and get changes from the MsGy

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[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

there. We were trying to understand the timeline and needed to know what changed over time.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you talk Threat streams?

(2) Answer. In that time, it was day-to-day. So we would show up and make sure the Marines were taken care of. As we got closer to the 24th, we heard about the potential threats. My focus was taking care of the Marines.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Threat-wise, scale of 1-10, how specific and able to react to what you heard?

(2) Answer. 7-8. It was helpful. We got bits and pieces and based on what was going on, I think the intel was good. We were able to identify possible threats.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Enough to screen the crowd for a possible threat?

(2) Answer. There is NO WAY to identify the specific threat. That mass crowd. There were so many people and there is no way to see between that many people. At the end of the day, unless the threat is wearing a neon sign that says "hey this is me", then you don't know.

a. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything you were looking for specifically?

(2) Answer. I know they got info about a guy carrying a backpack. There's not much I can do with that. The only thing I could do and the CO could do for us was to maintain dispersion so that if something did happen, the threat would be less to the group. Make sure the Marines had their sectors of fire and make sure people stayed on watch. At one point there was a bag in the C-Wire, but that turned out to be nothing.

b. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you elaborate about Suspicious persons?

(2) Answer. Just in general, there's nothing we can do unless they show a weapon and engage you. We can't go out to the outer walkway or anything. The water was an issue and we couldn't be getting into the canal. That would have been a problem too for engaging with the crowd. Not advisable to engage past our near side

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with [REDACTED] – E Co 2/1

[REDACTED] for MSAU

walkway perimeter. At the end of the day we're just observing. We'd see things and report up suspicious activity.

c. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] Was there a difference between junior and senior Marines?

(2) Answer. As a newer Marine, you think everything is suspicious. Brand new set of eyes and you think everything is a problem. For the older guys, we'd been around the block and could screen it all a bit. As long as the info was sent up, if it's actually suspicious or if it's just bits and pieces, we just assess by the incident. For real issues, it would have to go up to the COC. If it pertained to the real threat, the COC would vet it against their known issues. The snipers never showed us their pictures or anything.

d. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] You said the Marines talked about suspicious things, describe that?

(2) Answer. People hanging out too long, or other weird actions. There wasn't anything that was passed up to me that was a credible threat.

e. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] Did you engage with the [REDACTED] team?

(2) Answer. They gave me a ride one time. We talked to them sometimes. Their focus was to discourage people from trying to get in as it got near the end. They were messaging the crowd and trying to keep them calm. They were talking directly to the crowd with their loud speaker. I didn't interact with them much, but they didn't come to me to message operations or

f. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] Sometime around the 22nd, was there an IED test run?

(2) Answer. I think that was the bag thing. I don't think it was anything real or a threat. It was just a bag with personal stuff in it.

g. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] We talked about how intel was passed. You talked about the S2 Marine. Can you talk through the logical path of that?

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[REDACTED] for MSAU

(2) Answer. So 51/5 had a headquarters and we had an [REDACTED] there. He would come down or we would go up the COC. The [REDACTED] was there or they would bring it down to us. We were limited in personnel, so they did what they could. The intel would be passed down efficiently. There wasn't like an intel shop building products or anything. They worked shifts and it was hard to work all that with the number of people they had.

h. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Specifically on intel reporting, you said the radios sucked, so how did comms work between the intel and you at the gate?

(2) Answer. I focused more inward, and the other folks worked all the comms pieces mostly in person. Passed word in person and worked through details as much as possible.

i. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So on the 25th, you said you had the perimeter pushed out to the foot bridge/parking lot area. Can you talk about that?

(2) Answer. So when we took over, the perimeter was already established. We didn't push out there. The foot bridge was important because that's how they accessed our side.

j. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Can you talk about the mood of the crowd?

(2) Answer. The people weren't very aggressive originally. We would just work with them to get documents and if we found people that had the right stuff, they would come through and we were able to work with them. Once the flights stopped, that created a huge backlog. That was a problem. We had more people and that meant more food and water. That meant we had to take care of them and keep an eye on them. As we got closer to the 25th, the other gates closed and the people got a lot more dense and their behavior really started to change.

k. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you see any issues of people jumping out of the canal?

(2) Answer. No. We had control of the canal. If that would have happened we would have had to stop and control the area, but it wasn't an issue.

l. Question and Answer 36.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – E Co 2/1

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So 25-26AUG, G Co takes over the gate, and they moved the perimeter back to the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. Yeah, I thought that was a horrible decision. It made all the hard work undone. I understand the possible threat was made aware, and that the threat was imminent. Me and (b)(6) was at the gym, and we got the call from the COG (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) called us in and told us they needed CS. They told us we needed to go down there and work with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and unfuck that area. Golf company had the sniper tower to the Barron hotel and we were going to have the inner corridor to the inner gate. We started working that way to help with all the inner corridor area.

m. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think the gate closure timeline played a factor in the perimeter security collapse?

(2) Answer. The closure timeline changed a lot. Why wouldn't you keep the dispersion if you already had control?

n. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear anything from the Snipers during this time?

(2) Answer. I didn't hear anything from them. Maybe they talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or something, but not me.

o. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the threat?

(2) Answer. Suicide bomber. Observe for the threat, but I don't remember any specific threat or description. We got that from the intel guy and they would make sure we had any info as soon as it was credible and available. We would pass it down through Chain of Command from Platoon Commander or Platoon Sergeant.

p. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So while all that's happening, would you say the nature of the crowd changed?

(2) Answer. 23,24,25 – No. No different atmospherics during that time.

q. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned Chaos. Would you say the Chaos was just normal?

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) E Co 2/1

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

(2) Answer. The Chaos was different between when we left and came back on the 26th. The people at the barrier were getting crushed. The Marines at the barrier were having to deal with a lot of desperate people. The people couldn't get out of the canal without help and so they were pushing at the barrier below the tower. Majority of the people were on the far side, but they were trying to make their way to the near side.

r. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think the C-wire was a deterrent before the 26th on the foot bridge?

(2) Answer. If you would have maintained at the footbridge, then you would have been able to keep those crowds on the other side of the crowd. Biggest thing at that point would have been anti-riot gear and rounds to control the crowd. That bridge wasn't very wide.

s. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The 25th and 26th, there was a lot of reporting about a suspicious person. When did you get the call to go back to the gate?

(2) Answer. We got the call around noon. We were told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and G Co was losing control of the gate. We got pulled off on the 25th, and we weren't supposed to go back until 1800 on the 26th. We were told that me and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) should go back there and try to help get control. We saw what it looked like and we went back to the gym to get our stuff and get our Marines back down to help at the gate. We tried to get as many folks we could to move down to the gate. We were starting to identify stuff that we would have to destroy by then. We got back to the gate and assumed control of the inner corridor and started getting ready to help in the outer corridor. Everyone was getting Signal messages and such that were saying "hey help this person" and we were trying to get everyone focused on the fact that we were hearing the suicide bomber was about to detonate at around 1400. Everything stopped for a while, but nothing happened. Once we waited a bit, and nothing happened, we just started again. I was in the corridor inside by the sniper tower. At that time we were still pulling people out and helping where we could before everything shut down. Obviously with everything coming to an end we were really trying to help identify people and get them out.

t. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were any of the other Soldiers or Marines or groups talking to you about suspicious people?

(2) Answer. No, not to me. I heard later about some suspicious things or whatever from the snipers, but I never heard any of that from the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a guys or whatever.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

E Co 2/1

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

for MSAU

u. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where'd you hear about the Suspicious person afterward?

(2) Answer. I don't remember who specifically. It was the snipers, but I don't know. To me, no matter what, it wouldn't have changed anything. If you had taken out that target or whatever, it would have just happened later. I don't agree that it would have mattered if you had shot at that guy or whatever. The snipers were already talking about it then. "If we would have taken them out, it wouldn't have happened", and I disagreed with them about all that. They felt like they could have killed the guy. I think this was a lot of survivors guilt.

v. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you talk about that?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was attached to us (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and those guys. The Battalion will make their own snipers and they work through INDOC. I don't think that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ever went through school.

w. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you talk a little bit about the dispersion and position on the outer canal, and whether or not you feel like that would have been different if they held the bridge?

(2) Answer. It would have been different. Dispersion is what we're taught. This was a problem created by the collapse. The area out the canal and down the walkway would have allowed us to hold a different position. Same issue, but more dispersion means less people get killed. I think we would have had a better chance of having more people survive. Not sure who made that decision, but I don't think that it was the right call. Any 0311 will tell you that dispersion saves lives. Convoys, vehicles, same. Just don't collapse and get clumped up. Maybe it would have been a way to discourage the guy from doing it. If you make yourself a target, then the enemy is going to take advantage of the opportunity.

x. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The snipers thought they could have shot the guy. What did you hear about that?

(2) Answer. It was about the black backpack or whatever, and they think they knew what they were looking for. They felt like they knew enough. But I don't think that's enough to shoot someone over the ROE. That report would have had to go up if they have suspicion, but they didn't have PID. They didn't give enough info up or down to show hostile act and hostile intent. None of it ever happened that way, even the Taliban

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

didn't really show intent. A person with a backpack doesn't just match that basic description. No demonstrated intent was ever passed up. People being desperate isn't enough to shoot.

y. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where were you at this time?

(2) Answer. I was inside the gate and I was hanging out next to the sniper tower. I was observing the marines by the T-barriers. I saw people trying to jump over the barriers. I saw CPL Lopez, and he was by the tower, and some guy had jumped the barrier, and I was helping him understand that he was hurting the guy he was trying to push back into the canal. He ended up getting pulled off and I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) down there and Hoover was down there helping an interpreter. As they were there and I saw a lady who asked me for help. At that point I told her I'd help, and I helped pull her family out. I got them out and had them staged by the fence. I told them to stay there and tried to get a (b)(1)1.4d soldier to help get this lady to the (b)(1)1.4d to get them to help. I ended up changing my mind and basically, in stead of being outside the tower right at the spot of the attack, I moved the family down towards the Barron. I got the family down there by the Barron and then turned around and that's when the blast happened. The Marines at the tower had CS, and that popped off. I don't remember hearing gunfire immediately after the blast. I remember seeing the cloud of smoke and the CS cloud just forming. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was near me and he and I got up and as we moved that way we got choked out by CS. We came back through the hole and moved to the sniper tower and we were telling folks to come out because we had a Mass Casualty. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and told him to cut the fence so we didn't have to go around by the original hole in the fence. We were pulling people out. We couldn't really tell who was who. There were civilians and Marines mixed in. The Marines needed to be prioritized and we were getting the ones that hadn't passed into the CCP. Everyone was getting pushed out and getting security set up. One thing I started doing after the casualties were in, I started grabbing weapons and other gear. We started loading the gaiters and stuff and we were trying to make sure we had all the green gear. Because the (b)(1)1.4a vehicle had green gear, we ended up using that vehicle to get back to the COC. I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was hurt and I knew Hoover was there.

z. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned where you were. Where did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Hoover?

(2) Answer. I know I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out by the canal. He was out with the groups of Marines by the canal when the blast went off, and the ones at the wall took a lot of the hit. Most of the Marines were right up against the barriers. Hoover was down there too. So those ball bearings went right through everything, and even if they looked like bullet wounds or whatever it was ball bearings.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) – E Co 2/1

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

aa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you didn't see gunfire?

(2) Answer. Not directed at us. I know there was gunfire, but I didn't hear anything immediately and my initial reaction was to go to the site of the blast, and I know nothing was incoming because that was my queue to move. Never got worried about anything incoming.

b. Question and Answer 52.

bb. (1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you had any issues with TBI or anything?

(2) Answer. No. I have been screened or whatever. I'm getting screened now with ANAM and all that with my retirement. I don't have any issues I feel like are related to that. I don't have memory issues or whatever. I was far enough away from the blast and everything and haven't had issues (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and those guys not so much. The (b)(6) (b)(6) and all those guys were right there inside. I talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) all the time, and he's having a hard time. Not their fault and all, and I talk to him a lot. There's nothing you could have done differently. I talk to Hoovers parents and such. There's a lot of blame being thrown out there, and there's nothing we could have done differently.

cc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So have you done any public interviews or press or anything on this?

(2) Answer. No. I don't do that or whatever. I agreed to do this because it's facts. Not trying to gain anything out of this or whatever. I've gone to some of the events they've done. It turns into making money or whatever. Even with the parents and such, it turns bad. I try to tell them "your son did what he could have done". I try to tell them that like (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is all about "I could have killed him or whatever", and I don't see it that way. With the type of weapon you're talking about, you would have killed others. And we still had to get out of there and we would have to fight our way out or whatever.

dd. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So from your perspective being there, can you talk about your opinion on hostile act/intent?

(2) Answer. No. Not enough hostile act or intent. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a good kid. If you're a young kid, and he's a kid, then you're going to find a way to try to blame this on something. It's a job we do and there's a lot of risk involved. That's one of the biggest things, like, I just sent Marines out to Beirut. Use your instinct, and do your job.

ee. Question and Answer 55.

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SUBJECT: Supplementary Review Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - E Co 2/1

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for MSAU

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). You mentioned (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) do you see anything on Social Media and consume anything that's out there?

(2) Answer. I look at it and I see it, but I see it and it's just some stuff out there. When I hear people say things like "I didn't have what I needed or whatever" I question that because I'm like: "I gave you everything you needed, and I'm that guy you're talking about" and he's like: "that's not what I'm talking about, it's not that". The funny thing is, they don't see it, but I had so much. We gave anyone who asked anything they asked for. We focused on non-lethal and made sure that they had what they needed.

ff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Anything else?

(2) Answer. On the record, I know the (b)(6) name got brought up and into this. On the Record, I want to say, he equipped us as best he could. I've had a lot of commanders and whatever and he did everything he could. He kept us informed and he gave us as much as he could (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) even if I don't agree with whatever he chose to do, that's up to him to have to live with.

gg. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Do you specifically remember any conversation about the permission to engage? Do you remember any times where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) like he said?

(2) Answer. That conversation I don't think ever happened that way. I don't think he would talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) like that. I don't think that's accurate. Would we need to clear stuff with 51.5 or anyone? Not if they had that type of real threat or whatever. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a good man and did everything he could to make sure we had what we needed. Good man.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 19 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 15. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

19 OCT 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

19 OCT 23
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The lead interview, BG Lance Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. BG Curtis served as the primary interviewer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked clarifying questions and will be identified in the below transcription as follows:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. You were previously interviewed?

(2) Answer. Yes. Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. How long have you been in the Army?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Moved to

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. How did you get into (b)(1)1.4a community?

(2) Answer. Failed the STAR course and move into (b)(1)1.4a

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. You were offered the opportunity to go (b)(1)1.4a selection?

(2) Answer. Yes. Talked to a (b)(1)1.4a recruiter after the STAR course. Went to (b)(1)1.4a selection, which was harder than expected, but made it through and did the course. Spent a year at 5th BN with no deployment opportunities. Assessed for 9th BN, made it in and got on a deployment 4 months later.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Do you have language capabilities?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sir, a category 4 language.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4a Tell me about that?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4a loved that deployment and working with the (b)(1)1.4a. OPTEMPO was low and didn't go outside the wire much. Had an amazing platoon.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. How long have you been a (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. 3 years. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Will pin E7 in 3 months.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. How did you get on the deployment that we are discussing?

(2) Answer. We all watched the news and rumors were afoot. Ryan Knauss was my team SGT and asked for volunteers for this deployment. I volunteered.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. How many were selected to deploy?

(2) Answer. Originally 8.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Tracking you wanted to have a larger presence, but was whittled down to 4?

(2) Answer. That's correct. We meet (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) forward.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. You volunteered, then what happened?

(2) Answer. We sat down and identified duties, tasked them out, then found out we weren't going. This was 2-3 weeks before we actually deployed. That lasted a week, we re-spun up then was stood down again. The 3rd spin up is when we actually deployed with 5 days' notice. No real S2 at the time. All info came from open source media to know what we were walking into. Majority of time was spent packing and attended a range with the 82nd. We got a call from XVIII ABN Corps about being manifested for a flight. Was told to stand down and a flight would be booked for us. This was 2 days before we deployed. Around 16/17 Aug 23. A day or so later we were woken up and told to head to Charleston within the hour for movement into theater. We showed up w/ 1/82, they bumped 4x privates and put us on the bird. We got kicked off the bird in (b)(1)1.4d. We called back to our home unit for guidance and was told to push equipment forward and we return home. We recommended that was a bad idea. We finally talked our way onto a flight into Afghanistan. We landed night of the 18th at HKIA.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Give me a picture of what it looks like when it lands.

(2) Answer. Period of darkness. Pure chaos. Tracers are going through the sky. Linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to the JOC then got to work. It felt like "Lord of the flies". We meet (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he stated we work with him. We jumped in with them.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What was the ROE at HKIA?

(2) Answer. Officially never given ROE. It was clear we had right to self-defense. Just don't point our rifle at people.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Was it clear to you about self-defense w/ hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. No sir. With the Taliban it's hard to identify what is hostile act/ intent.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Was there self-restraint from US FORCES?

(2) Answer. There was a ton of self-restraint from US Forces. Having to cooperate with the Taliban was hard. It was tough to see what they were doing to people trying to get in.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Why was that?

(2) Answer. The talks in (b)(1)1.4d It's hard to see them hurt women/children because the Americans are moving too slow. They would say speed up or we'll stop. They would spray bullets in the air.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Did you feel threatened? What as their real motivation?

(2) Answer. No sir. Not threatened. They wanted us gone, so they won't turn on us. They were smart enough to know that.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Leading up to the closure of north and east gate, your team was moving between gates?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We had a land cruiser and would respond to gates depending on the situation. It was all reactionary.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Your mission was based on crowd control.

(2) Answer. Yes, Sir it was.

u. Question and Answer 20.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. How was the situation inside the base?

(2) Answer. The first day we showed up they were swinging 2x4s at Marines in the comfort area b/c it was hot and they were sitting there. We figured out what was causing this and rectified the situation. We identified someone who spoke English to help solve the issues in the comfort area. He helped work a movement plan for the families, then we never had another issue.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Did the Marines have restraint?

(2) Answer. Yes they did.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Were you day or night shift? Who was on the team?

(2) Answer. Night shift. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. How did comms work between you and the gates?

(2) Answer. We took direction from the JOC. No direct comms with all the gates.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. How did you determine what gate to go to?

(2) Answer. No real method. We tried to identify where the biggest issues were and move to it. Majority of the time we were directed from the JOC. That's who the gates communicated to.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Who was the night shift senior and was it clear?

(2) Answer. I was Sir and yes.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. How was information being disseminated? How does shift change look?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. 1700/1800 is when night shift starts. The previous shift wakes the next shift up. We would start the hand over while we work our way to the JOC. We link in with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and complete the handover

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. What brief from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did you receive?

(2) Answer. Either what the last shift did or current issues at the gates.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Any threat streams discussed? We know many are occurring throughout the day and some have common identifiers. Do you remember any tied to a SVEST?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would push them to us as he received them. Yes I do. It was at Abbey gate the morning prior to the actual attack. The S2 briefed us they expected a person to detonate at the gate.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. Do you remember others than the one on the 25th? Does any description stand out?

(2) Answer. That one stands out to me because of what happened. There were others throughout the time. The description was common with clothing and a bag. At Abbey gate the description was short/bald hair, low cut beard, carrying a backpack.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. When you look at the crowd, how does that description fit?

(2) Answer. It is common, however we saw an individual fitting that description at the gate.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Who gave you that info?

(2) Answer. Two desk NCOs in the JOC.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Describe what you saw

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. Everyone felt something was coming. Morning of 26 Aug, my team was out at the gate. The vehicle was parked further into the inner corridor and moving on foot into the outer corridor. That's when we saw him on the canal. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or myself saw him first. This is around 0900/1000 in the morning. We went to the sniper tower and pointed him out. He fit the description and different from anyone else. He was stone cold calm and everyone else was yelling/screaming. He had a bookbag that looked like a Jansport backpack. We went into the tower and spoke with some of the Marines.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. How were the other Afghans acting around him?

(2) Answer. Didn't seem to notice him. No one was focused on him

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. How did you see him through the crowd?

(2) Answer. No real answer. He didn't act like everyone else. He was sitting on the far side canal wall with the backpack on his lap. He was staring off into space with everyone else around him acting chaotically.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Describe him.

(2) Answer. He was bald and a trimmed beard. He wore a pakol and would take on/off. We watched him about 15-20 min. It believe it was a brown pakol, I'm not fully sure.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Any idea what his clothes are like?

(2) Answer. Top was tan gray. That's the only thing I remember for sure. He wore a man dress, no actual pants on.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. So, you first identified this guy due to the BOLO information from the JOC and while you are walking around you notice him?

(2) Answer. No one said anything to me first. When I walked past the fence, we had a weird ominous feeling. I was helping the Marines and just looked across the

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

canal and saw him immediately. He just stood out. We watched him with the snipers for 15-20min then he got up and left.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

- (1) Question. Why the sniper tower?
- (2) Answer. We wanted a better vantage point.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

- (1) Question. Who did you see in the Tower?
- (2) Answer. I believe his name was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the guy making his rounds across the country, and another marine with a bushy red beard.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

- (1) Question. What happened?
- (2) Answer. We pointed out the individual and both agree he matched the description and acting strange for the situation by his action which was stone cold/no emotion. We asked the snipers to call it up and they said "of course".

pp. Question and Answer 41.

- (1) Question. Who is the senior in the sniper tower?
- (2) Answer. I do not remember.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

- (1) Question. Does anyone else come into the tower with you and the snipers?
- (2) Answer. I don't believe so.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

- (1) Question. Did you physically hear them call someone about this and what did they say?
- (2) Answer. I did. Not sure who. They stated they had someone who matched the physical description at Abbey Gate and wanted to get additional eyes on.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. When you said he matched other descriptions, why?

(2) Answer. Because this was a common look.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. So what made him stand out was how he was acting?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. People were fighting/yelling/throwing rocks (anything they could). This individual was completely still and outwardly emotionless.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. You believe during the course of your duty you could find others to match the same physical description?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I could find others to match that description.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. So within approximate time of 30 min, you've been watching, the phone call was made and you were physically present. Did anyone come up to the tower? Did you see a response?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. No one came up. We did not see any response to the threat. When the individual walked away we thought that was the end of it.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. When he walked away what did he do?

(2) Answer. Nothing. Just got up and calmly walked out

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. How long have you been an Abbey gate when this happened?

(2) Answer. About 7 days.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. Can you confirm the numbers of Afghans at Abbey Gate grew astronomically when North and East Gates closed due to their respective threat level? The crowd surged night of 25/morning on 26.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. It did. After the other gate closure at other gates the canal was completely filled with people, people standing/walking on buildings, people standing on shoulders.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. You believe the call went up to the JOC, 30 min pass, then the guy walks away. Describe that please.

(2) Answer. Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were at the tower. The individual in question was on the far side canal wall, about 50-60 feet away. He stood up and walked towards the footbridge. He turned off at the building and that is where we lost sight of him. He wasn't fighting his way through the crowd, he just calmly made his way through.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Did snipers laze him, what were their discussions?

(2) Answer. No sir. They were looking at him through their binoculars.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Did he ever look up?

(2) Answer. I don't think so Sir. We would have small talk and then check on him routinely.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. So the snipers are looking at the canal holistically and not just the individual?

(2) Answer. Correct. They would go back and check on him but didn't stay focused on him. They looked through their binoculars and not their scopes.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. What were his distinguishing features?

(2) Answer. He had a round face, eyes were sunken in and head was buzzed. He didn't look tired, just stoned and sitting perfectly still. Not moving or anything. He was roughly the same height as the other Afghans. If it wasn't for how he was acting he would be another face in the crowd.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. Did you observe other Afghans with the same behavior?

(2) Answer. No Sir.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. Was there any indicator that he had a SVEST or any weapon?

(2) Answer. Only the backpack. That's about it. There were no distinguishing markings on the backpack. It looked like a store-bought backpack

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. You are sure there were no markings? Did it have (b)(1)1.4c?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. If it did have (b)(1)1.4c would that stick out in your mind?

(2) Answer. Most likely sir

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. Did at any moment his body language change?

(2) Answer. No

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. Did the snipers ask you anything else?

(2) Answer. No. It was super busy and chaos in the canal.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. Did the snipers ask for engagement authority in your presence?

(2) Answer. No Sir

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. Did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ever come into the sniper tower while you were there and the Marines ask for engagement authority?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. That did not happen while I was in there.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. While you were present in tower, did the Marines put the weapon and optics on the individual?

(3) Answer. Not that I saw.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. While you were there, were there any other individuals matching a BOLO description?

(2) Answer. Not while I was in the tower. No Sir.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. Where were you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I was bedded down at the time. I woke up to the ground attack alarm. It was a loud beeping with "GROUND ATTACK SEEK COVER". I grab my gear and then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came around the corner. He said "they hit us, get in". We went to the JOC, got the report, but were denied from going to the gate.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. Tell me about what happened post blast.

(2) Answer. We went to the JOC, found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he gave us info that there was a blast and some of our guys got hurt. We went to get into the vehicle to head to the gate and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stood us down. We went back and got (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then went back to the JOC. We saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) bloodied up in the JOC. We were trying to figure out what happened to Ryan Knauss. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) knew the medics took him to the Role II closest to the JOC. We headed to the Role II to check on Ryan.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. What happens there?

(2) Answer. First thing was we saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We saw he was good, beaten up but alive. Then we tried to find out where Ryan was. Someone finally told us he was in surgery. We believe he was in this Role II but not sure. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed to be with him. I left and headed back to the JOC to find out what was happening and what we need to do. One of the Force Pro Marine officers had lost personnel. We heard rumors of if someone jumps the fence we are to engage. The Marine Force Pro officer

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

tried to grab guys to engage and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stepped in and stood him down. A little after midnight we were at the JOC with Marine EOD guys. That is when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back and told me that Knauss had passed.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. What happened next? Did you escort Ryan?

(2) Answer. We did. I remember being in the JOC determining that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was going to Germany and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would accompany the ride home. That left me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Pretty much all operations stopped at that point. Everyone started pulling out. We passed off our speakers/audio files to the 82nd to help keep people at the gates calm. Then we got ready to get on the plane.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. Would you know if the pictures of the individual were provided to

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes sir. If (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) received pictures I would have known.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. Do you feel confident if you saw a picture of this individual you would recognize him?

(2) Answer. I would sir. Actually, I learned after the fact that it was the individual's second trip to the gate. This information came from the JOC S2. The individual was at the gate in the morning then came back and detonated. I am not entirely sure of this claim, and if it was this individual, but felt that it would have been this individual.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. So this is what led you to believe this was the same individual?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I'm not 100% sure it was the same individual, but my mind made this connection.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. Who did you share that with?

(2) Answer. That stayed between myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't tell (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) till a few months later. I never shared it with the snipers, I am not sure if others did.

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www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. Where any of you close personally with the snipers?

(2) Answer. No sir.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. Do you think the snipers went VFR direct to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Not that I'm aware of Sir. Any information passed to him would come to us. We are close personally where I feel information would not be withheld from each other. To add, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was not in the tower with myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was outside the tower with a Marine Lt keeping eyes on our vehicle and equipment.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) A couple of days before the blast, we heard there were reports of an IED test run. Did you hear or witness this?

(2) Answer. Not anything that I recall Sir. Nothing stands out in my head like that. I do not recall any real blast prior, mostly just pop shots.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you in the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. Once/twice the whole trip. A lot the morning of the blast.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you went into the sniper tower how many people would you see?

(2) Answer. Never more than 3-4 in the tower, and 1-2 under the ladder trying to sleep when they could. I never went in by myself.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would you ever see one person in the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No sir.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you describe being in the tower when you saw the individual in the canal?

(2) Answer. We went up to the tower to observe the individual and pass information to the JOC, we still had situations we need to deal with at the gate. I went up and down numerous times while the individual was being observed.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When was the discussion with the S2 regarding what happened at the gate?

(2) Answer. It was very very quickly after the blast. It woke me up and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up about 5 min after the blast to take him to the JOC.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who prompted the conversation at the JOC?

(2) Answer. Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked the (b)(6) what happened, he stated it was a blast at the gate. Not entirely sure when the (b)(6) specifically stated that it was the second trip for the individual that detonated the SVEST.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was the intel provided?

(2) Answer. The intel seemed sincere and not just chatter. The intel NCO pulled us off to the side and told us they thought this was the bombers second trip.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you were at the tower and you finished your shift you went to the JOC and reported what you saw?

(3) Answer. Yes. We stated what we saw and that he matched the description. They said "got it" and we didn't hear anything further.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(6) What was your intent in reporting to the JOC?

(2) Answer. If we could have PID the individual we could have engaged.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you're having this conversation with the (b)(6) was it the same person or a different one?

(2) Answer. It was a follow-on conversation with the same person we originally reported to.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In the conversation it was you, the (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. He pulled us away from everyone else and stated that. It was a "hush" comment.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After that who else have you had a conversation with about the situation?

(2) Answer. After that it was with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during the first interviews.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the conversation with the JOC (b)(6), you also had the conversations with your fellow teammates?

(2) Answer. Yes ma'am. It wasn't often. We talked immediately after this, but have not really discussed it after.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Since coming back and reintegrating, have you discussed this further?

(2) Answer. Not much. Mainly with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at his house when we first got back.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. The JOC (b)(6) what was his rank?

(2) Answer. Not sure, he had two chevrons. I was assuming he was an intel analyst.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question. Do you know his unit?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. I do not, just that he was in the JOC.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. What were your actions during imminent threats? Can you give me an example?

(2) Answer. For VBIED, we would go to the gate and place speakers forward, then move back to cover.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. For SVESTS, would you cease operations and take cover.

(2) Answer. Yes sir. That happened. We would take cover and cease operation.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) around the gate? Would you recognize him?

(2) Answer. No sir. We were fully engaged the entire time. I don't recall seeing a Marine LtCol around the gate.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. Are you on social media?

(2) Answer. No Sir. I'm not in to social media.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question. Have you listened to any podcasts or accounts of what happened?

(2) Answer. No Sir. I don't want to relive my memories of what happened. That would only make it worse.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question. Anything else we should know?

(2) Answer. Just some frustrations. The last man standing photoshoot occurred days before I actually left. The 82nd dumped us in (b)(1)1.4d creating a delay for our team having us to figure out how to get into Afghanistan. And the entry requirements for

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

Afghans into HKIA changed frequently/were added to which caused chaos and more commotion at the gate.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question. Is there anyone else you think we need to talk to?

(2) Answer. Other than (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) no Sir.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is BG Lance G. Curtis, (b)(6), and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Lead Investigating Officer



GUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 5 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 18. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

5 OCT 2023

DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

5 OCT 2023

DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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30 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)], [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] Team member, follow-up

1. On 30 October 2023, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] answered verbally. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Due to there being multiple interviewers, questions asked by [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] will be denoted by [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] those by [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] as [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] and those by [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] as [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)].

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. One thing that popped up, what was your callsign?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] I don't know if that was officially established [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] was the running nickname.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Confusion on threat reporting. Explain shift change and how you received intel reporting?

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SUBJECT: Interview [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Team member, follow-up

(2) Answer. Do not remember names. Went to the JOC w/the MEU. The MEU S2 had a desk on the main floor.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Was there a semi-circle of flags outside of the building?

(2) Answer. We were across the street from the building with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d General.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Who was the officer working the J2 desk? What was his rank?

(2) Answer. I believe it was a Naval Petty Officer, NCO.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Going into the 26th and the BOLO. What do you remember?

(2) Answer. I remember being told they were expecting an SVEST.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. To the best of your recollection describe the suspicious person.

(2) Answer. Bald with well-kept beard, about the length of mine (gestures to beard) and dressed like in generic clothing for an Afghan male.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Did you interact with anyone else?

(2) Answer. Not in an official capacity. Otherwise, there was the rumor-mill, pre-event; that someone was coming with an SVEST, but I do not remember specifics.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Any [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a interactions with you or the staff?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did you interact with or see any CI/HUMINT walking around?

(2) Answer. I ran into HU that were not in uniform. Interacted with HU a few

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Team member, follow-up

times after fence jumpers were caught. Not sure if it was CI or HUMINT.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Did you ever see the snipers interact with HU/CI?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall; not when I was there.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Did you hear any comments about "compromising the source"?

(2) Answer. I do not recall that conversation happening.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Could snipers have confused you with intel?

(2) Answer. Possibly, because not a lot of people know what [REDACTED] does. We were in nonstandard uniform. I never got the feeling that they thought I had more info that them or their intel guys.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Did they understand your role as [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. I'm not confident they understood. I would like to think they understood because the Marines have [REDACTED], but the Army doesn't know what [REDACTED] does either.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you go down to the gate to pass intel to the tower?

(2) Answer. Did not go down to the gate to pass intel but we did pass what we had. We were already at the gate dealing with crowd and saw someone who matched description. Went to the tower for better view. It was the morning of the blast, sun-up.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Would people come to you for intel updates? Were they ever surprised by what you knew?

(2) Answer. We shared what we knew. They were sometime surprised by what we knew because comms were a struggle.

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SUBJECT: Interview [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Team member, follow-up

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Did you have access to SIPR or TS?

(2) Answer. I did not, but [redacted] did. Occasionally, [redacted] had access to SIPR when he was in the JOC. Most of what we passed was verbal SITREPS to [redacted] [redacted]

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Do you know if [redacted] was sending info back or looking into the intel?

(2) Answer. Any answer would be speculation.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Suspicious persons at gate: Did you identify a suspicious person at sun-up? What do you remember?

(2) Answer. He (suspicious person) was completely non-reactive to the crowd. It was a full-blown riot – running across shoulders, throwing babies. We were worried about the crowd storming the gate and this suspicious person was completely calm. Shaved head, beard about the length of mine and had a bag.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. When you informed the snipers about the suspicious person, were they already aware?

(2) Answer. This was the first time the suspicious person was brought to their notice, and they thought that it matched the description of the BOLO. It was a very general description. Could've found 50 people that matched that description. The snipers seemed like they knew about the BOLO.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Do you know how? Or where the BOLO came from?

(2) Answer. I did not know. But, being on different shifts, I don't know when they came for updates.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. How long did you stay in the tower while they watched the suspicious person?

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SUBJECT: Interview [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Team member, follow-up

(2) Answer. Not long – about an hour, because we had so much going on. They homed in on him with their binsos.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Did they use a camera?

(2) Answer. I do not remember them using a camera. I saw the spotting scope.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Do you remember being shown a picture (interview team shows (S066 exhibit) an image of the alleged suspicious person of 26 AUG)? Did the snipers point out anyone else?

(2) Answer. That looks about right (affirmative head nod). That is about what I remember. I do not remember them showing me anyone else. I'm disappointed that [REDACTED] did not show me this pic.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Later that morning, were you there when they asked for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. I was aware that engagement authority was being requested, but I was not physically there.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. How did you become aware?

(2) Answer. I remember someone saying, but don't remember who. We were at the base of the tower, against the wall, when I learned of it.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. How many snipers in the tower? Do you remember seeing a 1stSgt? Do you remember [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Two to three in the tower. Some were sleeping on the floor below. We had to step over them. I do not remember seeing a 1stSgt? I do not remember

[REDACTED]

bb. Question and Answer 27.

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SUBJECT: Interview [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Team member, follow-up

(1) Question. In our last interview you talked about an intel guy, post-blast. You said he said that the guy in the photo had been there previously. Who was the intel person?

(2) Answer. The MEU [REDACTED] He was the only one I talked to, post blast that night. He was fairly confident that the image was of the guy, but not certain. I'm not sure if the intel guys saw the actual photo in question.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Do you know how the intel folks are who concluded that the person seen at the gate multiple times was the bomber?

(2) Answer. I do not. I know the guy had left by that point.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. Was the MEU [REDACTED] or someone else?

(2) Answer. It was whatever NCO was working the desk. A Navy NCO .

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. When going up to the tower. Do you remember who was in the tower?

(2) Answer. Red head with scruffy beard and likely [REDACTED]

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (Shown a group pic from Leatherneck Magazine) Who did you see?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] was up there; him (also points to [REDACTED]) and I remember he (points to [REDACTED]) was in and out.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. You didn't witness request for engagement. Can you describe the tone of asking?

(2) Answer. Tone was not excited or angry. A lot was going on and its hard to describe feeling that something was going to go wrong but everything was business like. Everything felt off that day

hh. Question and Answer 33.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Team member, follow-up

(1) Question. What was the environment and reaction to spotting the suspect?

(2) Answer. Same answer. Ominous feeling like something bad was about to happen. We saw the guy, and everyone jumped on the scope. They agreed with us [REDACTED] about the suspicious person.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. You mentioned last time 30 minutes to an hour that you were up and down the tower three times.

(2) Answer. I was checking on [REDACTED] because he was staying with the vehicle to make sure it wasn't stolen and moving back and forth from the Entry Control Point to help calm the crowd.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. So, you were messaging the crowd, and not just talking to Marines?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, thank you.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. To this day, do you think that was the bomber?

(2) Answer. My opinion, yes, I do think that was the bomber. He was stone cold calm in what was going on, and what the [REDACTED] said probably also planted the seed in my mind.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. During that day, how many times did you go up to the tower to spot a BOLO?

(2) Answer. That was the only day I remember getting a full physical description of someone. We received VBIED reports but that was the only actual description of a BOLO that I remember.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Can you confirm he could look like a hundred other people?

(2) Answer. Confirmed, yes ma'am. But it was his demeanor that made him stand out. With however many thousands of people out there, who knows. I thoroughly believe that the crowd knew that something was going to happen.

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SUBJECT: Interview [redacted] [redacted] Team member, follow-up

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Is this the tower (shown Leatherneck Magazine image)?

(2) Answer. I believe that was the tower. We were looking in the other direction. That window faces the access point. We were looking through the binos out the forward-facing window toward the canal.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Have you been contacted by anyone about this?

(2) Answer. No. Should I expect to be contacted by anyone else. [redacted] talked about it briefly because we worked back-to-back and lived five minutes from each other.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. Anything else relevant?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. As [redacted] were you receiving intel updates from social media exploitation?

(2) Answer. Exploitation specifically, no. We had guys in [redacted] that were monitoring social media, but not officially doing social media scraping. No update prior to, but post-blast. When I got in the vicinity of the JOC, I got e-mails and texts from people back here that heard about it. Social media updates from guys that were in [redacted] and Ft Liberty were mostly updates regarding movement of the crowd to various gates.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 30 OCT 23, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 7. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Signature of Person Making Statement 30 OCT 23
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 30 OCT 23
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 20 October 2023, BG Curtis conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. BG Curtis (C1), [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted the interview and the person asking the question corresponds to the abbreviations seen here.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: Could you maybe start by talking about timelines and indicators you would deploy to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. My unit and I were doing training in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d then we went to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d to meet with the ship. We hung out there for three weeks, it was great. That's when we started hearing that we might go there. We didn't know for sure, but we knew that was the point of the MEU. I was an intel specialist, so I kind of knew what was going on in Afghanistan. We weren't super concerned at first, and I had hadn't been working too much for several weeks. Being intel, I knew that I didn't like it. I had made so many friendships during the deployment, I didn't want anyone I cared about to be hurt.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

From (b)(1)1.4d we went to (b)(1)1.4d I think. Maybe I got back on ship for a few days first, but we went to (b)(1)1.4d to posture for a while. That's when I started intel work and watched things get worse and worse. Then they were telling me they didn't know if they were going to bring me or not, but if I had a choice, I said I wanted to go since all my guys and friends were going. Towards the beginning of August, it became more definite. I got there on August 16th. I had friends go several days before that, but trying to get out there was a mess and took several days for everyone. Even up to the 16th it wasn't clear if I was even going.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Before you went, were you briefed on Rules of Engagement (RoE)?

(2) Answer. I was part of 2nd Recon Battalion. We were under the BLT; their intel guys did a big brief. I can't remember exactly the RoE, I think we all had RoE cards. It was all hostile act, hostile intent, rite to defend. It was pretty common. I don't think we really knew what to expect, except for maybe the infantry guys. RoE means more to them. Not that it doesn't mean anything to me, but when I think of it, I think of me doing intel and what intel I would be doing for my guys. I wasn't super focused on RoE, I was more focused on what my job would be and I went with the intent of doing intel. As I'm sure you know it takes a while to get secret clearances updated, and I wasn't helping as much as I could have, and I was doing radio work for my guys. At the time, the FET really needed help, so I wanted to help and contribute with that. My commander told me that the FET needed some people, and he asked me if I wanted to help. The guys were being used as kind of a special recovery team at various gates. It didn't feel like they super needed intel.

I was totally for doing the FET team, then I would go with my guys to get the families so I could search women or children for them.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: We have heard some great things about the impacts of the FET and how immensely helpful they were in coming the crowds.

(2) Answer. The infantry guys definitely had a higher stress level working the gates, which had an impact on their patience with everybody. It was high stress around the clock, dealing with so many people. I think once people got to us, it was more about calming them. We had people pass out in our arms because they had been waiting for days. So, we would calm them and their children down. It was stressful, but not as stressful as what the guys had to do.

e. Question and Answer 4.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: The situation changed a lot between the 25th and the 26th, were you ever at North Gate or East Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, I was at North Gate. I remember seeing someone jumping over the concrete walls by East Gate, so I definitely saw plenty of that.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember anything about the night of the 25th and the crowd surging at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I have a journal I kind of kept on my phone. By the 25th the FET wasn't shutdown, but all gates were closed besides Abbey Gate. I was helping my guy's teams more at that point. On the 26th they asked if we wanted to work a shift, but I don't remember a specific surge because I wasn't out there at that point in time. The 25th was calm for me, doing stuff with my guys and waiting around for people that never showed up.

*Discussion of the unclassified Abbey Gate map to establish a common lexicon ranging from the inner gate to the chevron and covering other points of interest in between.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Does the description of that area make sense?

(2) Answer. I had only been to Abbey Gate that one day. I remember the tents set up for the process area inside the outer gate.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: When did you physically get to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It was the afternoon of the 26th, around maybe 2 pm. We showed up to the processing area and the team that we switched out with told us not to go up the gate, that wasn't our job. We shouldn't go up there, we were only supposed to search people. We had been on shift for a little bit when they started calling for the FET. Nicole asked if I wanted to go. I was [REDACTED] (b)(6) I understood the threats, but I wasn't going to let her go by herself. She talked to a Major from her unit, and asked if we could go up. He okayed it. We went up to the area by the canal wall. Anytime the guys would get women or children that weren't supposed to be there, the guys would call for us to escort them down. We had done that several times, then I remember there was an IED threat, so everyone crouched below the wall. We sat with our backs against the wall, completely covered. We were at a standstill for 20 or 30 minutes, then we just resumed. You think they would have just called it since the gate was going to shut anyways.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

After that we went back and forth again. The last time we went up there was a woman with her two little boys. I was around the canal wall by the sniper tower. Nicole and I got in an argument with a couple of guys over there who I have since met, they were injured too, which is kind of funny that I met them after the fact and talked about our argument. So, we got the woman down first, then Nicole went to help with something else. Then I got the two-year-old down to the mom, but the older one was kind of digging his feet into the wall. He didn't really want to go. He was really fighting me, trying not to go down with them. I had my right knee and both hands on the wall. My left leg was off the wall on the ground. Right as I did that, the bomb went off.

I remember looking at my hands, there was some blood. [REDACTED] (b)(6) so I don't know if the blood in front of me was mine or that boy. I don't know what happened to him, I couldn't look up. I felt like a floating torso. I looked around, and I saw Nicole. I thought she just had a scratch and was knocked out; I didn't comprehend that she was dead. I thought she was fine, so I was looking around. I made eye contact with another Marine and asked for help. He yanked me off the wall. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

(b)(6) He got my rifle off me.

Then him and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who I found out helped me later, picked me up by my flak and knees and carried me out. They dropped me when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) couldn't go on any longer with his injuries. Then they took my flak off and someone yelled at them to put a [REDACTED] (b)(6) so they did that. They had the fence cut, so they brought me through somewhere.

From what I have been told, I was one of the first people that couldn't move themselves that was taken out. I want to say I went through the initial hole in the fence since it took a long time. One of my guys, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the medevac and loaded up with me. There were two other Marines in that vehicle, but they must have been dead since he wasn't helping them, and they weren't moving. The guys driving were flying around curves, so [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was bouncing around trying to help me. I remember telling him that I was fine, but obviously I must not have looked fine. I went to the ICU area after that, and they took care of me there.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: So, you were conscious the whole time?

(2) Answer. I was conscious the whole time, I think I was conscious until they started doping me up.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: Do you know which hospital you were at?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I don't know. I'm sure you will interview (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he mentioned that when I saw him this past weekend. His surgeon, I think it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you should definitely interview him. All of those guys (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will tell you more about them (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was his surgeon; I have talked to him too. I was wherever they were at, because he remembers me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: We know he stopped at the shock trauma platoon before the Role II, did you as well?

(2) Answer. No, I went straight to the Role II. I was in the triage point, and I remember asking them to (b)(6) so bad, and they did. I remember people walking around, I saw one of the team leaders from my platoon there, and he told me how messed up everything was. A lot of people were shaken up. I was put in the ICU portion, and I know several people visited me there, but I started getting medicine, so my memory is in and out at this point.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: if you need a break just let us know.

(2) Answer. I think talking about it helps, not to bottle it all up. So it doesn't really bother me.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Did you see the blast at all?

(2) Answer. Nope. I know it was from my right. I don't know if I knew that initially. I saw the chunks of skin, a lot of dust. My ears were ringing super loud. I didn't see where it came from, (b)(6)
(b)(6). So, I knew it was on the right.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Can you tell me about your injuries?

(2) Answer (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I know as far as the gunshot, the initial investigation said there weren't any. A lot of people I have talked to said there was certainly gunfire, and I know guys I talked to saw someone suspicious and took shots. I'm not entirely sure how ball bearings and other things go through a human body, but it's crazy to me that the ball bearing (b)(6)

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) I get that speed and size could affect it, but I don't know. Another guy had one that went through both legs, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has so many still in him. I don't know, it doesn't make sense to me.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: We can explain that if you like.

(2) Answer. Sure.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: We have spoken with surgeons and the AFMEO. They are in agreement that they never found any bullets. They acknowledge that they used "Gunshot Wounds" to identify point of injury as that is the way they were trained. We asked them if they found bullets, they acknowledged that they did not. Docs at Landstuhl and Walter Reed agreed, as did AFMEO. We acknowledge there were gunshots at the time. There were Force Recon guys that saw a suspicious individual, and they fired shots over his head. (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4b
 (b)(1)1.4b Individuals in the inner gate also fired in the direction of the building with a water tower, because they saw an individual with a weapon there. So, you absolutely heard shots, but we found no evidence of gunshots.

(2) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Confirmed on using GSW as a point of reference. For the ball bearings, a lot of it depends on what it hit first and where it was in the explosive itself. Some of the rounds slow down and stop in people, but the rounds that go through may have hit nothing first or been closer to the explosive. There were ball bearings that had enough velocity to stick in concrete and go through bodies. I am glad you had enough surgeons available, that was good happenstance. It sounds like you went straight to the Role II-E with the ICU. I have a question, what have the doctors said in terms of your recovery?

(3) Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

q. Question and Answer 16.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any issues with (b)(6)

(2) Answer. The way they did the surgery, it seems that there was too much

(b)(6)

(b)(6) but other than that, its fine. I have talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) surgeon, he was saying it was coincidence that they were all there, and that it was very lucky.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. It was good. Therapy isn't fun regardless, but I was glad I was there over the VA. I had very good therapists and was part of research opportunities there. So I was glad I went there, even though (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) isn't my favorite place in the world. I was at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they have a lot of experience (b)(6)

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: Do you have contact with that (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. If you talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I know that he has that info and will tell you to talk to them. I don't know if you have seen anything that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has talked about. It's frustrating to hear some of that stuff, but I don't know. I do have a question; do you know anything about Tim Kennedy and his whole thing there?

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: That's not part of our investigation, but what specifically do you mean?

(2) Answer. He obviously had good intentions. The morning of the 26th, I was with my guys at Black Gate. We were trying to get a family out, just waiting and waiting. I went back to where I was staying, got ready for bed and tried to sleep for 30 minutes. Then I had to go back out. Got picked up and went back. Some man came up to me, and told me he was bringing 10 busses of women and children. He told me it was on me since I was the only woman there. I was confused, it was just some random man, not in uniform. The team leader who told him we would help asked me to get someone else from the FET, so I went to get Nicole.

Obviously, this man was Tim Kennedy. He brought in 10 busses, that ended up being primarily military aged males. Obviously, they had pushed their way on. We weren't vetting them, just searching them. We searched these busses for several hours for this man. I know it was a whole big mess with different entities and different countries, I just don't get that. It makes me angry. He goes on all these podcasts talking about how his team of four people got 12,000 people out. My platoon was doing the same thing, and only got 800 people out. Thats total BS. He had no assets to search these people. We

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

heard those busses got turned away later. What if an IED had been on those busses? He just makes me very angry.

I have since talked to Tim Kennedy and told him all of that as well. He wasn't part of the command and didn't identify himself at all. We were already dealing with so many people. I know he has a huge platform, and I know that people with big platforms got people out. I think he had good intentions, but no way to execute it and search the people that he was bringing in.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I'm sure with you [REDACTED] (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6), you have a lot of that running through your head.

(2) Answer. You view it through a different lens. I was mad my guys were on there doing it. I think that team leader promised too much without consulting anyone else. Yea, that's just a bone I have to pick.

I don't know if you guys have any more specific questions, or if I have anything else to add. For the gunshot thing, I don't know. I know a lot of the gold star families and the guys think it might have happened. My ears were ringing, so I didn't hear gunshots and I was in shock. To me, I don't know if the gunshot part would actually affect anything. It is interesting to see other people's injuries that look like a gunshot. I think its believable that ball bearings could go through multiple people, in my opinion. I don't know why the concern on a complex attack is so big, obviously the guy who did this works for somebody else and was told he was going to do it. He wasn't alone regardless, so I don't know if that changes anything. I can show you pictures of [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: How old are you? You're doing Triathlons?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I am [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) one. I don't think I'll be making it my total personality.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Being in the intel community, were you ever given a 'be on the lookout' description at any gate?

(2) Answer. I was not specifically. When we were still in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d, I was doing intel work, we were doing TDGs everyday which are awful. We are doing those, seeing how things were going to pan out and seeing which units would take over different parts of the airports. I was telling them specific threats, like which gates were more susceptible

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

to VBIEDs. I knew it would get worse closer to the 31st. There may have been some reporting on certain people, but no pictures. Once we got there though, I didn't get any specific BOLOs. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did, but the FET wasn't really supposed to be by there at all so we didn't get anything like that. I hope you interview (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he has a lot more specific points about where things went wrong or how things could have been prevented. The FET was more just about showing up and searching people.

Like I said, going into Afghanistan, I thought I was going to be doing intel. Priorities shifted once we got there. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was better off going to a FET since they were hurting for people.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever do any shifts in the CoC?

(2) Answer. I did in the beginning. I shouldn't say shifts, but I was trying to get certs and get my workspace set up. I couldn't really do anything other than look at the maps. I can't remember exactly what I was doing, I remember going in and out to get updates for my guys. After two or three days I was with the FET full time, not doing any intel anymore so I wasn't in there much after the first two or three days.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned you received RoE training and received a card. Was this the card you received? *Shows MEU RoE card*

(2) Answer. Yea, I think it was. This card is what I received, a pink sheet of paper just like that. I might have it, I don't know. I have the notebook I used while I was on deployment.

What's interesting is that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Reading the first one, it says you can use force to defend allied military. Does that not include civilians? (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says he saw the Taliban line up and execute Afghan civilians, was told he wasn't allowed to shoot them since the people weren't Americans. The RoE says that you can.

If that's the RoE we received before, they obviously changed it (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't allowed to shoot while he was witnessing people being executed.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see people being executed?

(2) Answer. I did not. I remember at North Gate; the processing area was very far from the gate itself. We went up there to help, and that day I know that a girl was shot with like a rubber bullet, and we were helping to shield her since she didn't want anyone to see her. We took her to a doc to fix her up. There was a guy, I don't know if he got hit

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

by a flash bang or the Taliban, I don't know if he made it. There was some girl with an injury to her femoral, I don't know if she made it. The FET didn't usually go to the gate and leave the search area, unless we were needed to go up there. I didn't see people being executed, but I heard people talk about it. There's a lot of talk about dead babies being passed, I didn't really see any of that, but I know it happened. There are videos of the Taliban and ANA beating people. Stories from guys that were at the gate, I don't know how if these were the RoE, a lot of the Taliban didn't get killed by us.

I don't know if that's because the Taliban were helping with checkpoints. Obviously, there was some deal in place not to shoot them. I hope that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talks to you guys, because a lot of stuff he was told is failure of leadership and stuff like that. He seemed like he was going to when I talked to him last, but maybe not.

a. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned you took notes, could you share those notes with us?

(2) Answer. A lot of them are just like what I ate and when I woke up. I can share some, I guess. I wrote on the 23rd, "the gates are closed, and it sounds like they will be for good". I wrote that women had money and documents sewn into their clothes which was really weird. You'd search them, and they always had a pouch of their valuables in the center of their chest. You'd pat their backs and there would be a wad of paper. I'd tell them to take it out because we had to see it. If they brought bags, there was usually a lot of bread. One person we talked to said she saw perfume bottle with a wire in it. We don't know if that was a bomb or something to see how we would react. None of the women really tried anything, they were very shy. They would giggle while we were patting them down, or they would pass out a lot from dehydration. One woman passed out on me and would not wake up even with a sternum rub. I was trying to calm down her kids, and I got a male doc that finally woke her up. That was good, I was worried she was going to die on me. A lot of stuff like that.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What's your contact?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else?

(2) Answer. I know there has been a lot of talk about accountability, what are you trying to accomplish with this second investigation? I think as far as the complex attack, I don't know why people focus on that specifically. I think it's better to focus on like the RoEs, and what [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saw. I think a lot of the things that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has talked about; makes

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

you wonder why some people weren't held accountable. I'm not sure what accountability is expected. I know a lot the 13 families talk about accountability. I don't know what that looks like, or if that's what this is about, but hopefully something comes of it. I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will make a big difference and that the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a people will corroborate whatever he says. I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) leadership was recently interviewed, separately from this, I think you should interview him as well. I would talk to anyone that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says to talk to, because I think a lot of layers in his unique scenario went wrong. I would definitely talk to him and anyone that he says to talk to.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis,

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lance Curtis
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer



CUI
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 10/20/2023, which begins on ^{question} page 1 and ends on ^{question} page 28. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

10/20/2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20 Oct 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

12 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

1. On 12 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at 2/1 (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as C1, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: What is your name?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: What rank were you at the time of the incident?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. C1: Let's talk about a couple things. Pre-deployment training, your understanding of RoE, the blast itself, then your medical treatment post blast. When do you first remember hearing you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. We were training in (b)(1)1.4d It was early August time frame. We got to (b)(1)1.4d in April of 2021, about two weeks before we went to Afghanistan is when the news started to get crazy, that's when we got our 94-hour window to be ready. We found out officially in mid-august. We actually arrived on 18 August.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: What was your initial impression?

(2) Answer. It was night. We stepped off in condition one, with a round in the chamber. We had a lot of adrenaline and didn't know what to expect since we had seen the news. I can't remember the building specifically, but we collected our packs and were waiting to be told where to go. Then we went to the gym and spent the night there.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Did you work at other gates or mainly Abbey?

(2) Answer. Primarily Abbey Gate. I was never at East or North Gates. I think there was one part of a day, maybe four hours, that we worked by the Airstrip. When we first got there, we spent the night in the gym, then the next like 96 hours were spent at the Abbey Gate with less than four hours of sleep.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Corpsman are in high demand, were you treating Afghans?

(2) Answer. Yes. A lot. I wish I had managed my equipment more properly. I wanted to keep ice packs on me, I brought those just in case and I wasted all 6 in the first half hour. There were geriatrics to infants. I wish I had kept those for my guys, but they were all tough guys. They barely needed treatment, even when they did need treatment.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: You were there with a variety of companies. Did you work the gate with Echo and Ghost Company? Were you mainly attached to 1?

(2) Answer. Correct, I worked with both, but I stuck with my platoon, which was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I knew about 9 of the KIA and 14 of the wounded.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Time of the incident where are you?

(2) Answer. Between the Sniper Tower and the (b)(1)1.4a truck. No one was around me at the time that I know of; the other corpsmen were by the CCP. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I believe, was by the (b)(1)1.4a truck.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Your location was as you described, what were you looking at and doing at the time?

(2) Answer. Soviak and I had just swapped out, I had just treated at a casualty that was crushed against a concrete slab before returning him into the canal. We were ready to start closing the gate, so after I finished treating the patient Maxton and I were swapping out. Our med bags were against the sniper tower. I let him know right where I would be, I was pacing around over there. And that's about it. That's when the bomb went off.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: Where was Max Soviak?

(2) Answer. I can't remember, I think he was near the gate in the fence. I was pacing back and forth standing by.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: Did you realize you were injured?

(2) Answer. Yes. I fell. I couldn't move or hear. I thought I was dying. Eventually I was dragged to the CCP. Another Corpsman was taking a look at me. He put gauze in (b)(6) I wanted to get out of the way because I was useless. Another corpsman escorted me to the gate, and I was transported to the hospital.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any briefings on RoE prior to the deployment? Like right to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, I remember being told we could shoot back if we were in danger or in harm's way.

n. Question and Answer 13.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), HQBN 1st Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you carry a firearm?

(2) Answer. Yes, my issued rifle.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember where you were transported to, the enhanced Role II with the CT scanner?

(2) Answer. I believe so. We all went to about the same place, the one near the flight line, where we were taking the kids.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Before the blast occurred, what was your day-to-day movement? What was your routine?

(2) Answer. When we first approached the gate, all the outer corridor didn't exist. It was just people shoulder to shoulder. The (b)(1) 1.4g got up and we were just trying to hold everyone back. We organized a group of 200 inside the inner gate and checked and treated them. Our platoon got to the gate and, as a platoon, pushed the crowd up to the chevron area. Some marines put those shipping containers in with a crane, which I think helped the (b)(1) 1.4g or not. That was our whole day and night, then we got an hour of sleep. We were tired. After that, us corpsman usually were by the CCP or with our platoon, making sure that they and the refugees were okay. The daytime was worse for complaints of thirst and hunger. There were some with burns and broken bones, a mother and children with 60% body burns. A lot of children separated from families. We had whatever vehicles we could get into to move those kids to a foster area the Swedish had setup. Mostly heat cases, hunger, trying to take care of the kids. A few guys in the platoon got sick, so I would run to the STP to get meds.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Marines were receiving some threat streams about VBIEDs and SVEST and what to look for as threats. Did you receive those as well?

(2) Answer. That would normally be the squad leaders or word of mouth saying there was a VBIED, then we would get pulled into a safer zone. You could see the drones checking the area. It felt like every day there was a supposed VBIED. I only ever heard of an SVEST once, and it was that day. I just heard of a single man in black, I didn't hear about a shaved head or anything.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see anyone with hostile intent?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

(2) Answer. No, it was hard. We knew there were individuals having a hard time. People wanted to get out of the group, and they'd start shoving. I never got physical; the Marines were always there to take care of the corpsman. I was never in distress.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there a point in time, prior to the explosion, that the crowd got more agitated in demeanor?

(2) Answer. Yes, they would definitely get angry if people weren't being processed or if we would stop checking visas for a few minutes. A day before and on the day of, people were getting amped up. We used to have more area further down on the near side of the canal, but we fell back because we were going to close the gate. That's when I had to tend to that gentleman being crushed. I always heard flashbangs, and occasional CS going off. There wasn't a day that the crowd was agitated.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Once East and North Gates closed, did things get worse?

(2) Answer. Yes. When we stopped taking people as well, the crowd was just standing there in the heat and people in the back are pushing. All we had was a squad against the jersey barrier trying to hold people back.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What's your recollection of leadership from Platoon commander to (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I thought it was phenomenal. We had (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who wanted to be as nice with the crowd as he could. He would always take with the crowd and go in with them. Our platoon commander followed in his footsteps. I didn't talk to our company commander too much, but I remember seeing him go talk with the Taliban which is when the Taliban started helping more.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think the leadership was looking out for the safety of the corpsman?

(2) Answer. Yes. They always would get a little mad when we would go to the frontline near crowd, they wanted Marines to escort people who needed treatment back to us.

w. Question and Answer 22.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), HQBN 1st Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any measures being taken when there was an imminent threat?

(2) Answer. I remember taking cover and dispersion. I remember taking a knee, getting concealment if we ever heard that word.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact with the snipers in the tower?

(2) Answer. No, I never engaged with them. Their platoon had two corpsman,
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You spent a lot of time at Abbey Gate. Do you recall any kind of IED rehearsal or a test IED?

(2) Answer. No, not a rehearsal. Not that I can recall.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any IED exploding in that time period?

(2) Answer. No, I remember possible VBIED descriptions but no drills.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever witness any Taliban executing civilians?

(2) Answer. No, I heard gunshots behind the shipping containers. I saw a guy get beat. Over where individuals would exit the Chevron, I saw them hit one guy with a metal pipe. That sucked.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was your understanding of RoE that it was the same across HKIA? Did you get different info on the RoE from before you deployed and when you arrived there?

(2) Answer. It was the same. No ma'am, it was the same across the board.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you by the tower before the explosion?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

(2) Answer. Maybe 10 minutes. We had been at the CCP and we kept hearing "Corpsman up," so Max wanted to hang out around the sniper tower. That's when I treated the casualty being crushed. We switched. He was treating a patient and I was standing by.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You never saw anyone in the crowd that stood out based on threat briefings?

(2) Answer. I wasn't paying attention to the crowd, just the Marines.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who do you remember describing the gentlemen in black?

(2) Answer. I don't remember exactly who we heard that from. I only ever heard the man in black, nothing about him having a shaved head.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who have you heard mention a shaved head?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described a clean-shaven guy in black. I didn't know those details, I just remember a guy in black.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you met that Marine and talked about it?

(2) Answer. No, I have just seen his interviews.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much social media have you consumed on this topic?

(2) Answer. Probably too much. I have seen the hearing, then the podcasts that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has been on, then posts related to HKIA saying we should have used Bagram.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you have heard?

(2) Answer. Just the drone footage from after the explosion. I remember there was a large report that was brought up while we were at wounded warrior.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay, so back to the moment, how many times a day did you hear threat streams?

(2) Answer. Every day there was at least a VBIED warning. One day was twice or three times; it felt like every day there was a possible warning. Just a van or a sedan, differing colors of red or yellow.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Based on your role, you weren't looking for positive ID though, correct?

(2) Answer. That's correct.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: From your perspective, we know that this wasn't something foreseen in terms of scope, this was much larger than you thought right?

(2) Answer. That's right.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: What do you think the leadership was trying to do to balance risk-to-force and risk-to-mission? As an example, the (b)(1)1.4g and jersey barriers?

(2) Answer. Yes, and I believe even the (b)(1)1.4g they had by the inner gate; I remember the .50 cal's there.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Did they plus up medical assets during this time?

(2) Answer. Not that I know of, I remember my senior line bringing AMOLs with gauze, splits, and IVs that brought those out at the time.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: In your mind, according to the RoE, would you have been authorized to engage a target if you had a be on the lookout for, or would you need hostile act/hostile intent?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

(2) Answer.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: Would you have seen multiple people matching a threat description in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Yes, a lot of people looked alike.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: So, what do you remember from the BOLO on that day?

(2) Answer. Just a man in black. Nothing else.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else that you think is important that you want to add?

(2) Answer. Nothing that I can think of, sir.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: Anything that you want to ask me about this?

(2) Answer. No, sir, not that I can think of.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone you think we should talk to, based on what we spoke about today?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HQBN 1st Marines

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He got out in August. He is in (b)(6) now. His phone number is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He wanted to go Green Berets; I think he's waiting on Army recruiters. He's the most fit guy I know, runs at least 6 miles a day. My senior line, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he received a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He got the AMOLs for us. He got out, he is in (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) now. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who is at (b)(6) then, also (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Echo and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from fourth platoon. They were both meritoriously promoted.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You got your FMF, I see.

(2) Answer. I received mine meritoriously. I wish that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had received an FMF. He didn't get his FMF; he received a Navy Commendation Medal with Combat V and got a significant problems evaluation for not receiving his FMF on the same day, even though he was out there treating guys right after the incident. I feel like he deserves it, and his getting both things on the same day sucked. I feel like it got lost as we were changing leadership.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That brings purple heart submissions to mind. Anything to say?

(2) Answer. I received mine, and Max Soviak did, posthumously. None of the other corpsmen were injured.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI

Exhibit S009

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 49. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

12 Oct 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

12 Oct 2023
DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2023, BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by 130b, and questions from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by 130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion: The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

a. Question 1

Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We interviewed your team two years ago so we don't need to cover the arrival to HKIA and the pre-deployment training. Quick background though, how long were you with the battalion?

Answer: I was with the battalion for 4 years prior to deployment, since 2017. I was there June of 2017. We did two deployments before that. A UDP to Okinawa, then the 31st MEU.

b. Question 2

Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any prior deployments to CENTCOM?

Answer: No, Sir.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

c. Question 3

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Are you a school trained (b)(6)?

Answer: Yes sir. I went to (b)(6) during the winter of 2020.

d. Question 4

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your billet on the team?

Answer: I was assistant team leader. Essentially the (b)(6) of the team. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the (b)(6).

e. Question 5

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the entire team at HKIA?

Answer: Yes, and we were plussed up with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) for a more even rotation.

f. Question 6

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you deployed in April of 2021?

Answer: Either early April or early March. We were attached to Echo Company throughout the deployment.

g. Question 7

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you hear you were going to HKIA?

Answer: We heard the rumor mill as the Taliban were taking over Afghanistan. We heard it could be a thing, but then it would fade away, then it would come back. It would do that until a week before we left. We were packed and ready to go, then got the actual call to go while we were in a planning meeting. We were in (b)(1)1.4d at the time.

h. Question 8

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you leave?

Answer: I was the only one of my team to leave with the first element of Echo. We got there during period of darkness between 15 and 16 August.

i. Question 9

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did the rest of your team arrive?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 2/1 (b)(6)

Answer: The rest of the company and my team got there on the morning of the 17th.

j. Question 10

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your initial task for your team?

Answer: Go to a radio tower and replace a sniper team from 1/8 that was in a radio tower by the civilian pax terminal. We replaced them, that was our mission for about 24 hours. Echo Company had a perimeter by that civilian pax terminal, so we plussed them up with some overhead support.

k. Question 11

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to pushing out, did you receive any ROE brief?

Answer: We received our ROE brief in (b)(1)1.4d prior to departing. We got some cards that had the ROE on them. There were short answer questions on the back to use if anyone asked what we were doing there.

l. Question 12

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you still have those cards?

Answer: I do. It is in my office. My whole team got that card, and I am almost positive that all of Echo Company did because we were all in the same brief that they got passed out.

m. Question 13

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember what the ROE stated?

Answer: Positive ID, inherent right to self-defense, defense of others. Escalation of force. It told us not to use unnecessary amounts of force. I can't remember verbatim, but that's what I remember.

n. Question 14

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You'd say it's a defensive ROE that required hostile act, hostile intent, and positive ID in order to engage?

Answer: Yes sir.

o. Question 15

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your understanding of defense of others?

Answer: That's where it got weird. Initially we were defending everyone. If we believed there was an American in the crowd we were cleared to use deadly force if necessary. After the 17th, it was you have to know that there is an American being shot at or you had to be directly shot at to engage. That's where it got weird.

p. Question 16

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They had to be shooting at you, or would the standing ROE of hostile intent still have stood?

Answer: Pointing a weapon would suffice, the part about shooting was in regard to crowds.

q. Question 17

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did that change on the 17th coincide with the relationship established with Taliban for security?

Answer: That would be my assumption, but I do not know that for a fact.

r. Question 18

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you hear that we would be coordinating with the Taliban?

Answer: I don't know if I officially heard about that until we were moving out to Abbey Gate.

s. Question 19

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you stay at that tower until you went to Abbey Gate?

Answer: We were there for approximately 24 hours. Then we got called from our (b)(6) and were told we were being re-tasked. That's when we were told we were going to Abbey Gate to provide overwatch. Initially that was just to provide overwatch for a platoon that was recovering some guys from (b)(1)1.4d, but that mission never happened.

t. Question 20

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was your (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

Answer: Yes.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

u. Question 21

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were attached to Echo, so who were you receiving taskings from prior to that?

Answer: The whole deployment we were working for and being tasked by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) until Weapons Company arrived to HKIA, then (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) took over our tasking at battalion's direction.

v. Question 22

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you worked for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who took direction from the battalion command team?

Answer: Yes sir.

w. Question 23

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did your team push to Abbey Gate?

Answer: I believe it was the 19th.

x. Question 24

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Can you describe what the conditions were like when you arrived out there?

Answer: It was probably the most chaotic scene that I have seen in my life. The entire alley that we later cleared out was full of civilians trying to push through the gate. We got in the tower to get overwatch. Everyone was trying to keep the gate closed. We pulled up a vehicle to the back side of the gate just to keep it closed. Once we finally got our bearing to push to (b)(1)1.4d we opened the gate and had guys in riot gear push out. They didn't make it far before being consumed by the crowd. We saw guys almost trampled to death, so we pulled everyone back inside. Non-lethals were then employed to break up the crowd. That was CS gas and flashbangs.

y. Question 25

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened next?

Answer: Once the CS Gas was employed we had enough standoff to push some guys out. We pushed out the platoon that was initially going to go to (b)(1)1.4d. They pushed out and created a safe space and pushed the civilians to the other side of the chain link fence to give us some stand off. We also had a decent amount of distance away from the outer gate.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

z. Question 26

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Your team was in the tower during this?

Answer: Yes, correct (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were down helping the guys push out, the rest of us were up top doing overwatch. We had that covered, so we sent those two down to help out (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was down there as well.

aa. Question 27

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you there when they set the chevron was up?

Answer: I was on post and saw the giant forklift carrying shipping containers, and was very confused. When I asked why, we got back briefed that it was to help in the event of possible VBIEDs.

bb. Question 28

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long after that did you see Taliban operating checkpoints?

Answer: Prior to the chevron, they were about 100 meters down the road past where the chevron eventually ended up. We could barely see them. Once the shipping containers went up, they started using that as their entry control point and had guys on top with two alleys on the sides to vet people.

cc. Question 29

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever interact with the Taliban directly?

Answer: I did not have any interactions with them whatsoever. They stayed at the chevron the entire time. At one point, one dude came right below the tower and did crowd control next to Marines, which was insane to me.

dd. Question 30

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever go to the chevron or the Barron Hotel?

Answer: I walked down almost to the chevron, it made me uneasy, I turned around and walked back. I just didn't like having them elevated and looking down on me.

ee. Question 31

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So your observation of the Taliban was from the sniper tower? Did you ever witness the Taliban kill evacuees?

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Answer: Correct. I saw them beating evacuees. I cannot confirm if they were shooting civilians. I did see them shooting from the side of the chevron, shooting in the air. At certain points I saw them shoot down, but I couldn't see what they were shooting at.

ff. Question 32

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you saw them beating people in the gap between the chevron and the wall?

Answer: Correct, sir.

gg. Question 33

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) you never personally saw Taliban shoot civilians?

Answer: Correct.

hh. Question 34

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your team ever see Taliban shoot civilians?

Answer: I believe (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did, he spoke about seeing it. Personally, I did not.

ii. Question 35

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Back to your understanding of the ROE, how long after the chevron was emplaced did you see the Taliban mistreating civilians?

Answer: As soon as the Taliban collapsed to the chevron, we started seeing that.

jj. Question 36

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) At this point you were still operating off defensive ROE, what was your understanding of defense of others?

Answer: At this point, my understanding was we needed confirmation of US citizens in the crowd. I couldn't see past the chevron, and there were hundreds of people in the crowd making it impossible to act. I would not have been confident that I was doing the right thing if I were to engage.

kk. Question 37

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever ask anyone if you were allowed to engage?

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Answer: Personally I did not. Adding on to that, we knew that the Taliban were holding our outer cordon. That coupled with not being able to confirm anything is why I didn't ask any questions.

II. Question 38

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you assessed that engaging the Taliban would have caused greater issues?

Answer: I would say yes, in my opinion. In my head, that action would have made problems higher than there needed to be problems. At battalion or higher. I don't think it was battalion that made the decision to work with the Taliban, so my understanding of that stopped me from engaging them.

mm. Question 39

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your comms with higher like at this point?

Answer: At this point, kind of a joke. We used the Signal App. With the (b)(1)1.4g in place, we couldn't even reach to the inner gate with comms. Black gear kind of worked, but Signal was primary. Our (b)(6) would come to the gate and get reports, and swap our SD cards. We would do that, rinse and repeat. He would take those reports and pictures back to the JOC or Battalion COC, and bring us any information when he came back.

nn. Question 40

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you are on Signal, who are you sending traffic to?

Answer: Primarily our guys at inner gate, (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(6) Also internal comms with the team, like when I would go for a supply run. That was pretty much it, via Signal or black gear.

oo. Question 41

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding the Taliban, you never requested to engage them. Did any of your teammates request to engage them?

Answer: Not that I can confidently recollect.

pp. Question 42

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You referenced black gear, what's that?

Answer: The little black Motorola radio. Those worked in the Abbey Gate Corridor, but that was it. We monitored that with whatever company was at the gate so

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that we could report to them or they could report to us. That was generally with their company staff.

qq. Question 43

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the Signal messages a chat group?

Answer: I think it was mostly just traffic between individuals like our (b)(6) (b)(6) or the senior HOG (Hunter of Gunmen) back at inner gate, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

rr. Question 44

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who would send that traffic?

Answer: I can't speak for everybody, I think it was mostly myself and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I would assume the other guys did.

ss. Question 45

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you still have those messages?

Answer: Possibly. I have deleted the app. I would need to redownload and see if I still have them.

tt. Question 46

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would act as a runner, would you send others to him or the COC?

Answer: Yes, once we had a vehicle that made things easier. They also had a vehicle, so they could drive up and make that SD card swap. If they didn't come to us, I would run back in the vehicle and get whatever we needed.

uu. Question 47

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How were reports being passed?

Answer: At first they were in rite-in-the rain notebooks. After that we transitioned to observation log sheets. We still have all of those observation logs from that deployment. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) has all of those. I believe the earliest he has is the 19th, and the latest he has is the morning of the 26th. Once the IED hit it was a scramble, and he ended up with those. I saw them about a month and a half ago, first time I had seen them since the deployment.

vv. Question 48

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The SD Cards, were those from your camera kit?

Answer: Yeah we had that Canon camera. We would take pictures, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would come grab the SD card. Once the pics went wherever they went, he would come swap us out. He would do that probably every 12 hours.

ww. Question 49

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you received the SD cards back, everything had been taken off?

Answer: Correct, my understanding is he brought those pictures to the JOC.

xx. Question 50

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The JOC or the COC?

Answer: I couldn't tell you for sure, one of the two.

yy. Question 51

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever bring reports or SD cards to the JOC or COC?

Answer: I did not, and to my knowledge my team did not.

zz. Question 52

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We have seen some pictures of pictures. Do you have any of those?

Answer: I do. Mostly of Taliban at the gate and the crowds. That's about all I have.

aaa. Question 53

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any photos of suspicious individuals?

Answer: I might have two pictures. A group of two individuals on a rooftop, then one dude that was deep on the fence line on a rooftop that would pop his head up. He was a ways out there, but they looked just like the Taliban at the checkpoint. We just made note of them and observed them. They didn't do anything weird.

bbb. Question 54

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever have conversations at the gate or in the tower about ROE or changing ROE?

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Answer: I pretty much just talked to the team to make sure we were on the same page about what we understood. That's about where it stopped, for me.

ccc. Question 55

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We heard reports about IED probes, about ISIS or the Taliban trying to see how we would respond to an IED, do you remember anything like that?

Answer: I don't remember exactly what day, but there were reports of a suspicious individual with a backpack in vicinity of the footbridge. We saw that dude and watched him. Nothing was weird about him, it was just a guy with a backpack. Eventually we lost him in the crowd. At one point there was a BOLO for a gold Corolla, but we never had eyes on a gold Corolla. Those were the only two probes I was aware of.

ddd. Question 56

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you receive those BOLOs or threat streams?

Answer: Either via black gear from the team that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was with, or from company commanders that would come to the towers. Or if the commanders ever got any intel, they would pass it to us.

eee. Question 57

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did you interact with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)?

Answer: I don't remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) until post blast. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would come say what's up to us. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would come talk to us when they were on the gate, and their staff would as well. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came a lot to check on us. So did (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was out there any time his guys were out there.

fff. Question 58

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They would use those face-to-face opportunities to pass you new information?

Answer: Correct.

ggg. Question 59

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any engagements with the battalion leadership like the (b)(6) (b)(6) near the tower?

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Answer: The only time I saw the (b)(6) was our first day out there when he almost got trampled. We saw the (b)(6) a couple times. The (b)(6) would come and talk to us in the tower. The majority of leaders we talked to, talked to us in the tower so that they could get a lay of the land and get any back-briefs from us on what we saw.

hhh. Question 60

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any threat streams that you received other than those two? Anything that battalion or higher was concerned about?

Answer: Other than until the BOLO of the guy we thought was the actual bomber, no.

iii. Question 61

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you see that suspicious individual by the footbridge?

Answer: Earlier on, maybe the 22nd or the 23rd.

jjj. Question 62

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any individuals that company or other attachments like (b)(1)1.4a or foreign militaries pointed out to you?

Answer: Other than those two BOLOs, the only BOLO we got was from the Army (b)(1)1.4a guys who told us about an older gentlemen with a younger gentlemen, clean shaven, in a black man dress. That was early on the morning of the 26th. The (b)(1)1.4a guys actually came down when we had eyes on that BOLO, and confirmed that our observation matched the description of that BOLO.

kkk. Question 63

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Describe that sequence of events of being notified of that individual?

Answer: I don't remember exactly how we got the BOLO. When we were looking at the individuals we thought fit the BOLO, (b)(1)1.4a came to the tower. We pointed out the two individuals, and confirmed that they matched the description of the BOLO that they had received.

lll. Question 64

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember who the (b)(1)1.4a guys were that came to the tower?

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Answer: It was two of them. SSG Knauss and I don't remember the other one.

mmm. Question 65

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened after they confirmed the individuals you saw matched the BOLO?

Answer: We had our consolidation order to prep our gear to depart late morning on the 26th. My job was guys and gear. I started shuttling guys back to the gym in the NATO zone to prep our gear. I was in the gym until the guys that were with me had their gear prepped. After that, they pushed back out. During that gap, apparently (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) spoke with the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) about those individuals. But that's just what I have been told.

nnn. Question 66

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was with you at the gym?

Answer: I cant remember exactly who was with me when we first went back. I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I think, maybe, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were with me as well. Once those guys prepped their stuff, they took the vic back out. I stayed at the gym, then the other half of the team came to do their stuff.

ooo. Question 67

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you didn't return to the gate until right before the blast, after everyone prepped their gear?

Answer: Correct.

ppp. Question 68

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to the 26th, how often was your team identifying suspicious people in the crowd?

Answer: A couple times a day. You could tell which people wanted to leave the country because they were trying to get ahead. There would usually be older men just sitting on the canal wall with no sense of urgency, just watching everything happen. We would make note and pay attention to those guys.

qqq. Question 69

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What would you do about those suspicious individuals?

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Answer: We would take pictures. If they were weird, we would write it in the ObsLog. The pictures would go back to the COC or the JOC and our (b)(6) (b)(6) would look at our ObsLog.

rrr. Question 70

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see anyone out there that met engagement criteria under the ROE?

Answer: Not that I personally saw.

sss. Question 71

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, you saw guys that matched the (b)(1)1.4a BOLO. Did you personally get eyes on those individuals?

Answer: I did, through the M110. He was approximately 15-20 meters southwest of the tower on the far side of the canal. We zoomed in and took some pictures. That was our interaction.

ttt. Question 72

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember what that picture looks like?

Answer: No I don't. I remember what those two guys were doing. The younger gentlemen, in his early 20s was laying in the older gentleman's lap. The older gentleman was rubbing his back, like he was consoling him. That's the part that stood out to me the most.

uuu. Question 73

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) But you don't think their actions met the requirements for engagement?

Answer: Personally, if we had the engagement authority, I would have been confident taking that shot. I think it would have been a lawful shot to take. We had multiple individuals involved with the BOLO, the (b)(1)1.4a guys, confirm that BOLO. I don't know where they got that BOLO from, but our (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came and confirmed that those guys fit that BOLO to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) when I was back in the gym.

vvv. Question 74

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you hear about that confirmation from the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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Answer: Actually, I can't tell you exactly when I had that conversation with the guys on the team.

www. Question 75

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you still at HKIA when you had that conversation?

Answer: I can't confidently tell you, sir.

xxx. Question 76

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So regarding that individual, what do you think should have happened? Should he have been shot, or should something else have happened?

Answer: I'm not sure. I think some type of action should have been taken. We just watched him for a while, probably two or three hours, would be my best guess. I think they were still watching him when I left to prep our gear. We pretty much just watched them until they disappeared in the crowd, and we didn't see them again.

yyy. Question 77

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They lost observation while you were away from the tower?

Answer: Correct, sir.

zzz. Question 78

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You didn't know who this guy was, he wasn't a known hostile threat or a combatant, correct? You just had that BOLO from (b)(1)1.4a?

Answer: Correct, sir.

aaaa. Question 79

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see any individuals, other than that occasion, that you felt warranted further action other than observation?

Answer: No, sir.

bbbb. Question 80

Question: On the evening of 25 August, we know that Echo RIP'd (Relief in Place) out with Golf Company. Prior to that, Echo Company had been pushed out to the footbridge for security. Could you describe what that force posture looked like?

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Answer: They had quite a few Marines out there. From what I saw, it was a pretty even spread along the canal wall. Areas that had a bunch of civilians in the canal would have maybe two or three Marines to keep the crowd in the canal. That is pretty much all I have for that.

cccc. Question 81

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could you observe the footbridge where the Marines were holding back the crowd?

Answer: Yes, I actually walked down there at one point. The footbridge wasn't crazy from what I saw. There was some C-Wire on it to keep the civilians at bay. There were a ton of civilians on the south side of that bridge, in vicinity of the parking lot, on the 25th.

dddd. Question 82

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember about how many Marines or (b)(1)1.4d Soldiers that were in vicinity of the footbridge?

Answer: Probably about 5-6 Marines, maybe a little bit more. There were probably about 2-3 (b)(1)1.4d by the foot bridge as well.

eeee. Question 83

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember when you went down there?

Answer: Not for sure, sir.

ffff. Question 84

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there many people on the far side walk way?

Answer: No, sir.

gggg. Question 85

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember when that changed? We understand there was a huge surge of people the night of the 25th?

Answer: When I went to sleep, we had dispersion to the foot path. When I woke up to take my shift, we had collapsed the dispersion and civilians were all the way up to the Jersey Barriers and c-wire at the base of the sniper tower.

hhhh. Question 86

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Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What time did you get on shift?

Answer: Either late the 25th or early the 26th. It was dark. I was confused as to why I could hear the voices or the screaming again. When I looked outside, I saw that the crowd had collapsed. I don't remember who I replaced at the time, but they told me we had collapsed the perimeter. After that, I sat there with a flashlight and screamed at people to sit down.

iiii. Question 87

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you know why the perimeter was closed?

Answer: I was told that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) had pulled the perimeter back. When (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came out to the tower early on the morning of the 26th and asked us why the perimeter had collapsed. We kind of asked him the same thing, we didn't know why that decision was made. From my understanding, it was to reduce the signature along the canal. That's just what I grasp, I was never told the specific why.

jjjj. Question 88

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your team have word about when the gate would close at this point?

Answer: It would have been the morning of the 26th that we were told that we were going to close the gate. We were told that North Gate had closed and that Abbey Gate was the only gate open. That was definitely on the 26th.

kkkk. Question 89

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you come on shift between the 25th and the 26th, do you remember any threat streams about attacks at Abbey Gate?

Answer: I do not.

llll. Question 90

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember any changes to security measures during that period?

Answer: Yes, actually. There was one point, and I can't tell you exactly where, the (b)(1) 1.44 told us that an IED was going to be detonated around X time. I don't remember what that time was. We had that hard timeline that an IED was going to go off. We shut everything down, all the guys took a knee behind the wall. We were buttoned up in the tower. The time hit, and nothing happened. That was kind of that, so we moved on trying to get as many people in while we still had the gate open. I don't know exactly

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when that happened on the 26th, it was before I went back to north HKIA to get our gear ready. I can't put an exact time to it. I remember events for that day, but not times.

mmmm. Question 91

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned that the ROE changed on the 17th. Who did you hear that from?

Answer: The (b)(6) of the platoon I was initially attached to, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I traveled into HKIA with him and his platoon, the (b)(6) I heard about the change from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) probably on the 17th. He told us we needed to confirm it was a US citizen being threatened prior to engaging the threat.

nnnn. Question 92

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You said that when you were observing, you would take note if any individuals were suspicious, was that based on a baseline or parameters you were given?

Answer: That was a just at the team level. If any of us saw someone we deemed suspicious, we would tell the team and look at that individuals through the glass. We had some young guys, this was their first time doing anything like that. So we were trying to train them on their callouts. Only legitimately suspicious activity went higher, that stuff stayed at the team level

We were looking for any anomalies in how people would act or move, if they were just hanging out. Anyone that didn't fit the mold of the crowd. We would check them out, look at their build, and observe the actions they were taking. You could tell who wanted out and who was just there for the ride, so we paid attention to the guys just hanging out.

oooo. Question 93

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned that this was training for some of the guys on the team, who was doing stuff like this for the first time?

Answer: All of us except for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who had worked at the border doing some customs work. None of us had deployed to the Middle East except for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he had spent some time in (b)(1)1.4d

pppp. Question 94

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, a (b)(1)1.4a soldier came and gave you a BOLO. Who was in the tower at that time?

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Answer: I remember him coming up. I remember a Soldier and a second individual, it might have been a Marine. I have a mental image of the Soldier standing next to the ladder well and the second guy coming up the ladder well. That was when they came and confirmed that the individuals that we saw matched the BOLO. I think that is was SSG Knauss with a Marine.

I know that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were there from our team. That might have been it. I was up there as well, I saw the (b)(1)1.4a team come up. I remember seeing them come up. I don't know.

qqqq. Question 95

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you are confident that the three of you were up in the tower when those two guys came up?

Answer: I am. I may have been sleeping up there at the time that they came up, which would be why my account is so hazy.

rrrr. Question 96

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long did you personally observe those suspicious individuals?

Answer: For 20-30 minutes (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on the gun at the time. I looked through the gun, we had pictures, and it was also just looking with my eyes. I would say 20-30 minutes, before (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) took over on observing, before I left to get our gear ready.

ssss. Question 97

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You came back to the tower in a vehicle after prepping gear at North HKIA, correct?

Answer: Yeah, I had (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) with me in the second wave that came back. We stopped off at Echo, who were staged at the inner gate, because they had a bunch of non-lethal munitions (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) walked back to the tower (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and I got the non-lethals and drove back in. By the time we got back to the outer gate, I was pulling in our team vic. The Engineers were setting up obstacles, and told me I needed to move our vehicle. That's what I was doing when the blast went off.

tttt. Question 98

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where was all of your team at the time of the blast?

Answer: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were in the tower (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was walking in the outer corridor (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was pulling a guy out the crowd that had reached out from the canal, because there was a guy with my name on a sign. Guys would reach out to us, and tell

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us that an individual had clear paperwork, and they would look for a signal on how they could indicate that to us. That's why my name was on the sign. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were with me in the vehicle.

uuuu. Question 99

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were two guys being in the tower at all times the standard minimum?

Answer: Yes, sir.

vvvv. Question 100

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We know the blast went off at 1736 and 52 seconds. What do you experience after the blast goes off?

Answer: The blast goes off when the vehicle was almost parked. I looked to my right and saw the plume of smoke. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) said it was an IED, I said it wasn't. I was still in disbelief. He jumps out. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was trapped in the back since the door would get stuck. My sling was wrapped around the gear shift. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) gets out to go see what is going on. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) heads up to the tower. Once I finally get out, I see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) run past me with a kid in his hand. I start trying to get accountability. I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the tower. I need to find (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) so I ask them where those guys were.

The guys in the tower were shaken up. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) had blood all over his face and asked me if his eyes were bleeding. They told us that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were down by the canal. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) looked and saw that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was in the area of the blast. We knew we had to go get our boy. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) headed down to get him. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came up to the tower at that time, so I put him on the gun since (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was rocked. I had to calm (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) down, he racked the .50 cal right away. I had to calm him down and tell him it was fine. That's when we had impacts on the east window of the tower. We closed the window, and pulled the .50 cal out of the west window. We tried observing to see if we could see where those shots had come from. Once we got (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) calmed down, we put him in that back window.

wwww. Question 101

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How do you know you took rounds on the eastern window?

Answer: It looked like rounds hit the window. We heard noises hit the window, and it looked like rounds had hit a bulletproof pane of glass. We never saw a confirmed shooter, we just heard the sounds and saw what looked like round impacts on the glass before we even shut it. Those 3 marks had not been there previously. After that we gave it a little bit, we moved the SAS to the back window to scan for hostiles. We thought maybe it came from the building we called the crack house, since it was kind of

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shady. At this point I have (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) up there. They had snapped out of it. We knew where (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were, so I go down out of the tower to look for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). That's when everything started hitting me. The smell of smoke and burnt hair smacked me in the face. I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) helping drag SSgt Hoover into the gate. Seeing his cammies stained with blood, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told me that he was gone. That's when the reality of the entire situation hit me.

yyyy. Question 102

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) This is right at the base of the tower, at the start of the inner corridor where you see this. Was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) trying to treat his injuries or was he being medevaced?

Answer: When I saw him, he had just been drug in (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) said that he was gone. They were getting him to the CCP established inside the outer gate. Every single corpsman in the battalion was established right there. I don't know who's idea that was, but it definitely saved some guys.

They got Hoover to the corpsmen, all the corpsmen were triaging bodies. As corpsmen would come by, I kept asking where (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was, trying to find out where he was. Finally I see him, out in the outer corridor. I saw him, so at this point I know where everyone is. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was good. I knew (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was working on trying to get to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). I didn't see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) again until maybe a year following the attack.

xxxx. Question 103

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) But you saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) from the tower, that's when (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) went to get him?

Answer: That's correct. So after I found (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I went back into the tower to try and work crowd control while everyone was being triaged. Once I got into the tower, we had some pen flares that we used as crowd control. I shot those at the wall to try and keep the crowd back while we got all of our guys back inside the wire. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) had grabbed our bolt cutters and cut a hole in the fence to cut down the evacuation time and distance. I don't know exactly when he did that. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was helping triage (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). They got everyone in and evacuated from that area in less than 15 minutes. Once everyone was evacuated, the gate was closed. I remember sitting up there, and hearing a civilian at the base of the tower just gasping for air. That was what stuck with me. The pure carnage of something like that happening. That dude breathing at the base of the tower was rough. He just finally stopped breathing. Once everyone was evacuated we closed up shop.

Somehow our vehicle reappeared. It had been used as an evac vehicle. It showed up in the same spot, just with blood in it. Our guys packed up. I remember we were told that they needed more blood, so we headed back and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) donated some blood. An Army unit, I don't know which one, came and replaced us in the inner corridor. After

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(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) donated blood, we went back to where Echo Company and our stuff was in the gym. We hung out for the rest of the night and sorted out the gear we had scattered around that area.

zzzz. Question 104

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6): Post blast, you didn't see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at all, other than when you looked out and saw him?

Answer: I did not. He was one of my junior guys when I was a squad leader. He was very mature. I fired one of my team leaders, to basically make him my second in command. When I told him I was going to sniper platoon, he wanted to drop a package to come over as well. It was a lot, I was in kind of denial at the time. When we got to the Role II, only one of us could go in. So (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) went in and checked on him, so did (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

aaaa. Question 105

Question: C1: You said you could see where (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was?

Answer: Yes, he was in the outer corridor when I got eyes on him. We had some sort of eye to eye, acknowledgement.

bbbb. Question 106

Question: C1: You could see where (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was as well?

Answer: Yes, he was down by the wall near the canal. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) saw him, and told me he was hit. I said no way. I looked out, and I saw him. There were so many bodies strewn down there, he was all red. I couldn't make out his full body. I saw his face. He was looking up to us.

cccc. Question 107

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6): We know you interacted with the (b)(1)1.4a team. SSG Knauss, maybe a Marine with them. Did you ever engage with anyone from (b)(1)1.4a

Answer: Not that I could confidently confirm. I know that some of the guys that worked on (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at HKIA, he has talked to some of them since. A soldier that was out there, who was part of a med team out there, I met him at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) earlier this year. I don't remember his name. If you interview (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he can give you those guys names. But I didn't interact with any (b)(1)1.4a I don't know if anyone else did.

dddd. Question 108

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned that guys would sleep in the tower. What was your team's battle rhythm? Day/night crew? 8 on, 8 off?

Answer: We kind of had a rotation. We also had two guys on observation, the guy on the gun/the guy on the glass and taking pictures. One or two guys would be sleeping. The other guys would normally go help pull people from canal. We would probably do between 4-6 hours on post during the day. At night we would do 2-3 hours to make sure everyone was aware and not just nodding off. That was what our battle rhythm looked like.

eeee. Question 109

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you paired up with anyone specifically or was it just whoever was awake?

Answer: There weren't any set pairs. We tried to keep me, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) since he was less experienced. Any time we would go down to help, we would normally go in pairs as best as we could. Sometimes (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would go help with civilians in the tents in the inner corridor. We usually had to force him to sleep.

ffff. Question 110

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Going to work in the canal, were you tasked to do that?

Answer: No. No one told us to or asked us to, and no one complained. We saw how crazy it was. I had worked with Echo Company, that was my original company. I had a good working relationship with them. Anything I could do to help those guys out I would. We saw a need and just tried to help out everywhere we could.

ggggg. Question 111

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often do you consume any kind of media or podcasts or news about Abbey Gate?

Answer: The only one I have listened to is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) interview with Shawn Ryan. I was done talking with this about 4 months ago, I have been avoiding it.

hhhhh. Question 112

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why did you stop talking about this four months ago?

Answer: It's like a scab that doesn't heal. I have drug my feet for two years with

(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

(b)(6)

iiii. Question 113

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6) ?

Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

jjjj. Question 114

Question: C1: So (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is the (b)(6) You are the (b)(6) (b)(6) What is everyone else's position?

Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

kkkk. Question 115

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Back to the suspicious male on the 26th, what was his description again?

Answer: Two individuals. An older gentlemen, and a younger gentlemen. The older gentlemen was wearing a black man dress. The younger dude was clean shaven, early to mid twenties. I don't remember what color he was wearing. That was the description, to the best of my knowledge.

llll. Question 116

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was this the photo? *Shows photo of bearded individual on the wall*

Answer: I can't confirm if that's the same guy we were observing that day. That photo looks familiar. It is off our camera. It has the same scratch that our camera had.

mmmm. Question 117

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 (b)(6)

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything else you want to add that we didn't cover?

Answer: No.

nnnnn. Question 118

Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anyone else that we should talk to?

Answer: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) since he's got the higher-level knowledge of what was going on (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I know he is coming in later. I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) has one later with someone. Y'all have already talked to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I believe. I would talk to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Especially for the obslogs that he has. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That's it for me sir. I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will have some names for you, but that's all I can think of. I would also say (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

ooooo. Question 119

Question: C1: Right before the blast could you see people in the crowd still holding up blue passports?

Answer: The entire reason that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was down there was because someone had reached out from the states that their old interpreter was in the crowd who had good SIV paperwork and was totally cleared for entrance, and they were looking for a way to get him to us. There were definitely still people out there, that's why Hoover was out there as well, trying to get his old interpreter. I didn't see many blue Passports while I was there, other than a family of six Americans I pulled out at one point. That was hard for us the whole time, we didn't know what the right SIV documents looked like, and people had all kinds of not real documents. That was a whole thing.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231025, which begins on *Question page 1* and ends on *question page 119*. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231025
DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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ACCG-SR

16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of three interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (C1), (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you get any initial indicators about deployment to Afghanistan, any on again off again?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. In (b)(1)1.4d it was 'we are going, not going, back to going, then back off.' It went on for months.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Talk to me about the chain of command within the sniper team.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) #2 was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he was our (b)(6) #3 would be me (b)(6). #4 was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) team (b)(6). He managed all things that dealt with comms for the team. When we did real sniper missions, we carried comms sets with us. He kept up the comms and managed the equipment. #5 was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I don't believe he had any special qualifications (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) wasn't originally on our team in (b)(1)1.4d. He joined us on our team in (b)(1)1.4d from a different sniper team. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) #6 was the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was with us the entire time. He went through the screening and brought into our platoon before he deployed. I think he is out now and in (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) #6 was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). He was our point man, our youngest guy. (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: Does (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) have (b)(6)? Was there a sniper with a bushy beard?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. If it would be anyone it would be him.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Explain to me the team qualification (HOG vs. PIG)

(2) Answer. They are community acronyms. It really indicates who has been to Scout Sniper School. Everyone on the team is expected to have the skills, but only 0317s have been to the Scout Sniper School. A HOG (Hunter of Gunmen) has been to the school. A PIG has not been officially Scout Sniper trained. Sniper platoons would have tryouts (selection) for Marines. If selected, they are now PIGs and they are in the platoons. They are Scout Sniper platoon members, but not Scout Snipers.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What is the difference in capability?

(2) Answer. Compared to a brand-new PIG, there is a lot b/c they are junior in the platoon. If you've been in the platoon for years, then not much difference between a PIG and HOG. Really that we have only not been through the school.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Are HOGs the senior trainers for the PIGs

(2) Answer. Yes sir. The HOGs are in charge of training the PIGs. (b)(6)

(b)(6) It's a particular skill set you have to be trained on. It provides us a special skill identifier. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were the only HOGs on our team.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How does the RTO get selected and trained?

(2) Answer. How they get selected is they have a natural inclination for comms. It's an important aspect to the team. He was selected by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and we send them to the comms shop for more training. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) course.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember when (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) joined your team?

(2) Answer. It was a couple days in to being at HKIA.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) position?

(2) Answer. He joined our team to increase our manning. (b)(6)

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was in the tower with you?

(2) Answer. Yes. He was with me when the blast went off.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: How long was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on the team?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. *BG Curtis orienting (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to the UNCLASS map and common lexicon used to describe Abbey Gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: While you're in (b)(1)1.4d on/off again. When do you know you're going to go to Afghanistan ballpark? Or when do you get the final word?

(2) Answer. It couldn't have been more than a week before we left.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: When do you remember being boots on ground in Kabul?

(2) Answer. We landed in a C130 from (b)(1)1.4d

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Describe the first thing you remember when you land?

(2) Answer. They told us before we landed the airport was overrun and to expect contact. When we landed it was dark, empty. We set up 360 security and it wasn't crowds of people and contact with the Taliban. It was just dark. Then we started walking to get our gear/packs from the shipping containers.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where do you go after you get your gear?

(2) Answer. We went to the gym w/ Echo Co. Walked around. I've been on joint bases before and it felt the exact same way. Didn't feel any different than any other base I've been on.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it just your team attached to Echo Company, or any others from the sniper platoon?

(2) Answer. Just our team. I think the rest came later. They eventually came to Kabul.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where were the other teams located while at HKIA?

(2) Answer. They were at another tower at the inner gate looking south towards the canal.

u. Question and Answer 20.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember who was on that team?

(2) Answer. I do. It was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I think he was the (b)(6). The team leader was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). I can't remember who else (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on that team before he was pushed to us. They pushed him to us because we were more forward and at the point of friction and needed bodies to help.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was your platoon leader?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your initial task at HKIA?

(2) Answer. We didn't go right to the gate. Initially we didn't have anything, no mission or task. Not sure what to do. So we went to look for work. I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) went and talked with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). There are two missions I remember prior to Abbey gate. The first mission was still nighttime. We pushed out to this destroyed graveyard of airplanes and set up a sniper hide-site there. Not sure where that was located on the airfield. We conducted observation from there. I think that was a mix of what we think we should do and the company ordered us to do. We set up comms. People were tripping out over gunshots. I told them you're going to hear that. Besides me, this was everyone else's first deployment. They were more heightened and nervous that first night. We set stuff up, everything became a target so I had to tell them not everything is a target. Nothing came from there. We also went to another hide-site for observation. We were in an actual tower of some sort. At this point, not sure which company, Marines were all around the perimeter in the prone. I think to prevent the airport from being overrun. They were 2/1 Marines. Again nothing came from this hide-site.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get an ROE brief before you got to HKIA? What did you understand of the ROE?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. The JAG briefed us. We had a lot of partner forces there. #1 just because they are engaging people doesn't mean we do. #2 if the Taliban is engaging an Afghan doesn't mean we can. Other than that, it was basic/inherent right to self-defense.

y. Question and Answer 24.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were already tracking that you were going to be working with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. From what I knew the Taliban was working a checkpoint ahead of us.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you understand as the basic ROE to protect yourself?

(2) Answer. Hostile act/hostile intent had to be shown. I understood and the rest of the team did as well. In (b)(1)1.4d the JAG spoke to us about the capability of our optics to help him understand how far out we could see personnel.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember anything else prior to pushing out to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Nothing significant that I can remember.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Some indicated the snipers used vehicles on the airfield as sniper platforms, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. I can never think of a time when we did that.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember when you pushed out to Abbey Gate or what your task was?

(2) Answer. I don't remember the time. We were tasked with going to one of the gates to provide observation/overwatch over the gate. We were replacing (b)(1) 1.4d soldiers out there.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Did anyone use the term guardian angel?

(2) Answer. Not that I heard. I wouldn't have used that term.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember who tasked you to go out to Abbey Gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Not sure who directly. I listened to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as the team leader.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Describe infilling into Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We did a turnover with the (b)(1) 1.4a. There was a machine gun team in the tower. They just gave us, "this is the tower, that's the canal, that's the Taliban."

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were the shipping containers used to form the chevron there when you got there?

(2) Answer. No. I think there were just a bunch of cars.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. How was the gate/crowd when you got out there?

(2) Answer. Day 1 at Abbey was when we pushed the crowd back. It was completely slammed with civilians. Me, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went out to help push the crowd back. I'm not sure with which company. It was 2/1 Marines. We threw some CS gas into the crowd, some units were shooting their rifles into the air to disperse the crowd. I think it was (b)(1)1.4a. I was not sure who was in charge. There were a lot of units out there. Eventually as we pushed the crowd back, I think it was the (b)(1)1.4a who threw out some CS gas into the crowd. Some people died because they got trampled.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were you actually on ground when the shipping containers were brought out for the chevron?

(2) Answer. I was in the tower. It wasn't on the first day when the containers were brought out. The far side canal was completely empty at this point.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Any more conversations about ROE or how to handle civilians as you began to establish Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No. When I got to the gate, I realized we weren't here to be snipers, we were here to deal with civilians.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What kind of prep, as far as pre-deployment training, did your team do specifically tied to this mission set?

(2) Answer. For us we only trained to it once. Our team only did one training prep at (b)(1)1.4d They had Echo Co set up controlled lanes, like TSA at the airport, they had Marines checking people as they came in. They had the sniper team adjacent to the lanes set up in vans as overwatch.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That's the only one you remember?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. The sniper team also did a lot of shooting at the ranges at (b)(1) 1.4d

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other pre-deployment training besides that?

(2) Answer. Not that I can remember for my sniper team. The only thing we did specific to this was when we setup in a van providing overwatch for the other Marines. The rest of the unit did additional training, but we went to ranges.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Once the crowd cleared out and the chevron was in place, what was the environment like at the gate?

(2) Answer. It's complete chaos quite honestly. Once the near and far side canal filled up with people, things just got really bad.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long after the chevron was put in place did the canal fill up?

(2) Answer. Definitely not more than 2 days. People were just scared and wanted to get away. Marines were along the near side canal wall sorting through people. Even us in the sniper section would go down to help.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you guys given a specific tasking, or SOP, that said X number of Marines stay in the tower while others help out by the canal?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. It was up to us. Sometimes (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and I would be in the tower, the others would go down to help. Then some came back up to the tower and we would go down.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the guidance to man the tower?

(2) Answer. Two Marines, a spotter and shooter. One on the gun, one on an optic.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did it vary what windows you would look out from the tower?

(2) Answer. It would vary. We would orient the SAS (Semi Automatic Sniper System) on the west side window towards the chevron. The other windows we would watch the crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you determine what was significant information to push up?

(2) Answer. It was just us acting on our instincts. The other teams would identify some people that would look out of place. That happened a couple times early on that you could tell people weren't there to get away. People that were clean shaven or carrying a suspicious bag. We would follow them and report it up.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you report information up?

(2) Answer. I think to the BN S2 and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was serving as the SRC (Scouting and Reconnaissance Center).

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would your team pass information to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) face to face?

(2) Answer. Sometimes we would. Primary reporting would be over green gear radios. Not sure who were sending it to. We reported anything we saw up via radio.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you reported up information do you remember what feedback you would get?

(2) Answer. Just a roger. I didn't really expect much to happen. There were a lot of guys that hadn't deployed before between the two sniper teams, so a lot was sent up.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Pointing to a tower located on HKIA on Google maps on Gov't phone to identify tower* Is this where (b)(6) were located?

(2) Answer. Yes, the tower is just inside the inner gate (airfield side).

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember the tower that would have been North of you at the airfield?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. There were always guys up there. I remember seeing them, not sure what they were doing.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get any intel on threats during the first day or two?

(2) Answer. So there were two different things. First one was a report of a bag someone left on the far side canal. EOD came out to grab it, everyone got down even the civilians. It was extremely organized even with all the chaos. It ended up being nothing. Number two was talks of a guy who was bald, clean cut, doesn't look like everyone else...so we got reports that some person was leaving his accommodation that was possibly ISIS. Not sure how we got this reporting. There was a lot of white noise between getting down to Abbey and the explosion.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) get that info?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) It all came through him or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They would sometimes leave the tower to do TL/ATL tasks with the company. So we found a guy that fit that description. He was a bald guy sitting on the far side canal wall, passing out cards to people, sitting there intently. Then he disappeared into the crowd. People like to think he was the guy. Then sometime later the explosion went off. To this day people are arguing back and forth within the snipers if this was the guy.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What time did you see the person of interest?

(2) Answer. Couldn't have been more than 4 hours prior to the attack.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who spotted him from your team?

(2) Answer. I want to say (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) an Army (b)(1)1.4a Soldier, said he first saw this individual in the crowd that matched a BOLO, came up to the sniper tower, and notified the snipers to take a look at this guy, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. I remember him coming up to the tower and telling us. That is how it happened (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) found the individual after (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) notified us. We stayed on him the entire time.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did the guy look like?

(2) Answer. He was bald, he had nicer clothes on, trimmed facial hair. He had a bluish shemagh (Middle Eastern scarf) half on and half off his head. He was wearing darker colors from the waist up. He was sitting on the canal wall handing cards out to people. He was older, probably in his 30s.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was he doing anything that alerted you according to the ROE?

(2) Answer. No sir. Absolutely not. No hostile act/hostile intent.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you were just worried about him based off what he was doing?

(2) Answer. I wasn't. He wasn't alarming to me. He just fit the description of the BOLO but he wasn't doing anything that could have rated an engagement. I mean I would have gone to jail if I shot him.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Are there multiple people in the crowd that fit that BOLO description at that time?

(2) Answer. What made this guy stand out was that he was well groomed and a shaved head. Everyone else had hair, was scruffy. He had nice clothes. We could not engage him because he was only just sitting there.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What information did you report to higher about this guy?

(2) Answer. We only sent up that we found a guy that matched the BOLO and that was it.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did the sniper team understand that you had the right to engage with hostile intent/hostile act?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. This guy did not meet the requirement for us to engage and shoot him.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What would have happened if you did engage?

(2) Answer. Other civilians would have been hurt if we shot from the 7.62 round, there would have been possible collateral damage. If someone did shoot, they would have been acting on their own. The Sgt cannot give the authority to shoot in this scenario. And higher would not have given us that authority because he did not show any hostile act/hostile intent.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone request engagement authority?

(2) Answer. No sir. No one asked to shoot this person. We just reported it up as we should.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why do you think (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) thought this guy was of interest?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. My opinion is this guy matched the description that was on the BOLO.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were in the tower when the individual was found and what did (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) do?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We found him and reported it up. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have reported it up. We took pictures and sent them up. I'm pretty sure it was just crickets after that. I didn't expect to get anything back.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You're sure no one asked for engagement authority, or did they call any leader up to the tower?

(2) Answer. No one requested for engagement authority. I believe we showed someone the guy but I don't think anything happened. I don't remember any leader coming up to the tower during this time and asking for engagement authority.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you send the pictures up?

(2) Answer. We took the SD card out and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have taken it up to the COC.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you didn't expect anything to happen when you reported it up?

(2) Answer. I think it was because the Army reported to us and we sent up to the Marines. I really didn't expect to get an answer back because there wasn't a lot to go on. I've been on situations like this in the past and it takes time for things like this to get sorted out. I had a situation in (b)(1)1.4d where we found a guy that met a description, conducted a raid and he ended up not being the guy.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see anything on this individual that led you to believe you could engage based on the ROE? Any wires, vest, etc.?

(2) Answer. No sir. There was nothing that guy was doing, other than possibly matching that description/BOLO, that would merit an engagement.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Some people have said this was absolutely the bomber, what do you think?

(2) Answer. I don't know how they can say this. I personally saw him sitting there, doing his thing. I zoomed all the way in on him and looked at every single part of his body. There were no wires, no vest. Nothing that would have allowed us to engage based off the ROE. People want to argue that this was the bomber, but there was no way of knowing. They want to say they had him and could have prevented it, but I have to level them out stating that they have no way of knowing.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was convinced that this was the guy and who had doubt in the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I would say (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would argue this was the guy. I don't believe in absolutes and I would have no way of knowing for sure.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So certain members on the team said they would have shot this guy?

(2) Answer. No sir. They would not have just engaged.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why do you think they are saying they could have prevented it?

(2) Answer. I think it's because with what happened they begin to believe they could have prevented other people from dying.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) No one from higher spoke to your team about engagement authority for the individual?

(2) Answer. No one ever came and said (b)(6) you have authority to engage". No one stating from Marine higher that we could engage.

www. Question and Answer 74.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You said no more than 4 hours prior to the attack you started to get eyes on the individual, and it was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) that spotted him from your team, correct?

(2) Answer. Yes.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Once you got eyes on the individual, what was the demeanor of the team?

(2) Answer. Focused. The team was being engaged in what we were designed to do. Have eyes on the person, engaged with watching.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who on the team was watching?

(2) Answer. It was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I'm almost certain (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on the gun (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have been on optics and the camera.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on the gun, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were on optics/camera, you were in the tower, and who else?

(2) Answer. I was. I think everyone except to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the tower?

(2) Answer. He was. He eventually left.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After you spotted the individual (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on the gun, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were on optics/camera, and the rest of the team were doing what?

(2) Answer. We were watching/looking out the windows. They were looking southwest at the individual. I was looking east down the other part of the canal. The individual sat there for a long time. No more than an hour he was sitting there for sure. Definitely longer than 15 mins, but not sure exactly how long.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

2/1 Marines,

(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the conversation about this guy in your tower?

(2) Answer. That he perfectly matched the description and if anything would come from the report we sent up. It was team chatter about if anything would come up. I kept telling them we can't do anything until something does come back on the radio or until we are told. I told them this isn't meeting ROE or engagement requirements so we can't do anything. Imagine if the blast didn't happen, then this was just a guy sitting there.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So everyone is saying this could be the attacker, you're still interjecting this isn't meeting ROE requirements? Did everyone understand that?

(2) Answer. Yes. I kept saying we couldn't engage. I think everyone understood that. I mean we had everything on him. I'm not sure exactly how far away he was. But we had everything ready to engage if authorized.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did he stay in the same position the entire time?

(2) Answer. Yes. He just sat there until he left and went back into the crowd. When I got back to the tower he was gone. We weren't told to do anything, so when he left we thought that was it.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) From the time you identified him from the time he left was how long?

(2) Answer. Not sure. It all happened within an hour or so.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After that, you stayed around the tower?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We had all gear around the tower, we slept there. I was just around the tower after we saw him and before I went back up.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone leadership wise come up to the tower to see this individual?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. People came up all the time, people that didn't matter to people that did. I cannot confidently remember that some leader came up.

iii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You think (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) reported to COC and that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) took the SD card to the COC? And when did the SD card get pushed up?

(2) Answer. Yes. He met with the COC at least twice a day. It would have been him that pushed the SD card up. I'm not sure when it happened.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who took the picture of the individuals?

(2) Answer. If (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was on the gun, then (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have taken the picture.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In the days leading up to the 26th, from gate establishment to the 26th, what kind of threat reporting were you getting and was it on a consistent basis?

(2) Answer. I was never getting formally told any of this stuff.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Not even from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)?

(2) Answer. No. To me it was common knowledge. No one ever said we were expecting anything. We just knew an SVEST could be a thing that could happen. We never got any word over the radio that there was a potential threat. We did get requests to go look for people to pull out of the crowds, but nothing about threat reporting.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So information would go from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. Yes.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember anyone from your chain of command coming to the tower saying we are looking at this specific individual?

(2) Answer. No sir I never heard any of that.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So the first time you've heard about this individual was from the Army (b)(1)1.4a team (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Yes sir.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So no HUMINT guys or (b)(1)1.4 guys or anyone else came up to the tower saying this is who you're looking for?

(2) Answer. All I can remember is him (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) coming to the tower and identifying the individual. I don't remember anyone else coming up to the tower to say look for a specific guy.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You don't remember your teammates saying to look for a specific guy?

(2) Answer. No sir.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did you leave the tower or Abbey Gate in general?

(2) Answer. I never left the gate. I was pretty split half/half between the tower and the gate.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was there ever an ROE update leading up to the 26th?

(2) Answer. No sir. It stayed the same the whole time.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the Taliban beating or executing people by the chevron?

(2) Answer. Yes sir.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often?

(2) Answer. It was daily. Not sure how many times daily, but daily. I would see them shooting into the crowd behind the chevron. We saw them beating the crowd with sticks.

vvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When they shot into the crowd you would see them actually shoot people and kill them?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Right into the crowds.

www. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would you report that?

(2) Answer. We always reported it. We reported everything.

xxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would you get feedback from higher?

(2) Answer. It was always a "roger" or "copy". But nothing was ever actionable.

yyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you all understood you couldn't engage the Taliban based off the ROE?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We all understood. My understanding was that we were working with the Taliban. The (b)(1) 1.4 were really in the loop with them. The (b)(1) 1.4 have been my boys for 3 deployments in a row, if they are good with it then I'm good.

zzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much interaction with the (b)(1) 1.4 did you have?

(2) Answer. A lot. We had a lot of interaction with them. They were the driving force for success.

aaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you discuss any intel or threat streams with them?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No. They didn't hear anything. (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

bbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other countries operating down there?

(2) Answer. There were a lot but I didn't have any discussion of reporting or threats or things that may happen.

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We've heard reports of an IED test run, have you heard this regarding the guy with the backpack?

(2) Answer. I would connect that with the bag that EOD came and cleared. There was nothing else I can remember regarding an IED test run.

dddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In general, did you notice any difference between E Co and G Co on the gate?

(2) Answer. I feel like, personally, and I'm not 2/1 proper. I was with 2/1 for a year, did the deployment, and left. When it came to Echo and Ghost I was having a hard time telling who was who. I feel like when Echo was there the crowd was more handled. That's kind of the only thing I can think of.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We know that Echo had pushed the crowd back to the footbridge, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. Yeah. I remember that helping.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That leads up to the night of the 25th to when Echo and Golf changed out. G Co reported that they heard an attack was coming at the gate, which played a big role in the decision to consolidate the position, do you remember hearing that?

(2) Answer. I never got a formalized threat report. I felt that people were just saying that threats could happen, but it felt generic because of the situation at Abbey Gate. I never got a formal report saying this was or this could happen.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When the crowd was pushed down the canal to the footbridge, what did it look like on the near side?

(2) Answer. The far side was backed up. The near side the civilians were at the footbridge and Marines spread out towards the tower.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). So another reason the Marines collapsed back towards the tower was due to the length of CASEVAC at the footbridge if an attack occurred. Would that have been more challenging?

(2) Answer. I don't think there was an entrance near the footbridge. It would have been difficult due to how far they would have to move.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). On the 26th, you are confident you never got briefs /threats /formal BOLO either in radio, person, signal/WhatsApp?

(2) Answer. No sir.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). 24/25 Aug, do you remember seeing any changes in force protection measures, did anything look different to you from the civilians?

(2) Answer. No. The people were just standing normally in the canal area like they always had. I do remember people saying we were not supposed to be taking people from the canal. They were supposed to go through the Taliban at the chevron and then into the outer gate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 114

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did that lead to a change in who you were conducting extractions for?

(2) Answer. No sir. We still pulled people from the canal.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Leading up to the 26th, did you take any photos of suspicious people?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I took pictures of suspicious looking people, people carrying bags, I took pictures with a camera that comes with our "camera kit". It's a normal camera that was included in the team camera kit.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All the photos went on the SD cards?

(2) Answer. Yes. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed them up.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any idea where the SD cards are?

(2) Answer. Not sure. It could be in the (b)(1)1.4g I know they were taken up to the COC to look at, then put into the kit. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a strong tie to those because of the pictures, but I didn't have anything to do with the transportation with that data.

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see the pictures again after leaving HKIA?

(2) Answer. No sir. I didn't. The SD cards went up to the S2 to be downloaded and viewed but I'm not sure what happened to them.

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) During your time at HKIA, did you ever talk to battalion leadership about the situation at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. They would come up to the tower. The (b)(6) all the leaders. I felt it was weird the (b)(6) was always there. I felt like everyone was trying to be involved with Abbey Gate because there was so much going on. I didn't get why the (b)(6) was always there at the gate.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you didn't have any conversations with any leaders about the threat streams or reporting?

(2) Answer. No sir. Not with me.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did any team members have conversations with the leaders?

(2) Answer. I feel that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would always say people were anticipating an attack. I'm not sure from who. I felt like everyone was on edge. Like we knew something was going to happen but didn't know when.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did people start to go on edge?

(2) Answer. I would say the day prior, at least for me.

ttttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Why do you think it changed on the 25th?

(2) Answer. I think because we began to think something was going to eventually happen, just not sure when.

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Even with the anticipation, Marines were still on the wall working with the civilians?

(2) Answer. Yes. That's what frustrated me the most. I don't think anyone should have been on the near side canal. We should have stayed in the outer corridor. The only reason (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there was because he was trying to find someone. If the blast occurred it would have been from the far side. For safety reasons we should not have been by the wall.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In the days leading up to the attack, did you ever see any individual that met the occasion for ROE?

(2) Answer. No, nothing.

wwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you aware of a timeline for when the gate was going to be closed?

(2) Answer. No sir. I didn't even know the gate was going to get closed. I thought there was no way because of all the people. I wasn't even sure when we were leaving. The only reason we left, I thought, was because the blast happened.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

xxxx. Question and Answer 127.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th did you see a change in the crowd?

(2) Answer. The crowd got worse, more desperation and they heard we were leaving. More people started showing up and filling up the entire canal.

yyyy. Question and Answer 128.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, how often did you team get contacted to pull someone out of the crowd.

(2) Answer. I feel that was daily. We kept getting calls. Something like 'look for a sign for someone's last name because they were an interpreter for them back in the day. I was just sorting actual people though. I was looking for specific individuals holding specific things.

zzzz. Question and Answer 129.(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did looking for specific people to retrieve increase leading up to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I wouldn't say it increased.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the sniper team ever get calls from senators, or other senior leaders to request you pull specific Afghans out?

(2) Answer. No. I don't think so. I did get weird messages on social media requesting to help find Afghans to pull out.

bbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the attack, about 30 min prior, where were you located?

(2) Answer. It was just myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the tower (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were back, not on Abbey Gate.

ccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was located?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yeah. He was a hero the whole time honestly. He was walking up and down helping Afghans and fellow Marines. He was always trying to be helpful, and he didn't stop.

ddddd. Question and Answer 133.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the tower while the others were on North HKIA about an hour before blast?

(2) Answer. Yeah. He was in the tower with me. He left the tower less than 30 min before the blast.

eeeeee. Question and Answer 134.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were yours and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) role in the tower when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) left the tower?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was prepping the camera because the Taliban were getting crazy with the Afghans at the chevron. I was on the gun. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) left saying he was going to go find someone in the crowd. He asked if I wanted to go, I said I would stay on the gun, so he went down. That was the last time I spoke with him.

fffff. Question and Answer 135.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have eyes on him?

(2) Answer. If I stuck my head out the window, I could see him. I could also see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) too.

ggggg. Question and Answer 136.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I think he was in this area. *Pointed to near side canal, outside of fence by sniper tower*.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 137.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Immediately leading up to the blast what were you looking at?

(2) Answer. I was looking at the Taliban through the scope on my rifle while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was prepping the camera. We were just doing our normal thing.

iiiiii. Question and Answer 138.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you weren't looking at any suspicious individuals?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No sir, we were just doing our thing.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 139.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When the bomb goes off 17:56:32 seconds, what happened?

(2) Answer. It felt like I got punched in the face, it was hot. I pulled the gun down with me. I got a bunch of stuff all over my face that caused issues for me, like blood and skin. I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if my face was ok, he said it was fine. We got what we needed and looked out the window. Our tower was getting shot at. The Marines were engaging someone. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get DOPE down by the Taliban. I thought it was the Taliban. When we looked it wasn't the Taliban, they were just standing on the container. Immediately we look out the window and see everyone messed up or dead. That's when we saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) comes up, checks on us, then sprints down the ladder to help (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) come up, now it's the four of us, chaos ensues and we try to figure out what's going on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was helping triage on the ground. Things got crazy internally at this point in the tower. We were calming down (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during this time.

kkkkk. Question and Answer 140.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Describe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and how he was acting?

(2) Answer. He came into the tower and started loading our .50 cal. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stopped him. We told him we weren't going to shoot people.

lllll. Question and Answer 141.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mention the tower being shot at, how do you know this?

(2) Answer. To my perception, I'm not all-knowing with this, the blast happened and all the ball bearings went everywhere and hit everything. But I could hear gunshots. The brick of the tower was obviously getting hit. The Marines on the ground were shooting towards the blast location. But I didn't see anyone shoot at us, so I'm not going to engage with no PID.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 142.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you think the tower was engaged by small arms fire post blast. How long did it last?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Probably a few minutes. Some GySgt yelled up to the tower saying we were taking small arms fire and find them and fucking kill them. I'm not sure of his name.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

nnnnnn. Question and Answer 143.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see any warning shots fired?

(2) Answer. I didn't see that. There wasn't really a crowd to disperse. After the blast they all ran away.

oooooo. Question and Answer 144.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said Marines in the outer corridor were shooting. Did you see where they were shooting?

(2) Answer. This is where things get cloudy. I didn't see them actually shooting at anybody. Maybe it was someone behind the backdrop or in some building. Then a million rumors started coming out about all that.

pppppp. Question and Answer 145.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see them shoot anybody or just shooting?

(2) Answer. I didn't see them shoot anyone. They were just shooting. This guy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got an award for shooting someone, but I never saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shoot a person.

qqqqqq. Question and Answer 146.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Post blast, did you see anyone that presented hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. No sir. Like before the explosion I saw no adversarial acts from anyone.

rrrrrr. Question and Answer 147.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You didn't see friendlies shooting Afghans?

(2) Answer. No. Not at all. And I was seeking the entire time. And once you know what it's like to get shot at, you know the difference in these types on situations. We looked all up and down the canal and saw no Taliban or Afghans firing at us. I was in the window, I was looking all over the canal and I did not see any enemies. Honestly, if I saw anything in question I would let you know, but I didn't see anything.

ssssss. Question and Answer 148.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You didn't see anything near the blast location?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I wasn't looking in that direction. I was just in the window looking outward at everything. I was in the window facing west towards the outer corridor. There was nothing that happened that would have identified a blast occurring. No one yelling, screaming, nothing different from anything else that was happening.

ttttt. Question and Answer 149.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Post blast, how long are you in the tower before you leave?

(2) Answer. This gets hazy. I remember switching the gun over to someone, maybe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then I came to the base of the tower to be a connective tissue to the tower. People kept trying to come talk to us. A little bit after the blast I spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was just in the area, he didn't come specifically to talk with me.

uuuuu. Question and Answer 150.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was the CASEVAC going on when you came to the base of the tower?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I didn't personally render aid to anyone.

vyyyv. Question and Answer 151.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What happens next?

(2) Answer. After that everyone was extremely on edge. I was completely... I felt so weird after getting hit with the blast. I was saying stuff that wasn't making sense at the time. People were trying to come retrieve the bodies at this point, the Afghans were. Marines were attempting to keep people out of the near side canal area. Eventually the Army came and took over from us. I stayed at the tower the entire time until the Army came and ripped us out. We moved to the inner corridor and then eventually filed out. That's when I met up with the rear sniper team. After that there was when weird reporting coming out of nowhere.

wwwww. Question and Answer 152.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) get any treatment post blast?

(2) Answer. I know for sure I didn't.

xxxxx. Question and Answer 153.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any treatment at HKIA or (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. No. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

yyyyyy. Question and Answer 154.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

zzzzz. Question and Answer 155.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So post blast, you mentioned seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what did you see?

(2) Answer. I thought they were all dead honestly. There were people down there to help with the situation where he was. I was focused on scanning the canal.

aaaaaaa. Question and Answer 156.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went down there did you see him help?

(2) Answer. I didn't see him actually doing anything. I believe he cut the fence.

bbbbbbb. Question and Answer 157.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) post blast?

(2) Answer. I didn't see him again after the blast.

ccccccc. Question and Answer 158.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mention (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) condition after the blast?

(2) Answer. He said he was awake, (b)(6)
(b)(6) All I remember is looking down out the window at pure horror with people laid out everywhere.

ddddddd. Question and Answer 159.

(1) Question. C1: Can you tell me, for threat mitigation, what kind of protection did you have in the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. It was a concrete tower with ballistic windows, but the windows were open. I'm very grateful the blast wasn't oriented high because I was in the window when the blast happened. It's a very well protected thing if you're not in the window.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

eeeeeee. Question and Answer 160.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you given any interviews about your experience at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I have not given an interview personally. I know some from my team have and I don't judge them. I haven't really wanted to interview or talk with people about this, besides you all. I remember seeing things on social media and I saw some misinformation from Battle & Beers. I've contacted them to let them know this is wrong and they don't need to post unless it's factual. They went back and changed the post.

ffffff. Question and Answer 161.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much do you pay attention to posts about this incident?

(2) Answer. The only post I did was initially to help raise money for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For this... this stuff started feeling like it was surrounding me everywhere. I stopped paying attention to it, talking to people about, stopped everything. It was consuming me. Some people made this their personality. I stopped people from messaging me.

ggggggg. Question and Answer 162.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you stop?

(2) Answer. Probably within the first 30 days, when I felt what it was going to turn into.

hhhhhhh. Question and Answer 163.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned some people have made this their personality, who are you referring to?

(2) Answer. Just the people that were at HKIA. It's all they talk about anymore, like all they have. People at Fallujah weren't talking and posting about it like this.

iiiiiii. Question and Answer 164.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often do you meet with members of 2/1, and do you talk about what happened at the gate?

(2) Answer. To be honest my sniper team talks about this every day in a group chat. I don't. But it's like every single day.

jjjjjjj. Question and Answer 165.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Why do you think that is?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. For (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I get it. For everyone else I'm not sure. Maybe it's their first deployment, they started getting social media attention and fell in love with it. They started going on podcasts and it has nothing to do with this. I think it's some military fame. I just kept this away from me for the most part.

kkkkkkk. Question and Answer 166.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you were observing in the tower the individual that was pointed out prior to explosion, did you see any bags or a backpack?

(2) Answer. No I didn't.

lllllll. Question and Answer 167.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you hear that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was going to speak with us?

(2) Answer. It was on a group chat (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) even popped in on it saying CENTCOM was wanting supplemental interviews. I think everyone was going to volunteer. He asked the group chat if they wanted any information.

mmmmmmm. Question and Answer 168.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would you say most of the conversation is group chat or phone calls?

(2) Answer. I think group chat, I'm on the other side of the world from those guys.

nnnnnnn. Question and Answer 169.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showing the photo of suspicious individual in black* Is this the guy you saw on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, that's the same guy. We took photos of him and pushed them up to the COC.

ooooooo. Question and Answer 170.

(1) Question. C1: Was there ever another BOLO of a guy who had a close beard, shaved beard, tan man-jams that you remember?

(2) Answer. That sounds so familiar.

ppppppp. Question and Answer 171.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: If (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had not come to the sniper tower, would you have focused on that individual?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. That's how we even knew of a description. I don't remember a channel of information that would have led to us having that information.

qqqqqq. Question and Answer 172.

(1) Question. C1: So there wasn't another BOLO saying to look at this guy?

(2) Answer. Not that I remember. It was from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) coming up and identifying him to us.

rrrrrr. Question and Answer 173.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is there anything else that you want to cover or you want to add?

(2) Answer. What are you really focusing on with this.

C1: Regarding those who were injured, many people think that we purposely did not talk to those injured during the initial investigation. We attempted to but were advised by the doctors to not speak with the injured individuals due to the extremity of their injuries. Now we want to go back and speak to these individuals. We are also talking to some personnel that were in the same squad and unit. We are talking with you because we identified some additional information that you most likely would provide to us.

ssssss. Question and Answer 174.

(1) Question. C1: Is there anything that you want to ask us about that has been bothering you

(2) Answer. Do we know who it was?

C1: Short answer, when a service member is killed overseas, the FBI has purview over the investigation. For this situation the FBI handled the investigation, and it is at the TS level. There is a lot of stuff of social media that identifies the person, but you need to be careful believing that.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I mean like the group responsible.

C1- It hasn't been confirmed by the FBI.

tttttt. Question and Answer 175.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1 Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: Do you believe your chain of command was doing all they could do to prevent a bad situation from happening?

(2) Answer. I'm going to say...no one had to be on the near side canal wall. Period. The reason there were people there is the fault of everyone that was higher there. No one was going from there. Those people dying, we couldn't have stopped that. The stuff in the outer corridor, you can't prevent everything. But you didn't need service members on the near side canal. That's really the only thing.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD


SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 2023/01/6, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 32. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2023/01/6
(Signature of Person Making Statement) DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2023/01/6
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) DATE





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(1)1.4c (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For clarity, questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted with C1, questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions asked by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will have her full name.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me about yourself.

(2) Answer. I want to thank everyone in the room for the opportunity to hear the side of me and my team members. It has been two years, and it doesn't get any better. I am (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I have been (b)(1)1.4a my entire career and deployed around the world, primarily CENTCOM. First was Iraq with (b)(1)1.4a then several deployments to Afghanistan, after that from 2015-2018 I was in SOCCOM. 2018-2021 I was an (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I came back here and deployed to Afghanistan in 2021 (b)(1)1.4a battalion is the premier (b)(1)1.4a. I believe that, and it comes with a price. Individuals are hand selected. That's my life.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: How many years have you been at Fort Liberty?

(2) Answer. 15 years, the whole time. The only time I wasn't there was while I was deployed.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: I'd like to look at the map to establish a common lexicon of Abbey Gate due to the volume of units present at the gate. *C1 provides an overview of the unclassified Abbey Gate map listing common terms such as inner gate, outer gate, chevron, sniper tower, near and far side of the canal, the footbridge, and the blast site. Does that all make sense?

(2) Answer. It does, sir. I don't remember the direction that outer gate opened, but I do know that it was open at the time of the blast. I recall the breach in the chain link fence, a little less than five feet tall. Enough to fit two grown people through. I remember an overpass toward the Baron Hotel, but I never went out there and interacted.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: Could you talk to us about two things to set the tone: a timeline of when you first start to know that there is a potential upcoming deployment and then a timeline of what happens between finding out and leaving Afghanistan? Also a detachment is twelve and a team is 3 right?

(2) Answer. Correct. There are three tactical teams of 3 and one headquarters team of 3.

This is the most difficult assignment I ever had. Due to lack of information and understanding of the request from higher to conduct any deliberate or hasty mission planning. I came to (b)(1)1.4a in 2021 and found out I was taking a detachment. The detachment I was supposed to take was deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, and I just barely met them a week before their transition into theater. This is around April. The first notification I received about this event transpiring was in June, I was asked to look at this problem set, and give my assessment of what (b)(1)1.4a could do in the event of a crisis. It didn't take long for me to identify that we were unprepared for this problem set.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: What was your view of the problem set?

(2) Answer. We were going to support 2 brigade size units in the evacuation of a major Airport. And we were asked to put together a team of 4, which is way too small for

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

the scope. We were requested to use tactical speakers on the ground, and we had some idea of the size of the airport, but no idea of the footprint that would be supported. Then we wanted to know who we were supporting: 24th MEU or the 82nd? So we had a lot of RFIs which would drive what equipment and which personnel we would bring and what we would need to attempt this. From a team NCOIC perspective, I knew we needed the bare minimum to deploy forward: organic weapons, communications, and organic (b)(1)1.4a equipment. The 'How' still needed to be answered, but I need shoot, move, communicate, and medicate to survive (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a prior (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and was someone I knew I could trust. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was knowledgeable at the tactical level and I knew him previously. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped with weapons and managing that portion of the team. That's what shaped my building of the element that was going to move forward. I did push back, I said I don't know how this would be possible with 4 people.

There was a lot of back and forth between our leadership and my initial feasibility assessment of this mission set. That was in June. I remember one particular moment when we briefed the Battalion Command Team and Company leadership that we were told to stand down due to that back and forth. I warned my leadership that we didn't have the appropriate amount of time to get to right, and I knew this would be someone's problem based on the intelligence. We knew it would develop, and we knew since we were the tactical battalion this would come to us. I wanted to train to get right for this, but I was told to stand down. I want to say that I fought for this particular moment, to keep the team together because I felt like we were unprepared and we were put together, we weren't an organic detachment. I didn't know them well enough to understand the individual and collective capabilities, and get us collectively qualified and achieve a level of proficiency at this event. I wasn't granted that time, and I knew something would come.

In August of 2021, around the 13th the Battalion asked for the 4 stateside individuals to come together as a team and get ready to deploy.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. With you as the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, with me as the (b)(6). We could have used those two months to prepare. However, by this time we had to act and gather our weapons, (b)(1)1.4a equipment, and medical equipment. About half of a 463L pallet of military gear. This probably condensed more at South Carolina, and we trimmed some weapons systems that we wouldn't need. But we knew that we would need our (b)(1)1.4a equipment since we didn't know what we would fall in on. We were notified on a Thursday, and we were at the airfield by Tuesday. We were only at Charleston for about two hours before we got on a flight. I didn't have a point of contact for our ride into theater, there was no linkup with another unit. We had not met the team we were supporting. We thought it would be the 82nd, but once we got into theater it turned out to be the 24th MEU.

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Shortly after that we flew in Germany, then into (b)(1)1.4d. Around this time some of the incidents, such as the person falling out of the airplane occurred. Then we landed in (b)(1)1.4d and were told we would be stranded there. I called back to (b)(1)1.4a to seek direction. I was told to wait for further notice. A few hours after that, we had an opportunity to get on an Aircraft and get into theater. We just seized an opportunity, that wasn't coordinated by the battalion. We arrive to HKIA with all of our equipment and met (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and, at the time, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: What night did you arrive? What did you initially notice?

(2) Answer. Period of darkness, around the 18th of August. I recall the ramp on the C17 going down. There was a line of refugees onto another aircraft. It looked chaotic from what I could see. At least to my comfort level of security. A lot of things are burning. There is IDF going over the airfield, what look like tracer rounds. That's what I envision. Darkness and people evacuating.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Who meets you when you land?

(2) Answer. We immediately secure our equipment, then we are met by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at a secured location. We found a way to transport it to the command center.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: Did you receive a brief there?

(2) Answer. I don't think there was ever a brief of what was happening. We linked up and went to work. I think at the time, the focus was on securing the airfield. We never received a brief, I know that for sure.

So after we received our equipment we met with the Marine IO, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He gave us areas of priority. He gave us a map, and told us which locations. They had been conducted targeted (b)(1)1.4a already. They knew what they wanted to do.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: Were you told Abbey, East, and North Gate as your areas of priority?

(2) Answer. No, those were the major points, which include the comfort zones. Those were our main points. But we owned everything on the right of the airfield. We

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would respond to people climbing fences or guard towers. Our whole job was protecting the force on the ground and providing information to civilians outside the gate about changing conditions. That was our whole purpose. Therefore, we split into a day and a night team and went straight to work.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: Was center mass of your efforts crowd control and mitigation?

(2) Answer. 100%. That, and dissemination of information from Department of Defense and Department of State.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: How did you get intelligence?

(2) Answer. We would have to gather that through different means. To back track a little bit, we knew we would get most of our information from a Master Gunnery Sergeant that would have a shift change at the JOC. I can't remember his name. We had that, and we would get live transmission over the radio about what the gates were seeing and what they needed.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Who was on each shift?

(2) Answer. Day shift was myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Night shift was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: Where is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) now?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, I think he is moving to SWC.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: You're getting intelligence from the JOC. What are you hearing there? I am most interest in threat streams?

(2) Answer. The updates are along the lines of conditions that were at every gate, where to prioritize gates by migration of civilians, any gates that had civil unrest, and any support we received that we needed to relay to the JOC. The security posture at HKIA deteriorated over time.

q. Question and Answer 16.

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(1) Question. C1: What do you mean by deterioration over time?

(2) Answer. The best way I can describe it, is that every other gate didn't have 200-300 meters of standoff.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: You're talking other gates closing due to threats? VBIED at North Gates and the crowd surge at East Gates? As those gates close and you get closer to the departure of the United States, how that causes a change of the mood and tenor at Abbey Gate making the people more desperate?

(2) Answer. From my perspective, I think that we, as a collective, US Forces as a collective, couldn't avoid showing a smaller footprint at Abbey Gate. From the minute we got on ground, until around the 24th or the 25th, Abbey Gate was like a SOF convention. It was multinational. By the time they withdrew, it was only (b)(1)1.4d and US Personnel, the footprint shrunk significantly which displayed to the civilians that we were leaving. It was a clear tell to the civilians. The other gates were also shifting their posture to protect themselves, but Abbey Gate in particular, it was noticeable from afar.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think that Abbey Gate surged because people realized that, unless they were part of a precision extraction, Abbey Gate was the last option?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, without a doubt in my mind.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: You remember the footbridge 90 meters down from the footbridge? I have seen that area on videos from the 25th to the 26th, to me it appears there was a huge surge in afghan civilians, does that match? Especially as people hear about the other gates closing and as they try to avoid Taliban checkpoints is the crowd significantly larger from when you left on the 25 to when you arrived on the 26th?

(2) Answer. That's accurate. It was definitely larger when we came back on the 26th. We had just left the comfort zone. Our route was North Gate, Comfort Zone, East Gate, and Abbey Gate. We were supporting all the locations and had our equipment dispersed so Marines could use our equipment if we were at a different gate. When we got to Abbey Gate, we were at the barriers around 100ft from the Sniper Tower around 2 hours prior to the blast. We sat there for a bit of time with our Marine counterparts scanning for threats. We knew that there was a threat.

u. Question and Answer 20.

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(1) Question. C1: How did you know there was a threat at the time? What were you tracking?

(2) Answer. We received that info from the JOC and from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) before we arrived at Abbey Gate. We were honed in on the threat of a suicide bomber. I could not pin down a fair description, specifically because of my background in the Middle East and the shared garb. Based off of that, that was the threat we were looking for. Really just any anomalies within the crowd. Obviously the crowd was desperate, but we were looking for anything that stood out. So we took that information with a grain of salt. It was unconfirmed, and it wasn't really our mission or our focus to find one person in a crowd of 4,000 people.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: I'm tracking the information was very general? The classic Toyota corolla, is that what you are tracking?

(2) Answer. We are tracking white dress, and white garments at the time. With a bag of some sort. That is all that I can recall at the time in terms of what we can identify.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When you did your shift change that morning, what was your handoff from the night team?

(2) Answer. We, as the day shift, usually receive information from the JOC. The night shift confirms with us what they are seeing which helps us build our load out. From what I remember, they talked about them looking at a particular individual. I cannot remember the details specifically. I know that the night shift spent time trying to identify an individual. I can't confirm this, but I believe they identified a specific individual.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Can you recall any info about that individual, even if it is second hand?

(2) Answer. I can't, sir.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: What I have heard is that there were a whole lot of people in the crowd that could have fit the difference, so it really came down to difference in behaviors. Does that resonate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember any of that, sir. Based off of my experience, what I have seen, and the quantity of people at the gate. I can't speak to that. I know what I am

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looking for as suspicious behavior from previous missions, but I couldn't pick that out of the crowd. Even from our little bit of elevation on that HESCO barrier. No way.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Who do you interact with at the gate?

(2) Answer. That's a good question, sir. We also speak with the ground force commander so we ask what they need in terms of support. Do you need a loudspeaker, crowd control, etc? Then, sometimes, we made recommendations based on that.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: Who was the ground commander you would have interacted with?

(2) Answer. The company commander. I can't remember specifically. On that day, I remember interacting with a Major. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who I was speaking with at the time of the blast.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Would you interact with anyone else?

(2) Answer. At that particular gate, the rare conversation with guys on the ground. Asking the leadership what support they needed. Some gunnery sergeants I can't recall by name.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Where would intelligence updates on the ground come from?

(2) Answer. We would receive it from guys on the ground and also from the JOC via radio.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Did you interact with Snipers at all? If so, why?

(2) Answer. I did not. I know that some of my team, specifically the night crew. I'm not sure why, possibly due to positioning.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: Let's talk about the blast. I apologize for doing this and I appreciate your willingness to do so.

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(2) Answer. At the time of the blast I was in the driver seat of the vehicle. We had been there for about two hours. The sun was coming down, we had been there for a while. We were with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time. I said that we were going to leave, so I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to grab the vehicle and meet us by the barricades. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was interacting with the leadership on ground and got information about civilians being crushed against the barricade and that our (b)(1)1.4g was requested to push back the crowd and protect the women and children. We took the vehicle which had the speaker mounted on it. I got in the driver seat to angle the vehicle towards the jersey barriers. (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g I didn't want to put the vehicle right up against the gate. We did not have an interpreter at the time so we sourced one. I don't know where he came from. I helped the interpreter, who was operating the microphone from the passenger side of the vehicle. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) approached the driver's side and we were conversing there. From the time we position the vehicle until finishing loud speaker operations was about 15-20 minutes. The interpreter started to walk away and that's when the blast went off.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: What do you remember when the blast went off?

(2) Answer. I am in a bit of a haze. I can't recall a lapse of time in this moment, or the few minutes leading up to this. I am trying to understand what just happened.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)? Where are you looking during the blast?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I was in the driver's seat at the time, looking at the driver side window. (b)(6)

(b)(6) I left the driver side of the vehicle. I don't know why. I got out and that's when I start thinking, and I grab my gun out of the vehicle. I then got behind the vehicle. I noticed I was injured because I did a quick check. I noticed a stream of blood from my face, but my priority was my men and accountability. I found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) north of the vehicle and told him to get behind the vehicle for cover. We are behind the vehicle at this point, and I can't see anything because of the dust.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any CS Gas?

(2) Answer. None at this time. The left side of my face is blurring. I remember telling (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to not move from behind the vehicle in case this was a complex attack. There weren't many people moving around yet, so I wanted to wait before acting.

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Shortly after that, I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we need to find SSG Knauss. Immediately following that, there was chaos. We were told by someone to retreat inside the gate. We took our time and looked around the vehicle but didn't find him.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1: Where did you think he was?

(2) Answer. I thought he was smoking cigarettes to the west of the vehicle at the time. I didn't know he was struck. After I can't find him, I'm thinking about getting treatment for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I told him to conduct self-aid and go get treated once we find Ryan. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to search along the fence line and the barricades in one direction in the inner gate and I went the other way. The assumption was that he was ambulatory but we just couldn't find him. Less than 10 minutes later I found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a Corpsman performing aid on SSG Knauss. I gave my tourniquet away to another Marine at this point. Now I had to go find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) again, because I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with Ryan. Ryan was being moved in a vehicle, so I got in the vehicle with him. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the way and yelled at him to get in the vehicle. We moved to the inner gate, I tried to aid a Marine there and add him to the CASEVAC (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped Ryan onto another vehicle, and I believe those were some of the first vehicles out of the site. We took a knee there, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me I had (b)(6) I told him he needed to be treated. Then we both got in a vehicle and evacuated from there.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: Is Ryan conscious when you see him?

(2) Answer. No, he is trying to breathe but not conscious.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: Did you see any part of the blast or anything immediately following?

(2) Answer. Sir, I recall the moment of light. Then everything in the vicinity was dust. I couldn't see three feet in front of me. Which made it difficult to identify anything. When I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with Ryan. I was doing a sweep of him while the corpsman was treating him. I don't remember seeing any wound on him, so I thought at the time that it was just a concussive blast that had injured him. My priority was to get Ryan to the next medical facility as fast as possible.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: When do Ryan and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) start moving?

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(2) Answer. I remember Ryan moving a bit when we loaded him into the vehicle.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6). They kept us together as we were moved between medical treatment facilities. I can't keep track of time at this point. I know I was with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the whole time. They put us in a room with other injured Service Members who were struck by the blast.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: There was a shock trauma platoon, an 82nd run treatment facility at (b)(1)1.4d and then a Role II-E which was a coalition facility. Any idea which you went to?

(2) Answer. I remember a female that assisted in treating (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) jump in the driver's seat and took us to a military treatment facility and drove as quickly as possible. I don't remember which one.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember anything while being treated? Are you in pain?

(2) Answer. I don't remember anything. (b)(6) I remember seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the adrenaline left the body I am shutting down. I am assuming that hours passed. I have no concept of time. At this point we are in the room with the other injured personnel. Then I see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the ground with (b)(6) and several other injuries. He is to my left and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is to my right. Around the room are other injured personnel. A doctor had come over to assist in treating our wounds. The rest of my team showed up, and I directed them to find Ryan Knauss. I stayed with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Several minutes later, a doctor walked into the room and told us that Ryan Knauss was no longer with us.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: When are you physically evacuated?

(2) Answer. I was not, sir. I had a responsibility still. To my team. To consolidate the equipment. I left the hospital to walk to the JOC. I ordered (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to be evacuated with Ryan (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the first flight to Germany. I told him to contact home station as soon as he got there. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to stay with me and consolidate equipment.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6) Where did it enter?

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(2) Answer. None. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

You could see the trajectory of the bullet hole through the windshield. [REDACTED] (b)(6) not in that exact position it would have gone through bone. I think the miracle was that all the other projectiles, nothing else hit me in anyway. The front end of the vehicle looked like it was hit by buckshot.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: I commend you for your commitment to your team throughout this whole process and your focus on them throughout this process.

(2) Answer. Thank you, sir.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: Did anyone ever pass you or your team any pictures of a suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I'll say this, the team, outside of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) there was some focus to identify a threat because it was their first time in Afghanistan. Again, from my perspective, you can't identify anyone in that crowd. The descriptions could have matched anyone in the crowd. You could not identify anyone with certainty unless you could identify some specific item in the crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Are you aware that some individuals believe that they identified the bomber? Do you have any factual information to weigh in on that belief either way?

(2) Answer. I'll put it to you this way, sir. Being around this community, if you are going to identify a threat you must identify a series of things. One would be moving into a position of advantage. You couldn't identify that in the crowd. You'd need to identify a weapon, which no one did. There would also need to be a threat to friendly forces. I know this from multiple deployments, and you could not have identified these things

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: Were you clear on the Rules of Engagement and how did you know them?

(2) Answer. I was, sir. Upon arrival, and as time transpired on ground, there were several instances where there were riots. The way we approached it, we need permission from the ground force commander to use nonlethal equipment. To use lethal weapons, there had to be threat to force.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

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(1) Question. C1: I think it's remarkable, that following RoE, there were instances that Service Members could have escalated but didn't. Why do you think they did not?

(2) Answer. I truly believe that, in this moment, you see humanity at its rawest moment. You see a significant amount of people in desperation to leave a situation where they are being persecuted. The service members on the ground were the most professional men and women you will ever be around, because they were the only thing between that and case. There were multiple instances where escalation could have occurred, but they chose not to. There were children and infants dying in the crowd, and the natural reaction is to help these people. I firmly believe that. I know it.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think that Service Members on the ground exercised restraint?

(2) Answer. Yes, I absolutely believe that.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1: Do you believe that individuals on the ground realized the impact if their decisions would have been otherwise in terms of how it would impact the situation on the ground?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, without a doubt in my mind.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: Do you believe your team had a clear view of the Rules of Engagement and the authority to defend themselves? How did you share those rules with them? Was there a certain RoE you were operating off of, was it the standing RoE?

(2) Answer. Absolutely, sir. Amongst ourselves, I gave them their left and right limits and we interacted with the units around us and how they dealt with the crowd. We had open communication with the ground force commander, which was our main effort to understand what they and the civilians needed, and how to respond to that. We had a gross understanding of the CENTCOM RoE.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1: Did you feel your team was supposed to calm the crowds and avoid an escalation of force? Could you see those effects and describe them?

(2) Answer. I do sir. The guidance I gave to my team was that we were a thin line of defense for the civilians to deescalate any civil unrest.

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Yes, I recall a specific moment in the comfort zones. The aircraft were not flying for reasons I am not familiar with and there was an influx of personnel. I remember standing on top of a vehicle with a Marine counterpart to calm down, and to provide aid to people and children that were fainting within that crowd. We were trying to separate the more combative members of the crowd with those that were trying to calm down. That was just one instance. We helped spread word about gate closures and inform civilians of where to go.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: Do you know anything about the Taliban executing individuals in the area, did you personally witness that?

(2) Answer. I have not personally witnessed that, but I have heard many individuals say that they have. I did not put myself in a position to be near them. I trust my men and my people.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: Why do you think the Taliban cooperated with us during this? Was it because they wanted us gone and their cooperation enabled that?

(2) Answer. Sir, I don't know if I can answer that question. In my military experience, I have no idea.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) thinks the individual he identified is the bomber. Why do you think that is?

(2) Answer. Several reasons, sir. I think that sometimes when an individual hears something enough, they can start to believe it as a truth for them. I think that's a reason, I think that's because there is a void in information. We never received an official debrief. I think that the team, after two years, all we had was a brief AAR. I think you being here, sir, has given them some priority. I trust (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trust (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trust (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) can't speak on what they saw. I believe there is a lot of fog of war. There are so many different perspectives about the events that transpired. I don't know, sir.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1: Was there a specific Marine NCO in the JOC that you interacted with routinely? Was there anyone in the JOC you interacted with routinely?

(2) Answer. There was a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was tall, with dark hair. He was very direct. I don't remember his exact name or duty title?

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We got most of our information from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) outside of those stand up JOC briefs. This was purposeful as well, in that for us the information on the ground was more important to us. Because that is who we were interacting with. That information from the ground force commander was more important, and I believe it was more actionable in real time.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Answer. Can I say something, Sir? If I could do this all over again, which I hope no one ever has to, the individuals that were selected for this mission and problem set were the best at what they did. I don't know if it was luck of the draw or if it was right place and right time. As far as survivability is concerned, my team was well balanced and I trusted every single one of them. Not long before the team was put together, Ryan was a communication specialist in the 82nd (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was new but trainable. What hurt me the most about this entire thing, was the inability of the unit not to identify the impacts that this had on the Service Members after the fact. I don't think that part of the process was handled well. We were asked to do something extremely difficult. And we did. And nothing that came after that was right, at least from my lens as a senior NCO (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) deployed shortly after that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) deployed to another Crisis shortly after that to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I received a detachment with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and instantly began training for another deployment. That left a lot of answers on the table.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1: Thoughts on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) basing his belief in the bomber off his information from the S2?

(2) Answer. I think that information could not be confirmed with accuracy.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think they could have positively identified the bomber?

(2) Answer. I don't believe that, unless they were using some kind of tech, that there was any way to positively identify the threat.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1: Did you see individuals in the crowd that made you suspicious? If so, why?

(2) Answer. I recall one particular individual in the crowd who had a weapon. He seem calm. He was near the footbridge. He looked like he had some level of rank associated with him. He had a shoulder holster which was uncommon. He had on

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darker clothing. He had a walking stick about his size, and his demeanor and interactions with the crowd made him feel like he had rank and was out of place. Again, out of 4000 individuals he is the only one that seemed to pose a threat.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1: There is a description of a threat stream describing two individuals, do you remember that? A younger man and an older man?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I need to be clear, we were elevated to the height of the wall at Abbey Gate. The only real people that could see into the crowd were those on the barricade and those in the sniper tower. Anyone else on the ground would have had to look directly into the depths of the crowd.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: It's packed chest to back in the crowd and there is a chance of people being trampled or crushed correct?

(2) Answer. Yes. Why I say that, is that unless you were in those positions of vantage, you could not see what was going on behind that first row of personnel. You can't see what's going on behind them.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1: Did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) share his observations of his suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. Maybe in passing, but not that I can recall.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. C1: You had frequent interactions with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How about the Snipers? Would you have known for the day shift?

(2) Answer. There was minimal, if any sir. I did not go in the sniper tower.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. C1: Did the snipers ever pass you SIM cards, pictures, etc?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know how many Marines you helped treat?

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(2) Answer. I provided my tourniquet to one Marine and I helped load one into a CASEVAC. Two that I remember.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You translated the RoE to your Soldiers; do you feel like that was the same regardless of the gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, it was.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When was the day of the suspicious individual that you saw? What were your next steps after seeing that individual?

(2) Answer. It was the 26th, about 2 hours before. We were conducting loud speaker operations, we could see from the top of the HESCO barrier. We could see a little foot traffic. We passed that info up to the ground force commander. We did not request anything, it was just a person with a gun. I told everyone to keep an eye on him.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any gunshots after the explosion?

(2) Answer. I don't recall any small arms fire. I knew, from my experience, that an attack would have come immediately after the explosion. I thought I was going to die behind the vehicle, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were the only ambulatory ones at that moment. I readied up for an imminent threat and told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get ready.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In the days prior to the attack, do you recall any IED 'test run' prior to the event.

(2) Answer. No, ma'am.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1: To clarify, the allegation is that individuals conducted a rehearsal of the bombing days prior to the blast. Or any IED blast days prior to the blast.

(2) Answer. I think that the threat streams were conditioning us on the ground for this instance, but I think that a rehearsal is not accurate. That's no such thing. That's upsetting. They don't happen in succession, they just happen.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

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(1) Question. C1: Do you know anyone who specifically stated seeing the Taliban execute people?

(2) Answer. I didn't see any of this happen. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mentioned something about seeing someone shot. This was not on my shift or while I was, and I did not see anything like this happen.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mentioned an ANDSF individual shoot someone?

(2) Answer. That could be it. I had no desire to interact with personnel outside of the U.S. Armed Forces.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. C1: Who do you talk to about this event?

(2) Answer. Myself, quite a bit. Following that, the people on my team. Following that, Ryan Knauss' mother. (b)(6) My family. That's about it, sir.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. C1: Have you watched any of the media online about this event?

(2) Answer. I try not to, particularly because, I'd like to believe truths. I was on the ground. I knew what we came to do. I don't want to listen to things that could deviate from that path. What I believe is that we, (b)(1)1.4a were sent to HKIA. Between the people desperate to leave that country, we were the only thing between those people and security forces.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1: What is your view of this?

(2) Answer. I do not think there is anything that anyone, at any level, could have done to make this evacuation more successful. It hurts to say that, because I don't know what success is with losing Ryan. But to evacuate 120,000 people in 10 days, with 5,000 Service Members, without clear guidance and direction. I don't know, sir, I have no idea. The Marines showed incredible restraint. I don't know how there wasn't any other incident throughout the 10 days. It's remarkable, and it shows the professionalism. I wear this 24th MEU patch every day to remind myself of how dedicated they were to keep us safe against overwhelming odds. I say that, having served with a lot of organizations.

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xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1: Do you feel as if leaders at echelon were looking out for the welfare and protection of Service Members? What leads you to see that?

(2) Answer. Tactically, yes. I say that because warfare is unpredictable. It's dangerous. You have humanity at its rawest moment. I think decisions were made based on information available, with hasty planning, and ever changing conditions on the ground. People did the best with what they had?

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Is there anything we did not cover that you think is important? Is there anyone else that we should talk to?

(2) Answer. Not at this time, sir. Only (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if you have not spoken to him.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is BG Lance Curtis at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USA
Investigating Officer



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 10 Oct 23, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 19. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
10 Oct 23
(Signature of Person Making Statement) DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

Lorraine Mangilio
10OCT23
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

12 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Formerly of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

1. On 10 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at 2/1 Headquarters, (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and questions from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: Where are you from and how long have you been in the Marines and what is your current job?

(2) Answer. I am from (b)(6) I have been in for four years, and I am currently an (b)(6) I have eight guys under me – 10, technically, but two are in career skills entry.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: What was your job at Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. An 0311, a basic rifleman, in Golf Company.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: When was the first time you thought you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I believe the day before we went. We were doing a CQB range and our staff sergeant told us we were going. We didn't believe it, but around 0100 or 0200 we were woken up to fill our mags with ammo. We got a small brief on the situation. Later that morning, everything was staged on the basketball courts and we were switching gear between the attachments with the PVS14s for the PVS31s so we had the appropriate gear since second stayed back. This was while we were in (b)(1)1.4d

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: You did some training with the (b)(1)1.4d there right?

(2) Answer. I believe so.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Roughly, what date did you go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Maybe 13-14 August.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: How did you get to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. We got on two charter busses, then we flew to (b)(1)1.4d then we flew to Afghanistan.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: Were the Rules of Engagement (RoE) discussed prior to deploying? Think right to defense, hostile act, hostile intent, etc.

(2) Answer. Yes sir. They made us go over the RoE in (b)(1)1.4d then before we went we got a brief on what not to do and what we were going to do, as well as how long we were supposed to be there.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Who gave those briefs?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Formerly of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Our chain of command.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: How was it done to ensure the Marines understood the RoE, situations?

(2) Answer. A few times back at the tents, yes. When we got there, we were told don't be hostile towards the people out there, and we were told that we were there to help people get out. Later we got briefed that we were looking for identification, and it took a day or two before we got a specific brief on what type of identification to look for, since initially only the higher were supposed to be looking for those.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: What are the first things you noticed getting off the plane?

(2) Answer. A lot of Marines were posted around the CP area. I remember walking toward the CP and getting our packs. I remember a lot of flags being lowered. I remember a few vehicles, but not a lot. Most were military vehicles. A lot of jersey barriers set up. A lot of streetlights weren't properly lit, so it was dark a lot of the time. It was night when we arrived.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: When you first got there, what are you told that your mission was? Any area of focus?

(2) Answer. We were told that we were focusing on Abbey Gate. When we got to the tents, we were told we would be there for a certain amount of time and the mission was to get as many people out as possible. Team Leaders and up were told to go through a small brief on what type of documents to look for, that if Marines saw any info they should pass it up, and that any good ID means that leaders should be brought over to verify.

*Brief discussion on the unclassified Abbey Gate map to establish a common lexicon for clarity of the interview. The inner gate, inner corridor, outer gate, outer corridor, canal, Sniper Tower, and Chevron were among the discussed areas.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Were you part of the group of Golf Company that switched out with Echo on the 25th into the 26th? Probably period of darkness between the two?

(2) Answer. Most of the time was switching between three platoons. The main thing I remember that night is that we had a group further out from the gate at an L-

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Formerly of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

Shaped jersey barrier. A lot of the people that were sitting there wanted to go back home; they didn't want to push through anymore. So, 1st platoon took them in groups, and we walked them through the gate to help them go out the canal. I was in 1st Platoon.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you most of the time on the 25th and the 26th?

(2) Answer. We were inside the gate, but we got pulled out because there were consistent warnings. We were inside the jersey barriers right inside the inner gate and told to get down behind those jersey barriers because of the threat.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: You're talking about an imminent threat warning? What would you do if you were told that something was about to happen? Lower profile, cease operations, get behind cover?

(2) Answer. They would try to clear out the area where an imminent threat was and pull us back as far as possible. We lowered our profile behind jersey barriers that were outside the gate. Once we figured out what was going on we would move back in.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: Were there times that operations ceased due to the threat, and you waited for a period before resuming operations? How long was the longest, a couple hours?

(2) Answer. I remember we ceased operations. I don't remember how long. I want to say no, but time didn't feel real. I remember when they said there was a bomb by the Abbey Gate and we got down it felt like a long time, but that may have just been the lack of sleep.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you physically located at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I was on the Jersey Barrier at the base of the sniper tower [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had pulled me off and told me to calm down and go talk to Staff Sergeant. I got a few feet toward [REDACTED] who was on the wall, and then the blast went off. I remember waking up in the corner at the base of the sniper tower, and [REDACTED] was next to me. The first thing I remember was trying to breathe, the CS gas was going off from other Marines flaks. I remember trying to wake up [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and then I remember moving down the canal and into the inner corridor. [REDACTED] grabbed me and told me to get down. I poured water on my face and telling him

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we need to go get (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I remember screaming at somebody to try and cut open the fence, since the only opening was in the U further down.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember who cut the holes?

(2) Answer. I do not. I remember we started pulling people out and passing them through the hole. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) grabbing me and telling me that there was a family in the inner corridor. We grabbed them and starting moving back. I remember hearing a whizz past my ear, but at the time I thought I wasn't mentally there. (b)(6) I remember going back out the opening and grabbing (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and trying to stay calm. I grabbed him with someone else and brought him back. Me and six people went back and grabbed Page on a riot shield. Then I remember we went back and grabbed Nikoui. After that someone told me to help with the casualties we had, and then (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told me to do the same.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: What injuries did you have, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and know you (b)(6) being so close.

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: You didn't get medical attention until (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. I blame myself for that. We were loading the injured into the vehicles, and I remember being in one with a corpsman in the back (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and someone else were in the back. I remember us trying to go through the inner gate but we couldn't make it that way so we took an alternate route straight to the flight line. I remember a flight coming down very close over us and a red bus trying to turn in front of us. We drove around it and drove behind the CP area to get to the hospital. We unloaded them and put (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on a bench by the hospital (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was next to me, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came and told me how upset he was that they took his rifle (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and I were pulling people off of vehicles in front of the hospital and laying them down wherever we could. Once we started, I feel like we got everything done relatively fast. I remember them giving medicine to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and I remember that the Hospital was filled so they were moving people to the alternative area. I was standing next to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and they were bringing vehicles to move people. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) grabbing me and telling me to keep track of everyone I was with before (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) being taken in for treatment.

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I remember asking someone at the gate where the alternate area was and being told the wrong area. I ran to the wrong area, ran back, and asked again. Someone just pointed, and I remember running that way, past the CP and toward the U-shape by the hospital. I ran until I saw a Marine standing out there, and I asked him, because he was near me, where it was. They told me to calm down, that everything was okay, and then giving me a water. I remember a corpsman pulling me into the CP of that medical base. I remember in that area I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) laying on the left side, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the middle, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on the right side. I remember being relieved, turning around, and throwing up outside. I spent the majority of my night there, before they asked to check me; I kept telling them that I was fine. (b)(6)

(b)(6) They gave me a quick look over, but I didn't feel comfortable taking off my gear so they had a hard time checking me. After that I walked out, took a knee, and had a hard time trying to breathe. Then I remember asking where they were getting moved now, and being told the hospital across the street which made me mad after all the running.

I remember going to my section leader at the time and talking to him about what was going on. A lot of people were asking if I saw this person, that person, or this person. I couldn't give an answer because I didn't see them, or I could tell they weren't there when we pulled them out of the gate. I wanted to keep commotion in the tent down.

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) I had a small first aid kit that I had at the time, I didn't use tourniquet pouch because I thought I might need it later.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Were you looking toward the blast and the bomber at the time?

(2) Answer. No. I remember a description at the time. A man and a teenager sitting over night. The teenager was laying in his lap. We got more description later about what he was wearing, but we didn't acknowledge that because of the amount of times that we got descriptions while we were there. The vbieds, the bags and book bags that we found along the canal area. The descriptions of people, a lot sounded the same.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: A lot of people would fit the descriptions of the threat?

(2) Answer. Yes, that was frustrating a majority of the time. There were always smaller details that they told us to look for, which helped but you would look so hard for it that you would keep seeing that thing.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: So you don't remember the specific description that day?

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(2) Answer. I do not. I remember small things they said, but a lot of time we were out there you would see a lot people that matched so we would continuously watch them, but that never resulted in properly subduing them or taking them into custody.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: If you were using the RoE and you saw someone who fit a description would you have the right to engage based off that alone?

(2) Answer. No, you can approach them calmly and try to figure out whats going on. If it's a positive ID you should tell them to stop, then raise the rifle without pointing it at them, you yell at them. Then you wait to see if they follow commands. If they attempt to attack you, you have to see them show that they are attempting harm before you were shoot them. Before hand, we were told to avoid shooting people.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: So you need hostile act/intent before you engage someone, it cant just be a description right?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Does shout, show, shove, shoot sound familiar?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear or witness any IED rehearsal or test runs?

(2) Answer. Nothing other than what higher told us. We heard what had been seen on social media, or what had been found around the gate from higher.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) around the gate while you were manning it?

(2) Answer. Once or twice. We didn't really want our (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) around at the time. Not because of any altercations, but his gear and the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) gear didn't look like it was set up properly, but we didn't want to tell them that. We didn't want to have to worry for them, so we just tried to do our job.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Formerly of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see any particularly suspicious individuals during that time period?

(2) Answer. I would say two people. One in a brown shirt, manjams, who walked thought the gate and dropped a book bag. That matched a description we had at the time, so I told higher, and we were pulled inside for about 10 minutes. Another time there was a person on the far side of the canal there was a guy talking on a radio, look around, talk on the radio, point at us. We told our SSgt at the time, but when we turned around again, he was gone. Multiple people saw him, but we couldn't do anything at the time.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: What do you mean you couldn't do anything about it?

(2) Answer. We would have had to go to the far side of the canal, and we couldn't do that to get to him.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you notice if he had a weapon?

(2) Answer. A few people there were in black getups and hitting people with sticks and their rifles, that's normally who we saw with rifles.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: Is it clear to you, according to the RoE that you could have engaged someone that had a hostile act towards you in such a way that you would feel the need to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you, about how many days, did you work along the canal wall?

(2) Answer. The last few days. We were probably in that area for three or four days. The first day we were inside the outer gate, it took a few days to push them out and then setup the chevron. When we first got there the gate was flooded with people. That was the second worst day for me, I was trampled multiple times trying to get another Marine out of the crowd. (b)(1)1.4d in front of me when I was trying to get a family (b)(6) pointed out with the right paperwork. I remember we had been told 1st Squad was going out, then 15 seconds later we all had to go out.

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hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That RoE brief you received in (b)(1)1.4d did that change once you arrived or were they the same?

(2) Answer. The rules were the same, but the mission changed slightly. Initially, we thought we were going to destroy intel, then support other units. When we got there, we were told we were going to Abbey Gate.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive instructions saying Abbey Gate had a different RoE, or would it have been the same no matter where?

(2) Answer. The only thing we were told like that, we were told that we would be professional. We would wear the proper PPE and be examples of professionalism.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why were you upset before being pulled off the wall?

(2) Answer. It was just enough. We had seen dead babies and people get trampled. We were fed up to see people being pushed against the wall. We saw a woman and child getting crushed. The mother was trying to protect the kid, and she looked like she was going to faint. I snapped a little bit and started pushing the crowd, but we were told to not be that aggressive.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long had you been there at the time?

(2) Answer. I want to say a couple hours, we usually switch every couple hours. I remember we were supposed to be relieved by another platoon, but we were trying to calm everyone down first.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned receiving a lot of information about threats, about how many would you say you received, just generally?

(2) Answer. On a day-to-day basis, it was probably about five a day.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You said it was frustrating to look and see the details, why was that, was it because you couldn't act?

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(2) Answer. No ma'am, it wasn't that. The tension I had at the time was between me and (b)(6). Our section would usually get pulled to do other things. My team leader kept getting upset because I would get pulled because they let (b)(6) know, but not him. So, my team leader thought I wasn't where I needed to be. I was just following the directions, but my team leader was upset about it until (b)(6) told me to stay by him the whole time.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who in your chain of command told you about threat streams and when?

(2) Answer. Any time. We would be told before the shift or during the shift by our team leader or squad leader, and that would let us know what we were looking for. Some people would look for that the whole time and someone would just keep an eye out. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and if we saw anything we would pass it up through them.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned a procedure was to approach a suspicious person, did you ever do that?

(2) Answer. No, we were cautious because we knew they might be carrying explosives and we didn't want to put anyone at risk.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you see the individual in the brown manjams drop the bag or the man on the radio?

(2) Answer. The manjams was a few days before the explosion, and I would say the radio was the first day. Maybe seven or eight days before the explosion.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever interact with the snipers?

(2) Answer. We only waved at them going through the gate, we didn't intertwine with them until we got to (b)(1)1.4d

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you talk about the events with people who were there with you? Anyone specifically?

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(2) Answer. Yes, I do, ma'am. I would say that I talk to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) the most, he was a friend from a different fire team but we were in the same mortar section. I talk to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) every once in a while, to figure out if he is okay, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you consume any social media about this incident?

(2) Answer. During the memorial and when we got back there was a lot, and I would try to avoid that when I saw it.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anyone ever reach out to you about this?

(2) Answer. We were told when we first got back to avoid organizations reaching out about this event. Nothing recently.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: One thing I've heard is that Golf set the example. You mentioned professionalism. Who is the highest level you heard say something like that? Any examples?

(2) Answer. Our (b)(6) and our (b)(6) That was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at the time. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would tell us, before we went out the gate, (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d; we knew that meant don't shoot in the air, beat people, throw CS Gas or flash bangs. Just not being too aggressive and trying to help anyone that was injured. Not pulling someone out of the canal without verifying their ID. Make sure you have PPE.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Did you feel clear that they cared about the safety of the Marines?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. They gave us precautions on what not to do, like not standing on the canal, in order to avoid putting yourself at bad predicaments. When you were helping people, make sure you were stable to avoid falling. Make sure that you keep your eye on the people around you.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1: Do you feel like the chain of command was trying to do the best thing for your safety?

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(2) Answer. For the most part. There was a lot out of their control. I wish we had more training on how to control and mitigate large crowds of people. Other than that, no.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: Your pre-deployment training just wasn't to scale, right?

(2) Answer. Yes, but the work-up was often about being the aggressor or looking for VBIEDs and IEDs. There were company-size movements that were the focus.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was this your first deployment?

(2) Answer. Yes, ma'am.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes sir. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: Are those injuries from this?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Formerly of Golf Company, 2/1 Marines

(b)(6)

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Anything we didn't talk about that you think is important?

(2) Answer. Not that I know of.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1: You're not paying attention to social media on this at all?

(2) Answer. Not really, I try to avoid thinking about things like this.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever interact with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. No, the majority of the time they were just hitting people. When we pushed to the Chevron, they would just be standing around watching us. They shot a few people on the other side of the Chevron, which made the (b)(1) 1.4 push back. Mostly, they were just aggressive on the far side of the canal. One of the dudes that was going back out to the Chevron, the Taliban over there let off a few potshots.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever physically see them shoot someone?

(2) Answer. Just that incident, it hit one of the locals and everyone else dispersed. That person fell and people avoided being around him for a while.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone you think we have to talk with?

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(2) Answer. I want to say (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), our (b)(6) at the time. Our (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They had the best overhead view of the situation, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would be great in that small group of higher; he was with the other section leaders.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. C1: Did you see any difference in the crowd between when Golf was in charge versus when you had to take over from Echo?

(2) Answer. Yes. Definitely. That was big thing. We had to spend a good amount of the time when we took over the gate from them trying to calm the crowd back down.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1: What's your best contact in case we need to do a follow-up?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) and my email is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis at (b)(6) or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USA
Supplemental Reviewer

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question ____ and ends on question _____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

10/12/23
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

12 OCT 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

13 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (2/3) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

1. On 13 October 2023, BG Curtis conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. BG Lance Curtis (C1), (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted the interview and are annotated by who is asking questions throughout the following transcript.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: How much have you been influenced by social media in regards to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I am not actively watching, but I have seen it from working connections and happen stance. The only page that I follow that posts a lot is the OIR foundation page. I do it to keep a pulse with people and where they are. I like to know when people I know are struggling so I can reach out. I acknowledge there is a lot of bias in the organization as a whole. In case and point, the alleged adult male that was seen, and a picture was taken. I know there was a picture on the SD card that was from one of the cameras that one of the snipers used, they had a lot. I know because the snipers would come to me, or meet half way and debrief. We would meet 2 or 3 times a

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day. The sniper platoon commander was out as a sniper, so I was trying to cut the fat. I only had a couple analysts under me, so I was trying to debrief directly.

The day of the 26th, I remember one of the debriefs the snipers were talking about (b)(1)1.4a having a description of a guy with a clean-shaven head, and a long beard. I can't remember if they described his clothes, they said he had a bag. They showed me a picture of some guy in the crowd with a serious face, just staring off and angry. But there was nothing special, he was another guy in the crowd. I wanted to know where the report came from. I know that there were SF Dudes and all kinds of forces coming through our gate. Abbey Gate was open 30-40% more than other gates, so other nations were coming through constantly. (b)(1)1.4a and other EODs and enablers would come through there, so it wouldn't surprise me if guys were talking down there. It might not follow task org, but it was the wild west trying to get things done. Information passing was often as lateral as it was vertical.

I don't remember any radio communications asking to engage a target. Granted I didn't have a direct radio, just the one in our command center. Threat reporting was constant, so we tried not to clog the radio with that, we would wait for debriefs. To the point, I don't remember a request to engage, I just remember being asked about that guy in a debrief. I asked the (b)(6) I assume he asked higher, and it came back that we had nothing on that guy. To me that ended it, and my understanding is that guy disappeared. I don't remember anyone saying they saw him again around the time of the blast.

That individual was allegedly on the near side of the canal, standing right before the fence, I think. So he was slightly elevated, then he went back toward the Taliban building that there were alleged pot shots at later. I remember talking about that with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) later, and at best it sounded circular. There was a vague description, then there wasn't enough to act on, but it was reported up. So at best, it was circular reporting confirming itself.

*Brief pause to describe the common lexicon of Abbey Gate based on the unclassified map.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Where do you think the holes in the fence were?

(2) Answer. One by the sniper tower that was cut, and one towards the Barron that was already open.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: Back to the circular discussion, I believe that a (b)(1)1.4a NCO was in the sniper tower and saw the individual, who he said was on the far side of the canal wall and had a description that generally matched one of that days 'Be on the

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 0/1 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lookout' For (BOLO) and was staring into space. He apparently told the snipers to look at him, they watched him for thirty minutes, and he walks away. Do you know where I could find a picture of that, and do you think that he could have been engaged on RoE?

(2) Answer. From what I recall, that instance happened, then I was debriefed a couple of hours later and we had our conversation. Then after that, they'd have gone back to their post. They didn't convey any hostile act or intent, just a partial PID match based on the bag and physical description with threat reporting.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: Would multiple individuals have fit that description?

(2) Answer. From the sheer number. The only thing I noticed in the image is that he looked bald underneath his hood/turban type hat. Something was on his head. He was bald, with a beard. He may have been scowling, he had thick, dark black eyebrows. I cant remember his clothes. There was nothing described as hostile act or intent, just 'PID'. I don't recall it going over the radio, I just remember a conversation about it.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: One of the (b)(1)1.4a said that he spoke to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and one other guy in the sniper tower, who he described as having some red facial hair for not shaving. That individual, he believes, picked up the radio and called the CoC or the JoC?

(2) Answer. The only communications they would have had was their CoC which they would have radioed to us. I don't recall any transmission like that.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Why would they key in and become convinced that this individual was the bomber, out of all the people in the crowd?

(2) Answer. I guess, if I can say, speaking from my gut: We were on day 15 of this thing, some had been there a little less. Reporting had gotten so imminent, seeming like something was going to happen. People were getting word that the gate was closing and they were flooding in. The night before I had literally, I was walking back from talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the Gate, and I had finished passing my info. I was going to check on the medical people, and two guys popped over the fence and I, by myself, had to point my weapon at them. We escorted them out, but I say that to say people were desperate. I think North Gate and East Gate were closed at this time.

I felt like they wanted that report, not that they wanted it to be true, but that they were scared that they were right, and it was the bomber. I think that they felt that they, with the compounding factors of more reports and people coming to Abbey gate. I can't

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remember the specific reporting, but I remember reports coming in about our layout. It felt more real. I think those things and the general desperation gave the snipers a greater confidence that the risk/reward of that individual being the bomber, was there.

There was nothing from the picture. I just felt he matched a partial description. The description wasn't specific enough. Everyone had a bag, bags were thrown over the fence everyday. Like when those two guys jumped in front of me, I called for help and we searched them. At that time, I wasn't thinking about getting blown up, I just thought it was a guy that wanted to get in.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. C1: Best guess, where could I find the picture?

(2) Answer. Were you able to check pictures from the cameras that the snipers used? Those cards SHOULD still be at 2/1 or uploaded to those hard drives. Those cameras came home, I don't know why they wouldn't be there.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: Was any info destroyed due to lack of room?

(2) Answer. I destroyed some computers and hard drives, but not ones that we were using directly for the mission, ones we were using for our intranet. When we were told we need to be ready to go, I told our guys to destroy our classified because we didn't have anything on it. The snipers had their own gear and would have brought it back.

I would see if you could get the sniper cameras from Weapons Company. The CMR (Consolidated Material Report) should still list the cameras. The cards would be hard, but I don't know if anything should have happened to them.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember a conversation about this with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Basically, I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being like "Why this dude?" and I explained what they thought, and he ran it up. It was basically a negative. I don't remember a big stink being made about this. I don't remember anyone being worked up about this. Everyone on the operations floor would agree. When the bomb went off we didn't feel it, we just got the reports, and we were shocked.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: The belief is that there is not enough tied to RoE?

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(2) Answer. I would agree, not nearly enough. People got RoE briefed in (b)(1)1.4d and when we came into theater which apply to all of CENTCOM, and I gave an intel brief before we came into theater.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1 shares a picture of the standing rules of engagement. So you were definitely briefed on right to self-defense?

(2) Answer. Yes. If I may, there was some dissonance. They got the RoE brief as soon as they got in theater, I just didn't think they viewed it as the real thing until they were going to Afghanistan. They didn't realize that the whole deployment was just preparing for that thing. Once we got there, we kept the gate open, and we saved a lot of people. It's that simple. I don't know how this has become so convoluted.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think this was preventable at the tactical level?

(2) Answer. Only if we close the gates.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: A lot of people say the same thing. Several have told me there are concerns associated with that. The thousands of people in the Barron Hotel. Several have told me that on the 26th there were hundreds of people with blue American passports, and closing the gates would have stranded them there. Your thoughts on that, would closing the gate have left American citizens?

(2) Answer. My opinion is, if there was one thing to critique it's that the MEU did not give us clear orders and guidance from day one, and I will call them out directly. We had to come out with our own mission orders and ask if that's what they wanted. The first order we got from them was "fill in the gaps". What does that mean. To me, this was combat. We did our mission. We did that until climax. It's irrelevant to me if we could have closed it, we did our mission until this happened. I don't think I'm answering this question very well, could you ask it again?

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think that individual they talked about was the bomber?

(2) Answer. No, I don't. A suicide bomber that was going to kill himself hours later, to have that composure seems a breach of human nature to me. To me, it's also reaching at straws. Its cognitive dissonance, you can't show any evidence. It's like the complex attack, there was a lot of shooting, a lot of people had guns. But if you were insinuating that ISIS-K and the Taliban did a complex attack, no. It's sad. I know a lot of

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people are trying to make sense of this thing, but to me its so clear. Its war, people die, people blow themselves up.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: What would have happened if they shot that individual?

(2) Answer. I don't know, but I think it would have been awful geo-politically. At the tactical level it could have gone either way. It could have frenzied the crowd, but the Taliban could have also stopped it because they wanted us to leave.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: Why were the Taliban partnering with us?

(2) Answer. I came in on the 15th, before the airfield was entirely compromised. Trying to get the civilians off, without us becoming war criminals, I remember talking with the (b)(6) and being in a meeting with some of the commanders. We knew we had to clear the airfield. It was terrible, we knew we were screwed. We knew we had like a day to decide before food ran out. Then Admiral Vasely I believe, one of the stars, communicated with the senior Taliban commanders. Then all of sudden they were coming in with bull whips and guns and the crowds left like butter. That was a great relief, but then we had to figure out what we just signed up for. We had to do meet ups with them, exchanges. There were also other agencies doing things on their own that we couldn't control.

Just developing Abbey Gate was difficult. Using cranes while the Taliban was keeping crowd control. I think we worked alongside them, which messed with a lot of people, badly.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever see the Taliban execute civilians?

(2) Answer. Not with my eyes. I have been told. I have zero doubt. On the IR camera initially, I saw them bull whipping and shooting into a crowd. I know that out at Abbey Gate, the snipers and others who could see out. They saw it. Maybe it wasn't regular, but an individual might come up to talk and then the husband would get smoked, I can only speculate for whatever reason.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When the bomb went off, what were your actions?

(2) Answer. I was in the JOC with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a couple others. He was on the radio. I remember hearing it. He wanted to kit and go out, I told him to stay so we

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could handle that. The JOC was trying to come in, but we kicked them out so we could handle our business. To tell the truth, we didn't have to do much. 2/1, the immediate actions were incredible. Within 5 minutes of the blast there was a luggage cart carrying bodies. In a weird way I was proud. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is a huge reason, the best officer in the Marine Corps. He trained these guys and coordinated them. It was just immediate action. Medical was ready, S1 knew how to do PCRs, S4 was trying to get more logistical support.

Once we had confirmed accountability of our people in the gate, we shut the gate. This is when I had to help confirm who was killed and who wasn't. We confirmed some guys through ISO prep. From there, that was it. We shut down operations, I tried to help with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) had been taken out, so I was trying to help the (b)(6) and I wanted to debrief people quickly. I talked to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) first, (b)(6) (b)(6) His first sergeants and platoon commanders were helpful. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was great at sending them to me to get a debrief and build a product. Other commanders were more hesitant.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: In what way was he fried?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is a smart guy, but he was affected by the blast. His answers were all over the place, he was 70% (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After that it was just getting ready to leave and cleaning the airfield.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Were (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) doing the right thing to mitigate threats?

(2) Answer. I think so, yes. There was an (b)(1)1.4g by the Sniper tower that should have jammed out to the chevron. One thing, I remember being mad at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) for both of those guys being at the gate when they are number one and number 2. I was number 3, so that was hard.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Why were they both there?

(2) Answer. I know at the time we had ridiculous calls from the JOC. We had a call from the highest levels to go open a gate by North Gate. I don't know where commands were coming from outside of 2/1 (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told me that I would be cannon fire, tell those guys that I would pass them along while (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did work at the gate. I would pass that info along when he got back. But the orders were weird, they shouldn't tell us how to run the gate. It's our gate. Sometimes high rank Colonels and important guys would come to the gate which is disruptive to the gate. So, I think (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) wanted

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to be able to make operational decisions so he tried to create some distance between himself.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is a guy who loves Marines and will achieve the mission. So, at the time I was mad, but I know they were doing a leaders recon on when to close the gate. I get it, it was just an opportune moment to strike.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: Was leader presence from (b)(6) and others high at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I think so. I was there 2-3 times a day. (b)(6) was there most of the day. The (b)(6) was cycling. There were Marines all up and down that gate, and they wouldn't remember you between times they saw you. I was the cigarette fairy to help guys stay awake, and the guys would have forgotten they had just gotten a cigarette from me. Those guys had two hours or less sleep a day.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: What's the most protected place at Abbey Gate from a blast?

(2) Answer. Inside the gate, I'm not sure anyone inside would have been directly affected.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: How about the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I remember being told there was a crack in their back window after the blast. I went and looked, and I didn't see it. I don't know how that window would have cracked anyway.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Last time you mentioned them saying they took fire and you having looked the next morning and finding no evidence?

(2) Answer. I remember that. My assessment with probably 60% confidence is there was small arms fire, just not coordinated or directed. I don't know who was shooting, I just don't think it had anything directly to do with the blast. The Taliban were probably freaking out too. I remember one of the Marines, told me they could see guys in a second story window down the canal which didn't make any sense.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

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(1) Question. C1: I have heard suspicious individuals by the water tower on the second story who say that they shot at an individual who was shooting at them. A lot of people, more senior guys, don't think that happened. Thoughts?

(2) Answer. Most I heard, was people saying snaps overhead. I'm sure that happened. There were Taliban on the Chevron and I'm sure they were shooting at the crowd just to go.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: I know (b)(1)1.4d Marine Recon, and Marines inside the gate fired some shots.

(2) Answer. I know that Marines pulled security by the Sniper tower before they closed the gate. Then I remember some of those reports, and I remember being asked to look at that area in IR. We didn't see any muzzle flashes in that area.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: I have a Marine saying he saw an individual shooting at them from the second story. Thoughts?

(2) Answer. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) telling me that, and it didn't make any sense to me. I remember talking to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at (b)(1)1.4d and him saying something about that. There were probably people in there, but I don't know if they were shooting.

Unrelated, our chaplain at one point had a stray round hit his Kevlar. The way he described it, it couldn't have been from enemy fire. That was the story, but I think it was a warning shot from Abbey Gate. No one in 2/1 or Abbey Gate shot warning shots, we tried not to do that. It was a thing for us. Maybe our guys did after the blast, but I know the (b)(1)1.4d

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Are there things that are important that we should talk about?

(2) Answer. It was confusing to me, and this might be outside the purview, that the intelligence beforehand and the public stance were totally conflicting. I knew before the fact, back in April or May, that this was going to happen. The DoD knew, we didn't know why the DoS was going to take so long. I didn't know why we weren't evacuating sooner; I don't know why they thought they had that long. Our reports were indicating it would be much faster. We were blatantly late to the game, and I would want to know.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

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(1) Question. C1: I understand your concern, but our scope was solely tactical. That's not something we were asked to look at, so we can't speak on that piece.

(2) Answer. I understand, sir. So, on the tactical side, no. The big questions, I don't think that was the guy that they saw. Secondly, I don't think we could or should have shut the gate. We were processing at a rate that was fair for the risk. It was a simple formula to me.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). A couple of basic questions. How long have you been in service? What deployment was this?

(2) Answer. Seven years. This was my second deployment. My first was to Helmand Afghanistan for a train, advise, and assist mission. I was deployed there for 9 months. 6 in Helmand, and 3 in Bagram.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Let's talk about RoE. You received briefs, did you brief RoE? Was the RoE the same across locations and times and gates?

(2) Answer. I didn't brief RoE. (b)(1)1.4a I think was responsible for briefing those. The RoE before we entered the CENTCOM AOR was from us, and we brief that to the whole battalion. I do think they were the same, we were never told otherwise. I think the RoE was a given and the same.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). On the 26th, (b)(1)1.4a got a report of a shaved head, long beard, with a bag, looking angry. When and who was that convo with? (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. No, only the snipers and then after that with the (b)(6) (b)(6) I could not tell you when in the day. I know it wasn't in the morning, because I remember the situation allegedly happened in the morning. I would estimate between 1200-1500, they would have come to me after their shift and doing their internal change over. I would always see them after their shift, we would usually talk for 30-45 minutes. So, I definitely talked to them then the (b)(6)

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). When they talked to you, did they mention the (b)(1)1.4a identifying this individual?

(2) Answer. I don't think I could give you a definite answer. I talked to them after the blast, conversations bleed together. So, I don't know. I know that, or at least I

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imagine, that they would only show me that picture if someone like (b)(1)1.4a gave them additional information which would have given me enough to pass the picture up. After I explained to him, he took it to the JOC. I don't know if the snipers were then ever told no directly about that guys.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: So, if they have PID and something that would allow them to engage like hostile act/hostile intent, why would they call higher and ask for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. To back track, with an anecdote from earlier in the week, there was a BOLO of a vehicle from earlier in the week. I know that some Marines shot at vehicles, maybe from 1/8. There were partial matches of BOLOs all the time. If there was a partial BOLO match, it wouldn't have surprised me, welcome to Afghanistan.

I remember getting this brief from them, after they saw the guy. So, I think they were maybe trying to engage before talking to me, so I'm not sure when that would have happened. I'm not even sure what report exactly this guy matched.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) For your conversations with the snipers, how many and who did you talk to? (Shows a picture of the sniper team for reference)

(2) Answer. I'm terrible with names, I'm good with faces. The platoon sergeant was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did a lot of the debriefs, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were there. I think they were running four-man teams, but maybe they were running two six-man teams. They were task organized at the platoon commanders desire. The conversation on the 26th would have been with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) the ones who said that they had the guy. I think (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there too.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: Who was in charge of these guys, you would say?

(2) Answer. I would say (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he took over as (b)(6)

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember what position the Marines held in the sniper team?

(2) Answer. In essence of this mission, it's hard to say. I think (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was a Sgt at the time and was like a team leader. I know they had a medic. Our teams were spread throughout CENTCOM, so it was trying to work with what we had. The

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companies wanted to keep the snipers with them, but the companies rotated, and we needed to keep them static. It was one of the first times we kept the snipers at the battalion control.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Would a radio operator ever have conversations directly with the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I never saw that specifically, but it wouldn't entirely surprise me if that happened. It would be nonstandard, but I don't know what exactly happened. There are instances where that could arise, but that's speculation. All I know is when that picture was taken, when I gave it to the chain of command, then that guy disappearing. I didn't hear about him ever coming back.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You could identify a few individuals from the sniper team who showed you the picture?

(2) Answer. I could not identify 100%. It's hard for me to remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) spoke to me a lot. I am highly confident that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there, but I couldn't say. I don't remember ever talking to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) much. It was a long couple of weeks.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, they show the picture, you show the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I disseminated via cell phone to whoever needed it. Within 15 or 20 minutes. I don't remember if the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was gone at the time, so I don't know if I showed him immediately.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When the picture of suspected PID was showed, what was their demeanor?

(2) Answer. They seemed worked up. Not scared, not angry, just excited.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was leaderships reaction when you showed them?

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(2) Answer. They didn't see any relevance or any PID. I agreed. It was a partial match to a PID in a tremendous crowd of people who matched partial PID. It seemed like they wanted it to be true, they manifested it.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Based on your experience, how many pictures did you review on a daily basis? Did that individual look similar to other pictures you reviewed?

(2) Answer. So many, hundreds. No, a lot of the pictures weren't of BOLOs. I had a lot of atmospheric and baselines. I would pass BOLOs, but we didn't see a ton of value in wasting time scanning individuals when we needed to understand the bigger picture. The Snipers were never told to scan solely for BOLOs, and at the time they weren't fixated on this guy. Even after the blast, I don't remember anything being said about it. IF the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said no, I don't know and it didn't cause any issue.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could that suspicious individual has been anyone based on his characteristics?

(2) Answer. I think his mannerisms indicated he wasn't there to be evacuated, but that's true for maybe 5% of the crowd. Out of thousands, that's still a lot of people trying not to leave. I also remember they said they had a kid with him, that he went away with for a while. Which made me think Taliban. ISIS-K wouldn't be able to move through Taliban country on a recon beforehand. They are not friends. It doesn't make sense in this context to me.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, his physical characteristics are unremarkable?

(2) Answer. He looked like an Afghan.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you send that picture to the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I showed the (b)(6) the picture. I don't know if I sent it. He agreed that its wasn't much.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was that info passed to the snipers?

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(2) Answer. Not that I personally know of. Shortly after that he went to the gate. There's a good chance he went to the gate directly to the gate. To me, that's his prerogative and that report was dead in the water.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you discuss the hostile act and intent of that individual with the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I relayed exactly what was relayed to me. That he was sitting and watching angrily and then left. We formed the same opinion, that this seemed like bunk. Part of it was no hostile act, no hostile intent, it was only a partial match. Physical matches to me are so weak. Then my opinion, and I'm not a Taliban expert, it doesn't make sense to have an ISIS-K guy walk through the crowd unchallenged. Getting in and out of the crowd is hard, he probably knew some Taliban.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mention debriefing people after the blast, did the snipers or anyone mention that individual at that time?

(2) Answer. Oh yeah. It became a rampant second or third hand account. I remember talking to officers and being told there were pictures, that we saw the guy. It just became the truth to them. That's what circular reporting is.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many people would you say repeated that rumor?

(2) Answer. Not everyone, but certainly individuals in every company. People who weren't right there was saying it. Snipers and (b)(1)1.4a may have been passing that info beforehand, so that after the blast it was a daisy chain.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) There is an allegation that some faction ran an IED test run around the 21st or the 22nd, either with an explosion or without, did you have any knowledge of that?

(2) Answer. I have no idea what you are talking about. I know that some platoon sergeant mentioned a bag flying over a fence, but that happened a billion times. I don't know what that dry run is.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) you would have heard about that as the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) night?

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(2) Answer. I would have heard that.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). When there were imminent threats what precautions would have been taken to protect Marines? Cease operations, take cover, etc?

(2) Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I don't know of tactical implementations to mitigate harm tied to explosives. I don't recall that specifically, I recall vaguely temporal elements tied to reporting. I know that's something that would have been implemented at a company level, it's not something that would have been directed from higher.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). You mentioned before that there was no way it was a complex attack?

(2) Answer. Yes, no way. I formed that opinion especially after debriefing people. The accounts that I could corroborate painted a clear picture. The accounts that I couldn't, it seemed like young, inexperienced Marines are prone to inflate events that happened. I can't say the exact motivation, but part of it is about reputation involved with being involved in combat. Marines would want to say they returned fire at a target. It may have been award chasing, trying to say that they engaged an enemy in order to get their combat action ribbon. I was just trying to get a scientific picture. I had a solid 80% confirmed, it was hard to piece together that stray voltage. Those two weeks were incredible in what we did, but that explosion was a way to end that great story that created some cognitive dissonance. Anyone who says they were shot falls into that category, as far as I know there was never a confirmed gunshot would.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Anything else?

(2) Answer. No. Compared to previous deployments, I didn't have a hard time with this. It is open and shut. We went to help, we helped a lot of people, something bad happened. Its war. I don't know how people are trying to make a different sense of this when it was so clear what happened.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any discussion of a BOLO for two individuals who may have been part of an IED test run?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. No. A BOLO would have had to come from higher, we didn't get that. A sniper couldn't give us the BOLO. I remember they had a theory at the time that they (the individuals) were trying to recruit kids in the crowd. I remember that being early in the week, nothing about a bomb. I don't remember that being relevant. Remember, there were tons of people selling things in the crowd. I remember the snipers would come back a lot of time going on tangents, trying to make something of nothing. Like a dog with a squirrel. They were excited about a lot of things, they were on a real mission, doing actual sniper things. They talked about this recruiting, I told them if you see a baseline, make note of it. But a one-off thing, is probably a one-off thing so you need a baseline. Was it anything? Probably not. It wasn't anything that met PID or hostile act, hostile intent.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis,

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lance G Curtis
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer



CUI

Exhibit S014

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 57. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Signature of Person Making Statement

13 OCT 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

13 OCT 2023
DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

12 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

1. On 12 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity, where questions are asked, below, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What year did you joining the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. 2018.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get orders to 1st CEB? When did you arrive?

(2) Answer. Yes, I got orders out of the schoolhouse. I arrived Dec 2018 to the unit.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any deployments prior to 2021?

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(2) Answer. No

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What training were you doing at 1st CEB prior to your deployment?

(2) Answer. We did a lot of self-sufficient training. We were not expected to deploy due to what we need to conduct our mission. Over the next two years we hung out (attached to train) with 3rd LAR (out of 29 Palms) for a while. We did a couple ITXs/MWXs, over roughly 2 months, and Steel Night with them. Doing a lot of breaching and vehicle reconnaissance. After a while I went from MAC 3 to MAC 2, went to another ITX, and then I got a call asking to go to a line company and deploy. I said yes, and was attached to 2/1 then went into another ITX.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When were you attached to 2/1 Marines?

(2) Answer. October 2020 I was with 2/1. So roughly in the fall I was attached.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you know you would deploy with the (b)(1)1.4a initially?

(2) Answer. We trained because we thought we were deploying. Then it was called off. So we kept training, issued some new gear. Then the deployment was back on. I was with 2/1 for 4-5 months before deploying with them.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What company were you in?

(2) Answer. Echo Company for the entire workup. All work up I was with (b)(6) When we got into country it changed.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you were with 2/1 4-5 months doing a work up, primarily with 1st Plt, E Co. When do you deploy with the (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. April 2021 we deploy from (b)(1)1.4d We were in (b)(1)1.4d for about a month or so, then went from (b)(1)1.4d for about a month. Then (b)(1)1.4d We were training constantly, conducting exercises.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

Most of (b)(6) At that point I went to (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) I was assigned to (b)(6) the first time we got into (b)(1)1.4d

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What kind of training were you doing in (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. A lot of live fire training. Static and maneuver ranges. We were constantly training.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you go back to (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. Yes.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you start hearing the mission could possibly change to a NEO?

(2) Answer. Around June/July is when it went from whispers of it happening, to it will happen.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you change your training?

(2) Answer. Yes. We started doing ECPs, searching, crowd control. A lot of non-lethal training. The Army and Air Force were made to participate in our training.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So throughout July you start to change the training focus?

(2) Answer. Yes. We start to do crazier ranges. Javelins going off, combined arms breaches, snipers involved. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d We also did additional training including TCCC, Call for Fire stuff, learning how to talk to aircraft.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was the TCCC training?

(2) Answer. It was more than just putting on a tourniquet. We actually had to stop bleeding on the dummies. It was more effective.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were with [REDACTED] (b)(6) the whole time for the training?

(2) Answer. Yes.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get any training on the Law of War or ROE?

(2) Answer. Yeah, but most of us were like, "whatever." We did get some from JAG. When we knew we were going, a JAG would come talk to us in a secure area.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In addition to the training, did you get any training on how to process evacuees?

(2) Answer. I wouldn't say it was a process. It was how to search an individual. Don't touch a woman unless you are female. We didn't know what to look for in terms of documentation when searching for people.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) DoS wasn't there to assist with training?

(2) Answer. No. I don't believe we received any training on AMCITs/SIVs and how to identify people to pull for processing till being in Afghanistan.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you get back over to [REDACTED] (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. When [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) It was about a month before deployment (mid-July)

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were they with you going through the NEO training?

(2) Answer. I believe they came back before our last final ECC (Evacuation Control Center) training, but not prior to that. There were more admin people during that training. We did a lot of final checks at training and then we went to HKIA.

v. Question and Answer 21.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who was your (b)(6)?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and SSgt Hoover.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. JN: What was your billet?

(2) Answer. I went from the fire team leader to team member when (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) got promoted and became team leader. I was in more of mentoring role. There were three (b)(6) in the Plt. This change in billet happened right before we left.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you get notified you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. About 5 days prior. We left a day or so after E Co HQ and 4 Plt departed. About 16 August we arrived. I think we landed around midnight/early morning 17 August. It was pitch black when we got there.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did they give you a mission/tell you a task?

(2) Answer. Officially it was go conduct and pull out AMCITs that helped us out during the war. We called it a NEO.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was your team given a specific role?

(2) Answer. It was to provide (b)(6) and be an infantryman.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you do the next 5 days prior to departing for HKIA?

(2) Answer. Sight our weapons, prep our gear, took some JAG classes talking about ROE, Law of War, etc. A lot of us knew we were not fighting on the streets of Fallujah, so it was not a big concern for us. We were going to help people and not be an aggressor. We understood hostile act/hostile intent. We got a demoralizing talk from a COMSTRAT Marine.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think your fellow Marines understood the standing ROE?

(2) Answer. I would say so. We knew we were there to help and not kill people, unless a situation presents itself. We knew we could protect ourselves.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was your (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He said do what's right. Take care of yourself and your buddy. He did group talks. Our engineer platoon wanted to talk to us. (b)(6) (b)(6) didn't go out. We were the only (b)(6) that were out with the infantry Marines. My squad was the only (b)(6) squad for all of 2/1.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many fire teams were there? How were they structured?

(2) Answer. There were four fire teams, but Echo Company had the only (b)(6) One (b)(6) per platoon. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the (b)(6) squad leader.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On or about 16 August you loaded a bird?

(2) Answer. Yes. We were up in the air for hours attempting to land b/c of people on the runway. The Marines that left before us were concerned about running out of fuel and being unable to land at HKIA. We were told to go to the airfield, start loading mags, and get ready. Got a great speech from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and a personal speech from SSgt Hoover. We were told to expect hell and a shit-fest. When we land expect to get right into action.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So after a long flight, you managed to get some sleep, and you were expecting the worst when you landed?

(2) Answer. Yeah. We felt this was when we get to be real Marines. We get to make our impact and know we actually got to do some shit. Everyone was ready. We landed and went into condition 1. We rushed out and took a security pause. We saw tracers and heard gunfire. The Army came and greeted us, it was super calm at that point. We waited to get the bird offloaded, grabbed our packs, and went to the gym to set up our bivouac site.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(130b) Was anyone else in the gym?

(2) Answer. No. That was just Echo Company's area.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(130b) What happened after setting up the gym?

(2) Answer. We went around HKIA, kept trying to find the New York Times associate, or someone related to US News out in the crowd. We were told to go to areas, secure the areas, and look for specific individuals/groups. It was like, "go find these people." We ended up finding a fire house with other Marines staying in there. We just randomly wandered around, looked for these specific people. We never found them. It was not clear guidance. That was about a day. About 18-20 hours of looking. We got some sleep in the firehouse.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(130b) What happened the next day?

(2) Answer. It was hectic on the fight line. Not too crazy. We take up position next to the contractor barracks. We broke into containers and found SAPI plates. **The contractor barracks was located southside of the airfield, southwest side of the fight line.** We used the plates for our fighting positions.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(130b) What was your task at that point, after the search for the reporters?

(2) Answer. It was just told to provide security and hold it. We heard there was a lot of Taliban activity and people infiltrating at that point.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(130b) Had you heard we were working with the Taliban at that point?

(2) Answer. I think so. We heard about it, but when we got back to the gym that's when we were told. This was about the 18th. We slept when we got back to the gym and reset/refit. We then went out to another gate, I think East Gate, hung out for a while. We ripped out/replaced 1/8 Marines. It was 1st Plt, and possibly another one. This was about mid-day getting to East Gate. We were there for 2-3 days. It wasn't too bad. There was a lot of gunfire but nothing crazy. There were hand to hand fights with some evacuees. There were a lot of Afghans on drugs so we had to subdue him. You could just tell they were on something, we didn't see them use. There was an English-

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speaking Afghan that told us he was on something. We caught an ISIS guy out there. Some civilians pointed him out as ISIS. I think 2/1 Marines grabbed him and flexi cuffed his feet and wrists. We kept him for hours, it was into the night. Possibly grabbed him on the 19th or 20th. We turned him over to an Afghan Security Unit. They beat the shit out of him, spun him around a couple times, put him in a car and left. I think it was Afghans that were trained up by (b)(1)1.4c

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4c Was it NSU, National Strike Unit?

(2) Answer. Yes. I think it was NSU.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4c Did anything come from that?

(2) Answer. Not that I know of. They took him and that was it. A Marine with facial hair, CRYE gear, he was a SSgt. He knew some of the staff of 2/1. He came to talk to us and the ISIS guy before we turned him over. He asked about him, how he was. He tried to talk to him in Farsi or Pashtu. He talked to him for a minute then left. We never saw him again.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4c Did anything else interesting happen at East Gate?

(2) Answer. Nothing crazy, there were some proposals with Afghans offering their daughters.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4c What were the crowds like?

(2) Answer. Pretty subdued. It was only hectic when the ISIS guy came or the Afghans had drugs.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. How many days were you on East Gate?

(2) Answer. About 2 ½ days.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(1)1.4c Did any leaders come out there?