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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did. I can't recall any other leaders.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened after you left East Gate?

(2) Answer. We went back to the gym for 12 hours, then moved to Abbey Gate. We shut East Gate down and turned it over, I think to the Army. Not sure who actually took it over or if it opened back up.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After your time at East Gate, you moved over to Abbey Gate, was that around the 21st?

(2) Answer. Yeah. We spent about 5-6 days there.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did all of Echo Company go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We went in shifts. Sometimes we got "f'd" and had to sleep there.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is describing the map and orienting (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to it.*

(2) Answer. *Added input from earlier* Sometime when we were randomly patrolling early on, a round impacted close by us. Not sure where it came from. This was around day 1-2 days on ground.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you get to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We hotwired vehicles and stole them from the Army.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened when you got down there?

(2) Answer. We came down to the inner gate, there was a MATV and we posted up there. We stayed there for a couple hours, then we moved to the outer gate. In the inner corridor there were a bunch of people and f'd up vehicles on the south side. We had a staging area that was more controlled on the north side of the inner corridor. You

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had "mini-warlords" that would control the food and water for the other Afghans in the inner corridor. It was like the wild west. The northside was much more relaxed and could be controlled.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many people were in the inner corridor?

(2) Answer. Probably at least 1,000. We walked in as a platoon. We were hearing sporadic gunfire.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you in the inner corridor?

(2) Answer. For some time, we passed out food and water. Maybe hours later we moved to the outer corridor. There were a lot of people. The canal was filled, the outer corridor was filled. We had a lot of other countries' military SOF out there identifying people. Not many other conventional foreign forces expect for (b)(1)1.4d and us.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were flights leaving HKIA at this time?

(2) Answer. I spent a day at the PAX terminal after the random patrol and before the East Gate. We saw people getting on planes. It was the first time I personally witnessed death. Some little girl died from dehydration and heat. I also provided security overwatch for a female corpsman at the terminal. The rest of the team was keeping the crowd under control.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Then what did your team do?

(2) Answer. Went to the gym, got some rest, then went to Abbey Gate. We entered the inner corridor and dealt with the mass of people. Then we went to the outer corridor and it was a zoo.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Had you been briefed you are working with the Taliban before you get out to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was weird watching them.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happens when you make your way to the outer corridor?

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(2) Answer. We start working the gate. We were told what DoS was looking for. Passports, green cards, driver's licenses, then pieces of paper that were emailed out. The information was passed down to us, DoS did not speak to us directly.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What about SIVs?

(2) Answer. We didn't even know what those looked like.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the process for getting evacuees out and what was your role?

(2) Answer. Find proof they were involved with America, bring them in to other Marines to process. I was on the wall identifying people. Some non-US forces were popping off rounds, we told him not to do that.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you given any specific instruction on escalation of force?

(2) Answer. We were given non-lethal flashbangs, CS gas. We were told to use them when a threat was perceived, or a legitimate threat. We were fighting every day pushing, punching, and shoving. I never had flashbangs or gas. Leaders and key personnel were given them. I do not recall them ever being used.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you authorized to use warning shots?

(2) Answer. I don't believe so. We never used any. If we shot, it was shoot to kill. When other countries used warning shots it would stir the crowds up.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was giving you your tasking?

(2) Answer. My squad leader told me to go to the near side canal, identify people, pull them out and pass them off to another Marine in the outer corridor.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

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(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You're at the canal, hands on with the people. Going down the east side in front of sniper tower, that's how you would escort people out?

(2) Answer. Yes. Sometimes though we would push them back into the canal because they were being dicks.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your force protection at the gate?

(2) Answer. Other than our gear we had some cover. The canal wall was only about 3 feet high. We had snipers from Marines and Army. A JLTV with an M240 with someone in the turret at all times. There were two Army towers with a SAW hanging out the window. (b)(1)1.4g were also out at the connex box on the inner corridor. I know we had more than one, not sure where the others were.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would you do an initial search if you pulled someone out of the crowd?

(2) Answer. No. They were searched immediately entering in the inner corridor. They could hang out in the outer corridor without be searched.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you on the wall?

(2) Answer. Most of the day into the night. I then moved back into the inner corridor that evening by the blown out vehicles to watch over the Afghans. We were mostly just bullshitting and getting into fights. It wasn't the worst in the world. It was hot but we were used to it. We did get replaced that night and we moved to the airfield side of the inner gate to get some rest.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were Afghans in the inner corridor at night?

(2) Answer. Yes. The DoS worked from morning to about 2000. Then they left. They didn't do shift work.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(1)130b,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So would Afghans still get pulled out of the crowd at night?

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(2) Answer. Yes. Other countries would. Then we would have to control them until DoS could process the next day

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After you got rest what happened?

(2) Answer. Got back to work. We passed out some food then went back out to the canal. Did the same thing as the day before. I was working with the New Zealanders and this Afghan male killed this kid in front of me. He was on the near side canal in front of the sniper tower. He had a newborn with them. The New Zealand guy and I started talking, we looked back and didn't see the baby anymore. He said because we weren't helping him he threw the baby into the canal. We didn't see the baby any longer at that point.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the process of pulling evacuees orderly or chaotic?

(2) Answer. Pretty chaotic. It was compact and a lot of people. I don't think there was any good way to do this.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you understand what you were looking for or was it changing?

(2) Answer. Yeah. The SIV thing was about day three. We saw people getting sent back and we didn't understand why. We found out later it was the email thing.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever escort people out?

(2) Answer. Some. I had to escort a blind guy out and he had no idea what was going on.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear about an IED explosion or observe an explosion prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I heard of a threat but I think that was related to the suicide attack. I can't remember hearing anything in the early days.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

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(1) Question. Any interaction with the Taliban at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I walked down to the chevron and was close to them. I just looked around and saw an execution or two.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You actually saw the Taliban kill Afghan civilians?

(2) Answer. Twice. Once down that way towards the chevron and one across on the far side canal. At the chevron I saw them gun down a civilian. On the far side I saw the Taliban use a bladed tool hacking the shit out of a civilian.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You never talked to or worked with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. No. They were just there pulling security.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any interaction with the (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. Yes. (b)(1)1.4d on the near side and outer corridor. Never with anyone in the Barron Hotel. We were just talking with them (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d You could trade a flashbang (b)(1)1.4d I believe 2/1 Marines did this, I don't know for sure.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the (b)(1)1.4d helpful?

(2) Answer. Oh yeah, they were awesome. I got into a situation, a fight with an Afghan, and his family got involved. His wife was holding my weapon and I was about to grab my fixed knife. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d I said yes he's being a dick. The situation immediately de-escalated. (He didn't kill him)

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened the next day?

(2) Answer. I think we cleared out the side of the near side canal.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How were you communicating?

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(2) Answer. We had radios, phones with the team leadership. We were using chats on phones. I don't think anything major, just photos and checking in on your boys.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any threat reporting you were aware of when you got there?

(2) Answer. Not the first few days.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you become aware of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. Two days pre-blast I was made aware of the suspected suicide bomber and his appearance. Around the 23 or 24 Aug.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who did you get that intel from?

(2) Answer. A STA guy, the sniper guys. I think they were getting better intel than the battalion.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the description you got?

(2) Answer. Clean clothing, freshly shaved, no hair. He would not look like the crowd. Very clean clothes with a backpack. Someone who doesn't belong there.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Over the first few days at Abbey Gate, did your leadership have any ROE or EOF discussions, or was it just the prior talks?

(2) Answer. Just the prior talks if I remember correctly.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone come up to reinforce the ROE or EOF?

(2) Answer. Nothing that I can remember in an official capacity.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

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(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The suspicious individual, was there ever a time a picture was shown of the individual for clarity?

(2) Answer. I never saw a picture.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any days prior to that of reports for potential threats/VBIEDs?

(2) Answer. There was one contractor who lost his hand. I was told a contractor picked up a cell phone and his hand was either blown off or shot off.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So the threat reporting streams came down to you how?

(2) Answer. I heard it from overwatch guys, then I heard it from squad leader or [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and then I think the day of the blast we were officially told by company leadership there is a chance of a threat.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So when you got the intel from the sniper guys, it wasn't a coordinated/daily sync. It was informal and started talking and the intel was brought up in conversation?

(2) Answer. Yes. We just ran into the sniper team guy and he told us informally.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So the sniper you talked to about threat streams, was it that we just saw this, or this is the intel they received?

(2) Answer. It was about the intel they received.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you got the potential threat, did your posture change?

(2) Answer. Our dispersion got more spread out, a lot less guys were grouped together on the near side.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you changed dispersion, how many were on the other side of the jersey barrier?

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(2) Answer. Not many. The dispersion is primarily between the near side and outer corridor.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you push the crowd down to the footbridge?

(2) Answer. I'd say day 3. Around 24 Aug. When we pushed the Afghans to the footbridge I came back to the near side canal. (b)(1)1.4d came to help and would use their beat sticks to hold the crowd back. About 10-20 people were holding the crowd by the footbridge. I did hear some flashbangs go off down there.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any interactions with the (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers on the 24th of August?

(2) Answer. Not really. We ended up resting in the back of their vehicle. A (b)(1)1.4a guy came out. We just stayed there to rest. That was it.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was PYSOP pushing messaging daily over their speaker?

(2) Answer. I believe so. I tuned it out a lot.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So on day three, you had the crowd pushed back past the footbridge. You disperse about 10-15 meters between Marines, and (b)(1)1.4d was at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. Yes. After that I never had to go deal with the Afghans on that side of the canal.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much longer were you at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We left I think on the 25th to go back to the gym. Golf Company came out to replace us. We still had the crowd pushed back to the footbridge at that point.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear any other intel of a threat description?

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(2) Answer. Yeah, but it was informal. It was the same description as before. Someone not freaking out trying to get pulled out of the crowd.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you see anyone matching that description?

(2) Answer. I did not.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When you think about any report that would come over on what the guy would look like, do you think you could find that out among the mass of people?

(2) Answer. If it was someone that was clean and not freaking out that would stand out. People were nasty, unhygienic, and yelling/screaming. People had been waiting days to get processed.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So would it be easier to call out based on behavior vice appearance?

(2) Answer. I would say half behavior, half appearance.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were you static while there?

(2) Answer. **Points to map along near side of the canal.** I would mainly stay on the near side and switch locations w/ fellow Marines.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Leading up to 25th, did you ever go to the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I never went up to the sniper tower.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you ever talk with them?

(2) Answer. Just small talk about what was going on. Nothing of substance other than that one time.

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zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) When did you leave Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Afternoon of the 25th.aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) When you left on the afternoon of the 25th, did you have any idea of when the gate would close?

(2) Answer. I heard 28 or 29 August it would close, and 30 engineers would go around and blow up birds, equipment, and classified stuff

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) Did you ever have any conversation with company leaders regarding ROE, EOF?

(2) Answer. No. Only interaction above platoon leader was [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(6) chewing me out because I rolled my sleeves. I had my sleeves rolled up because I was pulling people out of shit water.

ccccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) At this point you've been there over three days. Did you notice a change in the crowd?

(2) Answer. A rumor spread that the gate was closing. I heard the Afghans saying this. The crowds were getting bigger and more desperate. More physical altercations happening. The canal was becoming more packed.

dddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) Were people coming through the canal or chevron?

(2) Answer. Mostly the canal. I was focused on the canal and not the chevron.

eeeeee. Question and Answer 108.(1) Question [redacted] (b)130b, (b) Prior to leaving on the 25th, where did you hear the gunfire and how often?

(2) Answer. Pretty often, but not sure where it all was coming from.

fffff. Question and Answer 109.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would there be echoing with the gunfire?

(2) Answer. Depending on the distance. I know the Taliban would fire up into the air. I could tell general direction, but not specifically.

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear about any other threat prior to leaving on the 25th?

(2) Answer. I heard about VBIED on the 26th, but not on the 25th. It was only the one threat. Same description of the same individual.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you go back out to the gate?

(2) Answer. We got sleep on the 25th, and the morning of the 26th we were back out there. We were told it was about to close so we took a lot of photos on the airfield side of the inner gate since we were leaving. We hung out there that morning for a few hours.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where did you go after that?

(2) Answer. We went down around 1500 to meet up with Golf Company at the outer gate. At this point the engineers regrouped as a whole. We started prepping to seal up the gate once it closed. We were mainly putting up c-wire at this point.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any additional threats at this point?

(2) Answer. No. Just the suicide bomber and the VBIED. I wasn't very concerned about the VBIED based on where we were at. I believe (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told me about it.

kkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any other actions taken to prep to close the gate?

(2) Answer. Not really. We went to the outer corridor, but the prep was occurring in the inner corridor. When I did go to the outer corridor that day I saw the dispersion was gone and people were clumped up.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did the crowd look at that time?

(2) Answer. Pretty much the same. People screaming and yelling.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the crowd pushed back to the footbridge at this time?

(2) Answer. I never saw. I didn't get any view of what it looked like past the sniper tower on the near side canal.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened leading up to the blast?

(2) Answer. At that point we got fresh wire up on the inner corridor. We began moving some wire to outer gate when the blast went off.

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What time was that?

(2) Answer. Not sure. It was before sunset. (b)(6)

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Describe what happened when the bomb went off?

(2) Answer. First thing that hit me was the pressure wave. I thought, "oh that wasn't even that bad." It was like a stick of C4 going off. You could smell burning flesh and iron because of the blood. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) screamed at me like 5 times because I was just standing there. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were beside me when it went off. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) dragged me behind jersey barriers near the CCP (inner corridor near outer gate). I was trying to compute what happened. Someone was yelling for a corpsman. Some people went running to render aid. I remained in a security position. Some staff NCOs (1stSgt or GySgt) were fighting. 1stSgt said the guys were good. GySgt said the weren't and they got into a fight. My guys broke it up. I think they were Golf Company. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) didn't know what was going on. He was just standing there. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) just stood there. He didn't really take a command presence till a decent amount of time post blast. He did say if they jump those walls then shoot them. We saw some Afghans looking over the wall of the inner corridor.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where were they at?

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(2) Answer. **Pointed to right inside inner corridor, near the outer gate.** Here.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) out there when it went off?

(2) Answer. Yes he was. Not sure on where he was at the blast. I remember him hopping on a car to tell the Afghans to stop trying to climb the wall.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember seeing anyone else out there after the blast?

(2) Answer. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) sprinting from the outer to inner corridor post blast. He was running alongside a gator with an injured Marine on the back. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) went to the outer corridor. He said they cut a whole in the fence. One of the female Marines died in (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) arms. I just held my position and I saw the vehicles going back and forth. I got a peak out to the blast site and it was horrid.

ttttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see anyone suspicious, acting with hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. I did not.

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear gunfire post blast?

(2) Answer. I can't recall.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you help anyone evacuate/provide aid or were you posting security?

(2) Answer. I was security.

wwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long until you bounded back to the inner security area?

(2) Answer. It was about an hour before sunset. Probably between 1800-1900. I just got back and sun fully set. When we got there, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told us Hoover was killed and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was fucked up.

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xxxxx. Question and Answer 127.

(1) Question. (b)(6) What was SSgt Hoover doing at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. He was helping out at the canal and had a good relationship with the staff.

yyyyy. Question and Answer 128.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Prior to the attack, did anyone say stay in the inner corridor due to a heightened threat?

(2) Answer. No. All I heard about was the suicide bomber, the SVBIED. I heard something about a complex attack.

zzzzz. Question and Answer 129.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Did you hear that a threat was imminent, or it would happen today?

(2) Answer. I don't recall anyone ever saying it would happen today. It was always, "there is a chance."

aaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question. (b)(6) So you don't remember hearing about any specific threats?

(2) Answer. No. It was be ready, there is a chance, look out for each other.

bbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question. (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

ccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Was it severe enough for a purple heart?

(2) Answer. That's up in the air. I'm not sure. I think my VA advocate put me in for one, but I have not received one.

ddddd. Question and Answer 133.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Did you undergo any other tests other than those?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

eeeeee. Question and Answer 134.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

fffff. Question and Answer 135.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you redeploy?

(2) Answer. We went from (b)(6) Then we got shit news we couldn't go back for a month. We slept during the day and stayed up at night. We got back to the States and binge drank. No one really got in trouble.

ggggg. Question and Answer 136.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

hhhhh. Question and Answer 137.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

iiiiii. Question and Answer 138.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Circling back, post blast you went back to the gym?

(2) Answer. Yeah. The Army took over the gate. Some Marines went back to police up gear. I think 2 Para was dealing with the corpses.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 139.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you stayed in your bivouac site that night?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. Still on the airfield side of the inner gate. I went to the gym. I then walked around with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to decompress. Found some Afghan flags and brought them back for the guys. Then later we were allowed to start raiding, looting, and destroying. I think it was to prevent the Taliban from taking it.

kkkkkk. Question and Answer 140.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So what were you told to do?

(2) Answer. It was to deny the Taliban. We flipped cars, popped oil pans, painted graffiti on the place, broke windows, we completely destroyed that place. BGen Sullivan, when he got on ground, he saw this and made us re-flip vehicles and paint over the graffiti.

llllll. Question and Answer 141.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who told you to destroy everything?

(2) Answer. I'm not really sure where it came from.

mmmmmm. Question and Answer 142.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it just Echo Company involved or the whole battalion?

(2) Answer. I think it was the whole battalion.

nnnnnn. Question and Answer 143.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So how long after you re-deployed did you get out?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) is when I got out.

oooooo. Question and Answer 144.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many interviews have you given since you've been back?

(2) Answer. Just the one news article.

pppppp. Question and Answer 145.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did that come about?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) thought it would be good to get the stories out. She contacted the head editor.

qqqqqq. Question and Answer 146.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1) 1.4a,(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How active are you on social media regarding this event?

(2) Answer. Pretty active but I've never posted about it I only read it.

rrrrrr. Question and Answer 147.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you met up with any of your fellow Marines since then.

(2) Answer. Yeah. I have guys over to the house to drink and smoke cigars. We talk about what we saw at HKIA.

ssssss. Question and Answer 148.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Is there anything else you want to add or discuss that we didn't touch on?

(2) Answer. Everything stated is what I personally saw. The rumor mill wouldn't be helpful. I heard that the snipers had him in their sights, but I only heard that. I didn't personally see it. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) showed us two reports what happened at Abbey Gate. One was what the public would see (unclassified) and one that the public wouldn't see (classified). It was around February. We were pulled in the gymnasium to review these reports.

ttttt. Question and Answer 149.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think there is anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was the engineer team leader. You can talk with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was the (b)(6) and was everywhere. He's the one who cut the whole in the fence.

uuuuuu. Question and Answer 150.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Going back to the beginning of the conversation about Marines being 50/50 on the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and as you describe the location of the battalion command team. How much interaction did you have with the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. One time he spoke to the engineers. It was like words of encouragement type of shit. He never really engaged with us. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the one mostly talking through ROE.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 151.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) SPMAGTF (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You specifically felt that you knew how to respond to HA/HI?

(2) Answer. Yes.

wwwww. Question and Answer 152.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What's the next steps for PID?

(2) Answer. It would probably be roger up. Told (b)(6) and it would go up the chain for a decision.

xxxxxx. Question and Answer 153.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many engagements did you have with the snipers at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Just those few times in passing. No real relationship was made.

yyyyyy. Question and Answer 154.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding the interviews that have occurred regarding this incident, any thoughts on how you see the world?

(2) Answer. I was kind of sour towards the Marine Corps. I heard the snipers asked to engage and the (b)(6) said I don't know or no. They asked him who could authorize engagement, and he didn't know. I can only go off what I've been told. We all felt he valued his career over having an accidental civilian killed. I can kind of understand in that moment, but it's the aftermath with everyone killed.

zzzzzz. Question and Answer 155.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) For threat reporting, did it come down through official channels?

(2) Answer. I would say a couple times. It mostly came from the STA/sniper guys.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) Oct. 12 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 28. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Oct. 12 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

20231012
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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13 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 2/1 Golf Company

1. On 13 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. As there are multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What are you doing now?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

Specifically handling weapons, ammo, non-lethals.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were wounded at Abbey Gate, talk about that please.

(2) Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We are going to start broad. Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, when did you find out you were gonna go and what training did you do?

(2) Answer. We were at (b)(1)1.4a We had been conducting squad level training. Basic patrol operation training, with combined arms and maneuver. We didn't have any indirect assets so those were notional. Day and night, and there were several different ranges there that we could utilize. We were in the middle of that, then about a week or a week and a half we ceased training and started getting briefs about Kabul. Briefs covered what 1/8 were already there doing, the past couple months of activity, the Taliban taking over the country territory by territory. Once we started getting the secure briefs, we got intel about the riots and people getting shot and killed in the crowds. We got briefed that 1/8 had engaged in small-arms fire with the Taliban, we went over the map and layout of where 1/8 and the army was, who was manning what position.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As part of those briefs, did you get briefed on the Rules of Engagement?

(2) Answer. Yes, Yes. That was closer to us actually going. That last week we were getting at least a brief a day, that RoE brief was later in the week. It covered not engaging unless getting engaged upon, which is understandable given the civilian population around us.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could you defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Oh yeah, definitely. So, we got that, then some intel at the time about IED threats in the crowd.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it your job to help the younger Marines understand the RoE?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

(2) Answer. Yea, I was (b)(6) a corporal, so I was trying to spin up my guys. It was an eye-opener being a 4-year team leader who had never been through anything before. It was eye opening.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was this your first combat deployment?

(2) Answer. Combat, yes. In 2019 I had been on the naval ships in the Arabian Sea. I was a security element squad leader on the USS Puller, so it was my second time in CENTCOM.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, you were notified a week prior. How did you progress and arrive into Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. In (b)(1)1.4d we were told to pack our essentials. We loved our command staff; they were telling us their honest opinions. They told us to pack only what we need, but they were honest that we wouldn't see it much anyway. We were waiting for the go-ahead, once we got that go-ahead we went to the airport in (b)(1)1.4d then we flew to (b)(1)1.4d We staged there and got an update from our commander, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and an intel update. We waited there overnight. We left late afternoon on the 18th to fly to Kabul. We were on a plane with an Army unit that was flying in as well. We arrived late, maybe midnight.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you observe when you landed?

(2) Answer. On the flight in, maybe 30 minutes out, we got intel that the planes landing and leaving were taking small-arms fire. We prepped for that; then, when we landed, we exited the plane. It was pretty dead; the civilians had already been cleared off the tarmac. It was only service members and state department around.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When was your first day on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. That next morning. Once we got our gear, we staged our gear in the tent gym. We set up there and slept until 5 or 6 am. Then we were told to load up in cars – some old, retired SWAT vans. We went down to Abbey Gate, then we unloaded at the Abbey Gate Proper.

*Pause to describe the common lexicon of Abbey Gate based on the unclassified map. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) described the lexicon from the inner gate to the chevron.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With that understanding of Abbey Gate, what did you do that first day?

(2) Answer. We walked from the inner gate to the outer gate and staged inside the gate, about 100 meters back. We staged our gear, then our platoon staff walked up to the outer gate. At the time, the outer corridor was full of a riot up to the gate. The (b)(1) 1.4d and the Army were there trying to keep the gate closed. Our platoon command went to try and link up with someone in charge. We had been there for 20 minutes, and the crowd broke through the gate and moved toward us. My squad was the initial squad, and once that gate broke open our platoon commander told us to get up. We saw a wave of people moving at us, we got online about 80 meters into the inner corridor. It was like the movie 300, we were online, and that crowd hit us. Then we and the Marines behind us spent the next hour pushing them back out the gate. That was just getting pressed up and pushing the crowd out slowly. We got about 20 or 30 meters into the outer corridor, which is when some jerk started throwing CS cannisters near where we were, and we were too packed to access our gas masks. The crowd dispersed after that and ran out the outer corridor. That gave us time to get inside and close the gate.

At the time, I was trying to access my gas mask when I ran into Humberto Sanchez. We ran into the outer gate and tried to get out masks on, couldn't run back out, then ran back in. We were the last two in and pulled the gate closed, then used a white pickup to pin the gate closed.

Once we closed the gate, we were trying to figure out how we would start the vetting process. Late that evening, after sunset, we were told that we were going to push outside the gate and push out to where the Taliban had set up their checkpoint at the intersection. We pushed just outside the steel gate, and we got online, shoulder-to-shoulder. We linked arms, and slowly pushed the riot all the way back. That went all night, we went all the way to the Taliban checkpoint. We probably didn't finish until 0400 or 0500. We didn't have riot shields at the time, so we were pushing and shouldering the crowd. We were trying to communicate, but there was a huge language barrier so we would find guys in the crowd to translate for us, but the riot never really cared about the message. So, they would fight back, which caused chaos. Once we finished pushing the crowd, we got in a stalemate with the Taliban. They didn't know what we were doing so they pointed rifles at us, and we pointed at them. It was a cowboy standoff.

Some guy from department of state came down and spoke to their leader and at the check point. We had already established a security posture around them, toward the Barron Hotel, and along the wall toward the airfield. While we were waiting for the department of state, we were passing threats and people between sectors. The Marines were amazing at passing information, threats, and lines of sight. From what we saw, this department of state dude handed the Taliban dude a duffel bag at the end of their chit chat, then a woman and kids came back with the department of state dude. My mind wasn't focused on that, so I didn't focus on that too much.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As days passed, did the RoEs change at all?

(2) Answer. No, they stayed the same. At least from what I was told, nothing ever changed.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We have heard a phenomenal amount of restraint about Marines at the gate.

(2) Answer. I appreciate that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Moving forward, being a (b)(6) you're out there with your guys. Did you receive any be on the lookouts (BOLOs) or other threat streams?

(2) Answer. I had been passed the one about the younger, clean-shaven guy with some bag with an (b)(1)1.4c That's the only one I ever got passed. That was three or four days before the actual IED. That was from squad leader to me. I didn't ever see anyone fit that description.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could any number of people in the crowd have partially fit that description?

(2) Answer. Too an extent, yes. Some of them had been there for days, coming in and out of the canal, so none of them were clean by any means. Coming across a clean guy, clean shaven, would have been an eye-opener. But I never saw anyone like that.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What about leadership presence up to the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. My platoon commander was there 24/7. Company Commander, 1stSgt, and company guns were all there a lot. Not just doing their jobs, but also helping us control the crowds.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you a part of any intel updates? Where did your info come from?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

(2) Answer. Just my squad leader and occasionally my platoon sergeant.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With threat mitigation, if there was an imminent threat and a need to take cover, how often did that happen and did it seem like the leadership reacted?

(2) Answer. It happened a few times while we were there. The one I remember vividly is working inside the outer gate, processing the people there. I used to have a video, but I lost it when I got my new phone. We were tending to the civilians, and platoon leadership told us there was an IED in two minutes, so we needed to get down. At this point we had been there for 10 days. Me and Degan Page were right next to each other. We had been sitting there for 45 minutes, and I pulled my phone out to try and check my texts. I took a video of Degan and asked what was going on, and he said there was supposed to be an IED, but we are just sitting here. My company and platoon leadership took that very seriously. Stuff happens, nobody wants to not make it home. I took it very seriously, being in a real-life scenario.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you interact with the Snipers?

(2) Answer. I didn't. I didn't even know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was in Kabul until we were at the trauma center. I had no interaction with them whatsoever, from what I can recall.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: How would the leadership call an all clear after an imminent threat? You can't sit there all day, people still need to get processed, what did going back to work look like?

(2) Answer. It was playing the time game. We had conversations with our company commander one of the nights, the one night that we got to go shower and sleep at the bivouac. Our company came together and agreed we had a mission to evacuate as many civilians as we could. We all came to the consensus that we were going to do what we needed to do. If that meant pushing out to the wire after a threat, or if we had to go into the crowd, that was a risk we were all willing to take.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Why?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

(2) Answer. They were American citizens. I take that very seriously; I would do anything for another American. If that means getting blown up, or shot, or running into a crowd that's fine. I did that many times while I was there and I don't regret anything.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, so the day of the 26th, where are you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. Our platoon originally was along the canal wall, all the way down to the Barron hotel and held security along the canal wall and the jersey barrier. We used the area behind us as a vetting area. There was c-wire along some parts of the canal wall to prevent climbing. At the time, there was a hole in the fence with a U-Shape jersey barrier. I was, at the time of detonation, I was on the outside of the chain link fence maybe 10 meters from the sniper tower. I was on the wall originally. Corporal Lopez was on the jersey barrier and saw two girls getting pinned at the base there, and he grabbed me to help pull them out. That took 30 or 45 minutes, we had to climb into the crowd and push the jersey barrier with my back to help unpin them. We got the first sister out and put her five meters behind us. Corporal Lopez pulled out the second little girl, and I turned and grabbed her from him. I fist-bumped his chest.

It was a good feeling to do something like that, so I told him good job. That was the last time I talked to him. Then I walked away and set her down next to her sister. I was handing her a water bottle when the IED went off to my left. As soon as the IED went off, it hit my left hand and blew my glove and the water bottle up, and the little girl's forehead. From what I saw, neither girl survived. I picked up my rifle and turned to my left. There was dust and debris everywhere.

That's when I saw people running across the rooftop, going toward the water tower. I tried to sight on them, but I am left hand dominant so I realized I couldn't shoot. I dropped my rifle. That's when I saw LCpl Merola lying about two meters from me. I started dragging him out. That's when we started hearing the cracks of rounds flying around us, and realized I need to run faster. I made it 3/4 of the way to the hole in the fence, then I linked up with Sanchez and got him out. I tried to go out, and someone told me to go get treated. (b)(6)

(b)(6) Then I ran to the CCP.

That's when I saw the 82nd dudes running inside the gate, not out. As soon as I got inside the CCP, I ran into (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and he asked me what happened. (b)(6) and I told him I didn't know. I just knew we were hit with something. That's when (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) jumped under my arm and dragged me the rest of the way in. They laid me down and started triaging me. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) our 1st squad leader helped along with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who was one of our platoon's machine gunners. I was just lying there, getting triaged. That's when they pulled Soviak in and set him next to me. He was covered in blood from head to toe. His face was turned away, and whoever drug him in just left him there. I only knew it was Soviak from the IR Med patch on his helmet. I tried to pull him

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

toward me so I could do something, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) stopped me and told me he was gone. I laid back while they worked on me.

That's when they brought all the other casualties in, since I was one of the first guys in the CCP. They brought (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in and laid him to my right by my feet. He was trying to sit up and breathe, but he obviously couldn't. Behind me, by my head, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was being triaged. (b)(6) as soon as the CASEVACs started pulling up, I hobble-walked to a black pick-up truck. Then they took me to the hospital in Kabul.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you know which hospital?

(2) Answer. The main trauma center, I don't know what it was called. We were staged outside because they were vetting priority, trying to take the more severe injuries first.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the bomber?

(2) Answer. No, I did not. I was facing east and focusing on the little girls, I didn't see where he was.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: You remember one threat stream, that's it?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Did you reinforce the RoE with your Marines, maybe by giving scenarios?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Trying to make sure my guys were spun up and tracking on all information we got, and RoEs were important. But to be honest, I maybe only reinforced the RoE once because I trusted my team and they knew the RoE.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Is it safe to say that your mission is to evacuate as many people as possible? Was the chain of command at echelon telling you how to mitigate threat like seeking cover, the (b)(1)1.4g etc.?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Somewhat, yes. A lot of people got sucked into the sole purpose of the mission. I'm human, I caught myself putting myself in sketchy scenarios sometimes and then having to mitigate it. That happened to a lot of people, they cared. But, yes, there was a lot of adjusting security to address changes in the crowds and positions with certain lines of sight. I didn't interact personally with command staff and platoon staff because they went through chain of command, which I respect.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Were you there the night of the 25th into the morning of the 26th? You may remember the hand-off between Echo and Golf Company, the decision being made to collapse from the footbridge to the Jersey Barriers?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. I don't completely remember. I remember collapsing behind the Jersey barriers, I think it was because it was a long travel to the exfil route if anyone got wounded. I was all for making that distance shorter.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have any interaction with the Taliban? How did they treat you?

(2) Answer. A lot. Interactions I had after that first night, it was kind of just them brushing the Marines off. They didn't pay attention to us. I didn't communicate with them, but I was close to them. I saw them beating people with their buttstocks or hitting someone with a metal bar across their head by the chevron.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: Why do you think the Taliban agreed to pull outer security?

(2) Answer. Because they didn't want us there would be my assumption.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The normal flow of info would have been through your squad leader and platoon command staff, who was that?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much social media to you watch about this topic?

(2) Answer. I have seen pretty much everything. I have seen videos and pictures of the civilian side, the Marines with Marines, the few videos of pre- and post-blast, the

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

video of the small-arms exchange from far away, the videos of people falling off planes, the riot on the Tarmac.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yea, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you read any books or podcasts on the topic? What do you think about how they portray it?

(2) Answer. I don't like social media in general. I don't like seeing everything, but I want to know all the facts. I willingly look at the pictures I see or that people send me, that type of stuff.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you seen anything on social media that is helpful?

(2) Answer. Yea, anything that can help decipher what happened is helpful. The extra stuff, like a video of Marines pushing a lady into the canal water doesn't help us, it makes us look bad. There's not much you can do with that. I don't like social media, it's a waste of time, but I have it to communicate. That being said, some aspects of it can be helpful.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With the presence of leadership, do you think that anything could have been done to prevent it?

(2) Answer. I think our general security posture as a whole could have been better. I'm not sure we needed to be outside the outer gate at all; I may have tried to vet people through that steel gate. But I understand the decision to control it on the outside, away from our main access point to the airfield, so establishing outside was the best way to do that at the time. I think we could have established more assets, like machine gun positions and a mortar firing position. We wouldn't have used it, but it may have created more mental comfort for the guys. When you were out there, it sometimes felt like it was just you and the guys next to you in close proximity to the Taliban. It was ominous to work around them. I didn't like any of it; I didn't like partnering with them, I

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Golf Company

would have liked them just being at that checkpoint. I didn't like Taliban next to my Marines, but that's just my opinion.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think that accepting risk to help those people with blue passports was the right thing to do?

(2) Answer. To an extent, yes. An American life at risk is an American life at risk. Mitigating the loss of my Marines and all the Marines that were down there, and the DoS, and Army. Trying to mitigate that and maximize effectiveness of the mission, I understand that it was a hard situation in that scenario. Could it have been different? Yes. But someone had to make a decision, and the mission is the mission. We had our left and right limits, and we operated in between those.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything we haven't asked that you would like to tell us?

(2) Answer. Not that I can think of, no. Not that comes to mind.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. I don't know. I am assuming that you have talked to everyone on the deck that you could.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)



~~CUI~~

Exhibit S016

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 40. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

10/23/23
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

13 Oct 2023
DATE

~~CUI~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

20 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) AT (b)(6)

1. On 20 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity, where questions are asked below, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to deployment, how long were you with 2/1?

(2) Answer. I got to 2/1 in (b)(6) I was in IULC on the East Coast and was cut orders to 2/1 while there. I extended my time with IULC in order to complete my time and deploy with 2/1 on the 31st MEU. I was still a (b)(6) and deployed with the MEU in April 2019-Oct 2019. I was with good dudes and finished the work-up. When I got back, I stayed with (b)(6) While there, we started setting things up for easier transition of Weapons Platoon. Then, I moved into the (b)(6) billet after that. It wasn't up until a month until we went to ITX in Oct 2020 (estimated), (b)(6) I was still at school, graduated, then met them up at ITX. I was (b)(6) While there, we heard we aren't going to CENTCOM during the graduation. Through that time until we deployed it was up-and-down until we finally got word we were deploying.

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c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You remained the [REDACTED] through the rest of the work-up?

(2) Answer. Yes.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Since deploying what have you been doing?

(2) Answer. I stayed with Echo Company the whole time, [REDACTED] until we [REDACTED] I stayed with Echo Company after that until I left in Mar 2022. I graduated Jun 2022 from [REDACTED]

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] I'd like to start with when you received initial notification you were going to HKIA.

(2) Answer. We were at [REDACTED] our training focus was on platoon reinforced training. While we were there, we heard rumors about a NEO. When we got back to [REDACTED] we heard about the deployment and focused on NEO Training. Not much guidance on how we needed to train. We trained on how we thought an infantry platoon would fit in NEO. This was around July. We found out less than 72hrs prior that we were actually deploying.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Who was your platoon commander?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED]

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When did you depart [REDACTED] for HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were the first of the [REDACTED] I'm not sure of the exact date, maybe 15-16 August.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Was it Period of Darkness (POD) when you left?

(2) Answer. It was, we got our ammo, gear and loaded the birds. The [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was on the other bird. We didn't know the situation at the time. When we landed at HKIA it was POD. The airfield was under control when we landed. When we

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

disembarked, I remained back to act as a MACO (marshalling area control officer) for the second bird. After, we linked up with a liaison from the MEU who directed us on what we needed to do. We staged our packs and were immediately integrated in with 1/8.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Prior to departing for HKIA, did you receive a ROE brief?

(2) Answer. Yes. We got a very good ROE brief that lasted numerous hours. Everyone was there. Some guys didn't have a secret clearance, due to not being an American citizen yet, but we brought them in to receive the brief. Everyone from Echo Company received the brief.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How did you understand the ROE, was it briefed as the SROE (HA/HI/PID)?

(2) Answer. Yes. Hostile act/hostile intent was the understanding of it.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you receive any ROE in relation to the Taliban and how they were treating US Citizens?

(2) Answer. No. It was understood across the board that the Taliban was not a known enemy. There was no talk about how the Taliban was treating civilians.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You arrived in POD, airfield under control, and you're prepping to augment 1/8 to provide security?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We were staged with 10th MTN. I was working on getting ammo and smoke for my platoon. I bummed some ammo from the Army and de-linked some 7.72 from my sniper long gun.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Who was your sniper element?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] for reporting. My mortarmen remained at the main pax terminal. Everyone else went forward with us.

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n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Pushing out from there where were you tasked?

(2) Answer. We were tasked with 1/8. We coordinated with the Army to our right and 1/8. My platoon reinforced with some Army units and cleared across the airfield to supplement their lines. I had about 50 pax in my platoon. I talked with the platoon commander there at 1/8. He was like cool...you got it. They left, we set our guys in facing south and east. We put one team in a tower near a fire station. Another team in a tower to the south adjacent to Abbey Gate. We received shots at the tower however, did not engage due to not knowing where shots came from. After that, we moved to the Afghan terminal and people started seeing how little people we had compared to 1/8. They had a company, and it was just my platoon. We asked for C-Wire to help. Some shots were fired out in town and the civilians got more rowdy, we heard more shots fired. The civilians began to push over the wall against a gate that was closed. What set things off was a pack was thrown over the wall. I pulled my guys back and called EOD. When we did that the doors pushed up and civilians flooded in. We reformed our line and tried to push the civilians back through the gate. At one point, a little girl was brought to me, I thought she was dead, a corpsman found a pulse and then took her from there. Then 1/8 came back to assist. More warning shots were fired from 1/8 and this caused some issues with the civilians. It wasn't until the evening, the NSU was able to push everyone back and regain the airfield. We were told to hold the line and protect the US aircraft on the airfield.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Regarding warning shots, 1/8 was using warning shots, you weren't. Why was that?

(2) Answer. Nowhere was I told we could use warning shots. Our ROE brief at [REDACTED] stated that no warning shots were allowed.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Imagine this was unsettling for the Marines. Do you have any combat deployments?

(2) Answer. Yes. Twice to Afghanistan in 2009-2010, once to Afghanistan 2011-2012. All to Marjah. I was with 3/6 that entire time. I did the 24th MEU and did the Yemen evacuation during that time.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you have the most combat experience in your platoon? Anyone else have combat experience?

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(2) Answer. Yes. No one else did.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] That evening 1/8 comes out, you maintain the perimeter. What did you do from there before you went to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We went back to the gymnasium. We were still on the perimeter, and we rotated out. I volunteered to be the security detail for the [REDACTED] so he could move about. I was primarily focused on finding where we could be the most helpful and find us a job. When we got tasked for Abbey Gate we went and took over from 4th Plt at the gate.

[REDACTED] orienting [REDACTED] to the UNCLASS Abbey Gate map and common nomenclature*

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When you got out to Abbey Gate, describe the situation.

(2) Answer. Not under control. It sounded like Fox Company was very tired. It was that they were exhausted. We started working with them to see how they were running things. We immediately started doing a one-for-one swap. We were out in the near-side canal. We didn't have anyone at the chevron.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was the outer corridor cleared when you took over?

(2) Answer. No. The outer corridor was full of Afghans waiting to get processed. The near-side canal was crowded with people, along with the far-side and canal itself. We had some order in the outer corridor.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you receive any guidance from the State Department on what to look for prior to getting to the gate.

(2) Answer. No. It wasn't till a couple days later did we find out what to look for. No one came up before we got there to brief us on what we needed to identify. Our company pushed down to look for letters telling them to go to HKIA, and to look for passports and green cards. We didn't know at that time there were fakes.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What did you do when you got there?

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(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We went through the outer corridor personnel and searched Afghans the first 8hrs we were there. We split into sections and each section had a portion of each canal wall. I briefed my guys that the Taliban were not an enemy to us. I went up to the sniper tower regularly since they supported my platoon through the deployment.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was there any discussion on ROE pertaining to Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. I briefed them you cannot shoot them unless you were getting shot at, or you knew they were going to shoot you. I felt confident that (b)(6) was watching the Taliban for us. During that time, we pushed the Afghans out towards the footbridge to clear the near side canal wall. It took us 8 hours to do so. It also took us 8 hours to search the outer corridor to screen the Afghans and push them down to the State Department.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you pushed the Afghans to the footbridge, how were the Marines dispersed along the near side walkway?

(2) Answer. They stood/sat on the canal wall to prevent the Afghans from taking the near side wall. The squad leaders wanted to do that and I was ok with that. It was easier for them to see the paperwork from the wall. We had about 3 meters between each Marine. At the hole in the fence, the corpsmen would stage there and go up and down treating Afghans. There was a point of friction with the (b)(1)1.4 with having Americans going through their checkpoints. We ended up pulling every country out of the canal and pushing to where they needed to go. I was pulling out AMCITs and pushing towards the Dept of State.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long did your platoon stay out there?

(2) Answer. 8 hours. After a shift, our resting and sleeping spot was in the inner corridor near the sniper tower. We would just continue to rotate.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you pushed them out to the footbridge, how many Marines were down at the bridge vicinity?

(2) Answer. When we pushed them out to the fence, they kept pushing Afghans down the near-side canal. At the footbridge the Afghans were on the far side of the canal, the other side of the footbridge. We had about a squad of Marines at the

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) AT [REDACTED] (b)(6)

footbridge along with [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d guys. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d were very helpful in moving people out, and we would do the same for them. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d had about 6 or 7 guys at the footbridge.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). In the days you were out there, how much interaction did you have with the Taliban, if any?

(2) Answer. Personally, I was down by the chevron every time. They directly talked with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d interpreters. [REDACTED] (b)(6) would report the Taliban were killing people past the chevron. When I went up to the tower the sniper team would show me through the SSOT (Scout Sniper Observation Optic).

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Did you ever see the Taliban executing people?

(2) Answer. No sir. I did not see them do that. I would hear from [REDACTED] (b)(6) as well as Afghan civilians. They would state, "I'm the only one left, the Taliban has killed the rest of my family."

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). In terms of the ROE, did you receive any updates pertaining to the Taliban if they were harming AMCITs?

(2) Answer. No. It didn't change. Unless we could verify it was an AMCIT then we could not engage. That was part of the ROE brief. If we could get PID on an AMCIT that was being harmed/killed by the Taliban we were allowed to engage them. However, in that situation it was almost impossible to ever prove that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Was there ever a time your platoon had a valid opportunity to engage under ROE?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Do you, or did you, ever have any photos of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No. [REDACTED] (b)(6) would most likely have that. No Marines were integrated at the chevron, that was [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d. When I was at the chevron it was my guys

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT (b)(6)

and a (b)(1)1.4 pulling people out. I would have a queue beside me for AMCITs, then radio to have my guys bring them in for processing.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) If the ROE didn't change, how about EOF procedures?

(2) Answer. No. EOF never had to get past SHOVE. Everything was really handled by using SHOVE. We were able to keep the near-side clear and the outer corridor staging area clear.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were your Marines using flashbangs or tear gas?

(2) Answer. No. The only time we used flashbangs was when we were clearing the airfield. The only time at Abbey Gate was after the explosion.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much sleep were your Marines getting at the gate?

(2) Answer. Not sure on how many hours. Maybe at least 4, at most 6 hours.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were they doing if not on the canal, corridor, or sleeping?

(2) Answer. My platoon never left the wall. The other platoons manned the outer corridor and inner corridor. I only rotated my platoon to the wall and QRF. On any given day my platoon would rotate between those two. We only left when another company came on the relieve us. We rotated with a company at least twice at the gate.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the threat reporting you were receiving?

(2) Answer. Through (b)(6) It was about 2 days prior, about a possible SVEST. (b)(6) told us what he would look like. That came from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the description of the SVEST bomber?

(2) Answer. Bald head, clean shaven face. That's about it, from what I remember.

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(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT (b)(6)

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Based on the description, how easy would that be to identify at Abbey Gate.

(2) Answer. The crowd would be hard. I could easily tell if a military-aged male was there to cause chaos. If they were acting weird, then we could see them because they acted differently.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did that happen?

(2) Answer. Continuously. We saw guys like that acting suspiciously every day.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive any other threat reporting outside of (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I did from my Company Commander. I would speak with our Company Commander/leadership for a daily sync. My Platoon Commander would come down and get a general SA of the area and what's happening.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How was threat reporting shared?

(2) Answer. Everything I received was face-to-face with my Plt Cdr and (b)(6) We mainly used Signal Chat with the platoon and up. (b)(6) would use the radio.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many daily interactions did you have with (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Initially, 4-5 times daily, until I gained confidence with my team.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned multiple nations pulling people from the crowd, were there any other interactions with US organizations?

(2) Answer. The Army came down a few times and walked the line. Nothing to interrupt the wall. A few times plain clothes gentlemen with rifles would come down, start probing the wall and pull people out. The (b)(1)1.4d would help us with the line along with the (b)(1)1.4d We really wanted the outer corridor cleared.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT (b)(6)

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever engage with the Army or plain clothes people on threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No. We never engaged them on that. The only interaction I had with plain clothes people was identifying people in the canal to pull people out. (b)(6) was the primary means of receiving threat reporting.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever hear about an IED test-run or a fake IED?

(2) Answer. No. If there was, my platoon wasn't there, or I'm not aware of it.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We heard reports of an IED test run and everyone got down, EOD was called?

(2) Answer. My platoon was not there.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever adjust how you were operating due to threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No. We had good dispersion and controlled the area very well. On the 25th, there was a change in demeanor b/c the Afghans knew we were going to leave. The energy level increased, and you could see a shift in the Afghans. I had a conversation of with my Platoon Commander about how we would execute our movement if that gate closed on the 25th or 26th. It didn't close because the (b)(1)1.4 still had people to process and were out there.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, on the 25th the crowd was more desperate; had it grown in size?

(2) Answer. It was more desperate. The far-side canal and canal congestion increased on the 25th. There used to be space throughout the crowd, but then it became should-to-shoulder. The entire canal was filled with people.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How many personnel were at the foot bridge holding the crowd back, Marines and [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. I'm not sure.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. On the 26th, Golf Company pulled back to the sniper tower, do you know why?

(2) Answer. I do not sir.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You haven't talked to anyone about that?

(2) Answer. No. I came in the next morning and we were slated for QRF by the Turkish checkpoint. I came down to Abbey Gate the afternoon of the 26th. When we came through, there was a complete difference/change in security posture. The whole entire near side was full of people up to the base of the sniper tower. I went to talk to the [REDACTED] Everyone was tensed up, you could sense it. I think Golf Company broke it down from the footbridge to the base of the tower to pull Marines back and get some rest.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When you got back out there on the 26th, you noticed the crowd filled up the canal. What time did you get out to the gate?

(2) Answer. I [REDACTED] since this was the last time I thought I would be in Afghanistan. I think it was early afternoon.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What was the crowd like?

(2) Answer. Unbearable on the wall. My platoon was staged at the inner corridor. My CO/leadership was between the inner and outer corridor. People were piling up, pushing, shoving, trying to leave.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you get down to the chevron at all on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes. Same thing. Choas there too.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why do you think that is?

(2) Answer. Because they knew we were leaving. A vehicle was placed there with loud-speakers.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, the (b)(1)1.4a vehicle was there when you got there?

(2) Answer. Yes.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the messaging?

(2) Answer. To disperse. The gate was closing and to move away from the area.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, did you continue with your battle rhythm and check with (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. Yes. They said there was an SVEST. They had an optic scanning the crowd.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did they tell you they saw someone that matched the BOLO?

(2) Answer. They did. They said they passed up that they saw a person that matched a description. That they asked the (b)(6) and got nothing back.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, on the 26th they told you they asked the (b)(6) (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. Yes. On the 26th, they said they asked the (b)(6) if they could shoot a possible person.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who told you that?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED] told you that they had a person that matched the BOLO and asked to engage the person?

(2) Answer. Yes. But they didn't hear anything back from the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When you got up to the tower, they didn't have eyes on the individual anymore?

(2) Answer. Yes. They lost him.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did the ROE ever change during your time at Abbey Gate, or were they still the same?

(2) Answer. It was the same it never changed.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So, you couldn't engage without seeing Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Yes. We would not have engaged without Hostile Act/Hostile Intent.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Where was your platoon assigned at the time?

(2) Answer. We were QRF staged in vicinity of the inner gate.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How long after the attack did you get to the outer corridor?

(2) Answer. However long it took me to run 309 meters. I went through the inner gate and stood on my vehicle [REDACTED] That's when the explosion happened. I heard the explosion and we had to move back towards Abbey Gate.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

(1) Question [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] I couldn't see the blast or the canal where it happened. When I heard the blast, I turned around and went to help.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So, at the time of the attack your platoon was QRF?

(2) Answer. Yes. As soon as I heard the blast, I grabbed my Platoon Commander, gave orders to the squad leaders, and moved towards the gate. I ran into [REDACTED] and he saw bloody Afgans. He stated some Marines already had security pulled and they were taking fire.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question [REDACTED] confirmed the IED and that there were other Marines setting security?

(2) Answer. He said they had Marines set on the inner corridor and there was fire coming from the water tower on the far-side canal.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So, while you were running did you hear gunfire?

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire from the direction of the water tower. I could not see the tower from where I was.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question [REDACTED] What happened after you talked with [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. He told me about the gunfire; I said, "okay, great," and ran to the outer corridor. I saw bodies with blankets over them. I saw [REDACTED] on the other side of fence through the hole on the near side. I saw [REDACTED] was there rendering aid. As we tried getting him, I saw [REDACTED], I cut his pants and started [REDACTED], we got him on a shield and pulled him out. There was a lot of Weapons Company and the [REDACTED]. They pulled everyone that didn't need to be there out so we could pull casualties. We had Hoover on a litter and I ran with him while his litter was halfway on a vehicle. When we got to the CCP at the inner gate, I saw the shock trauma team nurse, and I told her Hoover died as we were running. We dropped him off, I jumped on a vehicle to start helping back at the outer gate. I told guys to throw flashbangs to clear out the civilians and we then went out to grab Marines and Marines' gear to pull back to the inner gate. I do have footage, I'm not sure whose it was (possibly from Golf Company), that shows the demeanor of the

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

crowd. I think it was about at noon. I found the Go-Pro when we grabbed the gear from the near side where the Marines were hit.

[REDACTED] will provide go-pro for supplemental review*

After the casualties I saw the [REDACTED]. I asked if the Sergeant Major was good, and he said I think so. I told him to take off all his gear and checked him. He just had some bruises, and I told him to go back to the COC. He and the [REDACTED] did. I placed Marines in security positions in the inner corridor. That evening, I went with EOD to do a sweep with them at the blast site. I helped with the post blast analysis. We then moved back to the gym.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When you got to [REDACTED] was he awake or conscious?

(2) Answer. He was very awake. He was conscious when [REDACTED] then placed him on the riot shield. He was talking the whole time.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So, you've seen Marines concussed talking non-sense [REDACTED] was not like this?

(2) Answer. No. He was talking, kept apologizing to [REDACTED] He was aware while I was around him.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What was the leadership presence like on the 26th.

(2) Answer. It was a common complaint from the platoon sergeants and platoon commanders that the [REDACTED] was never present, he was at the hotel most of the time. It came to me in general conversation, mainly from the Plt Sgts. To answer your question, the Plt Cdrs and Plt Sgt from [REDACTED] said that.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What about the [REDACTED] or other battalion leadership?

(2) Answer. I didn't see him. I did treat him, so I know he was there. For [REDACTED] the XO and 1stSgt were at the inner gate. The [REDACTED] and Weapons Company XO were there. [REDACTED] was in the way, so I had him move so I could get

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other Marines to help search. He said he was an officer and could be here. I was like ok, but there are other spots that you need to be at. He understood what I was saying and he left. There were body parts and red everywhere in the canal, but we were able to get full accountability without having to get into the canal.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much interaction did you have with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. They were with my platoon leading up to this. At some point, I lost them due to company support. I was able to talk to them a few times.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was (b)(6) doing on the 26th?

(2) Answer. They were tasked to create a more robust obstacle plan on the inner corridor in preparation for the gate closure.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see any gunfire while you were running out there?

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire. Almost immediately when I was running down I heard it. It came from my southeast.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see any gunfire while you were running out there.

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire. Almost immediately when I was running down I heard it. It came from my southeast.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding your conversation with (b)(6) about the BOLO, was there any other conversations like that?

(2) Answer. I only remember that one time. I do not recall any other conversation about a BOLO and identification.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you describe your CO, was he respected throughout your battalion?

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(2) Answer. Yes and No. Out of all the [REDACTED] I've served with, he spoke with the battalion the least. When he did speak, he was very well spoken, so he had my respect. The junior Marines did not see or hear from him much which I think is why they did not have high respect from him. My assumption is due to COVID we had less engagement with leadership and that could have caused this viewpoint from the junior Marines.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] So, with COVID, was the at all levels?

(2) Answer. Yes. A lot of interactions were via Zoom.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you think he was competent as a CO?

(2) Answer. Yes. From my opinion he was. He didn't push back when I told him to leave the outer gate because he needed to regain his senses.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] In the last two years have you personally given any interview or made public comments?

(2) Answer. I have not.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How closely have you paid attention to social media/podcasts about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I knew they were happening. It was around Sep 2023, when I went to Quantico, that I saw this. I spoke with [REDACTED] in Jul 2023 and spoke about Abbey Gate

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you see [REDACTED] statement at the HFAC?

(2) Answer. I've seen a bit, but I haven't seen the whole thing.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] In the statement, he mentioned he brought in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to the tower to ask for engagement authority. Have you had a conversation with [REDACTED] about that?

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(2) Answer. No. When I saw him it centered around moving him out to the CCP and talking about what I did to help him out, because I didn't feel like I did enough. The other conversation was nothing about Abbey Gate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Statement [REDACTED] So, when we interviewed [REDACTED] - she made the comment that whoever made the decision to bring [REDACTED] to the Shock Trauma Platoon and the care he received there saved his life. She mentioned that a couple times. She said it was a miracle he is alive, and that that starts at the point of injury care. That was because of you and the Marines there.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Going back to the [REDACTED] comment about him asking engagement authority from the [REDACTED], would that be a thing that would/could happen?

(2) Answer. No Sir. They just said they pushed it up and asked since they were in general support of the battalion. For them to get clarification to shoot would have to go through the [REDACTED] to whoever would decide that on HKIA.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question [REDACTED] How often have you met with other Marines from 2/1 and discussed Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I give counsel to [REDACTED] often due to SSgt Hoover. I help counsel a few other guys in Echo Company. It's more about coping and not about the incident. I work with my 1st Sqd Ldr now from 2/1, and thank him all the time for making my life easier.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question [REDACTED] At any time out there at Abbey Gate, was there any occasion where you felt you had the authorization to engage a target because it met ROE?

(2) Answer. No. The only time there was confusion about ROE was when we were pushing people across the airfield, which is really EOF.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question [REDACTED] So, with the threat reporting there was not specific target in which you could take action against?

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. No sir. Nothing that would meet the requirements to engage. We were mainly focused on pulling people out for processing.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What are your feelings and thoughts on what you see on social media? What you've seen/experienced vs what is being told?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] was coherent the whole time I was there. He was talking with [REDACTED] I had [REDACTED] talk to him while I could cut his pants and treat the wounds. I knew he was coherent because he could feel the pain. I know this because when I rolled him [REDACTED] and he felt that. When I rolled him and got him on the shield to move him to inner gate, he was coherent. I know he blacked out at some point because he told me that on a later conversation.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Is there anything else you would like to add?

(2) Answer. No sir. Only thing is that my interaction with my [REDACTED] at the base of the sniper tower was due to his [REDACTED] and him needing to leave the scene. My other point of frustration is that the [REDACTED] was not there and at the Barron Hotel. I believe this led to the Plt Cdrs not agreeing and being synchronized to help prevent a situation like this from occurring. The Plt Cdrs and Plt Sgts from both [REDACTED] were stating this about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I feel that the gate was in disarray because the [REDACTED] was not present and would spend time at the Barron.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Is there anyone else we should speak with?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you think their perspective would change from yours?

(2) Answer. They would be the same. [REDACTED], my [REDACTED] would be on the wall with the other squad leaders. He would also go up to speak with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at times. He was holding QRF, post-blast. Days leading up to that, he was integrated in the canal.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

AT

(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231020, which begins on page 1 and ends on page _____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231020
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

20231020
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

1. On 26 October 2023, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conducted an interview of the above personnel at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] answered verbally. [REDACTED] recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by [REDACTED] will be denoted [REDACTED] and questions by [REDACTED] will be denoted by [REDACTED].

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. [REDACTED] would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] walked [REDACTED] through the unclassified macro and micro maps of Abbey Gate to reestablish a common lexicon of the geography of the gate, to facilitate clear communication during the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] We did a deep dive with you two years ago, but to recap what was your training like pre-deployment?

(2) Answer. June of 2020 after graduating from MCCC, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at the end of the month. It was during COVID, so not a lot of training had gone on that year. We had our prime time training cancelled in July due to a COVID outbreak, but we were able to accomplish some small ranges and a battalion field exercise. We got to 29 Palms in September to train for 60 days. We went out 10 days early and went from buddy pair to platoon supported attacks to prepare for Integrated Training Exercise

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and get where we needed to be for deployment. That was critical in building the team, over that intense 60 days. Looking back, we think that going through that as a team was pretty good training for the 8 nonstop days of Abbey Gate, obviously with different stakes. [REDACTED] was set officially in January of 2021 when our [REDACTED] got on board after we were gapped a [REDACTED] for three months. We swapped out [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] shortly before as well. We also got a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in November, so that is about 5 or 6 new key leaders. Then we deployed in two waves. Wave one left ahead of wave two in March by one month. One platoon was our advanced party to [REDACTED] to begin our mission of fixed site security and serve as an alternate crisis response force. We stood up a new platoon with some of the best squad leaders and a seasoned platoon sergeant to support the new platoon commander. We were informed where we were deploying in January and quickly had to prepare a platoon to serve as TRAP Force, who had no prior helicopter training. They deployed in March as well, so they had little time to prepare. The leadership there figured it out, they did a great job. That was third platoon, with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] we didn't see them again until August [REDACTED] was their [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

As you can see, the team was still gelling in the spring of 2021. That time in [REDACTED] was very helpful in letting us make up lost time. Early on we got warnings that we might get diverted to Kabul, this was as early as March and beginning of April 2021. I think that the embassy security eventually went to an Army unit, but that drove the training we did in [REDACTED]. We immediately qualified all Marines on crew serve weapons in the company. We worked on reporting and everything needed to assume a fixed defense. The security mission in [REDACTED] also lent itself to mission rehearsals, we focused on securing the compound there. We doubled down on ROE, shoot/no shoot scenarios, and ethical decision games. We hammered that home in every turnover. We got an SVTC brief from the [REDACTED] on hostile act/hostile intent on the SROE. 4th platoon would have received that during their RIP, then everyone else would have received that in [REDACTED] when they got on deck. We supplemented that with ethical decision games, every time that we assumed post. Our rotation was 2 weeks on post, 2 weeks training, 2 weeks MWR and internal training. The two weeks of training was intense, individual to squad level and would have gone to the platoon level if we hadn't been called forward. That was in [REDACTED] to train, and the security was up in [REDACTED]. We also conducted training there for two weeks with a Company from [REDACTED] – the same company we worked with at Abbey Gate. We definitely had the trust of our leadership and internally so we aggressively pursued training and opportunities outside of our primary mission. For example, by July we were running live-fire training at [REDACTED] and running camp security with a platoon, and [REDACTED] would be supervising training with the [REDACTED] at another training location. I was very impressed with what the team could take on in our couple months there.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You're in [REDACTED] for 4 months?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. For one platoon it was mid-March through mid-August. For the rest it was mid-April through mid-August.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your [redacted] (b)(6) ever come see you?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there twice. He was there right around our RIP with 3/1, that was tight, I only had 48 hours on ground with their commander. The [redacted] (b)(6) came out a few days after me and spent some time with us. The [redacted] (b)(6) had been out previously with the ADVON. The [redacted] (b)(6) came out with [redacted] (b)(6). Then the [redacted] (b)(6) came later for a second visit and observed our training at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d. He was with [redacted] (b)(6) on that one as well.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They must have trusted you to let you stay that decentralized?

(2) Answer. I would agree with that.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you start hearing that you might support a NEO?

(2) Answer. I started seeing planning documents for a potential NEO in April. [redacted] (b)(5) We saw those conversations begin at the higher level. I believe around June there was a deliberate planning effort under way that I saw documents from. I was aware that a PDSS went out. I went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d and spent 8 days there, and reviewed documents for a potential ECP at Abbey Gate. There was an Excel sheet of what that would like. Beginning in June or July I think Echo would begin rehearsal exercises for that. They shared those documents with us, from force flow to set up on the ground. I think the battalion began deliberate planning for that no later than June.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you receive official word that you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. The evening of August 12th, I was at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d. I got a text about the Washington Post reporting that we were going into Kabul, 2/1 and 1/8. [redacted] (b)(6) texted me about the news. I texted and asked the [redacted] (b)(6) if I needed to head to base and get on the phone to get secure comms. At that point our platoon from TF TRAP had returned, so they headed to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d to do LFX training since they hadn't been able to previously. The next morning, I see them at the range. I tell them to train for the rest of the day, and to return to base tomorrow. We were on a 96 hour tether, I

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

knew we wouldn't be able to move that day as we needed to get contracted support to move us out of country under emergency conditions which we were able to successfully schedule through the army unit in country.

I got in touch with command on the 13th, and we went on to an N+48 tether. It was not official that we were going, but it was very likely and we assumed it was happening. We went to our deployment drill that we had rehearsed. We knew how much gear we would bring and what our package would look like, so we just had to execute that plan. I sent WARNO1 with priorities of rehearsal which were, I believe, zero all weapons and optics, 50m shoot in day and night conditions, and an M320 shoot in case we received nonlethal rounds, and we reviewed all CLS. I asked the docs to review our MASCAS SOP that we had created while in [REDACTED]. Reviewed the ROE, it was still standing CENTOM ROE so we went over those. We looked to review crowd control procedures. We didn't have a nonlethal weapons kit with us, so we went over formations and what that included.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You talked about the standing CENTCOM ROE which was hostile act/hostile intent, was there any discussion of defense of others?

(2) Answer. Once we got to [REDACTED] We left [REDACTED] on the 16th and we arrived to [REDACTED] on the 17th. We believe that we were going to fly out the night of the 17th, but that flight was cancelled. I drove to [REDACTED] to get a class brief and link up with the Bravo command since some of the Battalion deployed on the 15th. That's when the ROE expanded to defense of American and NATO partner force civilians that were in danger. If we saw an American outside of the gate in danger, we could act to protect them. We also learned on the 16th that the Taliban were the partner force. I notified our team from [REDACTED] that the Taliban were an adjacent unit and I highlighted the ROE there as well.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Was that a discussion that you had to have with the Marines? I feel like that would cause concern.

(2) Answer. I'd like to highlight, [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] CO had come out to see us in April or May in [REDACTED] and took all the staff and ran us through a TDG and an EDG. If you remember the Rwanda EDG. You are a Dutch platoon commander who has to defend a base that has Tutsis hiding, and Hutus on the outside waiting to attack them. You have an order to return to base. What do you do?

My guys, a lot of them, said that they would stay regardless. I had a chance to then address the matter with my leadership and make it clear that when I came on the phone with an order, you follow that order. I made it clear the priority would be to follow the order, and my guys all understood that. One, after we got back, told me that that

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

guidance helped him through difficult decisions when we were in Kabul. We had very experienced platoon sergeants, two who had purple hearts. So when it came to stating that we had to work with the Taliban, I paused, let it sink in, repeated it clearly and trusted they would follow the guidance. I didn't dwell on the order because I needed to be firm with this very difficult and emotional task. When we didn't fly out on the night of the 17th, we had a lot of excess time to see what was going on at HKIA. At that time, we went through EDGs over and over to keep the Marines busy. We knew the Marines were nervous about knowing what they needed to do. We gave shoot/no shoot scenarios to all the squad leaders to execute. I emphasized that leadership would be with them the whole time. It would be close ranks crowd control, and I think that helped our guys feel better and set us up for when we had to push back the crowd on the 19th.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Sounds like good preparations were made, when do you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We land early morning on the 19th, around 0100. We had a BPT order to hold security on the south side of the runway. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get an update to your tasking as well?

(2) Answer. That we would move to Abbey Gate, later that morning on the 19th. We would secure the ECC at the Abbey Gate to facilitate the evacuation of AMCITs.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Just AMCITs at that time?

(2) Answer. We understood that to include individuals with specific documentation. While in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d we received examples of the documents we were looking for. We had five things to look for and some imagery on what that looked like. We started seeing those in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and again in Kabul, we distributed that information over Signal so Marines could reference that information. The RSO at Abbey Gate confirmed that later, but that guidance changed almost hourly throughout our time there. The intent was to get to the gate, make it work, make it better. It was about getting qualified people in early on, that changed as the situation progressed.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question. [REDACTED] What did you do after receiving that tasking?

(2) Answer. Moved to the gym. Told the Marines to rest. XO and Ops Chief started working on what they needed to. I started working on the OPORD. I called leadership together at probably about 0400 or 0500 to issue the order. We talked force flow and what that would be. We still needed to locate, secure and hotwire vehicles to get to the gate, as it was a long walk. [REDACTED] and I went out after that to try and hotwire some vehicles and tag it with our unit ownership. That's when we established our company motor pool.

That's the guidance we had at the time. I linked up with [REDACTED] he had good advice on crowd control measures. He said if you get calm, they get calm. That advice served us well over our first few days there. We moved down. Myself, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] headed down to the gate. [REDACTED] was an exceptional corpsman who could work well on general guidance. I wanted him to make a plan from the point of injury to the Role II. He highlighted that connections between those points weren't solid yet, and I told him to fix that, which I think he absolutely did which is self-evident by the execution. He did that and went to find out what assets we would need. I had [REDACTED] go to Weapons Company at the inner gate to discuss integration since I understood the Weapons Company platoons there would be in direct support of us.

I moved with [REDACTED] down to the outer gate. It appeared no one was firmly in charge there. [REDACTED] RSO, SOF, parts of Fox Company were all there. Eventually I linked up with the [REDACTED] who arrived around that time. It was chaotic. We saw the [REDACTED] bring convoys through very slowly from the outer corridor. This was sometime mid-morning on the 19th. The gate was physically shut at the time by a vehicle with some straps, so the [REDACTED] would clear the crowd away from the gate and quickly open the gate to let vehicles through. They would do the same thing in reverse. It was not a process that could work in the long term.

I linked up with the RSO and an Air Force major that worked with personnel recovery. I tried to find out if they were in charge. I linked up with the [REDACTED] who I had worked with in [REDACTED] we had a very good relationship. That's when I find out that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was going to make a movement as two platoons, in the direction of Camp Sullivan to conduct a linkup for an escort of some civilians there.

At that point, I had some concerns with that plan. I wanted to send vehicles with them, since Afghans got out of the way of vehicles. That recommendation was too late, the plan was set. As [REDACTED] tried to push through the gate they were absorbed by the crowd and the [REDACTED] began to lose a handle on the control of the gate itself. Shortly thereafter, the [REDACTED] called for support up. Right as that happens, my 1st platoon arrives. I grabbed the platoon commander, [REDACTED] and told him to get his platoon on line to push the crowd back. They pushed into the crowd, and like the others, we start getting absorbed. I follow in after them. We were losing cohesion at this point; guys were getting split up

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left and right. The [REDACTED] was out there at the time. It was incredibly violent in the crowd. We were out there for a while. It takes a long time to extract ourselves. It was dangerous, I had my sling wrapped around my neck at one point, as did others. I am surprised no one died. Marines exhibited incredible bravery to see so many guys knocked down by the crowd and just having to keep pulling them out. That might have been 30-45 minutes. I eventually break out of the crowd. Hop on a vehicle. Look around and try to figure out how to solve this. I hop down to try and go back in; a team leader of mine [REDACTED] tells me that's his job. I hop back on the car, and realized we need to let in people to relieve pressure. I got my 2nd platoon ready to control some people. The issue was that we had these different layers of [REDACTED] Marines, and civilians all pushing on each other and it was only making things worse. I then went layer to layer to either get the [REDACTED] or Marines to let in civilians until we could extract all [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at that point was well ahead of us in the crowd.

Around that time, [REDACTED] That was awful for everyone, we couldn't reach our gas masks. Then the Afghans push back, we pull back behind the gate. [REDACTED] made a line in front of the gate and calmed down the crowd in front of them. There were now hundreds of Afghans behind us that had not been searched. Given our positions, we realized we needed to search all the people inside the gate. We corralled and searched them, established our search areas throughout the inner corridor.

By the 20th, we have a queue of individuals stretching to the inner gate because no flights were leaving the airfield. We had two platoons holding that many people, the ratio was terrible. It was what it was though, it was what we had to do.

So for the rest of the 19th, we screen the crowd and brought in the ones behind [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Eventually we make it to them, and we swap a platoon out for them since they had been out there for a while. In my mind, [REDACTED] was in direct support of [REDACTED] going forward from this point, given our mission. Throughout the whole time, we all had great cooperation but a challenging unity of command with so many units and the terrain of the Abbey Gate AO. We constantly had to work to segregate units to make sure there could be command and control if we ever had to respond to an attack. Once we got to [REDACTED] relieved them, I spoke with the [REDACTED] company commander about next steps.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Were the [REDACTED] still there? Did they give you guidance?

(2) Answer. At some point they left. I do not remember receiving further guidance. Once we relieved [REDACTED] we realized we needed to clear to the Barron Hotel. We needed to push the crowds back past the Barron Hotel to establish clear lines of communication to the Barron Hotel. I discussed this with my [REDACTED] counterpart, we agreed that trying to do that at night and possibly with CS gas would have been more manageable. The crowds were too large in the day, but we realized doing it in night with NVGs and gas

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masks would be a nightmare. We decided to move the crowd back at first light when the crowd was smaller and calmer, and at least we could see.

Right as the sun went down, the [REDACTED] called us and told us to push the crowd back now. I requested to delay until the morning and was told we needed to push immediately. So we followed the order. I got with [REDACTED] we made a plan to have 1st platoon walk the crowd back with their weapons back slung. The [REDACTED] Interpreter and [REDACTED] had an excellent idea that we needed to talk to the crowd and give them time to receive the word all the way back through the crowd. We gave them a 30 minute notice that we were going to walk them back to the Barron Hotel in order to begin clearing in the morning. The plan included having the [REDACTED] flank us on our left along the chain link fence so that we couldn't get over run from there. We held [REDACTED] back as QRF in case anything happened. The other two platoons in [REDACTED] were still running crowd control in the inner corridor. Our 2nd platoon never made it in, they were stuck in Kuwait. We were a company reduced at the time. [REDACTED] had two platoons. We had three. [REDACTED] Company was full strength. Unaware to me and the [REDACTED] company commander, it was related to me later that a [REDACTED] flag officer came into our COC and asked why [REDACTED] was not pushing the crowd back. That's what drove us to begin moving the crowd back. It wasn't until we reached the Barron Hotel, that's when we learned that shipping containers were coming to emplace the chevron. That's when a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] made it clear to us what the plan was with the timeline to clear the outer corridor.

So that was the general plan. When we started clearing, I got to the front of the crowd and told them why we were clearing, which was translated. They were very compliant and passed word back. The problem is some of the guys in the front were so close, it was hard to get the first layer to move back to the Taliban checkpoint. The Marines did an excellent job at just inching them forward. We brought up two vehicles for their lights and because the crowds responded to vehicles. We would tiptoe forward and tell the crowd calmly to move back. We did that from the evening until nautical morning twilight. During that evening, I realized that 2/1 fell under the MEU CO when I arrived to the Barron Hotel because [REDACTED] was there and engaged with me. The [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] were also there, as well as another [REDACTED].

I was not previously aware of the obstacle plan and the end state, so there were some struggles with establishing a common operating picture. That's when a [REDACTED] engineer comes and grabs me, and that's when I realize we were going to talk to the Taliban. Our guys had stopped by the Taliban checkpoint and myself, the [REDACTED] and the interpreter went to a back alley to meet with Taliban leadership. The [REDACTED] was telling the Taliban they needed to move their cars since we were going to emplace the chevron. They were compliant. We saw the Taliban drive the cars back and establish a new position. We asked them to move a little further back. At this point, by sunrise on the 20th, the shipping containers were brought out and the chevron was established.

o. Question and Answer 14.

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(1) Question. (b)(6) Is the outer corridor more ordered now?

(2) Answer. More so than before. We had a LOC from the outer gate to the chevron. The challenge we had was that our lines were still not secure. We had troops holding our perimeter, but there were pockets of Afghans all throughout the outer corridor. The largest was maybe 100 plus Afghans. We had some massing in the canal area and bleeding. I think while we were pushing the crowd, Daegan Page found a family of 17 Americans, so we would let guys like that through. But there were always squitters that would come in after those groups. (b)(1)1.4d SOF elements were bad about doing that the whole time. Individuals like that cluttered everything. They weren't searched or screened; they were just waiting in our lines. That was a problem for the next 36 hours, trying to tighten that up. Meanwhile the pressure on Abbey Gate was increasing as crowds grew.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 20th, do you have effective comms with the Battalion COC?

(2) Answer. That night the (b)(6) come down and we talk through the next few days. Not exactly certain on what our layout was going to be yet. We had green gear and Signal App. We established two radio operator points to pass messages along if I missed anything. We got some info from green gear, some from Signal, some from the (b)(1)1.4d COC. The (b)(1)1.4d COC is where I got our clearest threat streams, so I would go up there often for meetings. Often while I was there, there would be like an attention to the COC about threats in the Barron Hotel. They would identify (b)(1)1.4d or American sources, it appeared they were tied in well with the JOC.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much longer did you spend at Abbey Gate after this?

(2) Answer. On the evening of the 22nd is when we RIP'd out with (b)(6) I was between the inner gate and the Barron Hotel for that whole 3-day period. I would meet with the (b)(1)1.4d walk the line, and pass any word I had, examine the Marines, make it to the inner gate and meet with (b)(6) then do the process in reverse. That was my battle rhythm. I didn't sleep very much during this time and I look back with some regret on that fact.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So mid-morning of the 19th until the 22nd evening how much sleep did you get?

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(2) Answer. Maybe 4 hours of sleep during that time. We RIP'd out with [REDACTED] sometime on the evening of the 22nd.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Okay, the gate is established during that period. What was the battle rhythm for the company?

(2) Answer. The challenge was, we didn't have a rest cycle for the first two days. We had forces from the inner gate to the chevron. We didn't have a chance for a rest cycle. I was trying to argue to the [REDACTED] that there was not good command and control at the moments because our forces were too mixed up. It was a complicated problem we faced. The backlog of people stacking up was growing and increasing by the hour because we were pulling in more and some people were squirting in. We thought they were going to be let in, until eventually being told that the airfield was full.

With that, the challenge we had was that command and control was difficult. The ratio between Marines and civilians was getting worse and worse. Everyone was on their feet continuously. The [REDACTED] eventually had 5 companies at the Barron Hotel. They kept increasing their forces because of the crowd control challenge we had. We also didn't have an immediate idea of what our aim was. Staring at this, I was trying to figure out what came next. Standing there couldn't be the plan. I went and talked to the two [REDACTED] to do some deliberate planning and try to figure out what the plan was. I told them I needed them to take over more of the line because my guys needed rest. They agreed, but that was a challenge, because they were two different battalions, managing the area jointly, so there was some friction. I kept asking until the morning of the 21st or the 22nd. I eventually go to their morning sync. I see a [REDACTED] I brought up my concerns and told them that my Marines would fall over if we were not relieved and able to execute a rest plan. At that point they finally took over some of the line and we could do a rest plan.

The other thing they offered, was blocks of hotel rooms. They offered us a block of rooms to let our guys sleep, maybe shower and get chow. I thought that was great if I could get a platoon in there for 4 hours. We started working steps towards this as the [REDACTED] were taking over. As another challenge, [REDACTED] was getting hit by a stomach bug, so their strength was reduced. We got room keys, sent some of our guys to chow. That's when we got word of chow. We gave the room keys to [REDACTED] and let them know that was available instead of having to go back to the gym. I think those keys were exchange between gunnies or 1stSgts. My guys never made it to the hotel rooms, likely one of the platoons got chow.

I advocated that we should stay at the gate since we had a plan. Looking back, that was probably the wrong call. I was too sleep deprived. I thought we had a viable plan going forward, but I think that created some friction. We finished RIPping out with [REDACTED] some time that evening.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Until your RIP with [REDACTED] did the ROE change or update?

(2) Answer. Not that I remember. I remember adjusting force protection based on threat streams but that's it.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Regarding threat streams from the 20th to the 22nd, what were you receiving? How were you receiving them and how were you disseminating them?

(2) Answer. Going in, our analysis was that a suicide bomber was the greatest threat. Once on the deck, two threat streams were highlighted around the same time. One was a VBIED at the chevron. The concern there was that the only place a vehicle could reach was the chevron, but it would have had to get past 100s of people which felt unlikely. The other was while I was at the [REDACTED] COC getting a briefing [REDACTED] was there as well. He and the [REDACTED] would regularly come down and sometimes join me at the [REDACTED] COC. While we at the COC, there was a suspected insider threat in a red shirt or jacket, with an SVEST in the Barron Hotel. After that, I left and passed it to my guys as well as there might be an attack of some sort on our own position. If I received an immediate threat from either my BN or the [REDACTED] I would pass on Signal and then immediately move to the Sniper tower for face to face link up and supervise reduction of force posture. Tell everyone to get low, tell them there was a potential attack. If it was a BOLO, I would report it face to face and via Signal as well, but that didn't necessarily lead to a force protection change.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did any specific threats happen in those first three days originate from your battalion or the [REDACTED] though?

(2) Answer. I remember the battalion pushing the VBIED concern, there were some details of the car that changed a couple times. I don't remember at this time anything specific about a suicide bomber, just that the threat persisted and that a complex attack could happen. That was brought up at some point. The level of specificity on the 25th was much higher, prior to that it was more general.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] And you normally received face to face threat reports from BN or [REDACTED] leadership?

(2) Answer. It was a balanced mix between Signal, green gear, and face to face for Battalion. [REDACTED] was more face to face, I would stop by their intel desk and ask them about threat reporting about every 3-6 hours or so.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you worked from inner gate to the chevron and back, that would take about 3 hours?

(2) Answer. 3 to 6 hours. It depended. If there was a major issue. If the crowd got rowdy or SOF elements took my attention, or I was looking at a specific plan it took longer. But generally, it was about that long until I got back to the (b)(1)14COC.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you normally in the (b)(1)14COC for?

(2) Answer. 30 minutes to an hour depending on planning or updates. If it was an all-hands meeting, a solid hour.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The Taliban manned the chevron, right?

(2) Answer. That evolved over time. Initially we were on top of the chevron. However, the messaging of the US government on how long we would stay in country, if it was past the 31st, once that was in the public news, the Taliban disappeared, and the crowds became hard to manage because they weren't doing crowd control. When the government walked that back, the Taliban came back. I think that was around the 21st of August. The first couple days we were on the chevron. The 20th, the Taliban move away from the chevron. They were initially in buildings and cars and in the crowd near the chevron. Over time, on the 21st the Taliban 'sealed' the exit on the chevron since they were frustrated that we were slowing down processing in conjunction with the news about staying longer. It was a message that if we didn't hold up our end, they wouldn't hold up their end. They blocked the exit and didn't let anyone out of the chevron, which was never that feasible of an exit anyway since the crowd was so dense. That drove the use of the canal as an ejection point. That's also when people started trying to enter through the canal.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) During that period in the first three days, did you see them kill any civilians?

(2) Answer. I did not. I saw them beat and hit civilians.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your Marines see anything like that?

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(2) Answer. Afghans told us they had been wounded or beaten by the Taliban. They told us the Taliban were killing people. [REDACTED] wasn't high enough to see if that was happening. The Snipers were high enough maybe, but [REDACTED] Marines generally weren't high enough to see anything like that from our close in, crowd control perspective. Some Marines might have witnessed that from their positions on the very edge of our lines.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Marine, in a public interview, says that one point the [REDACTED] requested Marines help outside the chevron. The Marine says he witnessed a Taliban member turn and kill 3 Afghan Civilians in front of him. Did your Marines go provide crowd control past the chevron?

(2) Answer. There was a time, I think on the 20th or the 21st, where the Marines extended to help control the crowd that far out. I did not receive any direct reports of Taliban killing civilians like that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you have any interactions with the snipers in the first few days?

(2) Answer. I would yell up to them while I walked the lines to see how they were doing. My understanding is they worked for battalion. I listened to their reports to battalion over green gear. Their reports were excellent, I thought they were doing a good job of balancing what they were seeing with the amount of action beyond the walls. At one point they witnessed individuals carrying a bag with two people by the parking lot. They tracked them into the crowd and saw them leave the crowd without a bag. That didn't match the description of any bags we had. I remember being impressed with how well they articulated that.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you go and talk to them about that?

(2) Answer. They described it as deep in the crowd on the far side of the canal. I don't remember if I talked to the snipers abouts that.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Do you think that was an IED probe?

(2) Answer. During this time, there were people dropping off supplies to other people in the crowd like water or baby formula to pass to people in the crowd. Given

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that no bomb went off, my assumption was it was more like provisions for the crowd. At that point, we still had a somewhat reduced posture near that side of the canal. We weren't pulling aggressively from the canal at that point, our risk there was low.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Describe your force posture before the RIP on the 22nd?

(2) Answer. As I remember we had Marines from the inner gate to the Barron, along the inner and outer corridor. The level of Afghans was getting better, they were moving onto the airfield. C-17s were coming in and out. I was optimistic at the time. We still had some rough spots in the line, but we were heading in the right direction, and we were establishing a rest plan. Our last night out there, the night of the 21st, the platoons got a little sleep.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Were any Marines outside the fence near the canal before the RIP?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I want to clarify a timeline point: on the 21st, we began a large-scale screening effort, internal to [REDACTED] to put our fire support officer in the Barron Hotel. He was screening over there. We had folks at the inner and outer gate trying to work through everyone we had, to reduce our backlog and eject people who didn't meet criteria. However, other entities would start ejecting people from the airfield through our ejection point. That's when the Taliban sealed the exit, so we had to start using the canal as an exit.

Then on the 22nd, we actually had continuous DoS and bus support and we can clear most of our backlog. Civilians, at this point, begin entering the canal and we start pulling people from that area as they avoid Taliban positions. That was a discussion we had, but the conclusion was that these were the people who needed to get out most desperately, so we needed to get them out. That was a conversation between my [REDACTED] since we understood that the Taliban were denying people who were on a wanted list. So that's when more people started coming that way.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Prior to the RIP on the 22nd, do you remember any instances of an 'IED Probe' or clear IED threat?

(2) Answer. I believe there was an IED threat when I was in the [REDACTED] COC, and there was the concern about the insider threat, that was paired with another IED threat at Abbey Gate. We got that threat, wrapped up the meeting, then I went back to inform the Marines of a threat in the area. I told them to be aware and we took a hard look at where folks were along the canal, trying to see where we could reduce posture. We just

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had so many people in the corridor, that we were already fully stretched and dispersed to levels that were risky for crowd control.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED] From the evening of the 22nd, until you come back on the 25th what did you guys do?

(2) Answer. We were incredibly sleep deprived so on 23 August, it was just rest and refit. Reset our gear. Conducted Hygiene. Corpsmen made sure hygiene was prioritized and they did a great job enforcing that. Only one [REDACTED] Marine had a stomach bug, I believe from all the human waste we were constantly around. On the 24th we were in support of the pax terminal. I did deliberate planning with the [REDACTED] The initial task was BPT reconnoiter a designated area to mark sensitive items for follow on destruction. Later in the day we were told we would relieve [REDACTED] at Abbey Gate on the 25th, and we would be there until the [REDACTED] withdrawal on the 27th then we would RIP with the 82nd. That's what we were told on the 24th.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you receive any update to situation at Abbey Gate before heading back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No change specifically that I can remember to ROE or the situation at the Gate.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Any conversations about threat streams at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I would have received an intel brief before completing my order and updating for the company; I don't remember what was passed at that time. I believe it was just continued concern of VBIED and potential suicide bomber. A continuation of what we had been briefed before.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did you head back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] and I went earlier on the 25th to discuss the withdrawal with the [REDACTED] and coordinate the RIP with [REDACTED] I departed for the recon at 1100. Wave 1 departed at 1200. We had two platoons occupy positions to begin with, the whole company didn't go at once based on how we were organized. I had conducted another meeting with [REDACTED] the day prior for some coordination, which was why I sent two down initially and kept the other one in reserve. On the 25th, at about 1500 local time, I sent:

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2/1 Marines

(b)(1)1.4c

I don't know where I got that threat, if it was the battalion Signal chat or if I was in the (b)(1) 1.4c COC coordinating the RIP at that point. I told the platoons to roger up to receiving that message.

Shortly thereafter, we pulled back from the footbridge. I was likely planning with the (b)(1) 1.4d when I received that information, after that previous report, they told us that a suicide bomber was inbound to Abbey Gate. I was in the COC around 1500 or 1600. That threat came in. It appeared credible. They got a phone call from their higher to discuss force protection and how to reduce posture. We and the (b)(1)1.4d were extended all the way to the footbridge and that area at the time.

To back up for context, I had walked to the footbridge prior to the RIP and wondered how to control that area. There were several threats to consider. First, the threat of being overrun never went away. If we faced a complex attack, we were exposed to the Market. The VBIED could also drive up in vicinity of the footbridge from the Market and get very close to us. In the event of a complex attack, the canal wall gets lower and lower the closer you get to the footbridge, to about mid-calf. Between the lack of cover and narrowness of the path, you were going to be in the wide open. Additionally, the Marines that far out had no way to get over the wall and into the inner corridor without having to move a couple hundred meters. To complicate this even further, there was a mashup of units out there with foreign SOF (b)(1)1.4d a Weapons Company Platoon was still out there. So who would be in charge if there was a fight? Command and control would have been near impossible.

Now combine that with an SVEST threat. We had a line of Marines shoulder to shoulder and no separation from the crowd in the canal pathway. We were also nearly in an L-shape by the footbridge with the (b)(1)1.4d making us a larger target. They were face to face with the crowd out there themselves, which was growing as other gates began to close. We were within 30-50 meters of the (b)(1)1.4d

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) what time do you think you actually relieved (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Probably midafternoon. Not the evening. I think that previously when I told you evening (During Initial Investigation) it was based on my Signal messages, but I think the timing on those messages was jacked up with delivery delay and time zones. By mid-afternoon, (b)(6) was on the line and replaced (b)(6)

oo. Question and Answer 40.

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(1) Question. [REDACTED] So when do you walk the line to the footbridge?

(2) Answer. During the leaders recon. I walked down there. I was taken aback by how far they had gone and extended their footprint.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did you actually notice the crowd being larger at that time, or was that looking with hindsight?

(2) Answer. I think the perception was certainly greater, seeing the human wall of Marines by the footbridge, whereas before we used barriers and the fences. Now there was no barrier between the Marines and the crowd.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] You say there was a human wall at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. Yes. I have a photo, past the footbridge, looking east down the canal. There is probably over a squad there, compressed and face to face with the crowd, mid afternoon on the 25th. You can see that the crowd has lined up on the canal wall along there and there are people in the canal as well. The people in the canal stretched all the way down to the Barron Hotel, so technically, into our lines. So, even though the near side walkway was cleared, to an extent, because there were still squatters, the canal still had people all the way down to the footbridge. If I recall the [REDACTED] controlled the far side of the canal, I know they also had a blocking position near the footbridge, with probably a squad reduced and riot shields.

As you walked the near side walkway, you had [REDACTED] Marines from Different companies, Foreign SOF, and Afghan squatters along the entire walkway.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Okay so that's the situation. There was a meeting with the [REDACTED] in the Barron Hotel. You have already pushed out that first BOLO. You are discussing how to improve security?

(2) Answer. I have messages on this. I set a time for an 1800 sync with company leadership on how to give ground and reduce footprint. We needed to reduce backlog and have better control. We needed a rotation plan. I said I was with the [REDACTED] discussing force pro. I said I would be back when able. This was all before we got an immediate threat alert.

We had discussed this on the 22nd. Possibly getting engineer assets to emplace walls and reduce Marines exposed, but no matter how we drew it up there was no way to avoid having Marines face to face with the crowd. We were chasing standoff. I think

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that's why [REDACTED] Company and the [REDACTED] pushed out, to create standoff for the main body, at the risk of experiencing some casualties far out. I was not willing to assume that risk and I believe we exposed ourselves to additional threats given that we were now exposed to the market, which could invite a complex attack, VBIED and also stretched us for a chance to be overrun by the crowd again.

So while I was in that meeting in the [REDACTED] COC at the Barron, later afternoon on the 25th, we had the specific IED threat toward Abbey Gate. I argued with the [REDACTED] that because of that threat, we need to collapse time now. I then sent a message saying Company Staff needed to go to the exit in the fence, time now.

I sent a message, at 1500, from what I can guess. I know that timeline doesn't quite line up, but I took this photo at 1539 of the footbridge area, so I know that's accurate. I sent the message to prepare to back clear. I [REDACTED] I make my way down toward the footbridge and tell my guys and the [REDACTED] about what is going to happen.

However, what we have to wait for is to fall back and cover gaps. The [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] so we are holding the line. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

we started to inch back. That crowd was more aggressive. They would no longer stay calm, there were a lot more men in the crowd. We eventually make our way back to the sniper tower and reduce our force posture. We pulled everyone back as much as possible, held on to riot shields that were there, and paused until the morning.

It was still daylight by the time we finished, it probably took us about 30 minutes to an hour to work backwards.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question [REDACTED] By the time you got to the tower, how many guys did you need at the Jersey barrier?

(2) Answer. I believe third platoon used a squad reduced on the barrier, one squad on the wall, and one in reserve. [REDACTED] Company was managing the queue in the outer corridor with the FET. [REDACTED] owned outer security, [REDACTED] owned inner security, Weapons owned the inner gate. So we had one platoon outer corridor, one platoon inner corridor, and one platoon on rest.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Okay, you sent the message to your leaders about the threat and needing to meet. You want to collapse your position, who was in the meeting about the collapse?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Company leadership, 3rd and 4th platoon leadership. 1st platoon was on rest cycle.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Anyone argue the plan to collapse?

(2) Answer. They did not. I learned later that 3rd platoon wasn't happy, they felt better having the standoff, but I think that was an illusion. Later, I think they felt relief about the decision because it shortened the distance of the CASEVAC significantly. Some members expressed gratitude directly to me that we had pulled back to the tower in hindsight. In their opinion the decision saved lives.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Did you discuss that with the [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. Just me and the [REDACTED] They were not present at that time. I did not inform them due to the urgency of the situation that was occurring.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Okay, it's around 1700-1800 on the 25th. You have one platoon outer corridor, one inner, one on rest. The crowd is larger, with more males. You had one IED threat specific to Abbey Gate causing you to collapse and reduce footprint IVO the canal. You stopped pulling people that night as well?

(2) Answer. Yes, given the nature of the threat we pulled out our Marines that didn't need to be there. We spent the whole night on a knee. We rotated the platoons and maintained security. At one point, that evening or early morning on the 26th, Battalion asked for full accountability of the company. We did that.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED] When did you start processing again on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think 0700 or 0800. The SOF elements were lined up to come in, we had denied them entry until this point of the day because of the chaos that their pulling was created. I was holding back an Italian general and his team who were clamoring to get into the canal to pull people. For the rest of the day, we only let in one SOF element at a time. One challenge we had, because all other gates were closed, we were still the only exit area for Afghans who were being removed from HKIA. This is something we had to deal with. We tried to limit that to one action at a time to reduce exposure and maximize control.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other specific threat streams from the 25th to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think another threat that night, but we were already at reduced force posture at that point. Then the next day, on the 26th, there was a specific threat of an ISIS suicide bomber that I had gotten from the (b)(1)1.4d I left the hotel, rushed back, put everyone in a knee. That was at about 1300. I believe we even had a timeline, the bomb was going off in 15 minutes. I put everyone in a knee, and I moved personally to the jersey barrier behind the canal in the outer corridor. I remained out there for the next hour with 4th Platoon. I think we had another threat like that the morning of the 26th as well. At that point, it was time for 3rd platoon to rotate on. We didn't have much time left to process, so we wanted to continue to pull the people that we could.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you had a threat sometime the morning of the 26th then again at 1300. Then you start processing again, how long did you think you were holding the gate for?

(2) Answer. The timeline with the (b)(1)1.4d was shifting. By the afternoon of the 26th, we thought the (b)(1)1.4d would pull their last guy out at 0100 on the 27th. We knew that we would be holding our position, increasing our footprint, to control the outer corridor while the (b)(1)1.4d We knew we couldn't leave until the (b)(1)1.4d were out. That was the plan.

Having a conversation with battalion leadership, and other adjacent company leadership, we were in agreement that we would pull people from the canal until 1800. We thought we had another 2-3 days to screen and process anyone that we pulled out before 1800. What I mean by that, is that grab teams or specific individuals could still get pulled from the canal. Key leaders from the company or battalion would grab people with good paper work, but the element in the canal primarily had the mission of security. I did not task any of my company with the specific duty of looking for people, it was mostly other entities pulling folks they found. We would still pull good credentials if we saw them.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) when did (b)(6) arrive again on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think there was a meeting with the Taliban, myself, the (b)(6) HUMINT, the 82nd, and some interpreters from around 1630-1700. I had that meeting. Did one final coordination with the (b)(6) on our plan. There was an initial plan of how this would look developed on the 25th or early on the 26th, but that shifted as the (b)(1)1.4d plan changed. I briefed the (b)(6) on the updated plan, and he approved. I don't think those changes made it to (b)(1)1.4d Company, or the (b)(6) by the time (b)(6) arrived around

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

1600-1700. When I walked back after that meeting, I ran into members of [REDACTED] Company around the outer gate area.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] On the 26th, you mention 2 threat streams specific to Abbey Gate. You adjust your posture, do you remember any other times where you or your Marines identified any suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Marines identified suspicious individuals regularly over the duration. That was a continuous event. There were always people watching, filming. For some it was a sport, trying to get in, then begin escorted out with a smile on their face. There were dozens of individuals staring and watching us from across the way, who clearly had no intention of coming in.

That definitely happened on the 26th too. Marines would point those guys out to us, but those guys were typically on the far side of the canal, so we couldn't get to them to apprehend them. It would have exposed our guys drastically to try and do so. They would have had to get into the sewage canal and climb up the other side and we would have no way to support them. On the 26th you were staring at a dense crowd, so thick that it was trampling people. The fence near the corner of the sniper tower was being overwhelmed, people were being crushed. Also, what would detaining someone accomplish if they had a suicide vest? It would put Marines at risk.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Multiple occasions you see suspicious individuals, just watching or stirring things up. Did you ever have a conversation with the Snipers about that?

(2) Answer. I would follow their reporting, check in with them as I walked by. They would pass info down from the tower, there was communication going back and forth.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Did they ever pass you a BOLO?

(2) Answer. Not that I was aware of. In the BOLO I passed to my company, I mentioned a [REDACTED] for the intention of blending in. And I mentioned a black bag with [REDACTED]

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How many people had bags?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. At least half of them, some of them black bags.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there multiple people with neatly trimmed beards and black hair?

(2) Answer. Yes, absolutely.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see anyone that met the ROE with hostile act and hostile intent?

(2) Answer. No.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did a Marine ever tell you they saw someone exhibit hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. No.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, you mentioned the [redacted] (b)(6) was at the meeting. Was he there at other points of the day?

(2) Answer. He regularly came to the gate.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the [redacted] (b)(6) go into the sniper tower on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I did not.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the [redacted] (b)(6) on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, I did.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the [redacted] (b)(6) speak with snipers on the 26th?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. I did not.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). You mentioned earlier your rhythm was to work from the Barron Hotel to the inner gate. What was your rhythm on the 26th, what were you doing?

(2) Answer. To start the day, once we opened the canal, I was supervising to make sure the SOF elements did what I needed them to do. That was by the outer gate. I passed that to my (b)(6). In the morning we had concern about pressure at the jersey barrier, so I supervised a jersey barrier being moved by HE to reinforce the fence where it was caving in from people being crushed into it. The morning was about shoring up our position and monitoring extractions. I then went to the (b)(1)1.4d COC to do more planning since the timeline was changing. At this point, (b)(6) was more consolidated, only having to worry about from the outer corridor to the inner gate. The internal process was smoothing out, we had a rhythm. So my attention was on planning the RIP. When I had high threat streams, about the bomb going off, I moved directly to the sniper tower or the jersey barrier where I briefed everyone and waited out the moment with (b)(6). I would normally observe if platoons were RIPing. Amongst all of this I would walk in the inner corridor and ensure only essential people were forward and were correctly positioned.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Your focus is on the outer corridor, the canal area, since that is the point of friction. You said you would tell people to minimize their footprint, who were those people?

(2) Answer. Those were Marines from (b)(6). I wanted them moving in a timely manner, making sure they weren't hanging out. Marines and others present always wanted to find a way to help, or something to do, and they had wonderful intentions. But the threat was severe and unless you had a critical job, I would try and remove individuals that didn't need to be there. The other action I had during this time; we had some individuals clustered in the outer corridor who had been abandoned by foreign SOF. I had to remove a family of 35 Canadians that the Canadians rejected, so I told them that I was going to clear them out.

This was a hard day. The crowd was desperate, they were aggressive with (b)(6) Marines, so I was trying to calm down (b)(6) guys that had to interface directly with the crowd, just pulling them aside for a second to let them calm down. I spent a lot of time making sure small unit leaders were keeping discipline up. I also assisted in particularly difficult removals that (b)(6) guys had deal with. This could get very emotional for everyone involved.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever, on the 26th, engage with any US SOF elements at the gate?

(2) Answer. I interacted with (b)(1)1.4a like Ryan Knauss' team. Other than that, I don't remember doing so.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you talk to (b)(1)1.4a about?

(2) Answer. I think they showed up around 1700. I told them I was happy to see them. I asked them to talk to the crowd and calm them down. I remember saying that, but not exactly certain when.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to, or after that, did you ever speak to them about individuals matching a BOLO?

(2) Answer. I do not remember a specific conversation but if they were working for me when I was passed updates, I would have passed it to them.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other information passed to you, via U.S. channels, internal or external to the battalion about threat streams on the 26th?

(2) Answer. The only other thing was a be on the lookout for a man dismounting from a motorcycle in the marketplace with a camera. That was also on the 26th, sometime in the afternoon.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That was an individual getting off a motorcycle in the marketplace, with a possible IED?

(2) Answer. Around the 1300 warning, I said ISIS attack imminent, rally at the tower. Look for a cameraman arriving on a motorcycle at the market.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Post gate closure meeting around 1700, you depart the Barron Hotel, what do you remember doing until the blast?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. I remember just final coordination with the [redacted] to make sure we were on the same page for what I intended to do. That's as we walked back. I found [redacted] leadership at the outer gate, I had a conversation with their [redacted] about the updates to the plan, which were new to him. I then went back, maybe I talked to [redacted] at this point to calm the crowd. I continued my rounds of supervising my small unit leaders to make sure the process was working. Then I moved into the canal to see how it felt for [redacted] first platoon there. I was doing that when I saw the flash from the bomb.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you spoke to [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), did you talk to him about anything other than the updates? Where his people needed to be?

(2) Answer. Yes. The initial plan was for [redacted] (b)(6) to control everything inside the sniper tower, and us with everything forward. That left us exposed. I was still trying to leave [redacted] (b)(6) two platoons inside the inner corridor. He would control the inner gate. We would RIP with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4b then we would fall into the 82nd at the outer gate. After that, we would fall behind [redacted] (b)(6) at the inner gate. This was confirmed by the [redacted] (b)(6) the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d the 82nd, and the Taliban. I just don't think word had made it back to [redacted] (b)(6) and the [redacted] (b)(6) yet. The challenge was, we didn't have enough resources to leave a battalion coordination cell with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d to help coordinate planning across 2/1 elements. I wasn't willing to have all of [redacted] (b)(6) outside the gate, exposed and not maintain our own CCP inside the gate and blur the lines of who owns what area. The threat was still very much present and we needed to be in a position to respond. Changing the posture would have unnecessarily disrupted our established CCP and confused who would be in charge of a react to contact or detonation.

The way the original order was written, some coordination had to occur between company commanders, unfortunately some friction occurred due to the time constraints we were under and the changes from the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d I understand how this created frustration for [redacted] (b)(6) though.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the end of that conversation, was [redacted] (b)(6) going to move [redacted] (b)(6) to the inner gate?

(2) Answer. The last thing I said to him was this was the plan that the [redacted] (b)(6) the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d the Taliban and the 82nd were tracking, this was what we were going to do. I said that, then I walked away. He and his leaders remained by the Sniper Tower. I then went about my responsibilities in the outer corridor.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Prior to this point, you had established a CCP in the inner corridor near the sniper tower, correct?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. Yes, we started that on the 25th due to the heightened threat. There was more protection there. I kept [REDACTED] there. I told key leaders not to have meetings forward of the outer gate, they needed to happen inside the walls. I emphasized dispersion. If you didn't need to be forward, do not be forward. We worked to enforce that with senior leaders as well who would come observe our work. We brought up vehicles and staged them in the inner corridor for potential CASEVAC, we were making preparations for a MASCAS. We staged corpsmen and 1tsSgts, reduced our force posture forward of the outer gate, we had one platoon on QRF. On 26th, we had one platoon also working the crowd in the inner corridor because we knew we were pulling out that night and we had to prepare for the RIP.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question [REDACTED] We have photos and video from 10 minutes prior to the attack of canal area. You can see 20-30 Marines in the area between the jersey barrier and about 15 meters passed that. Very condensed. Was that a concern of yours?

(2) Answer. I was very concerned of about how difficult and desperate the crowd was. We relieved third platoon early because they were exhausted. People were trying to crawl over, the pressure was so great, we saw people getting crushed in front of us. 3rd came off the line, 1st came on with guidance to maintain dispersion. Given the press of the crowd, they felt the need to call more of their guys forward to deal with people pressing from the crowd or trying to pull themselves over the wall. It was just a terrible situation, the pressure forced us into that L-shape to keep control. We had the need to keep the crowd back, to mitigate the threat of being over run and lose control and affect the retrograde. They were able to keep one squad well dispersed down the crowd, but even had to call for another fire team from that squad to handle the surging crowd.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Okay Marines were there to maintain security, were Marines still pulling people from the crowd?

(2) Answer. If they saw paperwork that would allow them to get in, passports or visas, you would absolutely pull them. At one point, Marines saw a woman and child being crushed, and pulled them out. They needed help. That is why the FET team and corpsmen were called forward to assist from the inner corridor.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [REDACTED] You worked your way to the canal, through the break in the fence. You went down the near side walkway toward the sniper tower. That's when you saw the flash?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. I saw the flash. There was a small pop as well. I think looking back, I was affected tremendously by that blast. I think the pop was a CS cannister opening. I remember taking a knee. I yelled to get security; I remember that I couldn't focus my eyes. At that point, there was a lot of screaming from the crowd. The blast had sounded like a pop at the infantry immersion trainer, so I didn't grasp right away how big the blast was. Then I heard the screaming and got hit by the CS gas. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his platoon sergeant found me and dragged me out on my feet, back to the CCP. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) pats me down for any wounds. I get the gas out of my eyes and lungs. Adrenaline hits me. I open my eyes to see [REDACTED] (b)(6) taking charge of the CCP like they were trained to do. I get up, run out. See the [REDACTED] (b)(6) he is bleeding and is located near the cut in the fence. He asked me what I needed him to do, which is the right question, it was my battle space.

He calls the 9 line in and goes and pulls out a Marine to the CCP. I focus on security, Marines are pulling security I believe, it is hard to remember. I remember finding one of [REDACTED] (b)(6) squad leaders holding [REDACTED] (b)(6) holding Cpl Page who is expectant. I told him we needed to move. We grab [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and drag him to the CCP. Then I realized we need more medical help. I grab some Marines for security. We ran to the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a and asked for medics. They initially didn't understand the severity. Once I told them the casualty count, they sent their medics with me. We ran back to the CCP together and a [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4d officer came to help serve as a liaison and get more vics to our position. I realized that we might have Marines in the canal, so I pushed back out and scanned the canal, looking to make sure that no Marine had been blown in. The canal was packed with bodies through and through. I scanned for a minute, but didn't see any Marines. I ran back to the gate, saw we had all our Marines back in from the outer corridor, and we shut the gate.

I found [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told him he would hold the position as we withdrew. He told us he would cover us. I saw the 82nd, told them it was their show now. I went back to the inner gate where the STP was. We got accountability and reorganized ourselves. We came up with a plan and came up with the assumption that no where on base was secure. I told 3rd platoon to go establish security in our berthing area. I then saw the [REDACTED] (b)(6) briefed him on our plan and he told me to proceed. That was back by the STP, he seemed like he may have been [REDACTED] (b)(6) as well, he also seemed dazed. Things to me felt very clear at the time from all of the adrenaline. We echeloned the first two platoons back, I went with the last wave. [REDACTED] (b)(6) managed the movement. At that point we were receiving threats that fighters had penetrated HKIA or there were other explosions. We didn't think we were out of the fight yet.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the [REDACTED] (b)(6) before you saw him at the inner gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember seeing him after the blast until I got to the inner gate, but looking back, it is obvious that my peripheral vision had narrowed from the adrenaline.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1 Marines

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. [redacted] What other leadership do you see after the blast?

(2) Answer. Just my linkup with [redacted] I saw [redacted] carry a Marine. I saw [redacted] from 81s trying to assist with casualties and security at the inner gate. That's who I remember seeing.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. [redacted] Did you get treated post attack?

(2) Answer. I did not.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. [redacted] Any treatment since?

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. [redacted] Before you left [redacted] we understand you gave up your independent duty care officer, why is that?

(2) Answer. The battalion medical officer believed he was needed in [redacted] I pushed back a little, but the battalion took him and I didn't argue it beyond that. He had been collocated with us in [redacted] based on our medical situation. He was not attached to us and guaranteed to go forward with us. We all would have liked to have him go forward with us as he did an incredible job training our corpsmen. He trained them so well that I don't think his presence would have changed the outcome, though it certainly would have helped with the sheer amount of work we had caring for civilians every day. Our guys did a phenomenal job, our docs were incredible.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1 Marines

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How did you validate receipt of messages that you sent out to your leaders over the Signal group chat?

(2) Answer. It was a [REDACTED] leadership chat. The green gear I had didn't always work depending on where I was located. I would tell my guys to roger up on receipt, if they didn't, I would then have a face-to-face conversation. The Signal chat was just trying to get the information out as quickly as possible until I could talk to my guys. We had a separate chat we used for admin and logistics.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Have you spoken publicly about your experiences at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Only in my New York Times interview. I spoke with them, with the 1st MARDIV PAO [REDACTED] present for the conversation. I did not seek that out, Headquarters Marine Corps passed that request to 1st MarDiv, specifically asking for me and [REDACTED] to do that interview. I think because I made a Facebook post after the blast, which might have made me a person of interest. [REDACTED] was working with one of the internet groups like Pineapple Express trying to get people out and I think their personnel mentioned them to the journalist.

Additionally, [REDACTED] reached out to me in March of 2022 that ProPublica was going to come out with an article accusing us of shooting the crowd. I was in Japan at the time. They sent him a list of questions allowing for me to respond via email. I responded to those questions and I believe it changed their opinion some as I was able to prove how much training we had conducted and how ready we were for contingency operations.

I have spoken to the Expeditionary Warfare School twice and a couple of units that have asked me to speak to them about combat leadership.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How often do you consume social media or news about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Sometimes I will ignore it and sometimes I will review it frequently. If my guys give an interview I always watch that and usually follow up to tell them I think they did a good job.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How often do you speak to members of 2/1, post blast?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] 2/1 Marines

(2) Answer. I speak to a member of [redacted (b)(6)] at least each week, and a gold star family at least every month, if not more. That's not just about Abbey Gate, it will be about checking in or writing letters of recommendation or just staying up to date in general. It's just about staying in touch to make sure that guys are getting the support they need, especially administratively. Especially some guys who are still trying to get their awards.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)] Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. In terms of what occurred, we covered everything.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)], at

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)]

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I, _____, have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) Oct 26 2023, which begins on Question page 1 and ends on page 07. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231026

DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231026

DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

03 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) formerly of (b)(6) 1st
Battalion, 2nd Marines

1. On 03 November 2023 BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. BG Curtis will be denoted as C1 and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1 Why the Marines?

(2) Answer. Wanted to go to school. Stayed in for a total of five years. I left to pursue life choices. I wanted to move to cyber mostly. I submitted a packet to transfer to cyber; it was accepted but then an order came out that I couldn't laterally move over because I was not in long enough. The package was too late. Best route was to get out and go to school for cyber security.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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(1) Question. C1 What did you do?

(2) Answer. I was a radio operator (RO). In Afghanistan, I worked as a RO for [REDACTED] for the entire Surveillance and Target (STA) Platoon. I worked directly for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ON deployment, I was with [REDACTED] at the Abbey Gate

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1 Do you stay in contact?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. I said "hi" on the group chat a few months ago. Others I talk to all the time.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1 We really want to understand how information was being passed and what you remember of how information was being passed. How far away do you live?

(2) Answer. I live [REDACTED] away.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1 Have you been active on social media or watched any Podcast interviews?

(2) Answer. I don't want to unless I have to. It's not my spotlight. It's [REDACTED] story and my friends like [REDACTED] I've seen the podcast with [REDACTED] I've seen Gen McKenzie talk on TV. I've seen [REDACTED] on TV with congress. The President talking about what happened. I stay up to date on the news. I want to have respect for the family members and my friends. Only they should be on TV.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1 When did you first get notified to go to Afghanistan? Don't need exact dates.

(2) Answer. So, I can't give you an exact date. We were supposed to go to a training event in [REDACTED] There were rumors to be prepared go in case something happened. They canceled [REDACTED] and said it was happening. We had just did training in [REDACTED] Sniper related and infantry man related CQB house clearing in [REDACTED] Before or after that we had spent time in [REDACTED] doing medical training on expensive moving robotic bodies.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

(1) Question. BG Curtis introduces everyone around the table. Offers for support of concerns from [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. Yes. Sir.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1 What day did you potentially arrived in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. The day 2/1 weapons company arrived in Afghanistan.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1 What did that look like?

(2) Answer. We were staged in [REDACTED] We didn't have a definite answer about what to expect going into Kabul, but we went over scenarios like a black hawk down, people storming the airfield. We prepared for everything. How we were going to get off the plane. So, we were all taking it seriously. We were goin to be the security element to stage in an area that was unknown to use for operations. We were told that people were storming the airfield.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1 Did you do any particular training before entering country? Any training with [REDACTED] forces?

(2) Answer. We spent a month in [REDACTED] doing regular sniper platoon stuff. I did go to [REDACTED] area for whole month and worked with the [REDACTED] on the base in [REDACTED] and kind of just waited to leave. Infantry man and sniper related training.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1 What kind of stuff? Sniper specific. Ground surveillance?

(2) Answer. We trained at [REDACTED] special warfare area [REDACTED] how ever you spell that. We worked out at the gym and our HOGS in the platoon made shooting packages for the Golf Co Marines. We had some beers with the [REDACTED] on a training fun day. Watch [REDACTED] about knock out a [REDACTED] in Boxing. Great time for comradery with our peers. We were doing training behind the base in [REDACTED] doing sniper specific stuff. The earth was very impressive looking. It was cool, the way the earth looks over there. Especially the weather is so nice compared to [REDACTED]

m. Question and Answer 12.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you do any Rules of Engagement (ROE) training? Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Anything we were briefed for ROEs was focused on paying attention to leaders. We were told many times at random times. If someone points a gun at you, that is a reason to kill somebody. The training was more like talking, I don't remember who I can say said that. The only time the ROE's changed dramatically was the night after the bombing. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) "WPNS CO Commanding Officer" told us that we had permission to shoot anybody looking over the cement into the area where we had Marines sleeping at nighttime.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You had briefings about the ROE and then was informed by unit leaders and also other marines?

(2) Answer. We didn't know the ROEs until were in Afghanistan. We were told things prior, examples that happened with people's prior experiences. Our Captain of the Company explained to us examples what exact thing could happened to you, then do this.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1 What about platoon leadership?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told us and he told (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) which reiterated us with the ROE's.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1 What does it look like when you land?

(2) Answer. We load off the plane onto the airstrip. There was smoke and gunfire around the city. We took our packs to our staging area; we received orders to go to different places where we were needed. Our team went to somewhere around the airport where the tower was at? The main tower for air traffic control. We were trying to get SATCOM up. I was told to put SATCOM on top of our building. We were trying to figure out why things were not working, and we didn't find until later that we had some type of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) going on that interfered with our SATCOM and phones. Something about Russians also possibly being heavily investigated in the Area.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1 Did you go to other gates besides the Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. We were primarily at Abbey Gate. Both at [REDACTED] location. We went somewhere where they had planes and met up with [REDACTED] 2/1 Sniper Team Leader. We coordinated working with each other after we met with ECHO because [REDACTED] was already acting like they were separate from our Platoon. Which is not a bad thing, but something I remembered. Typically, it's expected that they always come to me in some form of away because of my Comm skills. As soon as I had seen [REDACTED] in the COC; he was bitching about a 152 from Echo not working. I told him they gave him a broken one to stop wasting his time and move on with something else and so he did. That was around where the airplanes were at. [REDACTED] points to the overhead image of HKIA to orient)). Based off of this picture, I wouldn't be able to tell you but I just know it was near planes. ((BG Curtis briefs lexicon from overhead image of HKIA and overview of Abbey Gate and canal inner gate)). It's nothing but a long space where you could have people. I remember that, I was there too. Yes, sir that helps. I was primarily with [REDACTED] closest to the airfield. I remember. Have you seen the picture? ((BG Curtis explains non attributions for picture))

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1 Have you seen the blast video?

(2) Answer. I have seen the video in person on a Marines phone before it came out on the news. The dude you can barely see explode. There is video of the people messed up in canal probably recorded by an Afghan citizen. I have also seen a video of the drone footage aftermath. I know who had it. I think those pictures you guys might already have. When we took pictures from the platoon, we would put it on a disc and turn it into the S2, they would look at it and brief us on what was on it; [REDACTED] was the S2 officer guy. At the end of the deployment, I was trying to get all the SD cards from all the cameras. The only cards I could not get were the ones that came from [REDACTED] I asked all the time and never got them. Someone that could verify that CPI at the time [REDACTED] and possibly [REDACTED] V 21 Snipers. Generally, of the team, [REDACTED] probably gave their SD Card to [REDACTED] We did not get pictures from them while we were in Afghanistan. I did my own investigation. I wanted know for myself. Because I didn't see any of them. If you asked them what happened to the pictures, I would never see them. I don't recall at any time after deployment getting any of the SD cards from [REDACTED] I could be wrong, but I'm 95 percent sure it didn't happen. Something to note was the time when [REDACTED] ordered us to compile the photos on a CD for a report. The time from when that happened was probably at the begging of DEC. All that time [REDACTED] could have had the photos and did something with them. The Photos I have are about all of [REDACTED] Only after looking at them over again did I possibly see a instant where they could of possibly had a few of them on the compilation. I cannot say for sure though because all of them for the most part are [REDACTED] and I was denied access by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] which is a red flag.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1 Who were you asking?

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(2) Answer. [REDACTED] primarily and any of the [REDACTED] teams guys that are not [REDACTED]

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1 One of your jobs was to consolidate the SD cards?

(2) Answer. They were used for training for future events and what [REDACTED] wanted them for. For example, a training event using the [REDACTED]. The critical aspect of this job is to teach new individuals how to do [REDACTED] related stuff. A lot of training material uses old pictures.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1 You collected the SD cards? Who else were you getting the cards from?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] and the other Teams not in HKIA, and what I was concerned about the pictures from HKIA but I don't recall anything getting anything from [REDACTED]

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1 What was the process when the SD cards were turned in?

(2) Answer. So, we along with our [REDACTED] computers, we have an SD card adapter. I would have the adapter and the SD card, using the [REDACTED] we would convert it onto a disk and then turn the disk into our S2. The SD cards were never turned in to anyone specifically. They should 100 percent still be in the [REDACTED] cases.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1 You were the intermediary process? Physically who did you give the SD Cards to?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] would facilitate giving the information. At the end of the day, [REDACTED] always kept us well informed all the time. He was the best officer and would tell us everything. He would look for specific things in the photos to turn into the S-2 at the end of every day. He was there when we were training on the [REDACTED] and also trained on the equipment. Sometimes he would say, [REDACTED] "I feel like I'm a Comms officer all the time now. I'm like you, I know how to do this now. I feel more like a Comms officer."

x. Question and Answer 23.

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(1) Question. C1 What I would like to see is do you have pictures of individuals.

(2) Answer. I have pictures from [REDACTED] but if you look over the pictures maybe you can find something.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1 Do you think you have them?

(2) Answer. I may have. Is there a way to get that to you. An SSD card would be better.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1 On the team's Cannon camera sometimes, they would take a picture of the picture on the camera. Did you see those pictures?

(2) Answer. No but someone could do that.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1 Do you know who may have the [REDACTED] pictures?

(2) Answer. The best place to start would be [REDACTED] team leaders, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] because those guys were the primary guys. If there was something they would know but I don't think there is. The other guys are [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Probe them for questions. They were there too. They would know if there was a story.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1 Why did you want to know?

(2) Answer. Those were my friends. I was with [REDACTED] before. I just wanted to know. I did my boot cycle with as a Golf Co Marine. They all knew me 100%.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any theories on why you didn't get the SD cards from [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. I don't know. I can speculate on a reason. If somebody had bad intent with a picture of a person, they took. Otherwise, I don't know why they wouldn't show it TV already. So, there is probably nothing. If they took pictures of like dead bodies or something, like Marines are notorious for doing stupid things like that. I can see that being something a Marine would do. I know there is a video of a bomb happening and

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the aftermath of the explosion. They were all messed up. It's very possible that those pictures were lost by [REDACTED] at Abby Gate, But that is highly unlikely [REDACTED] 100 percent unlikely [REDACTED] He was such a carrier hard charger. [REDACTED] could verify this.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1 How often are you in the tower with [REDACTED]

(2) Answer. 14-16 hours, I was always with [REDACTED] Sniper Section [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I was 100 percent with them all the time unless we went back to get to sleep and prepare for the next shift while I was getting batteries and updates from the Six.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1 Where is [REDACTED] now?

(2) Answer. I think he is in [REDACTED] He was the one that was writing down the description of the bomber as I was talking. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A lot of time when I was giving updates, I would get information from the CoC and then disseminate info to Marines. I was the main one, if not the person.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1 What are you doing school? What is your degree?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] I wanted to do something important after all I almost stayed another five years in the Marine Corps. I would love to do something with the government like [REDACTED] that's my dream. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember any threat streams?

(2) Answer. 100%. S2 first of all, primarily we know that we are in a place that's bad, S2 gave us updates every day. Be on the lookout for guys wearing red. The Taliban was getting pissed off and they would start wearing red. When someone got pissed off again, S2 informed us to lookout for guys with small arms. Then we started getting hard core death threats from ISIS coming up to the day of the bombing.

We were in the tower with Azerbaijani and Turks. They were looking for [REDACTED] who knows some Arabic. They were telling him (I don't know who translated), they were looking for a white truck and it was parked and that was strange. The vehicle was parked ((BG Curtis explains, 90 meters from [REDACTED] tower was a foot bridge, and the

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structure across the canal was referred to the "crack house")) It was coming from [REDACTED] point of view. It drove by and the Turkish guy spotted it. WE had the bomber description of suicide bomber on the motorcycle. This was given by Cpl possibly [REDACTED] S-6 Marine at the COC S-6, The VPID was briefed probably by [REDACTED] S-6. The Suicide bomber being walked by the old man "Bomber was clean shaved with a brown man dress and had a black bag with him." That was [REDACTED] from what I remember. He was in the S-6 and he is a data Marine probably last time I check in [REDACTED]. When I got this information, I passed out to every company out and they rogered-up they got the information. Everyone 100 percent received this vital important information. We had a couple of times where we hid from possible IED explosions.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1 What did they tell you?

(2) Answer. In Arabic, he was saying that it was odd to see that because it was the words written on the vehicle did not use the local dialect of someone local from here. It could be possible ISIS; not from here. We profiled it but nothing ever came of it. I saw something on TV about it.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember the description?

(2) Answer. It was a small white truck being driven around possibly a Toyota.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1 Did you have a description of the bomber?

(2) Answer. Yes. We had a description. Clean shaven, with brown garb, holding a black bag, escorted by an old man.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1 Who did you get that info from?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] from the 2/1 CoC. He's our data Marine. If I'm correct he is still in the Marines. He gave us that information. Called it over he radio. This happened a couple times. The first day it started with the dude on the motorcycle, then he was walking. Maybe that all happened on one day, but I remember it could've been over three days. We would take 5 min or 10 min holding. They would say "Hey guys hunker down." Something is about to happen. If we are in the tower, we would close the windows. Got that information from [REDACTED] COC S-6 and [REDACTED] from what I remember was signal. I remember something about the [REDACTED] could have floated early from them.

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II. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember any threats that key in on any individuals?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Ther was a Nike bag going around. Someone was wearing a Nike bag and passing it around. Something that I saw, is that they noticed that we were profiling them, they were watch us looking at them and then drop it off and walk away, then someone else would come and pick it up. We would write it down, then pass it up to the CoC. Then they would facilitate by, I think, having the Army or the MEU send someone out to investigate. They definite did that for the truck.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1 To described what you just said, you would pass suspicious activity to the S2 at the CoC, then you observed when other personnel, maybe EOD, would follow up on what was happening?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. If I reported something it went to the CoC. 100% because I was the person reporting to the CoC. EOD went out the wire to look at a possible threat. They found nothing.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember on the 26th, reporting suspicious activity?

(2) Answer. They asked for permission to shoot somebody. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were talking to the radio. From what I can see over the situation, they asked to shoot somebody and was denied. It was just speculation of what they thought of the individual and asked to shoot. As far as the direct target of a person, that was the only time they were asked to shoot someone. The other time they asked before was people getting shot and killed and burned. I defiantly remember [REDACTED] on the Radio talking about someone getting stabbed. They said you can't do that ((shoot someone)) because it wasn't in the ROE and the Taliban was going to do what they were gonna do. You could see more atrocity's at [REDACTED] area then [REDACTED]

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1 Were there situations where you could identify an American was involved. If an American was being attacked by the Taliban

(2) Answer. They were trying to say that like guarding people that were out there. If it were a service member out there, then it would be different. It's hard to say if there was an American out there. Because so many people were saying that they were American and some were lying. Some people would speak super good English language. Something that came up were international people from different.

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country. If it was an American that knew English, we would tell them what they needed to do. If it was English from another country, we couldn't help them, are they were wasting our time. It was very hard to distinguish Americans or people of interest after the first days of people coming up random code words or signs and signals. Once the Taliban caught on. A lot of people would show up to the tower area saying they new so and so or had a signal that was supposed to mean something. After you see that 100 different times you know people are faking stuff. People would also say they got robbed at a Taliban Check point.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1 Did the snipers ask permission to shoot any suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. They asked permission to shoot the guy with the clean-shaven face and brown man dress. And the person shooting and stabbing people out in the city and around areas where the dead were getting stacked.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1 If you looked in the crowd, are there multiple people that would fit that description?

(2) Answer. For these specifics you could defiantly pinpoint people out who could fit the description. ON a day with like the last couple of days where the was an extreme amount of people it would be extremely hard. "Extremely".

They asked for permission to shoot. That call came to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on them talking to the S-6 over the radio. We were all in the tower and heard the request got out on the 152-out load. I remember them getting denied and being upset about it. At some point in time in that tower I remember talk of the BLTC going over to (b)(6) position. No official recording. The (b)(6) went down there, there was some talk that he was going over there. I don't remember who. I just remember them getting denied.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember them telling you why it was denied?

(2) Answer. No. they were just pissed off they got denied

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1 Was it on the day?

(2) Answer. We were talking about it, these guys are calling in shots this is the second time. I think it was. But it for sure did happen.

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tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1 Do remember them saying we can see wires or explosives?

(2) Answer. Nothing like that. There was definitely a suicide bomber threat, particularly a SVEST with that description.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1 Did they tell you the bomber had a black bag also?

(2) Answer. Yes

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1 How did [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] get involved?

(2) Answer. They called it up to the CoC. And I remember [REDACTED] to the COC with inner Comm via the situation.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1 ((BG Curtis describes for clarification)) The threat came from the data Marine, you [REDACTED] was the guy in [REDACTED] receiving the threat and you remember it says an older gentleman, a younger man and clean shave, and then what?

(2) Answer. When I received any important information, I passed it over the radio "ALL UNITES be advised and Roger up for conformation. says description. Then I told them all to "Roger Up" on confirmation that you received that description. They all confirmed. How could you not tell somebody that? Information relayed was of the bomber on bike, being walked by an old man with description of bomber and the VBID.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have a book where you took notes?

(2) Answer. I looked for it. It may be in a storage unit I have 5 hours from here. I'll see if I can get. If I do have it, I definitely have it in storage. However, the since the information was passed, then it could've gotten thrown out.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any picture of the individual?

(2) Answer. No. not my knowledge.

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zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1 Did anyone share the photos with you?

(2) Answer. Just from what I remember [REDACTED] and the other team from IRAQ for the compilation. I was chasing down [REDACTED] stuff for a bit then I made the best choice to let him do his thing with it the right way because I was thinking he would do the right thing, but I have my suspicions [REDACTED] could defiantly verify that.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1 Some people got frustrated with [REDACTED] saying that they were going rogue. Would you agree with that?

(2) Answer. Yeah. 100% you could ask any individual in the platoon about the character, and that's how it was. As far as the attitude on how they wanted to operate. That's why when they didn't want to give me the photos, I began to suspect the worst. But [REDACTED] has always had great communication skills in situation with his people. No matter what.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1 Did [REDACTED] get along with [REDACTED] ?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] tried out for MARSOC and didn't get selected. He was supposed to go, and everyone thought he was going to make it. [REDACTED] took over his position, so now you have two peers working together and their attitudes were like they hated each other. [REDACTED] overly did things, he was a better person to work with. We had a SSgt that we considered like the logistical person. [REDACTED] was always considered out [REDACTED]

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1 Did you hear the conversation between the snipers and the [REDACTED]

(2) Answer I did not capture the conversation with [REDACTED] The denial came over the radio 100 percent over the 152. Some time in that tower I remember chatter about the [REDACTED] going to [REDACTED] spot and them being upset about not getting to shoot. This prob happened I want to say noonish. From what I remember of the 2 times they asked to shoot There was a time that I was holding the [REDACTED] vehicle downstairs for him almost fighting state department workers because they were going to jack it. But I'm 95 percent sure that I wasn't holding the vehicle on the bombing day.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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(1) Question. C1 Is it possible that the denial came over the radio and not face to face?

(2) Answer. I remember the facilitation and that they were talking about it over the radio, the 152. I think its possible that it did happen not face to face but I don't know I wasn't in the (b)(6) tower.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1 What is the method for shooting someone that fits description but doesn't display Hostile Act/Hostile Intent (BG Curtis clarifies with an example of someone not doing anything vs someone pointing a weapon))?

(2) Answer. My idea of the best applied Methodology was using Sectary former Commandant General Mattis mindset about putting his Marines first and protecting American service members first. As a priority. Better to be offensive. I read an article about this somewhere and took this for my interpretation.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1 Do you understand Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Trying to say is it reasonable to shoot. From my point of view, I would've taken the shot. If that did happen maybe it'll turn into a fire fight and comes out on world news, seeing us killing somebody and the Taliban gets pissed. More of us could have died.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1 Do you think there would be a firefight with Taliban and Marines?

(2) Answer. For sure. Based off the death threats and seeing the people. They were digging fighting position and digging out shooting holes for people to shoot from. You could see them behind manmade barriers. I was like telling (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) that that wasn't there the day before ((referring to Taliban shooting positions)) This is popping up progressively over the day. I don't want to die. The tower was at a bad place to be at.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1 Were the towers protected?

(2) Answer. Based on the architecture of the city, you were easily a walking duck.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

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(1) Question. C1 What about the blast itself?

(2) Answer. We were looking for cases to help us move the comm gear back to the planes. We started our normal shift the day of the bomb and by the time we were going to break down we started walking to [REDACTED] position to replace them for a longer 16-hour shift day. At some point during that time [REDACTED] decided not we had to stop and go back to the staging area to start packing to leave. After dropping our gear off we decided to go look for cases to put our comm gear and help us carry it out. We got on the car that we had hotwired to find boxes to put the radio gear in. The area with the broken-down Apache's and little birds and dogs left in the hangers. That's when we got the message from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and hauled ass to back to Abby gate.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1 Did you hear the explosion?

(2) Answer. No

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. C1 Where did you go? What did you see?

(2) Answer. As soon as I get there, I see from what I remember was Page and Sowiaks brain matter in his Kevlar with blood everywhere. The back door swings open and everyone is posting security and yelling at each other. I get off and see Page getting loaded to the vehicle that we were in. They're yelling at people "don't look" because people were going into shock from seeing their friends hit. We went up to the tower and replaced the guys that were there for the remainder of the time. You could see the aftermath of everyone in the canal. Around nighttime people got shaky. Two o'clock in the morning an alarm comes in saying "GROUND ATTACK IMMINENT". That was around 2am, the sun was down. Someone the radio said they had gotten shot at behind concrete or glass.

We were constantly watching in the tower. When that happened [REDACTED] was holding his morphine and bawling his eyes out because he watched his friend die and was stressed out. People were stressed out. I couldn't sleep, I didn't feel entirely safe per the situation. Anybody could have thrown a grenade over the wall and killed everyone. I don't trust nobody. It would be easy to throw a grenade and kill everyone that was sleeping on the floor of the outside the tower. [REDACTED] of weapons company was saying that "if anyone pokes their head over that wall, shoot them".

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. C1 You weren't able to help with the CASEVAC?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1

(2) Answer. As soon as we got to the gate, they used our vehicle to load casualties and then we took over the tower. At that point we were aware of the level of people injured and as far as being more alert, it was like 100% on another scale. As time is going by, at around two o'clock in the morning people were looking for people trying to sneak past the tree line.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. C1 How long were you there after the bombing?

(2) Answer. We left the 28th of August.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1 [redacted] ?

(2) Answer. [redacted] Doesn't the S2, I don't know how they disseminated the SD cards. I can look over my stuff from when I was asking for the SD Cards. Let's say I did, they had time to have those cards and do something with them. The best thing is to go to the individuals and ask. Maybe if you go to where the equipment is at [redacted] could know something. Yes.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1 Can you describe the threat stream timeline: to the extent you remember times that [redacted] gave you this initial report?

(2) Answer. The sun was up, not early in the morning when the sun was down.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. [redacted] How soon did the information get disseminated after the reports of a suspicious person?

(2) Answer. Disseminate immediately. The reports of a suicide bomber were over several days not over one day. I would say a span of three days. From my understanding, that it came from the [redacted] They were saying it was coming from the [redacted] The S2 was doing some facilitating and updates with them. No person came to talk to us. It was more of them talking and receiving updates from the S2. The S2 was saying, that they mentioned the [redacted] That there was a [redacted] Immediately disseminate information, but it came over a period of 2-3 days before the blast, everything that came to me from the CoC.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 2/1
(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(1) Question. (b)(6) How many times did you pass a BOLO report?

(2) Answer. It was only said once, but it was remembered. The first time it was the dude on the motor turned into him being walked with someone another day later. First the BOLOs were focused on the truck.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1 What about the request from [redacted] (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. They asked for permission to shoot, they told him no. This was definitely like 5-6 hours before the bombing, about noon from what I remember, or it could have been the other time he asked to shoot.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember the time from the request being made to when it was denied?

(2) Answer. It was about 15 min. The time of the request and the whole scenario. That was sent up immediately, the denial was 10-15 minutes. They had questions of why. Then there was discussion about them calling shots. The first time it was about a kid getting burned and then a woman getting hacked with a pipe people getting shot and stabbed. This happened from [redacted] (b)(6) all the time you could see people getting hit with the pipe.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1 Did you witness or only heard chatter about [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) going to tower?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. Not a long time frame. I want to say once we talked about possible chatter of him going over and why they were so pissed off. One thing I remember that was important: there were Marine officers that were blaming each other for something that happened at the gate "this is your fault". This was coming from someone talking about it because we were asking questions about what happened.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. C1 Was that possibly a disagreement with the Company Commanders or the Platoon Commanders?

(2) Answer. I have no idea.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2/1

(1) Question. C1 Did you have any interactions with [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. Who? What do you mean [REDACTED]? Information that we received would automatically get sent to CoC or compiled and given to the CoC.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1 How would you share information at the tower?

(2) Answer. It would be written. Let's ask [REDACTED] I remember receiving it and talking it and people wrote it down. I would write it down.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1 What was your direct interaction with [REDACTED]?

(2) Answer. People were trying to sneak people in. [REDACTED] I don't know about that. I didn't know who they were. I knew megaphones were happening but that they were our guys.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1 Primary comms were 152s: Did you use signal chat?

(2) Answer. I facilitated comms through a 117 Golf VHF. Primary communications were VHF on the golf and 152, and signal. The golf was good enough to echelon the rest of the communications down to all the ground USMCF elements and any other localized foreign elements added.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1 Do you still use the signal chat?

(2) Answer. Yes. I never deleted anything.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. C1 Maybe a BOLO threat stream or a message pushed out of a description over signal?

(2) Answer. What I got, I pushed to the radio. Everyone that had a radio operator, they knew because I made them 'roger up'. [REDACTED] also received the BOLO I think from signal or how ever he did.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) requests to ask a question of BG Curtis.

(2) Answer. ((BG Curtis answers)) Gen Mackenzie did an interview on TV, he said no description came of anything. I sent (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) a message. I sent (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and my buddy (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Why did GEN Mackenzie say there was no description. Is that because we have people undercover?

BG Curtis: I did not see the interview. What I think he was referring to be a specific description of the bomber over the course the threat reporting, getting an exact set of clothes, height age, etc. When you start getting that level of detail and we never had that level of specificity. We had general decriptoins that were changing rapidly. ((BG Curtis explained an example of VBIED description changing)) It changed so much that we did not have a level of specifity.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. C1 How would you describe the primary task of the tower; overwatch or targeting?

(2) Answer. Overwatch. I know we were not there to cause problems. Our mission was to help people.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any other info or things to add?

(2) Answer. It's worth mentioning that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) lost their cameras on their decent back to Abby gate in order to leave, but they found their equipment at least so I've thought. This could be a reason for their picture issue, but I don't know. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) could verify that and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer



~~CUI~~
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231108, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 81. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231108
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) ✓

8 Nov 23
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

1. On 26 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) via Secure Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Present for the interview were (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and the person asking each question is noted at the beginning of each question indicated by the above abbreviations.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where'd you grow up?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you come in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What is your MOS?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you get to 2/1?

(2) Answer. July 2016.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That seems like a long time in one unit, is that normal?

(2) Answer. I reenlisted to be on the (b)(1) 1.4a, so yes, that is longer than normal in the same unit.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many deployments have you done?

(2) Answer. Three. I went to Okinawa, 31st MEU, then I reenlisted to be on the (b)(1) 1.4ah. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long have you been at your current job?

(2) Answer. I reported in April of 2022 then went to Instructor school and started in July of 2022 with my current billet.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) During the Deployment, you didn't go immediately into Afghanistan. Talk to me about that timeline?

(2) Answer. It was a little odd. We were the last (b)(1) 1.4a in CENTCOM, and we got split after about a month in (b)(1)1.4d. The GCE HQ was split between (b)(1)1.4d. I went to (b)(1)1.4d for a few weeks and the intent was to move me there permanently. When I returned to (b)(1)1.4d to get the remainder of my belongings, soon after we got the word that we would be going to Afghanistan, a few days later myself and the other personnel that would be going on the NEO that were at (b)(1)1.4d to then fly to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you in the line companies during that time or back and forth, or what was your assignment?

(2) Answer. No in the Ops section.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you actually know you were going?

(2) Answer. A few days before. It became a back and forth between who was going and who needed to be on ground. We got told where we were going. We left (b)(1)1.4d and that's when they decided who was actually going. Our C2 node got pushed up front along with one platoon from Echo Co. I was on an early flight and it would have been the 15th.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your job on ground?

(2) Answer. Nighttime watch chief, not hands on refugees or anything like that. I was in the CoC full time.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get RoE Training?

(2) Answer. If the question is asking if I received an ROE brief, then I do not recall receiving one for the operation. However if the question is asking if I have ever gotten training on what ROEs are, why we have them, etc., then the answer is yes.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your initial tasks?

(2) Answer. Establish and set up CoC. It was a really small office that became the CoC. We had to shove all the functional areas into what essentially amounted to a broom closet to control the operations. It was a small area but we worked with what we had.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who controlled the JOC ?

(2) Answer. To the best of my recollection TF 51/5 – that was the JOC.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What'd you do between arrival and set-up?

(2) Answer. We were plugging holes. We didn't have all our teams, and we had to wait for the arrival of our folks before we could really get started. We got tasked eventually to go down to Abbey Gate once our Marines arrived. Had to figure out which location we were actually responsible for, then had to get set up for refugees. It was changing a lot in the first few days, but then became about running the gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often were you at the gate?

(2) Answer. One or two times per day if I could but there were multi-day stints that I wasn't down there. I would make it there as often as possible but that wasn't my primary responsibility. Day to Day it was working in the COC and controlling operations. We would do a one hour turn over and we would work in rotation between the day and night. I was the night shift.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your tasks during shift?

(2) Answer. Mostly battle tracking and pushing and pulling information. We had a map on the wall with sticky notes and we really just battle tracked and reported. To the best of my recollection we reported directly to the MEU. I believe I reported to a Capt at the MEU. It was between that Capt and some MSgt in the JOC that I would always talk to.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did you make it to 51/5?

(2) Answer. Lots. It was approximately 15 steps between the locations. I would go over there to share and get info all the time.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Field reports from people at the gate, do you remember reports of Taliban violence?

(2) Answer. I don't know if they came over the radio, or whatever, but there were reports of the Taliban murdering civilians. The reports I recall of Taliban violence were about a lot of civilians below the Taliban screening area and they would be forced to

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

squat down or be beaten with what appeared to be a black hose or just outright shot for not complying. Again, I don't exactly remember how those reports came through. I know people talked about that.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your communication methods? How did you talk to the gates?

(2) Answer. Talking to ground units, it was 152 or 117 radio, but the chat rooms between units was best for sharing info and getting info from higher. Especially receiving reports, it was the chat rooms.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) These reports, what were you hearing?

(2) Answer. Just general reports about the situation down at the gate, numbers of refugees that had been screened and allowed in or turned away, requests for chow or water, things of that nature.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone ask if they could do anything about that?

(2) Answer. To the best of my recollection, it would have come through the meet ups between the unit leaders and the (b)(6) I believe they had asked what they were allowed to do. To the best of my recollection they were essentially told 'nothing' because it's outside our gate and we would end up starting a gunfight if we shot at them for killing civilians, and we couldn't confirm they were Americans. We were trying to avoid unneeded casualties by getting into it with Taliban.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Sounds like RoE conversation, would you say that's where that was coming from?

(2) Answer. Essentially it was. We understood we couldn't shoot them. When the refugees stormed the airport, we ended up going out there. We got them pushed back to the terminals. Then we were told that we'd see Taliban on the airfield with guns and not to engage them. We were told not to take decisive action and we were essentially partnering with the Taliban it felt like. It was hostile act/hostile intent from that point on because the Taliban were around us all the time.

y. Question and Answer 24.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see pictures from the gate about the violence or killing?

(2) Answer. No. Not that I recall.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You described "we were told not to take decisive action and partnering with Taliban" who told you that?

(2) Answer. At the time we received that information we were down by the main terminal, we had gotten the vast majority of the refugees that stormed the airfield back to the terminal and behind some c-wire. As we are trying to get the stragglers off the airfield we start hearing that we would be seeing individuals wearing local garb with AKs coming around, we were told they are the Taliban and that they are here to help us get the refugees off the airfield, and explicit instructions to not engage them. To the best of my recollection I don't remember who exactly told me this first, at the time units were kind of all over the place and intermingled with other units as we just tried to fill a hole somewhere and move the refugees back. But shortly after I had heard that about the Taliban it was being widely discussed by everyone there.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get any reports of an IED probe?

(2) Answer. What do you mean by that? I don't know what that would mean, and based on what was going on down at the gates, there was stuff everywhere, I do not specifically remember any reports about a rehearsal, or a dry run. I don't recall that at all.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Any reports of a bag being thrown over the wall?

(2) Answer. I vaguely remember something like that, but not specifically enough to talk about it.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Threats and Threat reporting? What'd that look like? Was it quality and detailed information?

(2) Answer. Reports came over SIGINT tac-chat but I don't remember what agencies provided that data. I remember in conversation with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he said the local towers were monitored and we could listen in on their conversations. I remember VBIED and SVEST being the common things to be on the lookout for, but I

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

remember them not being very specific. I remember them saying that Person Borne was more specific than VBIED. Those reports would come through a couple times per day. But I don't remember how detailed or specific they would have been.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Drill down into the report about the SVEST versus VBIED. Do you remember any specifics about those reports you can talk about?

(2) Answer. I don't recall specific info between the reporting of those types.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. When you got info from higher, how did you get info to the gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4a. We'd call down to leaders and make sure they had info to send stuff down.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Initially Signal was primary and then radios?

(2) Answer. Yes, the improvement of the radio networks came after the initial use of Signal. I didn't have access to a wifi puck to be able to connect to signal that I recall.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any interruptions of comms (b)(1)1.4g Who would you visit at gates?

(2) Answer. Like with all our comms, we lose comms often, but our S6 guys were great and would make sure to address it quickly. When I would go down to the gate, the original plan was to have a forward CoC so that we could work and pass info at the gate, but the environment wasn't conducive to that. There wasn't really space or a need for it at that point. Realistically it wasn't going to work, and since we had direct access to the XO's, CO's, and CO Guns, it wasn't much of a challenge to talk with them often.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Did the snipers send any reports?

(2) Answer. They worked in shifts. I don't remember any specific reports from them, but they came to the CoC at the end of every shift and debriefed in person about their Obslogs. I was usually pretty saturated when they would come in. I do remember a couple persons of interest. Specifically, I remember the 'pancake hat' guy. He kept showing up and it was over a couple of days. To the best of my recollection he was

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

interesting to them because he wasn't trying to get in. He was just there watching and I remember them calling him 'pancake hat'.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Why were they concerned about the guy in the hat?

(2) Answer. I don't know, but as far as I remember he wasn't trying to get in the gate and he looked suspicious and kept coming back. I think that was reported a few times.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where was he specifically in the gate complex?

(2) Answer. I don't know, but that's because he never tried to come through that I can recall. As far as I can remember he just kept showing up but didn't try to pass through our security.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you deal with the (b)(1)1.4a folks at all?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So any reports that came up, how would it get to you? Sketches? Pics?

(2) Answer. If the leaders were stuck down there at the gate, it would have to wait until the end of the shift. I believe they used cameras.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any pictures of phones or other cameras?

(2) Answer. I don't remember.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Pancake hat, who did that BOLO come through, and what was the description of BOLO versus the description of the individual coming from the gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember and I don't remember what assigned him as a person of interest other than 'pancake hat' and being reported for a few days.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did the units at the gate report their actions? Do you remember any escalation or requests to escalate use of force?

(2) Answer. I don't recall that. I don't recall that ever being asked. I was night shift and it may have come through at other times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As we get closer to 26 August, what about threat stream changes?

(2) Answer. I believe the streams increased specific to it being a suicide bomber. I don't recall that any specifics. It shifted almost exclusively towards Person Borne, but don't remember specifics about description or things of that nature.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you pass those messages to the gate?

(2) Answer. Leaders would come through and have those conversations with the intel section. It was runners mostly. They would be in the CoC working on lots of things, and if I recall correctly that would also have been due to comms challenges but it allowed them a chance to touch bases with the (b)(6) or the (b)(6) as well.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other reports of suspicious people?

(2) Answer. I recall there being a couple of people that they'd been watching for a few days, nothing specific that I recall.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the reports coming through the snipers?

(2) Answer. Yeah, that would have come from them because that was their function being elevated and watching over the crowds. Their view was best in that area and they were there for that purpose.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything early on the 26th you remember from the snipers?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Nothing specific I remember.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any pictures coming back from the gates on the 26th? Pictures at all?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember using SD cards or those cards floating around the CoC?

(2) Answer. No.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything else specific on the 26th?

(2) Answer. That day was kind of different, myself along with the intel officer and the 2 alpha had planned to go to the gate. One of the Intel officers had a former terp they were trying to recover maybe later in the day. It was supposed to be sometime in the late morning and they were going to wake me up when they planned on leaving, but I didn't get woken up. I went to the CoC when I woke up and realized they hadn't gotten me up and they told me they decided not to go down. If I recall correctly the S2 said he had a bad feeling and we didn't go. I stayed in the CoC with the watch chief and just assisted as needed.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did the S2 explain the bad feeling?

(2) Answer. No I don't remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) saying why, but I believe he said he had a bad feeling about the gate.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember hearing anything specifically identifying PID?

(2) Answer. No Sir.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Night of the 26th or the day of the 27th, did you hear conversation about people saying 'I knew it was that guy' or other conversation about the bomber?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any of the other Marines saying that? (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or anyone else?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything you remember specifically about that day of the bombing and anything about it that was strange?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall, nothing out of the baseline as far as I remember.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember the (b)(6) coming to the CoC?

(2) Answer. Not on the 26th, I don't remember them coming back to the CoC on that day specifically. I know they were all down at the gates during the attack.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any discussion on the afternoon of the 26th about engagement requests or anything like that at the gates?

(2) Answer. Not that I recalled.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned earlier about sniper teams being tasked with intel. Can you explain that?

(2) Answer. Their job is surveillance, and they can see over the crowds. Because of that they can see over the crowd and observe everything down there, and report what they see back to the COC.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. SS: So you spoke with them over radio?

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(2) Answer. The CoC did unless the radios were failing which did happen. I remember multiple lulls between the comms not working. We had gaiters which would take runners to the gate and they would constantly run to the gates to try to fix comms.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Post Blast and you're preparing for exfil. Talk to me about exfil and property destruction?

(2) Answer. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) telling us the hard drives had to be destroyed and I believe the intel Marines destroyed those out back with a sledge hammer. I don't remember if we had any server stacks or anything we specifically needed to destroy or any of that. A lot of the infrastructure was already there when we started using those areas, and I don't know much about all that. I wasn't asked to bring anything back, and don't have anything like logs or any of those things.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you given any interviews about any of this?

(2) Answer. No.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Are you on Social media, and do you look at any of these things on Social Media?

(2) Answer. I try my best to avoid consuming things regarding the bombing on social media.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. There are still groups from Abbey gate that get together, do you go to any meetings with 2/1 people from Abbey?

(2) Answer. Not really with 2/1. I work with a Marine that was with 1/8 LAR there in Afghanistan and someone who was a part of the MAGTF and was placed as a FET team members. We rarely discuss what occurred, if we do its more so to check on each other.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. Do you have any logs or notebooks?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I only have a little rite-in-the-rain book that I had to write down 4 names after the blast. When I went to the medical facility I had to try to figure out people that were there and write down the names of those I found.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything at all in your mind that you think could have been given to the units to help warn them before the blast?

(2) Answer. I don't know. I think maybe the Sniper teams may or may not have been able to engage their targets, but it would have turned into a lose-lose situation on both sides and that would have created its own problems.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He worked in the CoC and we were around each other a lot. He was the operations NCO. He was day-shift with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

POC info: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 13. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement) 20231120
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) 20NOV23
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

17 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1, (b)(6)

1. On 17 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at 2/1 to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present and recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. To distinguish between interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were you doing in (b)(1)1.4d prior to deploying?

(2) Answer. We were doing squad and platoon attacks at (b)(1)1.4a and also standing 8-hour shifts on guard. Other platoons were doing rest and refit at the time.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever receive any NEO training?

(2) Answer. No sir.

d. Question and Answer 3.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2/1,

(b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did your training change as you found out you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. No change, just more and more info about Afghanistan and what was going on there.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any training on rules of engagement?

(2) Answer. Just shout, show, shove, shoot. The rules of engagement covered danger to self and others and the danger to government property.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You knew you had the right to use deadly force and defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What happens when you got to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. We landed, lowered our nods, got accountability, then moved to the gym we were staying in. We echeloned by squad to get our packs off the plane, got a bit of rest, then headed to the gate the next morning.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the airfield like when you landed?

(2) Answer. Dark, I didn't see much.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was that first day like?

(2) Answer. Our platoon got there, our machine gun squad brought their weapons and we put those with the gear because we had to go push the crowd back. That didn't work that well and the (b)(1)1.4d so we had to fall back until they eventually used a vehicle to get the gate shut. After that, there were a group of civilians that we got over to some concrete barriers. We searched them and gave them food and water and made sure they were okay from the CS gas. We checked their papers and guarded them for the rest of the day.