

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 161, (b)(5)

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Page 3 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 162,(b)(5)

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Rank	L Name	F Name	EDIPI
SSgt	Hoover	Darin	(b)(6)
Sgt	Gee	Nicole	
Sgt	RosarioPichardo	Johanny	
Cpl	Lopez	Hunter	
Cpl	Page	Daegan	
Cpl	Sanchez	Humberto	
LCpl	Espinoza	David	
LCpl	McCollum	Rylee	
LCpl	Merola	Dylan	
LCpl	Nikoui	Kareem	
LCpl	Schmitz	Jared	
HN	Soviak	Maxton	

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Exhibit 164 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ISIS-K suicide bomber who carried out deadly Kabul airport attack had been released from prison days earlier

By [Oren Liebermann](#) and [Natasha Bertrand](#), CNN

Updated 11:38 AM ET, Wed October 6, 2021

(CNN) — The [ISIS-K](#) suicide bomber who carried out a [terrorist attack](#) at Kabul international airport in late August, killing 13 US service members and dozens of Afghans, had been released from a prison near Kabul just days earlier when the Taliban took control of the area, according to three US officials.

Two US officials, as well as Rep. Ken Calvert, a California Republican who said he had been briefed by national security officials, said the suicide bomber was released from the Parwan prison at Bagram air base. The US controlled the base until it abandoned Bagram in early July. It had turned over the prison to Afghan authorities in 2013.



perimeter of the airport.



Related Article: Women in Kabul return to work, school and the streets, in defiance of the Taliban

The Parwan prison at Bagram, along with the Pul-e-Charkhi prison near Kabul, housed several hundred members of ISIS-K, as well as thousands of other prisoners when the Taliban took control of both facilities hours before taking over the capital with barely a shot fired in mid-August, a regional counter-terrorism source told CNN at the time. The Taliban emptied out both prisons, releasing their own members who had been imprisoned but also members of ISIS-K, which is the terror group's affiliate in Afghanistan.

Eleven days later, on August 26, it was one of those prisoners who carried out the suicide bombing at Abbey Gate, killing the 13 US service members, including 11 Marines, one soldier and one sailor. They would be the last US troops killed in Afghanistan as part of America's longest war.

As of Tuesday, one Marine injured in the attack remains in a serious but stable condition at Walter Reed Military Medical

Center near Washington, the Marine Corps said in a statement. Another Marine is receiving care at a specialty facility, while 16 others are receiving outpatient treatment.

Two US officials confirmed attacker's identity

ISIS-K took credit for the attack and named the suicide bomber as Abdul Rehman Al-Loghri. Two US officials confirmed the identity of the attacker. FirstPost, an English-language news site based in India, was [first to report](#) that he had been released from the Bagram prison.



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
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The rapid transition from released prisoner to suicide bomber highlights the dangers Afghanistan could pose without a US military presence on the ground to monitor the latest developments in the country. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley said the threat from Afghanistan is currently lower than it was after the 9/11 attack, but he warned that conditions "could be set" for a reconstitution of al Qaeda or ISIS-K.

"It's a real possibility in the not too distant future -- six, 12, 18, 24, 36 months that kind of timeframe -- for reconstitution of al Qaeda or ISIS," Milley said at Capitol Hill hearing last week, "and it's our job now, under different conditions, to protect the American citizens against attacks from Afghanistan."



Related Article: Five takeaways from senior military leaders' testimony on Afghanistan

Calvert, who serves as the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, represented one of those killed in the suicide attack, Marine Corps Lance Corporal Kareem Nikoui. In a statement released last month, Calvert said he was briefed by national security officials on the identity of the suicide bomber and his release from Bagram prison.

In the statement, Calvert said the "disastrous" handling of the withdrawal "led to a series of events that culminated with the tragic loss of life on August 26th outside of the Kabul airport. Thirteen Americans, including one of my constituents, were killed because of the poor judgement and execution of our troop withdrawal."

The Biden administration faced widespread criticism for its withdrawal from Bagram, not only because of the decision to abandon a sprawling military complex that was the heart of

the US military operations in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, but also for the way in which it was done.

Some Afghan officials said the US left the base in the middle of the night with little warning. The Pentagon insisted there had been communication and coordination about the handover of the base about 48 hours before the US left, but that the exact time of the final departure from Bagram was never given to the Afghan government.

Majority of Bagram prisoners were terrorists

The US handed Bagram Air Base over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) on July 1, as the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan neared 90% completion.

At the time, there were approximately 5,000 prisoners at Bagram, an Afghan Ministry of Defense spokesman told CNN. A few hundred were criminals, but the vast majority were terrorists, the spokesman said, including members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. There were also foreign prisoners from Pakistan, Chechnya, and the Middle East detained there. It was up to the Afghans to secure the compound.

As the US was turning over Bagram to the ANDSF, the Taliban accelerated their sweep across the country, claiming to control 150 of Afghanistan's 407 districts by July 5. It was a sign of things to come, as provincial capitals began falling to the Taliban offensive in rapid succession. By mid-August, the Taliban were on the doorstep of Kabul and the complete collapse of the Afghan military was virtually complete.



OHSSR/ATF/GETTY IMAGES

On August 15, the day former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani secretly fled the country, the Taliban reached the capital city, taking control of Bagram air base and the Pul-e-Charkhi prison facility.

In releasing the prisoners, the Taliban introduced another threat into an already chaotic environment, just as thousands



Related Article: 'Still waiting for what is to come for us': American University of Afghanistan students face fear and uncertainty

for an attack at the airport and a threat from ISIS-K, and the State Department repeatedly cautioned American citizens to stay from the airport or certain gates.

The Taliban also viewed ISIS-K as an enemy, despite releasing some of their number from the prisons at Bagram air base and Pul-e-Charkhi.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin acknowledged in Capitol Hill hearings last week that the Pentagon was surprised by the collapse of the Afghan military within 11 days. But in his

opening statements in the hearings, Austin defended the decision to leave Bagram.

"Retaining Bagram would have required putting as many as five thousand U.S. troops in harm's way, just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed little to the mission that we had been assigned, and that was to protect and defend our embassy which was some 30 miles away," he said. "Staying at Bagram -- even for counter- terrorism purposes -- meant staying at war in Afghanistan, something that the President made clear that he would not do."

CNN's Katie Bo Lillis and Tim Lister contributed to this report.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28310-5000

AFVC-CG

08 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: JTF-82 EXSUM Operation Allies Refuge

1. EXSUM for JTF-82 at Hamid Karzai Airport (HKIA), Afghanistan from 16 to 30 August, 2021.

2. Commander's EXSUM.

a. We are proud to be part of the CENTCOM, USFOR-A, JTF-CR, Interagency, and Coalition partners team that, over the course of twenty days, was able to retrograde approx. 9,500 US, Coalition, and over 124,000 evacuees and AMCITS. We did so in an extremely complex environment that challenged us and required us to accomplish a wide-range of interdependent tasks against multiple timelines. The team not only synchronized efforts across multiple USG and Coalition organizations, but also ensured and maintained Taliban compliance with an international spotlight on our efforts.

b. The summary that follows covers some of JTF-82's key events. We will publish a follow-on document that captures the complete detailed account of the events and efforts not covered in this summary.

c. The 82nd Airborne Division was alerted and started the process to deploy IRF1 on 12 1600Z AUG in support of USFOR-A and JTF-CR. Subsequently, our DTAC and support elements were alerted and deployed. Within 72 hours IRF1 arrived on the ground in HKIA and the 82nd Airborne Forces continued to flow in over the next several days. The team's main priority was to ensure USFOR-A could evacuate AMCITs, SIVs, Coalition members, and Afghan partners. Our initial key tasks were:

- Secure the airhead
- Support the NEO
- Plan to retrograde all personnel and equipment
- Plan and execute the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE)

d. To accomplish our mission, we quickly assessed the need to synchronize SOF, DoS, (b)(1)1.4c JTF-CR, and USFOR-A, and Coalition forces. With the approval of USFOR-A, we established a battle rhythm to drive this alignment.

e. Previous relationships also played a critical role in quickly aligning unity of effort. I served with the USFOR-A and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c commanders in various organizations over the

preceding years. Ambassador Bass and CdA Wilson also worked with myself and this group of commanders during their time at the embassy. Finally, I had existing relationships with the international SOF commanders from previous SOF assignments and my time as the NSOCC-A commander. These relationships served as a foundation of trust and enabled us to communicate, establish and maintain shared understanding, and work through the complexities of the mission.

f. From a security perspective, we assessed the Taliban were unable to control the population on HKIA which hampered AMCIT access to the gates. We were also concerned about miscalculation between Taliban and Coalition forces in an environment of an increasing ISIS-K threat. Based on this assessment, we met with Taliban to:

- Establish a position of tactical advantage over the Taliban to ensure mission success and force protection
- Establish conditions for AMCITs/SIVs/Coalition citizens/At-risk Afghans to get to the Taliban and through the gates
- Prevent miscalculation by the Taliban
- Build a bridge for future AMCIT/Coalition departures
- Address multiple threats and risk that included large crowds at HKIA and ISIS-K
- Share intel on emerging threats
- These efforts allowed us to continue the evacuation efforts up until the final hour of our departure and deescalate potential flashpoints during the operation.

g. Based on the scope and scale of the challenges we faced, USFOR-A decided to retain control of JTF-CR. Our biggest challenge was to balance our initial four key tasks with the critical tasks outlined below, while maintaining the right amount of capability and capacity on HKIA for security and to conduct a JTE by 31 August. We also had to be prepared to extend beyond 31 August or resume operations if required.

h. As the mission evolved, we managed the CUOPs fight, executed the retrograde, managed the A/DACG, opened three additional gates, prepared for and executed the JTE, and were prepared to resume offensive operations to retake the Kabul Bowl, while managing the below:

- Demilitarize all military and strategic equipment
- Conduct an operational clearance of all personnel and military equipment
- Build capacity at the gates (opened three gates) and airfield
- Establish a battle rhythm to align efforts across coalition, DoS, and DoD, which included AM/PM ambassador working groups, KLEs, US Military/Coalition/MNCC WG, and planning touch points/briefs for all parties
- Establish and maintain dominance over the Taliban and enforce their cooperation
- Reopen the international airfield for commercial traffic

- Mitigate several threats while maintaining capability and capacity to deal with any contingency
- Prepare for contingencies

i. Risk to mission remained high throughout the operation. As an example, each night we had approximately fifty Afghans breach the perimeter —each breach required our service members to assume the civilian had an SVEST, yet maintain restraint and avoid CIVCAS. We planned for multiple contingencies, to include downed aircraft scenarios, MASCAL, and possible hostage situations.

j. We assessed ISIS-K was attempting to conduct SVEST, VBIED, and indirect fire attacks all way up to and during our final departure. At 1741 on 26 August ISIS-K executed a suicide bomber attack on Abbey Gate, killing thirteen US service members, injuring twenty-two more, and causing more than 170 Afghan civilian casualties due. The response to the MASCAL was as close to as rehearsed as possible due to a number of rehearsals, based on current threat, prior to the attack. We remain grateful for the efforts of Norwegian medical professionals and Special Operations Surgical Team who provided care for the wounded.

k. We also assessed ISIS-K launched five rockets on the morning of 30AUG. 2x HKIA CRAMs successfully interdicted one of the rocket rounds which caused it to fail to detonate vicinity the Airhead line. EOD responded and rendered safe 2x warheads. ISIS-K also attempted to attack coalition forces and aircraft parked on HKIA the evening of 30 AUG just prior to the JTE. However, we assessed they were unsuccessful due to the actions and monitoring by the US and Taliban.

l. We wanted to build a bridge into the future and focused efforts to posture the international airport to continue evacuation post 31 AUG. In support of the State Department, we met with Taliban representatives to lay the groundwork for them to continue to allow AMCITS, coalition citizens, and SIV holders to depart Afghanistan. We ensured critical airport terminal and equipment was preserved, such as the firetruck and airplane stairs, and that the airfield was fully operational prior to the Qatari team arriving. We brought in a Qatari Airfield Inspection team to the civilian terminal and facilitated their inspection of the facility to ensure it was capable of continuing international flights once the military transitioned control of HKIA. Based on US efforts and those of the Qataris, the airport remains operational.

m. At end state, we were able to retrograde all equipment (minus a few pieces of inoperable military equipment and a HMMWV) by 28 AUG. This was largely in part due the US military/coalition working group efforts, which brought together fifteen US military units and over 18 nations to synchronized demilitarization, clearing, security transitions, end of mission timelines, and complete the retrograde of pax and equipment.

n. Final retrograde was 169 pieces of major US equipment, including vehicles, artillery, rotary wing aircraft, and mission command systems as well as 2xMD-530s.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

p. Clearance Operations ensured all personnel departed HKIA and no sensitive equipment was left behind. It was a 3 phased operation beginning on 20 AUG with final clearance on 30 AUG prior to JTE.

q. In the final 24 hours on HKIA, our priority remained keeping the gates open to ensure all AMCITS/SIVs could be evacuated. We prepared to and postured to receive any last minute AMCITs and escort them directly to HKIA up until our departure. The last main body departed HKIA at 1621D, leaving 807 personnel (803 JTF-82, 4 DOS) to execute the JTE.

r. The JTE was the result of a detailed joint planning effort and multiple rehearsals between then 82nd Airborne HQ, CENTCOM components, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. First, we repositioned the PRTF to (b)(1)1.4a to ensure full PR coverage. Next, we demilitarized the HKIA servers, which triggered the displacement of JTF-82 mission command TAC to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c compound to oversee the JTE. During the last two hours of the JTE, TF CRAM demilitarized the final two CRAMS. The JTE force then moved to the airhead line, maintained a reduced security posture, and loaded the five remaining C17s. The threat of RPG, machine gun fire, and IDF increased leading up to the JTE. The last US Soldier stepped aboard the last C17 and departed HKIA at 2359D on 30 AUG.

s. Throughout the operation, AMCIT/coalition recovery remained a priority for the task force at HKIA. During this operation, fifteen US military units and over eighteen nations came together as a team to successfully retrograde approximately 9,500 US coalition and over 124,000 evacuees and AMCITS from HKIA by AUG 31, 2021.

End of EXSUM



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(b)(6)



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


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
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Abuse Case

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(b) (3)130b; (b) (6)

Abbey

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Exhibit 195

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

1874

01/02/22

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Exhibit 203



(b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

21 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 224, SUBJECT: Interview with Psychological Operations Non-Commissioned Officers Group Interview and Sketch

1. On 19 October 2021, Army Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) from the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) group were gathered for an interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. At the conclusion of the interview, I had the NCOs diagram the location of Soldiers at the time of the attack and who was KIA.

2. Using paper and a pen, Exhibit 224 was collaboratively sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Both are members of the Army PSYOP group present at HKIA.

3. Each participant was instructed to only rely on their direct memory and not what they heard from others. They were also instructed to categorize the certainty of their memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the location of Soldiers and a service member who was KIA.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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Abbey Gate


ABBEY GATE 26 AUG 21
PSYOP Sketch 19 OCT 21

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(b)(1)1.4a



(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

- 5. Civilian Interpreter
- 6. SSG Knaus (KIA)

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SECRET//REL USA, FVEY



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

27 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Follow up interview with [REDACTED] Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 27 October 2021

1. On 27 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis contacted [REDACTED] via the Signal App to clarify the previous conversation captured in Exhibit 106 on 13 October 2021.
2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions to clarify [REDACTED] statement from 13 October 2021, specifically with regard to which direction warning shots were fired at Abbey Gate on 26 August. BG Curtis used the context from the prior statements to ask generic questions on an unclassified medium. [REDACTED] responded, using prior context. The conversation is captured below, with minor corrections for clarity.
3. Discussion.
 - a. Question and Answer 1.
 - (1) Question. Was the guy in the ball cap at the bridge, or closer to the sniper tower, and peeking over the inner corridor wall when [REDACTED] fired the four warning shots?
 - (2) Answer. We believe he was standing on the bridge, he was deep away from the blast sight when it detonated.
 - c. Question and Answer 2.
 - (1) Question. Was he peeking over the wall when warning shots were fired, and how far away was [REDACTED] from him when firing?
 - (2) Answer. Yes, his bust (shoulders to top of the ball cap) was clearly visible over the wall to us. We were approximately 30-40 meters from him.
 - d. Question and Answer 3.
 - (1) Question. Was he peeking into the inner corridor on the near side (the side of the canal with the sniper tower and closest to the Marines) of the canal?

SECRET//REL USA, FVEY

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Follow up Signal chat with [redacted] [redacted] 27
October 2021

(2) Answer. He was staring straight down towards the detonation site and the entrance of our interior corridor of the Abbey Gate.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Towards the Barron Hotel? And the bridge closer to the Barron?

(2) Answer. He was standing closer to the bridge, or on it. It was the foot bridge area close to the Barron Hotel.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted]

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

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Exhibit 238 (b)(1)1.4a

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Exhibit 239 (b)(1)1.4a

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Exhibit 240 (b)(1)1.4a

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