

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2/1,

(b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How were you taught RoE, was that a class?

(2) Answer. In (b)(1)1.4d we went over the rules of engagement every time we took post.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall any of what you were or weren't allowed to do by the RoE?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But you knew if your life was threatened you could take action?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Only the first night setting up the chevron because we were working with the Taliban, they were nearby just standing on cars and watching us.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you interact with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. No, I believe the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were the Taliban doing? Did they interact with the civilians?

(2) Answer. They were just standing there watching us. I didn't see them interact with the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did all Marines understand show, shout, shove, shoot? Did you ever have to do that?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir, and no, sir.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever get any descriptions of people to look for?

(2) Answer. More so baggage for a possible IED threat. I remember a red and black duffel bag, or some suitcase.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any personnel descriptions you can remember?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever a time after you opened the gate on the 19th until the 26th that you got threat reporting?

(2) Answer. We heard them, but I don't remember them specifically.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there a time that the volume of reporting increased?

(2) Answer. It stayed the same, we didn't get flooded with that information.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Around the 21st or 22nd, did you hear about or see an IED test run?

(2) Answer. No, I did not hear anything about a rehearsal. I know I saw other Marines set up overwatch and we hunkered down, but that's about all.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember of those first days at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. First night was setting up the chevron, the second day was holding security all the way down past the bridge. We weren't told to accept anybody, so we were just standing there watching. On the 21st, another Marine and I were sent to the (b)(1)1.4d Embassy to help escort some people through. It was a fire team and an officer; I don't remember who.

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cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see Department of State reps?

(2) Answer. I don't really remember.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The morning of the 26th Golf Company took over from Echo, had anything changed from the day prior?

(2) Answer. Not to my knowledge.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where were you in relation to the blast and tell me what happened?

(2) Answer. I was originally standing with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and they turned on the speakers on the vehicle. They were loud so we moved to the other side of the vehicle, so they weren't shouting in our ears. When the blast went off, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were standing there. I took a (b)(6) We went and took cover behind the sniper tower with 3rd platoon. I sat back there with 3rd platoon. I don't remember which SSgt told 3rd to stay put. The wounded and the rest of first started pushing people through.

That's when I got up to link up with the reset of my squad and platoon further down. I know they had cut a hole open in the fence to help transport the wounded and casualties, I don't know who cut it. When I got up there most of the squad was gone so I moved to the wall and started pulling security on the right side, pulling security facing the Barron. Once I was relieved, I linked up with my squad leader (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I found some more of my platoon mates; they picked up a stretcher and we headed to Abbey Gate proper to consolidate.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you receive medical attention?

(2) Answer. From an Army Medic at Abbey Gate proper. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) We moved to the gym after that, and a Navy Corpsman treated me there and cleaned it. Then I went to the hospital the next day.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact with the snipers?

(2) Answer. No, I just saw them every once and a while taking a break at the bottom of the tower.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How about the (b)(1)1.4a ?

(2) Answer. I never spoke to them.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At your level, what was the means of communicating threats?

(2) Answer. Squad leader would get word from the platoon sergeant, he would pass it to team leaders, they would come to us.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any recollection at all of those reports?

(2) Answer. If there was a possible IED threat, we would hunker behind barriers. That's all I really remember. We didn't do that too many times.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1, (b)(6)

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see anything that you saw was the Taliban watching, not interacting with the crowd?

(2) Answer. I did not see that, sir.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you usually find yourself in a static position or did you rotate positions?

(2) Answer. It was fluid. If our platoon was on, we would rotate through my positions. I know my team was by the cut out in the gate while some other squads were on the wall with the crowds.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question.

(2) Answer.

qq. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As a rifleman, anything you would do different or think about in terms of changing your posture?

(2) Answer. I can't think of anything that I would change.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you think could have been done to prevent the blast?

(2) Answer. Try to eliminate the crowd as much as possible. People were standing around even if they were rejected, just causing a fuss.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see a difference in the size of the crowd over several days?

(2) Answer. No, just a lot of people all the time. The day of the blast, they always say that civilians knew. I don't think the civilians knew, there was a lot of people. I remember Abbey Gate being the only gate open.

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tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Based on that being the only gate, did that change how you did things?

(2) Answer. Just the team leaders and up were allowed to check papers, everyone else had to focus on crowd control and the civilians.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). You were on security most of the time, what were you looking for?

(2) Answer. Individuals taking pictures, phone calls with frantic pointing, anything unusual. I saw a couple people taking pictures, and I would route that up through my team leader. The team leader would come over and get eyes on before running it up the rest of the way and I would tell him what he was doing.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was there ever a time that you heard about a suspicious individual that other people saw?

(2) Answer. I'd sometimes look over to see a squad passing something up and see if I could see what they were doing, mostly I would just focus on my area.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Do you think your training was sufficient to prepare you for what to do?

(2) Answer. No, because we didn't do much crowd control except for one embassy scenario we did where people were getting rowdy. That was the only training we had to prepare us for Abbey Gate.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What's the lesson learned, that if you had to deploy again, that you would teach your Marines?

(2) Answer. More TSA handling. Like at IAT, we would do vehicle checkpoints and have everyone get out and search the vehicle, the individuals, and their baggage. Proper procedures on how to have them search themselves if you don't want to touch them.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

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SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you track what's going with Abbey Gate on social media or from reporters?

(2) Answer. No, I am not following that at all. A reporter from my hometown contacted me right after, but I didn't really want to tell my story about that. Not everything I remember is accurate, there's an adrenaline rush.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you still talk to your buddies about it?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I talk about (b)(1)1.4a a lot. That was the highlight of our deployment work-up.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anyone we should talk to that would provide some information along the line of questions we asked you?

(2) Answer. No, not really sir.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202**

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 51. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231016
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16 OCT 2023
DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1, (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity with multiple interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be recorded as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To start, walk us through your unit and role at the time?

(2) Answer. At the time I was part of 1st platoon, 2nd or 3rd squad I believe, 3rd team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my squad leader and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my team leader. It was Golf Company and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my Commander and we had (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Platoon Commander was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you in the unit before you deployed?

(2) Answer. A little over a year

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

, 2/1,

(b)(6)

(1) Question. AD: What did your train up look like to deploy?

(2) Answer. A good deal of non-live fire training. The infantry immersion trainer. The ITX at 29 Palms and a variety of ranges at Camp Pendleton. Then we deployed to (b)(1)1.4a Did the machine gun package. We stood post for a while, then we to (b)(1)1.4a a training area in (b)(1)1.4a After that we went back to (b)(1)1.4a and did a couple ranges. Every now and then we would hear what was going on in Afghanistan. The possibility of our going there just went up and up as time went on.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did your training adapt as you found out you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. As far as I was aware it was pretty much the same.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you ever told that you were going to conduct a Non-Combatant Evacuation?

(2) Answer. Yes, we were.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What time did you get to HKIA?

(2) Answer. Nighttime, I don't know the specific time. We got off the plane and went across the landing strip. We went into the gym there and put our stuff down. We waited for a bit, and I think we slept for a while. By the time we went out it was daytime.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the environment like when you landed?

(2) Answer. Loud. There were the planes and I remember a bunch of people yelling. I know I heard shots, I don't know what kind of gun. We would see tracers in the air.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you do when you wake up the next morning?

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(2) Answer. We get transportation to Abbey Gate. We went all the way there; they were going to open it with one squad at a time. First squad went up to hold the crowd where they were, but it was thousands of people, so the rest of the squads went up from there. I remember I ended up far out, and I heard someone telling everyone to get back. I tried to and got stuck around the base of the tower. I got trampled there for like 5 minutes. I had been trying to get out, but some lady fell and then I fell, and I had like 30 people on me. A couple guys in my Platoon were trying to pull me out.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Describe the environment?

(2) Answer. There was a lot of c-wire. I don't know if this happened before or after we got there, but there was a lot of trash everywhere. The whole area outside the gate was full of people, like a loud concert.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any gunshots at the time?

(2) Answer. There was a guy, I don't know where he was from, letting off shots in the air. He may have been (b)(1)1.4d

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact with the (b)(1)1.4d or the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I never saw the Taliban. I interacted with the (b)(1)1.4d a couple times but nothing major.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got word you were going to Afghanistan, did you get briefed on Rules of Engagement?

(2) Answer. Yes, yes we did. A day or two before we got out there.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have the right to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, we did.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Any specifics on what you were taught?

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(b)(6)

(2) Answer. No specifics. But none of the people we saw out there were armed or intentionally hostile. It was just hysteria, so many people trying to get out. As individuals they weren't that bad.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you on the ground once we got to Abbey Gate? What was your squad's task at that time?

(2) Answer. Three or four days straight. I only somewhat remember; I went on pack watch after I got trampled. Before that we were trying to funnel people into a waiting area.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any information on how to process civilians?

(2) Answer. I am not entirely sure. We just tried to control the crowd as much as possible.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did information flow look like at your level?

(2) Answer. From what I remember it came from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to us. It was pretty fast.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You felt like you had situational awareness of what was going on?

(2) Answer. Yes.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you feel like the threat was at the time?

(2) Answer. Aside from the hordes of people, I didn't have a feel for what the threat could have been. All the shots sounded like they were miles away.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember getting any specific threat streams from your chain of command?

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(b)(6)

(2) Answer. On the 2nd or 3rd to last day we had a bomb threat. The last day we had two or three. I think those were person borne. The description of the guy himself was kind of weird, I don't remember if it was cleanly shaven or full beard, but I remember a computer case with some kind of marking on it.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you get that info, your squad leader?

(2) Answer. Yes.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What actions did you take when you got those bomb threats?

(2) Answer. On QRF, we basically just went inside the gate up against the wall. When we weren't on QRF, when we were against the canal, we got on a knee to avoid exposing ourselves as much as possible.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long would you be on a knee, there was an all-clear?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was. It was an hour, maybe.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many times did that happen?

(2) Answer. Taking a knee? Maybe once, at like 0400. On QRF it happened like twice inside the gate.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You had that be on the lookout (BOLO), did anyone fit that description?

(2) Answer. Everyone looked similar, a lot of beards, a lot of cleanly shaven, a lot of people cleaner than others. It was hard. You couldn't fit one individual, a lot of people in the crowd would fit a description.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your battle rhythm?

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(2) Answer. I think it was like 8- or 12-hour shifts, then a couple hours of QRF, then a couple hours of rest. I don't remember being on QRF for long.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did switching out with Echo Company look like?

(2) Answer. They or Fox would come through and replace us one at a time. We would meet by the CCP and move to the inner gate, then get a ride back to the gym. I don't remember how long we left for, maybe about a day.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Back to intel about that case, can you recall how specific that was or was it more general?

(2) Answer. I'd say the description of the individual was more general, but something about it seemed specific. I can't remember.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was your platoon leadership on the ground with you the whole time?

(2) Answer. Yes, they were. Aside from passing word, they were doing the same thing as us and looking for people to pull out of the crowd. I remember calling them over to verify credentials, they were the ones I would call.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever a time when the crowd got bigger?

(2) Answer. I don't know, I wouldn't say so. It felt the same.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did it feel like your leadership was concerned about Marine safety?

(2) Answer. I would say they were as worried as when we initially left. I felt they were only more worried when there was a threat.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Did the RoE ever change?

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(2) Answer. No.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did threat reporting ever change? Did it get more specific?

(2) Answer. As far as I am aware, no.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did your posture change as you got closer to the 26th?

(2) Answer. We somewhat collapsed the perimeter. We had more people, maybe 8 or 10, at the jersey barrier. The rest were spread along the canal wall.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were you doing on the morning of the 26th?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. I think we had an IED threat so we got on a knee.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember right before the blast happened?

(2) Answer. I was next to LCpl McCollum, watching the crowd near the wall. We were just told to stop bringing people in, something like that.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So, what did you see when the blast went off?

(2) Answer. My brain couldn't really process the people in front of me. There was a lot of dirt and dust in the air. I thought someone threw a flash bang near my head. I looked around and saw McCollum on the ground next to me.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

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(2) Answer. (b)(6)
 in the fence. (b)(6) The
 corpsmen were focused on people who were more severely injured, (b)(6)
 (b)(6) I was there for maybe five minutes, it felt longer at the time.
 (b)(6) We got a ride there with everyone else.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
 (b)(6) They were evacuating the people
 who were more severely injured.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(6) you redeployed with (b)(6)
 (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
 (b)(6)

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(6) How long did it take you to get from where the blast happened
 to the outside gate?

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(b)(6)

(2) Answer. A couple minutes, maybe less. I went through that first hole in the fence by the U-Shaped barrier.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you remember after the blast?

(2) Answer. I heard some shots, that's when I decided to move on. I tried leaving. Someone's CS cannister was punctured. I had to walk through that, which sucked. I walked through the first hole, then I got treated.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much social media have you seen on this event?

(2) Answer. A lot at first, but it died down after the first six months.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you stay in touch with other people who were wounded?

(2) Answer. Just (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) really, because he's in the same company.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever have contact with any of the snipers?

(2) Answer. No.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any reporter try to contact you? What did you see in terms of social media?

(2) Answer. No, and I don't really know.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything you want to add?

(2) Answer. Nothing that I have to add.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you think we should talk to?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Nobody that probably hasn't been interviewed already.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In the days prior to the explosion, did you see or hear anyone conducting an "IED rehearsal"?

(2) Answer. As far as I am aware no, just those two possible threats we had.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 53. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231016
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16 OCT 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of three interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (C1), [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: This is a supplemental review; this is not an investigation. We are interviewing those that we could not interview for the original investigation due to their medical condition at the time. We are also interviewing those identified that may have information regarding this event. What I need from you is any information you have that is relevant to this. Specifically, the picture that is referenced that was passed from the Snipers to the COC. You said this now resides with 1/4 Marines, please explain why 1/4 would have that.

(2) Answer. When we did a 31st MEU we didn't bring our own equipment. 1/4 was the BLT for the MEU originally. When we deployed we signed for their equipment that

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

was being used. When we flew out for this deployment, I gave all our SIPR assets to Victor 1/4 who now has custody of it.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) All of the infantry battalions that go on MEUs from Pendleton rotate equipment sets?

(2) Answer. Just the 31st. The West-Pac MEU has their own.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) The equipment with [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a where would it have gone?

(2) Answer. It would have flown back with them to Camp Pendleton

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) The equipment goes from HKIA to Pendleton with 2/1. Then where?

(2) Answer. We had it through our Pre-Deployment training program. When our unit came to [REDACTED] (b)(6) we began moving our equipment over to 1/4.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) This is just SIPR assets?

(2) Answer. It's everything. The entire unit's CMR is signed over to 1/4.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) All the SIPR, Intel, Scout Sniper assets (camera, SD Cards)...all of that was turned over to 1/4 when?

(2) Answer. We flew out here in May, so I think in April 23.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Backing up, prior to all that, when the battalion returned from [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a do you know if they uploaded any type of reporting or photos to Intelink, SharePoint, or any other database to establish a record.

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, Sir. My assumption is they would upload to MKG. MKG effectively is an intelligence SharePoint. It's where all products live and manage the life cycle with managing intelligence.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Can you access that to see if anything is on there.

(2) Answer. I can, but I don't have access to the 1st MARDIV site [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe is helping. My hope is someone put that picture in a daily intel brief that we could pull it from. We can also look into a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g where the sniper photos would be hung. My guess is that they took pictures, could have 100s, they pull the photos from the SD card out, rip everything off the SD card, possibly wipe the SD card, and put it back in the camera.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c is a server that comes with our intel suite that enables an intranet out in the field. 2/1 had two [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c at HKIA (8 SIPR Hard Drives total). I believe 4 were destroyed, and 4 went to 1/4.

They could have picked and chosen what pictures to load into Intelink or MKG, I'm not sure if they would have uploaded all the photos.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: So you're saying they would prioritize/upload photos that had a link to PID, ROE concerns, or a BOLO?

(2) Answer. Yes. I believe that's a reasonable explanation.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: So the 1/4 S2 should have the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c hard drives?

(2) Answer. They should have them unless they switched them out with the Network Battalion. They should have the SD Cards.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Is there any other piece of equipment or database the photos could have been saved onto?

(2) Answer. No sir. If it's on MKG or Intelink I can pull it. I would go to 1st MARDIV G2. They could access all that if it was loaded.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: If there is reporting done, do you still have any hard drives or classified log, or anything of the actual 26th Aug blast that would survive that would have any mention of this individual?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I don't sir unless they are on MKG.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. [redacted] Is there a physical log book

(2) Answer. There are log books from 2/1. I didn't bring any to [redacted] with me. We closed our vault before we left. There are some log books stored in the 1st MAR Regt vault that we pulled from our vault before we closed it. It's not a lot because we do an annual classified cleanout. [redacted] is the Assistant S2 at the regiment.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 16 October 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 4. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

16 Oct 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Signature of Supplemental Reviewer

20231016
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Curtis, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The interviewers asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity with multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be recorded as C1, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: How long have you been in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Timeline. When did you get indicators that you would deploy to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I was advon to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d I would say immediately we had an indication that we would possibly deploy to Afghanistan. Speaking to members of 3rd battalion, going to CUBs with [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a there were talks of us deploying to Afghanistan. I would say a month or two, once we turned over with 3/1, we were trying to train and prepare.

d. Question and Answer 3.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1; What was your job?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for 2/1, I was an [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time. I promoted last June.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Describe the predeployment training.

(2) Answer. It was pretty dynamic. It was a slow build-up after being in the 31st MEU in Okinawa. We leaned more into NEO. Knowing what I know now, it needs to be reevaluated how we trained for NEO. I don't think it can ever be perfectly done, but lessons learned need to be applied. Especially in a joint environment. Prior to that, we had no experience with the state department or other agencies that we don't work with as an infantry battalion. Specific training for NEO and working with other agencies, we had a little training on, but not the training that we needed.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Did you do any predeployment training in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d with fixed wing aircraft and other servicemembers simulating evacuees?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, it couldn't replicate the scale. I think the work that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) paid off in dividends once we got to HKIA. We worked to establish processes, what we were going to do, how medical was involved. Every unit that was attached to the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a was a part of that for month. Echo and Golf were training in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d, and Echo was our crisis response company. The FET team was in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d with us. We trained for months, and we established our CoC packed since we didn't know what equipment we would have available. We trained for processing SIV and civilians but had no plan for working with SoF. We didn't think State Department would be next to useless. We did all the training we could for months, and the airmen on [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d worked to mimic a crowd but a couple hundred can't replicate thousands of people.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: When did you realize this was really going to happen?

(2) Answer. Two or three days before we got there, and we got there on the 15th or 16th. We loaded everything on the airfield and starting moving units. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) started moving units to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d and getting ready. That's when I knew it was going to happen.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: What's the actual movement and deployment look like?

(2) Answer. Early in the morning, I was woken up by my Ops personnel around 0500. I saw the [REDACTED] (b)(6) going back and forth, we went to the CoC, and it became clear we were going. We were figuring out who was going. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) recommended that the command team needed to get on the ground, so we don't start flooding people on ground. I think that was a great decision.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: What does you going in look like?

(2) Answer. I think it was the night of the 15th. Myself, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and the majority of the S-3, and a platoon from Echo Company. So much was happening, we didn't understand what was going on. The pilots told us to go Condition One since there were breaches on the airfield and we may need to engage threats. I had never been to Kabul, so I didn't understand the structure. When we landed, we saw contractors leaving, multinational SOF, and other forces making a picket on the field. After that we had to fend for ourselves to find space to work in until our equipment got there.

Most of our equipment arrived with us, but we don't know where the contractors put it because they were rushing due to the threat at the time. I stayed to find our equipment, and once I did, I had my marines drag it to set up a CoC next to the JoC.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: How did you fit in terms of your higher headquarters?

(2) Answer. Initially, we thought the MAGTF staff would deploy with us, but then we heard it was the MEU staff. Then, when the MEU staff spoke to us, it was as peers, not subordinates. So, for a week I thought we worked directly for the JOC. Maybe mid-second week the MEU figured out that we work for them.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: What are your initial areas of operations? Just Abbey?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Fox Company only had a half of a company; the rest was stuck in Iraq. We had all of Echo, Golf, and Weapons Company.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: When did you assume control of Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I dont remember.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Prior to deployment, what were you doing to train on Rules of Engagement and how did you message that as leaders?

(2) Answer. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) would always stretch that prior to training, especially doing ECPs. Once we got to HKIA, one of the first things we did was bring incoming Marines to the CoC. At which point the Commanders, XOs, and Platoon Commanders would get briefed by [REDACTED] (b)(6) on the RoE to pass to their guys.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me about the Rules of Engagement? I have a picture of the Standing CENTCOM Rules of Engagement. Take a second to look at it and tell me if that is similar to your Rules of Engagement.

(2) Answer. It does sir, but I think it was a little diluted. I think the Marines understood hostile act, hostile intent. If there was a threat within the base, it was clear that they could engage. Where it got diluted was when Marines would observe the Taliban executing civilians outside the gate, could they engage. I never saw that, but multiple Marines have said they witnessed those executions, but they felt that they couldn't engage because the Taliban were a piece of the puzzle for base defense. If we engaged the Taliban, that cordon around the base would get comprised. It would have thrown everything down the drain.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: How do you mitigate that concern? All it would take is one individual not executing restraint, and all Service Members would have been at enhanced risk.

(2) Answer. I think it was the lesser evil, sir. I think the junior Marines did a phenomenal job, all Service Members and NATO forces did an incredible job with restraint. Engaging the Taliban would have started a shoot-out with innocent people around us. Engaging one would risk the entire operation, the innocent people around us, and introduce a new problem. It was a difficult problem set. I think the operation would have needed more personnel to come to Kabul to address the Taliban kinetic fight.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: So, you thought leaders at echelon were engaged to ensure the importance of restraint was communicated? You feel confident that Marines on the ground had the right to self-defense, and that it is important to identify hostile act hostile intent through the process?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. At the CoC.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: What did you deal with in the CoC?

(2) Answer. Everything, sir, I was the musician in there. I wanted to make sure the (b)(6) had a clear idea of what was going on, his assets, and any essential information. During that day, and that week, we knew there was a possible threat. The (b)(6) addressed it by messaging the staff and all commanders to pass the info to their Marines. He moved medical services, the shock trauma platoon, closer to the gate. They started talking about Marines getting behind cover.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: You're putting this out through OPS channels?

(2) Answer. It was put out that morning, the (b)(6) went down to the gate to oversee that it was happening.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: I am tracking over 60 threat streams, with some of those being imminent at which point service members would mitigate by taking cover, ceasing operations briefly, etc. Is that right?

(2) Answer. Thats exactly what is happening, sir.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: I know that North Gate closed due to the VBIED threat due to the traffic circle. East Gate was closed due to the difficulty of processing with its geography and the difficult of controlling the gate itself. Because of that, the Afghans message that Abbey Gate is the best chance on social media. They are trying to get around the Taliban, so they are finding alternate methods of ingress. This leads the crowd to surge on the 25th. Is that all accurate? Did the crowd grow rapidly in a short period of time? What does that look like?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We kept getting indications of a complex attack or ambush at Abbey Gate initiated by suicide vest, which we had heard for three or four

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

days. This started when the Taliban broke into a prison and realized a bunch of members, which is when the threat streams ramped up. That's when the [REDACTED] (b)(6) started emphasizing hard cover and being protective. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) is a hands-on guy, as is the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were critical of both of them being at Abbey Gate at the same time, because the [REDACTED] (b)(6) knew the gate would be flooded with the other gates flooded. The drones that morning just showed a flood of people.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. The constant that I heard was military-aged male, black clothing, black backpack. If you have ever tried to identify that at a concert, everyone matches that. You couldn't 1) identify that in a crowd 2) Also establish hostile act/ hostile intent. It was almost laughable to get that description because everyone there had that.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: It was easy to find multiple people matching that description?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I remember [REDACTED] (b)(6) decided to not let anyone in with a non-see through bag after the bag threats started.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Did you get a BOLO for a man with a closed shaved beard, shaved head, and tan 'manjams'. Do you remember that?

(2) Answer. No sir, but you just described 50% of the people that were out there. I would almost put the radio and say Roger when I got reports like that. It doesn't give you enough information to act in a sea of people that matches that description. You couldn't find, let alone engage someone that matches that.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: If someone said they saw that person, do you think that's person?

(2) Answer. I think that's possible, but it matched the description of a vast majority of personnel out there. A whole bunch could match that.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: There has been reporting that some snipers see the exact individual previously, or on the day of?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I did not see or hear of any reports from snipers saying that. I never heard any reports like that.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: If the Snipers had that, would you have known about that? Why?

(2) Answer. I would, sir. That would have been a CCIR, info that the [REDACTED] (b)(6) would have needed. Snipers act off intent, and the intent is to protect personnel. They need hostile act, hostile intent. If they saw that individual, id argue that they'd have no quarrels with engaging. but given their distance, and the surrounding, there would have been collateral damage.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Based on the RoE, you don't think matching the description is enough to engage based on the volume of people that match. you would also need Hostile act or Hostile Intent? Do you feel like any individual in 2/1 would be able to act, based on that criteria?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Even with the description with that suicide bomber. If i had been behind that sniper rifle and seen that, I would not have engaged because it is too common.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Are you sniper trained?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. In 2011-2013 I was a sniper team leader. I started as assistant team leader and helped plan operations. A few months later I got my own team. I went to school twice and did not complete. Then I deployed as a team leader. When I came back, I took over as the platoon sergeant for the sniper platoon.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Did the snipers ever ask [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or others for authority to engage a target?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: If you were a Marine on the ground, you've been trained on RoE, it seems to me that you'd have the authority to engage a target if they had positive ID and hostile intent, is that accurate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: Why would a sniper make a request to engage if they had PID and met the RoE?

(2) Answer. My guess is that it presents a dilemma. You can understand the RoE but you have to know the target and what lies beyond. If I shot, it would go through my targets and at least several others. Given the landscape and the situation, I personally would not have engaged without hostile act/intent or seeing a device that I thought indicated an SVEST.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: But engaging just because of a BOLO description would not be enough?

(2) Answer. No, sir, it's not.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: How often were you at the Sniper tower? What did you see?

(2) Answer. I was at the sniper tower a few times. A sea of people. I would ask (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) how he and his Marines were doing. He spoke to me about engagement criteria in regard to seeing some of the Taliban and what they were doing to civilians. I told him that if you had hostile act and hostile intent, no one would question you if you had those things as a threat to you or Service Members on the ground.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1: Did you know the sniper structure that was in place at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The times that I went there, the RTO was normally at the bottom of the steps. That would rotate. When I was there it was a black guy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was always in the tower; he was the team leader. Then his ATL would be up there and another Marine resting. It looked to me like they kept three in the tower, and three resting. That comprised the six members of the team. That was a few days before the blast.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: Who else do you remember on the sniper team?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I did not know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) until the incident. I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the platoon sergeant (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the mortarman. I didn't really talk to or know the other guys.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: Who was the RTO for the Sniper Team?

(2) Answer. From talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was told that it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but from when I went to the tower it seemed to be a rotation. The RTO was supposed to ensure clear communications from the tower and the CoC.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember reports from the Sniper Teams?

(2) Answer. I know that they would pass intel, and then some pictures. I remember some reports of a Taliban red team, who were supposed to be their bad guys. I would see the picture, but a lot of reporting was just on Taliban activity.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any pictures about a potential bomber?

(2) Answer. No, sir. They would have passed that info to me. Nothing that they sent back really stood out.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Would it make sense to you to pass pictures of a bomber to the (b)(1)1.4a team?

(2) Answer. No.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: Did the (b)(1) 1.4a understand the threat on ground?

(2) Answer. I remember the morning of the 26th, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) briefing the (b)(1) 1.4a and others, including the EOD Tech (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about the current threat streams we had heard about for the weak. They emphasized hard targeting. Nothing stood out, but I got a sense that whatever threat was coming down felt like it was getting closer. I think every person in the room understood we were trying to still help American citizens. BGen Sullivan said it that morning. I remember him saying "I acknowledge the threat, I understand the risk, but we need to get Americans

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out". I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) did the best they could, but you can only mitigate risk. You can't eradicate it.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: You feel that the leaders were taking steps to protect Marines and ensure their safety?

(2) Answer. I feel that the leaders did everything they could to protect the personnel on the ground and create a buffer in the event of the threat. A buffer would include dispersion in the search area, ensuring that medical personnel were at Abbey Gate proper in a covered position, ensuring that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g were in place, hearing over the radio that they would stop operations and get behind cover. Given the amount of personnel in the canal, us being the only gate open, I don't think you could do anything else other than close the gate completely.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: Why not close the gate?

(2) Answer. There were blue passports, which were American Citizens, being held in the air, and citizens from other countries that we could see that still needed to get out. I think it manifested one of the reasons we all joined the service, to be part of something greater. What greater calling to go to combat than to save Americans. You could close the gate and not save Americans or risk your life and save Americans. I know that's what I signed up for. That's why BGen Sullivan accepted that risk.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: There have been reports that some individuals thought the chain of command didn't look out for them, what are your thoughts?

(2) Answer. I don't know how any Marine could come to that conclusion. If I had to guess, I would say there is always some confusion between the boots on ground and the decision makers. I had the same confusion as junior Marine being told what to do. Having been exposed to the JOC and the CoC I think the [REDACTED] (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mitigated risk to allow Marines to do their jobs with the equipment and information they had. I would refute that.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think it would bother some Marines to hear discussion of that?

(2) Answer. I think everyone is entitled to their opinion, especially if they have served. But people can have opinions without the full scope of the things around them.

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I'm sure half the Marines on the ground don't know that shock trauma was moved, or that [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g were put in place to protect them. That's part of combat, and the fog of war. The higher you get up the more understanding you have, and your blinders are focused on other things. But to say that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) neglected the troops, I couldn't get behind that at all. I heard them discussing those things.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: What area at the gate offers the most physical protection?

(2) Answer. Behind the main gate. Outside of the gate you are exposed at every angle.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think the sniper towers offered protection?

(2) Answer. They were probably the most protected. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d operated the towers beforehand. The glass was thick ballistic glass. That actually stood out to me. When I was up there, I thought about how well protected it was. That's why when I first found out [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was injured, I couldn't understand how he was injured because I expected him to be in the tower.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Do you know where he was?

(2) Answer. From what I understand now, out of there tower. Somewhere in vicinity of the gate door.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1: What is standard operating procedure for who should be on watch for the snipers at any given time?

(2) Answer. Bare minimum would be shooter, spotter, and radio operator.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: How do you think I can get any photos that the snipers took of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. I think all the photos that were taken that I saw matched the general description of 15-20 other individuals in the crowd. The description would be null and void unless there was also hostile act, hostile intent, or some type of wiring and device. Given that it was a suicide vest, that would match hostile.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think they would have been right to take out every person that matched that description?

(2) Answer. No sir, they would have got in trouble.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else that you think would be important for us to understand?

(2) Answer. Not really, sir. I think that the [REDACTED] (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had an Ops huddle every day and we talked about threats and changes that the [REDACTED] (b)(6) wanted to implement for force posture. He was adamant about Marines personnel actions to view those actions.

aa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: How often are [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the gate?

(2) Answer. Multiple times every day. They cared more than any other leaders that I have known in my twenty years. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SAPI plate was ripped off when civilians flooded the airfield. I don't know if [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) slept more than two hours the whole time we were out there because they were working the whole time. They were assuming the same risks as the Service Members, I assumed they were killed in the blast until I heard [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the radio. I still thought the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was dead until I heard him giving orders to the commanders to move their personnel around for force posture. I remember them asking him if the RoE changed after the blast, and I remember him telling the commanders that they always had the inherent right to protect themselves.

bb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: Do you have any knowledge of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saying "I don't know" when asked for engagement authority of a positive identification?

(2) Answer. I have been with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) since he was a [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He has always been a very engaged and direct leader, so that doesn't sound anything like him.

cc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever receive a question or request for engagement authority?

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(2) Answer. On August 26th, immediately after I saw the blast on the drone [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) notified the CoC that there was a mass casualty on the radio. After that there was a pause, and I heard [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) giving directions to the Company Commanders on casualty evacuation and security. A few Commanders asked the CoC "has the RoE changed?" At the time the [REDACTED] (b)(6) came into our CoC, and I looked at him and he told me that the RoE had not changed. I repeated that same information through the radio. Before that, I had never received any requests to engage a positive ID.

dd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Was that footage of the actual blast or immediately following? We haven't seen that.

(2) Answer. I can't entirely recall; it may just have been the footage immediately following the blast. I know I was in the CoC watching drone footage, I remember seeing scattered personnel and someone on a stretcher.

ee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). From your perspective, could anything else tactically have been done to prevent this?

(2) Answer. Only closing the gate, which would have meant we weren't doing the mission we came to do.

ff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did you ever witness or hear about an IED test or rehearsal around the 21st or the 22nd? Or two individuals suspicious around that time frame?

(2) Answer. I have never heard of that, sir. It was like being at a concert, sir, you couldn't see that. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) took recommendations from the commanders on ground and did all that they could to protect the troops and allow them to complete the mission.

gg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was it your understanding that the RoE were different at other gates or the same across the board?

(2) Answer. I don't know what RoE 1/8 had, but I would assume that since we fell under 24th MEU it was the same RoE we had been under the whole time, since we were in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a I think the Marines understood and understood that engaging Taliban outside the gate would have made it impossible to complete the mission.

hh. Question and Answer 59.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said that you briefed the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No, the [REDACTED] (b)(6) briefed everyone involved with operations that day. Knauss stayed after and spoke with the [REDACTED] (b)(6) about what messaging would go over the speaker. I don't think they discussed force posture; I think it was just their job.

ii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many threat streams would you estimate a day?

(2) Answer. More than I could count. The ones that stuck out were Taliban releasing prisoners, ISIS-K planning an attack on HKIA, a VBIED threat at North Gate, an SVEST threat at Abbey Gate. That's why we tried to create buffers and protect the troops. Otherwise, it was just bomb threats. I know on the 26th, multiple times, the [REDACTED] (b)(6) or the colonel came on the net to stop operations and do some hard targeting, to get behind cover and not expose themselves to threats.

jj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You remember seeing pictures, how did you receive them?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would bring them back on his toughbook. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I would look at their reports. They kept talking about a redteam, but the pictures I saw of those guys were more equipped than the normal Taliban. They had modern weapons and plate carriers; they looked like they robbed a depot. That's all that stood out to me. The threat of a guy with an SVEST was a description of the majority of people in the personnel.

kk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) About how many pictures would you see a day?

(2) Answer: Every time they brought a report, I would check it out. I would say they came in periodically; it wasn't a set schedule.

ll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know if those pictures were preserved or if they were destroyed? Who do you think would have them?

(2) Answer. I don't have any information, but I don't think they would be destroyed even when we left. If I had to guess, the sniper team might still have them in their toughbook. As a sniper team leader, I would have to make sure I had a back-up. If not, the S2. I don't think they would delete those files.

mm. Question and Answer 64.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Your conversation with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the sniper tower in the days before the blast, could you give some context on that?

(2) Answer. I went up to ask him how he was doing, and he asked me if he could engage personnel, I told him that no one would second guess you if they had hostile act, and hostile intent. I told him that he was the person on the gun and acting with the commander's intent, and that was about all.

nn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1: How would you characterize the leadership of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I never worked with him in an extensive capacity. He was very outspoken as a leader. He was very process oriented. I have never heard any bad things about him. Personalities will always bump heads, but I have never heard him called a bad leader. He would voice concerns about his Marines to the [REDACTED] (b)(6) in a way that would let the [REDACTED] (b)(6) make adjustments. I have never been privy to a conversation between him where he said that he felt unsafe or like he wasn't getting the equipment he needed.

oo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1: There was a decision during the shift change between Golf and Echo Company to adjust the lines and collapse from the foot bridge to the base of the Sniper Tower. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assessed that, due to the crowd surge, that Marines were at risk of being isolated. He decided to collapse to the sniper tower to mitigate threat, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

pp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1: How did people stand out in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Every day I was out there I saw passports. Whether it was American or other countries, I saw them holding them so we could identify them and pull them out of the crowd. Some individuals were holding signs to stand out, but the passport was the biggest way to spot an American.

qq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think the bomber was identified prior to the blast? Some have said they had the opportunity to remove that threat prior to the blast because they had him in their sights, do you think that's possible?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I can't give you a yes or no answer, there's other factors you need. The threat streams weren't clear, there were too many similar targets and packs to identify a target in the crowd. Even if you could, you still need hostile act and hostile intent. You could only see that if you saw an SVEST or a hostile act.

rr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1: What would have happened if they had taken out the bomber?

(2) Answer. I think there are two scenarios. I think that if he was 100% identified, and he engaged, I think there is a high probability of collateral damage, meaning the round would go through that individual and hit multiple civilians. The next scenario is engaging and killing the target, but there is a dead man's switch or a remote device. There's too many possibilities to layout. If he had engaged, maybe you hit the bomber. Or maybe you shoot the guy who's not the bomber. Then you have to explain killing a civilian that is trying to evacuate. A potential US citizen. A service member killing a us citizen is the opposite of what we are trying to do.

ss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) now. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to different countries. The Marine Security Guard. Echo Companies company [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the radio operator in the CoC during the blast. The initial radio operator wasn't doing a good job, so I replaced him with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was very capable, intelligent, well liked. I don't know where he is at now. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the operations chief.

tt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: Complex attack. Our findings found initially that it was not a complex attack. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d could and the 82nd Tower had an unaffected view and understood why it could look like a complex attack, when in reality it was the intersection of warning shots from three different elements creating the illusion of a complex attack. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d marine recon, and a marine team all fired a few shots, but the unimpeded individuals refute a complex attack. Your thoughts on that?

(2) Answer. The only reports I got from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was single shots that they believed were sniper shots. I never got any reports that it was directed at them.

uu. Question and Answer 72.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. C1: The Snipers report rounds being fired at their tower and impacting the tower. Did you hear any reports of rounds at the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No, sir. After the blast, the only people on the radio were [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) directing his ground commanders, the JTAC requesting to take control of the drone. We told the JTAC no, what was he going to do with that sea of people? I didn't have that authority anyway.

vv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. C1: You believe not preventable at the tactical level?

(2) Answer. I 100% believe there was nothing else they could do.

ww. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1: What have you seen on social media?

(2) Answer. Just sporadic pieces of [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony to congress. Other than that, zero. I disagreed with some of that. I disagree that he requested to engage a target, because I was in the CoC the majority of the time, especially when things were happening. I disagreed with him saying that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said "I don't know". I don't think that's something that he would say. Third, he said that things weren't done to mitigate risk and that people weren't listening to them. I heard their reports and passed their information along. The description of the suicide bomber was just too vague.

xx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1: Did you think it was odd he was requesting engagement authority for someone that failed to meet the threshold of RoE? Just a visual description without hostile act and hostile intent.

(2) Answer. At no time, while I manned the CoC, which was more than 12 hours a day, did I get a request from snipers to engage. And that would have been odd to me if they had PID and hostile intent, or to engage if they didn't have those criteria.

yy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Contact info?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

zz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1: Did you interact with any [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a on the 26th?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I interacted with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) post blast because he was looking for SSG Knauss' equipment, and to direct him to Echo company to find that equipment. At no other time did he come to interact in our CoC. That morning, SSG Knauss was in there, as I mentioned. He spoke with the [REDACTED] (b)(6). I think talking about what they would say on the speaker to calm the crowd. After the blast, I do think I saw a driver that was injured, but I didn't talk to him.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is BG Lance Curtis,

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

L. G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer



CUI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 17. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

12 Oct 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

12 Oct 2023
DATE

CUI



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

13 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 13 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of two interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your billet with 2/1?

(2) Answer. I was the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Since coming back, where have you been since?

(2) Answer. I was with 2/1 up until May 22. Since then I moved to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Do you remember when you arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We arrived 16 Aug really, really late at night. After midnight.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What were your initial tasks as the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. We arrived, got off the plane. I had done a site survey in June, so I knew where the JOC was. I remember taking the BN Leadership into that direction. Couldn't really see much. We found our way to the JOC and found the MEU [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He gave us a description of what was happening with the movement. He said there was a breach, Afghans were occupying an aircraft and he wanted us to place our Marines to plug the gaps. It was Echo Company with us and 1st Platoon leadership. They didn't come into the JOC. They found their tasking for whatever it was. After that we scrambled to find an office to set up our COC. Those were our actions for the next several hours until the sun came up.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: The JOC was on North HKIA?

(2) Answer. Yes.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: From that point what was your section doing?

(2) Answer. We set up our COC adjacent to the JOC. We had live feeds in our COC and got lucky to get a good map of HKIA. Set up comms so we can talk with units on the deck. It was very surreal looking at the live feeds and seeing the hoards of people, like World War Z, coming across the tarmac. I remember Echo Company saying it was getting heavy and we needed more people. They were out there for a good 24 hours managing the hoard of people.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Where were the live feeds coming from?

(2) Answer. I think ISR from the air providing that. We had one screen from ISR giving live feeds of the tarmac. Another one was a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g showing the North Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there no (b)(1)1.4g or CCTV down by Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No, I don't remember any.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were you doing next? This is still on the 16th during daylight hours.

(2) Answer. My CO and (b)(6) went out to the tarmac. There were calls in the building to send available personnel to the tarmac. I went out with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and left (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the COC to manage it. I went out to see what was going on and it was chaos. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trying to figure out what we need to do. I was out there for 6 hours, we finally were able to push the Afghans south off of the tarmac. It was a shit show. We would push them successfully, until a gap opens up, then 1, 2, 3 Afghans would start flowing through the gap. We couldn't keep this up. I tried to get water and MREs to give to Afghans hoping it would calm them down. ****Showing pictures****. Eventually we were able to clear the tarmac. After those 6 hours myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back to the COC.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is this the day the Afghans were holding onto the military aircraft and falling off?

(2) Answer. Yes it was. That was a bizarre moment. It was like time paused. You saw Afghans sitting on the wheel well as it took off. We saw two humans fall off the C130. The bodies did make it to us. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted to move the bodies off the tarmac and to the terminal, and we did that. We wanted to show respect to the Afghans.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What happens when you got back to the COC?

(2) Answer. Not really sure. I started making my notes on 18 Aug. I only slept 6 hours in the last 36 hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is that the same for your Marines?

(2) Answer. I consider myself lucky. Echo Company hadn't slept at all. When the first element of Golf Company showed up we were able to start cycling people. Not sure if this was on the 18th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What is your focus after you get security set, prior to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. My focus I was checking flights. At about 2030 on the 18th, the [REDACTED] (b)(6) was working a new plan on what we were going to be doing. I believe this was a tasker coming down where we were going to take [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d We didn't want to do that and we had pushed back. Eventually it did not happen. Not sure who made the decision to not to do it. Earlier, the JOC floor told me to have my boss download WhatsApp and contact Taliban leadership. This was probably on the 16th or 17th. We didn't. [REDACTED] (b)(5) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6) We also were getting calls from people/friends back in the States requesting help to pull specific Afghans.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: So you're working a variety of tasks prior to establishing Abbey Gate, moving from fire to fire?

(2) Answer. Yes Sir. I'm running around, looking at flight trackers identifying Afghan personnel to place on the flights.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: What kind of guidance did you receive from the JOC or DoS regarding documents needed for Afghans to evacuate?

(2) Answer. It changed. First it was AMCITS, then it was visa holders, then green card holders. I heard the DoS say they have no solution in the JOC. They were working through all sorts of friction, and they didn't have any idea on what to do either. I wrote this down on the 20th. People were also destroying sensitive equipment, shredding papers, things that were there. We were also stealing vehicles from each other at this point. On the 20th in the afternoon, things have settled into a battle rhythm now. Actions are not as kinetic. I was able to sit back, listen, and work issues as they come.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(5): Define the first day that was not kinetic?

(2) Answer. I think what I meant is that we finally have an idea of what we are supposed to be doing. We knew we were pulling Afghans for processing with DoS, plugging the gaps. There was some sense of order and some processes established.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Moving back to the 19th, what were you doing then?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. On the 19th, I was running the COC floor. A major from the JOC came down and requested to pull forces from us. I told him no, you need to talk to my CO and (b)(6) as we were attempting to secure Abbey Gate.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). By the morning on the 19th, 2/1's priority was establishing Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It was happening then. That's where our focus was and where we were moving into.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). At this time your COC is established and your battle tracking is occurring?

(2) Answer. Yes. On the 20th is when things started to go into a battle rhythm.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What comms were at the gate?

(2) Answer. Green gear (radios), WhatsApp, and Signal.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What did you use most frequently?

(2) Answer. We used green gear mostly. Most of the information from Abbey Gate came from the tactical radio. WhatsApp was a communication tool, but I don't believe that was our primary comms at all.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How did you log in radio traffic as reports came in?

(2) Answer. I think we had a log book. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) always made sure the yellow canaries were kept. He would always review them at the end of the day. We had several chat rooms on SIPR. Anything pertinent we would roll over to the JOC right next door. We had frequent communication with the JOC the entire time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or the S2A were always in our COC with us.

x. Question and Answer 23.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (A) As they worked to establish the gate, what do you remember about any type of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. Verbally I remember talks of a potential suicide bomber.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (D) Do you know when that started to make its way to you?

(2) Answer. I'm not exactly sure.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (D) Do you remember where you would have heard these initial reports of a suicide bomber?

(2) Answer. No sir. To give you an idea, this is a quote I wrote down on 21 Aug from an intel report. It was really absurd. "An associate of a possible Kabul terrorist planned to possibly attack an unknown force in an unknown location." Absolutely not specific and no help at all.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (W) Were there any daily/nightly syncs during which the intel officer would push threat streams?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. In the morning and evening in BUBs. The team would go around and provide updates. I do think we were getting saturated in the JOC, so we brought our leadership back to help out with the COC.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (A) As you're in the updates, would that information get pushed to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. Either me or the (b)(6) talking to the Company Commander on the deck, or over tactical radio or WhatsApp directly to the guys at Abbey Gate. The commanders would come daily to download what the COC was tracking.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (H) How often did you go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I went a few times. I went on the 24th to see where the gaps were to inform our barrier plan and make it better. We also worked through a plan on locking up

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

the gate when we went to leave, so it didn't trigger the Afghans and create another hoard to rush the tarmac.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] Was the barrier plan for the Marines for protection or to enable the gate closure?

(2) Answer. Both. I went out on the 22nd and 24th to look at set up and inform the plan. I never went out there after the blast.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When you went out there on the 22nd, do you remember what it looked like?

(2) Answer. It looked like a scene from the Children of Men. Displaced families everywhere, sleeping on cardboard, family eating MREs, a young girl being fed by a spoon, families sleeping in vehicles. C-Wire everywhere, vehicles were speeding all over the place. It was a miracle there wasn't an accident.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When you went out to the gate, do you remember anything about threats, or changes to the threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No I don't. I remember the snipers at Abbey Gate zeroed in on one guy at the gate. He looked like a villain out of a Star Wars movie. He was wearing all black, trimmed beard, acting very calmly "as a Hindu cow." I remember [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the COC looking at him. He said if that guy does anything fishy then drop him.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] How did the snipers pass the intel?

(2) Answer. They physically brought a photo into the COC to show us.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] When the CO was shown this photo, he said if this guy makes any kind of move then drop him?

(2) Answer. Yes. He verbatim said, "you drop him."

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was it clear to everybody?

(2) Answer. Yes. I think it was clear to everybody in the room.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was ROE at this point, was it SROE?

(2) Answer. I believe that's fair. I'm not sure. Our battalion was directed to not do warning shots.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): For this individual, in order to fire on this guy he had to show hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Yes. But I don't believe he did.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What did you hear from the COC on various or specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. I don't remember a description, who it was, what to look out for. I don't remember where I heard this, but I heard that the individual was there a day or two prior to the IED and there was concern about children being casualties and the person left.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The same individual?

(2) Answer. No. The snipers came to the COC, we were shown the picture (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave his guidance, and that was it. I don't know if that was the guy. The guy never came back up again.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you know where the guy was located at the gate?

(2) Answer. *Orienting on the map* I'm not sure where he would have been sitting. I can't tell from the angle of the photo shown.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): As best you recall, what other guys stood out?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. There was one other guy. Two days prior to the incident. *Showing picture*. I zoomed in on the picture and saw this guy. He was not the one we saw prior that looked like the Star Wars villain. He was by himself and had a backpack on his front. I first saw him back in Aug 23 as I was looking through the photos from back then.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did you remember any request to engage targets?

(2) Answer. I do not remember that happening. I don't remember the report coming in and requesting to engage anybody. I was in the COC or sleeping in the COC.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Do you remember any discussion/requests about ROE and engaging anyone?

(2) Answer. No sir I don't remember any talks about requesting to engage,

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How often were the CO and (b)(6) at the gate?

(2) Answer. Daily. They were out there regularly.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When they came back, did they bring you back any info about force protection?

(2) Answer. They might have but I don't remember.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was there any discussion at the BUB about increasing force protection, or how to improve?

(2) Answer. Yes. I remember that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did have a conference with Taliban leadership in person talking about a security plan. I was not there. The Taliban was interested in how the security plan would work out. There was concern about engagements between us and the Taliban to ensure it did not happen.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you went out on the 24th did you have concerns about force protection or how the Marines were operating?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I thought it would be easy for someone to come in and blow this up

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): On the 24th, what did it look like? Did it look different from the 22nd?

(2) Answer. I think over time the crowds just got larger and larger. We could see them on the ISR feed and the crowds were getting bigger. Interestingly, as we let people in to get processed, it took so much time that some Afghans got frustrated and decided to leave.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why do you think that was?

(2) Answer. I think the DoS was not very clear on what they wanted. First it was AMCITS, then visa holders, then green cards. I spoke to a man named [REDACTED] (b)(6) from DoS who said that they were doing their best to get AMCITS out. This was at Abbey Gate. He was out by the chevron with me. However they were not always out there. There were times that they were not available. The DoS reps were not around, would be unavailable, or there was no rep in the JOC.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else regarding threat streams regarding a suicide attack, VBIED, complex attack? Anything more credible or more specific that you may have heard?

(2) Answer. We thought maybe a VBIED at the North Gate. We had to cancel flights for two reasons. The tarmac was a problem, and the possibility of rockets shooting planes as they arrive/depart. This was prior to the 26th. On 21 Aug around noon I wrote, "waiting for ISIS-K to show up and blow up the North Gate, maybe a rocket attack on a plane if we fly again." Not sure why I wrote that. Maybe something I heard being talked about.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Could that be because flights were not taking off because of the intermediate staging bases being full?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I did write that down 21 Aug. **Reading from his journal** "Afghans outside for days now. We stopped taking them in b/c all flights have stopped." I remember running around to get camo nets for the Afghans. "We were told not to push any more AMCITs. Other nations like Germany had full reign to pull out their people. Germans had 1000 seats open yesterday. We could have pulled AMCITS/SIVs and put our people on it, but the DoS said too many to process." [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) .. Was there a time when you started to get into the 22nd-25th when he interacted with Marines/snipers?

(2) Answer. I don't remember him ever going to Abbey Gate. He would run the watch floor while I was sleeping. He slept most of night.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got out to Abbey Gate to assess, did you interact with Marines on the ground or the snipers to reemphasize ROE and intel threats you received at the COC?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I specifically remember more telling them to get some sleep and put their cameras/phones down. I remember telling [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you're the man in charge here. I was more concerned with Marines staying off their phones and getting rest.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever go into the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No sir.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the day of the 26th, was there anything you remember leading up to the attack that may have been out of the ordinary?

(2) Answer. No sir I don't. When the attack came I remember it being a surprise. When it came I remember it being like, well, here it is. I have a gap in my notes from the 23rd where I was talking about going with the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to Abbey Gate and when I talked with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from DoS. We had some blue on blue on the north side between the Marines and NSU. Later that evening I wrote it's been an uneventful day. And then my next entry is on the 26th, post blast. **Reading from journal** "We lost 11 Marines to a blast. Possibly a suicide attack." On the 27th I wrote we had our fallen angel ceremony.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) On the 26th, were you tracking when it was going to be closed?

(2) Answer. I don't remember when, I remember discussions that it was going to close in the coming days. I was told an Army unit would take control when we were going to leave. After the attack I believe it fully closed.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Do you remember any ISR of Abbey Gate prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. It looks like it has the all the other days while were on Abbey Gate. Pulling AMCITS out. The ISR was mainly on Abbey Gate.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How were you notified of the blast on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It came over green gear to my radio operator. He came in and said there was an attack/explosion at Abbey Gate. Everyone's eyes turned to the ISR feed to see what was happening. I immediately ran into the JOC, said, "Attention in the JOC, there has been an attack at Abbey Gate, we are working the situation," and ran back to the COC.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Was the ISR on Abbey Gate at the time of the explosion?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. However the ISR was offset from the location of the explosion, so we didn't actually see the explosion.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you see any gunfire on the ISR Feed?

(2) Answer. No sir. I don't know if I'd be able to see it or not.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you hear any reports about gunfire?

(2) Answer. There was talk there was possible gunfire coming from the top of that far side canal wall. I don't think that was true. I think somebody may have made a mistake. I don't think it was a complex attack, just an IED.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So Marines were saying they were shot, why do you think they said that then?

(2) Answer. It could have been blue on blue. I'm not sure why. I really don't know and I would just be speculating. The end state was there were no shots fired. Not sure what the Taliban was doing either at this point.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else about the attack that sticks out to you?

(2) Answer. No sir. When it happened it did feel like it was a surprise. We were told verbally ISIS-K could potentially conduct a suicide attack. But we kept hearing it and as you hear it more and more you get numb to it. At this point we got tired of hearing it because it was never coming, until it did.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You talked about using tactical radios as your primary means, as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were forward at most times, how much comms did you maintain with them (pushing/pulling information to/from COC and CO/ (b)(6)). Was it frequent comms?

(2) Answer. Yes. I believe so. Once we got into our rhythm I don't believe there was any real problem with comms between the COC and Abbey Gate. When battalion leadership went down to the gate they always had radio operators with them.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Leading up to the surprise on the attack, was the COC at the battalion level, was there anything your team pulled intelligence wise through the days, bottom up, into the COC and your BN S2 shop analyzing, recording it, then took intel from higher, and then sit down with you, CO, (b)(6) and then just talk about things. Getting at building an intel picture and determining necessary actions at the gate?

(2) Answer. I don't think there was any breakdown of feeding us any intel from higher and getting it to troops on the deck. The reports they were getting up to us would be pushed where it needed to go. I'm not sure if the picture got up to the JOC

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What does your BUB look like?

(2) Answer. Last 12/24 hours, next 12/24 hours, hit the warfighting functions, then to the company leadership.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you start to redeploy, what did you do with your equipment in the COC?

(2) Answer. We had our CAPE set sent there, but it got looted and we destroyed it. We mostly fell in on equipment that was there. We had SIPR and CENTRIX laptops. I believe we took them with us, but I did not leave with a computer.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about intel products, yellow canaries, what would have happened with all of that?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. It should have been shredded, but I can't remember.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you deal with any SD cards from the snipers?

(2) Answer. I don't remember any SD cards coming to the COC. I don't think it ever did. If it did I missed it. Not sure if any was passed to the S2.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who made the decision to destroy the intel?

(2) Answer. BGen Sullivan.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything you were told to preserve?

(2) Answer. Not that I can remember.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about the picture on the phone from the snipers?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. It was on one of the sniper's phones.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The past two years have you done any interviews or spoken out publicly about Abbey Gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Just with my wife and siblings. No social media or other media.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you read anything in the news regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Not really. I may read something. I did see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony. I do not remember what he said actually happening.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Specifically, what happening?

(2) Answer. That he requested to engage the target to the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stating he couldn't authorize and he didn't know who could.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So the only conversation about this occurred in the COC?

(2) Answer. Yes. When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said drop him if he does anything. That's the only time I know of.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How often have you spoken with Marines from 2/1?

(2) Answer. About a year ago. They came here to do mountain training. We really didn't talk about the Abbey Gate explosion. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) actually contacted me in August. We exchanged a few texts but didn't discuss Abbey Gate.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else you wish to add?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I'm still irritated about having to police call the terminal before we had to leave.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever get a reason on why?

(2) Answer. No. I heard it was supposed to be functioning airport.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anyone else we need to talk to?

(2) Answer. I know you'll be talking to [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be good to talk to as he was in the COC when I wasn't. He possibly could fill in some gaps. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in [redacted] (b)(6) He was one of our clerks. He actually assisted with the CASEVAC and was the first one to tell me how many KIAs we had. He was around in the COC and would be good to talk to. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out of the Marine Corps now, my memory of him was that he was scatterbrained the whole time. He was our other [redacted] (b)(6) but he was all over the place. He's a great guy but might not provide clear accounting of what occurred. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his XO of weapons company. The XO seemed to know about what was going on over [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think his last name may be [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 13 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 16. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

13 OCT 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

20231013
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

24 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 24 October 2023, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). As we are going through this, we are looking for your personal recollections. Not what you may have heard second hand. We understand this was two years ago and it was a hectic time. It is okay not to remember. When did you enter the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6). I was in the reserve for 5 years before that, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I am an infantry officer. I got to 2/1 in October of 2018. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I deployed with ADVON in March of 2021, so I had been with them for about 2.5 years at that point. I got back September 8, 2021 then checked in here at TBS in October, 2021.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you a staff platoon commander over there?

(2) Answer. I was sir. I checked into IOC in [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) October 2021-June 2022 I was a bull pen instructor, then I was and instructro from June to January, 2023.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your billet here?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you receive notification you would be going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We found out that Weapons Company was going via the [REDACTED] (b)(6) on 14 August. We had heard initially from open source reporting on 12 August. I was at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d conducting a joint exercise with JAF and the Army. I was there from Aug 6th to the 14th. Then I flew from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d the I got to HKIA on the evening of the 18th. We had a layover in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d due to the flight crew.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were evacuees already flowing into Al Udeid at that time?

(2) Answer. They were. Mostly people who worked at the embassy or the airfield at the time.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who were you with on the 18th?

(2) Answer. Echo Company, 1st Platoon, the Shock Trauma Platoon, and the EOD team from the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were present.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(6) What did you do when your arrived?

(2) Answer. When we left, we were receiving reports of the airfield in chaos. We got off that night, went to secure the plane and realized that was not required. I linked up with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then the [REDACTED] (b)(6). I made sure Echo Company was situated, they went to the gym, then I found Weapons Company who had been there for about approximately 6 hours.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who was with you in (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. Myself, the 81mm mortar platoon, and half the fire support coordination center.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive an ROE brief while you were there?

(2) Answer. No, sir. Not prior to entering HKIA. I know the company did some in Camp Buehring, but I was not there to receive that.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your understanding of the ROE as an infantry officer at the time?

(2) Answer. Myself and SSgt Hoover and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) briefed that self defense was authorized, Hostile Act, Hostile Intent, Positive identification, but other than that to treat individuals on the airfield as civilians. Other than that, I was worried about fires approval and the over the horizon strike cell in (b)(1)1.4d held approval for fires. I knew we could use battalion mortars in self-defense, we never made them fire capable at HKIA though.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So on the evening of the 18th, what was Weapons Company doing?

(2) Answer. For the first 24 hours we didn't get tasked with a gate. Part of the company was at the PAX terminal. After that, we went to part of Abbey Gate.

Pause in the conversation for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to describe the common shared lexicon of Abbey Gate ranging from the inner gate to the Barron Hotel.

Initially, Golf and Echo were tasked to hold the inner gate. The (b)(1)1.4d were at the Barron Hotel. As Golf cleared from inner to outer, then from outer to the Barron, Weapons Company took over the inner gate security. We weren't approving Battalion fires at the time, so the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for the first two days in the main JOC until we realized that wasn't necessary. After that he used me kind of as a directed telescope at Abbey Gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So that brings us to the 20th or the 21st, what was that tasking like?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. I kept count of the people we were processing. At the time the comfort areas inside of HKIA were overwhelmed. We didn't have the capacity. So there were times when only Abbey Gate or none of the gates were processing. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) goal for me was to keep the battalion COC and JOC up to date with how many people we brought in. After the 22nd, it was about coordinating between the battalion and the companies.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you keep track?

(2) Answer. By speaking with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), then [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as well. I spoke to all of them. I couldn't tell you exactly how many now, but I would say a couple thousand every day.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you hearing any threat streams?

(2) Answer. Yes, our [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave his MLCOA when we arrived. We talked about VBIEDs, and gold Corrolas. We knew that if an attack came it would probably be ISIS, not the Taliban.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Due to the fact we were working with the Taliban? Did you hear about that at the time?

(2) Answer. I heard they were on the outskirts of the town when I got on deck on the 18th. The first time I saw them was when I was with Golf Company, the night the chevron was emplaced. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) do a KLE with the Taliban.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there any specific ROE regarding the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Only Hostile Act/ Hostile Intent toward US forces.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you at the gate?

(2) Answer. Probably 18-20 hours a day, except for the 24th. I was only down there for a couple hours until we got RIPd out. I was there with Golf Company, then we

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RIPd out with Echo Company on the 24th. It was Golf with Fox from the 20th-23rd. On the 23rd, they were RIPd out with Echo. Weapons was at the inner gate the whole time.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were the conditions at the gate?

(2) Answer. Extremely chaotic until it was cleared to the Barron Hotel. After that, it was controlled inside the gate. Outside in the canal area was always utter chaos. If the civilians thought they were being processed in some fashion they were calm, but if not the emotion of the crowd was overwhelming.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From the 20th-22nd who did you usually interact with?

(2) Answer. I'd say probably the company XO's the most, my peers. I was a captain as of 01Jul, but I went to IOC with all those guys. I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) some, but he was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) were down there pretty often, that's why I had initially been in the JOC. After I rotated down, he was mostly in the COC but the [REDACTED] (b)(6) probably came once a day. I saw BGen Sullivan about 3 times, I don't think I ever saw MG Donahue or RADM Vasely.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much did you interact with [REDACTED] (b)(6), the sniper team?

(2) Answer. I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at least once a day in passing. They weren't the only [REDACTED] (b)(6) team that was down there, our other snipers were at the inner gate. It was mostly just [REDACTED] (b)(6) at Abbey Gate, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a good Marine. They were attached to Echo company at the time, but working for the battalion, being tasked through [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't interact with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) too much. We were friends, but not in an official capacity at the time.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you do from the 23rd-26th?

(2) Answer. Similar to what I was doing, but at that point we were less concerned with numbers and I had a system for the companies working the gate to report it. I was with Weapons in the inner gate sometimes, sometimes in the JOC trying to get DoS. Filling in where I was needed.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there a battle rhythm once the gate was established?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I don't think I could speak intelligently to that question at this point.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, How about you personally for that 20-22nd time period, what was your battle rhythm?

(2) Answer. I was getting 3-4 hours a day until the 23rd, then I probably slept 11 hours straight. I was getting enough sleep to operate, I was able to get more sleep later so I guess we had a rhythm. I would rack out in the Weapons Co area we had by the cafeteria.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, How often were you getting into the COC or the JOC?

(2) Answer. Once or twice a day. Every day after I woke up, I would swing in and see any taskings for me or Weapons Company from the COC. I'd go to the JOC, see if there were any changes to fires authority. Then I would talk to my CO, go to the inner and outer gate, then do the reverse before I went to bed.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Did you hear about any threat streams in these touchpoints?

(2) Answer. There were IED threat streams every day that we were there. At times it was VBIEDs, at times suicide bombers. I would hear them in the JOC or from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the Battalion COC.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Do you remember any specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. On the 26th or the night of the 25th we received a picture or description of the person thought to be the bomber.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Where did that description come from?

(2) Answer. From (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was grainy, pretty blurry. There was a blue background, a guy with a beard. Some kind of headdress. You could see major or knew the major features on the person.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would it have been enough to pick him out in a crowd of thousand of Afghans?

(2) Answer. If you're asking if I think it was enough to identify a threat, I think it was enough to identify that we need to confirm if that was the person or not.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember where it came from?

(2) Answer. I only remember it coming from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time, it wasn't in my purview to ask if we had HUMINT, etc.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you say that was?

(2) Answer. Maybe the evening of the 25th, or the day of the 26th.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where were you at the time?

(2) Answer. In the COC, with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe. It's been a long time

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was that photo shared to the gates?

(2) Answer. I believe so. I didn't see anyone receive it. But when I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they knew there was an IED threat at the gate, but we had IED threats at the gate the whole time we were there.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were Marines becoming de-sensitized to that threat?

(2) Answer. To an extent. I know around 1400 on the 26th there were imminent reports of an attack. When we got close to that we did what we could, got behind cover until a reasonable time had passed. There wasn't a great answer to an IED threat in that environment. Either we were there to physically keep the crowd back, or the crowd would overwhelm us and no one would have gotten processed.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay if you [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) received that photo what would you do?

(2) Answer. Share it with my company. Everything that I got, I know that everyone [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) like platoon commanders would have been shared.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How would you have shared that photo, did you have it on your phone?

(2) Answer. I never had it on my phone. It went through the S2 side. I am comfortable saying the threat stream made it down to the gate, especially any BOLOs. I am comfortable saying [REDACTED] (b)(6) would have had any threat reporting given to the S2.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned one occasion where there was an imminent threat, were there any other occasions where leaders took similar actions?

(2) Answer. We took cover and halted processing any time there was an imminent threat. I can't speak to another specific time.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many times do you think that happened, where force posture needed to be adjusted like that?

(2) Answer. At a minimum, once or twice a day, posture had to be adjusted based on intel reporting and what we saw at the gates.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there times that you were at the gate that you saw the Marines receive intel? How would they receive that?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Over Signal. Green gear wasn't working at the gate. I wasn't getting messages from the S2. The [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) doesn't have a tactical role outside of fires, so most of our units were tasked directly. Individual commanders were getting tasks from battalion, so any info I got, I got directly from the COC.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But you are confident that threat streams made it to the squad level?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I couldn't speak to that at the squad level. I know that company level was receiving those reports and taking actions that affected everyone down to the squad level.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. From the 20th-26th, how much interaction did you have with

(b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Not too much. I didn't have an official capacity with them, it was just that I knew them personally. I went into the tower several times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. They ever show you photos or suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I had no knowledge that they had identified any kind of threat until the attack had already occurred.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. When did you learn that they had identified a threat or someone who matched the description of a possible attacker?

(2) Answer. It was a long time ago. Confidently, I can't give a time line. I know, confidently, that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me after the attack that (b)(6) had reported they had thought they had seen the person who matched the description we had received through intel. That's all that I could confidently say.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. So you had limited interaction with the snipers, and in your interactions they never showed you a photo or suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. No sir.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. Did you ever speak with them about that after the fact?

(2) Answer. I never spoke with anyone from (b)(6) that told me that, just (b)(6) who told me about it.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who did you say was tasking sniper teams during the evacuation?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was getting his tasks directly from the (b)(6) to my knowledge. It was a slightly weird dynamic. I know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was handling reporting and taskings.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were they tasked to do?

(2) Answer. Observe, report, and conduct overwatch.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were they tasked to pull people out and assist with processing?

(2) Answer. They were not tasked to do that directly. I know that it is something that everyone there did, however.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you doing that?

(2) Answer. Pretty much the whole 25th and the 26th. Something we noticed, specifically at the jersey barrier, until the 25th, Echo had cleared all the way to the footbridge (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided to collapse to the jersey barrier the night of the 25th to decrease our exterior footprint. The day of the 26th, the crowd was getting anxious because they were watching the news, so people were pushing themselves to heat exhaustion and injury. I realized that people recognized (b)(6) rank as someone with authority, so most of the 26th I was on the jersey barrier because I knew they would listen to me if I told them to sit down and wait to be processed.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the 25th and the 26th?

(2) Answer. I don't know about the 25th, absolutely on the 26th. They were there when the attack happened. They were there multiple times throughout our time at Abbey Gate.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) go into the tower on the 26th?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No, sir I never saw them go on that occasion. I had seen them talk to the snipers on multiple occasions prior to the 26th, but not on the 26th. I know they had interactions with (b)(6). It was certainly at the tower, but I don't know if it was in the tower. I know that I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) outside the tower at some point throughout the week.

I am not confident they went in the tower prior, but I didn't see them talk at all on the 26th.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Do you remember any IED test run or an occasion that EOD had to be called to the gate?

(2) Answer. Sir, I was just inside the outer gate where we would do additional searches before going to inner gate where they would be processed by CAT red. I was there when a black pack got tossed over the wall. We treated it like an IED. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) called someone to look at it. I don't remember more details than that.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what was in the bag?

(1) Answer. If I recall correctly, the assumption was that it was someone trying to toss something over to children. I think it was children's clothes or toys, but I don't know. It was a long time ago.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact or coordinate with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. There were times that we were in close proximity. At most it was a handwave or gestures to get people over, but never a conversation.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you witness the Taliban kill anyone?

(2) Answer. No, sir, I did not witness it. I did hear gunshots on the far side of the chevron, I heard stories from the evacuees, and saw bruises and welts on evacuees. It was consistent and enough to notice, but I didn't every see the Taliban execute anyone.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did any Marine ever tell you that they witnessed the Taliban execute civilians?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I heard stories from North Gate, some guys from 1/8. I didn't witness that, but no Marines around me or under me told me anything like that.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Up to the attack, was there ever a time where you felt like you could have engaged under the ROE?

(2) Answer. No, sir. If there had been, then I would have.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there ever an occasion where you were unsure that you or your Marines could engage someone, so you would have needed to request guidance from higher?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): To your knowledge did the ROE change during the NEO?

(2) Answer. After the blast, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did. Throughout the preceding week, we had a problem with people climbing the fences especially on the inner side of the Abbey Gate. (b)(6) and our gun truck saw that multiple times, and we didn't engage. After the blast, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us give them one warning, then engage. Up until the blast, the ROE was the standard, defensive ROE.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): On the 26th, other than the 1400 threat, do you remember any other specific threats?

(2) Answer. No, sir. Just having that description of the person and that he would detonate around 1400. We took appropriate action. Other than that, it was just the same consistent threat streams.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did anyone on the 26th identify a suspicious individual or someone who matched a BOLO?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Throughout our time there, every Marine saw suspicious individuals that they watched. No one ever pointed out someone suspicious to me. I didn't ever see anyone act outside of the baseline.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have any interactions with any (b)(6) or SOF?

(2) Answer. Throughout, from multiple countries. They would come grab their target, but we didn't do anything other than help them pull people out of the canal.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone besides your chain of command pass intel to you?

(2) Answer. About threat streams? No, sir. The only thing we would get outside the chain of command would be pictures of people or signs they were trying to extract. They wouldn't show us threats.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned that at some point Echo Company cleared out to the footbridge, did you ever go out there? What did that look like for the Service Members with the crowd?

(2) Answer. It looked different at different times. (b)(1)1.4d and foreign militaries were along that wall a lot of the time. Marines set up a barrier with riot shields by the footbridge. Everywhere that service members were, the crowds would form. About 30 or 40 meters passed that, the crowds would thin out.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many Marines would you say were out that far?

(2) Answer. I would say it varied by time of day. At night there were less civilians. A couple hours after sunrise, more would show up. We mimicked that. I would say there was up to a squad maintaining that riot shield wall, then a platoon to two platoons outside the jersey barrier. Upwards of 30-60 Marines, then foreign troops and (b)(1)1.4d as well.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you there for the RIP between Echo and Golf?

(2) Answer. No sir, I was at the JOC when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me about the RIP. I went out again around midnight to 0100 then again around 0800.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there any differences you noticed in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Every day, the crowds were getting less compliant as we approached the 31st.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any difference in crowd size that evening, the 25th into the 26th, did the crowd thin out?

(2) Answer. I don't think they did, at least not as significantly as usual.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Had Golf collapsed and the crowd formed at the jersey barrier by the time you got down there?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. That jersey barrier was more appealing than wading through the canal.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Looking at this tactically as an infantry officer, if you knew the gate was being closed the next day, you had threat reporting of an attack, and the crowds were larger and more anxious, what do you think of that scenario tactically?

(2) Answer. I prefer not to Monday morning quarterback the decisions made. I think the individuals making the decisions thought that they were appropriate for the circumstance. Physical controls like jersey barriers were useful. Less of those were available further out, you would have had to use more Marines. Three Marines at the Jersey barrier could hold back the whole crowd. It would have taken more effort to hold back the crowd if the Marines hadn't collapsed.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The evening of the 25th into the 26th, you got back to the gate around midnight. Throughout that evening, into the next morning, were any adjustments to force pro made?

(2) Answer. Other than collapsing to the jersey barrier and the instance where we got off the wall and took cover, no sir.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Were you pulling people out of the crowd that night?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Did you see Marines take cover that evening?

(2) Answer. Possibly, sir. The nights get jumbled.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Can you speak to any noticeable changes to the crowd in size and demeanor on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It was one of the larger crowds we had seen. They were more agitated and less responsive to our commands. They were easier to excite, going from listening to us to pushing each other quickly.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, Did you hear any timeline about gate closure?

(2) Answer. It kept getting pushed back. It was initially the evening of the 25th, then noon of the 26th, then 1800 on the 26th. My understanding was the (b)(1)1.4d needed us to keep the gate open to evacuate people through the outer corridor. Also, we were still pulling blue passports out of the crowd on the 26th. If we were going to be there, we were going to keep pulling people out.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, What was the attitude of the Marines on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think everyone was aware of the increase in the amount of threat reporting. Most of the Marines were focused on getting as many people out as possible. I think they all knew what they were doing, saving women and children. It was an important mission.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, As a commander, looking at risk to force vs risk to mission, do you think you could have processed people if you pulled Marines into the gate?

(2) Answer. No, sir. We processed more people than any other gate. We had physical stand off with the inner and outer gate, then we had the canal to create a long

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

space to pull people out of. The first couple of days, we only had the outer gate. Through those doors, you can only let a couple people through and you had no stand off. That was more concerning. Having physical controls and a larger area made it much easier.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Were you or any of the other Marines preparing to close the gate prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. I'd say the priority was getting people out prior to 1800. We had started clearing out our holding area in the outer corridor, in order to reduce our footprint. We had already done our link up for turnover with the 82nd at the inner and outer gate, we had pushed our fire plan sketch data to them. The engineers had started moving vehicles and concertina wire into place in the inner corridor. Some Weapons Company assets moved our sustainment gear back to our bivouac area.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). At the outer corridor, were any changes to force protection or improvements made on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Besides what we discussed about pulling people off the wall or collapsing back, no.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Were any additional (b)(1)1.4g or snipers emplaced?

(2) Answer. We emplaced another (b)(1)1.4g I think right after we identified the black backpack. I can't speak to how many snipers were in each tower. I know we had two medium machine guns in overwatch at the inner gate. We had QRF ready and Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) on standby. We had an ambulance ready with personnel at the inner gate.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). On the 26th, you were at the outer corridor all day? How about at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I was sir. A buddy of mine was sending me pictures of an interpreter the whole time we were there, and the interpreter made it to the canal on the 26th. It was just the men in the family who got there around 1430, so they were waiting for their women. Their women got there around 1730, Nikoui helped me pull them out of the canal. We walked them in and searched them. I was walking back from the inner gate when the bomb went off.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We have a video from 10 minutes prior, from one of the (b)(1)1.4d guys. He pans from the Barron, past the jersey barrier. You can see 20-30 Marines by the jersey barrier, you're one of them?

(2) Answer. Most likely, yes sir.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Earlier you said 3 Marines could hold back the crowd. Why were there so many Marines that afternoon?

(2) Answer. They were from Golf, not my company. So I am not sure or questioning their actions. I think they were trying to get as many people out as possible. I think 2nd and 1st platoon had RIPd out a couple of hours earlier, so I know that some guys who were there weren't on duty to be there, like SSgt Hoover or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think they were just trying to get guys out.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How often did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out there that day?

(2) Answer. Several times, sir. I spoke to him a couple times. I know he spent a lot of time coordinating with the (b)(1)1.4d at the Barron Hotel.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How much time did he spend doing that?

(2) Answer. Unsure of the exact amount of time. Even when he wasn't there, the (b)(6) was always there. When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there, he was around engaging with his subordinate leaders.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). As far as you know, when he was at the Barron Hotel he was coordinating with the (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. As far as I know, sir.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). So until 1730 you were at the wall, mostly searching for the female family members?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Mostly, sir. But as I mentioned people listened to rank. I spent a couple of hours on the wall. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at some point, who told me we were going until 1800. So then it was just looking for female family members and helping with crowd control.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). No one stuck out to you as suspicious during that time?

(2) Answer. No individual that stood out to me more than the rest.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). How many total people were in the family you helped?

(2) Answer. Three men and a teenage boy, then three wives.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What did you do with them?

(2) Answer. I brought them to the holding area, searched them, then passed them off to some Marines from Weapons Company. Then I was walking back and the blast went off. I know they made it out.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). We know the blast happened at 1736 and 52 seconds. About how far away from the blast were you?

(2) Answer. Less than 50 meters away. I was just inside the outer gate, walking back along the series of jersey barriers. Between 30-50meters.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What do you remember hearing or seeing?

(2) Answer. I grabbed my 152 and was going to give my report (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) beat me to the punch. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) start establishing security. Once I was sure security was being set, some guys and I moved and passed through the outer gate. I interacted with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He told me to set security and get the Marines. I didn't even realize he was wounded, that was right at the gate. He was shuffling at the time. We were hit by the cloud of CS gas and smoke right after that. I went out of the outer gate right after that.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did that impact your ability to see and breathe by the inner gate?

(2) Answer. Absolutely sir. It got worse as you went further. I was probably the fourth guy through the hole in the fence. By the time I got near the canal wall, I remember another cloud of CS gas as I was working my way back to the jersey barriers. It stopped me momentarily. I couldn't breathe at all but forced myself to keep going.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at any point of this movement?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing him near the inside of the gate. I think he was to the right of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but I did not speak to him.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You've made it through the initial hole in the fence, and work toward the jersey barriers. You get to the area where the wounded are, then what?

(2) Answer. The first wounded person I saw was SSgt Hoover. A Golf Company Marine got him on his feet. SSgt Hoover was a hell of a guy, he was incredible. Taylor was a big dude, so the Golf Company guy wasn't getting him there. I shook Hoover awake, we told him we needed to get him up. He woke up for a second, then he stood and coughed blood on my face. We got him up over our shoulders, then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came and got him the rest of the way.

I looked over and saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and some others cutting a hole on the fence from the inside. I threw a tourniquet on a Marine, Lopez I think, then worked on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I carried (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Then when I came back through it was mostly civilians.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was Hoover trying to walk or were you dragging him?

(2) Answer. He was trying to walk, but he was a big boy. We were mostly dragging him.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where did you put the tourniquet on the Marine you think was Lopez? How was he?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. His leg, he was hemorrhaging from his leg. He was unconscious. Other Marines were also working on him.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After that was [REDACTED] (b)(6) what injuries did he have?

(2) Answer. At first I thought he was just [REDACTED] (b)(6) I shook him awake. He stood, then immediately face planted. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) then took his kit off and carried him in. Once I made it back out, it was mostly wounded civilians.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you treat civilians as well?

(2) Answer. We did. We got a decent number through before we collapsed back inside. It was a pretty horrendous scene.

Worth mentioning. One of the first things I heard was rounds from near the Barron Hotel. I remember sighting down my RCO that way and looking at a Taliban on the chevron who wasn't facing us. So it wasn't from them. We heard rounds over head, but it felt consistent with the single shots the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d had been firing the whole time. It was not automatic, and to me, highly unlikely it was from an AK.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long did it take you to reach the outer corridor?

(2) Answer. Maybe 60 seconds.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see any Marines firing their weapons?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I know there were Marines on security later, that made conscious decisions not to shoot. I know that when I was assisting in the evacuation, a Marine LCpl saw a guy standing on his cell phone. He and another Marine yelled and told him to stop. They were discussing what to do, that guy eventually sat down and got off his phone. The Marines didn't engage, they had good weapons discipline and were cognizant of the environment that we were in.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It took about 15 minutes to CASEVAC all the wounded US Forces?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. I was out there until the last service member was evacuated.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After you fell back to the inner corridor, what did you do?

(2) Answer. I linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who were the QRF and security at the inner gate. I talked to them, then sent them back to link up with their unit. Then I went back to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was being worked on by two corpsmen while talking on the radio. He handed me the radio, told me there would be a reaper overhead, and to get it killing things. But tasking of that asset was pushed to someone else.

At that time, Echo Company was pulling security away from the walls in case anything got tossed over. Golf Company was trying to re-task organize (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked like he was mentally impaired at that point. I had seen them previously (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had initially pulled security outside, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) discussed this with him and they eventually collapsed back inside the gate. I couldn't say exactly when that was.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When was the decision to pull security reversed, after the CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. I would say within 30 seconds of the initial decision. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) seemed mentally out of it. My guess is due to the proximity he was from the blast.

aaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get any blast effects?

(2) Answer. I just remember thinking it was a loud flashbang. There was a little concussive force you could feel. (b)(6)

bbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you spoken to any media about this event?

(2) Answer. Not external to the Marine Corps, sir. For the 1-year anniversary (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Nothing official other than that.

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often do you consume social media or news regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I avoid it, sir. I avoid social media for the most part anyways. I am also somewhat concerned, that the longer I go from the event and the more I discuss with other people, it clouds my memory of what happened. Personally, it's just not something I enjoy thinking about, either.

I have this story I'd like to share, about when I was waiting for the females, LCpl Nikoui helped me pull those women out. After we pulled them out, he asked me how long we would keep doing this. I told him I don't know, but as long as we were there, we would keep helping people. He told me, "hell yeah," and smiled at me. That was approximately 15 minutes before the blast.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Are you aware of some of the Congressional proceedings regarding Abbey Gate? If so, where did you hear about that?

(2) Answer. People send it to me, sir. I saw the video of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testifying to Congress.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any thoughts on the validity of the statements he made? Specifically about identifying the bomber and requesting engagement authority. How likely is it that that conversation would happen between a Sgt and the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I think it is possible that a conversation between a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the (b)(6) could have occurred. If (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were at the gate, and they were. In the work up to the deployment, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did fairly regular sit-downs with the NCOs and tried to develop an environment where they could bring things to his attention. In an infantry battalion, you know who the good NCOs were, so if he had identified someone, it is possible that they would have brought the (b)(6) to the tower. It could have occurred. The first time I heard about that conversation, though, was in the interview with the HFAC.

I had heard, and I don't know if it was before or after the blast, in conversations with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that (b)(6) thought they had identified someone. So that was not news, but the conversation with the (b)(6) was first heard.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What are your thoughts on the (b)(6)?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. One of the most competent people I have ever worked with. Competent, composed. I will try to work as a company commander under him when he becomes a (b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the time you were a (b)(6) What was your relationship with other (b)(6) as well as the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had arrived at 2/1 at the same time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I knew each other really well. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had deployed together. The relationship with (b)(6) across the board was good. I had been there the longest, and (b)(6) is the senior position. I was in charge, along with my CO, of training the fire support teams in the battalion. I had also spent six months as the (b)(6) (b)(6) I had a solid amount of interactions with the (b)(6)

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So what was your relationship with your (b)(6) as your Senior Rater?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the (b)(6) profile, since you brought it up, sir.

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you spend much time with the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Most of my development did not come from the (b)(6) (b)(6) I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) leveraged having a strong (b)(6) and senior company commanders to help run the battalion. Having strong leadership underneath, helped him to be more hands off. I will also say, when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) first showed up, I was the physical development officer for officer physical training. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) paired with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during our workouts and they came in second, which says something. That was impressive. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has a lot of good qualities.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned you get sent information about Abbey Gate, how often do you speak to members of 2/1 about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I would say pretty regularly, sir. I try not to let the focus of our relationship be that one 12 day period.

kkkk. Question and Answer 114.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) learned about the terms PIG and HOG. I understand that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a PIG. In regards to the interactions between the (b)(6) (b)(6) would the (b)(6) talk to a PIG instead of the team leader who is a HOG?

(2) Answer. I can't speak to that, sir. The only thing that would make that portion of it make sense. Is if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't there or they were both speaking and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) jumped in. I know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran a tight ship, so if he was there, he would have at least started that conversation.

I didn't know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that well. He came from Echo Company about 4-6 months before we left. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) well. If he was there, he would have had been involved in that conversation. That's all I can speak to for certainty.

III. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From where you sat, do you think that your team thought tactically in designing the layout of Abbey Gate and how you changed your posture? Or was it viewed more procedurally to pull people out?

(2) Answer. I think our main focus was on getting people out, not on running a perimeter defense.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I think the Marines did an excellent job of understanding their environment and the mission they were there for. They did an excellent job exhibiting extreme restraint under chaotic circumstances.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anyone you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would talk to him. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Golf Company. He was a squared away and mature NCO and he worked at the gate a lot. I know he was there in the immediate aftermath.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231024, which begins on ^{question} page 1 and ends on ^{page} 117. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231024
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231024
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
Unit

1. On 25 October 2023, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Before you deployed to Afghanistan where were you? What were you doing?

(2) Answer. from MCIOC attached to 24th MEU. 2020 did not meet staff until mid 2020. Pre mission training. Myself and other Marine agreed to come here from PMT and did not have to be attached. As [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a we are on MUE we cannot do anything from the ship. Myself and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to Italy for 4 and a half months. I was in Italy basically scraping the publicly available information about the ships in the media. Early MAY we heard of the possibility of the MUE being chopped to CENTCOM. I Went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a for a for a few days for Exercise SeaBreeze With a team from Kiev Military information support team. Got a call from Italy saying that we're going to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. I can speak a bit about 1-8 as they were in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a doing evacuation control center. Training incase certain scenarios happen. In [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a we did ECC and ECP drills.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Talk about ROE, did you ever receive any ROE training?

(2) Answer. They may have in (b)(1)1.4a but there was the typical SJA come in and tell us the ROE. They came in teams.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was ROE to your understanding?

(2) Answer. Inherent right to self-defense of yourself and others that are in capable. Hostile intent/hostile act. At the time we had been doing things for the past week in a half.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did you know you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. August 13 or 14. We get to the marshaling area at (b)(1)1.4a I didn't fly until August 15.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Who was part of the MEU Information Operations Section?

(2) Answer. It started at 2D Marines and a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was two enlisted two officers. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went home in May. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed on ship. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the ground with me.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What did you understand your missions and overall mission to be?

(2) Answer. Evacuating American citizens in the area and SIV Special immigrant visas. My individual mission was coordinating with a battalion. Putting instructions out to the group of people. Make sure the file was good and okay. 15-20% of it was me messing with my gear. (b)(6) checking docs. Visa Passport approved civilians. Which did change to in progress visas. Bad documents being shown. Photo IDs let them in.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Do you think you had the right equipment?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1

(2) Answer. Before HKIA yes, initially yes. Once I got out there I just started to help out

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you have to adapt the messaging?

(2) Answer. No firearms, explosives etc, North gate, east gate, Abbey gate. Battalion Landing Teams running gates. Changed the message by sending new messages to someone so that information could be translated and put out.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. What was day on like on the ground?

(2) Answer. We were briefed as the situation being chaotic. GIRoA Mostly pulled out. We were told we were landing on a contested airport. Landed around 930-945 on 15 August 21. No gunfire going off outside of people working with (b)(1)1.4d. We were given explanations of rules and when to put on Kevlar and FLAK. During the brief they were concerned. A cell phone was thrown over the gate and a contractor picked it up and the phone exploded. Throughout the day. The gear and my speakers hadn't arrived. 2215 I went back to lay on my poncho liner. Everyone's phone started ringing on the evening of the 15. The Combat Logistics BN, a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we're hearing it's from 300-400 people. They pushed over the fence and rifle fire was coming in our direction 45 degrees over the airport.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your first mission out there?

(2) Answer. 350-400 Marines and 1000+ Afghan Civilians pushing across the airfield. They made it through the terminal across the flight line. We pushed them back to the other side of the terminal. Bags were left everywhere. There were no translators at that time. Machine Guns still were still firing overhead. There was firing inside the terminal and the Afghan civilians would not move.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. When was it eventually calmed down?

(2) Answer. It was the C17 incident where they got ran over and dropped from the plane. That's when it calmed. The Afghan Army or NSU Reaction force got involved and were doing their own thing that kept the civilians at bay.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(1) Question. When did you receive your equipment?

(2) Answer. Morning of the 17th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Were you linked in with the Army (b)(1)1.4a team yet?

(2) Answer. Not until the 18th that's when they arrived. One came from (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Talk about the 19th when Abbey Gate opened?

(2) Answer. When they got on deck we got a white board and wrote down the plan 2, 3 man teams. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For the 18th to 19th we had the gear, they brought six or seven additional speakers. The Afghans took a speaker from the north gate. At the shift change we gave them the vehicle and I go to the JOC. I got a call from a Marine in Quantico of someone trying to travel back. Checked docs, drove them to the Holding area. Holding area playing the same messaging. Please be patient it was a twelve on twelve off.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Who would you talk to in order to get those updates?

(2) Answer. We stopped through the CoC Enough to ask what the updates were. I wouldn't say inaccurate it was just general stuff. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I ask did they hear about whatever we've heard and they would confirm or deny. Once we were at the gates we would ask have you heard or not heard about whatever the new update was.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What were the crowds like at the gates?

(2) Answer. At north gate no. The BLT at East gate, Abbey gate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would look for to get information out, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from weapons co. The people were getting rowdy but couldn't convey what they wanted because they didn't speak English. Typically it was always an easy fix to the rowdy crowds for example, they would be pointing at a pallet or a box of water and no one knew who the water belonged to so we would just hand out the water. It was simple fixes to the rowdy issues.

r. Question and Answer 17.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(1) Question. Talk about shift changes of day crew to night crew what info did you pass?

(2) Answer. We would pass off things like instances of trying to move people from one gate to another gate, locations of speakers, what speakers may need to be moved. Where to put gear, and if they see someone shooting in the air just leave them be as they are the Taliban and they are there to keep the crowds calm. We changed batteries a lot so we didn't have to follow up until later for the most part.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Once we shut the gate they'd pile in and we can't get out. A Taliban truck would pick up an RPGs and RPKs were facing the Marines at the East gate. I couldn't see the Taliban the next day and I asked about them and there was a Taliban guy next to him he was following up on him.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban hurt people?

(2) Answer. When the crowd got rowdy the Taliban would start shooting in the air

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Did you witness Taliban executing people?

(2) Answer. I did not see executions, but I did see guns to heads. 22nd - 26th all the attention and resources and effort was put towards checking documents.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What would you change the message to? What happened when both gates were closed?

(2) Answer. When they decided to change. The message was changed to these two locations are closed. 'Go towards Abbey gate.' The numbers of where everyone went swelled. We had control of a portion of the canal, left side on map. Once the swell began a lot of the people started to heat CAT at the jersey barrier. We could walk to about the Barron compound. There were civilians prior to the 25th, we checked their docs already. Late 26th that's when it was put out to be on the lookout for clean shaven, clean clothes, possibly a backpack. We went to towers asking had they heard about it. They started taking pictures, the sniper team started taking pictures of people who look a little off. I took a photo of a photo to try and confirm if it may be the person. The

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1

people at the S2 said the photos were not matching. I did that two or three times and after the third time I decided I clearly was not finding what they were looking for.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Who was your main point of contact in the tower? Did the day shift team ever go to the tower?

(2) Answer. I belonged to the MEU so I was able to come and go as I pleased. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the tower quite a few times. I tried to take a speaker to the tower to push out info over the canal. There was a truck spray painted. There were a couple of holes and he would go up to check out things in the tower. Once documents were checked they hung out and kind of started to get rowdy. We got a speaker to them so that someone could explain the process to the civilians. The day shift did go up to the tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after injuring himself did not go up the ladder.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. What was being put out over the threat stream? Were there any threats coming in?

(2) Answer. There were more reports of threats coming in the closer to the leaving date it got. People were getting shot. When asked what happened the injured party would point at someone. I do not know if it was Taliban or not. North gate was where I heard more of the injuries coming in.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. During that time 20-22 AUG prior to the blast were there any reports of an IED probe?

(2) Answer. I was not necessarily briefed on probe attacking just 'be on the look out'. They didn't look too concerned with trying to cross over. I wasn't concerned with bag dropping. Lots of people fit the description of clean shaven, clean look.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Do you feel like the Marines at the Gate were reacting to suspicious persons or abnormal behavior because of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. I don't know if Infantry Marines thought about that but most of the time you don't just do something, they try to see what they could get away with. We were concerned with the mopeds but not too much. Quite a few matched the "Clean Look"

aa. Question and Answer 26.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(1) Question. Do you remember any conversation about the Marine Snipers having someone 'in their sights'?

(2) Answer. I do remember them asking for the descriptions. They asked and were like "are we allowed to engage" and I told them "I don't know I'm just the IO". The Snipers are asking what to do but no one really told them the specifics of what to look for. The pictures I had I would not say there was a legit reason to act on that person in the threat. Some matched the description but not the backpack. If we see the person that matches a description no one can give the yes or no to engage based on what they were observing?.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Did you see leaders reinforcing ROE Messaging while working at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I believe it may have been like at the gate, we got reports but nothing actually what the report was saying. I did have to explain a bit further what the ROE was to the snipers.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Did the ROE change? What about Taliban cooperation near the Gates?

(2) Answer. With Taliban on the Chevrons, everyone was flooded with hostile intent. At a point it turned to 'we are working with the Taliban'. They were all over the place.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. How many snipers are typically up there in the tower?

(2) Answer. Two in a corner trying to catch a nap two at one window and one at another window. For the most part they were focusing out the canal to outer corridor window. They could see everything up in that window, The chevron containers, Marines were using MREs for pillows. We would do what we could to boost morale.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Did you ever pass information to the Tower? Did you get the information from the JOC?

(2) Answer. We did a little bit of info transferring. I would be in and grab an MRE and I never would go in looking for intel to get to the gate. One of the odd parts about hearing about the suspicious person was the information they would put out. It was never an actual description it was almost always something like "the suspected

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1

individual is he was last seen here” or, “he was seen in a market here” or “we lost him here.”

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Do you know how this information was being put out?

(2) Answer. A lot of things were SIPR Chatter with who was passing the info down. Many of the reports, there are two types that you all were receiving. Just listening to TOC Ops and the other some are on the front lines and getting reports on leads that were never tied specifically to one person.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Did you ever hear anyone say they saw the bomber? Where were you at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. Someone would say “I have reticle on a guy can I shoot”. You were in CoC or JOC and if I was in the JOC it would come over the radio. When the explosion went off it was 1730 something. I was in the cans getting wifi and I hadn’t heard the explosion as I was two buildings down. It was after noon to 1 o clock and while I was in the cans.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Was there ever a “hey, let’s sit down and talk about this and what happened during these so many hours?”

(2) Answer. When I was sat down to talk about this it was ‘where things were moved’ ‘what was heard over the JOC,’ what I would do differently with the crowd. Who or if we stopped people that were just walking alone. If they don’t have anything bad on them just take them to the terminal. (b)(6) ..

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Was there anything significant about the crowds on any specific day?

(2) Answer. Nothing significant, just when they tried to rush out of the control area, side focused and check on this gate. I was out at Abbey gate at the same time they were.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Leadership presence at the gates, did you ever really see the command team out there SgtMaj and (b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(2) Answer. The MEU Co and SgtMaj were in the JOC all the time. They could have been but it was hard to tell. I didn't personally know the CO or SgtMaj from 2/1 so I wouldn't be able to pick them out of a crowd.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Did they request to engage that guy you showed?

(2) Answer. Not that I am aware of. They just asked me and I said if they have the intent and hostile act, "ROE says that you can engage". I would tell them that outside of that 'that it's not my call' but they were asking and I did kind of explain.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. What was the sniper team attitude toward the ROE?

(2) Answer. I believe at one point before the 26th. Corollas going toward the North gate. They were saying if someone was inside the wire ROE is changing. As far as getting away from standard hostile act hostile intent no.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Were the Marines told to take specific action with any threat or person?

(2) Answer. There was a time where Marines got behind the tower. I was on the wall constantly; they would pull people off the wall but when they would say come down shut up take cover it lasted maybe 15 Minutes. The first time 10-15 Taliban start pointing firearms at civilians. I assume they had to see or hear someone.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Did you have any interaction with (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Army MAJ (b)(1)1.4a, one of the bigger interactions he knew I was trying to get a hold of a guy and his kids. He had one interaction where he gave a family's number to the LNO.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Do you remember who was in the tower when you took that photo?

(2) Answer. I could see some people's chevrons but can't remember names.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(1) Question. Do you remember seeing or hearing cards are being passed out to the crowd?

(2) Answer. This is the first time I'm hearing this. From the MEU side of it we didn't do any of that.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. Are you aware of the sniper's requesting engagement authority?

(2) Answer. As far as am I aware of them? Not directly, I wasn't present for that.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. Do you believe that guy was the bomber in the photo you showed us?

(2) Answer. I don't know, he met some criteria but not all.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. Tell me about the morning of the 26th.

(2) Answer. So the morning of the 26th coming off shift during the darkness hours we were around the gate. There were a lot of people who went home during the night and came back during the day. Population around the gates got smaller at night. At the jersey barrier there was a row of Marines there to keep people from jumping over. That area was the last stand. The FET team was scattered about. Other than losing a portion of property from the foot bridge to the sniper tower everything was normal. It was "be on the lookout for a guy" but I became desensitized. The force posture was about the same. Marines were in the tower keeping people calm getting them water and food. Outer corridor full of military and the near side of the canal had people there. Nothing seemed off or seemed to have changed drastically. I don't know whose call it was to keep processing, but I remember hearing someone say keep letting it run. As far as the posture it seemed to be the same as the day prior.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. Did you see the Marines execute a battle drill, procedures?

(2) Answer. I never saw the Marines get down and take cover, but I wasn't at any particular gate at all hours of the day. I was bouncing between 6-7 different locations. There were Taliban on the chevron, but everyone kept an eye on them, around the Barron compound people would pop up and down. For the time I was there I was focused and never really turned around. Around 1500 I went to go get Wi-Fi.

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On that day not that I can recall any interaction. We had the truck set up how it was needed, facing the chevron. But there was not much interaction. We learned the truck needed to change the other day and that's when it got switched.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. How was the Marines morale at the gate?

(2) Answer. Same as it had been, corpsman running up and down. Marines on canal wall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. How many times that night did you go from Abbey Gate to the JOC?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2-3 time. That's when we had 30 minutes of down time. We had the gate shut and c wire everywhere. Inside the east gate there was a holding area and a lot of tents. Marines were posted up on the tactical vehicle holding the gate closed. Marines were saying the same as I was. This gate is closed go to Abbey. The people who spoke English and could translate and helped get the message out so that we could get people moving. A male who could translate the message did and we were able to help get his family processed. His wife passed his baby is a basket and from there the basket was crowd surfing until someone just threw the basket to the side. We went to help find it. The baby was a couple weeks old and then his wife soon followed.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. What happened on the 26th when you found out about the explosion?

(2) Answer. In the relative time frame of 25th to 26th of Incoming from the JOC that sound started going off more and more. The Marines were probably desensitized like us and were just checking documents. I was probably in the JOC an hour before the explosion. I received a messaged from my wife and a friend about the explosion and I was about to nap for about 10 minutes. By the time I got to the JOC they were loading people and taking people to the Role2 medical facility. We know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were at Role2 because they could say "I'm in the MEU." 82nd took Ryan Knauss to Role 2 and learned he wasn't 82nd and promptly moved him to the MUEs Role 2. I immediately went to the JOC and they said no one was leaving and I went to go get

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Were there any reports of Marines taking gun fire?

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(2) Answer. I'm not sure I wasn't paying attention to that specifically. The speaker took the brunt of the blast but the motor in the truck worked. I never heard they were taking gunfire.

The equipment you brought here they said destroy everything. There were Marines beating on windows and smashing things. Half of my equipment was already loaded into shipping containers, so it made it out of HKIA.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. What did you do after the attack?

(2) Answer. After the explosion they said gates are done we're done. EOD was working on a demo plan and they were going to dig a hole and then they were told they wouldn't be doing any demo. The equipment we brought here they said destroy everything. There were Marines beating on windows and smashing things. Half of my equipment was already loaded into shipping containers so it made it out of HKIA.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. Do you follow any social media about all this?

(2) Answer. I follow (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I met up with him on the anniversary. I did see the most recent address. Some of his accounts I agree with and I remember the "hey I see this possible can we engage" and I was the only (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) so that was me when he says (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Did you see any leadership at the gates?

(2) Answer. I did see a few bronze oak-leaves out there and Gen Sullivan was at the time Task Force 51/5 CDR. And we were all shocked to see him go and meet with the Taliban. I wouldn't necessarily say it was targeting and engaging authority as it was more of a "can I shoot this guy"

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Do you remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being on ground or him being in the tower?

(2) Answer. I didn't know many officers outside of the MEU so I can't recall if I saw him out there or not.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1

(1) Question. Anything you want to add?

(2) Answer. I don't believe any of what I am saying is groundbreaking. Obviously, this was geared toward the incident. The biggest thing I had to come to terms with was playing God. You have 18- and 19-year-old kids that have been a Marine for 8 months and they have to make the decision of whether or not to act on ROE and they are standing right by the Taliban. And there were times where people look like Americans and talk like them and the Taliban took their documents. Had an ANA 4 star come up and say call your JOC they're expecting me. In plain clothes. I didn't see or catch or pick up on anything.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the time they flew in were on the night shift with me and they may have seen or heard different things (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

No I already went there (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went up there once or twice. It was never a set plan to go here first. But as we didn't belong to anyone specifically, they would ask what are you doing out here (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from what I saw, my time in (b)(1)1.4a CLB XO, all my training was BLT 1/8, from just talking to him and seeing how things were out there. We would offer our help, but he would help significantly.

It never clicked that they were separate companies.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Kolter R. Miller
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for release



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 25 October 2023, which begins on question page 1 and ends on question page 56. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

25 OCT 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
 [REDACTED] (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2023, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [REDACTED] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.
2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.
3. Discussion.
 - a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.
 - b. Question and Answer 1.
 - (1) Question. What do you do?
 - (2) Answer. I work with armed forces reviewing reserve medical cases of those who were injured during training.
 - c. Question and Answer 2.
 - (1) Question. How do you think your career progression has been?
 - (2) Answer. I had a bit of an issue coming back with family because of the transition.
 - d. Question and Answer 3.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(1) Question. What unit were you attached to and what did you do?

(2) Answer. G Company 3rd platoon, we did the normal ITX running ranges that training. My platoon worked with the SSGts and medical. Make sure you all teach as much as you know and to be as proficient. We got tasked with the Tactical Recovery mission. We did one TRAP Mission profile in the 53 Area and then we went to do a mission profile to see how long it would take to treat a patient and the bird would get us.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Did you start receiving briefs on ROE?

(2) Answer. We did before deploying but didn't receive anything on Afghanistan specifically. We were told we weren't going to support anything there or do anything until we did. I signed a 10 year NDA on March 15, 21 while we were doing QRF so I cant really talk about that. Worked with people down there and we were in (b)(1)1.4a for three and a half months. Took it upon ourselves in medical team where we ran scenarios and drills to teach all that we could. We had patients 2-300 meters from each other. If they messed up they restarted. We did inflight IV. Day and night .

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. When did you know you would be going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. August 3rd we came back to (b)(1)1.4a with G Co. Special training operation center 4 days CQB stuff. After the 4th day 1Sgt and the CO watched us train and we went back and were told we would be going to Afghanistan, and we went back to the camp and were told what we could take. Hey you're on a 96 tether and that was around the time we knew but didn't know when. After a few days when we returned to camp all the ammo and everything was out and we packed what we needed and left.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did they tell you what the mission was in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. At first it was we would pick up high value targets. We would do that at first, but they decided that would be too dangerous. They gave a quick brief at the airport of ROE at the airport. "make your best judgements" if you feel safe engage/ do what you have to do. We were checking that they had the right documents.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. NEO. What day you arrived in Afghan August 15 21

(2) Answer. It was dark. When we arrived, they had us run to the terminal. We did weapons checks and made sure we had everything. We did PCC and PCI checks.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

There were so many citizens at the airport. They put us in a gym then we did another PCC and PCI check to make sure nothing was lost on the walk to the gym. We received a brief on what we would do. The next day we were told to stand at Abbey Gate. We were searching the females. We pulled the women out of line and took them to the back to search, out of respect for their religion. I found a book that showed us how to say we are medical. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained to the women we would need to search them. We found mostly gold and money on the women. Gold bracelets mostly up their arms. After the search we put them back in line. That was Day 1. Day 2 they put G Co 3 Platoon on crowd control outside of Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. How were you organized? What was your medical team structure?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) we kind of just ran a 2 person team for 28 guys in the platoon.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Would you say your training was more decentralized from 3rd Platoon?

(2) Answer. We always integrated the training. We always taught TCCC. If a specific thing was needed in an algorithm, we did a one on one with that person.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. How often would you say Corpsman were integrated with 3rd platoon prior to deploying to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. From July 2020 up to deployment it was a daily thing. We were always teaching classes, or they were teaching us.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. You were with the unit a year prior to deployment. Where were you when you received ROE Brief?

(2) Answer. We were in (b)(1)1.4a The platoon Commander gave that brief (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He basically said if you feel threatened or that the civilians may feel threatened by the enemy then that gives you cause to engage. If shots are taken at you or your life is in danger. People take this differently but that's what I understood. I am not sure about anyone else. It was in a huddle away from everyone. They made sure everyone wrote them down.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(1) Question. What was steady state like at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It was more medical beside when the Marines are vetting. It was mostly crowd control and making sure the citizens are comfortable. But I would say it's more medical because those people have been there for about a week. Me and (b)(3)130(b); (b)(6) we were working with heat cats non-stop and elderly. 200-300 heat Casualties. We didn't know initially where the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) was set up. Did you know there was a platoon 2 and a half to three miles down the road. I was taken there. I established a rapport because the enroute Corpsman were with them. They said if there are major injuries take care of them if not let us know. I briefed the G Co Corpsman (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Max. This is where the STP is and we can take them there for better care. (b)(1)1.4d had a connex that they kept locked that had AC. We asked to use it but they wouldn't open it. We kicked the door in and used it. We started rendering care in there. While we were treating patients, they were just dropping to get behind the gate. Once someone dropped, we searched and brought them to the box.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Did you get any sleep? What did that look like for you?

(2) Answer. About 10pm we would turnover with CAAT platoon ... 10-11 sleep at night and up at 0500 to get back into the rhythm. We did that about 7 days straight.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you ever receive any threat briefs or info?

(2) Answer. They kind of said to keep an eye out for suspicious people around our platoon. Once we heard there was a threat it was 2 days prior to that stuff happening. They didn't tell us what we had to do. We just talked to each other and our people. We said 'hey if this happens this is the actions we will have to take'. We had heard that chatter the last couple of days.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Were you ever told about any imminent threats? What were the Marines told to do in cases like that?

(2) Answer. They were told to fall back behind the gate and get into a defensive posture and to keep a clear sight of the battlefield.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. As far as you could tell did the leadership take threats seriously?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes, because there was a point in time where people kept going past the gate and wall but they were told to keep their distance. We ended up setting a CCP. It was ten meters from the outer gate. That's where the casualty collection point was. Critically wounded was behind cover. They plan to move people down kind of fell apart and people just started running through the gate. We had to get to a point to regroup. On the 24th was when we set up the pre-planned CCP.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How often did you see officers in platoon company and battalion level at the gate?

(2) Answer. They were there all the time. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) every day. It was constant officers were at the gate. I didn't know many officers outside of my platoon. I saw the (b)(6) on day 2. My section was calm, and I was working with interpreters and my (b)(6) walked up to me and said it looks like you guys are pretty calm. And I saw him again the day of the blast.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I didn't see the Taliban personally. I just knew they were by the horseshoe area.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban hurt or shoot anyone?

(2) Answer. No, it was all hearsay. Just stories being told but I was focused on the medical aspect. There were shots going off from (b)(1)1.4d guys.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. At any point 20th -26th was there ever a change on the ROE?

(2) Answer. No one specifically came and told me the ROE had changed.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What were you told regarding bolo specifics?

(2) Answer. They told us to look out for a clean-shaven fresh-looking person. It was hard to tell if anyone fit that description because of how much medical stuff we were dealing with. There were times where we did interact with the crowd and that

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

would be towards the evening. It was pretty rowdy. In the afternoon, it was saving babies from c wire and stuff.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Did you feel not safe or as if the Commd wasn't taking the appropriate mitigation steps?

(2) Answer. Someone told me they were supposed to close the gate once we got the threat, but they didn't and that did make me nervous, but I always tried to put myself in the safest spot.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Do you feel that you were informed of the environment of what to team was doing?

(2) Answer. I think communication was a big thing everyone had trouble with. People kept getting pulled left and right. It was either take care of this or handle that. I didn't have a radio. Information got to me through the PL, CO CDR, or the SSgt.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. How did they disseminate info?

(2) Answer. They said they would use Signal but I believe that was for the CMD but my PLT CDR came and told us once he knew something.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. At night was more engagement with the crowd. Did you start in the morning, was there a brief every morning or what?

(2) Answer. Our PLT CDR and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would have their huddle at night. Once they received info, they would tell us before we stepped off.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. How did that change over time, what did that look like?

(2) Answer. Ever changing. The first patient I worked with was a 6-month-old baby. The baby was wrapped in too many blankets and the baby was not responding. I did my checks and ended up unwrapping the baby. I gave the baby a sternum rub and they baby came too, I doused the blankets in cold water and we got it checked out. I just found work to do. I walked in the general location of my platoon, checking and making sure they are good making sure if they needed water or a break, they got that.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. The posture that changed based on the threat. Prior to the blast can you recall how many times you had to get down and take cover?

(2) Answer. There was one night, the second or third day. Some guy, we were working in the middle section manning the area in the inner corridor and some guy popped up with an AK and just started shooting in the air. Everyone just turned towards the guy really quick and got behind the gate. It happened twice and the marines threw flash bangs over. We don't know who the shooter was. We weren't given a direct description of who or what to look for, only that there was a possible IED. We were just trying to do the right thing.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Who gave the clean-shaven report? Is there any standing description?

(2) Answer. It was put out by squad leaders. When people do things like that, clean shaven is what they typically look like. No specific clothing, they said watch out for backpacks, but everyone had that. Everyone in the crowd looked like that. It is hard to see that specifically in the crowd, because you have to be trained for that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. At any point throughout your time at Abbey gate was there anyone circulating a picture of someone who would pose a threat?

(2) Answer. No. I would everything in my green book. I did just a rough draft of everything. I personally did not see a photo of anyone.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Any interaction with the tower? The snipers?

(2) Answer. No just the corpsman attached to me. At first, he was help support, stayed attached to his team but he did help out treating civilians and walking around. He helped and trained with TCCC.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. What there a point where your two would talk and would share anything?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. No, it was just normal chatter, here is where CCP is. W/ Medical Communication has to be on point.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Day of the blast, 10-15 minutes prior to where are you and what are you doing?

(2) Answer. We woke up in the van that morning around 0800. At that time HM3 Soviak had started collecting kids. From 0800 - 1100 we just started taking kids. We took about 25 kids to one of the facilities. Around 2030 we got the word to go to the gym to clean our face and do hygiene. Gunny comes running in and said we have to go back and said something like you have to relieve 1st platoon. We stood there a couple of hours, then gave word they were about to close the gate. I'm sitting on an MRE box. We were shooting the shit. I spit in on the ground I looked back up, and everything slowed down. As soon as I look up the IED goes off. I saw clothing and people in the air. Go to the X, we grab our med bags, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said we need to stand here; this is game time.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe he was brought up by a SSgt. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6) Another Corpsman (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

another went to the black. A Corpsman was freaking out and out SSgt was trying to calm him down. I grabbed his flack and said "This is what the fuck we do, this is what we trained for," and then I proceeded to tell him what I needed from my med bag, more gauze and an IV starter kit and he calmed down a little after that.

We pulled up to the STP and they are outside waiting for us and they sent a few people to help us get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out the back. I talked to him once he got on the table, and he talked back to me. The doc told me I could let go. I asked three time are you sure and the Doc assured me it was okay to let go, and I let go. I grabbed two handfuls of med bags. And asked the Doc if they needed them and she told me to take them, and I got back in the van, and we went back to where we were treating patients. I met with my senior line and met with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). And he asked to start triaging patients and pass it up to 1SGT I got up to nine or ten people. 1Sgt is trying to get all the numbers. This is all at the CCP. I hop on another patient HM3 Soviak. (b)(6)

(b)(6) The best way to describe it would be the goonies movies. I
(b)(6)

method. I knew he was gone, and we put him in the back of the van and my SSgt told me to work on another patient. It was a young girl. Shrapnel metal through the back came out the top. We made sure she didn't have breathing issues. But she was good just a little freaked out.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

I found it and I had only one gram of TXA left and some ketamine and got him in the back on the van. The Marines started getting in a defensive posture to protect the CCP and us, and that's what I saw from looking around. When I came back, I saw the (b)(6) I grabbed him by the flack and told him where there was protection. I don't believe he was talking while he was injured just looked a little out of it. I told him to go where to go behind the Marines, and that was the last time I saw him. We were working on patients. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

When I returned again the Marines were in more in a defensive posture.

I was in the Casualty Collection Point when the blast went off and I was in the HESCO barrier. I was not injured. (b)(6) One of the most crucial things we wish we had when the IED went off. When we were in (b)(1)1.4d they took our Independent duty corpsman from us and they said they needed him in (b)(1)1.4d because of this we would go to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for things we hadn't seen before. The STP Doc froze at the triage point and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took over the inner gate of that location as far as patients coming.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What are the different levels/ types of Medics?

(2) Answer. Basic E-1 to E-5 can be basic corpsman in infantry platoon. Don't have higher echelon of care cannot sign off on prescriptions. IDC That's more free range of treating medical in the clinic. One step below PA but can still do what they do, chest tubes and things. Anywhere between E5 to E6, he would have been our triage office- person taken while in (b)(1)1.4d That kind of took away from our role. He said he did nothing in (b)(1)1.4d I am unsure of behind the scenes.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What was the medical ROE?

(2) Answer. It was never clearly defined.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Did any leadership ask you to treat civilians?

(2) Answer. No, the marines said that prior to the NEO, we didn't have the medical supplies to support everyone. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) built a trauma box and brought it and if we needed supplies then we wouldn't have run out fast.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(1) Question. Have you watched any of the testimony or YouTube videos of Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I don't get into all of that. I know my story and that's my story. And their story is their story. But I tried to do my best with what I was given. I just cared about the medicine. When I came back, they looked at me like you don't have your pin you're nothing.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Have you ever sat down and talked to the 3rd platoon marines?

(2) Answer. I talk to the squad leaders, but I talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he was just a grunt there. He thanks me for saving his life all the time.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. Is there anything that you want to tell us or want to add.

(2) Answer. No. I just want to tell my story the way I saw it. I have a video from the day. We were just chillin at the CCP point and relaxing. If I recorded another 3-5 minutes it would have recorded the blast.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Do you think there is anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He worked on, Sanchez and Lopez. Pretty much the same as I did. He was with HMS he was up with the HQ.

Describe for me that day when the blast happened. Walk me through it once that blast happened.

When the blast happened, I was positioned 25 meters from the Sniper tower. I was relaxing on an MRE Box. Everything slowed down and then the IED Blast went off. I grabbed my med bag, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the Senior line corpsman and he jumped in front of us, so that we can stay at the Control Casual collect P1 and P2. As patients came to us. We saw some had marines put at least a tourniquet on some of them. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought patients to me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I noticed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was saying I don't know what to do repeatedly, so I grabbed him and said this is what the fuck we do, this is what we trained for and told him to get everything I needed to keep treating this patient. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave us a thumbs up. I was still holding pressure and people came to help get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) off the bus and the doc asked what happened and I explained and gave her a quick overview of the patient's recent medical history, and she told me to let go. I go to grab a couple of med bags and asked if they needed them, and they said no take them I got back to the medline and asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what he needed from me. He said start checking, expected patients and I got up to 9 or 10 patients I gave the piece of papers that had the casualty triage card to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he gave it to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) so that he had a number of what is to come. I hopped on HM3 Max Soviak,

(b)(6)

her down. She seemed fine just a little scared. I saw 5 patients in total. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

hey, it happens. I know from being there to the moment we left I'd say we treated 200-300 heat injuries of Afghan civilians. Most had limbs locked up. Babies maybe 50-60 babies that had injuries. A couple with c wire injuries. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought two young girls 5 and 3. Before, we just ran, a young girl that got stepped on, her to the STP on a litter that as 3 miles away. Right before we left a British soldier arrived pulled up offering to help. On the way back from dropping of the woman off. There were two young girls that had 80% of their body burned. The mom and sister only said Taliban repeatedly. The mom said the Taliban came into their house and burned. The STP kept turning them away. Once I showed the people the extent of the injuries under the two girls clothes, they were shocked and only just began treating the young girls. I almost delivered two babies. I got a pregnant woman to the plane where soon after the plane took off, she had the two babies.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 25 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 10. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025

DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

25 OCT 2023

DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. [redacted] (b)(1)30b, (b)(6) Since we conducted a group interview with your team during the investigation two years ago and didn't cover it then, what is your personal background?

(2) Answer. I entered the Marine Corps in [redacted] (b)(6). I was an infantryman, I arrived to 2/1 in March of 2015 as an 0311. I did the selection for scout sniper in [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). From there we deployed on the 13th MEU in February or March of 2016. We sailed through PACOM, from San Diego to Hawaii, then up to 5th Fleet into CENTCOM. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a We went here and there. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a operating in the AOR. We got back in September of 2016, and I turned 21 when we got back.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

After that, I had a break of time with scout sniper platoon. I got the boot because I got in trouble, so I re-applied in February of 2017. After that we did a workup, then a unit rotation to Okinawa from October of 2017 to around March/April of 2018. From there, I [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Then I went back to 2/1, went to sniper school in the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Then in March or April of 2019 we went to the 31st MEU until getting back in the fall of 2019.

From there, I went to the Scout Sniper Unit Leader's Course in [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I went to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) after that. I was a non-select, but made it through [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I came back after that, finished up ITX. Around January or February of 21 we were solidified to go on the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a then in April we deployed and went to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a That was a nice space.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)130b, (b)(6) You were attached to Echo Company for that?

(2) Answer. Yes. Team 1 was with Fox Company at the BEC in Iraq. We were attached to Echo Company, the crisis response company. The other team and a half remained with Weapons Company in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d in a general support role. Golf Company was over in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)130b, (b)(6) When did you hear that you would support a NEO?

(2) Answer. We started talking about it right when we moved from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d So about 2 weeks before that move, in late May it popped up on the radar. Definitely in June in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d it was on the radar. Our team was going on training rotations with platoons from Echo Company to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d Every time the phone rang we thought it might be call to go. Early to Mid-July, the writing was on the wall that someone was going to go. We were waiting with our bags packed, that was frustrating. We saw the Taliban stalemating on how many provinces they had, then they suddenly took the whole country except for Kabul. All while we were sitting there. That was interesting.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)130b, (b)(6) When did you get notified you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. Around 13 August, 2021. First or second week of August. We were doing a lot of IPBs with the CO and [REDACTED] (b)(6) and getting ROE briefs.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)130b, (b)(6) What was in those ROE briefs?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Inherent right of self-defense, defense of others and US military personnel and assets. That was about it, if you were in fear of your life and had positive ID. It circled around that you would see people with guns, but it might be the ANA. And obviously we knew the Taliban were around, so we knew we needed hostile intent.

Someone asked if we saw Taliban shooting into the crowd, could we shoot at the Taliban? And the answer was no unless we could identify US civilians in the crowd. That's where the SJA drew the line. If I'm remembering correctly, if we saw someone engaging the (b)(1)1.4 that wasn't even enough.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Did anyone ask to clarify that?

(2) Answer. I can't remember. Someone asked if we saw the Taliban shoot into a crowd and killed people, could we do anything. That stuck with me, since that is something I personally saw.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So it was defensive ROE, you need hostile act and intent. If it was a threat to others, you had to identify it was a US citizen or personnel that was in danger?

(2) Answer. That was my understanding of it. CNN walked out there one day with their entourage, so I knew that if someone shot at them, I could defend them.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: When did you depart for HKIA?

(2) Answer. I believe it was the 16th. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived the 16th with the quartering party, about 24 hours prior to us. We landed about 0200 or 0300 on the 17th.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: What happened on arrival?

(2) Answer. I flew in with the rest of my team and 2nd Platoon, Echo Company, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with us, from 2nd Platoon. We linked up with the headquarters element from Echo, some of the battalion, then found our spot in the gym. I punched out with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get the lay of the land. We grabbed a John Deere gator and drove around to take everything in and get a baseline on how we could put ourselves into the fight. Shortly after that, our platoon commander, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up. He told us we were no longer attached to Echo Company, we were back with Weapons

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Company for tasking. Our first real task was to get to a red radar tower on the airport. We relieved the team that was there. We sat there for a day, then we broke down. We hung out with 4th Platoon, Echo after that and tried to employ ourself with them.

To back up, at the radar tower we were looking south at the main terminal. From there we observed ANA or ANP holding security at the main PAX terminal. We didn't see anything too irregular from that vantage point, it was pretty quiet. After that, we went into priorities of work. Getting observation and drawing a range card. Look for anyone doing something nefarious.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was the team doing when you got on the deck, with the chaos and the number of people?

(2) Answer. One of the first nights, when we got into the gym, from that point on there was constant gunfire. It sounded like a constant gun fight and explosions over near North Gate, I don't know if that was 10th Mountain or what. As far as my team, I got lucky. I had been with the platoon since 2015. We had two new guys that had only been with the platoon for a year, so we drafted our teams. I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because I had hawked him and brought him over to the platoon. He had done 2-3 deployments with FAST then the last few with 2/1. He is a great infantryman, that's why I wanted him. I sent him to the sniper school and he passed, crushed it. Then I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted him. After that, I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't pick (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but I got him as my point man, which was a whole debacle. He turned 19 while we were deployed. Then we also picked up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They were all good. We had good cohesion with the team. We were friends to a degree, but had the maturity to understand the chain of command in the team. I made the calls, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made calls in my absence. The guys did all the individual actions that you expect and train to. It wasn't until Abbey Gate that some of the more human dimensions popped out.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the debacle with picking (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I had originally picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I had a lot of time in the platoon with him, molding him into what I wanted him to be. Other team leaders had tried to take (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) telling me I didn't need a radio operator. I wouldn't give him up, so they took (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and gave me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It turned out to be good, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a good kid. They were just mad that I had better picks.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) OK, your initial time was spent conducting observations, and you were working for your Platoon Commander and not Echo Company?

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(2) Answer. Yes. While we were doing that, Echo Company had two platoons doing a defense on the southern side of the runway toward the pax terminal itself. After we left the radar site, we linked in with 4th platoon. There was an old air traffic control tower that they had a fire team in, saying that they thought they were getting shot at when they went on the roof. We went over there and set up to see if we could see anyone shooting at them.

We had heard reports about spotters and engagements from a Taliban sniper, so we were trying to look for that. After we set up, the Marines there walked out on the roof to have a cigarette. When they did that, they took a round overhead. The guy on the other end shooting didn't know what he was doing. We heard the snap whizz and figured the general direction it was coming from, maybe southwest. Then we hung out for a while before we got recalled.

We ran into the team leader from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). They were south of the flightline and had a hide in a half blind of an Airplane. ANA rolled up, talking. The 82nd also rolled up, exchanged some information. You could see that the ANA had like blue or red garb under their uniforms, their mannerisms were odd and they were postured and their hands were on their guns. That was interesting. After that they took off, and my team was called back to the battalion COC.

We linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and did a hotwash of the last 24 hours and got put on rest, while the other team was still out there. I had words about that with him, since we had another team stranded out there since we didn't have our own vehicles hotwired yet. I didn't get it, but he told us to hang out. That morning or night, he woke me up to go talk to the (b)(6). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came with me. The (b)(6) had a tasking for our team to occupy the sniper position at the Outer Gate of Abbey Gate. A platoon from Fox Company was supposed to move to Camp Sullivan to retrieve some American citizens and we would provide overwatch. We got our stuff together and punched out to that tower. That was around the 19th of August, I am pretty sure.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b (b)(6) What was the scene like at Abbey Gate on the 19th?

(2) Answer. We get down there, I don't know if the Fox Company platoon was there. There were Marines staged east of the gate, in the inner corridor where the HESCOs are. We got in the tower and joined a machinegun team from (b)(1)1.4d. They had one window and we had another, and we shared the window facing west out of the tower towards what would be called the chevron. The outer corridor was filled with people all the way from the gate to the intersection passed where the chevron would end up. The one west of the Barron. That's where the Taliban had their gun trucks, on the west side of the intersection. That was their ECP. They had some C-Wire on the eastern side. You could see all the way down there. We sat there for a bit, then they got the call to open the gate.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

There was a vehicle against the gate to prevent it from opening. Once they opened, it was a mad house. They deployed CS, so I had to eat that. That was great. Our (b)(6) and some PJ were sucked into the crowd. I remember the PJ trying to pull his Glock out and fire warning shots. I didn't think that was going to do anything, but that PJ had a light on his pistol. It was like he was drowning in a pool of people.

After they got the gate opened, they pushed that crowd back and back and back to the northwestern staging area by the Barron Hotel and the shack in the inner corridor. That's where we stopped for the duration of that day as we tried to get control of the situation.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sometime after that, they put in the chevron?

(2) Answer. I believe that was that night. They put in streetlights, which meant we could see but it impacted our night optics. We could only use our scopes since the NVGs would get bloomed out by too much light. After that a crane came with the shipping containers to set everything up. I took a siesta for an hour or two at that point, so things are a little hazy until the sun comes up.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That brings us about to the 20th then?

(2) Answer. That sounds about right.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the (b)(1)1.4d mission didn't happen, what was your tasking?

(2) Answer. Really nothing. I don't remember getting any follow on word (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) might have come and told us to stay in place, but we stayed because we knew that's where work was going to happen for the duration.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: When did the (b)(1)1.4d depart?

(2) Answer. The 19th or maybe the night of the 20th. We were up there with them for maybe two days, it was pretty cramped up there. Once they thought we were good, they pushed back to the Barron.

s. Question and Answer 18.

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(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) What were your comms like at this point?

(2) Answer. Spotty. Green Gear wasn't great. On the 19th or the 20th, [REDACTED] (b)(6) set up at the tower at the inner gate, looking south and west. We had decent comms with them. The day of the 20th, [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g Our Wi-Fi pucks weren't working, so it was hard to get up on Signal with the platoon commander or the [REDACTED] (b)(6) It was more just having direct line of communication between company commanders rotating in and out, or the [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) coming out. BGen Sullivan came to the gate a couple times. We always had 2 dudes on observation (obs), and 1-2 guys on rest. We couldn't just do that forever though, we had to resupply ourselves and we had a Bobcat so we usually resupplied the guys at the gate with water and MREs. Our corpsman spent a lot of time providing aid and helping out the other corpsmen. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a really, really great corpsman. He is a father, and honed in on the humanity of it all. People were just trying to leave the country, out there for days at a time, running into the Taliban, starving. Anytime people collapsed, he was trying to help people.

He would come in, nap, then go do it again. We were all just rotating on and off post to keep obs, especially to the west. We did have a line on the 153s, our black gear, to [REDACTED] (b)(6) on what we saw at the parking lot over there.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So you have some comms, who is making contact with your platoon commander and how often?

(2) Answer. He was spending a lot of time at the inner gate post. Our company had a CCP established there with some medical personnel from the battalion. I don't know if the surgical team was there. The company HQ for Weapons was, so he would come in and out of there and come visit us. He would act as re-trans for us, bouncing info forward and back. If we needed something, we could always reach him.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How often did he come to the tower?

(2) Answer. I don't know, I can't say with any kind of validity. It was regular, not sparse.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would the company commanders, [REDACTED] (b)(6), and the [REDACTED] (b)(6) come to the tower?

(2) Answer. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) did once. All the company commanders did except for [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That bird's eye view was pretty priceless, you could see over the cement wall

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and the whole area down to the other tower. You could see over the connex to a degree. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) did 2-3 times that I do remember, once on the 26th for sure.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) When you guys got to the gate, you were establishing your battle rhythm. Two guys on, one or two resting, the rest doing supply runs. That's pretty much the routine?

(2) Answer. Generally speaking, yes.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) We talked about ROE in terms of defense of others. Your understanding was that Taliban had to be shooting at US citizens to engage. Did that ever change or did it remain the same?

(2) Answer. To my understanding, it remained the same. It probably got more restrictive to a degree. I'm trying to remember, it was weird. After they put up the chevron, two up armored Humvees rolled up with weaponry. We watched an IED probe go on and we didn't know what that was.

At one point, we watched the Taliban shoot people and radioed to request engagement authority and were denied since they weren't shooting Americans.

There just weren't a lot of specifics in terms of changes that I can recall, if there was, it just wasn't something to worry about with a million other things going on. Any changes made weren't significant.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you personally see the Taliban kill people?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was on and off. It was after they put in the chevron. They would be shooting in the air, then they would look down and shoot their guns off into the crowd on the other side of the chevron. Then there was the gap between the chevron and the Barron Hotel and they would shoot people in there.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So you could see people shot in the gap between the chevron and the hotel, but you had to infer about the crowd on the other side of the chevron? But you could see them shot in the gap?

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(2) Answer. Yes. Yes, I could see the gap. I remember one time specifically, I don't remember the date I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said he saw the guys shoot two people [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said he saw them shoot one guy later that night. They were beating people constantly too.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: You saw impact and you saw people drop?

(2) Answer. Yes.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you saw that and requested engagement authority from higher?

(2) Answer. Yes, from my recollection. Specifically, the night that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on glass was the first time. The answer I remember was, "are they shooting at you or Americans, what positive ID do you have,?" and we said none since we couldn't verify that it was US citizens being killed.

It was mostly on black gear to the other team and our platoon commander to move that request higher. I know we had to use the 153 at one point. We occasionally had a direct line to battalion, but a lot of times we wouldn't.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you radioed [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the Platoon Commander requesting to engage?

(2) Answer. I guess, I can't remember exactly what I or [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said. We would see something, and I would tell him to call it up on the radio. I don't know exactly what he would say on the radio, especially if he had to go outside. I was focused on what was going on. I don't know exactly what the response was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would say that they would either say we needed positive ID or that he got no response on the radio.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why do you think the ROE was structured that way?

(2) Answer. We were told that it was because the Taliban were in a supporting role with the battalion, we had done key leader engagements with them and they were working in a support role with TF 51/5 to let people through. The American answer is they paid them not to kill us. I heard that from a couple different people.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (S) So you understood they were providing external security and we were coordinating with them?

(2) Answer. Yes. I remember standing there with the (b)(6) and he was drawing out command relationships. There was the MEU, 2/1, the 82nd, and the Taliban. BGen Sullivan and his posse and the (b)(6) did some KLEs with them at the chevron that I remember.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (W) What do you think would have happened if you shot Taliban on those occasions?

(2) Answer. I don't know. Maybe a gunfight would have ensued. From our perspective, they were in a checkpoint. We had our m110 and our SASR up there. We had a line of sight to the trucks and all the Taliban on top of the tower. In that sense for us, it would have been a turkey shoot initially. Civilians would have been getting shot for sure.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (J) Just to confirm, from your understanding did the ROE ever change while you were at HKIA? At the flight line, radar tower, or at the gate?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (S) So standard ROE hostile act and intent, positive ID, the whole time?

(2) Answer. Yes.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (B) But you felt the positive ID was impossible in terms of identifying US civilians?

(2) Answer. Yes.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (M) You mentioned an IED probe that you suspected, can you talk us through that?

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. This was around the 20th or the 21st. I can't remember the day, but it was earlier on. Team 3 cued into a black Toyota 4-Runner with a white Taliban sticker on the back. From there, they keyed in on some individuals that were out of the baseline, this was around the parking lot area by the water tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave us a couple BOLOs to look out for one guy in particular, an older gentleman we called the shot caller and the younger guy he was with. We called him the pancake hat, it was a traditional Afghan hat.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: A flat top hat with a roll called a Pakol?

(2) Answer. It looked like a stupid looking beret. We called him the pancake hat and he was with the young gentlemen. We saw them around, checking things out. We took some pictures of them. We keyed onto them. They would go back and forth. The shot caller came up to an empanada stand, we got some pictures of him. The younger gentlemen and the shot caller came to the nearside canal path across the bridge. We didn't have security there yet. They walked up past our tower. When they got to the path, Team 3 saw them. They both had a backpack and they were buddy carrying a 5-day duffel. They each had one handle. Made us wonder what could be that heavy. They walked past our tower. We were in a stand to phase, wondering what would happen. They walked into the very crowded area with 3 bags in total. They walked out with nothing.

That had us on alert. That was cause for trouble. We looked for that blue duffel, then a brown Jansport-style backpack with a Nike swoosh on it. We called it out. When they came out they had nothing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) comes up and links up with me. We walk around the jersey barriers looking for those bags. Trying to do something. We found a tan pack and called it to EOD.

They came out with their dogs, we formed a cordon. The dogs didn't find anything. We kept finding backpacks and there were just so many people.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: How did you get EOD out there?

(2) Answer. They were in and out of the area. They had emplaced (b)(1)1.4g so they were around. I assume (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or the Platoon Commander radioed it up when we saw those two individuals, they were out there pretty quick.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: But it turned out to be nothing?

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(2) Answer. We never found the bags. So to me, it was a probe on what they could get away with it. That's all I can think of.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Any other incidents with bags?

(2) Answer. A couple times bags would get thrown over the wall behind the tower and get caught in a C-wire. Marines would have to come knock it off. It happened after the blast once and it didn't concern anyone.

I know it also happened by Team 3. They saw some dudes trying to break through the wall by their position, trying to circumvent the ECP.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So multiple occasions with bags, for a number of reasons during your time there?

(2) Answer. Yes, multiple times. Everyone had back packs and suit cases, trying to cram their life into a bag and leave the country.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) What kind of intel reports were you getting IRT to threat streams and BOLOs?

(2) Answer. I remember a call out about a gold Toyota Corolla, one about a taxi cab, one about a garbage truck as possible VBIEDS. There was a report prior to the 26th of a potential suicide bomber, I can't entirely remember.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How did you receive those reports or updates?

(2) Answer. I can't really remember. Probably via 152s or 117G. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to set up the 117 Golf because we could kind of reach the COC with that. I remember [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us to keep 153 traffic to a minimum because it was essentially an open net. So it was 153, green gear of some capacity, or word of mouth.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How about Signal?

(2) Answer. I would have to look, I still have my messages.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

* Pause to scroll through Signal App*

Nothing I can find specifically right now. I don't have too much traffic during this period, mostly just some conversations between me and a corpsman I used to have that got out about people to try and find to get out.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay so communication was (b)(1)1.4a or word of mouth?

(2) Answer. Correct

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) And that was about those three VBIED threats?

(2) Answer. Yes.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. During your time out there, were you given BOLOs for individuals or possible attackers?

(2) Answer. Not before the 26th that I can recall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there times leading up to the 26th that your team identified someone that you thought was suspicious?

(2) Answer. Outside of the IED probe and trying to figure out who was in charge of the Taliban in huts down the road, no key individuals come to mind.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No suspicious individuals that your team took pictures of that you sent up to higher, anything like that?

(2) Answer. Maybe one time, prior to the 26th. We were hot swapping SD cards. There was period where we didn't have an SD card in the tower. I sent this picture of a guy in sunglasses up at one point, he just looked suspicious to me, that was on the 20th I think.

We took pictures of what we called the Red Unit Taliban, better equipped with better gear and looking in charge.

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xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: How would you pass photos up, you mentioned SD card swaps?

(2) Answer. I failed to mention that part of our battle rhythm was to head to the COC every 24 or 36 hours. We, either [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or myself, would bring our SD cards and any info we had up to the S2A, and they would burn those photos and we would use a different SD card. That's how we tried to pass up relevant information.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Who was that S2A?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. A lengthy gentleman. I think he was [REDACTED] (b)(6)

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Would [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ever come get SD cards from you?

(2) Answer. Yes, to the best of my knowledge that happened once or twice as well.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did you ever get any pictures of the Taliban shooting or harming civilians?

(2) Answer. Answer: No. I have a video on the 26th of the Taliban beating people with a stick that I'm sure you've seen, but that's about it.

As a side note, at some point, I don't know exactly when, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took the camera to the Barron. They snuck up on the wall, and were taking pictures of the Taliban in front of the chevron to try and document them killing people. I don't know what happened to those pictures, I think they would have been passed to the battalion.

I also later came to find out that a sniper team from 1/8 was engaging suspected VBIEDs from their position at North Gate. I know the ATL of that team was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Okay so you receive several VBIED threats, but aside from those two guys with the duffel bags, you never received intelligence on a suicide attacker at the gate?

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(2) Answer. Not that I can remember. The events of the 26th probably obscure some of that if there was.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But during that time, your team took photos of plenty of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Yes, we passed those up on the SD card. We would usually log those in our obslogs (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has those copies. Looking back, those are a little underwhelming. We tried to make a note in the log to the best of our ability.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Some individuals said it was frustrating to get a BOLO and see multiple people in the crowd that would fit the same description. Did you feel the same?

(2) Answer. Yes, 100% sir I would say that is accurate. To an untrained observer, from the ground level that was also processing people, you can only expect so much at one time. Definitely, 100% frustrating.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You requested to engage the Taliban on multiple occasions, were there any other requests to engage?

(2) Answer. No, and I only remember that one specific time that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked to engage. Other than that, it was just trying to find out what ROEs situations fall under, and we understood that the ROE was what it was, there wasn't much we could do about it. There was no point in asking, we knew the answer.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, there was a RIP between Golf and Echo on the night of the 25th. We know Echo had pushed the crowd out to the footbridge and had Marines dispersed along the canal wall. Do you remember that?

(2) Answer. Yes. At some point after the first day, we started to clear the near side walk way. The canal wasn't the original route for people trying to escape, it was initially the chevron. Once civilians found out they could go through the canal, they flooded that area so we needed to push them back. We had control to around the footbridge where we had an exit control point we could turn people away from. We had good dispersion along the canal, with a Marine about every 10 meters. There were probably about two squads of Marines out there. If not, probably a bit more.

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The UK was out there too, they were brutal. They were on the canal wall until they went back to the Barron Hotel. They held the bridge for a while, shoulder to shoulder with the Marines, pulling and processing people. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d were holding the line with us as far as that's concerned.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Were you awake when the RIP with Echo and Golf happened?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I did an all nighter the evening before, so I think I was catching some sleep. When I woke up on the 26th, the security was collapsed to the jersey barrier by the sniper tower, because the night before I could have walked to the footbridge.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How big was the crowd the night prior?

(2) Answer. It was massive. Once the crowd figured out they could go that way, it was packed. People resorted to walking in the canal itself. It was packed the night before, it was a sea of people on the far side of the canal. Golf collapsed security to the base of the tower, in conjunction with the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4d leaving so the crowd came to the base of the tower.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) were you tracking that the 26th the gate was going to close?

(2) Answer. I do. I think the time 1600 was being thrown around. I remember the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4d coming back and forth, getting ready to close down.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Was there a change in the crowd after the security collapsed down?

(2) Answer. Yes. Up to this point, I want to say that there was another gate east of the inner gate open. I can't remember. North Gate and East Gate were closed. We were the last point that anyone could come through on the 26th. The crowd size greatly reflected that. People were desperate. It was frustrating to me, the military aged males in the crowd. People were shoving each other, throwing themselves on the C-wire, asking Marines to shoot them. People trampling each other. That morning [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to the tower. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were close to him. He would come hang out with us to decompress. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would hang out at the base of the tower as well. I remember that morning, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would hangout. I remember looking down and seeing [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the front of the line physically

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fighting to control the crowd. I felt like he was out of control, and didn't understand what his position should have been as the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he needed to go get him. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went down and ended up pulling him out because he was out of it. People in the crowd were just desperate, it was a mess.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone tell you why Golf Company had collapsed security?

(2) Answer. At some point you are going to have to withdraw from the area, but I think we still had 12 hours of processing to do. But I don't know, I know the timeline was shifting, I think it shifted to 1600. Then when 1600 came, we still kept it open. But I don't know why they collapsed. Tactically it didn't make sense to me.

When I was coming up, we were being trained for IEDs in Afghanistan so I was always taught the importance of standoff and dispersion. By the time we got to the 26th, we had everyone bundled up on the nearside of the canal with no dispersion. Essentially the whole platoon.

To summarize, I don't know why. It doesn't make sense to me.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 26th, did you still see people in the crowd with US passports?

(2) Answer. I spent the 26th in the tower and wrapping our business up. I can only speculate, I wasn't down there at that time. My time trying to pull people out personally had kind of come to an end.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the morning of the 26th, when did you get up?

(2) Answer. Sometime early morning.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After waking up and seeing the crowd had collapsed to your tower, then what do you do that morning?

(2) Answer. We got word, sometime before midmorning, maybe around 0800 to make sure that we had our stuff packed away. The rest of the battalion was going through their destruction criteria and packing their stuff away. We were still holding

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overwatch, but also cycling back by elements of our sniper team. We have an alpha element and a bravo element. We sent our team back by elements to make sure our EDL and our serialized gear was packed away to get ready to get out of there.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: So as you were prepping to retrograde, did you spend any time on overwatch?

(2) Answer. Yes, we got a very specific BOLO on a suicide bomber. I think it came over the net, if not, it came in person. From (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if it came in person. Or maybe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The description that we were given, it was a younger clean shaven gentlemen. I can't remember if he was with another individual, but I remember another individual being a part of it. We keyed in to two individuals.

I think maybe we found them, sitting west of our tower. Close to where the blast site ended up being. I first keyed into them, then I think (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up.

(b)(1)1.4a had been up there before looking for people, but I know it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that came up on the 26th. I feel like he confirmed that the individuals we saw looked like the BOLO.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Why did he confirm that, because he received the same BOLO?

(2) Answer. To the best of my knowledge. I don't know, but he seemed pretty sure.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: About when did he come up?

(2) Answer. Around mid-morning. I don't remember his name or rank, but it was definitely a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't really know he was (b)(1)1.4a I think I figured that out after the fact.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: Okay so how were you seeing these individuals?

(2) Answer. We had pictures of the individuals, and we had the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) guy look at him through our scope, trying to discretely point out where he was in the canal. He confirmed that was the guy that the BOLO was for, that it looked like the guys.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Okay so the guys you see match the description of a BOLO, then what?

(2) Answer. We watch him and the individual that he was with. These two guys weren't trying to leave, as in evacuate the area through US personnel. The gentlemen in the black garb, had maybe a tan base layer on. He was eating a snack, some crackers or something, and handing out some little cards. We were trying to see what they said, he was only 16 meters away. The bomber was sitting with him, maybe in blue garb, I think. They were friendly, snuggled up to each other. Coaching or maybe coddling him. We watched him for maybe an hour, I don't know how long. They weren't trying to leave, everyone else was desperate to leave.

Maybe it was a false positive, but to me it looked like they had bad intentions.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The gentlemen with the black headdress, how old was he do you think? What did he look like?

(2) Answer. A little older. Maybe late thirties. I think he was bald. I can't remember. We took pictures of him through the camera and passed that SD card up. After the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up and confirmed the BOLO, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got on the radio, and we asked to shoot him after we passed up the pictures.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The other guy was in blue?

(2) Answer. Blue garb, and clean shaven. With longer, maybe curly hair.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you pass those pictures up?

(2) Answer. Before the (b)(6) into the tower, I don't remember. I think we gave the SD card to our platoon commander, or maybe the element that went back. I can't confirm that it was passed up, but to my knowledge it was passed up in the late morning of the 26th.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How long did you continue to observe those two for?

(2) Answer. I can't really remember. I remember that after we asked to shoot them, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up. We talked him through what we saw. We told him we saw

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the guy, that the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up and confirmed that those were the guys of the BOLO. I talked him through the details, that they were 16 meters away and that we would shoot him with the .308 and did the math for point of aim and point of impact. I told him I would shoot both guys through their face, and it would probably hit someone behind them.

I asked him where the engagement authority for that was, he said that was a good question, then he left. Sometime after he left, [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came back up, then we lost sight of the BOLO.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Prior to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) coming up, you said the request was called up. To where, the COC? And who was in the tower when your team called it up?

(2) Answer. Either the COC or our platoon commander. I think it was me [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time. We were alpha echelon [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gun [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took pictures, then [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) called it up.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Do you remember what [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked the CoC?

(2) Answer. I don't remember specifically. It would have been along the lines of, "We have PID, and we are requesting to engage." It was enough to get the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) to walk up.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Did the COC respond?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I didn't hear it and I don't remember [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talking about a response. I think the radio was in the tower at the time.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: How long after that call until the [REDACTED] (b)(6) came to the tower?

(2) Answer. I can't quantify that.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b: Who was in the tower when the [REDACTED] (b)(6) comes and who does the talking?

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(2) Answer. Me, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were there. I primarily did the talking, it was mostly me.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you point those individuals out to him, or did you show him the pictures? Did he already see the pictures since you sent them up?

(2) Answer. He may have seen the pictures. I definitely didn't blatantly point them out because we didn't want to spook them. I think I vaguely talked him on, maybe scooted the spotting scope back so he could look through. I cant remember if I had him look through.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you told him how you would engage the target, then what did you say?

(2) Answer. That we want to shoot that guy, and we wanted to know where the engagement authority lied for this. That's what we asked, and he said good question. Then we may have exchanged a few more words, then he departed.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember what those few more words were?

(2) Answer. No I don't.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Have you seen [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC testimony?

(2) Answer. I haven't. I have spent a lot of time with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we lived through most of it. I stay away from social media accounts of it for the most part. I watched part of it, but not all of it in its entirety.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): He recounts this sequence of events and states that the team showed the [REDACTED] (b)(6) the individual and he asked for the authority to authorize engagement, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says he asks, "Well then who does," when the [REDACTED] (b)(6) said he doesn't know. Does that line up with your recollection?

(2) Answer. I remember the [REDACTED] (b)(6) answer being to the effect of, that's a good question or I don't know. I was primarily doing the talking. I am sure

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) chimed in here and there. I can't 100% recall. We conveyed the information that we needed to convey.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): After saying he doesn't know, did you ever hear anything back about that request?

(2) Answer. Nothing.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): did you ever try to follow up with your platoon commander?

(2) Answer. I don't remember so. I remember after we lost the individuals, we rotated back to get our gear. Right when I got back to the tower, that's when the bomb went off.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was it still morning when you talked to the [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I want to say that sounds accurate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you lose track of those individuals?

(2) Answer. I want to say in the afternoon.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You think it was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the tower at the time?

(2) Answer. That sounds accurate.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you have the SD card with those pictures?

(2) Answer. No, we never got it back.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

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(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6): Did anyone else besides the [REDACTED] (b)(6) and the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) come to talk about those pictures?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6): Do you think that was the bomber that you saw?

(2) Answer. I can only speculate. I think potentially, yeah. Why would two guys sit there for a while, scout out an area and then leave. Then a couple hours later the bomb goes off.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6): Did you have authority to engage those individuals under the ROE?

(2) Answer. No.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6): Could you identify those guys as part of a hostile force, like ISIS-K?

(2) Answer. Negative.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6): As a scout sniper team leader, you understood ROE. If you understood the ROE, and you knew you weren't authorized to engage that target, why request authorization to engage?

(2) Answer. Because it was two dudes that we did not have 100% PID on just sitting there. Going on a hunch, they were sitting there looking suspicious. The one guy eating crackers didn't have guns or a bomb that you could see. The younger individual didn't look like he had a suicide vest or anything like that, he didn't even use a suicide vest. So the intent looked like it was somewhere there, but we didn't know if it was with them. If that makes sense. We had a description over the radio, and a Marine confirm that these guys matched the description. It plays into the rabbit hole of, can you just start shooting guys who are a little suspicious?

To answer the question directly, we asked to engage in the event that it was an opportunity to kill the individual that we suspected to be the suicide bomber.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were there other Afghans that looked like them and could have matched the description of that BOLO in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Yeah, absolutely. But it plays into the factor of the guys sitting there on the wall, with the older guy coaching the younger guy. They weren't doing what everyone else was doing and they matched a description. That's the best that we had to go off of.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Moving into the afternoon of the 26th, you had lost observation of that individual before you went to take care of your gear?

(2) Answer. Yes.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else unique on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was a very specific time hack that they thought the suicide bomber was going to detonate. If I remember, about a minute prior to that time all the Marines laid down and got behind cover. I stayed on the gun. Someone had to keep their head up. We buttoned up and closed our windows. Made sure everyone had flaks and Kevlars on.

That's the other thing. That morning when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in our tower, I think we took a round to the tower, right in the window behind (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) head. Those windows are thick. Something impacted the window, and it spider webbed. Throwing something at the window wouldn't have done that. We heard a hard thwack. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told him to put his Kevlar on, he thought we just got shot at, and that was a guy with prior combat experience.

Also on the morning, we saw a husky Russian-Afghan looking guy with an AK with a grenade launcher mounted on it. We saw someone else with a gun too, and we saw that guy just whacking people with a stick. He had a vest with grenades on, he was standing next to our guy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who just looked up at me like he couldn't believe what he was seeing. I think that was all prior to keying into the suicide bomber.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you see the (b)(6) or the (b)(6) again prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. I don't think I did. If I did it was in passing, and the opportunity to engage those two guys had passed.

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www. Question and Answer 100.(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was leadership presence like at the gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) down by the canal, I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) by the wall. I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that day because he came and sat in the tower at some point before our conversation with the CO. I might be getting my days mixed up. That shot we took to the window might have happened the day before.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anyone else that sticks out? We acknowledge you were in the tower throughout the day.

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you go to recover your gear?

(2) Answer. Maybe 1300. It was early afternoon [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to make sure our EDL was squared away earlier. I definitely saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that day, because he's the one who told us to get our stuff packed. And I think to take a shower too. Intermittently, he would come put two guys in the tower so we could go do hygiene, but there was no way to really do that since everyone was so disgusting. We went to go take a shower in the hidden showers behind the gym, but the water was out. I shaved since people were upset we hadn't shaved in a week. That's when we started to head back out there.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you stop in the COC or the JOC while you were at North HKIA to ask about the suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No. I wonder about that thinking back, but the guys were gone by that point. Nobody had eyes on them and I was frustrated with other stuff. It's frustrating to think back on, that maybe I should have asked more questions. We didn't stop in, that I remember. We headed back. I think fourth platoon was staged by the inner gate.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were in an up armored blue Range Rover. We dropped some stuff with fourth platoon, I was feeling like I was in a rush to get back to the tower. That was a pretty common feeling. They gave us a bunch of CS and Flashbangs that we put in the truck. That's when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) headed back while we did that. Once we got loaded, we took off and we were pulling up to the sniper tower when some engineers asked us to back up. That's when the bomb went off.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was you, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the vehicle at the time?

(2) Answer. Yea. I looked at [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and told him it was an IED. I ran to the tower, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) finished parking and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was trying to kick his way out of the back of the truck since the door was stuck.

bbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You were in the truck, were the windows open? What did it sound like?

(2) Answer. The windows wouldn't open. I don't really remember what it sounded like when it went off just a loud boom. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said it kind of hurt. I just remember the massive cloud of smoke, debris, and body parts. There was nothing else it could have been, just a massive explosion and the cloud of debris was twice as tall as the tower. It obscured everything in the area.

cccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So what did you do when you got out?

(2) Answer. I ran right into the tower. I tried to get some SA on what was going on. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in there, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was freaking out; I think he was close to the window when it went off, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was standing there with the SAS, screaming. I was asking where [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were, trying to figure everything out. I was just looking around.

I remember running up to the tower and running into a big 6'2" Marine. I ran into him and he fell on his back. There were dudes covered in blood running out of the smoke. In the tower, I could the debris was starting to settle. I was trying to see everything in the canal. Marines were laying everywhere. I was trying to find [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), the guys said they went out there. That's when I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just laying there with everybody else. That's when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up. I told him that he needed to get accountability because I was going down to help.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where did you see [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time?

(2) Answer. I ran into the tower, and I saw him in the corner between the canal wall and the jersey barrier. He was really close. He was laid out. I can't remember if his eyes were shut or open, I just saw him lying there.

eeee. Question and Answer 108.

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(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So then you went down to get him?

(2) Answer: Yeah. This all happened really quickly. I tried to go out (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabbed me and told me to wait. Part of our planning process for this was that this could have been a complex attack. Their MLCOA would be to follow the bombing up with an attack. So (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to wait, we waited for like 10 seconds. Then he told me to go. I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) through the fence. Gunny told me we needed to cut a hole in the fence, since the initial hole was 30 meters away. I tried to throw a rock at the tower, to tell them to pass down the breaching kit we brought with us, I wanted the bolt cutters. I had to run back into the tower and yell at them to give me the bolt cutters. I then went to cut a hole in the fence, another Marine helped me do that. I remember getting a weird adrenaline dump and felt tired doing that. We pried the fence back, then I tried to aid (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got to him; I was just going to drag him out. I grabbed him, he screamed a little bit. I figured that would have to do, so I took a knee behind the canal wall. We weren't taking any direct fire at that time.

I do remember looking at the fence as I was going through and hearing some cracks overhead. It sounded like gunshots; I couldn't tell you from what direction. I know that one of the first things I heard was the M2 on the Taliban gun truck, but we weren't taking any fire from them at all. So that wasn't to worry about.

I got to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) dragged him a bit, he screamed. I decided to triage him a bit. Shortly after, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up. We tried to do a little triage since we weren't taking fire. Then we moved (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out, so I think we threw him on a riot shield and carried him back to the tower. I think I handed him off to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) dropped him off at the CCP, then I went out to see if anything else needed to happen. No one had security to the east, so I posted up on the jersey barrier facing that way with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

At some point, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us to come and break it down (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I bounded back in at that point. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were still out there taking a knee by the X. I told them to get up and move. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me he was a commissioned officer. I couldn't figure out what they were doing. It was ridiculous and it pissed me off. That was incompetence. After that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) directed me where to post up, but I realized I shouldn't be doing that. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pulled us all back into the gate. At that time a dude and a girl were running up to the gate with a backpack, I almost shot them. We held them back, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to let them in. That confused me, we just got blown up, why are we going to let everybody in. I felt like we didn't need to let everyone in. After that we closed the gate. I think a backpack was thrown over the wall at some point. It was a mad house.

I remember when I was pulling security by the vehicle outside the gate, I was looking at the Taliban by the Chevron through my sights. I saw a dude in a lawn chair pointing and laughing. I wanted them to do something stupid, I would have taken them out.

After that whole debacle, I went back into the tower. At that point, the guys told me that they took fire from the east side of the tower. They described it as two shots to the south

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

side of the tower, then one more after they closed the window. After that, we grabbed the pen flares that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had acquired. There were gaggles of people by the canal we wanted to disperse.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up and asked if we saw anything. We saw some kid with a phone near the blast site, and we pointed him out. He was like 13, the warrant officer told us to just leave the kid. We just started shooting pen flares near crowds to get them to leave the area and establish our security posture.

Then we just break down our stuff and pack up to head back to inner gate where we consolidated with everybody. We held rear security while the company moved out of there.

ffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) When you got to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Is that the only casualty you had treated?

(2) Answer. It was. It pissed me off, because it felt like he had been stepped over and left there by the time we got him. The fact that he is alive is insane to me, because he was in a pile of dead bodies. No one I know that was around him lived. Hoover was next to him and succumbed to his wounds, so I guess it would make sense that bodies got pulled off of him.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you see him at the Role II?

(2) Answer. I don't think that I did, my Corpsman and I went to look for him. A (b)(1)1.4a a mammoth of a man with a beard asked us what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked like. He talked to us about it and told us that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was barely holding on and fighting through his injuries. I don't think I actually saw him. If I did, it was very briefly.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

iiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you know who made the decision to send him to the Shock Trauma Platoon instead of directly to the Role II?

(2) Answer. Probably the MEDEVAC vehicle. I think he was just so urgent that they ran him directly to the STP, since so much was going on and everyone else was treating other people. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) treated him some at the CCP and put some occlusive dressings on his wounds. Thinking back, it was pretty lucky. While we were in (b)(1)1.4a we did training on the dummies that bleed. Figuring out a hasty method to make a junctional tourniquet. I felt bad, talking to the corpsman what the blood looked like coming out, and they told me it was probably a severed artery. I don't know if I could have known that about his leg at the time.

jjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you receive any blast effects, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

kkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever interact with (b)(1)1.4a in the tower?

(2) Answer. Potentially, but I am not sure.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question. C1: Would anyone mean (b)(1)1.4a when they say (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Potentially, but not in the capacity that I think of it. I can't say for sure. I can say the doctor I talked to that treated him was the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

mmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Going back to the individual that was out of place on the 26th, who took the picture?

(2) Answer. I believe it was me.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

nnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you show that picture to anyone at the COC?

(2) Answer. I believe that we passed the SD card with the pictures to the COC.

oooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you show the camera itself to anyone?

(2) Answer. I believe (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) I still don't know his name. We had limited interactions with him prior. There were a million people coming to the gate, and we had the best view.

pppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember who was there when you showed the picture to the COC?

(2) Answer. I don't recall or any responses.

qqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what you said in conjunction with passing that picture?

(2) Answer. Not specifically, no.

rrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question. C1: Did you get an out brief after the event?

(2) Answer. Not other than the hotwash and the initial investigation that your team did.

ssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Based on your recollection, did you ever see someone shoot at the tower?

(2) Answer. I never saw anyone shoot at the tower, no.

tttt. Question and Answer 123.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered that he was alert, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Are you in touch with him?

(2) Answer. I see him regularly. I was in the room when he did the podcast with Travis Haley.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you done any interviews?

(2) Answer. No. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think. It was an (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he just wanted my account of things.

wwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned seeing the human dimensions of your team at the gate. What do you mean by that?

(2) Answer. Compounding fatigue and lack of sleep. Looking through magnified optics for lengths of times rots your brain, you get fatigued. Couple that with babies being thrown, people dying, seeing that desperation. It weighed on people, especially our corpsman. He is a father, as is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). People had a hard time with that, seeing the things that happened.

People would lose their shit sometimes. I yelled at two Marines for pointing their grenade launcher with a sponge round in it at two civilians from real close. I was like, "what are you doing?" We wanted to help, it was hard to sleep with everything going on. So we helped, people were getting mad and people were tired. Then there was also a language barrier. Ultimately, these are all human beings. What if these people were your mother or your sister? People are desperate.

xxxxx. Question and Answer 127.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is this the photo of the guy that you saw? *Shows the picture of the bearded individual sitting on the wall. *

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. That is the picture. That's the dude. I think we had another picture of the individual behind him in the blue too. That is the guy that he was sitting with, I think. Maybe we didn't have a picture of the other guy, but this dude for sure is the one that was eating crackers and coddling the younger guy.

Maybe we didn't get a picture of the other guy that he was with, but definitely this bald guy in black matched the BOLO. I don't know if this second guy of the photo was the second individual. I don't think the second individual is in this photo.

yyyyy. Question and Answer 128.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. The State Department sucks. We were doing their job the whole time while they were working a 9-5. I saw their after action, and stopped reading after the first two paragraphs. They just wanted to shift the blame, there were no lessons learned.

I get that it's war, and that Marines are going to die. At the end of the day, we all do the bidding of the government. Maybe that's a jaded perspective, but that's my take on it. At the end of the day, we were trying to help people and save people. I took one family, took him to DoS and told him that the family wanted to leave. The DoS told me I needed to get that guy out since he worked with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 for 15 years, but I don't know how I was supposed to deduce that. I don't know how many people might have been left because of that.

zzzzz. Question and Answer 129.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), or maybe someone like [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, were in the tower and you were discussing shooting the individuals on the wall. I think [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked why not engage or apprehend the guy, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that the guy responded, "The asset cannot be comprised." what does that mean?

(2) Answer. I am not sure. I think that may have been an after the fact thing. I

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c Seeing a picture would give us something to go off. Looking back now, I wish we would have shot them.

aaaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Two years ago, you said that you passed the photos up. You said that it was bothering you that you passed those up and you never heard anything back, you wanted to know if it was the guy. You didn't mention the conversation with the CO at the time. Why didn't that come up, why not mention that the first time we spoke?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I don't have a good answer for you. I think I brought it up in the hotwash with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), but I don't know. I don't have a good answer for you.

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else to add?

(2) Answer. No, not that I can think of.

cccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Who else should we talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He has retired, he does (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He is a big guy. Their perspectives would be good. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he is a Marine's Marine. The rest of our team (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be good. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) another very experienced guy. The (b)(6) and the (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-6202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231025, which begins on ^{question} page 1 and ends on ^{question} page 132. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231025
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR

26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 26 October 2023, BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at [redacted] (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Can you please provide a little career background?

(2) Answer. I arrived at 2/1 Echo company and about 6-8 months later I joined [redacted] (b)(6). We were going to deploy in 3 months after I joined the platoon. We were training to see who matched together best. I was with [redacted] (b)(6). We deployed in March. In [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d We conducted long range shoots. We got word we were going to Afghan at the 4 of 7-month mark while in [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d Watching the news pretty-closely and we heard more info from social media than what was being put out. The [redacted] (b)(6) brought us in with little to say about what was going to happen next.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. Did you ever get ROE Briefings?

(2) Answer. We were pulled in a room [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was giving a brief along with the jag and it was kind of confusing for me personally. They were not sure exactly what they would be walking into. We didn't believe we would be the ones to go due to feeling like we've been hyped up and not sent out before. Some people got cards that had the ROE on them but I did not remember receiving one. I remember the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a cards being straight forward and similar to Generic ROE. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or maybe CENTCOM CDR or 51/5 handed down the ROE. He flew around to kind of fly around the place and check in [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) instructed us to use sound judgment and simply do the right thing.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Did you understand you had the right to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, but it was still a pretty gray area we did not understand.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When you got to Afghanistan did you understand you had the right to defend yourself? Hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. If they shoot at you and you know something is about to go down you have the right to defend yourself. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had left 12-24 hours prior alone. When we arrived, we knew some had gotten in small scuffles and some were wounded. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was trying to engage someone and there were too many people and avoided to not kill innocent civilians. ROE constantly changed on the ground. If an American citizen was being fired upon and we had the right to defend them, but it was too crowded to know who was or wasn't an American citizen. Later found out we were working with the Taliban, and I did not know and used my best judgement to not put myself or others in danger, as well as protect myself legally.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What was your understanding of the RoE?

(2) Answer. Even before we pushed out to Abbey Gate, we knew we had justified means to engage many individuals, but we were told not to and chose not to out of fear of punishment when returning home. We understood hostile act with hostile intent. We had 100% justified reason to engage people, but we were told not to. We kept finding ourselves in weird situations that made us question what exactly the right thing was.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you first know for sure you knew you would deploy to Afghanistan?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. At the ROE brief and 2-3 days between and we were told Echo would be punching out. We sent one of our guys and enabler assets. There was an issue at (b)(1)1.4d where a suspicious vehicle entered the gate and delayed flights.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. When do you physically get on a plane?

(2) Answer. August 16

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. With whom did you go with?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Were you in a different platoon at once upon arrival?

(2) Answer. It's all one platoon but they moved me to a team of seniors, and they moved the other LCpl to the other team of seniors.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. When you arrive at HKIA, talk us through that?

(2) Answer. It was about 4 hours. I remember there is some type of issue with having to land on a taxi way. They gave me CS cans and we expected heavy contact/kinetic engagements on the ground. Nothing came of it.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What was your position on the team?

(2) Answer. The eyes and ears of the team itself. It's usually the most junior guy on a team because there's a lot to teach and execute. Route planning, navigation, packing. Anything to better the team.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Can you talk about any other training prior to deployment?

(2) Answer. 1-3 weeks on indoctrination. To see if you would make it. 38 people initially were there for the training and 4 made it out. If you can communicate and work

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

well with teams over 3 months, you will be worthy of staying. As a SLUG/PIG my job was to learn everything possible about Sniper-craft. I had to be employed just as any sniper within a team. I took on advanced medical training, shooting, and infantry skills.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Who was Sniper trained on the team?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you graduate as a PIG?

(2) Answer. You graduate as a slug after INDOC and after 3 months of probation as a PIG. If you prove yourself to be both a good shooter, leader, and thinker you are allowed to remain within the teams and platoon. The platoon came together in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d where everyone came together as a team, and it was the best learning experience ever. Years of experience brought together.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. By the end of training, you are a PIG, at the point of deployment?

(2) Answer. First month of deployment was my last month of training.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Was this your first deployment? What happened when you landed?

(2) Answer. This was my first deployment. We hit the ground hard. Arriving at HKIA we got out set up on a perimeter. There was a young lady that walked up to us. Its dark when we arrive. We got pushed to connexes and picked up more ammunition and then to the gym. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) goes to make coordination with higher, all team billets execute their duties.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Who did [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) make contact with when you landed?

(2) Answer. The CO at the time was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's who [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) should have made contact with once we come off the aircraft. We were checking maps and checking the ground. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was doing his comm piece and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a JFO and he couldn't really do much as far as controlling the air. Our job was to basically find work.

s. Question and Answer 18.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. What's your first mission?

(2) Answer. Team gets back together, and we have to figure out how we would travel so we broke windows and hot wired vehicles. Our mission was to provide reconnaissance from a Satellite tower and surveil the terminal. Defense in depth lines were set. We were going to rotate but it didn't last long. We were ensuring force protection and pointing out weak spots within and outside the airport. We also surveilled people in the terminal. We did in depth field sketches, getting distances and milling out objects to better engage threats if need be.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Would you mind going to your barracks room and getting your logbooks so we can discuss them?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) goes to get a box from his room. Below is a brief description of what was in the ice box*

(2) Answer. Brought ice box. Brought sketches of Abbey gate. Do outs logs. Took military items and took photos of them. Sheets built up for ranges and dope sheets. Psychological planning. What things were hot to brief. Sketch on (b)(6)? Has the PIG bible. Describes everything they would do in a conscience element. Packet has every in-depth definitions of training. A few publications of how a round will do to someone or go through someone or what it will do to their body. Has family history in Marines. (b)(6) was in the Marines for about 8 years and then in the Army National Guard. And (b)(6) works in the pentagon, retired Air Force. Observation logs from Day 1 Abbey gate to the day they got hit. It is okay to make copies of docs. Not logs.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. What was your mission out there?

(2) Answer. One of your responsibilities is to maintain the obs log. We ended up a 7-man team. It was my duty to report and to write everything down. We kept our own logs as well as those for the team strictly.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What was the mission up there in the tower?

(2) Answer. To make observations to S2. We would send it up in a sheet and continually take pictures and maintain surveillance. Had a runner getting food describing what they saw to S2. S2 was telling the runner what they found on the SIG. At a point I was a runner. But at a point they did have to go back because they were not eating.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. How can I tell when there's a BOLO?

(2) Answer. I report what I see. That was the hard piece in terms of communications. When we arrived to Abbey gate we knew there was no way someone would not try to take advantage of the amount of people there. That did come out eventually. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us the run-down of what SIGINT was picking up between Al Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS-K. They told us to rest up because tomorrow will be big. They told us to pack our assault packs with essentials. Keep your ILBE in the center and if we have to burn everything in case we have to escape the airport light, we will. In the north gate there was a lot of kinetic activity as well as in the mountains. We waited and prepared to be pushed into the city and got our tasking. The mission changed 4-5 times while in the assembly area at the inner gate. (b)(6) took over and they pushed us down to Abbey gate. The gates were closed but it was a lot of commotion. The 19th or 20th was when we pushed through with the gate.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Describe the location of the Sniper tower (b)(6) was located in at Abbey gate?

(2) Answer. The gate closest to the airfield is abbey proper. The outer gate. Inner gate closest to airfield. Outer gate 155 meter to the chevron. Canal wall closest to sniper tower.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Which date do you arrive at abbey? Anyone on the team can annotate the log, right? who made the most inputs on the log?

(2) Answer. I want to say the 19th. the most inputs could have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - Identifies his handwriting.- (21 August 0600 that is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Handwriting) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made entry on 26 August 0210 "I believe is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When we were caught - I grabbed everything. That's how I ended up with the logs. I believe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 22 August 0610-1535 (at least the bottom of the page is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hand writing). 25 August at 1119 is possibly (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Everyone should have writing on this log.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Are there periods of time, you where you were with someone and you remember the event?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Sometimes. I start writing and then I would hand off the logs to take photos and let someone else fill in the log.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Start on 21st what happened? When did you arrive at abbey gate?

(2) Answer. We arrive at abbey gate I believe the 19th. We go through the riot situation. The [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4 are currently in the sniper tower. We the team and the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4 have a machine gun element. The [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4 were there for 2 or 3 days. They were running in and out. and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) form [REDACTED] (b)(6) are together [REDACTED] (b)(6) was going to mesh with another team. And they sent [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to [REDACTED] (b)(6). We were not down any people, we had a full team [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was just added. The other two teams were just added together.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at the gate? What happened when you arrived at the gate?

(2) Answer. August 19 is when we arrived at the gate. It was pretty crowded. When we moved from the assembly area and Golf Co and rear. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d had a JLTV style vehicle and the xo popped on the vehicle. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got in line with golf company guys. We grabbed each others flaks and pushed the crowd back. Gun fire was going above head from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4 and Taliban [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got dragged into a crowd. Our PPE was getting caught on walls, gear being ripped off and we were in a full on 300 style fight. The air was burning from CS, Gunfire rang out and everything just started swaying and we could not breath. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d were hitting people with their vehicles. They hit a group of people and it took a lot of yelling and hitting their vehicle to stop them. I was pulling [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as he was falling into the crowd.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. When did you clear the surge?

(2) Answer. Clear the surge. We muzzle thumped our way out and I almost past out. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) almost passed out. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started administering aid to people after he came to. He thought he would die. And I felt like it was worse than the 26 in my mind. We had marines stuck and we gassed ourselves and when the crowd pushed out a lot of people got trampled. Kids were dead, a woman looked like she was crushed by a cider block. Trying to grab people that are escaping. And kids kept getting caught into the crowd. We came out of the riot bloodied up and we decided not to gas anymore.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. This question may have been, what else do you have there, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had what looked like a ziplock bag with a newspaper and a small book he found in the Gym?

(2) Answer. Grabbed a newspaper and found something in the gym.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. What else do you have related to your job?

(2) Answer. Old camp Pendleton map. Has a shot placement book. Found out the rounds they were using would go through people. Has a tactical thought process slide. Different ranges for guns notes.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Your CO joined you in the sniper tower with (b)(1)1.4a Cleared the areas and using riot shields. People are getting crushed against walls and fences?

(2) Answer. We had gotten ordered not to shoot over anyone's head, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. NO QUESTION CAPTURED

(2) Answer. That was whenever Echo could get in the same space of each other. It was made clear we will not shoot over anyone's head. 1/8 was doing it, there were lieutenants with brass knuckles, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team was exercising restraint. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was adamant about who they are helping. His SNCOs were helping explain what they were not to do. To avoid collateral damage. The more experienced were telling them shooting over head with a weapon won't help.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What happened on the 20th ?

(2) Answer. 19th it cleared. The team got together and they said they don't think they would be able to hold up long. Later in the night on the 19th the Taliban are sitting on their trucks and there was too much light for night optics to work. We asked for flood lights to be put out, when they were put out we could see with the optics. The truck with connex boxes come in and created the chevron. Combat engineers set up c-wire at the base of the tower toward the chevron chain link fence. On the 20th the Chevron went up and it affected the visuals from the tower. The immediate area behind the chevron is obstructed. At this point no one is in the canal yet. They are still talking with people and handing out food.

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. How did you get the first BOLO?

(2) Answer. There are BOLO messages. That started 18th into the 19th and the 20th. A cyber message. We drive up to the NSU and they leave the post and throw down their firearms. NSU were trying to evacuate as well. The 20th everything is calm and bringing food in. kinda calm. The crowds grow on the 21st. and there was a dummy dropped. All of the crowds, (b)(6) and we didn't have a (b)(1)1.4g up yet but we heard about a Toyota corolla if EOD didn't set up comm. Signal was used if comms were down. EOD set up (b)(1)1.4g system. On the 21st Comms are being affected. Runners and signal app are being used. Did not use black gear because of Taliban. Signal worked okay. WhatsApp was compromised. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may have more messages from or on signal. I was more on the team camera.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. How were you passing things to the S2?

(2) Answer. Use SD card to get info to S2. They ask us to gather more info on somethings or people. I ran around probably the most but running to and from S2 was not one set person. Whoever is on gun and optic are most important.

c. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Pictures that you took with your camera are being passed to the 2/1 S2 Shop via SD Card, how many times a day?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2-3 times a day. As often as possible.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. How are you managing overwatch, protect those on the ground and paying attention to threat streams and individuals?

(2) Answer. We have two sniper teams, as well as continuous all-weather day and night surveillance.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. Any discussion of potential IED test run?

(2) Answer. Yes, we coordinated well there was not [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g was working. We heard a suspicious vehicle in parking lot. This is the day of the blast. The vehicle is full of back packs. He had all white on and lots of gold heavy set male with a brown vest and long white beard and glasses are gold aviator type. And he was given the name "shot caller."

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Do you believe there was hostile act and hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Shot caller is the guy in the parking lot.

*At this point, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) begins reading from his obs logs from Abbey gate:

21 August

0800 POI 3-4 group of males

Coordinating with a team reporting what they are doing. Shot Caller looks at inner gate and tower. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said "I know we have to get the Mfer". Put the SAS in west window. "A lot of energy was being put towards Shot Caller." [REDACTED] (b)(6) communicates [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is closest to inner gate. Green gear comms is how they are communicating. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was calling things out.

0745 Partial plate on the vehicle in the parking lot C120 in the native language.

Description of elder. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) named Shot Caller. White garb brown vest long white beard.

0805 2-3 man detail accompany Shot Caller. To the calm side of canal, no one thought to jump in water yet. They make their way forward and keep looking at the tower and inching toward the gate.

0820 Shot Caller goes back to car and makes phone calls and is looking nervous at this point.

0917 someone in group moves away.

0920 clean cut male is with Shot Caller. Clean cut has blue duffel. Another male carries a coyote bag. Two walkers walk towards entry control point.

0930 Shot Caller is elder man in white garb

1031 two walkers moving Shot Caller moving with someone else. We are watching the bags Shot Caller walk up pretty close to us. Shot Caller is on the north west side of the tower but getting closer. We shut one window and the camera is still recording Shot

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Caller. As he is walking up, we think we may have to drop him- we know there is something wrong but when we see the bags come out of the vehicle and when we see the bags, its fitting the descriptions the only thing that doesn't match is the Toyota corolla. The actions are suspicious and that is why we thought that we may have to stop him, and we hit the Shot Caller with the camera. Once he sees we have the camera and the Rifle on him he runs to the parking lot.

Concludes reading from log

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Do they have weapons visible?

(2) Answer. They did not have any visible specifically no wires because there is a team carrying the bag that's why we had suspicion. They kept picking the bag up and putting it back down.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. What is their route?

(2) Answer. They just keep walking up and down. Shot Caller gets on phone looks left. Shot Caller stays in parking lot after we took photos of him. He knows we are taking photos and he's moving fast back to parking lot. One on right [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is on east side window. I pop the camera out and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pops out rifle and we scream hey! And I take the photos. The bags are not going in one direction at one single time. The bags are not near him. I believe they are in the parking lot near the vehicle. Shot Caller is with one person near the tower.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. * Reading from Logs*

(2) Answer. After photos
1045 we were looking at umbrellas in the parking lot [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) calls out there are multiple bags in a forerunner. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) calls and says I've got bags in Parking lot

1223 hotel gold corolla get away from me. Threat stream came out. No threat stream on Shot Caller and group just on gold corolla.

1225 someone acting frantic with a backpack. Their body language is off. Frantic person was not tied to any threat stream, him being suspicious was just tied to behavior and body language. And it just catches his attention

1305 man runs from camera. This is frantic individual with a backpack in blue smog

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1318 Shot Caller is just looking around in other vehicles. Shot Caller is picking up phone and putting it back down multiple times he stays in parking lot and doesn't go past umbrellas

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. What happened to the photos on the SD Card once they are taken to S2?

(2) Answer. When SD cards go to S2 we have no idea where those photos go. I was hoping they were downloading the photos, but I do not know what they did with them.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. Who was the EOD Person?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was being pulled in many directions.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. What was happening at this point?

(2) Answer. Lost eyes on Shot Caller. Taliban doing weird stuff.

ww. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. What happened next?

Starts reading from Logs

(2) Answer. 1344 found bag within perimeter [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) handwriting starts 1318.

Between 1349 and 1600 we observe the two individuals move into the crowd and another guy with a bag move into the crowd at 1349. So now three people are in the crowd. Dust starts to pick up in the parking lot. Cameras go down. Shot Caller is nowhere to be seen. Weapons are down but optics are up. Now group of three are in crowd Shot Caller was not one of the three. The Three are the people we observed previously.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Two individuals walked into the crowd and a third separate. Team camera is on. Pancake head, with traditional Afghan wool hat. (b)(6) had bowl cut, man wearing pacool. We first started watching the three in the parking lot. They are on the inner wall moving towards my positions. People started yelling a bit more. Marines are down by the Barron hotel. Marines on the outside in the vicinity of the near side of the canal. They range about 30-40 meters. They are more in buddy pairs. More than ten Marines doing this. A girl jumps in the water. She stays out somewhere. She came and stole cigarettes and sold shoes. When she jumped in the water everyone follows. A six y/o girl jumps in the canal, sewage water. They fed the girl and her brother. The girl put a cigarette out on one of the Marines so we kind of stopped feeding her and her brother.

1448 girl jumps in canal on or about 1500 on the 21st the guys start moving into the crowd. Pancake traditional headgear (pacool), (b)(6) bowl cut (1053), and third military age male. Three military age males. At this point I am moving pretty quick and the three are on the near side of the canal.

xx. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. They disappeared and it is not on the log. Why did you get the log together on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It may be on someone's personal log. Why did you decide to get your log straight. We were just in (b)(1)1.4d and decided to get our logs straight. Some of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) things ended up burned and some of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1349-1600 that's the gap. Because I was concentrated on watching these three guys. It calms down a little and I was able to take the photo of the girl in the water.

They make their way in the crowd and you can hear panic in (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) voice, at this point he is talking over the green gear radio. He's saying "They're moving in they're moving in." As they are walking in I start to lose sight of them as they get closer into the crowd. It was about 1305 when I lost visual of these guys.

I was told to go find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and everyone is starting to notice I'm frantic. I scream to the gun guys and ask if they see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and tell them to keep and eye out. I am in the inner corridor trying to find him, I find a bridge EOD guy and let him know what's happening. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came from the inner gate to sniper position. He said hey we are gonna go out and tackle these guys ourselves.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran to the inner Corridor and I am passing info to tower. I follow (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was told not to go with him but I did and we are walking pretty quick down the U shape barrier. Toward the opening in the fence. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) jumped up on jersey barriers by the break in the fence and tells everyone to calm down and to sit down. I kept looking and people are shouting "officer officer, look look" and the crowd separates. They are on the far side of chain link fence, when the crowd parts I

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

see a duffle right in front of me near the opening on the near side of the canal. About 5-7 meters away, the bag is about 3.5 - 4 feet long. It was probably definitely the bag. I am trying to get [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) attention and I was telling the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4d to get the dogs. And the [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4 EOD guy is talking to the Marine Warrant Officer. Dog sniffs bag and sit down. And we tell everyone to get down. Women were crying and kids are crying and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I look at each other like we are about to die. A woman was upset and praying and I was consoling the praying woman and holding two children. We sit for 30 minutes before getting the 'all clear'. At this point I am behind the jersey barrier. I cannot see what specifically is happening.

The crowd is staying put and the Marines too just saying put behind a wall. I do not know what company was on the gate at this time but it could have been Echo. We got the all clear 30 minutes later. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told Me not to mention this to their wives. I heard there was a bag drop was attempted at the north gate as well.

yy. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. Did anyone every say what was in the bag?

(2) Answer. Never talked about what was actually in the bag.

zz. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Start to Finish. Who gives the all clear?

(2) Answer. I just hear it not sure who gave it. From us walking out to coming back in this may have taken 45 minutes.

* Starts reading from Logs*

1600 Taliban observed putting children and a father and kids on top of boxes. The media showed up at this time. And the Taliban starts giving out food to people.

aaa. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. How do you know they were shooting people? When and where was this happening?

(2) Answer. They can't drive a vehicle through it to his us but on the other side of the chevron was chaos. I saw executions through the SSRT on the gun. The first one I saw was AK shot someone in the head. About 20-30 meters beyond the chevron my field of view opened up around the 20-30 meters behind the chevron. I witnessed multiple executions. Taliban male is in brown garb in man jams. Who shot someone execution style. When I saw it happen, I just stopped and told everyone what I just saw. The Taliban shot what looked like a male in the head. I saw the male look up just before he was shot in the head. And I saw the impact of the bullet. Once the Taliban pulled the

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

trigger the person's he kind of jerked back. I saw executions on the 20th. I put a few on the log but not all of them.

bbb. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. You believe the last entry ended at 1600

(2) Answer. NO ANSWER CAPTURED

22 August 1710

23 August 1734 large crowds running down the street beatings and shootings follow. I saw the shootings myself

ccc. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Are you able to distinguish if the executed people are American citizens?

(2) Answer. No. Numerous times throughout the week I witnessed executions occurring on the other side of the chevron.

A Green laser kept lasing us. It hit my eye. I did not know what to do at this time. But its hard to distinguish hostile act hostile intent at this point, and I do not believe I should act at this point. I have hundreds if not thousands of civilians everywhere. I don't want blue on blue. I exercised restraint because I know there could be collateral damage of civilians. I also don't have PID of who is lasing me. At this point it doesn't meet PID nor the ROE.

My 1stSgt came to check on us. I am switching eyes as I was just lased, and he hits my on the shoulder and someone got shot on the other side of the chevron. I told him that and they told me to take a nap. I believe it would have been easier to do something about the Taliban with the ROE if we had control.

We would drive around the airport and things would shoot overhead, - I head two guys came under fire and they were told not to fire and just had to take cover-

I did go down to the Barron hotel and they wanted a report, so myself and

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we were going to get up to the roof tops to get better observation. This was after the dummy drop so this was after the 21st maybe 22nd or 23rd.

We push down we walked up to (b)(1)1.4d We were sweet talking and climbed into the stair well got low put black sheets up and we see everything on the other side of the chevron. We saw the tables and the dead bodies. We were within 5 meters of the Taliban. I am

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

taking notes doc is holding up corner. And we jump from roof top to roof top and some (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got up on a roof top three buildings down. Some guy had a go pro recording -two guys- Taliban freaks out. Once I saw them I started pushing back. We are further down. The two guys got chewed out by the (b)(1)1.4d interpreter. We brought photos back and the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked how did we get the photos and how did we get that close.

The rumor mill was that the Taliban was being peaceful and that was not the case. That is why we did that and to find out the weapons system. I could not say whether they were Americans.

md. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Have you seen an interview on social media?

(2) Answer. Yes and with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says we have photos he means the ones on the SD cards that S2 has them. It was too many photos and I did not want my phone storage taken up by all of those photos. I stopped taking photos by the 21st or 22nd and I had a feeling someone would blow us up and I might catch it on my phone. I had helped and picked up a kid on the canal wall and I started to take a photo but decide against it because I felt it was wrong to take a photo.

eee. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. Were there other threat streams coming through?

(2) Answer. After the first few days they were saying there was possible VBIEDs. What we are finding we are trying to find in the area but there are things on social media that we were looking at and later looking for in the crowd as potential threats.

Someone was able to get a car to the tower by driving on the wall. It was a small car and I was yelling at the car to push back. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to calm down, but it was another Afghan trying to drop someone off close to the gate and it ended up not being a threat.

fff. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Was there any hostile act or hostile intent?

(2) No didn't meet PID didn't meet ROE. The crowd was helping by telling the car to get back. The car backed up and got off the wall.

ggg. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. Threat streams making their way to you or open social media saying suicide vest concerns?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. We started getting texts from green berets asking to get interpreters. Can you contact this person. Instagram messages are being sent to people in the tower. Giving out descriptions of people, giving descriptions to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and EOD started coming up in the tower. It was used to calm down the crowd.

hhh. Question and Answers 57.

(1) What [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a SM do you remember?

(2) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a big guy with dark hair. The [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was called [REDACTED] (b)(6). They would come up to ask what we had going on to help or for overhead cover.

jjj. Question and Answers 58.

(1) Question. Did anyone give you any type of description?

(2) Answer. The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a guys gave us a description. They asked for overwatch while they did precision extractions.

Myself and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had been messaged to find a family. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed Afghans back to have Marines in buddy pairs. We stopped and kicked people out because they begged us to shoot them. Near side of canal wall pushing out toward foot bridge. We had on head lamps and flashlights. Trying to find a particular family. We did a few flashes they did a few flashes. And I jump in the canal and help the family over.

kkk. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. Describe what is happening in the building across the canal?

(2) Answer. I looked in the crack house and everyone in the crack house had an evil look on their face. 10-15 meters. I make hard eye contact with a guy. The people are wearing traditional Afghan clothing. There are about 6 people in the family and I am helping them cross the wall. I am having them grab each other's shoulder. I told [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) there is something weird about a house. And he agreed their facial features body language and they are postured up. They are going from sitting to standing and they seem tall. We talked about it and we just did not like their body posture and body language. I am back in the tower by 0247 on the 26 August.

cl. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Why did the [REDACTED] (b)(6) come up?

(2) He came up later in the day, but he came up that day because we had a PID on the photo. It is my understanding a runner was sent out to get the [REDACTED] (b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just on the gun and explained to the (b)(6) what's going on. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is confirming everything going on. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said to the (b)(6) You can have two casualties, or you can have 8 and the (b)(6) just sat there and thought to himself about that. No wires were seen coming from these males or bag. The ID is coming from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Things around them didn't match. Everything around them was erratic but they were not. The guy had a blank stare face and had a lot of confidence. The (b)(6) sits there and says "No I am not risking that I don't know what to do", and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looks up at the (b)(6) (he was on the gun) and says "Who the fuck does?" and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said I'll go tackle him myself. After that the guy slipped back into the crowd. The (b)(6) walks out and says he will get back to us. The (b)(6) told them no.

From the Ops Log

They spotted three hours later (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is writing -0210-0258

I woke up to flash bangs and a lot of people being rowdy. This is early morning on the 26th. I am trying to figure out why they are so loud. A girl maybe 18 or 19 got caught in c-wire. And they were trampling her. Not long after I placed my head against the bullet proof window, heard a pop and felt impact. The window vibrated on my head, and I saw a round had landed directly behind me.

We got a description of what to look for from the (b)(1)1.4a Description was a "clean shaven guy in brown". The really big guy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is giving the BOLO and doesn't say how he got the threat stream. There was a guy that had a green Gen 3 FLAK but in jeans and they asked were we looking for the guy. The guy they are looking for may be 30-40. A guy in his lap had his head down, in his lap, and he had his hair being caressed. The guy in the brown garb was who I was keeping an eye out for.

I don't know where the clean-shaven description came from but I'm pretty sure that's an ISIS description thing. That's something the (b)(1)1.4a was briefed on and does not know by who but it's kind of stressed when they are briefed in (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in tower. (b)(1)1.4a guys come up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is in the tower and another (b)(1)1.4a and could have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describes someone and the team fairly quickly spots the individual in question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is in on gun. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is doing obs log (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is obs logging and looking through his SSOT. We end up rotating through guns every thirty minutes. I was definitely on the gun but not sure about who was on the spotting optics. There were red balloons set up that had not been there prior. A bald man is staring at me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he is the older guy. The younger guy is in his lap. Took photos of bald guy. I motioned to him to come over. He did not react when we lased his forehead. The (b)(6) came up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) identified an olde male with a black garb as possibly being the guy who stared at him straight through the lens.

mmm. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. Why did the (b)(6) come up?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answers. He came up later in the day, but he came up that day because we had a PID on the photo. It is my understanding a runner was sent out to get the [REDACTED] (b)(6)

nnn. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) why do you think he said no?

(2) Answers. The description was pretty exact and I could see why the [REDACTED] (b)(6) said no but at this point we were not allowed to use CS without [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) approval. In my opinion, I feel it was hostile act, hostile intent. But that's where it gets tricky. Everyone sat behind that gun and had that same feeling. This felt real and pretty serious. I was basing this on their body language. The only other time I saw anything similar (the body language) was days prior when there was the dummy drop of the blue duffle bag.

ooo. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. Was it a vibe or something definitive on what you saw before?

(2) Answer. It was the vibe and how I saw the people with the dummy drop before, it was the state that they were in (calm) and everything around them was chaos.

ppp. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. *Photo is shown to [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Sometimes when we see guys like that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) does recognize yellow/ tan vest) they would come up and sit down and they would do sexual things towards our tower or asking to take our photo. They look calm (the current picture) But it seemed as if something else was going on in their mind (referring to the PID individual). Its totally his facial construct. And after everything knowing that they were sitting were the actual explosion happened. I am 100% sure it was the bomber. You could tell some were tired because they been there so long and a new person shows up and sits for a long time.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) leave they go to the inner corridor, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may have been with him. And he made a joke about how the [REDACTED] (b)(6) holster was empty.

qqq. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. If they had displayed hostile act or hostile intent why didn't you engage?

(2) Answer. I would have asked for permission to act because if I was to follow the ROE because this would have happened very differently if I had shot that guy I believed that was the guy that hit us. Because of his behavior how he seemed calm.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

rrr. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. Did you know we used the balloons to identify those that need exactions?

(2) No

sss. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. If [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had not have come to the tower, do you think you would have keyed in on him?

(2) Answer. We had keyed in on him and said Hey come up. We showed him who it was and he said that's our guy. Someone from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a gave descriptions before. Then we call [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) up and show him who we had our eye on, he says that's our guy. I am very confident that was the guy because I don't think incidents like that happen. Too many things made sense. Based on where the blue bag was, and the vibe you are getting from watching him. I can confidently say I believe that's the bomber. When we had the dummy drop, everyone stayed in place. Day of the blast marines were lined up on the wall. I heard [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave the order to collapse. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said something's really weird today, this is on the 26th, the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from echo came out and said something is gonna go boom today, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and you guy are going to lose your fucking brains. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frustrated. Flashbangs are overhead.

ttt. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. Do you guys talk about this over chat. Like after all this has happened?

(2) Answer. No. the blast happened. I personally don't like to talk about it. There are some things. It was unhealthy for me. There are things I heard there is no way that happened. Just people claiming Echo got into a scuffle and claimed to have shot a second bomber just people being overzealous about what they did. Just pulling people off the x when they didn't or saying they created the opening in the fence. And I had to turn off my phone and turn on my brain. I was basically being told we were lying about getting into contact with small arms and I was at a point where it felt as if no one would listen. The whole thing kind of killed my morale and I felt I lost a lot of friends and my mentor, and I don't know why.

uuu. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. Is there anything on social media you don't agree with?

(2) Answer. Theres one kid. We saw the same thing we saw the same person we ask each other "are you sure, are you sure that we felt the actual same." I've searched Reddit or Twitter to see if there were certain impacts or anything like what I felt.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

xv. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. At 17:36:52 I'm tracking that you had been on a pretty regular run as time allows that let you take care of referred and you're in the middle of backing up your vehicle as the bomb goes off.

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

We came back from normal run and we were rushing to get back to the gate, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said if you guys leave something bad is going to happen. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the tower together. First Platoon was out on the flight line. I took photos because I was feeling down because I said I would never see combat. They said, hey get as much of this down as you can so they could close the gate referring to tons of non-lethal. We pull up to close the (b)(1) 1.4a vehicle, and immediately (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tells (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to back up. We back up and stop. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came and said he was going to set up C-wire. We push into reverse and a massive explosion goes off. Boom. It knocked the air out of me and shook the ground as far back as the platoon on the flight line. I saw bodies go in the air. I saw a torso and legs get launched across the street. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed out the vehicle. I had to kick the doors open and gunfire from all directions began. I was sighted in on the Taliban and saw they were sitting in lawn chairs and laughing at us. When I peeked around the vehicle, I saw three guys shoot towards the canal. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frozen, and I took the front, and he follows. I am hearing shots and what looks like people are screaming but their screams are muffled to me. Things started to not seem real. I picked up a child bleeding profusely. He was spaying blood all over my kit and my entire right side including both arms to my elbow got covered in blood. (b)(6)

(b)(6) My buddy fell on top of me covered in his own blood and I knew I needed to get to a position and get fire superiority quickly.

www. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. When do you get back to the tower?

(2) Answer. I push to the tower, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was fucked up and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabs me (b)(6) (b)(6) He pushed me. There were two impacts on the window. I pushed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to a corner, slammed the window shut, followed by a third round barely missing me. I stayed low and moved gained sight picture as well as I could. I pop up through the window and cannot find where they are shooting from. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(6) Had another view from a different angle. I pop up to scan out the window. I grabbed the M107 SASR and dropped my M4 to engage a second floor structure with a higher caliber. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me calm down and not use the SASR. I was upset that we were not being as aggressive as we could. I was placed into a new security position. The shooting stops after 2 ½ - 3 minutes. I cannot see anyone I knew got hit. I turned towards where all the American casualties were, and I couldn't look at it because I didn't want to see my guys.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

After EOD came everyone started waking up and screaming in pain. It was a lot of dead people. The Taliban met us at a gate and we saw 82nd guys coming out also.

xxx. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. Have you gone on social media to be interviewed?

(2) Answer. I did but I told them I don't want it to be aired. Because I don't want to air that out and not be in the right headspace.

I have talked to people on my team about this. That's why I'm kind of angry at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a bit. I would say fucked up shit like if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there we would have gotten back with more people. I was the first at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hospital bed along with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I have talked to him about the podcast. I don't know if it was because of (b)(6) and I wanted to go about it in an old school manner. I would disagree with somethings he described in terms of who exactly passed the info over to us. I believe it's because he doesn't understand the intelligence process.

If I had no idea about those other things in relation to the other agencies on deck I would think it's a spook coming to talk to me too. I didn't agree when he testified to congress about the timeline of the suspected suicide bomber. We spoke about that in person and he agreed that the timeline given was unintentionally shorter. Everything is pretty much 100%. (b)(6) and is trying somewhat harder to remember the course of events. Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are the same page about talking about this publicly. I understand what he is trying to do for the families and our generation affected by this. I respect and support what he does publicly.

We got everything. What (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did was huge. What our Corpsman did was huge. Everyone in their own way definitely saved lives. This craziness continued until we left, even near blue on blue incidents on the days leading to us leaving, due to chasing enemy around the airport.

Reference to (b)(1)1.4a that's the thing I thought 'ehh' I thought it was definitely referencing the (b)(1)1.4a guys. There were a lot that came in and out that were definitely not conventional. And would not say they are (b)(1)1.4a because they came in a flannel. I think there are somethings that kind of get lost and us not being able to write and sit down and do without giving it to S2 I just would not go as far as saying it was (b)(1)1.4a

It was my team only that handed the SD cards to S2. Just the Sniper team and S2.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis,

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

ACCG-SR

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lance Curtis

LANCE G CURTIS
BG, US ARMY
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) THURS OCT 26, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 21. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

10/26/2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

26 OCT 2023
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
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ACCG-SR

19 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 19 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The Interview team asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by the interviewers are annotated as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long have you been in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. A little over 6 years. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) ?

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(2) Answer. Yes sir.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. That would have been Feb 2020 I want to say I went to (b)(6). Then I was transferred over to the platoon Jun 2020 and I was with them about a year prior to the deployment, then through the deployment. We deployed April 2021.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many Marines were in the platoon?

(2) Answer. We deployed with 21 including me. We had four teams. Plus we had three corpsmen included, 24 total. It was three teams of six, then I would go wherever to plug in.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What point do you remember hearing about deploying in support of the NEO?

(2) Answer. As the (b)(6) I would plug into SIPR at (b)(1)1.4a and read the reports. To be honest no one really knew what was going on. If we left it would have been around Aug. We probably got about three days tops from finding out officially to deploying.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the platoon move together?

(2) Answer. No. One team went with Echo Company, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6) were with me and we flew in 12-15 hours afterwards from (b)(1)1.4a. The other team remained in Iraq with Fox Company.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. Around the 17th of August.i. Question and Answer 8.

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(1) Question. What was your understating of ROE when arriving on the ground?

(2) Answer. My understating was self-defense. If there is hostile act/hostile intent you can engage. In addition to that if we knew and AMCIT/Blue Passport life was in danger we could take action.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So self-defense of US forces and US Citizens?

(2) Answer. Yes. Which is really hard to do. If you're holding up a blue passport you would get mugged.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your mission when you first arrived there?

(2) Answer. When we landed the airfield was mostly clear. I landed a little bit ahead of my teams with my radio operator to get the comms situation set. We were then basically told to find work in the sector. We had our sector area to hold, I did a leader's recon to find locations for sniper teams to do overwatch/security. There wasn't much because it was an airfield. That's what we did for the first few days. Just radioed up anything unusual or situations with the Afghans on the ground in the airfield. It wasn't anything crazy.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As the [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) how are you communicating to the [REDACTED] (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I have a direct line to the COC and [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) was out doing crowd control. He would check in on us but we reported directly to the COC. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was out there too, but he was focused on the infantry platoons/mortar squad.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When your platoon was tasked to move to Abbey Gate, what task were you given?

(2) Answer. I was told we weren't able to process people b/c the gate was so big, and Fox Company needed to get the crowd pushed back so we could create room to process people. My tasking was to find overwatch positions to help them with that. The wall that runs along Abbey Gate only provided a few raised areas to do so, so we occupied the towers along the perimeter walls. I had [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the tower at the outer gate, and [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the tower inside the inner gate.

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n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So [REDACTED] (b)(6) was at the tower the whole time?

(2) Answer. I would push [REDACTED] (b)(6) back to shower/eat at times and replace them with another team. [REDACTED] (b)(6) mainly was in that tower though.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you augment [REDACTED] (b)(6) during your time at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I pushed one guy, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to [REDACTED] (b)(6) to provide them additional manning at the forward tower.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why did you place [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team at that tower and not another team?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a very motivated sniper and I wanted to place him there because he wanted to be there, and I trusted his capabilities.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was his team your best sniper team?

(2) Answer. Well his team was with Echo Company leading up to the deployment to HKIA, so his team was connected and had relationships built with Echo Company, who was out at Abbey Gate. All my team leaders were school trained snipers and very capable, that's why I rotated them up there.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Can you talk through the makeup of the team?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could plug and play in a lot of positions. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - new guy. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - An extra guy to augment the team. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All the team members were capable guys and trained for this.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Had any of those guys deployed before?

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(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had. He deployed about 3-4 times with the battalion. I don't think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had done a deployment. We ran a screener in Jan 2021 to round out the teams.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did anyone have combat experience?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had, he had a NAM with a C device. Other than him it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and my Plt Sgt in Afghanistan (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who had combat experience (b)(6) and did not deploy.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has he EAS'd or is he still in?

(2) Answer. He's out now. He's going to college in Wisconsin. I sent (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) his contact information.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): As they were establishing Abby Gate, how often were you down there?

(2) Answer. The comms was shit throughout the whole corridor. I figured out if we had comms between the Abbey Gate tower pushing to the inner gate tower, I could re-transmit comms back to the COC. On the morning of the 26th I was out there all morning helping get a family out who were connected with a Marine family from Pendleton.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So much of the reporting from the outer gate back to the COC would go through you?

(2) Answer. Yes.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The days leading up, 19-25 Aug 21, how often were you in the outer corridor area and sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I would check on them 2-3 times a day if I was co-located with them. The outer corridor area I would be spending more time down there as we were trying to get people out. We would have split responsibilities (a team in the tower and other guys

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in the outer corridor). Snipers in the tower would identify people in the canal to pull and radio their location to the team on the ground.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever give guidance on how many people you wanted in the tower at a time?

(2) Answer. I mentioned I would like three people in the tower, but I never gave specific guidance on that. Based on the situation the TLs were able to make calls on their manning as long as they had two people in the tower. Being on overwatch for two weeks is not something snipers are supposed to do. The OPTEMPO was high and it was exhausting.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were the snipers' primary duties?

(2) Answer. To provide overwatch and report. I took it upon myself to split hide sites and help get people out and processed. To save people we understood we had to be out there.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You would get out around three times a day, how often were you talking on the radio with them daily?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. Typically as their [REDACTED] (b)(6) I would usually operate from the COC, but our comms were bad and I wasn't doing much good at the COC. To improve the comms/reporting I decided to get out of the COC and to the gate to get my own eyes out there on the situation. They would pass radio reporting about hourly. Maybe 2-3 hours during slower periods. It was never longer than that.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

bb. (1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were the sniper teams getting their tasking just from you or from others as well?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. I gave them the mission of overwatch and that's what we went with. There were a lot of leaders out there. If they received tasking from other leaders I am not aware of it.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How other were battalion leaders out there by the outer gate?

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(2) Answer. I remember the [REDACTED] (b)(6) stopping by our positions daily. I'm not sure how often but they did get around the battle space.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). What about company commanders?

(2) Answer. The whole time. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were all out there. They didn't stop.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). So if the Taliban was doing harm to AMCITs and you could take action to protect them, did you ever see Taliban killing evacuees?

(2) Answer. I don't know if they killed them. I saw them doing grave harm. Beating, stabbing, but I never saw anyone killed. I heard they were shooting/killing up by the connex boxes (chevron), but I never saw it personally.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did you receive a report from [REDACTED] (b)(6) about killing Afghans?

(2) Answer. I did. It was up by the chevron. But to me it's impossible to actually see that occurring. That was further away to see exactly what was happening. In my opinion there was nothing that we could do to prevent that from occurring.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) ever ask to engage the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. They asked if the ROE has changed. I asked the COC and they stated no. That's what I relayed. They asked me about 2-3 times.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Was this on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It was prior to the 26th.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Leading up to the 26th, did the ROE ever change?

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(2) Answer. No. I was never told it changed, and confirmed with the COC 2-3 times. It remained defensive ROE, had to show hostile act/hostile intent. This is what I shared with my sniper team.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What about EOF, were there any changes to that?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) had flashbangs, but it was not feasible to employ them from towers. Marines on ground would deploy them along with tear gas. (b)(1)1.4d would fire warning shots, we were not allowed to.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How do you know you were not allowed to fire warning shots?

(2) Answer. Not sure where it came from, but I asked leadership if we could because the (b)(1)1.4d were. I was told we weren't allowed to. I'm surprised accidents didn't happen with all the warning shots being fired.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How did you manage your guys at the towers?

(2) Answer. I had (b)(6) manning the back tower since (b)(6) had less guys. It would calm down at night (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was adamant at keeping his team in the outer sniper tower the whole time. That's why I made him come back to shower/eat and push up another team to replace them. I wanted to make sure his team was able to refit/reset. Most of the time it was (b)(6) on the outer gate tower, they only left when I made them switch out.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How many hours of sleep do you think the teams were getting?

(2) Answer. I would guess no more than 5-6 hours. We didn't get a lot of sleep.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Between 19-23 August, what kind of threat reporting were you getting?

(2) Answer. I don't remember getting a lot of threat reports. It may have been something like a vehicle in the area. I remember it was mostly us pushing up individuals acting suspiciously. Every night I would go to the S2 and try to match up photos and threat reports. If we saw backpacks we would push it up, EOD would come out and

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check it out and nothing would come from it. I felt that this was an Afghan testing what we would do with an IED.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where was this?

(2) Answer. Cars would pull up in the parking lot by the footbridge, we never went out to check that. I think for the backpack it was before the 26th when EOD went out to check the backpack. It was one time for certain, I can't recall if EOD went out any additional times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, did you ever get anything on individuals in your threat reporting?

(2) Answer. It was primarily cars. I remember cars. We would get random snippets on things but not a lot of context. It mainly came from the COC tactical radio or a yellow canary. I relayed to my teams either face to face or would radio up to the other teams. I would go up to (b)(6) to make sure they had the right details.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As you got closer to the 26th did the threat reporting change?

(2) Answer. I would say it became more frequent. The crowds were growing and Afghans kept asking us if the gate was closing. I don't know if that was fueling the threat reporting growing. I remember as we got closer to the 26th it was about individuals and less about vehicles.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get BOLOs or descriptions of individuals?

(2) Answer. I think on the 25th or 26th we got a description of a bald, Middle Eastern man carrying a backpack. This matched the description of the entire crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many people met that description in the crowd?

(2) Answer. The crowd was thousands. In my mind it was impossible to identify that person in this crowd.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you get any other reports from the COC?

(2) Answer. No specifics. It was general and sometimes vague information.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did you remember any specific threat reports on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I remember the morning of the 26th we were like, "Oh...an ISIS attack may happen." That type of reporting was frequent and we just tried to make light of it.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) On the 25th, we're tracking Echo Company was manning the gate and pushed the crowd to the footbridge, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. I remember the crowd was pushed back. Most of the time the crowd came back to that barrier on the near side by the sniper tower. The crowd ebbed and flowed.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Could you see down to the footbridge from the tower inside the inner gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. We would see down that corridor.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How many people were keeping the crowd back at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. There were a lot. The (b)(1)1 had guys all over the place. Maybe like 10 or a squad out there where the crowd was.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) In your opinion as a leader, as you got increased threats of and IED attack, would you want your troops towards the footbridge or the sniper tower looking at the possibility of conducting a CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. I feel like that's a gimme question. We were out there trying to find people to process to evacuate, but we needed space to be able to see these individuals and families. It was hard to do so when they were crushed up against the barrier by the

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tower. On the 25th there was a threat, but the only way to prevent Marines being injured/killed from an IED attack would be to cease operations. We still had a mission to accomplish.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): In your opinion, regardless of where of the crowd was, we would have still sustained casualties?

(2) Answer. Yes. You would have casualties. It's impossible to know how many, and also impossible to know where the attack would occur.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember the Marines collapsing back to the sniper tower from the footbridge?

(2) Answer. I knew they were ripping with Echo Company, but I never observed that happening.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): On the 26th, how was the crowd?

(2) Answer. I noticed how the crowd had grown in size around the sniper tower and near side walkway. The far side canal walkway was also full. The crowd had become noticeably more desperate and more aggressive. They wanted to leave.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you think the crowd was anticipating the gate closing?

(2) Answer. Yes. They all knew it. None of us told them. But they knew it.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. On the 26th, what threat reporting did you receive?

(2) Answer. Just that one about a bald, Middle Eastern male with a backpack, or it may have been a briefcase. I remember during the afternoon of the 26th, there was going to be an IED attack. We pulled everyone back, took cover, ceased operations, had a countdown to the explosion. I'm not sure how they knew that. Then 10 min passed, 20 min passed, 30 min passed, then the decision was made to resume operations.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Do you remember any other times you did that?

(2) Answer. That was the only time I remember like that. It was crazy how the intel was saying they knew the time of the blast. Then about 30min after the time of the supposed blast, and nothing happened, we resumed operations. We needed to get people out.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Did the Marines want the gate to close?

(2) Answer. No. 2/1 dudes wanted to get as many people out as they could.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So 20 min after the supposed blast time, Marines wanted to get back at it and continue processing people?

(2) Answer. Yes. We followed orders when to cease and take cover, but we wanted to get out there and help people.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Do you remember [REDACTED] (b)(6) passing up reports about any suspicious people in the crowd on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I Don't remember that happening.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Could that be because you were out with your teams?

(2) Answer. Yeah. Definitely. If they passed it over the radio that could have happened. But no one ever mentioned that to me.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So no one told you about or showed you a suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. No.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Do you remember (b)(6) asking for engagement authority on a suspicious individual on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I don't remember anyone asking me if we could shoot a guy.

III. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) So on the 26th, you don't remember a report about a bald guy, black garb, passing out cards in the crowd?

(2) Answer. No. If I heard that I would have gone up to the tower. I was down there the whole morning and never heard that.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How likely is it that they would have asked you to engage someone?

(2) Answer. It would be situation dependent.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) If it's an occasion were there see a guy matching a BOLO, not displaying hostile act/hostile intent, would they ask?

(2) Answer. They would not have shot them. They would have asked me, a company commander, or passed up the request via radio.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How likely would a sniper team leader go directly to the (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. Not likely.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Do you know how often the (b)(6) would go into the tower?

(2) Answer. They would go up there and be around. I was never in the tower when the (b)(6) was in the tower.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did the [REDACTED] (b)(6) ever tell you the sniper team asked to engage the individual?

(2) Answer. No.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever see the picture of the guy the sniper team wanted to engage?

(2) Answer. No. I have seen a lot of photos, but I never saw a photo of a guy they wanted to engage.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Would they push photos to you or the S2?

(2) Answer. Both. Either they would go through me and I would push them to the S2, or if they were going back to the COC I made sure they would go to the S2 to provide the photos.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you are not aware of any scout sniper requesting engagement authority on an individual in the crowd on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): And to your knowledge there is not a photo of the guy they wanted to engage?

(2) Answer. To my knowledge no. I don't remember seeing one. The S2 would have all the photos.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Prior to the attack, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to North HKIA to do a refit/reset run. Could they have provided the photos to the S2 then or gone to the COC to discuss the suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. Yes it's possible. I wasn't with them.

www. Question and Answer 74.

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(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Where were you primarily on the 26th in the early afternoon?

(2) Answer. Primarily with the rear tower after that morning. We were told we were RIPing so I began to plan for our RIP with the Army.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was your timeline for the RIP?

(2) Answer. I wasn't told one, I just knew it was happening. I just started to get things together that would need to happen for the RIP.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you talk with anyone from the 82d prior to the blast?

(2) Answer. No I didn't, only afterwards.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When the blast occurred where were you located?

(2) Answer. At the COC. I was in the sniper tower about 20 mins before and talked with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about the RIP plan [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't there. I just checked on them, said they have overwatch and that [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be back.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. Do you remember when [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his team left and how long their trip was?

(2) Answer. It was before I got there. It was a quick trip. They got back right before the blast.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you were up in the tower with [REDACTED] (b)(6), did they relay they had asked for engagement authority on an individual?

(2) Answer. No. they didn't mention that. I just came up to check with them, shot the shit with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for second, that was it.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you see any leadership out by the outer gate at that time?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Not the [REDACTED] (b)(6) at that time [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was out engaged with his Marines. He was pushing himself being out there all the time.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So how long were you at the COC when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer. I was watching it happening on the drone feed. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) weren't in the COC. I ran out of the COC, grabbed some guys and our gear. We hopped in a vehicle and went towards the gate. It took us about 15-20 min to get out there. I met up with my company commander at the inner gate. I thought they needed vehicles for CASEVAC, so I sent my Corpsman and vehicle up to the outer gates to help. I went to the [REDACTED] (b)(6) and spoke with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the inner corridor tower. He said he heard the blast and saw a small puff of smoke. I helped with pushing reports to the COC. We set up a Rear CCP to help people fall back when we shut down the gate.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you help with any casualties?

(2) Answer. Not Directly.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you heard about [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) condition?

(2) Answer. I heard he got hit, but I was told he wasn't that bad. I can't recall who told me that. Obviously, he wasn't good. After the CASEVAC was complete, we jumped in the vehicle and went to check on him. We had our guys on two towers to keep providing overwatch and security. We pulled the sniper team out of the outer corridor, put teams in the towers in the inner corridors.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often would a radio operator speak with the [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. In this case I could say it was possible. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) was out there spending time with the Marines. I never heard of him asking for engagement authority from the [REDACTED] (b)(6).

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) ever talk to you about them seeing an individual and/or asking for engagement authority?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. No. Not while I was there. They never mentioned that to me.

iii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Were you surprised hearing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) say this in his testimony?

(2) Answer. Yes. I was taken aback and surprised. I visited him, paying out of pocket with my own money, with [REDACTED] (b)(6) about six months after we got back and he never mentioned that to me. It hurts that I was never told any of this.

jjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Why do you think that was?

(2) Answer. Well [REDACTED] (b)(6) wasn't co-located with us in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d So it may be because they had a relationship with Echo Company. But we did the whole train up together, and when we got to HKIA they fell [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6)

kkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Do you think that was relayed to them on [REDACTED] (b)(6) again?

(2) Answer. I believe so. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

lll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did you talk to them on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes. I spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he made no mention of a conversation with the (b)(6) in where he requested engagement authority on a suspected individual.

mmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. Did [REDACTED] (b)(6) asked you for ROE changes, and did they understand it was your job to coordinate with higher?

(2) Answer. Yes. They did that multiple times.

nnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b. What was your personal battle rhythm/sleep cycle?

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SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Most of the days I was out there from 0400 to sunset. I would do a de-brief with the S2, get some sleep, and get back out there.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(1)1.4a You talked about your teams not in (b)(1)1.4a but doing the entire workup together. During your training, would you have radio operators thinking they were authorized to request engagement authority above you?

(2) Answer. We didn't do that in training. Sniper teams can work on their own. For example, they do request call for fire directly from the weapons team, it would be specific scenarios like that.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) What has been stated, is that a radio operator (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) non-sniper school trained, requested directly to the (b)(6) for engagement authority. My question is, that is something like this trained on, for a non-sniper to call up past echelons to request authority to engage?

(2) Answer. No Sir. We never trained to that.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Since redeploying from Afghanistan, have you ever given an interview or spoken publicly about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No. Only the interview was to a Marine Corps historian in an official capacity. Other than that no, and I really don't want to.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) How often do you read or consume social media regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Initially I did a lot, but not so much anymore. It's bad for my mental health. I stopped following and reading social media when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started making a lot of these comments.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b: (b)(6) Bad for your mental health why? Because you disagree with what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is saying?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. What's being said now is not helping others with closing the wounds. It's more counterproductive.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you PCS'd in May 2022? How often do you get with Marines from Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. We've had a couple platoon things, more social things. I haven't linked up with anyone from [REDACTED] (b)(6) spoken in depth.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you have any contact with anyone from [REDACTED] (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I did initially. Not really anymore. I've tried to stay engaged with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but he has not been responding to any texts. Jun 25 was the last response from [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I keep in touch with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a little bit.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else you want to cover or you think is important to add?

(2) Answer. No sir. We pretty much covered my notes.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anyone else you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When I wasn't in the tower he was always there.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Where was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer. With me in the COC.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Who would have been on the radio at the [REDACTED] (b)(6) tower at time of the blast?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the [REDACTED] (b)(6) but really the platoon RO. If I wasn't in the tower, he was there on the radio.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 2023/0/9, which begins on page 1 and ends on page _____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2023/0/4
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

2023/0/9
DATE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
 1 GABRESKI DRIVE
 SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

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05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Operations Battalion

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conducted an interview of the above personnel in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. BG Lance Curtis will be denoted as C1, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] is written in full.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with the interviewers introducing themselves and the describing their backgrounds. BG Curtis provided an overview of the scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. BG Curtis oriented [REDACTED] to the unclassified map of Abbey Gate, for the purpose of providing a shared lexicon to ensure clarity of communication during the interview. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: Does the map orientation I just provided to you make sense?

(2) Answer. It makes sense to me, I remember the inner gate having the better gate. It all makes sense.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. C1: Tell me about yourself?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

there until August 17, at which point I was pushed to Abbey Gate. My team joined a day later. I was injured on the 26th. I was medically evacuated after that. Last year I deployed for 6 months to Iraq. Now I'm back. I supported the joint task force there as the (b)(1)1.4a planner.

d. Question and Answer 3.(1) Question. C1: Explain again why you were in (b)(1)1.4d on the 17th?

(2) Answer. Our detachment deployed to go to the information warfare taskforce in Afghanistan. I moved from Afghanistan to (b)(1)1.4d so our detachment was supporting the over the horizon mission set. We worked with the (b)(1)1.4a on the ground. We supported some of the NEO planning when NEO was just an idea. Then, I believe at the one star level at SOCCENT, it was decided that one (b)(1)1.4a would go forward. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) who I met at that time.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. That is correct.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: So why are you picked as an individual augmentee?

(2) Answer. It was unclear whether the team from Fort Liberty was going to make it into HKIA. So they figured they had to send something.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have a specific skillset?

(2) Answer. No, other than just being capable.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. C1: You were an E5 until when? How many years do you have in?

(2) Answer. I picked up in September of (b)(6), I just hit (b)(6) years in service.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: What is your (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. The (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: Was it (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. I think so.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. That's where Ryan was?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, we didn't see him. We were at the Role II for a couple hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: How much do you remember post blast?

(2) Answer. I remember most immediately post blast, but it's a little hazy as I receive treatment.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: What are the docs telling you immediately while being treated?

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: What we found the first time around was doctors would shout out GSW as a point of reference for the type of wound, not a definitive finding. In regard to the fishing weights, forensics found it was only ball bearings. But a lot of secondary fragmentation did occur.

(2) Answer. Mhm.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: When could you talk to your parents?

(2) Answer. At the hospital in Afghanistan. I told them I was okay and that I was on my way to Germany. They were on vacation in the Black Sea at the time, I told them not to end their vacation and that I'd be back in North Carolina in a few weeks.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me, sequentially, what happened from when you heard that you're going to HKIA to the time that you are boots on ground at HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were in the SOCCENT compound, getting our equipment ready. The initial plan was three people were going to Afghanistan. We had our weapons and our stuff ready. We got the call that it would just be one person. Initially it was also one other sergeant and one staff sergeant. We found out it was just me, so from there I was told I will meet (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was an IO with the Marines. I went from the SOCCENT HQ building to the terminal. I was there for a couple hours, then I get on a military flight with a fire department that had to go to HKIA. To the best of my knowledge, it was just us on that flight.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Did you take any specific (b)(1)1.4a equipment?

(2) Answer. A lot actually. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Remember how long the flight was?

(2) Answer. No, I had been at the PAX terminal for 8 hours. I think the flight took off at around 1200 and we got there around 1900-2000.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. When do you land?

(2) Answer. I don't really remember, the day after the Afghans on the airfield.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me your first recollection hitting the ground?

(2) Answer. This was my first deployment. The first thing I remember is a lot of gunshots. The Afghans fire in the air to quiet the crowd. You can see the tracers flying. Then it was just a mad dash to figure out where I was supposed to go. I didn't have cell service. I wandered around until I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I packed

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

my equipment in and moved to the JOC at which point I meant (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who ran the IO cell for the Marines at the time.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: What is the team construct at the time? My understanding is that there were between 4-6 people on the team? I want your recollection of the (b)(1)1.4a team construct

(2) Answer. The other 4 Army (b)(1)1.4a got on ground the next day. The first night was just me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) working to move around Abbey Gate. We were taking manpack Next Generation loudspeaker systems (NGLS) to the gates to provide Marines the ability to message to the crowds and negate some of their problems. So we were emplacing NGLS and moving around.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Is your mission crowd control mitigation?

(2) Answer. Yes, that was our mission the entire time.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: What languages do you speak?

(2) Answer. English and Spanish.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: You're using Afghan linguists to help you then? How were they selected? What's that look like?

(2) Answer. We pulled them from the crowd. Once they were processed and waiting to be transported, we asked if anyone spoke English. A lot did, and we would take them and ask them to help us while they waited. It didn't matter exactly who, but we tried to pick people who had spouses with them so they wouldn't have to leave their kids alone. They didn't mind as long as they didn't miss their bus.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have any non-optimal individuals translate?

(2) Answer. Yes, we just had so many every day.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. What gate did you start at?

(2) Answer. That first night was East Gate. *Gestures on the table with his hands while describing areas on the picture of the area of operation* If this is the main hangar, there is a road at a 45 degree angle up. Once you follow that, there are two metal poles. That first night they put out c-wire and made an almost bubble into the street that ran parallel to HKIA to help channel the crowd.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: How many people that first time? Hundreds?

(2) Answer. At least two thousand. There was a lot of traffic, people packed in together, and people coming from each direction for several hundred meters.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: So where did they put you as the (b)(1)1.4a ?

(2) Answer. We moved with a lot of autonomy. That first night we were out there 17 August 2021, I think, we put the load speaker right in front. The speaker was placed directly behind the c-wire and pointed toward the crowd. We would've like to elevate it more. That first night we had a guy from the processed group talk for 2-3 hours. We kept working the NGLS, but we also helped the Marines filter people through the crowd. Then we didn't stop at the comfort zone that night, it wasn't big yet. We were helping out where we could. That first night was pandemonium. East Gate had a big corridor straight out that was just full of people.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: Do they have the MRAPs to bolster the gate yet?

(2) Answer. No, not until around 24 August 2021.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: Yea, East gate seemed difficult with the pushing of the crowd. What was the messaging you would put out?

(2) Answer. True. We were there for another two hours. We would put out entry criteria, SIV, passports, etc. We had MP3s that had a pre-recorded messages in Dari, Pashtu, and English that would play on repeat. Then when that wasn't playing, the interpreters would message to stop pushing, etc.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

(1) Question. C1: Are people getting crushed at this point?

(2) Answer. At North Gate, yes. East Gate had a little cutlet in which people were trying to enter through, which was the Marines biggest problem there. We were at East Gate for a few hours, then went to Abbey Gate the next morning.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. This is the 18th now?

(2) Answer. Yes. The (b)(1)1.4d were still there. I believe they closed the gate that morning because of the state of the crowd. The crowd was pushing hard, so I know (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d to help control that. After that, we go back to the office. We hadn't slept yet. Then our other four showed up: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Ryan Knauss.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in charge of the team right? Then you have Ryan Knauss and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ?

(2) Answer. Correct (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had two deployments at that point so he was very experienced.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: When did you meet up with them?

(2) Answer. Late that night, maybe 2000-2100. We do an introduction of them around HKIA. We go to North, East, and Abbey Gate and the comfort zone now that people were being filtered there. We were changing batteries on the loudspeakers and showing the team who was in charge at the gates. We were all together that first night. The following morning we split into teams. At which point we split into day shift/night shift and roved anywhere that had the most conflict, usually the comfort zones.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: Why? When does it get better?

(2) Answer. They didn't like sitting in the sun. They could be there for 72 hours, it didn't get better until the 24th roughly.

nn. Question and Answer 39.