



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021, [redacted] USA, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.
2. Methodology: [redacted] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which he rendered to writing as close to the exact words used by [redacted] during the discussion.
3. Discussion.
 - a. The interview began with [redacted] describing the scope of the investigation, methodology for capturing the statement, and the opportunity to review the memorandum for record after.
 - b. Question and Answer 1.
 - (1) Question. How long have you been in 2/1 Marines?
 - (2) Answer. I arrived to the unit in July 2020. I've been in the Marines 2 ½ years, and attended the Infantry School prior to arriving. I was commissioned through of OSC and got my degree from Northwest Missouri State.
 - c. Question and Answer 2.
 - (1) Question. When did you deploy to CENTCOM?
 - (2) Answer. My platoon, 1st platoon, arrived with all of G Co to [redacted] in early April.
 - d. Question and Answer 3.
 - (1) Question. What did you do in [redacted]
 - (2) Answer. The company did a lot of infantry combat training. We executed a progressive training plan, starting with individual tasks and progressed to squad tasks. Squad training included patrolling techniques, culminating with a 10 KM contract patrol.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

We knew the deployment was ultimately a crisis response support effort, but we were able to do a lot of infantry training. The British element we trained with came out in mid-July. This was 2 Paramarines, who were later at Abbey Gate with us at HKIA. In July we conducted force on force and an LFX with them.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When were you aware NEO in Afghanistan might become a possibility?

(2) Answer. The situation in Afghanistan was on the news and social media, so you could feel it coming. We officially got a warning order from the BN in early August. On 10-12 August, we were officially notified some of the Golf Platoons would go to HKIA.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Any chance to prepare or train before departing for Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. Very little. We were able to rehearse basic crowd control and we had some discussions on ROE.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What was the mission and when did you learn what tasks you would be performing?

(2) Answer. We were told to be prepared to come off the aircraft, get accountability, and be tasked immediately. We saw the news with the civilians falling off the C-17s and the civilians overrunning the airfield. We arrived a couple of days after that, night of the 18th, about 0100.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. What was the situation on ground when you get off the plane?

(2) Answer. We consolidated at PAX terminal and then to the gym, which served as our staging area. The Platoon Commander and Company Commander huddled to discuss the next morning tasks. The company was tasked to go out to Abbey Gate in the morning of the 18th. We secured a couple of vehicles for transportation; they were abandoned. My platoon was the first to go out to Abbey gate and we arrived at approximately 0800.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question. What units within Golf arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer. 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoons, and the Company HQ were all at HKIA. 2nd platoon was in [REDACTED] but never arrived because the flow of forces was stopped.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When you arrived at Abbey gate, what do you see?

(2) Answer. We travelled down to the gate area by vehicle and patrolled through Abbey Gate proper, down to the middle gate. We found Air Force Pararescue Jumpers and [REDACTED] at the gate. The crowd was pushed up against the outer gate. The actual physical gates for Abbey Gate, both proper and outer, were larger solid metal gate. I used one squad to open the gate and try to push the crowd back, but I quickly realized I needed the whole platoon. It was a rough experience. Marines were getting choked, punched, and pushed; but we had to hold the line. We held for 45 minutes, but had to close the gate to prevent the crowd from breaching the inner gate. Someone hooked up a tow strap to pull the gate shut, and my platoon had to slip back in, as it closed. A [REDACTED] Soldier released a C&S canister, which he took off a US Marine in my platoon, and created a small riot to clear the crowd. Some Marines got trampled. At this point, the crowd is pushed back, the gate was closed, and 50 evacuees were inside the gate with us. The evacuees inside the gate were not problem. Opening and closing the gate took about an hour total. Another platoon came up and moved the evacuees into the inner gate area and searched them. The CS had the platoon vomiting and out of the fight. We returned to the line and guarded the gate.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. How does the Gate get to the steady-state in place from 19-25 August?

(2) Answer. On August 19th, at 0100, we reopened gates, and cleared crowds with one platoon left and one right, on line. We slowly pushed the civilians back to the Barron Hotel inlet road. We stayed on line, two platoons abreast, concrete barrier in between. The Brits need to get vehicles up to the Barron Hotel, which was our reason for reopening the gates. During the push, the Taliban had one guy in the crowd, and he was violent and they complied with whatever he wanted. The engineers brought up the chevron containers after we pushed the crowds far enough down. [REDACTED] was coordinating with the Taliban through some SOF and interpreter, and then later individually. After the containers were in place, the Taliban took over the south entrance area and we pivoted behind the containers and road to the Barron Hotel. The Brits were positioned on the canal at this point. This becomes the steady state until 26 AUG. There was a platoon with the Brits on the canal, a platoon on the chevron behind the Taliban, and platoon on inner gate (holding area, search area, escorts).

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Where were you on the 26th of August?

(2) Answer. My platoon was on the canal on the 26th, pushed up against the jersey barrier beneath the tower. We RIP'd with 4th platoon at about 1600. The Gate was going to close that afternoon; we were told 1700. But that got pushed back until 1800. We were good with 1800, because it allowed us to keep pushing the evacuees through the gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Did you ever take a different force posture because of threat?

(2) Answer. A few days before 26 August we stopped the flow at the Gate, took a knee behind the T-walls, and reduced our profiles to the extent possible. We held the position for over 3 hours, from 0200-0500. We were not there when they executed a similar pause on 26 August.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What was the typical PPE worn at the gate?

(2) Answer. Everyone wore a vest with SAPI back and front, eye pro, gloves, and helmets. We could drop gear in inner gate or during rest in North HKIA. On the line, it was full PPE. Marines would occasionally remove their helmet to engage with a civilian, especially to calm them down.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What threat were you aware of on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I was tracking a potential SVIED or VBIED against the gate. I did not hear any details beyond the threat as an SVEST. Threats were constant throughout gate operations.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Where are you in relation to the canal and where is your platoon on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I was less than 25 meters from the tower. I had one squad at the jersey barriers at the tower, one at the canal edge, immediately next, and the last squad on line with the second. The crowd of people was rowdy and the biggest we had seen

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

so far. People at the jersey barrier were getting crushed to death and the crowd was going to come over the barrier, compromising the gate. The Brits were still out at the Barron Hotel so we had to keep the Gate open.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. How many KIA in your PLT?

(2) Answer. There were Nine KIA, all of Golf Companies KIA. The FETs were at the wall with us, mixed in with 2nd and 1st squads, helping with the crowds, especially the rejects.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. What were you doing at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. When the blast went off, I was escorting a family back and holding a child. I got knocked down but was still conscious and able to check myself for injuries. There were people on top me and after I cleared them off, I saw the blood on my arm. The first thing I see are casualties, but the Marine next to me has a CS gas canister going off. It must have been struck by shrapnel. I was able to move and a Marine came up to me, put on a tourniquet, and sent me to the CCP. On my way to the CCP, I see [redacted] crawling in that direction, so I pick him up, and we both get to CCP. When I get to the CCP, its clear the tourniquet is not on correctly, and need to be reestablished. I was losing a lot of blood. Someone helped me reapply the tourniquet. I went back to the outer gate, I saw Marines everywhere, but I knew I would be little help with one arm. So instead I told [redacted] to get accountability. After that, I blacked out. I woke up on the "baggage cart" and was going to the Hospital. A lot of my Marines were with me, so I was talking with those who being evac'd. I ended up on a British truck to go to Role 2 on North HKIA. The Role 2 had no room because of all the casualties, so I was put in a Toyota Hilux, and taken to another Field Hospital. I was stable, so not a high priority. They got me X-rays and then moved me back to the main hospital after about an hour. I was put into a room with my platoon's wounded, which when I started to hear about our KIA. They told us the plane was scheduled to leave 0100-0200. We had some time, so I left hospital for the gym we put our gear in, grabbed the wounded's phones and wallets, and returned to the hospital. The sun was coming up when the flight finally left, and went to Germany. We went to Walter Reed, after surgeries in Germany. [redacted]

[redacted]
(b)(6)

s. Question and Answer 18.

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question. Did you hear or experience any small arms fire?

(2) Answer. I did not hear anything. People said there was, but I don't remember any firing. I was focused on helping casualties.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. What would you say caused these injuries, based on what you saw?

(2) Answer. It was a lot of shrapnel and ball bearings, because of the round holes a lot of the wounded had for injuries. There was one gun-shot wound, which was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at least according to him. However, my arm was originally determined to be a gun-shot wound. One Marine might have been burned by the blast, but more likely it was from the heat of the shrapnel that struck him. I'm not aware of any blast trauma issues among the wounded.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Were there any platoon members who were injured, taken to Role 2, but not evacuated?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) my platoon sergeant, could give you a better list of who didn't get evacuated. He was with 3rd Squad on the jersey barriers, but had no injuries.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Is there anything you would like to add?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4d They would pull people from the crowd, put them in holding area, or worst against the fence immediately behind the canal position, while we were not taking anyone. The crowd would get really upset seeing this happen. This got worked out later, but it was a big problem for some time. It smoothed its self out by 25th and 26th of August.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 090

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment,
8 October 2021

1. On 8 October 2021, [REDACTED] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [REDACTED] answers individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: How long have you been in 2/1?

(2) Answer: Since March of 2020.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Were you with 2/1 for pre-deployment training? Were you able to visit some of the training?

(2) Answer: Yes and yes. It was an interesting time dealing with COVID mitigations during the train-up. We didn't want to risk insufficient training due to COVID but had to include risk mitigation. For example, we trained often by company and not as a whole battalion.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Did this pay off to have the companies used to working independently and still report to the battalion?

(2) Answer: Yes. It helped the companies exercise command and control internally and with the battalion.

For the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX), the battalion performed phenomenally. We heard great feedback from the outside units that worked with us and they said they loved working with our Marines. This was very motivating to our Marines. We culminated our train-up with the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX), a peer-adversary type of training

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Were you confident with the battalion's readiness after the train-up?

(2) Answer: Absolutely. I think we were very prepared. It was very rough when we were at the end of our ITX and to hear that the deployment was canceled around the end of October. The Marines were still training but didn't know what we would be doing. November, December, and January we felt like we were in limbo. We kept the mindset that we may still be going. I think it was late January when we got the call again that we were deploying.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Talk me through the flow of the battalion to theater.

(2) Answer: ADVON left in March. We were spread throughout different locations. G Co went to (b)(1)1.4a and did a lot of training with the British Military (Brits) and ended up working with them again at HKIA. This was beneficial in the long run.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When did you receive the order for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer: We knew that it was probably going to happen but we didn't know when. We did a lot of simulation training with role-players at this time in preparation. We rehearsed the landing of planes and tried to keep training as realistic as possible. We practiced loading and un-loading the aircraft, actions on the objective, interaction with different people, etc. I was walking the lines and observing training during this time. The Marines were very engaged in training.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Is it safe to say that, based upon all of the training to this point, the Marines have received a lot of practice adapting to situations?

(2) Answer: Yes. You can never predict what is going to happen but the Marines had a lot of exposure to different types of scenarios. We did a lot of mass casualty (MASCAL) training, integrating the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP), and had a lot of

practice for MASCALS. We had a lot of practice exercising crisis response. We asked the Air Force during our second large training to provide personnel to simulate large crowds. We performed a lot of repetitions practicing with the crowds.

The companies and platoon also did a lot of individual training internally.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When does 2/1 arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: We arrived 15-17 of August. The CO left one day ahead of me. I think he was there during the crazy time when people were hanging from aircraft. I left (b)(1)1.4a on a Tuesday. We got stuck in (b)(1)1.4a for quite some time.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Around 19 August, G Co begins manning Abbey Gate. Correct?

(2) Answer: Yes. I actually was there receiving G Co when they arrived. I was trying to help them as much as possible. I was at the flight line when they landed and did typical SgtMaj duties. They were coming in from (b)(1)1.4a and were tired.

G Co is the one that cleared the area. They did it in such a professional way that the two-star CSM from the Airborne unit approached me and said that they were the best Marines he had ever seen. After he saw E Co and the other companies, he said that the whole battalion was on point.

So G Co went and cleared the crowd. They were very professional and never fired any warning shots. We emphasized that the people were in the crowd were trying to find a better life and to stay empathetic. They convinced the crowd to move back without using force. They were able to connect with them. They moved them back toward the Barron Hotel and allowed the British and other foreign nations to have a clear corridor for them to move from the Barron Hotel to HKIA.

2/1 initially helped secure a perimeter on the airfield when we first arrive, we were tasked with the gates, and then the US Army took over security duties.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What were your general observations of the Marines working on the gates? How did the Marines deal with the crowd's desperation over the course of the days?

(2) Answer: I went with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) everywhere that he went. There were so many people. The flow of people never stopped and kept increasing. The Marines were

on their feet for over 20 hours at a time sometimes. They were so passionate about the mission and some would volunteer to not rest because they wanted to keep helping people. I saw a lot of joy in their help despite the tough circumstances.

The Department of State (DoS) would come, help, and then leave. They didn't always provide clear instruction and this led to the Marines getting very creative with their processes. The Marines became very good at finding ways to save time with processing people. They came up with color codes to separate processing people. They had green for those that were good to go to the terminal, yellow that needed the DoS to check documents, and red meant that they had to leave and wouldn't be processed. This helped limit the reactions of people getting turned away.

The crowd would freak out when [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d would pull other people out of the crowd. The Marines had to explain that they were going to different countries and not the US. They used the interpreters a lot to communicate this.

The heat was a large concern for the CO and I. We would find camo nets and tents to set up for the Marines to give shade to the crowds.

I. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Is there anything else leading up to 25 August that you would like to emphasize?

(2) Answer: No, the only thing I noticed was that people were reading the news and becoming desperate. They knew that this could be their last day at a chance to leave. The crowds were very desperate, especially the night of 25 August. People were trying to throw themselves over the wall. I caught about eight of them. We had to take them back to the gate. We tried to have the interpreters explain they couldn't do this.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: On 26 August, what was the threat reporting?

(2) Answer: I saw on the news that they were telling AMCITs to avoid the gates due to possible threats.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: The DoS was still taking people at the gate, despite this?

(2) Answer: Yes.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: I'm aware 2/1 took some additional FORCEPRO measures to mitigate this risk. Can you talk about this?

(2) Answer: Yes. We moved some Marines closer and set up overwatch.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Were you by the gate at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer: I went down there with the CO and moved away from him about five minutes before the blast. The Marines were smoking and I don't like to be around smoke so I moved away from them. They finished smoking and I was on my way walking toward them when all of a sudden I felt a pit in my stomach that something was wrong. I stopped and two 1stSgts came up to me and we were chatting. All of a sudden the blast went off and I saw bodies and debris fly.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Did you feel the blast?

(2) Answer: Yes, I felt some headache afterward.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: What happened after the blast?

(2) Answer: Everything felt like slow motion right after the blast. I immediately moved to my right and went to a LCpl next to me and thought that there may be a secondary blast. I told the LCpl not to move. Another Marine ran past me a few seconds later yelling that there were Marine casualties. I took off running toward the site of the blast and went through the hole in the fence and started assisting carrying the casualties out. I was one of the first ones on-site.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did you hear any gunfire at this time?

(2) Answer: Yes. I heard gunfire. I remember I heard automatic fire as I was running toward the blast sight. It sounded like it was being fired near the chevron. I didn't hear incoming rounds landing. People were saying that the Taliban were shooting in the air.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Do you know if any Marines fired shots?

(2) Answer: I do not know. I only heard shots fired near the chevron.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: So you assisting with casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of the Marines?

(2) Answer: Yes, I pulled out three of them and brought them to the casualty collection point (CCP). When I went back the fourth time, all casualties had been evacuated. It was a very quick effort. We CASEVAC everyone within minutes. I feel really bad about the wounded and dead civilians. There were bodies everywhere.

Once everyone was in we closed the gate and then started retrograding back and getting accountability.

Once we were retrograded back, we had to start identifying the casualties and KIA. I had to open body bags. It was hard to identify some Marines because they had a lot of facial injuries.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: From your perspective, is there anything else that you can add or anyone else that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer: No.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted]
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Exhibit 091

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 91, G Co Marines KIA Sketch and Discussion

1. On 7 October 2021, Marines from across G Co were gathered for an interview with Col CJ Douglas concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. At the conclusion of the interview, I gathered Marines from 1st Platoon and Marines closest to the attack-blast area to diagram the location of Marines at the time of the attack and who were KIA.

2. Using a whiteboard, Exhibit 91 was collaboratively sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)


3. Each participant was instructed to only rely on their direct memory and not what they heard from others. They were also instructed to categorize the certainty of their memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the Marines who were KIA.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Ar



**ABBEY GATE KIA
LOCATIONS**
G Co, 2/1 Marines Sketch
7 OCT 21
SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

1. HM3 Soviak, Maxton
2. LCpl McCollum, Rylee
3. LCpl Nikoui, Kareem
4. LCpl Espinoza, David
5. Cpl Sanchez, Humberto
6. Cpl Page, Daegan
7. LCpl Schmitz, Jared
8. Cpl Lopez, Hunter
9. LCpl Merola, Dylan
10. Sgt Rosario Pichardo, Johnny
11. Sgt Gee, Nicole
12. SSgt Hoover, Darin

SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY

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SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 092

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 92, G Co Platoon Sergeant KIA and WIA Sketch and Discussion

1. On 8 October 2021, I met with Marine (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st platoon to diagram the location of Marines at the time of the attack and who were KIA and WIA. The vast majority of both KIA and WIA were from 1st Platoon, G Co.
2. Using a whiteboard, Exhibit 92 was sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was instructed to only rely on direct memory, and not what they heard from others. He was also instructed to categorize the certainty of his memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the Marines who were KIA and WIA.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Abbey Gate

ABBAY GATE KIA LOCATIONS


(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sketch 8 OCT 21

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



1. HM3 Soviak, Maxton
 2. LCpl McCollum, Rylee
 3. LCpl Nikoui, Kareem
 4. LCpl Espinoza, David
 5. Cpl Sanchez, Humberto
 6. Cpl Page, Daegan
 7. LCpl Schmitz, Jared
 8. Cpl Lopez, Hunter
 9. LCpl Merola, Dylan
 10. Sgt Rosario Pichardo, Johnny
 11. Sgt Gee, Nicole
 12. SSgt Hoover, Darin
 13. SSG Knauss, Ryan
- X — (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (not KIA)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
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APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 93, Echo Company Abbey Gate 26 August Sketch and Discussion

1. Throughout 1 October 2021, Platoon Commanders, Platoon Sergeants and Squad Leaders from Echo Company, 2/1 Marines were gathered for an interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. During the interview, I drew a sketch of Abbey Gate at the time of the attack, based on their description of events and locations. All participants provided feedback as part of their interview to refine the sketch.

2. The sketch was done on a whiteboard and Exhibit 93 was collaboratively refined by all participants throughout 1 October 2021.

3. The interviews related to this sketch are Exhibit 59-61.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl


(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release


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ABBEY GATE 26 AUG 21
E Co Leaders Sketch 1 OCT 21
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



- 1. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- 2. SSgt Hoover (KIA)
- 3. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- 4. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
- 5.
- 6.

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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET



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ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 94, 2/1 Marines Sniper Abbey Gate 26 August Sketch and Discussion

1. On 1 October 2021, Snipers from 2/1 Marines were gathered for an interview with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. Throughout the interview, I drew a sketch of Abbey Gate at the time of the attack, based on their description of events and locations. The Snipers provided feedback as part of their interview to refine the sketch.

2. The sketch was done on a whiteboard, Exhibit 94 was collaboratively refined by (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. The interview related to this sketch is Exhibit 62.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl


(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

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ABBEY GATE 26 AUG 21
E Co Sniper Sketch 1 OCT 21
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2. SSgt Hoover (KIA)
3. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
4. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
5. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
6. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
7. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
8. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET

Page 107 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 095 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

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Page 123 redacted for the following reason:

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ACTS-SCK-DO

22 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USFOR-A,
22 October 2021

1. On 22 October 2021, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel over Secure Video Teleconference from the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command Headquarters, Fort Bragg NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which CSM Banfield answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Did you visit the gates?

(2) Answer: I hit every gate, every day starting on the 16th. All three of the main gates and the peripheral gates. That was my daily battle field circulation, I'd Hit North Gate, East Gate, then Abbey Gate. I'd do that in the morning and at night, then I would do the perimeter where we had Marines and Soldiers.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Can you speak to the atmosphere of the crowds and actions of Marines by Gate?

(2) Answer: North Gate was the most violent of the gates. The crowd up there was violent since the first time I went on the 15th or 16th. There were Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) up there, and my opinion is they started two rungs higher on the ladder of escalation than the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) did at the East and Abbey Gates. From the beginning, it appeared to me that they were at a higher state in the way they dealt with the crowd. It

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USFOR-A,
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was a bit heavier handed with yelling and screaming than it was at Abbey Gate. Full disclosure, this was my first Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) or large crowd control event. I did crowd control training 20 years ago with riot gear, but that gear and non-lethals were not widely available during this operation. Abbey Gate just had a strikingly different atmosphere. The Marines there were very stoic, they had a much different atmosphere. Perhaps the British being there had an effect on that. In the first few days, before the chevron was set up, there were large crowds pushed inside the Abbey Gate. We brought translators in to get control of the situation and clear the road there. Sometime between the 18th and the 20th, the Marines there pushed the crowd back. It was a deliberate operation. I observed some of it from on top of a guard shack nearby, and it was very deliberate. It almost reminded me of trench warfare with Marines and British pushing the crowd back. It was not violent, just a large scale crowd control measure.

While Abbey Gate later became the largest gate as more Afghans tried to use it to get on to HKIA, I don't know if they had different training, but the Marines from the SPMAGTF and Golf Company with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a different perspective on what was going on. It was clear down to the lowest level that this was a humanitarian effort. At North Gate, the mindset was more just about keep people back. I did not see any specific violent actions at Abbey Gate, at North Gate I had to control some Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) that were a bit heavy handed. I had to explain to them that yelling wasn't helping, these were desperate people trying to escape from their country. Many of them had spent years fighting for us in our war. The potential for violence was just higher at North Gate, if I was an Afghan I would not have gone through there because it would have been a scary experience.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Could you speak more about [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) His vision down from the Company Commander level to his Marines?

(2) Answer: I have never been a huge fan of Marines, my son-in-law is a Marine. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his Marines have changed my opinion of Marines. His demeanor, professionalism, and his Marines ability to make snap decisions were incredibly impressive. I was floored, it made me proud to be an American.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Were you there the day of the attack?

(2) Answer: Yes, two to three hours prior. Time and space was jumbled, I only know that because I called my wife that day, prior to the attack. When we got initial

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USFOR-A,
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reports of the bombing, it was incomprehensible because there was never a point where I saw Marines clustering there. They were as tactically sound as they could be, it was a high risk situation obviously, having the crowds within blast radius of Marines. We are lucky that it was only 13 Marines and there wasn't a second blast, it was high risk situation.

The first time I went to North gate on the 16th, they were running a turnstile type system, which I felt like was a suicide bomber's dream because there were so many people going into a narrow passage. The next morning they switched to a gate system which was more logistically sound, but obviously that was still high risk as Marines were so close to the crowds.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: We have heard Abbey referred to as the international gate?

(2) Answer: The first week North Gate was really the international gate while the Brits were getting set up at Abbey Gate. The Europeans were using North Gate, and having them there actually toned things down a bit. It was 19 year old Marines working up there at the gate, it was hard to change their more combative mindset on the spot. That is something that they would have had to think about before they got there. But the European countries came in deliberately and used North Gate until they hit a culmination point. After that, they moved to Abbey Gate in smaller numbers. Abbey Gate became the primary gate for everybody. There were British, French, Italians, etc down there and you could differentiate all the nations because they had flags set up to signal their civilians.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Anything else you want to highlight?

(2) Answer: When I did see specific instances that needed to be corrected, I would bring it up with leadership on the ground. Leadership always took appropriate actions, and BGen Sullivan and the entire JTF-CR did an excellent job with a difficult situation.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: In regards to the retrograde, there was clear guidance on how to execute the demilitarization (demil), could you speak to how Golf Company and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) executed that versus other companies?

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(2) Answer: After we pushed the task to conduct a demil, the intent got lost somewhere in the chain of command. The purpose wasn't to destroy everything, it was just to conduct a demil. Golf Company did exactly as they were supposed to, but some of the Marines on the North East side of HKIA cleared anything in their path to include vehicles, shops, and windows. It looked like vandals had gone through there, penises were spray painted all over the place. When that got up to me, I talked to [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He was already tracking and working on fixing it. He told me to wait a couple hours because he was going to try to fix it. We consolidated the vehicles that had been destroyed, and we tried to package it as best as we could to look like there was American discipline.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Golf Company set the standard on demil. I saw them one morning on North HKIA, and I knew already, but I asked him if it was his guys that did it. And he reassured me that his guys wouldn't do that, which I expected.

The destruction was wild, Marines were flipping cars. I don't know where the mindset came from, maybe from the early hot wiring of cars. Leadership, myself included, had spoken about how it was in American interest to leave a functional airport. There was a culture of not respecting equipment on ground, everywhere you went was destruction. It takes engaged leaders to stop that and explain that it is not in our best interest to just destroy things.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Any lessons learned?

(2) Answer: The difference that Abbey Gate had, tactically, is that they had a pressure release valve from the crowd. They could take in and screen people, and push them out as necessary, not back in to the same crowd. At North or East Gates, the rejected personnel were pushed back in to the same crowd they were pulled from. If I could go back to day zero, I would have built in a bleed off area, which I think is a good technique. There is definitely some tactics and strategy involved with running a NEO.

The other thing I want to address is the heat. I never imagined it before I got out there. It changed the dynamic of the crowd, they got angry and ornery and it also caused health problems. We couldn't have changed it, but the temperatures leading up to that event were milder. Marines could only throw a bottle of water so far in to the crowd, so the heat was a constant concern for us.

Mental Health checks for these guys that were face to face with the crowd will be important. These guys were making tough calls, they were telling males they had to pick which wife to bring in. That's going to have an effect on these guys, they were making

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USFOR-A,
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tough decisions that will stick with them for the rest of their lives. I think Golf Company will be extremely resilient even though they had the highest losses. I know they had a deliberate, day by day, group after action session during their redeployment so that everyone could talk about their experiences. I think there is a lot of guilt out there as a whole, because a lot of people were turned away. We were never going to get everyone out. We got 124,000 people out which is incredible, and the work they did was incredible.

This wasn't combat, but it had the fear and the close feeling of danger. Some of those guys were out there for 12 hours a day, and we need to remember that.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Can we have your contact information

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
assistant investigating officer, at [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



Exhibit 097

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

MEDICAL FORCE LAYDOWN (w/TSHs)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4c

HKIA MEDICAL CAPABILITIES (w/Tentative Retrograde Plan)

Pax	August													
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31			
								2-33	2-60	2-46	2-36	2-34	2-13	2

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

MEDICAL FORCES CURRENTLY IN HKIA (BOG)

US Surgical Teams (R2): 4 (b)(6)	US SPEC OPS Joint Medical Augmentation Unit (JMAU) 16 PAX	UK Surgical Team R2: 16 PAX	SPMAGTF STP R1E: 50 PAX (unit 27th) • 44 HMS (24Line/2Xray/2PMT/ 1 Pharm) (b)(6)	1/82nd R1E: 72 PAX (b)(6)	3/10 MTN R1: 4 PAX (b)(6)
			24th MEU R1: 64 PAX (unit 28) (b)(6)		
			CLASS VIII: 30 DOS Blood: 0 Walking Blood Bank kits: 50	Bpod: 47 units	

CCSG Update

- **HKIA Flow:**
 - N₂O, published to place medics on flights from HKIA (MARCENT / ARCENT)
 - Daily AE flights planned to preserve max available bed capacity at HKIA
- **TSHs:**
 - ~120K antigen tests at AUAB/CAS
 - LTSH CAS has received an FST, MCAS, and PM Tm; conducting integration
 - Population of pregnant women and children continues to increase; PEDs / OB CL VIII package arrived
 - VOCC from Kuwait Foreign Minister to use 2 HN MTFs
 - **USAF R3 for LTSH CAS personnel arrive ~26 Aug** 02/02/22
 - **Unaccompanied minors handed off to UNICEF at AUAB**
 - **500 vaccines administered at CAS / AFG physician present to assist**



Role 2LM
182
72 PAX BOG

CASEVAC (ALVARADO)
4x CH-47
2x Chalks/12 hrs Crew Swap

2 Corpsman

Role 2 Minimum: includes DCS, limited patient holding
Role 2E Additional OR capacity, patient holding and ancillary services

HKIA R2E
2 OR, 7 ICU, 14 ICW
UK GST R2 (1 OR)
Role 1
24th MEU STS
18 PAX/SHIFT BOG

NORTH GATE

1/82nd

MEU/SPMAGTF

Abbey Gate
ECC
Role 1
SPMAGTF STS
10 PAX/SHIFT

Role 1E
1/82 BDE
10 PAX/DAY SHIFT

Role 1
SPMAGTF STS
7 PAX/SHIFT


HO LD

HN Facilities

- 300 bed hospital (ANP)
- 400 bed hospital (ANA)
- NDS hospital (UKN # beds)
- Westex Clinic
- Private "German" Clinic
- Maiwand Teaching Hospital

Closed **Lost Contact**

MEDICAL FORCE LAYDOWN (w/TSHs)



HKIA MEDICAL CAPABILITIES (w/Tentative Retrograde Plan)

Pax	August													
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31			
German	6	6	6	6				Z-72	Z-60	Z-48	Z-36	Z-24	Z-12	Z
UK	16	16	16	16	16	10	10	10	10					
274th FRSD	20	10	10	10	10	10	10							
TF Med	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	3			
836th FRSD	18	18	18	9	9	9	9	9	9	9				
SOST	14			12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
SRT	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Total Pax	119	119	122	116	116	110	110	100	100	90	34	22	22	22

Capability	August													
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3
Surg TM	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	6	4	4	4	4
OR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
ICU	7	7	7	7	7	4	4	4	4	2	2	0	0	0
Ward	14	14	14	14	14	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0

Capability	August													
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3
SCATT Qatar	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
SCATT Kuwait	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

MEDICAL FORCES CURRENTLY IN HKIA (BOG)

<p>US Surgical Teams (R2): 4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FRSD 1 AD HOC (USAF) 2x SOS-T Blood: 182 units (US+KOR) 	<p>US SPEC OPS Joint Medical Augmentation Unit (JMAU) Surgical Team R2: 12 PAX</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 X PA, 2X SURG, 2x ER 2X CRNA 4 X 18D/SUPPORT 2 SURGICAL PACKAGES <p>USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abbey Gate Investigation)</p>	<p>UK Surgical Team R2: 16 PAX</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Surgical Team: 1 Medics Providers: Nurse CRNA AELO Blood: 86 Units 40 PRC 40 FFP 6 CRYO 	<p>SPMAGTF STP R1E: 50 PAX (unit 27th)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 44 HMS (24Line/2Xray/2PMT/ 1 Pharm) 2 ER DOC 2 ER RN 1 PA 1 DC <p>24th MEU R1: 64 PAX (unit 28)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 58 HMS, 1xPA, 1xEMPA, 1xER DOC 2 RN, 1 MED PLANNER CLASS VIII: 30 DOS Blood: 0 Walking Blood Bank kits: 50 	<p>1/82nd R1E: 72 PAX</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HO: 1 FM Red Devils (1/504): 1 Ped, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 19 Medics White Devils (2/504): 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 14 Medics Gun Devils (Field Art): 1 PA, 12 Medics 1/194: 1 ER doc, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 3 Medics 307th BSB Black Devils (Charlie Med): 1 ER, 1 GMO, 1 ERPA, 2 RN, 1 CRNA, 2 MEDO, 6 Medics; FRST (2 Surg Team) Blood: 47 units 	<p>3/10 MTN R1: 4 PAX</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 PA 1 ER Doc 4 Medics (A Co) 	<p>HKIA / Flow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> N.O. published to place medics on flights from HKIA (MARCENT / ARCENT) Daily AE flights planned to preserve max available bed capacity at HKIA UK extended 24hrs (New EDD 28 Aug 21) 3 AE missions following MASCAL; CL VIII supplies, blood and surgical supply sets distributed <p>TSHs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ~120K antigen tests at AUAB/CAS LTSH CAS has received an FST, MCAS, and PM Tm; conducting integration Population of pregnant women (85) and children continues to increase; PEDs / OB CL VIII package arrived VOCO from Kuwait Foreign Minister to use 2 HN MTFs 02/02/22 USAF R3 for LTSH CAS personnel arrived 581st MCAS arrived (working movement plan to Camp Buehring) 25x pax USN Medical AUG Tm for Camp Buehring (departs CONUS ~28AUG)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

07 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [REDACTED] USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology. BG Curtis and [REDACTED] asked a series of questions throughout the interview, and the Corpsmen answered them to the best of their ability. For brevity, the Corpsmen will be differentiated as follows. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
BG Curtis will be designated as C1 and [REDACTED]

3. Discussion.

a. [REDACTED] provided an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included fact finding concerning the actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum. They would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Can you speak to any training that Golf Company executed that was outside of the standard pre-deployment work up, or any training that you think prepared the company best for Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) and the mass casualty event on the 26th?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] 3rd platoon was tasked with the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission in [REDACTED] When we were in [REDACTED] working with the Air Force PJs and the 3/1 Marines, they were helping setup a medical [REDACTED] which was a more organized way to keep gear like sleds, litters, and oxygen tanks. We were doing all of this on the 5-7 and 5-6 med birds that we were utilizing. We were running through different scenarios that we might come

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

across. We were getting multiple reps of that in every night and day. We also got repetitions in with our inflight corpsmen. We practiced what we would do to care for a patient on board and how to provide care by priority. We would rep that and hold classes like we did in combat trauma management (CTM). We did that almost every day. We also set up trauma lanes with our guys, went through lanes and the algorithm of P-MARCH-P which is patient/provider safety, massive hemorrhage, airways, respiration, circulation, head wound and hypothermia, then pause. They had it memorized by the end and could go through it quickly. Pause refers to the time to administer antibiotics, pain meds, splints, or care for minor wounds. We were able to cover intravenous (IV) training as well, and most Marines were able to implement one in under 3 minutes. We had 3 Marines in 3rd platoon qualified for Valkyrie, the walking blood bank program. I was trained in that as well. It was very unique, the TRAP platoon Marines weren't straight up grunts. It was a medical mission, and our Platoon Commander, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) knew recovering personnel may have medical demands associated with it. Formal classes were at least every Tuesday and Thursday. Once guys were comfortable with the algorithm and initial steps to take, we moved into the science of why they took those steps.

(3) Answer (b)(6) We did training on securing an embassy before deploying. During that exercise, the local populace didn't speak same language. We gained a feeling for how stressful that can be, how hard it is to have to use physical and hand signs to communicate. We were taught what to look for in that scenario, I think that was a big help. We did that right down the road at the infantry immersion trainer which all the platoons cycled through. In (b)(1)1.4a, we did tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) for the guys and we did Valkyrie for ourselves and the junior corpsmen. We practiced that for multiple days, and I think those reps and refreshers made it much more second nature for everyone.

(4) Answer (b)(6) We had 3 new corpsmen that we needed to train - (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They hadn't been certified in CTM, and you can't even cover a live range unless you have been through CTM. It's basically training on TCCC and P-MARCH-P and ensuring the corpsmen are the masters of their profession. We used the independent duty corpsman from the battalion in (b)(1)1.4a to help train those new guys. They needed to do trauma lanes and assessments. They had only joined the unit in February or March and we couldn't really get them trained due to pre-deployment leave and COVID precautions. It was a priority as soon as we got to (b)(1)1.4a so we trained them for the 1st month before integrating them with their platoons. Then they started doing ranges. Our CO did a good job of getting platoons through squad attack lanes, and it let the corpsman get familiar with their guys. By around July, we started training on Valkyrie and whole blood. Once we got word we would deploy, we focused even more on training. I was always comfortable with those new guys even if they weren't CTM certified, all of our corpsmen were well trained and ready.

c. Question and Answer 2.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question (b)(6) When you get the word you'll be supporting a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Afghanistan, what did you do specifically and how did you change how you do things?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We heard in early August and I started packing an AMAL (Authorized Medical Allowance List), a medical supply box that would cover any injuries that might arise, right away. Some of the guys made fun of me at the time for how fast I started, but I was just prepping the gear and meds in case we couldn't bring everything. We ran the guys through full trauma assessment and whole blood and auto transfusions. We started checking individual first aid kits (IFAKs) and combat life saver (CLS) bags to ensure the supplies were up to date and cross loaded our equipment to maximize what we brought.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you run any drills for the Marines to find things in their IFAK or CLS bag?

(2) Answer (b)(6) For 3rd platoon we bought an extra med bag that we built. We would assign one person to carry it, and throughout the day we would approach them, tell them patient down, and see what they could do to find the stuff in their bag to treat the casualty. We worked to ensure that the IFAK was more accessible, Marines often put it in the back of their kit where they couldn't get to it

(3) Answer (b)(6) In the rear, a lot of the time it is frowned upon to open your IFAK since it will use up the materials in it. The current USMC issued IFAKs aren't great, the older ones are better, the zipper on the new one is hard to use. The Army pull out version is much better. Ours are difficult to close in moments of high stress. In terms of training, our CLS qualified individuals were being trained on using their bags. We didn't want to use all the equipment in their IFAKs. Before deployment we sent our Marines to supply to ensure that their IFAKs were filled.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(6) When did you all get to HKIA? What do you focus on when you get there?

(2) Answer (All). We arrived the night of the 18th.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Once we arrived, I went on a leader's recon with the CO and Gunny after we dropped our stuff in the bivouac area in the gym. I went to conduct the recon with the big 4 (CO, XO, 1stSgt, Co GySgt). I noticed that one of the combined anti-armor team (CAAT) platoons was at the gate, and 2 of their female corpsmen were running a female searching area, and would run to the crowd if someone called corpsmen up for a heat case or an injury. Fox Company corpsmen were by the gate as well, not doing too much at the time. I was looking for what areas could serve as

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casualty collection points (CCPs) depending on our missions. There were heat cases that I could see in the crowd. The shock trauma platoon (STP) didn't get setup until the 2nd day, so if we needed a higher echelon of care we would have to go to the Role 2. I was trying to establish the medical rules of engagement and casevac procedures.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Were you given a casevac plan in the event of a mass casualty?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] No. We were just told where the Role 2 was and to go to the STP first, but we didn't know where they were at initially. We didn't have casevac vehicles set aside. We had big blue (a large van), Casper (a baggage truck), and a gator, which were the three vehicles we had acquired. We heard that the STP had an ambulance, but comms were in and out and they might be difficult to call.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question [REDACTED] That first day were there any Marine patients? Did you talk about ROE or were you ever given an ROE?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] All our patients were Afghans at first. When 1st platoon pushed from the sniper tower toward the barriers on that first night we had a couple routine injuries from guys that got trampled in the crowd, the worst one was an ankle injury. Other than that, we just had a lot of heat cases from the Afghans. We sent about 70% of those heat cases back in to the crowd after treating, about 30% needed a higher echelon. We had no MEDROE from higher or from the company. We took it as it was and the Company trusted our decision on what to do. At one point the CO briefed us and explained that there were some people we couldn't take in because we wouldn't be able to treat everyone. Battalion didn't bring the actual Battalion Aid Station (BAS), so I didn't get much from the medical higher ups in regards to guidance.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] On our second day on the gate, I remember a Gunny, maybe from 1/8, told us that the STP was at East Gate about a 5 minute drive down the road. I was set up at the inner gate, so I had the most direct line to them.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] During the night we pushed to the Barron Hotel we set up a CCP behind the line of Marines as they advanced. [REDACTED] ordered corpsmen not to participate in the line push. We set up a CCP at the front of the gate, patients would be brought back to us or we would move forward to retrieve them. Our CCP moved up with the line as they pushed.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (C1). Did Afghans maim children to get them through?

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(2) Answer [REDACTED] I didn't see any of that. We had some children with burns, but I don't know if they were caused intentionally. Some of the heat cases would be dramatic, and over the top in an attempt to get their family through. A woman would faint, and then their 15 person family would stand up and try to follow them in through the gate. I remember a girl that we were treating, she was trying to get out through the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d but she didn't have the right credentials. She kept on fainting, but the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d wouldn't touch her because of her lack of credentials even when we asked them to assist because she had the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d Embassy on the phone and [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d documents. In those cases, we would funnel those personnel to the STP. The STP was very good to us, and they would figure out where to send the patients from there.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) Did you ever go to the STP's location to establish a relationship with them?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Yes. I had worked with the STP when working the TRAP mission. They told us they had supplies and an ambulance. After we brought that first girl there, I let everyone know that the STP was right down the road and ready to assist. They were very helpful.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) As the company established their position on the gate, did you ever speak to the company or adjacent units about actions to be taken in the event of a mass casualty (MASCAL)?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) No. The plan we had in place was basically rolling CCPs. Everything was so spread out. It was mostly us, Fox, and Weapons Company those first 4 days. We had CCPs set up along the way, but there was no formal talk about what to do for a MASCAL. There was always a corpsman by the search area, one from the STA team at the sniper tower, and one of the line corpsman was with the CCP as well. We had our litters staged right inside the outer gate. There was a vehicle before the chevron (blocking obstacle) that normally had a corpsman near it. The Brits were the forward CCP, because they had an actual doctor and some staff at the Barron. Once we found out about that it was a huge relief. It was nice to not have to bring someone all the way back to the gate. The STP was the rear release valve, and the Brits had the higher echelon forward release valve. They would take them off our hands if we asked, and kick them out as necessary.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I found out the Brits had that capability after an individual came through the chevron bloody. That's when I found out the Brits had a doc. That was huge, prior to that we were being overwhelmed by heat cases. Once we found out that they could help with anything serious, we could breathe a little easier. We also had the STP from the MEU inside the terminal by the Role 2. They were there since day 1, but

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no one really communicated that they were there. It was a poor location considering that the Role 2 was right next to them. I think they could have been in a much better location.

(4) Answer (G). I think that location was okay. That terminal had a large volume of people, it was probably good to utilize as a CCP near the Role 2.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(6) Alright, so starting on the 19th you're at Abbey Gate for 4 days, can you describe the atmosphere during that time?

(2) Answer (b)(6) During the first two to three days, we had a lot of heat cases due to lack of water. Water was coming in sporadically, and we were told to conserve water as much as possible. There were tons of people in the holding areas that were waiting for the Department of State (DoS), and there was only one of them usually and they would go home at night. We had to take care of and feed and give water to anyone inside the gate, but we didn't have enough to distribute. We had issues getting enough supplies during those first few days. The guys started high energy, but by the end they were just on autopilot. Starting around the 21st or 22nd the food and water came more consistently.

(3) Answer (b)(6) The MEU started to bring in more pallets of water and MREs. They brought enough that we were able to pass it out to the crowds. We would give water and food to women and children and they would share it with their families. Once we ran out of a pallet of water or food, another would be delivered. The Afghans were hoarding what they could get, they would put the water in their bag and the MREs weren't halal so they didn't always eat them.

(4) Answer (b)(6) In my opinion, we never had enough water. We always had people begging for it. During high noon there was no shade to be found, and people would start dropping. We would pass out water to those most at risk, but some folks would highly exaggerate their symptoms in order to get water. We would douse them with water and give them a bottle, but then everyone around would start to beg for water.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(6) When did you receive medical supplies?

(2) Answer (b)(6) That box I packed supported the whole battalion in terms of meds and fluids. One AMAL, about a 3x2x2 foot box. It resupplied us and it came in handy right off the bat. Most of our patients were just heat cases though.

(3) Answer (b)(6) We ended up breaking in to the Turkish dog kennel near the inner gate that had A/C. We made that into our Battalion Aid Station (BAS). We brought the

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AMAL can there and brought any major heat cases in there because it was cooler and they would be out of sight of the crowds when we gave them water. We could send them to the STP if necessary. If not, we would keep them there until they were okay. This was located directly behind the inner gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] So there was a CCP by the outer gate, the BAS at the inner gate, and corpsmen floating in between?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)]. Yes, platoon corpsmen were usually with their guys. I would rove between and see if anyone needed help.

(3) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] Eventually, we saw people were trying to use heat cases to get water for the crowd. They would cause a disruption, then when they called corpsman up, the crowd would start begging for water. I started to have heat cases searched then brought to the BAS for treatment away from the crowd.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] When you go back to the gate on the 25th, what is different?

(2) Answer, [redacted (b)(6)] It was more destroyed. There was more fecal matter, more trash. The people were mostly contained now, but the canal was bunched up.

(3) Answer (G). The DoS finally pushed up to the searching station by the outer gate. It seemed calmer, more organized. We only had to focus on that area along the fence, outside of the outer gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question [redacted (b)(6)] What were you hearing in terms of threat reporting?

(2) Answer, [redacted (b)(6)] I remember on the night of the 25th at 2200, we received an IED threat. I wasn't there for that. I was with one of my Marines, [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(6)] I got back around 1600 on the 26th.

(3) Answer [redacted (b)(6)]. We started getting a higher amount of IED threats and that's when we start talking with our XO about a possible MASCAL. We set up litters inside the outer gate. We staged our 3 vehicles for casevac with corpsmen there. The plan was to assign triage and push any casualties to the STP or Role 2 from there. We had our plan, equipment, and casevac prepared.

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p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question, [REDACTED] So on the 26th, you were almost always located at the CCP?

(2) Answer, [REDACTED] On the 25th into the 26th our corpsmen and the sniper team corpsman were usually in the vicinity of the CCP. As the platoons rotated, sometimes there would be a call for corpsman up, and we would go check on our guys, but the guidance from the CO and XO was to consolidate near the CCP.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question [REDACTED] On the 26th, were you hearing any increased threat reporting?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I remember being told that an IED would go off in 2 minutes, so we hunkered down but that didn't happen. The focus at the time was on the 82nd coming to relieve us. Everyone was giddy at the thought of getting relieved from the gate. We were anticipating an imminent attack, but the relief was giving people some energy.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] I remember speaking with [REDACTED] when we set up the first CCP about setting up an additional CCP, CCP2, by the sniper tower for the routine casualties and the urgent casualties would go to CCP1 by the vehicles. I wasn't at the gate until 1400 or 1500 on the 26th. Early on the 26th we brought some kids back to the orphanage and rested at the gym until about 1400 or 1500. [REDACTED] grabbed us and we rode back to the gate in big blue. Once we got there, I set up by the white van at CCP1.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question [REDACTED] On the afternoon of the 26th, had you established who would be sent to the STP versus the Role 2 in the event of a MASCAL?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] We were as ready as we could be. We were prepared mentally and doctrinally to use our CCP. The day prior, the ambulance with a triage team and en route care team moved from the STP had moved up to the inner gate due to the threat reporting. That was only about a 1 minute drive away. The STP was still at East Gate. They let us know they were there when we coordinated with their ambulance.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] There were 4 people on the team the STP sent to the inner gate, a nurse and 3 corpsmen.

(4) Answer [REDACTED] That was a relief for us, once they arrived we could bring all of our corpsmen up closer to the outer gate.

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(5) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) At this time, we also had a lot more turn over because the battalion had a better rest cycle. That made a lot more of us present when the event happened.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) For the blast, the Doctor at the STP said that the report of an explosion came over green gear at 1738. Where are you when that happens?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) I am at the main CCP, with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Doc Soviak were out checking on the line. There were probably 2-3 Echo corpsman at the search area, and one corpsman by the sniper tower. When the blast went off, I told our guys to standby, I knew that the casualties would come to us. About 20 second later, the first routine casualty was dragged to us. Within the first minute, we had about 6 get to us. One urgent came to us, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was bleeding from his jugular. I communicated to our driver that he was urgent and I packed his wound. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) accompanied him and 2 other wounded got into big blue as well to push to Role 2. That all happened within 3 minutes. We had about 12-13 people with us at that time.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) In the time immediately after the blast, what else were you seeing?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) The first injury was a frag wound right to his [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was fine, he wasn't bleeding elsewhere. I passed him [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for treatment. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in next and we threw him on a litter. [REDACTED] (b)(6) guy. I take off his kit and see that he is spurting blood from where he was hit by a fragment in [REDACTED] (b)(6) I start packing that wound and treating him. While doing that I saw [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a couple of Afghans come in. I was focused on [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was urgent and we had to get him out of there. That initial group of our wounded was [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had shrapnel in his legs, but he was okay. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I did a pressure bandage on his leg after we got [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on a casevac. An Echo corpsman showed up, I told him to give [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pain meds, some ketamine, since they were walking wounded.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question [REDACTED] (b)(6) You had wounded Afghans coming in already?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] (b)(6) Yes, I remember that I treated an Afghan girl. We prioritized US military like we discussed, but there was a one year old girl that a Marine was yelling at me to treat. She had an abrasion on her head. I wrapped her head and her family took her away. I didn't see any other patients at that moment and I wanted to diffuse the situation with the Marine. One thing I wish I did better was keep track of my guys and

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prioritizing who was pushing out, but there were so many casualties. Corpsmen were loading casualties and just going. I had to be a corpsman first, so I couldn't really stop that. After the Afghan baby I find Nikoui and he had no pulse. He was KIA. I moved onto the next guy Hunter Lopez, he was my friend. His head was swollen due to intracranial pressure and he also had no pulse. I spent 30 seconds on him, but he was already expectant. Next, I went to Cpl Humberto Sanchez, there were a group of Marines around him looking at his chest. I checked him and I thought I felt a pulse. I went to clear his airway and saw that his teeth were blown out. I did a cricke on him and another corpsman came to assist and ventilate. We moved him on to a van and got him out of there. I was on him for about 3-4 minutes. I looked up and saw Army medics and the Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman (SARC) I knew from [REDACTED] I saw [REDACTED] working on SSgt Hoover. At this point I linked up with 1stSgt. He gave me the casualty list so far, it was larger than I thought it would be. I kept looking for patients, the last 2 patients I could see were [REDACTED] and an Afghan woman. [REDACTED] had the tightest tourniquet I'd ever seen on, he kept yelling to take the boys first. He was the last to leave in one of the vans. After that I focused on consolidating gear, flaks, and medbags. I told the guys to resupply after that and moved into a holding position in case there was another attack.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question [REDACTED] Who was still around when you sent [REDACTED] back?

(2) Answer [REDACTED] I was back. It took 3-5 minutes to get [REDACTED] to the STP and back. The goal was to get him there quickly since he was bleeding so much. Eventually, we were able to stop that bleeding. The injury went through his mouth and ripped through his tongue. I didn't want to put gauze in his mouth and obstruct his airway. Once I got back, I saw [REDACTED] He tells me to find out casualties by type. I walked around and found 5 or 6. About half were priority, and half were urgent. After that, [REDACTED] got with 1stSgt. I saw Soviak and a couple other wounded guys. I hopped on Soviak, I didn't even recognize him at first. I checked his carotid and radial pulse. I didn't feel a pulse, but I was going to try refractory shock. I had a double needle d in my hand, but then [REDACTED] showed up with [REDACTED] I told him to try refractory shock and gave him the needles. I think he tried, but I think Soviak was expectant at that point. 3 people got on that casevac. [REDACTED] was the last one out, it was no more than 8-10 minutes before everyone was moving to STP or Role 2.

(3) Answer [REDACTED] Yea all of Weapons' corpsmen, [REDACTED] came up and were acting as en route care

(4) Answer [REDACTED] When the blast went off, I remember a moment of silence. I started to run forward, but I had to turn back for my med bag and Kevlar. Once I turned back around, I saw [REDACTED] and ran him in through the gate with me. I helped cut off his flak and weapon sling. After that I left and went to help next person I heard yelling for a corpsman. There was a Marine with a 7 year old kid that had shrapnel, I treated him, picked him up and took him to [REDACTED] I'm not sure if I gave him to a corpsman.

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This all happened from minutes 1-4. Then I hopped up, and treated a service member that had the back of their head smashed. I got gauze and made a donut to put around their head. After that an Echo and sniper corpsman came and asked how they could help. I realized there were too many of us in one spot. I let them finish and echelon that patient out.

Next, I treated [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was close to the blast. He had shrapnel through his [redacted] (b)(6) and had a tourniquet on his upper arm. I cut his sleeve back and saw there were no other wounds. I gave him to a Marine to walk back to the casevac. After that, I crossed back to the other side of the CCP. An older local female was the next patient, she had the same head wound as the guy that I treated before. Then I moved to Ssgt Hoover, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was treating a wound on his leg and [redacted] (b)(6) started helping with mass bleeding. I was treating his airway, he was gasping for air. I put an NPA in, but it did nothing. I put an i-gel (supraglottic airway) down his throat and waited a second or two before I felt that he had an airway. I heard other calls asking for corpsmen. I asked [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if he could handle Hoover, and he said yes. I left and told him to watch the breathing. I don't remember the next patient. Then I saw Soviak. I got his head, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got the side, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got the feet, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got on [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with him and they drove off.

I looked over and saw one of the female Marines get a tarp laid over her. Then I saw another patient and ran back across the street. When I came by again I saw the tarp was off and 2 or 3 Brits were doing CPR on her, I told them it was not the time and place for that because she was expectant. I checked on some children but they were fine. I saw [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) speaking with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I don't remember any shots being fired. I saw tons of med supplies were being used up, my med bag was low, and I yelled out to consolidate medical supplies by the van.

(5) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) There were 3 or 4 Brit medics with the doctor, trying to do CPR and treat that female. I told them to get her on a casevac, but they were trying to stabilize her there. Capt [redacted] (b)(3)130b had spoken with the Brits and that's where I think that response came from.

(6) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Around that time, I brought another med bag from the STP that I had asked them for since we were using up so many supplies.

(7) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) Then I grabbed two of my Marines to go get the green box with all the medical supplies. The last person I saw was [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with two tourniquets. I asked him what else hurt and he said his foot. I cut his boot off and there was a small hole in his foot that wasn't bleeding. I remember we got him on a litter and put him on a casevac to get him out of there. Once he was gone we just held our posture and echeloned out.

w. Question and Answer 22.

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(1) Question (b)(6) Did any of you treat [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) expressed that sending him to the STP saved his life because they were able to stabilize him before the Role 2.

(2) Answer (b)(6) It might have been [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that did that, as [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was his Marine. I had the same thought process when I took [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) there. That Role 2 was too far sometimes.

(3) Answer (b)(6) The STP at East Gate was only a 5 minute drive, it was about a mile and a half away. On the night of the push we didn't have a vehicle and we had to run a child with a pelvic fracture there.

(4) Answer (b)(6) Yeah we didn't have a vehicle yet. A few of us ran there, passing her back and forth. We ran her most of the way there before getting picked up by a British guy on the last leg.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (C1). Did any wounds penetrate Kevlar or SAPI plates?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I remember for [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he had a lot of blood inside his Kevlar. I didn't take his Kevlar off, so I couldn't say for sure if it was penetrated. I do know that a lot of Marines' Kevlars stopped shrapnel. I think the personal protective equipment (PPE) and plates did their job. I didn't see any that went through armor.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Most injuries were in the non-PPE areas. The neck or the area above the side SAPI plates was usually where we saw serious wounds.

(4) Answer (b)(6) The guys that passed away were mostly those too close to the blast. They were probably within 10 meters, and some were as close as 5, to the blast. We never heard gunshots after the blast, I was focused on treatment. I heard the canal was a mass of casualties. I'm glad the Marines did their job and pulled security so that only the right casualties got to us so we didn't get overwhelmed.

(5) Answer (b)(6) Our mind-frame at the time was to focus on treating US Military. The assets and the training we had enabled everyone to get treatment quickly.

(6) Answer (b)(6) Also, there were a lot of vehicles just showing up and evacuating anyone that needed help. There was some sort of ambulance exchange point (AXP) established inside the middle gate, I heard. I hope that's true because it would direct care to the right place. We had a lot of assets being flexed at that time. We had Fox Corpsmen and a bunch of guys in the rear that were ready to support, there were the 4 medical Brits, there were 3 or 4 Army medics helping take care of walking wounded, and the SARC.

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(7) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) After we pushed all of the casualties out, the Marines lined up and established a security posture. We fell back to the inner gate where the Weapons corpsmen were. I could see them directing where to send patients. We consolidated all of our meds with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Weapons Company there at inner gate. He was drawing up the proper dosage for corpsmen to administer and assess patients at the inner gate. I took [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and gave him ketamine before sending him to Role 2 care.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) About how long was it from the blast until [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) left?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) About 15-20 minutes probably, it was absolutely within 30 minutes.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (C1). The concussive waves are serious and have long term effects, what are you doing now to double back and check on those Marines affected? Are you checking for that?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6). When we got back to Kuwait we did a TBI screening on those who may have been affected. We made all of 1st platoon get checked. Now that we are back in Pendleton, the whole company will be doing our post deployment ANAM (Automated Neuro-psychological Assessment Metrics). We are identifying some guys who might need individual attention.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (C1). I heard about a Marine that had two feet blown off and kept trying to drag people?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) That may have been [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I heard that he was dragging [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after the blast, and she said she remembers seeing him bleeding while dragging her. They reunited later on, once they were both back receiving care State-side. It also may have been [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and kept dragging people off the X.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) Who was directing traffic at the inner gate?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the Weapons Company Senior Line Corpsman. He started the walking blood bank for [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and pulled ten units of blood from the field. He started leave today. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the other STA team may also have been there.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question, (C1). Can we get your contact info?

(2) Answer (All). [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] email.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (C1). Could you see, hear, or feel the blast?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] I didn't see it, but I heard it. It definitely wasn't a flashbang. Things were pretty dusty, after that my adrenaline kicked in and I just started acting.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] assistant investigating officer, at [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

LANCE G. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

08 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Company Intelligence Cell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 8 October 2021

1. On 08 October, 2021 BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology. BG Curtis [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered in a conversational manner. [redacted] (b)(6) will designate that [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking, a (C1) will indicate that BG Curtis is speaking, and an [redacted] (b)(6) designate [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking.

3. Discussion.

a. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have any information on threat streams right before the blast?

(2) Answer [redacted] (b)(6) If I could get on the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c could confirm. I saw that there was a timer from what I was reading, it was on the Hamad Karzia International Airport (HKIA) coordination thread. I couldn't say the exact source or if it was a specific gate. I remember a 30 minute, and then a 5 minute, and a 2 minute warning. I couldn't remember if it was specific to the blast, I would have to go back and read.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question [redacted] (b)(6) I don't think there is any doubt about there being counters that day, there was high confidence that an attack was imminent. That resulted in Marines taking a knee and waiting for impact, we were tracking it as being a couple of hours prior. Do you think what you remember is the false alarm or the actual blast?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] Company Intelligence Cell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 08 October 2021

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] I just remember that there was a countdown. I know it was in the afternoon, I couldn't say if the countdown happened for the actual blast.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have access to those reports?

(2) Answer [redacted (b)(6)] I'm locked out of my token right now, our [redacted (b)(6)] could probably get to it.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted (b)(6)] and

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]

[redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)]



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 100

ACTS-SCK-DO

12 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis (C1) and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: C1: Can you talk me through your pre-deployment training and validation?

(2) Answer: I've been the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) [REDACTED] (b)(6) since December of 2017. This is personally my second deployment with the MEU. I previously deployed with the SPMAGTF to Africa for Crisis Response.

The MEU went through a six-month pre-deployment training here at Camp Lejeune, NC. There are 13 Mission Essential Tasks (METs) that we trained on, including Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Normally, NEO is included during our urban training, but we actually did a NEO training package separate from what we normally go through. We added this as an extra exercise because we had extra time in January 2021. This NEO training was sponsored by our Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) We had personnel from the Department of State (DoS) and civilians train with us. We also had Professional Military Education (PME) provided by the former MEO XO that participated in the last [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d NEO.

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Our training consisted of sending in a Forward Command Element (FCE) and then a security element that practiced screening and searching operations. We went through practical exercises and conducted personnel searches. Looking back, this training was not to scale of HKIA, however, it provided us with a broad overview of Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations. It was less realistic than what I would have liked because we had Marines as role-players. Marines are much more compliant than civilians in real life. This NEO exercise was four to six days long.

The next NEO training we completed was during deployment. Initially, we were focused on the European Command (EUCOM) Area of Operations (AOR). We received SDOB for Central Command (CENTCOM) specifically for the NEO. June 1st 2021 was our first time dealing with CENTCOM. Initially, the orders were signed only for 30 days. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4d to practice NEO. We sent out our command and control element and security element into the embassy to practice how we would set up and process people through in order to practice repetitions of NEO.

On 28 June, we began heading back toward EUCOM. We made it to the Suez Canal, received a new SDOB, and made a U-turn back to CENTCOM. This next SDOB was for an additional 30 days.

Next, GEN Mackenzie postured us near the shore. We put our Marines [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a and staged our forces here for HKIA. Some Marines arrived to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a in July, coming off of the USS Iwo Jima. I arrived to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a on July 23rd. The rest of the Marines arrived a week after me after stopping in Oman for ship maintenance. Once everyone was in [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a we began running daily rehearsals. We focused on running organized operations and keeping stand-off at gates. We had some of our Marines practice with the security forces on the airfield at [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a so that they could learn airfield security operations. We practiced all aspects of NEO. We were running rehearsals up until the day that we went to HKIA. We ran at least four or five full rehearsals in preparation. On 13 August, we received the call from [REDACTED] (b)(7) that we were going to HKIA.

We first started hearing initial discussions about NEO around May. I don't remember the dates of the first Secure VTC with GEN Mackenzie. We had been talking with BG Sullivan since May or June about NEO. Our initial discussion and plan was to arrive to HKIA, augment with the Turks, set up the ECC, and process people. In July, we sent a leader's recon to check out HKIA; we left [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with the JTF at HKIA to help us continue our planning efforts.

We knew we would be operating out of Building 300 on HKIA as our headquarters and Tactical Operations Center (TOC). This area was already set up with a computer network. We also set up single-channel, plain text communications. We combined efforts with the JTF and created a Joint Operations Center (JOC). This helped create one central point of information. Again, our initial plan was to have our

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security element integrate with Turks, man gates, have QRF capability, and then have our ECC begin processing personnel. Our planned force flow was to have our ECC and security elements arrive first and the command and control elements arrive second.

We didn't conduct any training rehearsals with 2/1. As a MEU, I have a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 1/8, consisting of three Rifle Companies, a Weapons Company, an Artillery Battery, a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company 'minus', an Engineer Platoon, and a Reconnaissance Company 'minus'. I also have an Aviation Combat Element (ACE). I didn't take any aircraft forward, but brought some ACE, like air traffic controllers, to help run airfield operations. They ran air traffic with the Special Operations Forces until the Air Force arrived, and then continued to work into their organization. The Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) has a similar organization. The final piece of the MEU is the command element, consisting of the headquarters and staff.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: C1: Let's discuss Task Organization (TASKORG). Who did you work for directly? Was this clear?

(2) Answer: I worked for BG Sullivan from the Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR). Yes, it was very clear, but sometimes it was hard to tell who he worked for.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: C1: Who did 2/1 work for?

(2) Answer: They were TACON to the MEU and OPCON to the JTF. I was giving them their tasks. 2/1 still had a direct line to BG Sullivan and sat in a lot of the same meetings due to the OPCON relationship.

The initial plan did not have 2/1 TACON to the MEU. We originally were going to bring their SPAGTF in. As the plan evolved, it didn't make sense to bring in another O-6 headquarters and they were busy with other things. BG Sullivan asked if I could handle another battalion to command, and I said yes. It was helpful to have another unit.

The 2/1 Commander understood that he was TACON to me and he never tried to work around that. It was sometimes challenging with the other units already at HKIA. For example, TF Polar Bear (2-10th MTN), initially worked directly for United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the embassy. MG Donahue and TF Wild Boar (10th MTN Rifle Company 'minus', a very small element) arrived between 17-20 August. They were supposed to relieve TF Polar Bear but they ended up keeping both on HKIA. TF Wild Boar was pulled from our TASKORG and were put underneath one of the brigade commanders from 10th MTN that was working

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as the Deputy Commanding Officer for USFOR-A, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was the garrison commander of this unit. They formed a unit called the multi nation coordination cell. They coordinated the movement of people from all directions. We were receiving calls from retired generals, senators, and reporters, and they were tasked with coordinating these calls and movements. This command relationship was pretty unclear.

I was unclear of the two Army units' TASKORG to the JTF, the MEU and USFOR-A. It became especially confusing when the 82nd Airborne arrived. The TASKORG constantly changed with the force flow.

As the MEU [redacted] (b)(6) my command and control were clear. The 2/1 Commander arrived right after the MEU and was immediately TACON to me. He stayed like this for the duration of the NEO. The command and control relationships above the JTF sometimes changed, but didn't really affect me because I worked directly for BG Sullivan.

Our force flow was slowed due to the 82nd Airborne (1-82) using some of the crews that were supposed to fly our C-17s in. They started arriving on the 15th or 16th of August. I told BG Sullivan that this was affecting our combat power because we didn't have many people on ground. [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the 1-82 Commander, arrived and he was adjacent to me. The initial security that we were going to push out were delayed because the follow-on forces were delayed and we needed to integrate their personnel on the line to assist with security.

My initial security guys were manning some of the towers with the Turks and doing QRF drills. We hadn't started manning the gates to start pulling people through because we were limited on personnel. Once I put one of the companies in the towers, I really only had one company to serve as QRF. I sent one rifle company out during the first civilian uprising onto the airfield. They were trying to keep people from crossing the runway. We eventually brought some concertina wire out to assist with this. At the same time, the 82nd started to arrive to Camp Alvarado. The JTF tasked them to support us in the south by sending a unit to us to link up with 1/8. They were sent to assist 1/8 with pulling security to reinforce the line. This coordination was difficult because we hadn't met or talked to each other yet as units. This became a problem because we didn't have communications with them and had to go through their headquarters element to communicate.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: C1: What did the 82nd have for TASKORG when they arrived?

(2) Answer: I think they had about one battalion.

f. Question and Answer 5.

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(1) Question: What's the largest size for TASKORG that you received?

(2) Answer: All of 1/8, to include three Line Companies, one Weapons Company, two Provisional Companies, one Engineer Platoon and one Reconnaissance Platoon. We also had additional mortar personnel, most likely helping with searching personnel.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When do you achieve full strength of 1/8 at HKIA?

(2) Answer: It was around the 19th or 20th of August. It was well before the event on Abbey Gate. Our UAVs were flying around the 15th and 16th to provide video feeds.

2/1 was a lot smaller than 1/8. They were an Infantry Battalion 'minus'. Two of their platoons from F Co remained at the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a in Iraq. They brought forward G Co, E Co, two platoons from F Co, and a Weapons Company to HKIA. Initially, they were linked up us to help pull security on the line. 1/8 pulled one sector, 2/1 pulled a sector, and the 82nd pulled a sector.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: C1: When was the first time that you saw a large change to your mission set in regards to the 82nd arriving?

(2) Answer: The 82nd arrived around the 15th or 16th of August. A few days later, around the 19th, we decided that their mission would be to provide airfield security. The MEU would keep security on Abbey Gate, East Gate, and North Gate. I met with all of the battalion commanders and described who would pull security and where. Each gate had two rifle companies pulling security. BLT 2/1 was responsible for Abbey Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Can you provide a timeline of the gates opening and how operations at the gate changed up until the 25th of August?

(2) Answer: The first gate we opened was North Gate. It was open from 17-23 August. It was the only gate open for the first few days because we didn't have enough people to open more. This was not the gate that we first planned to open, but we had delayed planning with the Turks. We had to wait for some supplies, equipment, and personnel before opening Abbey Gate. We were planning to set up a holding area with tents on the eastern side of the airfield to keep from having to bring personnel up to the PAX terminal right away. This would help to limit the back log of personnel waiting for

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aircraft at the PAX terminal. We requested tents and other supplies in order to do this. There were pre-existing structures at North Gate and it was close to the airfield.

The North Gate allowed us to process people through and bring them immediately to the PAX terminal. There was a holding area that we called CATO where the overflow of people at the PAX terminal could wait.

The North Gate has an inner and outer gate but they were closer together than the other gates. The construction material was similar to that used at Abbey Gate; flimsy. The avenue of approach to North Gate was never shut down, even though we asked the Taliban to at least shut it down to one lane. That never happened. We received intelligence reports that mopeds or motorcycles were transporting Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). One time, a tanker truck came through that was a high threat. There was a lot of traffic in this area and it caused the personnel to be very cramped closer to the gate. This area required us to use a lot of measures to control the area allowed by our Ruled of Engagement (ROE).

The North Gate was the hardest gate to control.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What were your ROE?

(2) Answer: It was the same for all US Forces on HKIA.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

We had the National Strike Unit (NSU) trying to help us with crowd control. It was difficult to work with them because they had some overly-aggressive tendencies. They used a lot of warning shots. By the third day, warning shots weren't effective with the crowd because everyone was so used to them. You constantly heard warning shots at HKIA. Our guys didn't use warning shots very often because we didn't find it to be effective. The Taliban and NSU fired warning shots all of the time.

We used a vehicle to help reinforce the gate when we would close it. There was a natural alley/corridor that was made by some hesco and jersey barriers that helped us create lines for initially-screened evacuees to stand in as they waited to be searched and escorted to the PAX terminal. Once the PAX terminal was overflowing, we brought personnel to other designated holding areas. The Germans set up a separate NATO line at North Gate

We had to open and close the North Gate often. There was also a pedestrian gate with a turnstile that we originally wanted to use. However, this quickly became

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mobbed with people and was unusable. We eventually used this pedestrian gate to return people that didn't pass screening back out to the crowd.

North Gate was closed on the 23rd because it was too hard to control the flow of people and vehicles had a lot of access to it. We moved the mass screenings to Abbey Gate. North Gate remained closed after this, except for special intakes.

East Gate was open from the 20th to the 24th. It was the easiest gate to control because it had one access point and fewer people trying to enter. There were towers with strong overwatch at East Gate. The first day that we opened the gate was easy to man because people were not expecting it to be open. There is only one gate and a vehicle barrier at East Gate, so we accepted a lot of risk by using it. We had to push people outside away from the gate to create stand-off to try to control the crowd from storming in. We also emplaced a wire obstacle to help create stand-off. The crowds were very unyielding and the NSU eventually took over pulling security at East Gate and used aggressive crowd-control measures.

There were a lot of pre-existing structures behind East Gate that we could use to control the flow, searching, and movement of personnel for processing and movement to the PAX terminal. The walls were high and there weren't many people trying to climb over. There were still warning shots and non-lethal munitions used here.

Other elements, like the Taliban, did not like to help us pull security at the gates and this created some banter. Around 23 August, we saw the Taliban setting up mortars outside of East Gate. We understood that the Taliban help us until the 31st of August, but after that, they wouldn't hesitate to attack us. This caused for a ROE discussion because we agreed not to attack them. They ended up not doing anything with the mortars, but it was still surreal.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: Did you receive phone calls to help find people and bring them through?

(2) Answer: Yes. I created a special task force that dealt with this.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: As a (b)(6) which gate did you most prefer to use?

(2) Answer: At first, I preferred East Gate. Abbey Gate ended up being a better gate because it was easier to access evacuees and pull them through. The chevron was helpful with the crowd. The canal created a challenge as it filled up because it was hard to control who was moving to the front. The Brits also used it, operating out of the

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Barron Hotel. Once the Brits had enough people processed at the Barron Hotel, they would convoy them in during the night. By the 26th, all multinational forces were using Abbey Gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Why did East and North Gates close?

(2) Answer: We would close gates periodically if there was a backlog of personnel or if the crowds get too aggressive. The commander on the ground had the authority to open or close gates as they saw necessary.

We were directed to close North Gate by the JTF Commander because there was too high of a risk for VBIEDs and we were receiving constant threat streams for vehicles in that area. The VBIED threat was huge to me because there was a lot of room to get large vehicles by North Gate.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Why don't you think there was an incident with VBIEDs here?

(2) Answer: Someone was talking with the Taliban about watching and keeping people away. We had snipers on overwatch and they took out the Corolla and moped with disabling shots when those threat streams were published.

I'm not sure why a VBIED never actually went off.

North Gate was ultimately closed because the risk to force was too high.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Why did we close East Gate?

(2) Answer: We initially closed it on the 23rd because we had about 6,000 people now on HKIA with no flights coming in or out. The holding areas were overflowing and we needed to process people and get them on planes before we could intake more. All gates were closed at this time. We re-opened Abbey Gate once the flow of evacuees started moving again.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Why didn't you re-open East or North Gates?

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(2) Answer: Abbey Gate was working the best. The multinational forces were all using Abbey Gate. Every nation represented at HKIA had groups they were escorting through the Abbey Gate Corridor all day, every day.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Why was Abbey Gate used by the multinational forces the most?

(2) Answer: I think it was due to the ability to corral people through the canal. There were barriers to hold people back and it was wide enough to conduct searches. The multinational forces weren't assisting with security. Only the US Forces and British Forces were conducting security here. The other nations saw this and used the opportunity to pull their people through here without having to provide security.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Do you think it is possible that this caused additional inducement for the coalition forces to send all of their people to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: Yes. They had much smaller forces. It was easier for them to go to Abbey Gate to pull their people out and bring them through without having to provide security.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did you receive any phone calls to open up East and North Gates again?

(2) Answer: I did not. I only had people in the US call me asking me why we had gates closed.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Are you aware of other selective operations occurring at other gates?

(2) Answer: Yes, but we were only focused on East Gate, North Gate, and eventually only Abbey Gate.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: Did you receive any threat streams at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: By the 25th, we heard threat streams focused on Abbey Gate.

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v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Is this because it was the only gate left open?

(2) Answer: Yes. The intelligence brief we received on the night of the 25th was that there was a threat of something happening on the 26th. We discussed how to operate at Abbey Gate with this threat. The Brits were planning to stop operations and leave on the 26th, and we were also planning to stop the night of the 26th. Our plan was to close the gate around 1600, clear the area to the Barron Hotel, and then pull security while the Brits drove from the Barron Hotel through Abbey Gate around 1800.

We wanted to keep operating and pulling people for as long as we could on the 26th. All of the Marines on ground were aware of the threat and what to look for; a man dressed in black with a shaved head. The canal access was of huge concern at this time.

At this time, the 2/1 Commander, the 1-82 Commander, and the British Battalion Commander were going to have a KLE with the Taliban to discuss the turnover of the gate. The plan was to close Abbey Gate, have the Brits retrograde from the Barron Hotel, and then have 1-82 take over for us in preparation for the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE) on 30 August. The KLE occurred at 1700 on 26 August.

We were aware of the threat streams on the 26th. [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g The Commander moved the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) closer to the gate and the Marines at the gate were on high alert. Around 1430, we received intelligence from the Brits that someone with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) could be at the gate now and that it could detonate within the next five to ten minutes. I was between the inner and outer gate at this time. As I approached outer gate, [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stopped me and told me about the threat and asked me to take cover. I asked him about the information that they received and he told me this isn't the first time today that they received threats like this.

Earlier in the day, someone attempted to throw a backpack over the wall. The bag didn't explode and nothing happened. The Marines pushed the bag back over the wall safely. Bags were often thrown over the wall containing food and similar items.

After the threat timeline passed, the Marines continued their mission.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Do you know where the Brits received intelligence of this threat?

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(2) Answer: I don't know their source. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4c I saw an email after returning saying that the Brits passed this info to us.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: What actions were taken during this threat?

(2) Answer: Marines were pulled back from the canal. They kept a low profile and took cover if they could. Snipers were scanning and PSYOP was on their loud speakers giving messaging to the crowd to push back.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Did you ever get information about Afghans in the crowd being a threat?

(2) Answer: No. Just the threat information shared by the Brits.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: What time do you think the blast at Abbey Gate occurred?

(2) Answer: According to reporting, it occurred between 1730-1740 on 26 August.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: Where were you when the blast occurs?

(2) Answer: I was heading back to the JOC after a latrine break. I could not hear the blast. It was always pretty loud with small arms fire.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Did you hear small arms fire at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer: I heard small arms fire (warning shots) every time I left the JOC.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: When and what was the initial reporting to you of the blast at Abbey Gate?

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SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer: There was a blast at Abbey Gate. It initially looks like 20-30 personnel being treated and they couldn't tell if they were Marines or civilians. There were approximately 15 urgent and one routine casualties. Marines could hear small arms fire and they requested more ambulances. The BN OPSCO was hit but still communicating with us. Initially, he couldn't locate the battalion commander but then found him. We closed the gate after all casualties were pulled in.

By the time we had airborne assets en route, all casualties were already transported.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: What time did Abbey Gate close?

(2) Answer: I don't know.

The day after the blast, I brought a lot of people in and did a recap of the events.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: Do you have any products from this?

(2) Answer: Yes, my [REDACTED] (b)(6) was the scribe.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: What was the conclusion?

(2) Answer: One blast occurred. Some people thought it was two blasts because both the US and the Brits reported it. The Battalion Commander said there wasn't small arms fire but the [REDACTED] (b)(6) said that our Marines were engaged in small arms fire. We heard there was fire coming at us from the chevron, but were unsure if it was our guys being fired at, us returning fire, or there just warning shots being fired. It's a possibility that we could have been firing at the Taliban.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Are you aware of the 82nd having any designated marksman or snipers?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure about that.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

(1) Question: When is the decision made to close Abbey Gate blast and what time?

(2) Answer: We were planning to close Abbey Gate on the 26th to bring the Brits through. Originally, the Brits were going to come through and we were going to close on the 25th, but the Brits ended up needing more time to process their personnel. The next plan was to stop processing people at 1600, clear the area, and have the Brits come through and close Abbey Gate NLT 2000 on 26 August. This was information from a JTF meeting. I think this was discussed in the KLE as well. The gate would close, the 82nd would take over, and we would peel off and prepare to exfil.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Who made the decision to close the gate after the blast?

(2) Answer: I don't know who made the actual decision. It could have been me or it could have been BG Sullivan. The gate was closed but we knew we still had to bring the Brits through.

We talked with the Brits to coordinate bringing the rest of the people at the Barron Hotel through. Originally, before the blast, we were going to have them convoy through while we had Marines holding the area secure.

This was at the same time that we had the threat at North Gate with the tank truck. We still had people at the North Gate even though the gate was closed.

I met with BG Sullivan, post-blast, to discuss getting the Brits in from the Barron Hotel. I recommended that we still follow our plan to have the Marines and Brits push out to hold the canal, have the Brits convoy through, and then closed the gate. This is what ultimately occurred. We then had the engineers emplace obstacles between the inner and outer gates. The 82nd replace us at Abbey Gate around the morning of the 27th.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: Were people flooding to Abbey Gate again after the blast?

(2) Answer: I don't know.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: What time did the Brits finished coming in Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: Sometime between 2000 and midnight on 26 August.

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SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Do you know what obstacles were placed at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure. There were vehicles up against both the outer and inner gates to reinforce them being closed.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: Do you have the numbers of wounded and killed Afghans?

(2) Answer: The most I've heard is 160-170 Afghans killed, 12 US Servicemembers were KIA and an additional Servicemember passed away during surgery. There were 18 wounded Servicemembers evacuated the morning of the 27th.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Did you see [redacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)] shortly after the blast?

(2) Answer: Yes, he came back into the JOC and was clearly concussed. He was speaking very loudly because I think he was having a hard time hearing. He was clearly shaken.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer: My flight out of HKIA was around 1000 on 30 August.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: Is there anything that you think we need to know that we didn't discuss?

(2) Answer: No, but you didn't ask about the State Department's involvement during HKIA. The DoS started surging more assets around the 25th or 26th after we requested more personnel from them repeatedly. They didn't seem prepared to support the amount of people at HKIA. A lot of us were shocked when the embassy shut down around 15 August and was immediately evacuated. It took a while for them to provide DoS personnel to process people. The DoS kept changing who we could and could not bring through the gate. This confusion directly caused us to have the surge of 6,000 personnel on the airfield. Not only were we confused, but the DoS was confused and didn't keep standards between themselves. We would often pull people through the

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gate that passed initial screening, but when we brought them to the PAX terminal, DoS would change the requirements and they wouldn't be able to be processed and get on a flight.

At the end of the day, I think everyone wanted to get as many people as we rightfully could through the gate and to refuge. It was just really hard to get people through the gate and then get turned away at the PAX terminal.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: Was BG Sullivan hesitant to help get the Brits through from the Barron Hotel after the blast?

(2) Answer: No. We discussed it and decided it was the time to do it.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: Did you see the crowds surging around the timeframe that the Brits came through the Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer: No, I don't think so.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: What time do you think that Abbey Gate was completely closed after the Brits pushed through?

(2) Answer: Sometime between midnight and 0600 on 27 August. By the time we got all of the Brits through and had the obstacles in place it was probably around 0600.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that we didn't talk about that you think is important?

(2) Answer: No, I think we got all of it.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: Is there anyone else that you think we need to talk to?

(2) Answer: No.

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ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: [redacted]

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] and [redacted] assistant investigating officer, at [redacted]

[redacted]

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer