(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did. I can't recall any other leaders.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened after you left East Gate?

(2) Answer. We went back to the gym for 12 hours, then moved to Abbey Gate. We shut East Gate down and turned it over, I think to the Army. Not sure who actually took it over or if it opened back up.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After your time at East Gate, you moved over to Abbey Gate, was that around the 21st?

(2) Answer. Yeah. We spent about 5-6 days there.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did all of Echo Company go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We went in shifts. Sometimes we got "f'd" and had to sleep there.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is describing the map and orienting (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to it.*

(2) Answer. *Added input from earlier* Sometime when we were randomly patrolling early on, a round impacted close by us. Not sure where it came from. This was around day 1-2 days on ground.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you get to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We hotwired vehicles and stole them from the Army.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened when you got down there?

(2) Answer. We came down to the inner gate, there was a MATV and we posted up there. We stayed there for a couple hours, then we moved to the outer gate. In the inner corridor there were a bunch of people and f'd up vehicles on the south side. We had a staging area that was more controlled on the north side of the inner corridor. You

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had "mini-warlords" that would control the food and water for the other Afghans in the inner corridor. It was like the wild west. The northside was much more relaxed and could be controlled.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many people were in the inner corridor?

(2) Answer. Probably at least 1,000. We walked in as a platoon. We were hearing sporadic gunfire.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you in the inner corridor?

(2) Answer. For some time, we passed out food and water. Maybe hours later we moved to the outer corridor. There were a lot of people. The canal was filled, the outer corridor was filled. We had a lot of other countries' military SOF out there identifying people. Not many other conventional foreign forces expect for (b)(1)1.4d and us.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were flights leaving HKIA at this time?

(2) Answer. I spent a day at the PAX terminal after the random patrol and before the East Gate. We saw people getting on planes. It was the first time I personally witnessed death. Some little girl died from dehydration and heat. I also provided security overwatch for a female corpsman at the terminal. The rest of the team was keeping the crowd under control.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Then what did your team do?

(2) Answer. Went to the gym, got some rest, then went to Abbey Gate. We entered the inner corridor and dealt with the mass of people. Then we went to the outer corridor and it was a zoo.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Had you been briefed you are working with the Taliban before you get out to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was weird watching them.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happens when you make your way to the outer corridor?

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(2) Answer. We start working the gate. We were told what DoS was looking for. Passports, green cards, driver's licenses, then pieces of paper that were emailed out. The information was passed down to us, DoS did not speak to us directly.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What about SIVs?

(2) Answer. We didn't even know what those looked like.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the process for getting evacuees out and what was your role?

(2) Answer. Find proof they were involved with America, bring them in to other Marines to process. I was on the wall identifying people. Some non-US forces were popping off rounds, we told him not to do that.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you given any specific instruction on escalation of force?

(2) Answer. We were given non-lethal flashbangs, CS gas. We were told to use them when a threat was perceived, or a legitimate threat. We were fighting every day pushing, punching, and shoving. I never had flashbangs or gas. Leaders and key personnel were given them. I do not recall them ever being used.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you authorized to use warning shots?

(2) Answer. I don't believe so. We never used any. If we shot, it was shoot to kill. When other countries used warning shots it would stir the crowds up.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was giving you your tasking?

(2) Answer. My squad leader told me to go to the near side canal, identify people, pull them out and pass them off to another Marine in the outer corridor.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) You're at the canal, hands on with the people. Going down the east side in front of sniper tower, that's how you would escort people out?

(2) Answer. Yes. Sometimes though we would push them back into the canal because they were being dicks.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) What was your force protection at the gate?

(2) Answer. Other than our gear we had some cover. The canal wall was only about 3 feet high. We had snipers from Marines and Army. A JLTV with an M240 with someone in the turret at all times. There were two Army towers with a SAW hanging out the window. (b)(1)1.4g were also out at the connex box on the inner corridor. I know we had more than one, not sure where the others were.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) Would you do an initial search if you pulled someone out of the crowd?

(2) Answer. No. They were searched immediately entering in the inner corridor. They could hang out in the outer corridor without be searched.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) How long were you on the wall?

(2) Answer. Most of the day into the night. I then moved back into the inner corridor that evening by the blown out vehicles to watch over the Afghans. We were mostly just bullshitting and getting into fights. It wasn't the worst in the world. It was hot but we were used to it. We did get replaced that night and we moved to the airfield side of the inner gate to get some rest.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) Were Afghans in the inner corridor at night?

(2) Answer. Yes. The DoS worked from morning to about 2000. Then they left. They didn't do shift work.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b (b)(6) So would Afghans still get pulled out of the crowd at night?

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(2) Answer. Yes. Other countries would. Then we would have to control them until DoS could process the next day

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) After you got rest what happened?

(2) Answer. Got back to work. We passed out some food then went back out to the canal. Did the same thing as the day before. I was working with the New Zealanders and this Afghan male killed this kid in front of me. He was on the near side canal in front of the sniper tower. He had a newborn with them. The New Zealand guy and I started talking, we looked back and didn't see the baby anymore. He said because we weren't helping him he threw the baby into the canal. We didn't see the baby any longer at that point.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the process of pulling evacuees orderly or chaotic?

(2) Answer. Pretty chaotic. It was compact and a lot of people. I don't think there was any good way to do this.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you understand what you were looking for or was it changing?

(2) Answer. Yeah. The SIV thing was about day three. We saw people getting sent back and we didn't understand why. We found out later it was the email thing.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever escort people out?

(2) Answer. Some. I had to escort a blind guy out and he had no idea what was going on.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear about an IED explosion or observe an explosion prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I heard of a threat but I think that was related to the suicide attack. I can't remember hearing anything in the early days.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

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(1) Question. Any interaction with the Taliban at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I walked down to the chevron and was close to them. I just looked around and saw an execution or two.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You actually saw the Taliban kill Afghan civilians?

(2) Answer. Twice. Once down that way towards the chevron and one across on the far side canal. At the chevron I saw them gun down a civilian. On the far side I saw the Taliban use a bladed tool hacking the shit out of a civilian.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You never talked to or worked with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. No. They were just there pulling security.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any interaction with the (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. Yes. (b)(1)1.4d on the near side and outer corridor. Never with anyone in the Barron Hotel. We were just talking with them (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d You could trade a flashbang (b)(1)1.4d I believe 2/1 Marines did this, I don't know for sure.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the (b)(1)1.4d helpful?

(2) Answer. Oh yeah, they were awesome. I got into a situation, a fight with an Afghan, and his family got involved. His wife was holding my weapon and I was about to grab my fixed knife. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d I said yes he's being a dick. The situation immediately de-escalated. (He didn't kill him)

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened the next day?

(2) Answer. I think we cleared out the side of the near side canal.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How were you communicating?

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(2) Answer. We had radios, phones with the team leadership. We were using chats on phones. I don't think anything major, just photos and checking in on your boys.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any threat reporting you were aware of when you got there?

(2) Answer. Not the first few days.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you become aware of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. Two days pre-blast I was made aware of the suspected suicide bomber and his appearance. Around the 23 or 24 Aug.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who did you get that intel from?

(2) Answer. A STA guy, the sniper guys. I think they were getting better intel than the battalion.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the description you got?

(2) Answer. Clean clothing, freshly shaved, no hair. He would not look like the crowd. Very clean clothes with a backpack. Someone who doesn't belong there.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Over the first few days at Abbey Gate, did your leadership have any ROE or EOF discussions, or was it just the prior talks?

(2) Answer. Just the prior talks if I remember correctly.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone come up to reinforce the ROE or EOF?

(2) Answer. Nothing that I can remember in an official capacity.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The suspicious individual, was there ever a time a picture was shown of the individual for clarity?

(2) Answer. I never saw a picture.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any days prior to that of reports for potential threats/VBIEDs?

(2) Answer. There was one contractor who lost his hand. I was told a contractor picked up a cell phone and his hand was either blown off or shot off.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So the threat reporting streams came down to you how?

(2) Answer. I heard it from overwatch guys, then I heard it from squad leader or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and then I think the day of the blast we were officially told by company leadership there is a chance of a threat.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So when you got the intel from the sniper guys, it wasn't a coordinated/daily sync. It was informal and started talking and the intel was brought up in conversation?

(2) Answer. Yes. We just ran into the sniper team guy and he told us informally.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So the sniper you talked to about threat streams, was it that we just saw this, or this is the intel they received?

(2) Answer. It was about the intel they received.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you got the potential threat, did your posture change?

(2) Answer. Our dispersion got more spread out, a lot less guys were grouped together on the near side.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you changed dispersion, how many were on the other side of the jersey barrier?

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(2) Answer. Not many. The dispersion is primarily between the near side and outer corridor.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you push the crowd down to the footbridge?

(2) Answer. I'd say day 3. Around 24 Aug. When we pushed the Afghans to the footbridge I came back to the near side canal. (b)(1)1.4d came to help and would use their beat sticks to hold the crowd back. About 10-20 people were holding the crowd by the footbridge. I did hear some flashbangs go off down there.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have any interactions with the (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers on the 24th of August?

(2) Answer. Not really. We ended up resting in the back of their vehicle. A (b)(1)1.4a guy came out. We just stayed there to rest. That was it.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was PYSOP pushing messaging daily over their speaker?

(2) Answer. I believe so. I tuned it out a lot.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So on day three, you had the crowd pushed back past the footbridge. You disperse about 10-15 meters between Marines, and (b)(1)1.4d was at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. Yes. After that I never had to go deal with the Afghans on that side of the canal.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much longer were you at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We left I think on the 25th to go back to the gym. Golf Company came out to replace us. We still had the crowd pushed back to the footbridge at that point.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear any other intel of a threat description?

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(2) Answer. Yeah, but it was informal. It was the same description as before. Someone not freaking out trying to get pulled out of the crowd.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see anyone matching that description?

(2) Answer. I did not.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you think about any report that would come over on what the guy would look like, do you think you could find that out among the mass of people?

(2) Answer. If it was someone that was clean and not freaking out that would stand out. People were nasty, unhygienic, and yelling/screaming. People had been waiting days to get processed.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So would it be easier to call out based on behavior vice appearance?

(2) Answer. I would say half behavior, half appearance.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you static while there?

(2) Answer. **Points to map along near side of the canal.** I would mainly stay on the near side and switch locations w/ fellow Marines.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Leading up to 25th, did you ever go to the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I never went up to the sniper tower.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever talk with them?

(2) Answer. Just small talk about what was going on. Nothing of substance other than that one time.

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zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you leave Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Afternoon of the 25th.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you left on the afternoon of the 25th, did you have any idea of when the gate would close?

(2) Answer. I heard 28 or 29 August it would close, and 30 engineers would go around and blow up birds, equipment, and classified stuff

bbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever have any conversation with company leaders regarding ROE, EOF?

(2) Answer. No. Only interaction above platoon leader was (b)(6) and (b)(6) chewing me out because I rolled my sleeves. I had my sleeves rolled up because I was pulling people out of shit water.

ccccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) At this point you've been there over three days. Did you notice a change in the crowd?

(2) Answer. A rumor spread that the gate was closing. I heard the Afghans saying this. The crowds were getting bigger and more desperate. More physical altercations happening. The canal was becoming more packed.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were people coming through the canal or chevron?

(2) Answer. Mostly the canal. I was focused on the canal and not the chevron.

eeeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to leaving on the 25th, where did you hear the gunfire and how often?

(2) Answer. Pretty often, but not sure where it all was coming from.

fffff. Question and Answer 109.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Would there be echoing with the gunfire?

(2) Answer. Depending on the distance. I know the Taliban would fire up into the air. I could tell general direction, but not specifically.

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear about any other threat prior to leaving on the 25th?

(2) Answer. I heard about VBIED on the 26th, but not on the 25th. It was only the one threat. Same description of the same individual.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you go back out to the gate?

(2) Answer. We got sleep on the 25th, and the morning of the 26th we were back out there. We were told it was about to close so we took a lot of photos on the airfield side of the inner gate since we were leaving. We hung out there that morning for a few hours.

iiiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where did you go after that?

(2) Answer. We went down around 1500 to meet up with Golf Company at the outer gate. At this point the engineers regrouped as a whole. We started prepping to seal up the gate once it closed. We were mainly putting up c-wire at this point.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any additional threats at this point?

(2) Answer. No. Just the suicide bomber and the VBIED. I wasn't very concerned about the VBIED based on where we were at. I believe (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told me about it.

kkkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any other actions taken to prep to close the gate?

(2) Answer. Not really. We went to the outer corridor, but the prep was occurring in the inner corridor. When I did go to the outer corridor that day I saw the dispersion was gone and people were clumped up.

lllll. Question and Answer 115.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did the crowd look at that time?

(2) Answer. Pretty much the same. People screaming and yelling.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the crowd pushed back to the footbridge at this time?

(2) Answer. I never saw. I didn't get any view of what it looked like past the sniper tower on the near side canal.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened leading up to the blast?

(2) Answer. At that point we got fresh wire up on the inner corridor. We began moving some wire to outer gate when the blast went off.

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What time was that?

(2) Answer. Not sure. It was before sunset. (b)(6)

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Describe what happened when the bomb went off?

(2) Answer. First thing that hit me was the pressure wave. I thought, "oh that wasn't even that bad." It was like a stick of C4 going off. You could smell burning flesh and iron because of the blood. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) screamed at me like 5 times because I was just standing there. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were beside me when it went off. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) dragged me behind jersey barriers near the CCP (inner corridor near outer gate). I was trying to compute what happened. Someone was yelling for a corpsman. Some people went running to render aid. I remained in a security position. Some staff NCOs (1stSgt or GySgt) were fighting. 1stSgt said the guys were good. GySgt said the weren't and they got into a fight. My guys broke it up. I think they were Golf Company. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) didn't know what was going on. He was just standing there. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just stood there. He didn't really take a command presence till a decent amount of time post blast. He did say if they jump those walls then shoot them. We saw some Afghans looking over the wall of the inner corridor.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where were they at?

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(2) Answer. **Pointed to right inside inner corridor, near the outer gate.** Here.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) out there when it went off?

(2) Answer. Yes he was. Not sure on where he was at the blast. I remember him hopping on a car to tell the Afghans to stop trying to climb the wall.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember seeing anyone else out there after the blast?

(2) Answer. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) sprinting from the outer to inner corridor post blast. He was running alongside a gator with an injured Marine on the back. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) went to the outer corridor. He said they cut a whole in the fence. One of the female Marines died in (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) arms. I just held my position and I saw the vehicles going back and forth. I got a peak out to the blast site and it was horrid.

ttttt. Question and Answer 123.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see anyone suspicious, acting with hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. I did not.

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear gunfire post blast?

(2) Answer. I can't recall.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you help anyone evacuate/provide aid or were you posting security?

(2) Answer. I was security.

wwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long until you bounded back to the inner security area?

(2) Answer. It was about an hour before sunset. Probably between 1800-1900. I just got back and sun fully set. When we got there, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told us Hoover was killed and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was fucked up.

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xxxxx. Question and Answer 127.

(1) Question. (b)(6) What was SSgt Hoover doing at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. He was helping out at the canal and had a good relationship with the staff.

yyyyy. Question and Answer 128.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to the attack, did anyone say stay in the inner corridor due to a heightened threat?

(2) Answer. No. All I heard about was the suicide bomber, the SVBIED. I heard something about a complex attack.

zzzzz. Question and Answer 129.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you hear that a threat was imminent, or it would happen today?

(2) Answer. I don't recall anyone ever saying it would happen today. It was always, "there is a chance."

aaaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you don't remember hearing about any specific threats?

(2) Answer. No. It was be ready, there is a chance, look out for each other.

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)
(b)(6)

cccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it severe enough for a purple heart?

(2) Answer. That's up in the air. I'm not sure. I think my VA advocate put me in for one, but I have not received one.

dddddd. Question and Answer 133.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you undergo any other tests other than those?

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(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

eeeeee. Question and Answer 134.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

ffffff. Question and Answer 135.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you redeploy?

(2) Answer. We went from (b)(6) Then we got shit news we couldn't go back for a month. We slept during the day and stayed up at night. We got back to the States and binge drank. No one really got in trouble.

gggggg. Question and Answer 136.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

hhhhhh. Question and Answer 137.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

iiiiii. Question and Answer 138.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Circling back, post blast you went back to the gym?

(2) Answer. Yeah. The Army took over the gate. Some Marines went back to police up gear. I think 2 Para was dealing with the corpses.

jjjjjj. Question and Answer 139.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you stayed in your bivouac site that night?

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(2) Answer. Yes. Still on the airfield side of the inner gate. I went to the gym. I then walked around with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to decompress. Found some Afghan flags and brought them back for the guys. Then later we were allowed to start raiding, looting, and destroying. I think it was to prevent the Taliban from taking it.

kkkkkk. Question and Answer 140.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So what were you told to do?

(2) Answer. It was to deny the Taliban. We flipped cars, popped oil pans, painted graffiti on the place, broke windows, we completely destroyed that place. BGen Sullivan, when he got on ground, he saw this and made us re-flip vehicles and paint over the graffiti.

llllll. Question and Answer 141.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who told you to destroy everything?

(2) Answer. I'm not really sure where it came from.

mmmmmm. Question and Answer 142.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it just Echo Company involved or the whole battalion?

(2) Answer. I think it was the whole battalion.

nnnnnn. Question and Answer 143.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So how long after you re-deployed did you get out?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) is when I got out.

oooooo. Question and Answer 144.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many interviews have you given since you've been back?

(2) Answer. Just the one news article.

pppppp. Question and Answer 145.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did that come about?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) thought it would be good to get the stories out. She contacted the head editor.

qqqqqq. Question and Answer 146.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How active are you on social media regarding this event?

(2) Answer. Pretty active but I've never posted about it I only read it.

rrrrrr. Question and Answer 147.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you met up with any of your fellow Marines since then.

(2) Answer. Yeah. I have guys over to the house to drink and smoke cigars. We talk about what we saw at HKIA.

ssssss. Question and Answer 148.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Is there anything else you want to add or discuss that we didn't touch on?

(2) Answer. Everything stated is what I personally saw. The rumor mill wouldn't be helpful. I heard that the snipers had him in their sights, but I only heard that. I didn't personally see it. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) showed us two reports what happened at Abbey Gate. One was what the public would see (unclassified) and one that the public wouldn't see (classified). It was around February. We were pulled in the gymnasium to review these reports.

tttttt. Question and Answer 149.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think there is anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was the engineer team leader. You can talk with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was the (b)(6) and was everywhere. He's the one who cut the whole in the fence.

uuuuuu. Question and Answer 150.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Going back to the beginning of the conversation about Marines being 50/50 on the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and as you describe the location of the battalion command team. How much interaction did you have with the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. One time he spoke to the engineers. It was like words of encouragement type of shit. He never really engaged with us. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the one mostly talking through ROE.

vvvvvv. Question and Answer 151.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You specifically felt that you knew how to respond to HA/HI?

(2) Answer. Yes.

wwwwww. Question and Answer 152.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What's the next steps for PID?

(2) Answer. It would probably be roger up. Told (b)(6) and it would go up the chain for a decision.

xxxxxx. Question and Answer 153.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many engagements did you have with the snipers at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Just those few times in passing. No real relationship was made.

yyyyyy. Question and Answer 154.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding the interviews that have occurred regarding this incident, any thoughts on how you see the world?

(2) Answer. I was kind of sour towards the Marine Corps. I heard the snipers asked to engage and the (b)(6) said I don't know or no. They asked him who could authorize engagement, and he didn't know. I can only go off what I've been told. We all felt he valued his career over having an accidental civilian killed. I can kind of understand in that moment, but it's the aftermath with everyone killed.

zzzzzz. Question and Answer 155.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) For threat reporting, did it come down through official channels?

(2) Answer. I would say a couple times. It mostly came from the STA/sniper guys.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) Oct. 12 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 28. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Oct. 12 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

20231012
DATE

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Exhibit S016

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 13 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), 2/1 Golf Company

1. On 13 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review the transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. As there are multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What are you doing now?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
Specifically handling weapons, ammo, non-lethals.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You were wounded at Abbey Gate, talk about that please.

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We are going to start broad. Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, when did you find out you were gonna go and what training did you do?

(2) Answer. We were at (b)(1)1.4a We had been conducting squad level training. Basic patrol operation training, with combined arms and maneuver. We didn't have any indirect assets so those were notional. Day and night, and there were several different ranges there that we could utilize. We were in the middle of that, then about a week or a week and a half we ceased training and started getting briefs about Kabul. Briefs covered what 1/8 were already there doing, the past couple months of activity, the Taliban taking over the country territory by territory. Once we started getting the secure briefs, we got intel about the riots and people getting shot and killed in the crowds. We got briefed that 1/8 had engaged in small-arms fire with the Taliban, we went over the map and layout of where 1/8 and the army was, who was manning what position.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As part of those briefs, did you get briefed on the Rules of Engagement?

(2) Answer. Yes, Yes. That was closer to us actually going. That last week we were getting at least a brief a day, that RoE brief was later in the week. It covered not engaging unless getting engaged upon, which is understandable given the civilian population around us.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could you defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Oh yeah, definitely. So, we got that, then some intel at the time about IED threats in the crowd.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it your job to help the younger Marines understand the RoE?

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(2) Answer. Yea, I was (b)(6) a corporal, so I was trying to spin up my guys. It was an eye-opener being a 4-year team leader who had never been through anything before. It was eye opening.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was this your first combat deployment?

(2) Answer. Combat, yes. In 2019 I had been on the naval ships in the Arabian Sea. I was a security element squad leader on the USS Puller, so it was my second time in CENTCOM.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, you were notified a week prior. How did you progress and arrive into Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. In (b)(1)1.4d we were told to pack our essentials. We loved our command staff; they were telling us their honest opinions. They told us to pack only what we need, but they were honest that we wouldn't see it much anyway. We were waiting for the go-ahead, once we got that go-ahead we went to the airport in (b)(1)1.4d then we flew to (b)(1)1.4d We staged there and got an update from our commander, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and an intel update. We waited there overnight. We left late afternoon on the 18th to fly to Kabul. We were on a plane with an Army unit that was flying in as well. We arrived late, maybe midnight.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you observe when you landed?

(2) Answer. On the flight in, maybe 30 minutes out, we got intel that the planes landing and leaving were taking small-arms fire. We prepped for that; then, when we landed, we exited the plane. It was pretty dead; the civilians had already been cleared off the tarmac. It was only service members and state department around.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When was your first day on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. That next morning. Once we got our gear, we staged our gear in the tent gym. We set up there and slept until 5 or 6 am. Then we were told to load up in cars – some old, retired SWAT vans. We went down to Abbey Gate, then we unloaded at the Abbey Gate Proper.
*Pause to describe the common lexicon of Abbey Gate based on the unclassified map. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) described the lexicon from the inner gate to the chevron.

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m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With that understanding of Abbey Gate, what did you do that first day?

(2) Answer. We walked from the inner gate to the outer gate and staged inside the gate, about 100 meters back. We staged our gear, then our platoon staff walked up to the outer gate. At the time, the outer corridor was full of a riot up to the gate. The (b)(1) 1.4d and the Army were there trying to keep the gate closed. Our platoon command went to try and link up with someone in charge. We had been there for 20 minutes, and the crowd broke through the gate and moved toward us. My squad was the initial squad, and once that gate broke open our platoon commander told us to get up. We saw a wave of people moving at us, we got online about 80 meters into the inner corridor. It was like the movie 300, we were online, and that crowd hit us. Then we and the Marines behind us spent the next hour pushing them back out the gate. That was just getting pressed up and pushing the crowd out slowly. We got about 20 or 30 meters into the outer corridor, which is when some jerk started throwing CS cannisters near where we were, and we were too packed to access our gas masks. The crowd dispersed after that and ran out the outer corridor. That gave us time to get inside and close the gate.

At the time, I was trying to access my gas mask when I ran into Humberto Sanchez. We ran into the outer gate and tried to get out masks on, couldn't run back out, then ran back in. We were the last two in and pulled the gate closed, then used a white pickup to pin the gate closed.

Once we closed the gate, we were trying to figure out how we would start the vetting process. Late that evening, after sunset, we were told that we were going to push outside the gate and push out to where the Taliban had set up their checkpoint at the intersection. We pushed just outside the steel gate, and we got online, shoulder-to-shoulder. We linked arms, and slowly pushed the riot all the way back. That went all night, we went all the way to the Taliban checkpoint. We probably didn't finish until 0400 or 0500. We didn't have riot shields at the time, so we were pushing and shouldering the crowd. We were trying to communicate, but there was a huge language barrier so we would find guys in the crowd to translate for us, but the riot never really cared about the message. So, they would fight back, which caused chaos. Once we finished pushing the crowd, we got in a stalemate with the Taliban. They didn't know what we were doing so they pointed rifles at us, and we pointed at them. It was a cowboy standoff.

Some guy from department of state came down and spoke to their leader and at the check point. We had already established a security posture around them, toward the Barron Hotel, and along the wall toward the airfield. While we were waiting for the department of state, we were passing threats and people between sectors. The Marines were amazing at passing information, threats, and lines of sight. From what we saw, this department of state dude handed the Taliban dude a duffel bag at the end of their chit chat, then a woman and kids came back with the department of state dude. My mind wasn't focused on that, so I didn't focus on that too much.

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n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As days passed, did the RoEs change at all?

(2) Answer. No, they stayed the same. At least from what I was told, nothing ever changed.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We have heard a phenomenal amount of restraint about Marines at the gate.

(2) Answer. I appreciate that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Moving forward, being a (b)(6) you're out there with your guys. Did you receive any be on the lookouts (BOLOs) or other threat streams?

(2) Answer. I had been passed the one about the younger, clean-shaven guy with some bag with an (b)(1)1.4c That's the only one I ever got passed. That was three or four days before the actual IED. That was from squad leader to me. I didn't ever see anyone fit that description.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Could any number of people in the crowd have partially fit that description?

(2) Answer. Too an extent, yes. Some of them had been there for days, coming in and out of the canal, so none of them were clean by any means. Coming across a clean guy, clean shaven, would have been an eye-opener. But I never saw anyone like that.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What about leadership presence up to the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. My platoon commander was there 24/7. Company Commander, 1stSgt, and company guns were all there a lot. Not just doing their jobs, but also helping us control the crowds.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you a part of any intel updates? Where did your info come from?

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(2) Answer. Just my squad leader and occasionally my platoon sergeant.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With threat mitigation, if there was an imminent threat and a need to take cover, how often did that happen and did it seem like the leadership reacted?

(2) Answer. It happened a few times while we were there. The one I remember vividly is working inside the outer gate, processing the people there. I used to have a video, but I lost it when I got my new phone. We were tending to the civilians, and platoon leadership told us there was an IED in two minutes, so we needed to get down. At this point we had been there for 10 days. Me and Degan Page were right next to each other. We had been sitting there for 45 minutes, and I pulled my phone out to try and check my texts. I took a video of Degan and asked what was going on, and he said there was supposed to be an IED, but we are just sitting here. My company and platoon leadership took that very seriously. Stuff happens, nobody wants to not make it home. I took it very seriously, being in a real-life scenario.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you interact with the Snipers?

(2) Answer. I didn't. I didn't even know (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was in Kabul until we were at the trauma center. I had no interaction with them whatsoever, from what I can recall.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: How would the leadership call an all clear after an imminent threat? You can't sit there all day, people still need to get processed, what did going back to work look like?

(2) Answer. It was playing the time game. We had conversations with our company commander one of the nights, the one night that we got to go shower and sleep at the bivouac. Our company came together and agreed we had a mission to evacuate as many civilians as we could. We all came to the consensus that we were going to do what we needed to do. If that meant pushing out to the wire after a threat, or if we had to go into the crowd, that was a risk we were all willing to take.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Why?

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(2) Answer. They were American citizens. I take that very seriously; I would do anything for another American. If that means getting blown up, or shot, or running into a crowd that's fine. I did that many times while I was there and I don't regret anything.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, so the day of the 26th, where are you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. Our platoon originally was along the canal wall, all the way down to the Barron hotel and held security along the canal wall and the jersey barrier. We used the area behind us as a vetting area. There was c-wire along some parts of the canal wall to prevent climbing. At the time, there was a hole in the fence with a U-Shape jersey barrier. I was, at the time of detonation, I was on the outside of the chain link fence maybe 10 meters from the sniper tower. I was on the wall originally. Corporal Lopez was on the jersey barrier and saw two girls getting pinned at the base there, and he grabbed me to help pull them out. That took 30 or 45 minutes, we had to climb into the crowd and push the jersey barrier with my back to help unpin them. We got the first sister out and put her five meters behind us. Corporal Lopez pulled out the second little girl, and I turned and grabbed her from him. I fist-bumped his chest.

It was a good feeling to do something like that, so I told him good job. That was the last time I talked to him. Then I walked away and set her down next to her sister. I was handing her a water bottle when the IED went off to my left. As soon as the IED went off, it hit my left hand and blew my glove and the water bottle up, and the little girl's forehead. From what I saw, neither girl survived. I picked up my rifle and turned to my left. There was dust and debris everywhere.

Thats when I saw people running across the rooftop, going toward the water tower. I tried to sight on them, but I am left hand dominant so I realized I couldn't shoot. I dropped my rifle. That's when I saw LCpl Merola lying about two meters from me. I started dragging him out. That's when we started hearing the cracks of rounds flying around us, and realized I need to run faster. I made it 3/4 of the way to the hole in the fence, then I linked up with Sanchez and got him out. I tried to go out, and someone told me to go get treated. (b)(6) (b)(6) Then I ran to the CCP.

That's when I saw the 82nd dudes running inside the gate, not out. As soon as I got inside the CCP, I ran into (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and he asked me what happened. (b)(6) (b)(6) and I told him I didn't know. I just knew we were hit with something. That's when (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) jumped under my arm and dragged me the rest of the way in. They laid me down and started triaging me. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) our 1st squad leader helped along with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who was one of our platoon's machine gunners. I was just lying there, getting triaged. That's when they pulled Soviak in and set him next to me. He was covered in blood from head to toe. His face was turned away, and whoever drug him in just left him there. I only knew it was Soviak from the IR Med patch on his helmet. I tried to pull him

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toward me so I could do something, and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) stopped me and told me he was gone. I laid back while they worked on me.

That's when they brought all the other casualties in, since I was one of the first guys in the CCP. They brought (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in and laid him to my right by my feet. He was trying to sit up and breathe, but he obviously couldn't. Behind me, by my head, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was being triaged. (b)(6) as soon as the CASEVACs started pulling up, I hobble-walked to a black pick-up truck. Then they took me to the hospital in Kabul.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you know which hospital?

(2) Answer. The main trauma center, I don't know what it was called. We were staged outside because they were vetting priority, trying to take the more severe injuries first.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the bomber?

(2) Answer. No, I did not. I was facing east and focusing on the little girls, I didn't see where he was.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: You remember one threat stream, that's it?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Did you reinforce the RoE with your Marines, maybe by giving scenarios?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Trying to make sure my guys were spun up and tracking on all information we got, and RoEs were important. But to be honest, I maybe only reinforced the RoE once because I trusted my team and they knew the RoE.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Is it safe to say that your mission is to evacuate as many people as possible? Was the chain of command at echelon telling you how to mitigate threat like seeking cover, the (b)(1)1.4g etc.?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Somewhat, yes. A lot of people got sucked into the sole purpose of the mission. I'm human, I caught myself putting myself in sketchy scenarios sometimes and then having to mitigate it. That happened to a lot of people, they cared. But, yes, there was a lot of adjusting security to address changes in the crowds and positions with certain lines of sight. I didn't interact personally with command staff and platoon staff because they went through chain of command, which I respect.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Were you there the night of the 25th into the morning of the 26th? You may remember the hand-off between Echo and Golf Company, the decision being made to collapse from the footbridge to the Jersey Barriers?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. I don't completely remember. I remember collapsing behind the Jersey barriers, I think it was because it was a long travel to the exfil route if anyone got wounded. I was all for making that distance shorter.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have any interaction with the Taliban? How did they treat you?

(2) Answer. A lot. Interactions I had after that first night, it was kind of just them brushing the Marines off. They didn't pay attention to us. I didn't communicate with them, but I was close to them. I saw them beating people with their buttstocks or hitting someone with a metal bar across their head by the chevron.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: Why do you think the Taliban agreed to pull outer security?

(2) Answer. Because they didn't want us there would be my assumption.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The normal flow of info would have been through your squad leader and platoon command staff, who was that?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much social media to you watch about this topic?

(2) Answer. I have seen pretty much everything. I have seen videos and pictures of the civilian side, the Marines with Marines, the few videos of pre- and post-blast, the

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video of the small-arms exchange from far away, the videos of people falling off planes, the riot on the Tarmac.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yea, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you read any books or podcasts on the topic? What do you think about how they portray it?

(2) Answer. I don't like social media in general. I don't like seeing everything, but I want to know all the facts. I willingly look at the pictures I see or that people send me, that type of stuff.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you seen anything on social media that is helpful?

(2) Answer. Yea, anything that can help decipher what happened is helpful. The extra stuff, like a video of Marines pushing a lady into the canal water doesn't help us, it makes us look bad. There's not much you can do with that. I don't like social media, it's a waste of time, but I have it to communicate. That being said, some aspects of it can be helpful.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) With the presence of leadership, do you think that anything could have been done to prevent it?

(2) Answer. I think our general security posture as a whole could have been better. I'm not sure we needed to be outside the outer gate at all; I may have tried to vet people through that steel gate. But I understand the decision to control it on the outside, away from our main access point to the airfield, so establishing outside was the best way to do that at the time. I think we could have established more assets, like machine gun positions and a mortar firing position. We wouldn't have used it, but it may have created more mental comfort for the guys. When you were out there, it sometimes felt like it was just you and the guys next to you in close proximity to the Taliban. It was ominous to work around them. I didn't like any of it; I didn't like partnering with them, I

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would have liked them just being at that checkpoint. I didn't like Taliban next to my Marines, but that's just my opinion.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think that accepting risk to help those people with blue passports was the right thing to do?

(2) Answer. To an extent, yes. An American life at risk is an American life at risk. Mitigating the loss of my Marines and all the Marines that were down there, and the DoS, and Army. Trying to mitigate that and maximize effectiveness of the mission, I understand that it was a hard situation in that scenario. Could it have been different? Yes. But someone had to make a decision, and the mission is the mission. We had our left and right limits, and we operated in between those.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything we haven't asked that you would like to tell us?

(2) Answer. Not that I can think of, no. Not that comes to mind.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. I don't know. I am assuming that you have talked to everyone on the deck that you could.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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Exhibit S016

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) _____, have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 40. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
_____ 10/13/23
(Signature of Person Making Statement) DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
_____
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 13 OCT 2023
_____
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) DATE

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Exhibit S017

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 20 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) AT (b)(6)

1. On 20 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity, where questions are asked below, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to deployment, how long were you with 2/1?

(2) Answer. I got to 2/1 in (b)(6) I was in IULC on the East Coast and was cut orders to 2/1 while there. I extended my time with IULC in order to complete my time and deploy with 2/1 on the 31st MEU. I was still a (b)(6) and deployed with the MEU in April 2019-Oct 2019. I was with good dudes and finished the work-up. When I got back, I stayed with (b)(6) While there, we started setting things up for easier transition of Weapons Platoon. Then, I moved into the (b)(6) billet after that. It wasn't up until a month until we went to ITX in Oct 2020 (estimated), (b)(6) I was still at school, graduated, then met them up at ITX. I was (b)(6) While there, we heard we aren't going to CENTCOM during the graduation. Through that time until we deployed it was up-and-down until we finally got word we were deploying.

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c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You remained the (b)(6) through the rest of the work-up?

(2) Answer. Yes.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Since deploying what have you been doing?

(2) Answer. I stayed with Echo Company the whole time, (b)(6) until we (b)(6) I stayed with Echo Company after that until I left in Mar 2022. I graduated Jun 2022 from (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I'd like to start with when you received initial notification you were going to HKIA.

(2) Answer. We were at (b)(1)1.4d our training focus was on platoon reinforced training. While we were there, we heard rumors about a NEO. When we got back to (b)(1)1.4d we heard about the deployment and focused on NEO Training. Not much guidance on how we needed to train. We trained on how we thought an infantry platoon would fit in NEO. This was around July. We found out less than 72hrs prior that we were actually deploying.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was your platoon commander?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you depart (b)(1)1.4d for HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were the first of the (b)(1) 1.4a I'm not sure of the exact date, maybe 15-16 August.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was it Period of Darkness (POD) when you left?

(2) Answer. It was, we got our ammo, gear and loaded the birds. The (b)(6) (b)(6) was on the other bird. We didn't know the situation at the time. When we landed at HKIA it was POD. The airfield was under control when we landed. When we

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disembarked, I remained back to act as a MACO (marshalling area control officer) for the second bird. After, we linked up with a liaison from the MEU who directed us on what we needed to do. We staged our packs and were immediately integrated in with 1/8.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to departing for HKIA, did you receive a ROE brief?

(2) Answer. Yes. We got a very good ROE brief that lasted numerous hours. Everyone was there. Some guys didn't have a secret clearance, due to not being an American citizen yet, but we brought them in to receive the brief. Everyone from Echo Company received the brief.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you understand the ROE, was it briefed as the SROE (HA/HI/PID)?

(2) Answer. Yes. Hostile act/hostile intent was the understanding of it.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive any ROE in relation to the Taliban and how they were treating US Citizens?

(2) Answer. No. It was understood across the board that the Taliban was not a known enemy. There was no talk about how the Taliban was treating civilians.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You arrived in POD, airfield under control, and you're prepping to augment 1/8 to provide security?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. We were staged with 10th MTN. I was working on getting ammo and smoke for my platoon. I bummed some ammo from the Army and de-linked some 7.72 from my sniper long gun.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who was your sniper element?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was (b)(6) for reporting. My mortarmen remained at the main pax terminal. Everyone else went forward with us.

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n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Pushing out from there where were you tasked?

(2) Answer. We were tasked with 1/8. We coordinated with the Army to our right and 1/8. My platoon reinforced with some Army units and cleared across the airfield to supplement their lines. I had about 50 pax in my platoon. I talked with the platoon commander there at 1/8. He was like cool...you got it. They left, we set our guys in facing south and east. We put one team in a tower near a fire station. Another team in a tower to the south adjacent to Abbey Gate. We received shots at the tower however, did not engage due to not knowing where shots came from. After that, we moved to the Afghan terminal and people started seeing how little people we had compared to 1/8. They had a company, and it was just my platoon. We asked for C-Wire to help. Some shots were fired out in town and the civilians got more rowdy, we heard more shots fired. The civilians began to push over the wall against a gate that was closed. What set things off was a pack was thrown over the wall. I pulled my guys back and called EOD. When we did that the doors pushed up and civilians flooded in. We reformed our line and tried to push the civilians back through the gate. At one point, a little girl was brought to me, I thought she was dead, a corpsman found a pulse and then took her from there. Then 1/8 came back to assist. More warning shots were fired from 1/8 and this caused some issues with the civilians. It wasn't until the evening, the NSU was able to push everyone back and regain the airfield. We were told to hold the line and protect the US aircraft on the airfield.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding warning shots, 1/8 was using warning shots, you weren't. Why was that?

(2) Answer. Nowhere was I told we could use warning shots. Our ROE brief at (b)(1)1.4d stated that no warning shots were allowed.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I imagine this was unsettling for the Marines. Do you have any combat deployments?

(2) Answer. Yes. Twice to Afghanistan in 2009-2010, once to Afghanistan 2011-2012. All to Marjah. I was with 3/6 that entire time. I did the 24th MEU and did the Yemen evacuation during that time.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you have the most combat experience in your platoon? Anyone else have combat experience?

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(2) Answer. Yes. No one else did.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That evening 1/8 comes out, you maintain the perimeter. What did you do from there before you went to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We went back to the gymnasium. We were still on the perimeter, and we rotated out. I volunteered to be the security detail for the (b)(6) so he could move about. I was primarily focused on finding where we could be the most helpful and find us a job. When we got tasked for Abbey Gate we went and took over from 4th Plt at the gate.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) orienting (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to the UNCLASS Abbey Gate map and common nomenclature*

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you got out to Abbey Gate, describe the situation.

(2) Answer. Not under control. It sounded like Fox Company was very tired. It was that they were exhausted. We started working with them to see how they were running things. We immediately started doing a one-for-one swap. We were out in the near-side canal. We didn't have anyone at the chevron.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was the outer corridor cleared when you took over?

(2) Answer. No. The outer corridor was full of Afghans waiting to get processed. The near-side canal was crowded with people, along with the far-side and canal itself. We had some order in the outer corridor.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive any guidance from the State Department on what to look for prior to getting to the gate.

(2) Answer. No. It wasn't till a couple days later did we find out what to look for. No one came up before we got there to brief us on what we needed to identify. Our company pushed down to look for letters telling them to go to HKIA, and to look for passports and green cards. We didn't know at that time there were fakes.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you do when you got there?

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(2) Answer. We went through the outer corridor personnel and searched Afghans the first 8hrs we were there. We split into sections and each section had a portion of each canal wall. I briefed my guys that the Taliban were not an enemy to us. I went up to the sniper tower regularly since they supported my platoon through the deployment.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was there any discussion on ROE pertaining to Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. I briefed them you cannot shoot them unless you were getting shot at, or you knew they were going to shoot you. I felt confident that (b)(6) was watching the Taliban for us. During that time, we pushed the Afghans out towards the footbridge to clear the near side canal wall. It took us 8 hours to do so. It also took us 8 hours to search the outer corridor to screen the Afghans and push them down to the State Department.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you pushed the Afghans to the footbridge, how were the Marines dispersed along the near side walkway?

(2) Answer. They stood/sat on the canal wall to prevent the Afghans from taking the near side wall. The squad leaders wanted to do that and I was ok with that. It was easier for them to see the paperwork from the wall. We had about 3 meters between each Marine. At the hole in the fence, the corpsmen would stage there and go up and down treating Afghans. There was a point of friction with the (b)(1)1.4a with having Americans going through their checkpoints. We ended up pulling every country out of the canal and pushing to where they needed to go. I was pulling out AMCITs and pushing towards the Dept of State.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long did your platoon stay out there?

(2) Answer. 8 hours. After a shift, our resting and sleeping spot was in the inner corridor near the sniper tower. We would just continue to rotate.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you pushed them out to the footbridge, how many Marines were down at the bridge vicinity?

(2) Answer. When we pushed them out to the fence, they kept pushing Afghans down the near-side canal. At the footbridge the Afghans were on the far side of the canal, the other side of the footbridge. We had about a squad of Marines at the

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footbridge along with (b)(1)1.4d guys. The (b)(1)1.4d were very helpful in moving people out, and we would do the same for them. (b)(1)1.4d had about 6 or 7 guys at the footbridge.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In the days you were out there, how much interaction did you have with the Taliban, if any?

(2) Answer. Personally, I was down by the chevron every time. They directly talked with the (b)(1)1.4d interpreters. (b)(6) would report the Taliban were killing people past the chevron. When I went up to the tower the sniper team would show me through the SSOT (Scout Sniper Observation Optic).

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see the Taliban executing people?

(2) Answer. No sir. I did not see them do that. I would hear from (b)(6) as well as Afghan civilians. They would state, "I'm the only one left, the Taliban has killed the rest of my family."

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In terms of the ROE, did you receive any updates pertaining to the Taliban if they were harming AMCITs?

(2) Answer. No. It didn't change. Unless we could verify it was an AMCIT then we could not engage. That was part of the ROE brief. If we could get PID on an AMCIT that was being harmed/killed by the Taliban we were allowed to engage them. However, in that situation it was almost impossible to ever prove that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was there ever a time your platoon had a valid opportunity to engage under ROE?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you, or did you, ever have any photos of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No. (b)(6) would most likely have that. No Marines were integrated at the chevron, that was (b)(1)1.4d When I was at the chevron it was my guys

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and a (b)(1)1.4c pulling people out. I would have a queue beside me for AMCITs, then radio to have my guys bring them in for processing.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) If the ROE didn't change, how about EOF procedures?

(2) Answer. No. EOF never had to get past SHOVE. Everything was really handled by using SHOVE. We were able to keep the near-side clear and the outer corridor staging area clear.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were your Marines using flashbangs or tear gas?

(2) Answer. No. The only time we used flashbangs was when we were clearing the airfield. The only time at Abbey Gate was after the explosion.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much sleep were your Marines getting at the gate?

(2) Answer. Not sure on how many hours. Maybe at least 4, at most 6 hours.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were they doing if not on the canal, corridor, or sleeping?

(2) Answer. My platoon never left the wall. The other platoons manned the outer corridor and inner corridor. I only rotated my platoon to the wall and QRF. On any given day my platoon would rotate between those two. We only left when another company came on the relieve us. We rotated with a company at least twice at the gate.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the threat reporting you were receiving?

(2) Answer. Through (b)(6) It was about 2 days prior, about a possible SVEST. (b)(6) told us what he would look like. That came from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) or (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the description of the SVEST bomber?

(2) Answer. Bald head, clean shaven face. That's about it, from what I remember.

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ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Based on the description, how easy would that be to identify at Abbey Gate.

(2) Answer. The crowd would be hard. I could easily tell if a military-aged male was there to cause chaos. If they were acting weird, then we could see them because they acted differently.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did that happen?

(2) Answer. Continuously. We saw guys like that acting suspiciously every day.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive any other threat reporting outside of (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I did from my Company Commander. I would speak with our Company Commander/leadership for a daily sync. My Platoon Commander would come down and get a general SA of the area and what's happening.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How was threat reporting shared?

(2) Answer. Everything I received was face-to-face with my Plt Cdr and (b)(6) We mainly used Signal Chat with the platoon and up. (b)(6) would use the radio.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many daily interactions did you have with (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Initially, 4-5 times daily, until I gained confidence with my team.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned multiple nations puling people from the crowd, were there any other interactions with US organizations?

(2) Answer. The Army came down a few times and walked the line. Nothing to interrupt the wall. A few times plain clothes gentlemen with rifles would come down, start probing the wall and pull people out. The (b)(1) 1.4d would help us with the line along with the (b)(1)1.4d We really wanted the outer corridor cleared.

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rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever engage with the Army or plain clothes people on threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No. We never engaged them on that. The only interaction I had with plain clothes people was identifying people in the canal to pull people out. (b)(6) was the primary means of receiving threat reporting.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever hear about an IED test-run or a fake IED?

(2) Answer. No. If there was, my platoon wasn't there, or I'm not aware of it.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We heard reports of an IED test run and everyone got down, EOD was called?

(2) Answer. My platoon was not there.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever adjust how you were operating due to threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No. We had good dispersion and controlled the area very well. On the 25th, there was a change in demeanor b/c the Afghans knew we were going to leave. The energy level increased, and you could see a shift in the Afghans. I had a conversation of with my Platoon Commander about how we would execute our movement if that gate closed on the 25th or 26th. It didn't close because the (b)(1)1.4c still had people to process and were out there.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So on the 25th the crowd was more desperate; had it grown in size?

(2) Answer. It was more desperate. The far-side canal and canal congestion increased on the 25th. There used to be space throughout the crowd, but then it became should-to-shoulder. The entire canal was filled with people.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many personnel were at the foot bridge holding the crowd back, Marines and (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. I'm not sure.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. On the 26th, Golf Company pulled back to the sniper tower, do you know why?

(2) Answer. I do not sir.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You haven't talked to anyone about that?

(2) Answer. No. I came in the next morning and we were slated for QRF by the Turkish checkpoint. I came down to Abbey Gate the afternoon of the 26th. When we came through, there was a complete difference/change in security posture. The whole entire near side was full of people up to the base of the sniper tower. I went to talk to the (b)(1)1.4d Everyone was tensed up, you could sense it. I think Golf Company broke it down from the footbridge to the base of the tower to pull Marines back and get some rest.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you got back out there on the 26th, you noticed the crowd filled up the canal. What time did you get out to the gate?

(2) Answer. I (b)(6) since this was the last time I thought I would be in Afghanistan. I think it was early afternoon.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the crowd like?

(2) Answer. Unbearable on the wall. My platoon was staged at the inner corridor. My CO/leadership was between the inner and outer corridor. People were piling up, pushing, shoving, trying to leave.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get down to the chevron at all on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes. Same thing. Choas there too.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why do you think that is?

(2) Answer. Because they knew we were leaving. A vehicle was placed there with loud-speakers.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, the (b)(1)1.4a vehicle was there when you got there?

(2) Answer. Yes.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the messaging?

(2) Answer. To disperse. The gate was closing and to move away from the area.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, did you continue with your battle rhythm and check with (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Yes. They said there was an SVEST. They had an optic scanning the crowd.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did they tell you they saw someone that matched the BOLO?

(2) Answer. They did. They said they passed up that they saw a person that matched a description. That they asked the (b)(6) and got nothing back.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, on the 26th they told you they asked the (b)(6) (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. Yes. On the 26th, they said they asked the (b)(6) if they could shoot a possible person.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who told you that?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told you that they had a person that matched the BOLO and asked to engage the person?

(2) Answer. Yes. But they didn't hear anything back from the (b)(6) (b)(6)

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got up to the tower, they didn't have eyes on the individual anymore?

(2) Answer. Yes. They lost him.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the ROE ever change during your time at Abbey Gate, or were they still the same?

(2) Answer. It was the same it never changed.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you couldn't engage without seeing Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Yes. We would not have engaged without Hostile Act/Hostile Intent.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where was your platoon assigned at the time?

(2) Answer. We were QRF staged in vicinity of the inner gate.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long after the attack did you get to the outer corridor?

(2) Answer. However long it took me to run 309 meters. I went through the inner gate and stood on my vehicle (b)(6) That's when the explosion happened. I heard the explosion and we had to move back towards Abbey Gate.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I couldn't see the blast or the canal where it happened. When I heard the blast, I turned around and went to help.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, at the time of the attack your platoon was QRF?

(2) Answer. Yes. As soon as I heard the blast, I grabbed my Platoon Commander, gave orders to the squad leaders, and moved towards the gate. I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) and he saw bloody Afgans. He stated some Marines already had security pulled and they were taking fire.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) confirmed the IED and that there were other Marines setting security?

(2) Answer. He said they had Marines set on the inner corridor and there was fire coming from the water tower on the far-side canal.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, while you were running did you hear gunfire?

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire from the direction of the water tower. I could not see the tower from where I was.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What happened after you talked with (b)(6)

(2) Answer. He told me about the gunfire; I said, “okay, great,” and ran to the outer corridor. I saw bodies with blankets over them. I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on the other side of fence through the hole on the near side. I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there rendering aid. As we tried getting him, I saw (b)(6), I cut his pants and started (b)(6), we got him on a shield and pulled him out. There was a lot of Weapons Company and the (b)(6). They pulled everyone that didn't need to be there out so we could pull casualties. We had Hoover on a litter and I ran with him while his litter was halfway on a vehicle. When we got to the CCP at the inner gate, I saw the shock trauma team nurse, and I told her Hoover died as we were running. We dropped him off, I jumped on a vehicle to start helping back at the outer gate. I told guys to throw flashbangs to clear out the civilians and we then went out to grab Marines and Marines’ gear to pull back to the inner gate. I do have footage, I'm not sure whose it was (possibly from Golf Company), that shows the demeanor of the

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crowd. I think it was about at noon. I found the Go-Pro when we grabbed the gear from the near side where the Marines were hit.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will provide go-pro for supplemental review*

After the casualties I saw the (b)(6). I asked if the Sergeant Major was good, and he said I think so. I told him to take off all his gear and checked him. He just had some bruises, and I told him to go back to the COC. He and the (b)(6) did. I placed Marines in security positions in the inner corridor. That evening, I went with EOD to do a sweep with them at the blast site. I helped with the post blast analysis. We then moved back to the gym.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you got to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was he awake or conscious?

(2) Answer. He was very awake. He was conscious when (b)(6) (b)(6) then placed him on the riot shield. He was talking the whole time.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, you've seen Marines concussed talking non-sense (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was not like this?

(2) Answer. No. He was talking, kept apologizing to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was aware while I was around him.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was the leadership presence like on the 26th.

(2) Answer. It was a common complaint from the platoon sergeants and platoon commanders that the (b)(6) was never present, he was at the hotel most of the time. It came to me in general conversation, mainly from the Plt Sgts. To answer your question, the Plt Cdrs and Plt Sgt from (b)(6) said that.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What about the (b)(6) or other battalion leadership?

(2) Answer. I didn't see him. I did treat him, so I know he was there. For (b)(6) (b)(6) the XO and 1stSgt were at the inner gate. The (b)(6) and Weapons Company XO were there. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was in the way, so I had him move so I could get

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other Marines to help search. He said he was an officer and could be here. I was like ok, but there are other spots that you need to be at. He understood what I was saying and he left. There were body parts and red everywhere in the canal, but we were able to get full accountability without having to get into the canal.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much interaction did you have with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. They were with my platoon leading up to this. At some point, I lost them due to company support. I was able to talk to them a few times.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was (b)(6) doing on the 26th?

(2) Answer. They were tasked to create a more robust obstacle plan on the inner corridor in preparation for the gate closure.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see any gunfire while you were running out there?

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire. Almost immediately when I was running down I heard it. It came from my southeast.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see any gunfire while you were running out there.

(2) Answer. I heard gunfire. Almost immediately when I was running down I heard it. It came from my southeast.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding your conversation with (b)(6) about the BOLO, was there any other conversations like that?

(2) Answer. I only remember that one time. I do not recall any other conversation about a BOLO and identification.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you describe your CO, was he respected throughout your battalion?

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(2) Answer. Yes and No. Out of all the (b)(6) I've served with, he spoke with the battalion the least. When he did speak, he was very well spoken, so he had my respect. The junior Marines did not see or hear from him much which I think is why they did not have high respect from him. My assumption is due to COVID we had less engagement with leadership and that could have caused this viewpoint from the junior Marines.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So, with COVID, was the at all levels?

(2) Answer. Yes. A lot of interactions were via Zoom.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think he was competent as a CO?

(2) Answer. Yes. From my opinion he was. He didn't push back when I told him to leave the outer gate because he needed to regain his senses.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In the last two years have you personally given any interview or made public comments?

(2) Answer. I have not.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How closely have you paid attention to social media/podcasts about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I knew they were happening. It was around Sep 2023, when I went to Quantico, that I saw this. I spoke with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in Jul 2023 and spoke about Abbey Gate

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) statement at the HFAC?

(2) Answer. I've seen a bit, but I haven't seen the whole thing.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) In the statement, he mentioned he brought in the (b)(6) (b)(6) to the tower to ask for engagement authority. Have you had a conversation with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) about that?

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(2) Answer. No. When I saw him it centered around moving him out to the CCP and talking about what I did to help him out, because I didn't feel like I did enough. The other conversation was nothing about Abbey Gate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Statement (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So when we interviewed (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) - she made the comment that whoever made the decision to bring (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to the Shock Trauma Platoon and the care he received there saved his life. She mentioned that a couple times. She said it was a miracle he is alive, and that that starts at the point of injury care. That was because of you and the Marines there.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Going back to the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) comment about him asking engagement authority from the (b)(6), would that be a thing that would/could happen?

(2) Answer. No Sir. They just said they pushed it up and asked since they were in general support of the battalion. For them to get clarification to shoot would have to go through the (b)(6) to whoever would decide that on HKIA.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often have you met with other Marines from 2/1 and discussed Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I give counsel to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) often due to SSgt Hoover. I help counsel a few other guys in Echo Company. It's more about coping and not about the incident. I work with my 1st Sqd Ldr now from 2/1, and thank him all the time for making my life easier.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) At any time out there at Abbey Gate, was there any occasion where you felt you had the authorization to engage a target because it met ROE?

(2) Answer. No. The only time there was confusion about ROE was when we were pushing people across the airfield, which is really EOF.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So with the threat reporting there was not specific target in which you could take action against?

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(2) Answer. No sir. Nothing that would meet the requirements to engage. We were mainly focused on pulling people out for processing.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What are your feelings and thoughts on what you see on social media? What you've seen/experienced vs what is being told?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was coherent the whole time I was there. He was talking with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I had (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) talk to him while I could cut his pants and treat the wounds. I knew he was coherent because he could feel the pain. I know this because when I rolled him (b)(6) and he felt that. When I rolled him and got him on the shield to move him to inner gate, he was coherent. I know he blacked out at some point because he told me that on a later conversation.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Is there anything else you would like to add?

(2) Answer. No sir. Only thing is that my interaction with my (b)(6) at the base of the sniper tower was due to his (b)(6) and him needing to leave the scene. My other point of frustration is that the (b)(6) was not there and at the Barron Hotel. I believe this led to the Plt Cdrs not agreeing and being synchronized to help prevent a situation like this from occurring. The Plt Cdrs and Plt Sgts from both (b)(6) were stating this about (b)(6) (b)(6) I feel that the gate was in disarray because the (b)(6) was not present and would spend time at the Barron.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Is there anyone else we should speak with?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you think their perspective would change from yours?

(2) Answer. They would be the same. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), my (b)(6) would be on the wall with the other squad leaders. He would also go up to speak with (b)(6) (b)(6) at times. He was holding QRF, post-blast. Days leading up to that, he was integrated in the canal.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231020, which begins on page 1 and ends on page ____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231020
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

20231020
DATE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines

1. On 26 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at the (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) walked (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) through the unclassified macro and micro maps of Abbey Gate to reestablish a common lexicon of the geography of the gate, to facilitate clear communication during the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We did a deep dive with you two years ago, but to recap what was your training like pre-deployment?

(2) Answer. June of 2020 after graduating from MCCC, (b)(6) (b)(6) at the end of the month. It was during COVID, so not a lot of training had gone on that year. We had our prime time training cancelled in July due to a COVID outbreak, but we were able to accomplish some small ranges and a battalion field exercise. We got to 29 Palms in September to train for 60 days. We went out 10 days early and went from buddy pair to platoon supported attacks to prepare for Integrated Training Exercise

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and get where we needed to be for deployment. That was critical in building the team, over that intense 60 days. Looking back, we think that going through that as a team was pretty good training for the 8 nonstop days of Abbey Gate, obviously with different stakes. (b)(6) was set officially in January of 2021 when our (b)(6) got on board after we were gapped a (b)(6) for three months. We swapped out (b)(6) and (b)(6) shortly before as well. We also got a (b)(6) (b)(6) in November, so that is about 5 or 6 new key leaders. Then we deployed in two waves. Wave one left ahead of wave two in March by one month. One platoon was our advanced party to (b)(1)1.4d to begin our mission of fixed site security and serve as an alternate crisis response force. We stood up a new platoon with some of the best squad leaders and a seasoned platoon sergeant to support the new platoon commander. We were informed where we were deploying in January and quickly had to prepare a platoon to serve as TRAP Force, who had no prior helicopter training. They deployed in March as well, so they had little time to prepare. The leadership there figured it out, they did a great job. That was third platoon, with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) we didn't see them again until August (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was their (b)(6) (b)(6)

As you can see, the team was still gelling in the spring of 2021. That time in (b)(1)1.4d was very helpful in letting us make up lost time. Early on we got warnings that we might get diverted to Kabul, this was as early as March and beginning of April 2021. I think that the embassy security eventually went to an Army unit, but that drove the training we did in (b)(1)1.4d We immediately qualified all Marines on crew serve weapons in the company. We worked on reporting and everything needed to assume a fixed defense. The security mission in (b)(1)1.4d also lent itself to mission rehearsals, we focused on securing the compound there. We doubled down on ROE, shoot/no shoot scenarios, and ethical decision games. We hammered that home in every turnover. We got an SVTC brief from the (b)(1)1.4a on hostile act/hostile intent on the SROE. 4th platoon would have received that during their RIP, then everyone else would have received that in (b)(1)1.4d when they got on deck. We supplemented that with ethical decision games, every time that we assumed post. Our rotation was 2 weeks on post, 2 weeks training, 2 weeks MWR and internal training. The two weeks of training was intense, individual to squad level and would have gone to the platoon level if we hadn't been called forward. That was in (b)(1)1.4d to train, and the security was up in (b)(1)1.4d We also conducted training there for two weeks with a Company from (b)(1)1.4d – the same company we worked with at Abbey Gate. We definitely had the trust of our leadership and internally so we aggressively pursued training and opportunities outside of our primary mission. For example, by July we were running live-fire training at (b)(1)1.4d and running camp security with a platoon, and (b)(6) would be supervising training with the (b)(1)1.4d at another training location. I was very impressed with what the team could take on in our couple months there.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You're in (b)(1)1.4d for 4 months?

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(2) Answer. For one platoon it was mid-March through mid-August. For the rest it was mid-April through mid-August.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your (b)(6) ever come see you?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there twice. He was there right around our RIP with 3/1, that was tight, I only had 48 hours on ground with their commander. The (b)(6) came out a few days after me and spent some time with us. The (b)(6) had been out previously with the ADVON. The (b)(6) came out with (b)(6) Then the (b)(6) came later for a second visit and observed our training at (b)(1)1.4d He was with (b)(6) on that one as well.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) They must have trusted you to let you stay that decentralized?

(2) Answer. I would agree with that.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you start hearing that you might support a NEO?

(2) Answer. I started seeing planning documents for a potential NEO in April. (b)(5) We saw those conversations begin at the higher level. I believe around June there was a deliberate planning effort under way that I saw documents from. I was aware that a PDSS went out. I went to (b)(1)1.4d and spent 8 days there, and reviewed documents for a potential ECP at Abbey Gate. There was an Excel sheet of what that would like. Beginning in June or July I think Echo would begin rehearsal exercises for that. They shared those documents with us, from force flow to set up on the ground. I think the battalion began deliberate planning for that no later than June.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you receive official word that you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. The evening of August 12th, I was at (b)(1)1.4d I got a text about the Washington Post reporting that we were going into Kabul, 2/1 and 1/8. (b)(6) texted me about the news. I texted and asked the (b)(6) if I needed to head to base and get on the phone to get secure comms. At that point our platoon from TF TRAP had returned, so they headed to (b)(1)1.4d to do LFX training since they hadn't been able to previously. The next morning, I see them at the range. I tell them to train for the rest of the day, and to return to base tomorrow. We were on a 96 hour tether, I

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knew we wouldn't be able to move that day as we needed to get contracted support to move us out of country under emergency conditions which we were able to successfully schedule through the army unit in country.

I got in touch with command on the 13th, and we went on to an N+48 tether. It was not official that we were going, but it was very likely and we assumed it was happening. We went to our deployment drill that we had rehearsed. We knew how much gear we would bring and what our package would look like, so we just had to execute that plan. I sent WARNO1 with priorities of rehearsal which were, I believe, zero all weapons and optics, 50m shoot in day and night conditions, and an M320 shoot in case we received nonlethal rounds, and we reviewed all CLS. I asked the docs to review our MASCAS SOP that we had created while in (b)(1)1.4d Reviewed the ROE, it was still standing CENTOM ROE so we went over those. We looked to review crowd control procedures. We didn't have a nonlethal weapons kit with us, so we went over formations and what that included.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You talked about the standing CENTCOM ROE which was hostile act/hostile intent, was there any discussion of defense of others?

(2) Answer. Once we got to (b)(1)1.4d We left (b)(1)1.4d on the 16th and we arrived to (b)(1)1.4d on the 17th. We believe that we were going to fly out the night of the 17th, but that flight was cancelled. I drove to (b)(1)1.4d to get a class brief and link up with the Bravo command since some of the Battalion deployed on the 15th. That's when the ROE expanded to defense of American and NATO partner force civilians that were in danger. If we saw an American outside of the gate in danger, we could act to protect them. We also learned on the 16th that the Taliban were the partner force. I notified our team from (b)(1)1.4d that the Taliban were an adjacent unit and I highlighted the ROE there as well.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Was that a discussion that you had to have with the Marines? I feel like that would cause concern.

(2) Answer. I'd like to highlight, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the (b)(1)1.4a CO had come out to see us in April or May in (b)(1)1.4d and took all the staff and ran us through a TDG and an EDG. If you remember the Rwanda EDG. You are a Dutch platoon commander who has to defend a base that has Tutsis hiding, and Hutus on the outside waiting to attack them. You have an order to return to base. What do you do?

My guys, a lot of them, said that they would stay regardless. I had a chance to then address the matter with my leadership and make it clear that when I came on the phone with an order, you follow that order. I made it clear the priority would be to follow the order, and my guys all understood that. One, after we got back, told me that that

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guidance helped him through difficult decisions when we were in Kabul. We had very experienced platoon sergeants, two who had purple hearts. So when it came to stating that we had to work with the Taliban, I paused, let it sink in, repeated it clearly and trusted they would follow the guidance. I didn't dwell on the order because I needed to be firm with this very difficult and emotional task. When we didn't fly out on the night of the 17th, we had a lot of excess time to see what was going on at HKIA. At that time, we went through EDGs over and over to keep the Marines busy. We knew the Marines were nervous about knowing what they needed to do. We gave shoot/no shoot scenarios to all the squad leaders to execute. I emphasized that leadership would be with them the whole time. It would be close ranks crowd control, and I think that helped our guys feel better and set us up for when we had to push back the crowd on the 19th.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Sounds like good preparations were made, when do you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We land early morning on the 19th, around 0100. We had a BPT order to hold security on the south side of the runway. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get an update to your tasking as well?

(2) Answer. That we would move to Abbey Gate, later that morning on the 19th. We would secure the ECC at the Abbey Gate to facilitate the evacuation of AMCITs.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Just AMCITs at that time?

(2) Answer. We understood that to include individuals with specific documentation. While in (b)(1)1.4d we received examples of the documents we were looking for. We had five things to look for and some imagery on what that looked like. We started seeing those in (b)(1)1.4d and again in Kabul, we distributed that information over Signal so Marines could reference that information. The RSO at Abbey Gate confirmed that later, but that guidance changed almost hourly throughout our time there. The intent was to get to the gate, make it work, make it better. It was about getting qualified people in early on, that changed as the situation progressed.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you do after receiving that tasking?

(2) Answer. Moved to the gym. Told the Marines to rest. XO and Ops Chief started working on what they needed to. I started working on the OPORD. I called leadership together at probably about 0400 or 0500 to issue the order. We talked force flow and what that would be. We still needed to locate, secure and hotwire vehicles to get to the gate, as it was a long walk. (b)(6) and I went out after that to try and hotwire some vehicles and tag it with our unit ownership. That's when we established our company motor pool.

That's the guidance we had at the time. I linked up with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he had good advice on crowd control measures. He said if you get calm, they get calm. That advice served us well over our first few days there. We moved down. Myself, (b)(6) (b)(6) headed down to the gate. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was an exceptional corpsman who could work well on general guidance. I wanted him to make a plan from the point of injury to the Role II. He highlighted that connections between those points weren't solid yet, and I told him to fix that, which I think he absolutely did which is self-evident by the execution. He did that and went to find out what assets we would need. I had (b)(6) go to Weapons Company at the inner gate to discuss integration since I understood the Weapons Company platoons there would be in direct support of us.

I moved with (b)(6) down to the outer gate. It appeared no one was firmly in charge there. (b)(1)1.4d RSO, SOF, parts of Fox Company were all there. Eventually I linked up with the (b)(6) who arrived around that time. It was chaotic. We saw the (b)(1)1.4d bring convoys through very slowly from the outer corridor. This was sometime mid-morning on the 19th. The gate was physically shut at the time by a vehicle with some straps, so the (b)(1)1.4d would clear the crowd away from the gate and quickly open the gate to let vehicles through. They would do the same thing in reverse. It was not a process that could work in the long term.

I linked up with the RSO and an Air Force major that worked with personnel recovery. I tried to find out if they were in charge. I linked up with the (b)(1)1.4d who I had worked with in (b)(1)1.4d we had a very good relationship. That's when I find out that (b)(6) (b)(6) was going to make a movement as two platoons, in the direction of Camp Sullivan to conduct a linkup for an escort of some civilians there.

At that point, I had some concerns with that plan. I wanted to send vehicles with them, since Afghans got out of the way of vehicles. That recommendation was too late, the plan was set. As (b)(6) tried to push through the gate they were absorbed by the crowd and the (b)(1)1.4d began to lose a handle on the control of the gate itself. Shortly thereafter, the (b)(1)1.4d called for support up. Right as that happens, my 1st platoon arrives. I grabbed the platoon commander, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and told him to get his platoon on line to push the crowd back. They pushed into the crowd, and like the others, we start getting absorbed. I follow in after them. We were losing cohesion at this point; guys were getting split up

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left and right. The (b)(6) was out there at the time. It was incredibly violent in the crowd. We were out there for a while. It takes a long time to extract ourselves. It was dangerous, I had my sling wrapped around my neck at one point, as did others. I am surprised no one died. Marines exhibited incredible bravery to see so many guys knocked down by the crowd and just having to keep pulling them out. That might have been 30-45 minutes. I eventually break out of the crowd. Hop on a vehicle. Look around and try to figure out how to solve this. I hop down to try and go back in; a team leader of mine (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) tells me that's his job. I hop back on the car, and realized we need to let in people to relieve pressure. I got my 2nd platoon ready to control some people. The issue was that we had these different layers of (b)(1)1.4d Marines, and civilians all pushing on each other and it was only making things worse. I then went layer to layer to either get the (b)(1)1.4d or Marines to let in civilians until we could extract all (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) at that point was well ahead of us in the crowd.

Around that time, (b)(1)1.4d That was awful for everyone, we couldn't reach our gas masks. Then the Afghans push back, we pull back behind the gate. (b)(6) made a line in front of the gate and calmed down the crowd in front of them. There were now hundreds of Afghans behind us that had not been searched. Given our positions, we realized we needed to search all the people inside the gate. We corralled and searched them, established our search areas throughout the inner corridor.

By the 20th, we have a queue of individuals stretching to the inner gate because no flights were leaving the airfield. We had two platoons holding that many people, the ratio was terrible. It was what it was though, it was what we had to do.

So for the rest of the 19th, we screen the crowd and brought in the ones behind (b)(6) (b)(6) Eventually we make it to them, and we swap a platoon out for them since they had been out there for a while. In my mind, (b)(6) was in direct support of (b)(6) going forward from this point, given our mission. Throughout the whole time, we all had great cooperation but a challenging unity of command with so many units and the terrain of the Abbey Gate AO. We constantly had to work to segregate units to make sure there could be command and control if we ever had to respond to an attack. Once we got to (b)(6) relieved them, I spoke with the (b)(1)1.4d company commander about next steps.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the (b)(6) still there? Did they give you guidance?

(2) Answer. At some point they left. I do not remember receiving further guidance. Once we relieved (b)(6) we realized we needed to clear to the Barron Hotel. We needed to push the crowds back past the Barron Hotel to establish clear lines of communication to the Barron Hotel. I discussed this with my (b)(1)1.4d counterpart, we agreed that trying to do that at night and possibly with CS gas would have been more manageable. The crowds were too large in the day, but we realized doing it in night with NVGs and gas

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masks would be a nightmare. We decided to move the crowd back at first light when the crowd was smaller and calmer, and at least we could see.

Right as the sun went down, the (b)(6) called us and told us to push the crowd back now. I requested to delay until the morning and was told we needed to push immediately. So we followed the order. I got with (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) we made a plan to have 1st platoon walk the crowd back with their weapons back slung. The (b)(1)1.4d Interpreter and (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) had an excellent idea that we needed to talk to the crowd and give them time to receive the word all the way back through the crowd. We gave them a 30 minute notice that we were going to walk them back to the Barron Hotel in order to begin clearing in the morning. The plan included having the (b)(1)1.4d flank us on our left along the chain link fence so that we couldn't get over run from there. We held (b)(6) back as QRF in case anything happened. The other two platoons in (b)(6) were still running crowd control in the inner corridor. Our 2nd platoon never made it in, they were stuck in Kuwait. We were a company reduced at the time. (b)(6) had two platoons. We had three. (b)(6) Company was full strength. Unaware to me and the (b)(1)1.4d company commander, it was related to me later that a (b)(1)1.4d flag officer came into our COC and asked why (b)(6) was not pushing the crowd back. That's what drove us to begin moving the crowd back. It wasn't until we reached the Barron Hotel, that's when we learned that shipping containers were coming to emplace the chevron. That's when a (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d made it clear to us what the plan was with the timeline to clear the outer corridor.

So that was the general plan. When we started clearing, I got to the front of the crowd and told them why we were clearing, which was translated. They were very compliant and passed word back. The problem is some of the guys in the front were so close, it was hard to get the first layer to move back to the Taliban checkpoint. The Marines did an excellent job at just inching them forward. We brought up two vehicles for their lights and because the crowds responded to vehicles. We would tiptoe forward and tell the crowd calmly to move back. We did that from the evening until nautical morning twilight. During that evening, I realized that 2/1 fell under the MEU CO when I arrived to the Barron Hotel because (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was there and engaged with me. The (b)(1)1.4d and the (b)(1)1.4d were also there, as well as another (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d

I was not previously aware of the obstacle plan and the end state, so there were some struggles with establishing a common operating picture. That's when a (b)(1)1.4d engineer comes and grabs me, and that's when I realize we were going to talk to the Taliban. Our guys had stopped by the Taliban checkpoint and myself, the (b)(1)1.4d and the interpreter went to a back alley to meet with Taliban leadership. The (b)(1)1.4d was telling the Taliban they needed to move their cars since we were going to emplace the chevron. They were compliant. We saw the Taliban drive the cars back and establish a new position. We asked them to move a little further back. At this point, by sunrise on the 20th, the shipping containers were brought out and the chevron was established.

o. Question and Answer 14.

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(1) Question. (b)(6) Is the outer corridor more ordered now?

(2) Answer. More so than before. We had a LOC from the outer gate to the chevron. The challenge we had was that our lines were still not secure. We had troops holding our perimeter, but there were pockets of Afghans all throughout the outer corridor. The largest was maybe 100 plus Afghans. We had some massing in the canal area and bleeding. I think while we were pushing the crowd, Daegan Page found a family of 17 Americans, so we would let guys like that through. But there were always squirters that would come in after those groups. (b)(1)1.4d SOF elements were bad about doing that the whole time. Individuals like that cluttered everything. They weren't searchoed or screened; they were just waiting in our lines. That was a problem for the next 36 hours, trying to tighten that up. Meanwhile the pressure on Abbey Gate was increasing as crowds grew.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 20th, do you have effective comms with the Battalion COC?

(2) Answer. That night the (b)(6) come down and we talk through the next few days. Not exactly certain on what our layout was going to be yet. We had green gear and Signal App. We established two radio operator points to pass messages along if I missed anything. We got some info from green gear, some from Signal, some from the (b)(1)1.4d COC. The (b)(1)1.4d COC is where I got our clearest threat streams, so I would go up there often for meetings. Often while I was there, there would be like an attention to the COC about threats in the Barron Hotel. They would identify (b)(1)1.4d or American sources, it appeared they were tied in well with the JOC.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How much longer did you spend at Abbey Gate after this?

(2) Answer. On the evening of the 22nd is when we RIP'd out with (b)(6) I was between the inner gate and the Barron Hotel for that whole 3-day period. I would meet with the (b)(1)1.4d walk the line, and pass any word I had, examine the Marines, make it to the inner gate and meet with (b)(6) then do the process in reverse. That was my battle rhythm. I didn't sleep very much during this time and I look back with some regret on that fact.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So mid-morning of the 19th until the 22nd evening how much sleep did you get?

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(2) Answer. Maybe 4 hours of sleep during that time. We RIP'd out with (b)(6) sometime on the evening of the 22nd.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, the gate is established during that period. What was the battle rhythm for the company?

(2) Answer. The challenge was, we didn't have a rest cycle for the first two days. We had forces from the inner gate to the chevron. We didn't have a chance for a rest cycle. I was trying to argue to the (b)(1)1.4d that there was not good command and control at the moments because our forces were too mixed up. It was a complicated problem we faced. The backlog of people stacking up was growing and increasing by the hour because we were pulling in more and some people were squirting in. We thought they were going to be let in, until eventually being told that the airfield was full.

With that, the challenge we had was that command and control was difficult. The ratio between Marines and civilians was getting worse and worse. Everyone was on their feet continuously. The (b)(1)1.4d eventually had 5 companies at the Barron Hotel. They kept increasing their forces because of the crowd control challenge we had. We also didn't have an immediate idea of what our aim was. Staring at this, I was trying to figure out what came next. Standing there couldn't be the plan. I went and talked to the two (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d to do some deliberate planning and try to figure out what the plan was. I told them I needed them to take over more of the line because my guys needed rest. They agreed, but that was a challenge, because they were two different battalions, managing the area jointly, so there was some friction. I kept asking until the morning of the 21st or the 22nd. I eventually go to their morning sync. I see a (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d I brought up my concerns and told them that my Marines would fall over if we were not relieved and able to execute a rest plan. At that point they finally took over some of the line and we could do a rest plan.

The other thing they offered, was blocks of hotel rooms. They offered us a block of rooms to let our guys sleep, maybe shower and get chow. I thought that was great if I could get a platoon in there for 4 hours. We started working steps towards this as the (b)(1)1.4d were taking over. As another challenge, (b)(6) was getting hit by a stomach bug, so their strength was reduced. We got room keys, sent some of our guys to chow. That's when we got word of chow. We gave the room keys to (b)(6) and let them know that was available instead of having to go back to the gym. I think those keys were exchange between gunnies or 1stSgts. My guys never made it to the hotel rooms, likely one of the platoons got chow.

I advocated that we should stay at the gate since we had a plan. Looking back, that was probably the wrong call. I was too sleep deprived. I thought we had a viable plan going forward, but I think that created some friction. We finished RIPping out with (b)(6) (b)(6) some time that evening.

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t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Until your RIP with (b)(6) did the ROE change or update?

(2) Answer. Not that I remember. I remember adjusting force protection based on threat streams but that's it.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Regarding threat streams from the 20th to the 22nd, what were you receiving? How were you receiving them and how were you disseminating them?

(2) Answer. Going in, our analysis was that a suicide bomber was the greatest threat. Once on the deck, two threat streams were highlighted around the same time. One was a VBIED at the chevron. The concern there was that the only place a vehicle could reach was the chevron, but it would have had to get past 100s of people which felt unlikely. The other was while I was at the (b)(1)1.4d COC getting a briefing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there as well. He and the (b)(6) would regularly come down and sometimes join me at the (b)(1)1.4d COC. While we at the COC, there was a suspected insider threat in a red shirt or jacket, with an SVEST in the Barron Hotel. After that, I left and passed it to my guys as well as there might be an attack of some sort on our own position. If I received an immediate threat from either my BN or the (b)(1)1.4d I would pass on Signal and then immediately move to the Sniper tower for face to face link up and supervise reduction of force posture. Tell everyone to get low, tell them there was a potential attack. If it was a BOLO, I would report it face to face and via Signal as well, but that didn't necessarily lead to a force protection change.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did any specific threats happen in those first three days originate from your battalion or the (b)(1)1.4d though?

(2) Answer. I remember the battalion pushing the VBIED concern, there were some details of the car that changed a couple times. I don't remember at this time anything specific about a suicide bomber, just that the threat persisted and that a complex attack could happen. That was brought up at some point. The level of specificity on the 25th was much higher, prior to that it was more general.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) And you normally received face to face threat reports from BN or (b)(1)1.4d leadership?

(2) Answer. It was a balanced mix between Signal, green gear, and face to face for Battalion. (b)(1)1.4d was more face to face, I would stop by their intel desk and ask them about threat reporting about every 3-6 hours or so.

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x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When you worked from inner gate to the chevron and back, that would take about 3 hours?

(2) Answer. 3 to 6 hours. It depended. If there was a major issue. If the crowd got rowdy or SOF elements took my attention, or I was looking at a specific plan it took longer. But generally, it was about that long until I got back to the (b)(1)1.4c COC.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long were you normally in the (b)(1)1.4c COC for?

(2) Answer. 30 minutes to an hour depending on planning or updates. If it was an all-hands meeting, a solid hour.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The Taliban manned the chevron, right?

(2) Answer. That evolved over time. Initially we were on top of the chevron. However, the messaging of the US government on how long we would stay in country, if it was past the 31st, once that was in the public news, the Taliban disappeared, and the crowds became hard to manage because they weren't doing crowd control. When the government walked that back, the Taliban came back. I think that was around the 21st of August. The first couple days we were on the chevron. The 20th, the Taliban move away from the chevron. They were initially in buildings and cars and in the crowd near the chevron. Over time, on the 21st the Taliban 'sealed' the exit on the chevron since they were frustrated that we were slowing down processing in conjunction with the news about staying longer. It was a message that if we didn't hold up our end, they wouldn't hold up their end. They blocked the exit and didn't let anyone out of the chevron, which was never that feasible of an exit anyway since the crowd was so dense. That drove the use of the canal as an ejection point. That's also when people started trying to enter through the canal.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) During that period in the first three days, did you see them kill any civilians?

(2) Answer. I did not. I saw them beat and hit civilians.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did your Marines see anything like that?

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(2) Answer. Afghans told us they had been wounded or beaten by the Taliban. They told us the Taliban were killing people. (b)(6) wasn't high enough to see if that was happening. The Snipers were high enough maybe, but (b)(6) Marines generally weren't high enough to see anything like that from our close in, crowd control perspective. Some Marines might have witnessed that from their positions on the very edge of our lines.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) A (b)(6) Marine, in a public interview, says that one point the (b)(1)1.4d requested Marines help outside the chevron. The Marine says he witnessed a Taliban member turn and kill 3 Afghan Civilians in front of him. Did your Marines go provide crowd control past the chevron?

(2) Answer. There was a time, I think on the 20th or the 21st, where the Marines extended to help control the crowd that far out. I did not receive any direct reports of Taliban killing civilians like that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have any interactions with the snipers in the first few days?

(2) Answer. I would yell up to them while I walked the lines to see how they were doing. My understanding is they worked for battalion. I listened to their reports to battalion over green gear. Their reports were excellent, I thought they were doing a good job of balancing what they were seeing with the amount of action beyond the walls. At one point they witnessed individuals carrying a bag with two people by the parking lot. They tracked them into the crowd and saw them leave the crowd without a bag. That didn't match the description of any bags we had. I remember being impressed with how well they articulated that.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you go and talk to them about that?

(2) Answer. They described it as deep in the crowd on the far side of the canal. I don't remember if I talked to the snipers abouts that.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think that was an IED probe?

(2) Answer. During this time, there were people dropping off supplies to other people in the crowd like water or baby formula to pass to people in the crowd. Given

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that no bomb went off, my assumption was it was more like provisions for the crowd. At that point, we still had a somewhat reduced posture near that side of the canal. We weren't pulling aggressively from the canal at that point, our risk there was low.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Describe your force posture before the RIP on the 22nd?

(2) Answer. As I remember we had Marines from the inner gate to the Barron, along the inner and outer corridor. The level of Afghans was getting better, they were moving onto the airfield. C-17s were coming in and out. I was optimistic at the time. We still had some rough spots in the line, but we were heading in the right direction, and we were establishing a rest plan. Our last night out there, the night of the 21st, the platoons got a little sleep.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were any Marines outside the fence near the canal before the RIP?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I want to clarify a timeline point: on the 21st, we began a large-scale screening effort, internal to (b)(6) to put our fire support officer in the Barron Hotel. He was screening over there. We had folks at the inner and outer gate trying to work through everyone we had, to reduce our backlog and eject people who didn't meet criteria. However, other entities would start ejecting people from the airfield through our ejection point. That's when the Taliban sealed the exit, so we had to start using the canal as an exit.

Then on the 22nd, we actually had continuous DoS and bus support and we can clear most of our backlog. Civilians, at this point, begin entering the canal and we start pulling people from that area as they avoid Taliban positions. That was a discussion we had, but the conclusion was that these were the people who needed to get out most desperately, so we needed to get them out. That was a conversation between my (b)(6) since we understood that the Taliban were denying people who were on a wanted list. So that's when more people started coming that way.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to the RIP on the 22nd, do you remember any instances of an 'IED Probe' or clear IED threat?

(2) Answer. I believe there was an IED threat when I was in the (b)(1)1.4d COC, and there was the concern about the insider threat, that was paired with another IED threat at Abbey Gate. We got that threat, wrapped up the meeting, then I went back to inform the Marines of a threat in the area. I told them to be aware and we took a hard look at where folks were along the canal, trying to see where we could reduce posture. We just

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had so many people in the corridor, that we were already fully stretched and dispersed to levels that were risky for crowd control.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) From the evening of the 22nd, until you come back on the 25th what did you guys do?

(2) Answer. We were incredibly sleep deprived so on 23 August, it was just rest and refit. Reset our gear. Conducted Hygiene. Corpsmen made sure hygiene was prioritized and they did a great job enforcing that. Only one (b)(6) Marine had a stomach bug, I believe from all the human waste we were constantly around. On the 24th we were in support of the pax terminal. I did deliberate planning with the (b)(6) The initial task was BPT reconnoiter a designated area to mark sensitive items for follow on destruction. Later in the day we were told we would relieve (b)(6) at Abbey Gate on the 25th, and we would be there until the (b)(1) 1.4d withdrawal on the 27th then we would RIP with the 82nd. That's what we were told on the 24th.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you receive any update to situation at Abbey Gate before heading back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No change specifically that I can remember to ROE or the situation at the Gate.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any conversations about threat streams at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I would have received an intel brief before completing my order and updating for the company; I don't remember what was passed at that time. I believe it was just continued concern of VBIED and potential suicide bomber. A continuation of what we had been briefed before.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you head back to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) and I went earlier on the 25th to discuss the withdrawal with the (b)(1) 1.4d and coordinate the RIP with (b)(6) I departed for the recon at 1100. Wave 1 departed at 1200. We had two platoons occupy positions to begin with, the whole company didn't go at once based on how we were organized. I had conducted another meeting with (b)(6) the day prior for some coordination, which was why I sent two down initially and kept the other one in reserve. On the 25th, at about 1500 local time, I sent:

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(b)(1)1.4c

I don't know where I got that threat, if it was the battalion Signal chat or if I was in the (b)(1) 1.4d COC coordinating the RIP at that point. I told the platoons to roger up to receiving that message.

Shortly thereafter, we pulled back from the footbridge. I was likely planning with the (b)(1) 1.4d when I received that information, after that previous report, they told us that a suicide bomber was inbound to Abbey Gate. I was in the COC around 1500 or 1600. That threat came in. It appeared credible. They got a phone call from their higher to discuss force protection and how to reduce posture. We and the (b)(1)1.4d were extended all the way to the footbridge and that area at the time.

To back up for context, I had walked to the footbridge prior to the RIP and wondered how to control that area. There were several threats to consider. First, the threat of being overrun never went away. If we faced a complex attack, we were exposed to the Market. The VBIED could also drive up in vicinity of the footbridge from the Market and get very close to us. In the event of a complex attack, the canal wall gets lower and lower the closer you get to the footbridge, to about mid-calf. Between the lack of cover and narrowness of the path, you were going to be in the wide open. Additionally, the Marines that far out had no way to get over the wall and into the inner corridor without having to move a couple hundred meters. To complicate this even further, there was a mashup of units out there with foreign SOF (b)(1)1.4d a Weapons Company Platoon was still out there. So who would be in charge if there was a fight? Command and control would have been near impossible.

Now combine that with an SVEST threat. We had a line of Marines shoulder to shoulder and no separation from the crowd in the canal pathway. We were also nearly in an L-shape by the footbridge with the (b)(1)1.4d making us a larger target. They were face to face with the crowd out there themselves, which was growing as other gates began to close. We were within 30-50 meters of the (b)(1)1.4d

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) At what time do you think you actually relieved (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Probably midafternoon. Not the evening. I think that previously when I told you evening (During Initial Investigation) it was based on my Signal messages, but I think the timing on those messages was jacked up with delivery delay and time zones. By mid-afternoon, (b)(6) was on the line and replaced (b)(6)

oo. Question and Answer 40.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So when do you walk the line to the footbridge?

(2) Answer. During the leaders recon. I walked down there. I was taken aback by how far they had gone and extended their footprint.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you actually notice the crowd being larger at that time, or was that looking with hindsight?

(2) Answer. I think the perception was certainly greater, seeing the human wall of Marines by the footbridge, whereas before we used barriers and the fences. Now there was no barrier between the Marines and the crowd.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You say there was a human wall at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. Yes. I have a photo, past the footbridge, looking east down the canal. There is probably over a squad there, compressed and face to face with the crowd, mid afternoon on the 25th. You can see that the crowd has lined up on the canal wall along there and there are people in the canal as well. The people in the canal stretched all the way down to the Barron Hotel, so technically, into our lines. So, even though the near side walkway was cleared, to an extent, because there were still squatters, the canal still had people all the way down to the footbridge. If I recall the (b)(1) 1.4d controlled the far side of the canal, I know they also had a blocking position near the footbridge, with probably a squad reduced and riot shields.

As you walked the near side walkway, you had (b)(1)1.4d Marines from Different companies, Foreign SOF, and Afghan squatters along the entire walkway.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay so that's the situation. There was a meeting with the (b)(1) 1.4d in the Barron Hotel. You have already pushed out that first BOLO. You are discussing how to improve security?

(2) Answer. I have messages on this. I set a time for an 1800 sync with company leadership on how to give ground and reduce footprint. We needed to reduce backlog and have better control. We needed a rotation plan. I said I was with the (b)(1)1.4d discussing force pro. I said I would be back when able. This was all before we got an immediate threat alert.

We had discussed this on the 22nd. Possibly getting engineer assets to emplace walls and reduce Marines exposed, but no matter how we drew it up there was no way to avoid having Marines face to face with the crowd. We were chasing standoff. I think

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that's why (b)(6) Company and the (b)(1)1.4d pushed out, to create standoff for the main body, at the risk of experiencing some casualties far out. I was not willing to assume that risk and I believe we exposed ourselves to additional threats given that we were now exposed to the market, which could invite a complex attack, VBIED and also stretched us for a chance to be overrun by the crowd again.

So while I was in that meeting in the (b)(1)1.4d COC at the Barron, later afternoon on the 25th, we had the specific IED threat toward Abbey Gate. I argued with the (b)(1)1.4d that because of that threat, we need to collapse time now. I then sent a message saying Company Staff needed to go to the exit in the fence, time now.

I sent a message, at 1500, from what I can guess. I know that timeline doesn't quite line up, but I took this photo at 1539 of the footbridge area, so I know that's accurate. I sent the message to prepare to back clear. I (b)(6) I make my way down toward the footbridge and tell my guys and the (b)(1)1.4d about what is going to happen.

However, what we have to wait for is to fall back and cover gaps. The (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d so we are holding the line. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d we started to inch back. That crowd was more aggressive. They would no longer stay calm, there were a lot more men in the crowd. We eventually make our way back to the sniper tower and reduce our force posture. We pulled everyone back as much as possible, held on to riot shields that were there, and paused until the morning.

It was still daylight by the time we finished, it probably took us about 30 minutes to an hour to work backwards.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) By the time you got to the tower, how many guys did you need at the Jersey barrier?

(2) Answer. I believe third platoon used a squad reduced on the barrier, one squad on the wall, and one in reserve. (b)(6) Company was managing the queue in the outer corridor with the FET. (b)(6) owned outer security, (b)(6) owned inner security, Weapons owned the inner gate. So we had one platoon outer corridor, one platoon inner corridor, and one platoon on rest.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, you sent the message to your leaders about the threat and needing to meet. You want to collapse your position, who was in the meeting about the collapse?

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(2) Answer. Company leadership, 3rd and 4th platoon leadership. 1st platoon was on rest cycle.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anyone argue the plan to collapse?

(2) Answer. They did not. I learned later that 3rd platoon wasn't happy, they felt better having the standoff, but I think that was an illusion. Later, I think they felt relief about the decision because it shortened the distance of the CASEVAC significantly. Some members expressed gratitude directly to me that we had pulled back to the tower in hindsight. In their opinion the decision saved lives.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you discuss that with the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Just me and the (b)(1)1.4d They were not present at that time. I did not inform them due to the urgency of the situation that was occurring.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay, it's around 1700-1800 on the 25th. You have one platoon outer corridor, one inner, one on rest. The crowd is larger, with more males. You had one IED threat specific to Abbey Gate causing you to collapse and reduce footprint IVO the canal. You stopped pulling people that night as well?

(2) Answer. Yes, given the nature of the threat we pulled out our Marines that didn't need to be there. We spent the whole night on a knee. We rotated the platoons and maintained security. At one point, that evening or early morning on the 26th, Battalion asked for full accountability of the company. We did that.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you start processing again on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think 0700 or 0800. The SOF elements were lined up to come in, we had denied them entry until this point of the day because of the chaos that their pulling was created. I was holding back an Italian general and his team who were clamoring to get into the canal to pull people. For the rest of the day, we only let in one SOF element at a time. One challenge we had, because all other gates were closed, we were still the only exit area for Afghans who were being removed from HKIA. This is something we had to deal with. We tried to limit that to one action at a time to reduce exposure and maximize control.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other specific threat streams from the 25th to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think another threat that night, but we were already at reduced force posture at that point. Then the next day, on the 26th, there was a specific threat of an ISIS suicide bomber that I had gotten from the (b)(1)1.4d I left the hotel, rushed back, put everyone in a knee. That was at about 1300. I believe we even had a timeline, the bomb was going off in 15 minutes. I put everyone in a knee, and I moved personally to the jersey barrier behind the canal in the outer corridor. I remained out there for the next hour with 4th Platoon. I think we had another threat like that the morning of the 26th as well. At that point, it was time for 3rd platoon to rotate on. We didn't have much time left to process, so we wanted to continue to pull the people that we could.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So you had a threat sometime the morning of the 26th then again at 1300. Then you start processing again, how long did you think you were holding the gate for?

(2) Answer. The timeline with the (b)(1)1.4d was shifting. By the afternoon of the 26th, we thought the (b)(1)1.4d would pull their last guy out at 0100 on the 27th. We knew that we would be holding our position, increasing our footprint, to control the outer corridor while the (b)(1)1.4d We knew we couldn't leave until the (b)(1)1.4d were out. That was the plan.

Having a conversation with battalion leadership, and other adjacent company leadership, we were in agreement that we would pull people from the canal until 1800. We thought we had another 2-3 days to screen and process anyone that we pulled out before 1800. What I mean by that, is that grab teams or specific individuals could still get pulled from the canal. Key leaders from the company or battalion would grab people with good paper work, but the element in the canal primarily had the mission of security. I did not task any of my company with the specific duty of looking for people, it was mostly other entities pulling folks they found. We would still pull good credentials if we saw them.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did (b)(6) arrive again on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think there was a meeting with the Taliban, myself, the (b)(6) HUMINT, the 82nd, and some interpreters from around 1630-1700. I had that meeting. Did one final coordination with the (b)(6) on our plan. There was an initial plan of how this would look developed on the 25th or early on the 26th, but that shifted as the (b)(1)1.4d plan changed. I briefed the (b)(6) on the updated plan, and he approved. I don't think those changes made it to (b)(1)1.4d Company, or the (b)(6) by the time (b)(6) arrived around

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1600-1700. When I walked back after that meeting, I ran into members of (b)(6) Company around the outer gate area.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(6) On the 26th, you mention 2 threat streams specific to Abbey Gate. You adjust your posture, do you remember any other times where you or your Marines identified any suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Marines identified suspicious individuals regularly over the duration. That was a continuous event. There were always people watching, filming. For some it was a sport, trying to get in, then begin escorted out with a smile on their face. There were dozens of individuals staring and watching us from across the way, who clearly had no intention of coming in.

That definitely happened on the 26th too. Marines would point those guys out to us, but those guys were typically on the far side of the canal, so we couldn't get to them to apprehend them. It would have exposed our guys drastically to try and do so. They would have had to get into the sewage canal and climb up the other side and we would have no way to support them. On the 26th you were staring at a dense crowd, so thick that it was trampling people. The fence near the corner of the sniper tower was being overwhelmed, people were being crushed. Also, what would detaining someone accomplish if they had a suicide vest? It would put Marines at risk.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Multiple occasions you see suspicious individuals, just watching or stirring things up. Did you ever have a conversation with the Snipers about that?

(2) Answer. I would follow their reporting, check in with them as I walked by. They would pass info down from the tower, there was communication going back and forth.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did they ever pass you a BOLO?

(2) Answer. Not that I was aware of. In the BOLO I passed to my company, I mentioned a (b)(1)1.4c for the intention of blending in. And I mentioned a black bag with (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many people had bags?

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(2) Answer. At least half of them, some of them black bags.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there multiple people with neatly trimmed beards and black hair?

(2) Answer. Yes, absolutely.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see anyone that met the ROE with hostile act and hostile intent?

(2) Answer. No.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did a Marine ever tell you they saw someone exhibit hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. No.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) On the 26th, you mentioned the (b)(6) was at the meeting. Was he there at other points of the day?

(2) Answer. He regularly came to the gate.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the (b)(6) go into the sniper tower on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I did not.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the (b)(6) on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, I did.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the (b)(6) speak with snipers on the 26th?

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(2) Answer. I did not.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned earlier your rhythm was to work from the Barron Hotel to the inner gate. What was your rhythm on the 26th, what were you doing?

(2) Answer. To start the day, once we opened the canal, I was supervising to make sure the SOF elements did what I needed them to do. That was by the outer gate. I passed that to my (b)(6) In the morning we had concern about pressure at the jersey barrier, so I supervised a jersey barrier being moved by HE to reinforce the fence where it was caving in from people being crushed into it. The morning was about shoring up our position and monitoring extractions. I then went to the (b)(1)1.4d COC to do more planning since the timeline was changing. At this point, (b)(6) was more consolidated, only having to worry about from the outer corridor to the inner gate. The internal process was smoothing out, we had a rhythm. So my attention was on planning the RIP. When I had high threat streams, about the bomb going off, I moved directly to the sniper tower or the jersey barrier where I briefed everyone and waited out the moment with (b)(6) I would normally observe if platoons were RIPing. Amongst all of this I would walk in the inner corridor and ensure only essential people were forward and were correctly positioned.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Your focus is on the outer corridor, the canal area, since that is the point of friction. You said you would tell people to minimize their footprint, who were those people?

(2) Answer. Those were Marines from (b)(6) I wanted them moving in a timely manner, making sure they weren't hanging out. Marines and others present always wanted to find a way to help, or something to do, and they had wonderful intentions. But the threat was severe and unless you had a critical job, I would try and remove individuals that didn't need to be there. The other action I had during this time; we had some individuals clustered in the outer corridor who had been abandoned by foreign SOF. I had to remove a family of 35 Canadians that the Canadians rejected, so I told them that I was going to clear them out.

This was a hard day. The crowd was desperate, they were aggressive with (b)(6) Marines, so I was trying to calm down (b)(6) guys that had to interface directly with the crowd, just pulling them aside for a second to let them calm down. I spent a lot of time making sure small unit leaders were keeping discipline up. I also assisted in particularly difficult removals that (b)(6) guys had deal with. This could get very emotional for everyone involved.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever, on the 26th, engage with any US SOF elements at the gate?

(2) Answer. I interacted with (b)(1)1.4a like Ryan Knauss' team. Other than that, I don't remember doing so.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What did you talk to (b)(1)1.4a about?

(2) Answer. I think they showed up around 1700. I told them I was happy to see them. I asked them to talk to the crowd and calm them down. I remember saying that, but not exactly certain when.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Prior to, or after that, did you ever speak to them about individuals matching a BOLO?

(2) Answer. I do not remember a specific conversation but if they were working for me when I was passed updates, I would have passed it to them.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other information passed to you, via U.S. channels, internal or external to the battalion about threat streams on the 26th?

(2) Answer. The only other thing was a be on the lookout for a man dismounting from a motorcycle in the marketplace with a camera. That was also on the 26th, sometime in the afternoon.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That was an individual getting off a motorcycle in the marketplace, with a possible IED?

(2) Answer. Around the 1300 warning, I said ISIS attack imminent, rally at the tower. Look for a cameraman arriving on a motorcycle at the market.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Post gate closure meeting around 1700, you depart the Barron Hotel, what do you remember doing until the blast?

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(2) Answer. I remember just final coordination with the (b)(6) to make sure we were on the same page for what I intended to do. That's as we walked back. I found (b)(6) leadership at the outer gate, I had a conversation with their (b)(6) about the updates to the plan, which were new to him. I then went back, maybe I talked to (b)(1)1.4a at this point to calm the crowd. I continued my rounds of supervising my small unit leaders to make sure the process was working. Then I moved into the canal to see how it felt for (b)(6) first platoon there. I was doing that when I saw the flash from the bomb.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you spoke to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), did you talk to him about anything other than the updates? Where his people needed to be?

(2) Answer. Yes. The initial plan was for (b)(6) to control everything inside the sniper tower, and us with everything forward. That left us exposed. I was still trying to leave (b)(6) two platoons inside the inner corridor. He would control the inner gate. We would RIP with the (b)(1)1.4d then we would fall into the 82nd at the outer gate. After that, we would fall behind (b)(6) at the inner gate. This was confirmed by the (b)(6) the (b)(1)1.4d the 82nd, and the Taliban. I just don't think word had made it back to (b)(6) and the (b)(6) yet. The challenge was, we didn't have enough resources to leave a battalion coordination cell with the (b)(1)1.4d to help coordinate planning across 2/1 elements. I wasn't willing to have all of (b)(6) outside the gate, exposed and not maintain our own CCP inside the gate and blur the lines of who owns what area. The threat was still very much present and we needed to be in a position to respond. Changing the posture would have unnecessarily disrupted our established CCP and confused who would be in charge of a react to contact or detonation.

The way the original order was written, some coordination had to occur between company commanders, unfortunately some friction occurred due to the time constraints we were under and the changes from the (b)(1)1.4d I understand how this created frustration for (b)(6) though.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the end of that conversation, was (b)(6) going to move (b)(6) (b)(6) to the inner gate?

(2) Answer. The last thing I said to him was this was the plan that the (b)(6) the (b)(1)1.4d the Taliban and the 82nd were tracking, this was what we were going to do. I said that, then I walked away. He and his leaders remained by the Sniper Tower. I then went about my responsibilities in the outer corridor.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Prior to this point, you had established a CCP in the inner corridor near the sniper tower, correct?

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(2) Answer. Yes, we started that on the 25th due to the heightened threat. There was more protection there. I kept (b)(6) there. I told key leaders not to have meetings forward of the outer gate, they needed to happen inside the walls. I emphasized dispersion. If you didn't need to be forward, do not be forward. We worked to enforce that with senior leaders as well who would come observe our work. We brought up vehicles and staged them in the inner corridor for potential CASEVAC, we were making preparations for a MASCAS. We staged corpsmen and 1tsSgts, reduced our force posture forward of the outer gate, we had one platoon on QRF. On 26th, we had one platoon also working the crowd in the inner corridor because we knew we were pulling out that night and we had to prepare for the RIP.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) We have photos and video from 10 minutes prior to the attack of canal area. You can see 20-30 Marines in the area between the jersey barrier and about 15 meters passed that. Very condensed. Was that a concern of yours?

(2) Answer. I was very concerned of about how difficult and desperate the crowd was. We relieved third platoon early because they were exhausted. People were trying to crawl over, the pressure was so great, we saw people getting crushed in front of us. 3rd came off the line, 1st came on with guidance to maintain dispersion. Given the press of the crowd, they felt the need to call more of their guys forward to deal with people pressing from the crowd or trying to pull themselves over the wall. It was just a terrible situation, the pressure forced us into that L-shape to keep control. We had the need to keep the crowd back, to mitigate the threat of being over run and lose control and affect the retrograde. They were able to keep one squad well dispersed down the crowd, but even had to call for another fire team from that squad to handle the surging crowd.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Okay Marines were there to maintain security, were Marines still pulling people from the crowd?

(2) Answer. If they saw paperwork that would allow them to get in, passports or visas, you would absolutely pull them. At one point, Marines saw a woman and child being crushed, and pulled them out. They needed help. That is why the FET team and corpsmen were called forward to assist from the inner corridor.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You worked your way to the canal, through the break in the fence. You went down the near side walkway toward the sniper tower. That's when you saw the flash?

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(2) Answer. I saw the flash. There was a small pop as well. I think looking back, I was affected tremendously by that blast. I think the pop was a CS cannister opening. I remember taking a knee. I yelled to get security; I remember that I couldn't focus my eyes. At that point, there was a lot of screaming from the crowd. The blast had sounded like a pop at the infantry immersion trainer, so I didn't grasp right away how big the blast was. Then I heard the screaming and got hit by the CS gas. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his platoon sergeant found me and dragged me out on my feet, back to the CCP. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) pats me down for any wounds. I get the gas out of my eyes and lungs. Adrenaline hits me. I open my eyes to see (b)(6) taking charge of the CCP like they were trained to do. I get up, run out. See the (b)(6) he is bleeding and is located near the cut in the fence. He asked me what I needed him to do, which is the right question, it was my battle space.

He calls the 9 line in and goes and pulls out a Marine to the CCP. I focus on security, Marines are pulling security I believe, it is hard to remember. I remember finding one of (b)(6) squad leaders holding (b)(6) holding Cpl Page who is expectant. I told him we needed to move. We grab (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and drag him to the CCP. Then I realized we need more medical help. I grab some Marines for security. We ran to the (b)(1) 1.4a and asked for medics. They initially didn't understand the severity. Once I told them the casualty count, they sent their medics with me. We ran back to the CCP together and a (b)(1)1.4d officer came to help serve as a liaison and get more vics to our position. I realized that we might have Marines in the canal, so I pushed back out and scanned the canal, looking to make sure that no Marine had been blown in. The canal was packed with bodies through and through. I scanned for a minute, but didn't see any Marines. I ran back to the gate, saw we had all our Marines back in from the outer corridor, and we shut the gate.

I found (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told him he would hold the position as we withdrew. He told us he would cover us. I saw the 82nd, told them it was their show now. I went back to the inner gate where the STP was. We got accountability and reorganized ourselves. We came up with a plan and came up with the assumption that no where on base was secure. I told 3rd platoon to go establish security in our berthing area. I then saw the (b)(6) briefed him on our plan and he told me to proceed. That was back by the STP, he seemed like he may have been (b)(6) as well, he also seemed dazed. Things to me felt very clear at the time from all of the adrenaline. We echeloned the first two platoons back, I went with the last wave. (b)(6) managed the movement. At that point we were receiving threats that fighters had penetrated HKIA or there were other explosions. We didn't think we were out of the fight yet.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you see the (b)(6) before you saw him at the inner gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember seeing him after the blast until I got to the inner gate, but looking back, it is obvious that my peripheral vision had narrowed from the adrenaline.

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bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What other leadership do you see after the blast?

(2) Answer. Just my linkup with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) carry a Marine. I saw (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) from 81s trying to assist with casualties and security at the inner gate. That's who I remember seeing.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get treated post attack?

(2) Answer. I did not.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any treatment since?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Before you left (b)(1)1.4d we understand you gave up your independent duty care officer, why is that?

(2) Answer. The battalion medical officer believed he was needed in (b)(1)1.4d I pushed back a little, but the battalion took him and I didn't argue it beyond that. He had been collocated with us in (b)(1)1.4d based on our medical situation. He was not attached to us and guaranteed to go forward with us. We all would have liked to have him go forward with us as he did an incredible job training our corpsmen. He trained them so well that I don't think his presence would have changed the outcome, though it certainly would have helped with the sheer amount of work we had caring for civilians every day. Our guys did a phenomenal job, our docs were incredible.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How did you validate receipt of messages that you sent out to your leaders over the Signal group chat?

(2) Answer. It was a (b)(6) leadership chat. The green gear I had didn't always work depending on where I was located. I would tell my guys to roger up on receipt, if they didn't, I would then have a face-to-face conversation. The Signal chat was just trying to get the information out as quickly as possible until I could talk to my guys. We had a separate chat we used for admin and logistics.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you spoken publicly about your experiences at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Only in my New York Times interview. I spoke with them, with the 1st MARDIV PAO (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) present for the conversation. I did not seek that out, Headquarters Marine Corps passed that request to 1st MarDiv, specifically asking for me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to do that interview. I think because I made a Facebook post after the blast, which might have made me a person of interest. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was working with one of the internet groups like Pineapple Express trying to get people out and I think their personnel mentioned them to the journalist.

Additionally, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) reached out to me in March of 2022 that ProPublica was going to come out with an article accusing us of shooting the crowd. I was in Japan at the time. They sent him a list of questions allowing for me to respond via email. I responded to those questions and I believe it changed their opinion some as I was able to prove how much training we had conducted and how ready we were for contingency operations.

I have spoken to the Expeditionary Warfare School twice and a couple of units that have asked me to speak to them about combat leadership.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often do you consume social media or news about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Sometimes I will ignore it and sometimes I will review it frequently. If my guys give an interview I always watch that and usually follow up to tell them I think they did a good job.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often do you speak to members of 2/1, post blast?

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(2) Answer. I speak to a member of (b)(6) at least each week, and a gold star family at least every month, if not more. That's not just about Abbey Gate, it will be about checking in or writing letters of recommendation or just staying up to date in general. It's just about staying in touch to make sure that guys are getting the support they need, especially administratively. Especially some guys who are still trying to get their awards.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. In terms of what occurred, we covered everything.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) Oct 26 2023, which begins on Question ~~page~~ 1 and ends on Question ~~page~~ 87. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231026
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231026
DATE

~~CUI~~

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Exhibit S019

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 03 November 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) formerly of (b)(6) 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines

1. On 03 November 2023 BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. BG Curtis will be denoted as C1 and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1 Why the Marines?

(2) Answer. Wanted to go to school. Stayed in for a total of five years. I left to pursue life choices. I wanted to move to cyber mostly. I submitted a packet to transfer to cyber; it was accepted but than an order came out that I couldn't laterally move over because I was not in long enough. The package was too late. Best route was to get out and go to school for cyber security.

c. Question and Answer 2.

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(1) Question. C1 What did you do?

(2) Answer. I was a radio operator (RO). In Afghanistan, I worked as a RO for (b)(6) for the entire Surveillance and Target (STA) Platoon. I worked directly for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) ON deployment, I was with (b)(6) at the Abbey Gate

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1 Do you stay in contact?

(2) Answer. Absolutely. I said "hi" on the group chat a few months ago. Others I talk to all the time.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1 We really want to understand how information was being passed and what you remember of how information was being passed. How far away do you live?

(2) Answer. I live (b)(6) away.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1 Have you been active on social media or watched any Podcast interviews?

(2) Answer. I don't want to unless I have to. It's not my spotlight. It's (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) story and my friends like (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I've seen the podcast with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I've seen Gen McKenzie talk on TV. I've seen (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on TV with congress. The President talking about what happened. I stay up to date on the news. I want to have respect for the family members and my friends. Only they should be on TV.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1 When did you first get notified to go to Afghanistan? Don't need exact dates.

(2) Answer. So, I can't give you an exact date. We were supposed to go to a training event in (b)(1)1.4d There were rumors to be prepared go in case something happened. They canceled (b)(1)1.4d and said it was happening. We had just did training in (b)(1)1.4d Sniper related and infantry man related CQB house clearing in (b)(1)1.4d Before or after that we had spent time in (b)(1)1.4d doing medical training on expensive moving robotic bodies.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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(1) Question. BG Curtis introduces everyone around the table. Offers for support of concerns from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. Yes. Sir.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1 What day did you potentially arrived in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. The day 2/1 weapons company arrived in Afghanistan.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1 What did that look like?

(2) Answer. We were staged in (b)(1)1.4d We didn't have a definite answer about what to expect going into Kabul, but we went over scenarios like a black hawk down, people storming the airfield. We prepared for everything. How we were going to get off the plane. So, we were all taking it seriously. We were goin to be the seciruty element to stage in an area that was unknown to use for operations. We were told that people were storming the airfield.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1 Did you do any particular training before entering country? Any training with (b)(1)1.4d forces?

(2) Answer. We spent a month in (b)(1)1.4d doing regular sniper platoon stuff. I did go to (b)(1)1.4d area for whole month and worked with the (b)(1)1.4d on the base in (b)(1)1.4d and kind of just waited to leave. Infantry man and sniper related training.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1 What kind of stuff? Sniper specific. Ground surveillance?

(2) Answer. We trained at (b)(1)1.4d special warfare area (b)(1)1.4d how ever you spell that. We worked out at the gym and our HOGS in the platoon made shooting packages for the Golf Co Marines. We had some beers with the (b)(1)1.4d on a training fun day. Watch (b)(3)130b, (b) about knock out a (b)(1)1.4d in Boxing. Great time for comradery with our peers. We were doing training behind the base in (b)(1)1.4d doing sniper specific stuff. The earth was very impressive looking. It was cool, the way the earth looks over there. Especially the weather is so nice compared to (b)(1)1.4d

m. Question and Answer 12.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you do any Rules of Engagement (ROE) training? Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Anything we were briefed for ROEs was focused on paying attention to leaders. We were told many times at random times. If someone points a gun at you, that is a reason to kill somebody. The taining was more like talking, I don't remember who I can say said that. The only time the ROE's changed dramatically was the night after the bombing. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) "WPNS CO Commanding Officer" told us that we had permission to shoot anybody looking over the cement into the area where we had Marines sleeping at nighttime.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You had briefings about the ROE and then was informed by unit leaders and also other marines?

(2) Answer. We didn't know the ROEs until were in Afghanistan. We were told things prior, examples that happened with people's prior experiences. Our Captain of the Company explained to us examples what exact thing could happened to you, then do this.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1 What about platoon leadership?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) told us and he told (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) which reiterated us with the ROE's.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1 What does it look like when you land?

(2) Answer. We load off the plane onto the airstrip. There was smoke and gunfire around the city. We took our packs to our staging area; we received orders to go to different places where we were needed. Our team went to somewhere around the airport where the tower was at? The main tower for air traffic control. We were trying to get SATCOM up. I was told to put SATCOM on top of our building. We were trying to figure out why things were not working, and we didn't find until later that we had some type of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c going on that interfered with our SATCOM and phones. Something about Russians also possibly being heavily investigated in the Area.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1 Did you go to other gates besides the Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. We were primarily at Abbey Gate. Both at (b)(6) location. We went somewhere where they had planes and met up with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Sniper Team Leader. We coordinated working with each other after we met with ECHO because (b)(6) was already acting like they were separate from our Platoon. Which is not a bad thing, but something I remembered. Typically, it's expected that they always come to me in some form of away because of my Comm skills. As soon as I had seen (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the COC; he was bitching about a 152 from Echo not working. I told him they gave him a broken one to stop wasting his time and move on with something else and so he did. That was around where the airplanes were at. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) points to the overhead image of HKIA to orient)). Based off of this picture, I wouldn't be able to tell you but I just know it was near planes. ((BG Curtis briefs lexicon from overhead image of HKIA and overview of Abbey Gate and canal inner gate)). It's nothing but a long space where you could have people. I remember that, I was there too. Yes, sir that helps. I was primarily with (b)(6) closest to the airfield. I remember. Have you seen the picture? ((BG Curtis explains non attributions for picture))

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1 Have you seen the blast video?

(2) Answer. I have seen the video in person on a Marines phone before it came out on the news. The dude you can barely see explode. There is video of the people messed up in canal probably recorded by an Afghan citizen. I have also seen a video of the drone footage aftermath. I know who had it. I think those pictures you guys might already have. When we took pictures from the platoon, we would put it on a disc and turn it into the S2, they would look at it and brief us on what was on it; (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was the S2 officer guy. At the end of the deployment, I was trying to get all the SD cards form all the cameras. The only cards I could not get we the ones that came from (b)(6) I asked all the time and never got them. Someone that could verify that CPI at the time (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and possibly (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) V 21 Snipers. Generally, of the team, (b)(6) probably gave their SD Card to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We did not get pictures from them while we were in Afghanistan. I did my own investigation. I wanted know for myself. Because I didn't see any of them. If you asked them what happened to the pictures, I would never see them. I don't recall at any time after deployment getting any of the SD cards from (b)(6) I could be wrong, but I'm 95 percent sure it didn't happen. Something to note was the time when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ordered us to compile the photos on a CD for a report. The time from when that happened was probably at the begging of DEC. All that time (b)(6) could have had the photos and did soothing with them. The Photos I have are about all of (b)(6) Only after looking at them over again did possibly see a instant where they could of possibly had a few of them on the compilation. I cannot say for sure though because all of them for the most part are (b)(6) and I was denied access by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) which is a red flag.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1 Who were you asking?

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(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) primarily and any of the (b)(6) teams guys that are not (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1 One of your jobs was to consolidate the SD cards?

(2) Answer. They were used for training for future events and what (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) wanted them for. For example, a training event using the (b)(1)1.4g The critical aspect of this job is to teach new individuals how to do (b)(1)1.4g related stuff. A lot of training material uses old pictures.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1 You collected the SD cards? Who else were you getting the cards from?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) and the other Teams not in HKIA, and what I was concerned about the pictures from HKIA but I don't recall anything getting anything from (b)(6)

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1 What was the process when the SD cards were turned in?

(2) Answer. So, we along with our (b)(1)1.4g computers, we have an SD card adapter. I would have the adapter and the SD card, using the (b)(1)1.4g we would convert it onto a disk and then turn the disk into our S2. The SD cards where never turned in to anyone specifically. They should 100 percent still be in the (b)(1)1.4g cases.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1 You were the intermediary process? Physically who did you give the SD Cards to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) would facilitate giving the information. At the end of the day, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) always kept us well informed all the time. He was the best officer and would tell us everything. He would look for specific things in the photos to turn into the S-2 at the end of every day. He was there when we were training on the (b)(1)1.4g and also trained on the equipment. Sometimes he would say, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I feel like I'm a Comms officer all the time now. I'm like you, I know how to do this now. I feel more like a Comms officer."

x. Question and Answer 23.

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(1) Question. C1 What I would like to see is do you have pictures of individuals.

(2) Answer. I have pictures from (b)(6) but if you look over the pictures maybe you can find something.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1 Do you think you have them?

(2) Answer. I may have. Is there a way to get that to you. An SSD card would be better.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1 On the team's Cannon camera sometimes, they would take a picture of the picture on the camera. Did you see those pictures?

(2) Answer. No but someone could do that.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1 Do you know who may have the (b)(6) pictures?

(2) Answer. The best place to start would be (b)(6) team leaders, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) because those guys were the primary guys. If there was something they would know but I don't think there is. The other guys are (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Probe them for questions. They were there too. They would know if there was a story.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1 Why did you want to know?

(2) Answer. Those were my friends. I was with (b)(6) before. I just wanted to know. I did my boot cycle with as a Golf Co Marine. They all knew me 100%.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any theories on why you didn't get the SD cards from (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I don't know. I can speculate on a reason. If somedy had bad intent with a picture of a person, they took. Otherwise, I don't know why they wouldn't show it TV already. So, there is probably nothing. If they took pictures of like dead bodies or something, like Marines are notorious for doing stupid things like that. I can see that being something a Marine would do. I know there is a video of a bomb happening and

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the aftermath of the explosion. They were all messed up. It's very possible that those pictures were lost by (b)(6) at Abby Gate, But that is highly unlike (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 100 percent unlike (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He was such a carrier hard charger. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) could verify this.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1 How often are you in the tower with (b)(6)

(2) Answer. 14-16 hours, I was always with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Sniper Section (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). I was 100 percent with them all the time unless we went back to get to sleep and prepare for the next shift while I was getting batteries and updates from the Six.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1 Where is (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) now?

(2) Answer. I think he is in (b)(6) He was the one that was writing down the description of the bomber as I was talking. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) A lot of time when I was giving updates, I would get information form the CoC and then disseminate info to Marines. I was the main one, if not the person.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1 What are you doing school? What is your degree?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I wanted to do something important after all I almost stayed another five years in the Marine Corps. I would love to do something with the government like (b)(6) that's my dream. (b)(6) (b)(6)

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember any threat streams?

(2) Answer. 100%. S2 first of all, primarily we know that we are in a place that's bad, S2 gave us updates every day. Be on the lookout for guys wearing red. The Taliban was getting pissed off and they would start wearing red. When someone got pissed off again, S2 informed us to lookout for guys with small arms. Then we started getting hard core death threats from ISIS coming up to the day of the bombing.

We were in the tower with Azerbaijani and Turks. They were looking for (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who knows some Arabic. They were telling him (I don't know who translated), they were looking for a white truck and it was parked and that was strange. The vehicle was parked ((BG Curtis explains, 90 meters from (b)(6) tower was a foot bridge, and the

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structure across the canal was referred to the "crack house")) It was coming from (b)(6) point of view. It drove by and the Turkish guy spotted it. WE had the bomber description of suicide bomber on the motorcycle. This was given by Cpl possibly (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) S-6 Marine at the COC S-6, The VBID was briefed probably by (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) s-6 The Suicide bomber being walked by the old man "Bomber was clean shaved with a brown man dress and had a black bag with him." That was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) from what I remember. He was in the S-6 and he is a data Marine probably last time I check in (b)(6) When I got this information, I passed out to every company out and they rogered-up they got the information. Everyone 100 percent received this vital important information. We had a couple of times where we hid from possible IED explosions.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1 What did they tell you?

(2) Answer. In Arabic, he was saying that it was odd to see that because it was the words written on the vehicle did not use the local dialect of someone local from here. It could be possible ISIS; not from here. We profiled it but nothing ever came of it. I saw something on TV about it.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember the description?

(2) Answer. It was a small white truck being driven around possibly a Toyota.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1 Did you have a description of the bomber?

(2) Answer. Yes. We had a description. Clean shaven, with brown garb, holding a black bag, escorted by an old man.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1 Who did you get that info from?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the 2/1 CoC. He's our data Marine. If I'm correct he is still in the Marines. He gave us that information. Called it over he radio. This happened a couple times. The first day it started with the dude on the motorcycle, then he was walking. Maybe that all happened on one day, but I remember it could've been over three days. We would take 5 min or 10 min holding. They would say "Hey guys hunker down." Something is about to happen. If we are in the tower, we would close the windows. Got that information from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) COC S-6 and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) from what I remember was signal. I remember something about the (b)(1)1.4d T could have floated early from them.

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ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember any threats that key in on any individuals?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Ther was a Nike bag going around. Someone was wearing a Nike bag and passing it around. Something that I saw, is that they noticed that we were profiling them, they were watch us looking at them and then drop it off and walk away, then someone else would come and pick it up. We would write it down, then pass it up to the CoC. Then they would facilitate by, I think, having the Army or the MEU send someone out to investigate. They definite did that for the truck.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1 To described what you just said, you would pass suspicious activity to the S2 at the CoC, then you observed when other personnel, maybe EOD, would follow up on what was happening?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. If I reported something it went to the CoC. 100% because I was the person reporting to the CoC. EOD went out the wire to look at a possible threat. They found nothing.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember on the 26th, reporting suspicious activity?

(2) Answer. They asked for permission to shoot somebody. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were talking to the radio. From what I can see over the situation, they asked to shoot somebody and was denied. It was just speculation of what they thought of the individual and asked to shoot. As far as the direct target of a person, that was the only time they were asked to shoot someone. The other time they asked before was people getting shot and killed and burned. I defiantly remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the Radio talking about someone getting stabbed. They said you can't do that ((shoot someone)) because it wasn't in the ROE and the Taliban was going to do what they were gonna do. You could see more atrocity's at (b)(6) area then (b)(6)

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1 Were there situations where you could identify an American was involved. If an American was being attacked by the Taliban

(2) Answer. They were trying to say that like guarding people that were out there. If it were a service member out there, then it would be different. It's hard to say if there was an American out there. Because so many people were saying that they were American and some were lying. Some people would speak super good English language. Something that came up were international people from different.

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country. If it was an American that knew English, we would tell them what they needed to do. If it was English from another country, we couldn't help them, are they were wasting our time. It was very hard to distinguish Americans or people of interest after the first days of people coming up random code words or signs and signals. Once the Taliban caught on. A lot of people would show up to the tower area saying they new so and so or had a signal that was supposed to mean something. After you see that 100 different times you know people are faking stuff. People would also say they got robbed at a Taliban Check point.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1 Did the snipers ask permission to shoot any suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. They asked permission to shoot the guy with the clean-shaven face and brown man dress. And the person shooting and stabbing people out in the city and around areas where the dead were getting stacked.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1 If you looked in the crowd, are there multiple people that would fit that description?

(2) Answer. For these specifics you could defiantly pinpoint people out who could fit the description. ON a day with like the last couple of days where the was an extreme amount of people it would be extremely hard. "Extremely".

They asked for permission to shoot. That call came to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on them talking to the S-6 over the radio. We were all in the tower and heard the request got out on the 152-out load. I remember them getting denied and being upset about it. At some point in time in that tower I remember talk of the BLTC going over to (b)(6) position. No official recording. The (b)(6) went down there, there was some talk that he was going over there. I don't remember who. I just remember them getting denied.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember them telling you why it was denied?

(2) Answer. No. they were just pissed off they got denied

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1 Was it on the day?

(2) Answer. We were talking about it, these guys are calling in shots this is the second time. I think it was. But it for sure did happen.

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tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1 Do remember them saying we can see wires or explosives?

(2) Answer. Nothing like that. There was definitely a suicide bomber threat, particularly a SVEST with that description.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1 Did they tell you the bomber had a black bag also?

(2) Answer. Yes

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1 How did (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) get involved?

(2) Answer. They called it up to the CoC. And I remember (b)(6) to the COC with inner Comm via the situation.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1 ((BG Curtis describes for clarification)) The threat came from the data Marine, you (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the guy in (b)(6) receiving the threat and you remember it says an older gentleman, a younger man and clean shave, and then what?

(2) Answer. When I received any important information, I passed it over the radio "ALL UNITES be advised and Roger up for conformation. says description. Then I told them all to "Roger Up" on confirmation that you received that description. They all confirmed. How could you not tell somebody that? Information relayed was of the bomber on bike, being walked by an old man with description of bomber and the VBID.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have a book where you took notes?

(2) Answer. I looked for it. It may be in a storage unit I have 5 hours from here. I'll see if I can get. If I do have it, I definitely have it in storage. However, the since the information was passed, then it could've gotten thrown out.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any picture of the individual?

(2) Answer. No. not my knowledge.

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zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1 Did anyone share the photos with you?

(2) Answer. Just from what I remember (b)(6) and the other team from IRAQ for the compilation. I was chasing down (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) stuff for a bit then I made the best choice to let him do his thing with it the right way because I was thinking he would do the right thing, but I have my suspicions (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) could defiantly verify that.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1 Some people got frustrated with (b)(6) saying that they were going rogue. Would you agree with that?

(2) Answer. Yeah. 100% you could ask any individual in the platoon about the character, and that's how it was. As far as the attitude on how they wanted to operate. That's why when they didn't want to give me the photos, I began to suspect the worst. But (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) has always had great communication skills in situation with his people. No matter what.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1 Did (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) get along with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) tried out for MARSOC and didn't get selected. He was supposed to go, and everyone thought he was going to make it. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) took over his position, so now you have two peers working together and their attitudes were like they hated each other. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) overly did things, he was a better person to work with. We had a SSgt that we considered like the logistical person. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was always considered out (b)(6)

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. C1 Did you hear the conversation between the snipers and the (b)(6)

(2) Answer I did not capture the conversation with (b)(6) The denial came over the radio 100 percent over the 152. Some time in that tower I remember chatter about the (b)(6) going to (b)(6) spot and them being upset about not getting to shoot. This prob happened I want to say noonish. From what I remember of the 2 times they asked to shoot There was a time that I was holding the (b)(6) vehicle downstairs for him almost fighting state department workers because they were going to jack it. But I'm 95 percent sure that I wasn't holding the vehicle on the bombing day.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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(1) Question. C1 Is it possible that the denial came over the radio and not face to face?

(2) Answer. I remember the facilitation and that they were talking about it over the radio, the 152. I think its possible that it did happen not face to face but I don't know I wasn't in the (b)(6) tower.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. C1 What is the method for shooting someone that fits description but doesn't display Hostile Act/Hostile Intent (BG Curtis clarifies with an example of someone not doing anything vs someone pointing a weapon))?

(2) Answer. My idea of the best applied Methodology was using Sectary former Commandant General Mattis mindset about putting his Marines first and protecting American service members first. As a priority. Better to be offensive. I read an article about this somewhere and took this for my interpretation.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. C1 Do you understand Hostile Act/Hostile Intent?

(2) Answer. Trying to say is it reasonable to shoot. From my point of view, I would've taken the shot. If that did happen maybe it'll turn into a fire fight and comes out on world news, seeing us killing somebody and the Taliban gets pissed. More of us could have died.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. C1 Do you think there would be a firefight with Taliban and Marines?

(2) Answer. For sure. Based off the death threats and seeing the people. They were digging fighting position and digging out shooting holes for people to shoot from. You could see them behind manmade barriers. I was like telling (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) that that wasn't there the day before ((referring to Taliban shooting positions)) This is popping up progressively over the day. I don't want to die. The tower was at a bad place to be at.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. C1 Were the towers protected?

(2) Answer. Based on the architecture of the city, you were easily a walking duck.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

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(1) Question. C1 What about the blast itself?

(2) Answer. We were looking for cases to help us move the comm gear back to the planes. We started our normal shift the day of the bomb and by the time we were going to break down we started walking to (b)(6) position to replace them for a longer 16-hour shift day. At some point during that time (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) decided not we had to stop and go back to the staging area to start packing to leave. After dropping our gear off we decided to go look for cases to put our comm gear and help us carry it out. We got on the car that we had hotwired to find boxes to put the radio gear in. The area with the broken-down Apache's and little birds and dogs left in the hangers. That's when we got the message from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) via (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and hauled ass to back to Abby gate.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. C1 Did you hear the explosion?

(2) Answer. No

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. C1 Where did you go? What did you see?

(2) Answer. As soon as I get there, I see from what I remember was Page and Soviaks brain matter in his Kevlar with blood everywhere. The back door swings open and everyone is posting security and yelling at each other. I get off and see Page getting loaded to the vehicle that we were in. They're yelling at people "don't look" because people were going into shock from seeing their friends hit. We went up to the tower and replaced the guys that were there for the remainder of the time. You could see the aftermath of everyone in the canal. Around nighttime people got shacky. Two o'clock in the morning an alarm comes in saying "GROUND ATTACK IMMINENT". That was around 2am, the sun was down. Someone the radio said they had gotten shot at behind concrete or glass.

We were constantly watching in the tower. When that happened (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was holding his morphine and bawling his eyes out because he watched his friend die and was stressed out. People were stressed out. I couldn't sleep, I didn't feel entirely safe per the situation. Anybody could have thrown a grenade over the wall and killed everyone. I don't trust nobody. It would be easy to throw a grenade and kill everyone that was sleeping on the floor of the outside the tower. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) of weapons company was saying that "if anyone pokes their head over that wall, shoot them".

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. C1 You weren't able to help with the CASEVAC?

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(2) Answer. As soon as we got to the gate, they used our vehicle to load casualties and then we took over the tower. At that point we were aware of the level of people injured and as far as being more alert, it was like 100% on another scale. As time is going by, at around two o'clock in the morning people were looking for people trying to sneak past the tree line.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. C1 How long were you there after the bombing?

(2) Answer. We left the 28th of August.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(6) Doesn't the S2, I don't know how they disseminated the SD cards. I can look over my stuff from when I was asking for the SD Cards. Let's say I did, they had time to have those cards and do something with them. The best thing is to go to the individuals and ask. Maybe if you go to where the equipment is at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could know something. Yes.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1 Can you describe the threat stream timeline: to the extent you remember times that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) gave you this initial report?

(2) Answer. The sun was up, not early in the morning when the sun was down.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1 (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How soon did the information get disseminated after the reports of a suspicious person?

(2) Answer. Disseminate immediately. The reports of a suicide bomber were over several days not over one day. I would say a span of three days. From my understanding, that it came from the (b)(1)1.4c They were saying it was coming from the (b)(1)1.4c The S2 was doing some facilitating and updates with them. No person came to talk to us. It was more of them talking and receiving updates from the S2. The S2 was saying, that they mentioned the (b)(1)1.4c That there was a (b)(1)1.4c Immediately disseminate information, but it came over a period of 2-3 days before the blast, everything that came to me from the CoC.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

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(1) Question. (b)(6) How many times did you pass a BOLO report?

(2) Answer. It was only said once, but it was remembered. The first time it was the dude on the motor turned into him being walked with someone another day later. First the BOLOs were focused on the truck.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1 What about the request from (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. They asked for permission to shoot, they told him no. This was definitely like 5-6 hours before the bombing, about noon from what I remember, or it could have been the other time he asked to shoot.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1 Do you remember the time from the request being made to when it was denied?

(2) Answer. It was about 15 min. The time of the request and the whole scenario. That was sent up immediately, the denial was 10-15 minutes. They had questions of why. Then there was discuccion about them calling shots. The first time it was about a kid getting burned and them a woman getting hacked with a pipe people getting shot and stabbed. This happened from (b)(6) all the time you could see people getting hit with the pipe.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1 Did you witness or only heard chatter about (b)(6) (b)(6) going to tower?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. Not a long time frame. I want to say once we talked about possible chatter of him going over and why they were so pissed off. One thing I remember that was important: there were Marine officers that were blaming each other for something that happened at the gate "this is your fault". This was coming from someone talking about it because we were asking questions about what happened.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. C1 Was that possibly a disagreement with the Company Commanders or the Platoon Commanders?

(2) Answer. I have no idea.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

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(1) Question. C1 Did you have any interactions with (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Who? What do you mean (b)(1)1.4a? Information that we received would automatically get sent to CoC or compiled and given to the CoC.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1 How would you share information at the tower?

(2) Answer. It would be written. Let's ask (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I remember receiving it and talking it and people wrote it down. I would write it down.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1 What was you direct interaction with (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. People were trying to sneak people in. (b)(1)1.4a I don't know about that. I didn't know who they were. I knew megaphones were happening but that they were our guys.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1 Primary comms were 152s: Did you use signal chat?

(2) Answer. I facilitated comms through a 117 Golf VHF. Primary communications were VHF on the golf and 152, and signal. The golf was good enough to echelon the rest of the communications down to all the ground USMCF elements and any other localized foreign elements added.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1 Do you still use the signal chat?

(2) Answer. Yes. I never deleted anything.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. C1 Maybe a BOLO threat stream or a message pushed out of a description over signal?

(2) Answer. What I got, I pushed to the radio. Everyone that had a radio operator, they knew because I made them 'roger up'. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) also received the BOLO I think from signal or how ever he did.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) requests to ask a question of BG Curtis.

(2) Answer. ((BG Curtis answers)) Gen Mackenzie did an interview on TV, he said no description came of anything. I sent (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) a message. I sent (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and my buddy (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Why did GEN Mackenzie say there was no description. Is that because we have people undercover?

BG Curtis: I did not see the interview. What I think he was referring to be a specific description of the bomber over the course the threat reporting, getting an exact set of clothes, height age, etc. When you start getting that level of detail and we never had that level of specificity. We had general decriptoins that were changing rapidly. ((BG Curtis explained an example of VBIED description changing)) It changed so much that we did not have a level of specifity.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. C1 How would you describe the primary task of the tower; overwatch or targeting?

(2) Answer. Overwatch. I know we were not there to cause problems. Our mission was to help people.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. C1 Do you have any other info or things to add?

(2) Answer. It's worth mentioning that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) lost their cameras on their decent back to Abby gate in order to leave, but they found their equipment at least so I've thought. This could be a reason for their picture issue, but I don't know. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) could verify that and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231108, which begins on question 1 and ends on question 81. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231108
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

8 Nov 23
DATE

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Exhibit S020

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) 2/1 Marines (b)(6)

1. On 26 October 2023, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) via Secure Video Teleconference to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Present for the interview were (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and the person asking each question is noted at the beginning of each question indicated by the above abbreviations.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where'd you grow up?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you come in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What is your MOS?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you get to 2/1?

(2) Answer. July 2016.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) That seems like a long time in one unit, is that normal?

(2) Answer. I reenlisted to be on the (b)(1) 1.4a, so yes, that is longer than normal in the same unit.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How many deployments have you done?

(2) Answer. Three. I went to Okinawa, 31st MEU, then I reenlisted to be on the (b)(1) 1.4a

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How long have you been at your current job?

(2) Answer. I reported in April of 2022 then went to Instructor school and started in July of 2022 with my current billet.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) During the Deployment, you didn't go immediately into Afghanistan. Talk to me about that timeline?

(2) Answer. It was a little odd. We were the last (b)(1) 1.4a in CENTCOM, and we got split after about a month in (b)(1)1.4d The GCE HQ was split between (b)(1)1.4d I went to (b)(1)1.4d for a few weeks and the intent was to move me there permanently. When I returned to (b)(1)1.4d to get the remainder of my belongings, soon after we got the word that we would be going to Afghanistan, a few days later myself and the other personnel that would be going on the NEO that were at (b)(1)1.4d to then fly to Afghanistan.

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j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were you in the line companies during that time or back and forth, or what was your assignment?

(2) Answer. No in the Ops section.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) When did you actually know you were going?

(2) Answer. A few days before. It became a back and forth between who was going and who needed to be on ground. We got told where we were going. We left (b)(1)1.4d and that's when they decided who was actually going. Our C2 node got pushed up front along with one platoon from Echo Co. I was on an early flight and it would have been the 15th.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What was your job on ground?

(2) Answer. Nighttime watch chief, not hands on refugees or anything like that. I was in the CoC full time.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get RoE Training?

(2) Answer. If the question is asking if I received an ROE brief, then I do not recall receiving one for the operation. However if the question is asking if I have ever gotten training on what ROEs are, why we have them, etc., then the answer is yes.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your initial tasks?

(2) Answer. Establish and set up CoC. It was a really small office that became the CoC. We had to shove all the functional areas into what essentially amounted to a broom closet to control the operations. It was a small area but we worked with what we had.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Who controlled the JOC ?

(2) Answer. To the best of my recollection TF 51/5 – that was the JOC.

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p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What'd you do between arrival and set-up?

(2) Answer. We were plugging holes. We didn't have all our teams, and we had to wait for the arrival of our folks before we could really get started. We got tasked eventually to go down to Abbey Gate once our Marines arrived. Had to figure out which location we were actually responsible for, then had to get set up for refugees. It was changing a lot in the first few days, but then became about running the gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often were you at the gate?

(2) Answer. One or two times per day if I could but there were multi-day stints that I wasn't down there. I would make it there as often as possible but that wasn't my primary responsibility. Day to Day it was working in the COC and controlling operations. We would do a one hour turn over and we would work in rotation between the day and night. I was the night shift.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your tasks during shift?

(2) Answer. Mostly battle tracking and pushing and pulling information. We had a map on the wall with sticky notes and we really just battle tracked and reported. To the best of my recollection we reported directly to the MEU. I believe I reported to a Capt at the MEU. It was between that Capt and some MSgt in the JOC that I would always talk to.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How often did you make it to 51/5?

(2) Answer. Lots. It was approximately 15 steps between the locations. I would go over there to share and get info all the time.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Field reports from people at the gate, do you remember reports of Taliban violence?

(2) Answer. I don't know if they came over the radio, or whatever, but there were reports of the Taliban murdering civilians. The reports I recall of Taliban violence were about a lot of civilians below the Taliban screening area and they would be forced to

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squat down or be beaten with what appeared to be a black hose or just outright shot for not complying. Again, I don't exactly remember how those reports came through. I know people talked about that.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) What were your communication methods? How did you talk to the gates?

(2) Answer. Talking to ground units, it was 152 or 117 radio, but the chat rooms between units was best for sharing info and getting info from higher. Especially receiving reports, it was the chat rooms.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) These reports, what were you hearing?

(2) Answer. Just general reports about the situation down at the gate, numbers of refugees that had been screened and allowed in or turned away, requests for chow or water, things of that nature.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did anyone ask if they could do anything about that?

(2) Answer. To the best of my recollection, it would have come through the meet ups between the unit leaders and the (b)(6) I believe they had asked what they were allowed to do. To the best of my recollection they were essentially told 'nothing' because it's outside our gate and we would end up starting a gunfight if we shot at them for killing civilians, and we couldn't confirm they were Americans. We were trying to avoid unneeded casualties by getting into it with Taliban.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Sounds like RoE conversation, would you say that's where that was coming from?

(2) Answer. Essentially it was. We understood we couldn't shoot them. When the refugees stormed the airport, we ended up going out there. We got them pushed back to the terminals. Then we were told that we'd see Taliban on the airfield with guns and not to engage them. We were told not to take decisive action and we were essentially partnering with the Taliban it felt like. It was hostile act/hostile intent from that point on because the Taliban were around us all the time.

y. Question and Answer 24.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you ever see pictures from the gate about the violence or killing?

(2) Answer. No. Not that I recall.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You described "we were told not to take decisive action and partnering with Taliban" who told you that?

(2) Answer. At the time we received that information we were down by the main terminal, we had gotten the vast majority of the refugees that stormed the airfield back to the terminal and behind some c-wire. As we are trying to get the stragglers off the airfield we start hearing that we would be seeing individuals wearing local garb with AKs coming around, we were told they are the Taliban and that they are here to help us get the refugees off the airfield, and explicit instructions to not engage them. To the best of my recollection I don't remember who exactly told me this first, at the time units were kind of all over the place and intermingled with other units as we just tried to fill a hole somewhere and move the refugees back. But shortly after I had heard that about the Taliban it was being widely discussed by everyone there.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you get any reports of an IED probe?

(2) Answer. What do you mean by that? I don't know what that would mean, and based on what was going on down at the gates, there was stuff everywhere, I do not specifically remember any reports about a rehearsal, or a dry run. I don't recall that at all.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Any reports of a bag being thrown over the wall?

(2) Answer. I vaguely remember something like that, but not specifically enough to talk about it.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Threats and Threat reporting? What'd that look like? Was it quality and detailed information?

(2) Answer. Reports came over SIGINT tac-chat but I don't remember what agencies provided that data. I remember in conversation with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he said the local towers were monitored and we could listen in on their conversations. I remember VBIED and SVEST being the common things to be on the lookout for, but I

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remember them not being very specific. I remember them saying that Person Borne was more specific than VBIED. Those reports would come through a couple times per day. But I don't remember how detailed or specific they would have been.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Drill down into the report about the SVEST versus VBIED. Do you remember any specifics about those reports you can talk about?

(2) Answer. I don't recall specific info between the reporting of those types.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. When you got info from higher, how did you get info to the gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4a. We'd call down to leaders and make sure they had info to send stuff down.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Initially Signal was primary and then radios?

(2) Answer. Yes, the improvement of the radio networks came after the initial use of Signal. I didn't have access to a wifi puck to be able to connect to signal that I recall.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were there any interruptions of comms (b)(1)1.4g Who would you visit at gates?

(2) Answer. Like with all our comms, we lose comms often, but our S6 guys were great and would make sure to address it quickly. When I would go down to the gate, the original plan was to have a forward CoC so that we could work and pass info at the gate, but the environment wasn't conducive to that. There wasn't really space or a need for it at that point. Realistically it wasn't going to work, and since we had direct access to the XO's, CO's, and CO Guns, it wasn't much of a challenge to talk with them often.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Did the snipers send any reports?

(2) Answer. They worked in shifts. I don't remember any specific reports from them, but they came to the CoC at the end of every shift and debriefed in person about their Obslogs. I was usually pretty saturated when they would come in. I do remember a couple persons of interest. Specifically, I remember the 'pancake hat' guy. He kept showing up and it was over a couple of days. To the best of my recollection he was

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interesting to them because he wasn't trying to get in. He was just there watching and I remember them calling him 'pancake hat'.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Why were they concerned about the guy in the hat?

(2) Answer. I don't know, but as far as I remember he wasn't trying to get in the gate and he looked suspicious and kept coming back. I think that was reported a few times.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Where was he specifically in the gate complex?

(2) Answer. I don't know, but that's because he never tried to come through that I can recall. As far as I can remember he just kept showing up but didn't try to pass through our security.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did you deal with the (b)(1)1.4a folks at all?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) So any reports that came up, how would it get to you? Sketches? Pics?

(2) Answer. If the leaders were stuck down there at the gate, it would have to wait until the end of the shift. I believe they used cameras.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any pictures of phones or other cameras?

(2) Answer. I don't remember.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Pancake hat, who did that BOLO come through, and what was the description of BOLO versus the description of the individual coming from the gate?

(2) Answer. I don't remember and I don't remember what assigned him as a person of interest other that 'pancake hat' and being reported for a few days.

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oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did the units at the gate report their actions? Do you remember any escalation or requests to escalate use of force?

(2) Answer. I don't recall that. I don't recall that ever being asked. I was night shift and it may have come through at other times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) As we get closer to 26 August, what about threat stream changes?

(2) Answer. I believe the streams increased specific to it being a suicide bomber. I don't recall that any specifics. It shifted almost exclusively towards Person Borne, but don't remember specifics about description or things of that nature.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) How would you pass those messages to the gate?

(2) Answer. Leaders would come through and have those conversations with the intel section. It was runners mostly. They would be in the CoC working on lots of things, and if I recall correctly that would also have been due to comms challenges but it allowed them a chance to touch bases with the (b)(6) or the (b)(6) as well.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any other reports of suspicious people?

(2) Answer. I recall there being a couple of people that they'd been watching for a few days, nothing specific that I recall.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Were the reports coming through the snipers?

(2) Answer. Yeah, that would have come from them because that was their function being elevated and watching over the crowds. Their view was best in that area and they were there for that purpose.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything early on the 26th you remember from the snipers?

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(2) Answer. Nothing specific I remember.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any pictures coming back from the gates on the 26th? Pictures at all?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember using SD cards or those cards floating around the CoC?

(2) Answer. No.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything else specific on the 26th?

(2) Answer. That day was kind of different, myself along with the intel officer and the 2 alpha had planned to go to the gate. One of the Intel officers had a former terp they were trying to recover maybe later in the day. It was supposed to be sometime in the late morning and they were going to wake me up when they planned on leaving, but I didn't get woken up. I went to the CoC when I woke up and realized they hadn't gotten me up and they told me they decided not to go down. If I recall correctly the S2 said he had a bad feeling and we didn't go. I stayed in the CoC with the watch chief and just assisted as needed.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Did the S2 explain the bad feeling?

(2) Answer. No I don't remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) saying why, but I believe he said he had a bad feeling about the gate.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember hearing anything specifically identifying PID?

(2) Answer. No Sir.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Night of the 26th or the day of the 27th, did you hear conversation about people saying 'I knew it was that guy' or other conversation about the bomber?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any of the other Marines saying that? (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or anyone else?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything you remember specifically about that day of the bombing and anything about it that was strange?

(2) Answer. Not that I recall, nothing out of the baseline as far as I remember.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Do you remember the (b)(6) coming to the CoC?

(2) Answer. Not on the 26th, I don't remember them coming back to the CoC on that day specifically. I know they were all down at the gates during the attack.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Any discussion on the afternoon of the 26th about engagement requests or anything like that at the gates?

(2) Answer. Not that I recalled.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) You mentioned earlier about sniper teams being tasked with intel. Can you explain that?

(2) Answer. Their job is surveillance, and they can see over the crowds. Because of that they can see over the crowd and observe everything down there, and report what they see back to the COC.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. SS: So you spoke with them over radio?

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(2) Answer. The CoC did unless the radios were failing which did happen. I remember multiple lulls between the comms not working. We had gaiters which would take runners to the gate and they would constantly run to the gates to try to fix comms.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Post Blast and you're preparing for exfil. Talk to me about exfil and property destruction?

(2) Answer. I remember (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) telling us the hard drives had to be destroyed and I believe the intel Marines destroyed those out back with a sledge hammer. I don't remember if we had any server stacks or anything we specifically needed to destroy or any of that. A lot of the infrastructure was already there when we started using those areas, and I don't know much about all that. I wasn't asked to bring anything back, and don't have anything like logs or any of those things.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Have you given any interviews about any of this?

(2) Answer. No.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Are you on Social media, and do you look at any of these things on Social Media?

(2) Answer. I try my best to avoid consuming things regarding the bombing on social media.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. There are still groups from Abbey gate that get together, do you go to any meetings with 2/1 people from Abbey?

(2) Answer. Not really with 2/1. I work with a Marine that was with 1/8 LAR there in Afghanistan and someone who was a part of the MAGTF and was placed as a FET team members. We rarely discuss what occurred, if we do its more so to check on each other.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. Do you have any logs or notebooks?

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(2) Answer. I only have a little rite-in-the-rain book that I had to write down 4 names after the blast. When I went to the medical facility I had to try to figure out people that were there and write down the names of those I found.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Anything at all in your mind that you think could have been given to the units to help warn them before the blast?

(2) Answer. I don't know. I think maybe the Sniper teams may or may not have been able to engage their targets, but it would have turned into a lose-lose situation on both sides and that would have created its own problems.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). He worked in the CoC and we were around each other a lot. He was the operations NCO. He was day-shift with (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

POC info: (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 13. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231120
DATE

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20NOV23
DATE

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Exhibit S021

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 17 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 2/1, (b)(6)

1. On 17 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at 2/1 to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present and recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. To distinguish between interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were you doing in (b)(1)1.4d prior to deploying?

(2) Answer. We were doing squad and platoon attacks at (b)(1)1.4a and also standing 8-hour shifts on guard. Other platoons were doing rest and refit at the time.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever receive any NEO training?

(2) Answer. No sir.

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did your training change as you found out you were going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. No change, just more and more info about Afghanistan and what was going on there.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any training on rules of engagement?

(2) Answer. Just shout, show, shove, shoot. The rules of engagement covered danger to self and others and the danger to government property.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You knew you had the right to use deadly force and defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What happens when you got to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. We landed, lowered our nods, got accountability, then moved to the gym we were staying in. We echeloned by squad to get our packs off the plane, got a bit of rest, then headed to the gate the next morning.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the airfield like when you landed?

(2) Answer. Dark, I didn't see much.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was that first day like?

(2) Answer. Our platoon got there, our machine gun squad brought their weapons and we put those with the gear because we had to go push the crowd back. That didn't work that well and the (b)(1)1.4d so we had to fall back until they eventually used a vehicle to get the gate shut. After that, there were a group of civilians that we got over to some concrete barriers. We searched them and gave them food and water and made sure they were okay from the CS gas. We checked their papers and guarded them for the rest of the day.

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) paused the interview to orient (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the unclassified map of Abbey Gate to establish a common lexicon of the area's geography. The discussion ranged from the inner gate to the chevron and all areas in between.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many days were you out there?

(2) Answer. I want to say the first three days.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your sleep rest cycle like?

(2) Answer. I couldn't tell you sir, not much.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There were a lot of threat streams at the time, who would brief you on those threats?

(2) Answer. Our platoon sergeant, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were officers like your platoon commander and company commander present?

(2) Answer. Yes, they were. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the gate quite frequently.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did leaders seem focused on safety? How so?

(2) Answer. Yes, they would always come down and bring us and the civilians water.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were you told to do if there was an imminent threat?

(2) Answer. We would hunker down behind concrete barriers. I remember doing that, I think three times.

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p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How were you taught RoE, was that a class?

(2) Answer. In (b)(1)1.4d we went over the rules of engagement every time we took post.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you recall any of what you were or weren't allowed to do by the RoE?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But you knew if your life was threatened you could take action?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Only the first night setting up the chevron because we were working with the Taliban, they were nearby just standing on cars and watching us.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you interact with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. No, I believe the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were the Taliban doing? Did they interact with the civilians?

(2) Answer. They were just standing there watching us. I didn't see them interact with the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did all Marines understand show, shout, shove, shoot? Did you ever have to do that?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir, and no, sir.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever get any descriptions of people to look for?

(2) Answer. More so baggage for a possible IED threat. I remember a red and black duffel bag, or some suitcase.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any personnel descriptions you can remember?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever a time after you opened the gate on the 19th until the 26th that you got threat reporting?

(2) Answer. We heard them, but I don't remember them specifically.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there a time that the volume of reporting increased?

(2) Answer. It stayed the same, we didn't get flooded with that information.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Around the 21st or 22nd, did you hear about or see an IED test run?

(2) Answer. No, I did not hear anything about a rehearsal. I know I saw other Marines set up overwatch and we hunkered down, but that's about all.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember of those first days at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. First night was setting up the chevron, the second day was holding security all the way down past the bridge. We weren't told to accept anybody, so we were just standing there watching. On the 21st, another Marine and I were sent to the (b)(1)1.4d Embassy to help escort some people through. It was a fire team and an officer; I don't remember who.

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cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see Department of State reps?

(2) Answer. I don't really remember.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The morning of the 26th Golf Company took over from Echo, had anything changed from the day prior?

(2) Answer. Not to my knowledge.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where were you in relation to the blast and tell me what happened?

(2) Answer. I was originally standing with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and they turned on the speakers on the vehicle. They were loud so we moved to the other side of the vehicle, so they weren't shouting in our ears. When the blast went off, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were standing there. I took a (b)(6) We went and took cover behind the sniper tower with 3rd platoon. I sat back there with 3rd platoon. I don't remember which SSgt told 3rd to stay put. The wounded and the rest of first started pushing people through.

That's when I got up to link up with the reset of my squad and platoon further down. I know they had cut a hole open in the fence to help transport the wounded and casualties, I don't know who cut it. When I got up there most of the squad was gone so I moved to the wall and started pulling security on the right side, pulling security facing the Barron. Once I was relieved, I linked up with my squad leader (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I found some more of my platoon mates; they picked up a stretcher and we headed to Abbey Gate proper to consolidate.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you receive medical attention?

(2) Answer. From an Army Medic at Abbey Gate proper. (b)(6) (b)(6) We moved to the gym after that, and a Navy Corpsman treated me there and cleaned it. Then I went to the hospital the next day.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(6)

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact with the snipers?

(2) Answer. No, I just saw them every once and a while taking a break at the bottom of the tower.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How about the (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. I never spoke to them.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At your level, what was the means of communicating threats?

(2) Answer. Squad leader would get word from the platoon sergeant, he would pass it to team leaders, they would come to us.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any recollection at all of those reports?

(2) Answer. If there was a possible IED threat, we would hunker behind barriers. That's all I really remember. We didn't do that too many times.

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nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All you saw was the Taliban watching, not interacting with the crowd?

(2) Answer. I did not see that, sir.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you usually find yourself in a static position or did you rotate positions?

(2) Answer. It was fluid. If our platoon was on, we would rotate through my positions. I know my team was by the cut out in the gate while some other squads were on the wall with the crowds.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question.

(2) Answer.

qq. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As a rifleman, anything you would do different or think about in terms of changing your posture?

(2) Answer. I can't think of anything that I would change.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you think could have been done to prevent the blast?

(2) Answer. Try to eliminate the crowd as much as possible. People were standing around even if they were rejected, just causing a fuss.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see a difference in the size of the crowd over several days?

(2) Answer. No, just a lot of people all the time. The day of the blast, they always say that civilians knew. I don't think the civilians knew, there was a lot of people. I remember Abbey Gate being the only gate open.

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tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Based on that being the only gate, did that change how you did things?

(2) Answer. Just the team leaders and up were allowed to check papers, everyone else had to focus on crowd control and the civilians.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You were on security most of the time, what were you looking for?

(2) Answer. Individuals taking pictures, phone calls with frantic pointing, anything unusual. I saw a couple people taking pictures, and I would route that up through my team leader. The team leader would come over and get eyes on before running it up the rest of the way and I would tell him what he was doing.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever a time that your heard about a suspicious individual that other people saw?

(2) Answer. I'd sometimes look over to see a squad passing something up and see if I could see what they were doing, mostly I would just focus on my area.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think your training was sufficient to prepare you for what to do?

(2) Answer. No, because we didn't do much crowd control except for one embassy scenario we did where people were getting rowdy. That was the only training we had to prepare us for Abbey Gate.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What's the lesson learned, that if you had to deploy again, that you would teach your Marines?

(2) Answer. More TSA handling. Like at IAT, we would do vehicle checkpoints and have everyone get out and search the vehicle, the individuals, and their baggage. Proper procedures on how to have them search themselves if you don't want to touch them.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you track what's going with Abbey Gate on social media or from reporters?

(2) Answer. No, I am not following that at all. A reporter from my hometown contacted me right after, but I didn't really want to tell my story about that. Not everything I remember is accurate, there's an adrenaline rush.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you still talk to your buddies about it?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I talk about (b)(1)1.4a a lot. That was the highlight of our deployment work-up.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anyone we should talk to that would provide some information along the line of questions we asked you?

(2) Answer. No, not really sir.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 51. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231016
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16 OCT 2023
DATE

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Exhibit S022

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2/1, (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity with multiple interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be recorded as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To start, walk us through your unit and role at the time?

(2) Answer. At the time I was part of 1st platoon, 2nd or 3rd squad I believe, 3rd team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my squad leader and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my team leader. It was Golf Company and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was my Commander and we had (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Platoon Commander was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you in the unit before you deployed?

(2) Answer. A little over a year

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. AD: What did your train up look like to deploy?

(2) Answer. A good deal of non-live fire training. The infantry immersion trainer. The ITX at 29 Palms and a variety of ranges at Camp Pendleton. Then we deployed to (b)(1)1.4a Did the machine gun package. We stood post for a while, then we to (b)(1)1.4a a training area in (b)(1)1.4a After that we went back to (b)(1)1.4a and did a couple ranges. Every now and then we would hear what was going on in Afghanistan. The possibility of our going there just went up and up as time went on.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did your training adapt as you found out you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. As far as I was aware it was pretty much the same.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you ever told that you were going to conduct a Non-Combatant Evacuation?

(2) Answer. Yes, we were.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What time did you get to HKIA?

(2) Answer. Nighttime, I don't know the specific time. We got off the plane and went across the landing strip. We went into the gym there and put our stuff down. We waited for a bit, and I think we slept for a while. By the time we went out it was daytime.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the environment like when you landed?

(2) Answer. Loud. There were the planes and I remember a bunch of people yelling. I know I heard shots, I don't know what kind of gun. We would see tracers in the air.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you do when you wake up the next morning?

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(2) Answer. We get transportation to Abbey Gate. We went all the way there; they were going to open it with one squad at a time. First squad went up to hold the crowd where they were, but it was thousands of people, so the rest of the squads went up from there. I remember I ended up far out, and I heard someone telling everyone to get back. I tried to and got stuck around the base of the tower. I got trampled there for like 5 minutes. I had been trying to get out, but some lady fell and then I fell, and I had like 30 people on me. A couple guys in my Platoon were trying to pull me out.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Describe the environment?

(2) Answer. There was a lot of c-wire. I don't know if this happened before or after we got there, but there was a lot of trash everywhere. The whole area outside the gate was full of people, like a loud concert.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any gunshots at the time?

(2) Answer. There was a guy, I don't know where he was from, letting off shots in the air. He may have been (b)(1)1.4d

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact with the (b)(1)1.4d or the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I never saw the Taliban. I interacted with the (b)(1)1.4d a couple times but nothing major.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got word you were going to Afghanistan, did you get briefed on Rules of Engagement?

(2) Answer. Yes, yes we did. A day or two before we got out there.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have the right to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, we did.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Any specifics on what you were taught?

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(2) Answer. No specifics. But none of the people we saw out there were armed or intentionally hostile. It was just hysteria, so many people trying to get out. As individuals they weren't that bad.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long were you on the ground once we got to Abbey Gate? What was your squad's task at that time?

(2) Answer. Three or four days straight. I only somewhat remember; I went on pack watch after I got trampled. Before that we were trying to funnel people into a waiting area.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive any information on how to process civilians?

(2) Answer. I am not entirely sure. We just tried to control the crowd as much as possible.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did information flow look like at your level?

(2) Answer. From what I remember it came from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to us. It was pretty fast.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You felt like you had situational awareness of what was going on?

(2) Answer. Yes.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you feel like the threat was at the time?

(2) Answer. Aside from the hordes of people, I didn't have a feel for what the threat could have been. All the shots sounded like they were miles away.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember getting any specific threat streams from your chain of command?

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(2) Answer. On the 2nd or 3rd to last day we had a bomb threat. The last day we had two or three. I think those were person borne. The description of the guy himself was kind of weird, I don't remember if it was cleanly shaven or full beard, but I remember a computer case with some kind of marking on it.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you get that info, your squad leader?

(2) Answer. Yes.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What actions did you take when you got those bomb threats?

(2) Answer. On QRF, we basically just went inside the gate up against the wall. When we weren't on QRF, when we were against the canal, we got on a knee to avoid exposing ourselves as much as possible.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long would you be on a knee, there was an all-clear?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was. It was an hour, maybe.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many times did that happen?

(2) Answer. Taking a knee? Maybe once, at like 0400. On QRF it happened like twice inside the gate.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You had that be on the lookout (BOLO), did anyone fit that description?

(2) Answer. Everyone looked similar, a lot of beards, a lot of cleanly shaven, a lot of people cleaner than others. It was hard. You couldn't fit one individual, a lot of people in the crowd would fit a description.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your battle rhythm?

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(2) Answer. I think it was like 8- or 12-hour shifts, then a couple hours of QRF, then a couple hours of rest. I don't remember being on QRF for long.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did switching out with Echo Company look like?

(2) Answer. They or Fox would come through and replace us one at a time. We would meet by the CCP and move to the inner gate, then get a ride back to the gym. I don't remember how long we left for, maybe about a day.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Back to intel about that case, can you recall how specific that was or was it more general?

(2) Answer. I'd say the description of the individual was more general, but something about it seemed specific. I can't remember.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was your platoon leadership on the ground with you the whole time?

(2) Answer. Yes, they were. Aside from passing word, they were doing the same thing as us and looking for people to pull out of the crowd. I remember calling them over to verify credentials, they were the ones I would call.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever a time when the crowd got bigger?

(2) Answer. I don't know, I wouldn't say so. It felt the same.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did it feel like your leadership was concerned about Marine safety?

(2) Answer. I would say they were as worried as when we initially left. I felt they were only more worried when there was a threat.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Did the RoE ever change?

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(2) Answer. No.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did threat reporting ever change? Did it get more specific?

(2) Answer. As far as I am aware, no.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did your posture change as you got closer to the 26th?

(2) Answer. We somewhat collapsed the perimeter. We had more people, maybe 8 or 10, at the jersey barrier. The rest were spread along the canal wall.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were you doing on the morning of the 26th?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. I think we had an IED threat so we got on a knee.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember right before the blast happened?

(2) Answer. I was next to LCpl McCollum, watching the crowd near the wall. We were just told to stop bringing people in, something like that.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So, what did you see when the blast went off?

(2) Answer. My brain couldn't really process the people in front of me. There was a lot of dirt and dust in the air. I thought someone threw a flash bang near my head. I looked around and saw McCollum on the ground next to me.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

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(2) Answer. (b)(6) in the fence. (b)(6) The corpsmen were focused on people who were more severely injured, (b)(6) (b)(6) I was there for maybe five minutes, it felt longer at the time. (b)(6) We got a ride there with everyone else.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(6) They were evacuating the people who were more severely injured.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(6) you redeployed with (b)(6) (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(6)

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long did it take you to get from where the blast happened to the outside gate?

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(2) Answer. A couple minutes, maybe less. I went through that first hole in the fence by the U-Shaped barrier.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you remember after the blast?

(2) Answer. I heard some shots, that's when I decided to move on. I tried leaving. Someone's CS cannister was punctured. I had to walk through that, which sucked. I walked through the first hole, then I got treated.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much social media have you seen on this event?

(2) Answer. A lot at first, but it died down after the first six months.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you stay in touch with other people who were wounded?

(2) Answer. Just (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) really, because he's in the same company.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever have contact with any of the snipers?

(2) Answer. No.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any reporter try to contact you? What did you see in terms of social media?

(2) Answer. No, and I don't really know.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything you want to add?

(2) Answer. Nothing that I have to add.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you think we should talk to?

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(2) Answer. Nobody that probably hasn't been interviewed already.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In the days prior to the explosion, did you see or hear anyone conducting an "IED rehearsal"?

(2) Answer. As far as I am aware no, just those two possible threats we had.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 53. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231016
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

16 OCT 2023
DATE

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Exhibit S023

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 16 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 16 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(1)1.4d (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of three interviewers, BG Curtis will be denoted as (C1), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: This is a supplemental review; this is not an investigation. We are interviewing those that we could not interview for the original investigation due to their medical condition at the time. We are also interviewing those identified that may have information regarding this event. What I need from you is any information you have that is relevant to this. Specifically, the picture that is referenced that was passed from the Snipers to the COC. You said this now resides with 1/4 Marines, please explain why 1/4 would have that.

(2) Answer. When we did a 31st MEU we didn't bring our own equipment. 1/4 was the BLT for the MEU originally. When we deployed we signed for their equipment that

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was being used. When we flew out for this deployment, I gave all our SIPR assets to Victor 1/4 who now has custody of it.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All of the infantry battalions that go on MEUs from Pendleton rotate equipment sets?

(2) Answer. Just the 31st. The West-Pac MEU has their own.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The equipment with (b)(1) 1.4a where would it have gone?

(2) Answer. It would have flown back with them to Camp Pendleton

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The equipment goes from HKIA to Pendleton with 2/1. Then where?

(2) Answer. We had it through our Pre-Deployment training program. When our unit came to (b)(6) we began moving our equipment over to 1/4.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) This is just SIPR assets?

(2) Answer. It's everything. The entire unit's CMR is signed over to 1/4.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All the SIPR, Intel, Scout Sniper assets (camera, SD Cards)…all of that was turned over to 1/4 when?

(2) Answer. We flew out here in May, so I think in April 23.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Backing up, prior to all that, when the battalion returned from (b)(1) 1.4a do you know if they uploaded any type of reporting or photos to Intelink, SharePoint, or any other database to establish a record.

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, Sir. My assumption is they would upload to MKG. MKG effectively is an intelligence SharePoint. It's where all products live and manage the life cycle with managing intelligence.

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i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you access that to see if anything is on there.

(2) Answer. I can, but I don't have access to the 1st MARDIV site (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe is helping. My hope is someone put that picture in a daily intel brief that we could pull it from. We can also look into a (b)(1)1.4g where the sniper photos would be hung. My guess is that they took pictures, could have 100s, they pull the photos from the SD card out, rip everything off the SD card, possibly wipe the SD card, and put it back in the camera.

(b)(1)1.4c is a server that comes with our intel suite that enables an intranet out in the field. 2/1 had two (b)(1)1.4c at HKIA (8 SIPR Hard Drives total). I believe 4 were destroyed, and 4 went to 1/4.

They could have picked and chosen what pictures to load into Intelink or MKG, I'm not sure if they would have uploaded all the photos.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: So you're saying they would prioritize/upload photos that had a link to PID, ROE concerns, or a BOLO?

(2) Answer. Yes. I believe that's a reasonable explanation.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So the 1/4 S2 should have the (b)(1)1.4c hard drives?

(2) Answer. They should have them unless they switched them out with the Network Battalion. They should have the SD Cards.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is there any other piece of equipment or database the photos could have been saved onto?

(2) Answer. No sir. If it's on MKG or Intelink I can pull it. I would go to 1st MARDIV G2. They could access all that if it was loaded.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: If there is reporting done, do you still have any hard drives or classified log, or anything of the actual 26th Aug blast that would survive that would have any mention of this individual?

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(2) Answer. I don't sir unless they are on MKG.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Is there a physical log book

(2) Answer. There are log books from 2/1. I didn't bring any to (b)(1)1.4d with me. We closed our vault before we left. There are some log books stored in the 1st MAR Regt vault that we pulled from our vault before we closed it. It's not a lot because we do an annual classified cleanout. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the Assistant S2 at the regiment.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 16 OCTOBER 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 4. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature ~~of Person~~ Making Statement)

16 OCT 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)ture of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231016
DATE

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Exhibit S024

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The interviewers asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. For the purposes of clarity with multiple interviewers, BG Curtis will be recorded as C1, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. C1: How long have you been in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. C1: Timeline. When did you get indicators that you would deploy to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. I was advon to (b)(1)1.4d I would say immediately we had an indication that we would possibly deploy to Afghanistan. Speaking to members of 3rd battalion, going to CUBs with (b)(1) 1.4a, there were talks of us deploying to Afghanistan. I would say a month or two, once we turned over with 3/1, we were trying to train and prepare.

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. C1; What was your job?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) for 2/1, I was an (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time. I promoted last June.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Describe the predeployment training.

(2) Answer. It was pretty dynamic. It was a slow build-up after being in the 31st MEU in Okinawa. We leaned more into NEO. Knowing what I know now, it needs to be reevaluated how we trained for NEO. I don't think it can ever be perfectly done, but lessons learned need to be applied. Especially in a joint environment. Prior to that, we had no experience with the state department or other agencies that we don't work with as an infantry battalion. Specific training for NEO and working with other agencies, we had a little training on, but not the training that we needed.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: Did you do any predeployment training in (b)(1)1.4d with fixed wing aircraft and other servicemembers simulating evacuees?

(2) Answer. Yes sir, it couldn't replicate the scale. I think the work that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) paid off in dividends once we got to HKIA. We worked to establish processes, what we were going to do, how medical was involved. Every unit that was attached to the (b)(1) 1.4a was a part of that for month. Echo and Golf were training in (b)(1)1.4d, and Echo was our crisis response company. The FET team was in (b)(1)1.4d with us. We trained for months, and we established our CoC packed since we didn't know what equipment we would have available. We trained for processing SIV and civilians but had no plan for working with SoF. We didn't think State Department would be next to useless. We did all the training we could for months, and the airmen on (b)(1)1.4d worked to mimic a crowd but a couple hundred can't replicate thousands of people.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: When did you realize this was really going to happen?

(2) Answer. Two or three days before we got there, and we got there on the 15th or 16th. We loaded everything on the airfield and starting moving units. The (b)(6) (b)(6) started moving units to (b)(1)1.4d and getting ready. That's when I knew it was going to happen.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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(1) Question. C1: What's the actual movement and deployment look like?

(2) Answer. Early in the morning, I was woken up by my Ops personnel around 0500. I saw the (b)(6) going back and forth, we went to the CoC, and it became clear we were going. We were figuring out who was going. The (b)(6) recommended that the command team needed to get on the ground, so we don't start flooding people on ground. I think that was a great decision.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: What does you going in look like?

(2) Answer. I think it was the night of the 15th. Myself, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and the majority of the S-3, and a platoon from Echo Company. So much was happening, we didn't understand what was going on. The pilots told us to go Condition One since there were breaches on the airfield and we may need to engage threats. I had never been to Kabul, so I didn't understand the structure. When we landed, we saw contractors leaving, multinational SOF, and other forces making a picket on the field. After that we had to fend for ourselves to find space to work in until our equipment got there.

Most of our equipment arrived with us, but we don't know where the contractors put it because they were rushing due to the threat at the time. I stayed to find our equipment, and once I did, I had my marines drag it to set up a CoC next to the JoC.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: How did you fit in terms of your higher headquarters?

(2) Answer. Initially, we thought the MAGTF staff would deploy with us, but then we heard it was the MEU staff. Then, when the MEU staff spoke to us, it was as peers, not subordinates. So, for a week I thought we worked directly for the JOC. Maybe mid-second week the MEU figured out that we work for them.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: What are your initial areas of operations? Just Abbey?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. Fox Company only had a half of a company; the rest was stuck in Iraq. We had all of Echo, Golf, and Weapons Company.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. C1: When did you assume control of Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I dont remember.

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m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: Prior to deployment, what were you doing to train on Rules of Engagement and how did you message that as leaders?

(2) Answer. The (b)(6) would always stretch that prior to training, especially doing ECPs. Once we got to HKIA, one of the first things we did was bring incoming Marines to the CoC. At which point the Commanders, XOs, and Platoon Commanders would get briefed by (b)(6) on the RoE to pass to their guys.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me about the Rules of Engagement? I have a picture of the Standing CENTCOM Rules of Engagement. Take a second to look at it and tell me if that is similar to your Rules of Engagement.

(2) Answer. It does sir, but I think it was a little diluted. I think the Marines understood hostile act, hostile intent. If there was a threat within the base, it was clear that they could engage. Where it got diluted was when Marines would observe the Taliban executing civilians outside the gate, could they engage. I never saw that, but multiple Marines have said they witnessed those executions, but they felt that they couldn't engage because the Taliban were a piece of the puzzle for base defense. If we engaged the Taliban, that cordon around the base would get comprised. It would have thrown everything down the drain.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: How do you mitigate that concern? All it would take is one individual not executing restraint, and all Service Members would have been at enhanced risk.

(2) Answer. I think it was the lesser evil, sir. I think the junior Marines did a phenomenal job, all Service Members and NATO forces did an incredible job with restraint. Engaging the Taliban would have started a shoot-out with innocent people around us. Engaging one would risk the entire operation, the innocent people around us, and introduce a new problem. It was a difficult problem set. I think the operation would have needed more personnel to come to Kabul to address the Taliban kinetic fight.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: So, you thought leaders at echelon were engaged to ensure the importance of restraint was communicated? You feel confident that Marines on the ground had the right to self-defense, and that it is important to identify hostile act hostile intent through the process?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: Where were you at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. At the CoC.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: What did you deal with in the CoC?

(2) Answer. Everything, sir, I was the musician in there. I wanted to make sure the (b)(6) had a clear idea of what was going on, his assets, and any essential information. During that day, and that week, we knew there was a possible threat. The (b)(6) addressed it by messaging the staff and all commanders to pass the info to their Marines. He moved medical services, the shock trauma platoon, closer to the gate. They started talking about Marines getting behind cover.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: You're putting this out through OPS channels?

(2) Answer. It was put out that morning, the (b)(6) went down to the gate to oversee that it was happening.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: I am tracking over 60 threat streams, with some of those being imminent at which point service members would mitigate by taking cover, ceasing operations briefly, etc. Is that right?

(2) Answer. Thats exactly what is happening, sir.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: I know that North Gate closed due to the VBIED threat due to the traffic circle. East Gate was closed due to the difficulty of processing with its geography and the difficult of controlling the gate itself. Because of that, the Afghans message that Abbey Gate is the best chance on social media. They are trying to get around the Taliban, so they are finding alternate methods of ingress. This leads the crowd to surge on the 25th. Is that all accurate? Did the crowd grow rapidly in a short period of time? What does that look like?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We kept getting indications of a complex attack or ambush at Abbey Gate initiated by suicide vest, which we had heard for three or four

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days. This started when the Taliban broke into a prison and realized a bunch of members, which is when the threat streams ramped up. That's when the (b)(6) started emphasizing hard cover and being protective. The (b)(6) is a hands-on guy, as is the (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were critical of both of them being at Abbey Gate at the same time, because the (b)(6) knew the gate would be flooded with the other gates flooded. The drones that morning just showed a flood of people.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. The constant that I heard was military-aged male, black clothing, black backpack. If you have ever tried to identify that at a concert, everyone matches that. You couldn't 1) identify that in a crowd 2) Also establish hostile act/ hostile intent. It was almost laughable to get that description because everyone there had that.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. C1: It was easy to find multiple people matching that description?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I remember (b)(6) decided to not let anyone in with a non-see through bag after the bag threats started.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Did you get a BOLO for a man with a closed shaved beard, shaved head, and tan 'manjams'. Do you remember that?

(2) Answer. No sir, but you just described 50% of the people that were out there. I would almost put the radio and say Roger when I got reports like that. It doesn't give you enough information to act in a sea of people that matches that description. You couldn't find, let alone engage someone that matches that.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: If someone said they saw that person, do you think that's person?

(2) Answer. I think that's possible, but it matched the description of a vast majority of personnel out there. A whole bunch could match that.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: There has been reporting that some snipers see the exact individual previously, or on the day of?

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(2) Answer. I did not see or hear of any reports from snipers saying that. I never heard any reports like that.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: If the Snipers had that, would you have known about that? Why?

(2) Answer. I would, sir. That would have been a CCIR, info that the (b)(6) would have needed. Snipers act off intent, and the intent is to protect personnel. They need hostile act, hostile intent. If they saw that individual, id argue that they'd have no quarrels with engaging. but given their distance, and the surrounding, there would have been collateral damage.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: Based on the RoE, you don't think matching the description is enough to engage based on the volume of people that match. you would also need Hostile act or Hostile Intent? Do you feel like any individual in 2/1 would be able to act, based on that criteria?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Even with the description with that suicide bomber. If i had been behind that sniper rifle and seen that, I would not have engaged because it is too common.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Are you sniper trained?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. In 2011-2013 I was a sniper team leader. I started as assistant team leader and helped plan operations. A few months later I got my own team. I went to school twice and did not complete. Then I deployed as a team leader. When I came back, I took over as the platoon sergeant for the sniper platoon.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. C1: Did the snipers ever ask (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or others for authority to engage a target?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: If you were a Marine on the ground, you've been trained on RoE, it seems to me that you'd have the authority to engage a target if they had positive ID and hostile intent, is that accurate?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: Why would a sniper make a request to engage if they had PID and met the RoE?

(2) Answer. My guess is that it presents a dilemma. You can understand the RoE but you have to know the target and what lies beyond. If I shot, it would go through my targets and at least several others. Given the landscape and the situation, I personally would not have engaged without hostile act/intent or seeing a device that I thought indicated an SVEST.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: But engaging just because of a BOLO description would not be enough?

(2) Answer. No, sir, it's not.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: How often were you at the Sniper tower? What did you see?

(2) Answer. I was at the sniper tower a few times. A sea of people. I would ask (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) how he and his Marines were doing. He spoke to me about engagement criteria in regard to seeing some of the Taliban and what they were doing to civilians. I told him that if you had hostile act and hostile intent, no one would question you if you had those things as a threat to you or Service Members on the ground.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. C1: Did you know the sniper structure that was in place at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. The times that I went there, the RTO was normally at the bottom of the steps. That would rotate. When I was there it was a black guy. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was always in the tower; he was the team leader. Then his ATL would be up there and another Marine resting. It looked to me like they kept three in the tower, and three resting. That comprised the six members of the team. That was a few days before the blast.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. C1: Who else do you remember on the sniper team?

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(2) Answer. I did not know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) until the incident. I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the platoon sergeant (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the mortarman. I didn't really talk to or know the other guys.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: Who was the RTO for the Sniper Team?

(2) Answer. From talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was told that it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), but from when I went to the tower it seemed to be a rotation. The RTO was supposed to ensure clear communications from the tower and the CoC.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember reports from the Sniper Teams?

(2) Answer. I know that they would pass intel, and then some pictures. I remember some reports of a Taliban red team, who were supposed to be their bad guys. I would see the picture, but a lot of reporting was just on Taliban activity.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: Do you remember any pictures about a potential bomber?

(2) Answer. No, sir. They would have passed that info to me. Nothing that they sent back really stood out.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. C1: Would it make sense to you to pass pictures of a bomber to the (b)(1)1.4a team?

(2) Answer. No.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. C1: Did the (b)(1) 1.4a understand the threat on ground?

(2) Answer. I remember the morning of the 26th, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) briefing the (b)(1) 1.4a and others, including the EOD Tech (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about the current threat streams we had heard about for the weak. They emphasized hard targeting. Nothing stood out, but I got a sense that whatever threat was coming down felt like it was getting closer. I think every person in the room understood we were trying to still help American citizens. BGen Sullivan said it that morning. I remember him saying "I acknowledge the threat, I understand the risk, but we need to get Americans

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out". I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the (b)(6) did the best they could, but you can only mitigate risk. You can't eradicate it.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. C1: You feel that the leaders were taking steps to protect Marines and ensure their safety?

(2) Answer. I feel that the leaders did everything they could to protect the personnel on the ground and create a buffer in the event of the threat. A buffer would include dispersion in the search area, ensuring that medical personnel were at Abbey Gate proper in a covered position, ensuring that (b)(1)1.4g were in place, hearing over the radio that they would stop operations and get behind cover. Given the amount of personnel in the canal, us being the only gate open, I don't think you could do anything else other than close the gate completely.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. C1: Why not close the gate?

(2) Answer. There were blue passports, which were American Citizens, being held in the air, and citizens from other countries that we could see that still needed to get out. I think it manifested one of the reasons we all joined the service, to be part of something greater. What greater calling to go to combat than to save Americans. You could close the gate and not save Americans or risk your life and save Americans. I know that's what I signed up for. That's why BGen Sullivan accepted that risk.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. C1: There have been reports that some individuals thought the chain of command didn't look out for them, what are your thoughts?

(2) Answer. I don't know how any Marine could come to that conclusion. If I had to guess, I would say there is always some confusion between the boots on ground and the decision makers. I had the same confusion as junior Marine being told what to do. Having been exposed to the JOC and the CoC I think the (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) mitigated risk to allow Marines to do their jobs with the equipment and information they had. I would refute that.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think it would bother some Marines to hear discussion of that?

(2) Answer. I think everyone is entitled to their opinion, especially if they have served. But people can have opinions without the full scope of the things around them.

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I'm sure half the Marines on the ground don't know that shock trauma was moved, or that (b)(1)1.4g were put in place to protect them. That's part of combat, and the fog of war. The higher you get up the more understanding you have, and your blinders are focused on other things. But to say that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) neglected the troops, I couldn't get behind that at all. I heard them discussing those things.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. C1: What area at the gate offers the most physical protection?

(2) Answer. Behind the main gate. Outside of the gate you are exposed at every angle.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think the sniper towers offered protection?

(2) Answer. They were probably the most protected. The (b)(1)1.4d operated the towers beforehand. The glass was thick ballistic glass. That actually stood out to me. When I was up there, I thought about how well protected it was. That's why when I first found out (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was injured, I couldn't understand how he was injured because I expected him to be in the tower.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. C1: Do you know where he was?

(2) Answer. From what I understand now, out of there tower. Somewhere in vicinity of the gate door.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. C1: What is standard operating procedure for who should be on watch for the snipers at any given time?

(2) Answer. Bare minimum would be shooter, spotter, and radio operator.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. C1: How do you think I can get any photos that the snipers took of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. I think all the photos that were taken that I saw matched the general description of 15-20 other individuals in the crowd. The description would be null and void unless there was also hostile act, hostile intent, or some type of wiring and device. Given that it was a suicide vest, that would match hostile.

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yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think they would have been right to take out every person that matched that description?

(2) Answer. No sir, they would have got in trouble.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. C1: Anything else that you think would be important for us to understand?

(2) Answer. Not really, sir. I think that the (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had an Ops huddle every day and we talked about threats and changes that the (b)(6) wanted to implement for force posture. He was adamant about Marines personnel actions to view those actions.

aa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. C1: How often are (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the gate?

(2) Answer. Multiple times every day. They cared more than any other leaders that I have known in my twenty years. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SAPI plate was ripped off when civilians flooded the airfield. I don't know if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) slept more than two hours the whole time we were out there because they were working the whole time. They were assuming the same risks as the Service Members, I assumed they were killed in the blast until I heard (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the radio. I still thought the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was dead until I heard him giving orders to the commanders to move their personnel around for force posture. I remember them asking him if the RoE changed after the blast, and I remember him telling the commanders that they always had the inherent right to protect themselves.

bb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. C1: Do you have any knowledge of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) saying "I don't know" when asked for engagement authority of a positive identification?

(2) Answer. I have been with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) since he was a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He has always been a very engaged and direct leader, so that doesn't sound anything like him.

cc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever receive a question or request for engagement authority?

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(2) Answer. On August 26th, immediately after I saw the blast on the drone (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) notified the CoC that there was a mass casualty on the radio. After that there was a pause, and I heard (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) giving directions to the Company Commanders on casualty evacuation and security. A few Commanders asked the CoC "has the RoE changed?" At the time the (b)(6) came into our CoC, and I looked at him and he told me that the RoE had not changed. I repeated that same information through the radio. Before that, I had never received any requests to engage a positive ID.

dd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Was that footage of the actual blast or immediately following? We haven't seen that.

(2) Answer. I can't entirely recall; it may just have been the footage immediately following the blast. I know I was in the CoC watching drone footage, I remember seeing scattered personnel and someone on a stretcher.

ee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From your perspective, could anything else tactically have been done to prevent this?

(2) Answer. Only closing the gate, which would have meant we weren't doing the mission we came to do.

ff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever witness or hear about an IED test or rehearsal around the 21st or the 22nd? Or two individuals suspicious around that time frame?

(2) Answer. I have never heard of that, sir. It was like being at a concert, sir, you couldn't see that. The (b)(6) took recommendations from the commanders on ground and did all that they could to protect the troops and allow them to complete the mission.

gg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was it your understanding that the RoE were different at other gates or the same across the board?

(2) Answer. I don't know what RoE 1/8 had, but I would assume that since we fell under 24th MEU it was the same RoE we had been under the whole time, since we were in (b)(1)1.4a I think the Marines understood and understood that engaging Taliban outside the gate would have made it impossible to complete the mission.

hh. Question and Answer 59.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said that you briefed the (b)(1)1.4a on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No, the (b)(6) briefed everyone involved with operations that day. Knauss stayed after and spoke with the (b)(6) about what messaging would go over the speaker. I don't think they discussed force posture; I think it was just their job.

ii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many threat streams would you estimate a day?

(2) Answer. More than I could count. The ones that stuck out were Taliban releasing prisoners, ISIS-K planning an attack on HKIA, a VBIED threat at North Gate, an SVEST threat at Abbey Gate. That's why we tried to create buffers and protect the troops. Otherwise, it was just bomb threats. I know on the 26th, multiple times, the (b)(6) or the colonel came on the net to stop operations and do some hard targeting, to get behind cover and not expose themselves to threats.

jj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You remember seeing pictures, how did you receive them?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would bring them back on his toughbook. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I would look at their reports. They kept talking about a redteam, but the pictures I saw of those guys were more equipped than the normal Taliban. They had modern weapons and plate carriers; they looked like they robbed a depot. Thats all that stood out to me. The threat of a guy with an SVEST was a description of the majority of people in the personnel.

kk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) About how many pictures would you see a day?

(2) Answer: Every time they brought a report, I would check it out. I would say they came in periodically; it wasn't a set schedule.

ll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know if those pictures were preserved or if they were destroyed? Who do you think would have them?

(2) Answer. I don't have any information, but I don't think they would be destroyed even when we left. If I had to guess, the sniper team might still have them in their toughbook. As a sniper team leader, I would have to make sure I had a back-up. If not, the S2. I don't think they would delete those files.

mm. Question and Answer 64.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Your conversation with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the sniper tower in the days before the blast, could you give some context on that?

(2) Answer. I went up to ask him how he was doing, and he asked me if he could engage personnel, I told him that no one would second guess you if they had hostile act, and hostile intent. I told him that he was the person on the gun and acting with the commander's intent, and that was about all.

nn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. C1: How would you characterize the leadership of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I never worked with him in an extensive capacity. He was very outspoken as a leader. He was very process oriented. I have never heard any bad things about him. Personalities will always bump heads, but I have never heard him called a bad leader. He would voice concerns about his Marines to the (b)(6) in a way that would let the (b)(6) make adjustments. I have never been privy to a conversation between him where he said that he felt unsafe or like he wasn't getting the equipment he needed.

oo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. C1: There was a decision during the shift change between Golf and Echo Company to adjust the lines and collapse from the foot bridge to the base of the Sniper Tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assessed that, due to the crowd surge, that Marines were at risk of being isolated. He decided to collapse to the sniper tower to mitigate threat, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

pp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. C1: How did people stand out in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Every day I was out there I saw passports. Whether it was American or other countries, I saw them holding them so we could identify them and pull them out of the crowd. Some individuals were holding signs to standout, but the passport was the biggest way to spot an American.

qq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. C1: Do you think the bomber was identified prior to the blast? Some have said they had the opportunity to remove that threat prior to the blast because they had him in their sights, do you think that's possible?

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(2) Answer. I can't give you a yes or no answer, there's other factors you need. The threat streams weren't clear, there were too many similar targets and packs to identify a target in the crowd. Even if you could, you still need hostile act and hostile intent. You could only see that if you saw an SVEST or a hostile act.

rr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. C1: What would have happened if they had taken out the bomber?

(2) Answer. I think there are two scenarios. I think that if he was 100% identified, and he engaged, I think there is a high probability of collateral damage, meaning the round would go through that individual and hit multiple civilians. The next scenario is engaging and killing the target, but there is a dead man's switch or a remote device. Theres too many possibilities to layout. If he had engaged, maybe you hit the bomber. Or maybe you shoot the guy who's not the bomber. Then you have to explain killing a civilian that is trying to evacuate. A potential US citizen. A service member killing a us citizen is the opposite of what we are trying to do.

ss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. C1: Anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) now. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to different countries. The Marine Security Guard. Echo Companies company (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the radio operator in the CoC during the blast. The initial radio operator wasn't doing a good job, so I replaced him with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was very capable, intelligent, well liked. I don't know where he is at now. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the operations chief.

tt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. C1: Complex attack. Our findings found initially that it was not a complex attack. (b)(1)1.4d could and the 82nd Tower had an unaffected view and understood why it could look like a complex attack, when in reality it was the intersection of warning shots from three different elements creating the illusion of a complex attack. (b)(1)1.4d, marine recon, and a marine team all fired a few shots, but the unimpeded individuals refute a complex attack. Your thoughts on that?

(2) Answer. The only reports I got from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was single shots that they believed were sniper shots. I never got any reports that it was directed at them.

uu. Question and Answer 72.

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(1) Question. C1: The Snipers report rounds being fired at their tower and impacting the tower. Did you hear any reports of rounds at the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No, sir. After the blast, the only people on the radio were (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) directing his ground commanders, the JTAC requesting to take control of the drone. We told the JTAC no, what was he going to do with that sea of people? I didn't have that authority anyway.

vv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. C1: You believe not preventable at the tactical level?

(2) Answer. I 100% believe there was nothing else they could do.

ww. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. C1: What have you seen on social media?

(2) Answer. Just sporadic pieces of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony to congress. Other than that, zero. I disagreed with some of that. I disagree that he requested to engage a target, because I was in the CoC the majority of the time, especially when things were happening. I disagreed with him saying that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said "I don't know". I don't think that's something that he would say. Third, he said that things weren't done to mitigate risk and that people weren't listening to them. I heard their reports and passed their information along. The description of the suicide bomber was just too vague.

xx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. C1: Did you think it was odd he was requesting engagement authority for someone that failed to meet the threshold of RoE? Just a visual description without hostile act and hostile intent.

(2) Answer. At no time, while I manned the CoC, which was more than 12 hours a day, did I get a request from snipers to engage. And that would have been odd to me if they had PID and hostile intent, or to engage if they didn't have those criteria.

yy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. C1: Contact info?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

zz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. C1: Did you interact with any (b)(1)1.4a on the 26th?

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(2) Answer. I interacted with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) post blast because he was looking for SSG Knauss' equipment, and to direct him to Echo company to find that equipment. At no other time did he come to interact in our CoC. That morning, SSG Knauss was in there, as I mentioned. He spoke with the (b)(6), I think talking about what they would say on the speaker to calm the crowd. After the blast, I do think I saw a driver that was injured, but I didn't talk to him.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
L. G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on question 1 and ends on question 77. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be true. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

12 Oct 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

12 OCT 2023
DATE

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~~CUI~~

Exhibit S025

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 13 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 13 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. In the event of two interviewers, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your billet with 2/1?

(2) Answer. I was the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Since coming back, where have you been since?

(2) Answer. I was with 2/1 up until May 22. Since then I moved to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember when you arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We arrived 16 Aug really, really late at night. After midnight.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were your initial tasks as the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

(2) Answer. We arrived, got off the plane. I had done a site survey in June, so I knew where the JOC was. I remember taking the BN Leadership into that direction. Couldn't really see much. We found our way to the JOC and found the MEU (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He gave us a description of what was happening with the movement. He said there was a breach, Afghans were occupying an aircraft and he wanted us to place our Marines to plug the gaps. It was Echo Company with us and 1st Platton leadership. They didn't come into the JOC. They found their tasking for whatever it was. After that we scrambled to find an office to set up our COC. Those were our actions for the next several hours until the sun came up.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The JOC was on North HKIA?

(2) Answer. Yes.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): From that point what was your section doing?

(2) Answer. We set up our COC adjacent to the JOC. We had live feeds in our COC and got lucky to get a good map of HKIA. Set up comms so we can talk with units on the deck. It was very surreal looking at the live feeds and seeing the hoards of people, like World War Z, coming across the tarmac. I remember Echo Company saying it was getting heavy and we needed more people. They were out there for a good 24 hours managing the hoard of people.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Where were the live feeds coming from?

(2) Answer. I think ISR from the air providing that. We had one screen from ISR giving live feeds of the tarmac. Another one was a (b)(1)1.4g showing the North Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there no (b)(1)1.4g or CCTV down by Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No, I don't remember any.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were you doing next? This is still on the 16th during daylight hours.

(2) Answer. My CO and (b)(6) went out to the tarmac. There were calls in the building to send available personnel to the tarmac. I went out with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and left (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the COC to manage it. I went out to see what was going on and it was chaos. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) trying to figure out what we need to do. I was out there for 6 hours, we finally were able to push the Afghans south off of the tarmac. It was a shit show. We would push them successfully, until a gap opens up, then 1, 2, 3 Afghans would start flowing through the gap. We couldn't keep this up. I tried to get water and MREs to give to Afghans hoping it would calm them down. **Showing pictures**. Eventually we were able to clear the tarmac. After those 6 hours myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back to the COC.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is this the day the Afghans were holding onto the military aircraft and falling off?

(2) Answer. Yes it was. That was a bizarre moment. It was like time paused. You saw Afghans sitting on the wheel well as it took off. We saw two humans fall off the C130. The bodies did make it to us. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted to move the bodies off the tarmac and to the terminal, and we did that. We wanted to show respect to the Afghans.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What happens when you got back to the COC?

(2) Answer. Not really sure. I started making my notes on 18 Aug. I only slept 6 hours in the last 36 hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is that the same for your Marines?

(2) Answer. I consider myself lucky. Echo Company hadn't slept at all. When the first element of Golf Company showed up we were able to start cycling people. Not sure if this was on the 18th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your focus after you get security set, prior to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. My focus I was checking flights. At about 2030 on the 18th, the (b)(6) was working a new plan on what we were going to be doing. I believe this was a tasker coming down where we were going to take (b)(1)1.4d We didn't want to do that and we had pushed back. Eventually it did not happen. Not sure who made the decision to not to do it. Earlier, the JOC floor told me to have my boss download WhatsApp and contact Taliban leadership. This was probably on the 16th or 17th. We didn't. (b)(5) (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6) We also were getting calls from people/friends back in the States requesting help to pull specific Afghans.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you're working a variety of tasks prior to establishing Abbey Gate, moving from fire to fire?

(2) Answer. Yes Sir. I'm running around, looking at flight trackers identifying Afghan personnel to place on the flights.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What kind of guidance did you receive from the JOC or DoS regarding documents needed for Afghans to evacuate?

(2) Answer. It changed. First it was AMCITS, then it was visa holders, then green card holders. I heard the DoS say they have no solution in the JOC. They were working through all sorts of friction, and they didn't have any idea on what to do either. I wrote this down on the 20th. People were also destroying sensitive equipment, shredding papers, things that were there. We were also stealing vehicles from each other at this point. On the 20th in the afternoon, things have settled into a battle rhythm now. Actions are not as kinetic. I was able to sit back, listen, and work issues as they come.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Define the first day that was not kinetic?

(2) Answer. I think what I meant is that we finally have an idea of what we are supposed to be doing. We knew we were pulling Afghans for processing with DoS, plugging the gaps. There was some sense of order and some processes established.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Moving back to the 19th, what were you doing then?

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(2) Answer. On the 19th, I was running the COC floor. A major from the JOC came down and requested to pull forces from us. I told him no, you need to talk to my CO and (b)(6) as we were attempting to secure Abbey Gate.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) By the morning on the 19th, 2/1's priority was establishing Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It was happening then. That's where our focus was and where we were moving into.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At this time your COC is established and your battle tracking is occurring?

(2) Answer. Yes. On the 20th is when things started to go into a battle rhythm.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What comms were at the gate?

(2) Answer. Green gear (radios), WhatsApp, and Signal.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you use most frequently?

(2) Answer. We used green gear mostly. Most of the information from Abbey Gate came from the tactical radio. WhatsApp was a communication tool, but I don't believe that was our primary comms at all.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you log in radio traffic as reports came in?

(2) Answer. I think we had a log book. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) always made sure the yellow canaries were kept. He would always review them at the end of the day. We had several chat rooms on SIPR. Anything pertinent we would roll over to the JOC right next door. We had frequent communication with the JOC the entire time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or the S2A were always in our COC with us.

x. Question and Answer 23.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As they worked to establish the gate, what do you remember about any type of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. Verbally I remember talks of a potential suicide bomber.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you know when that started to make its way to you?

(2) Answer. I'm not exactly sure.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember where you would have heard these initial reports of a suicide bomber?

(2) Answer. No sir. To give you an idea, this is a quote I wrote down on 21 Aug from an intel report. It was really absurd. "An associate of a possible Kabul terrorist planned to possibly attack an unknown force in an unknown location." Absolutely not specific and no help at all.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there any daily/nightly syncs during which the intel officer would push threat streams?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. In the morning and evening in BUBs. The team would go around and provide updates. I do think we were getting saturated in the JOC, so we brought our leadership back to help out with the COC.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As you're in the updates, would that information get pushed to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. Either me or the (b)(6) talking to the Company Commander on the deck, or over tactical radio or WhatsApp directly to the guys at Abbey Gate. The commanders would come daily to download what the COC was tracking.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often did you go to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I went a few times. I went on the 24th to see where the gaps were to inform our barrier plan and make it better. We also worked through a plan on locking up

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the gate when we went to leave, so it didn't trigger the Afghans and create another hoard to rush the tarmac.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was the barrier plan for the Marines for protection or to enable the gate closure?

(2) Answer. Both. I went out on the 22nd and 24th to look at set up and inform the plan. I never went out there after the blast.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you went out there on the 22nd, do you remember what it looked like?

(2) Answer. It looked like a scene from the Children of Men. Displaced families everywhere, sleeping on cardboard, family eating MREs, a young girl being fed by a spoon, families sleeping in vehicles. C-Wire everywhere, vehicles were speeding all over the place. It was a miracle there wasn't an accident.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you went out to the gate, do you remember anything about threats, or changes to the threat reporting?

(2) Answer. No I don't. I remember the snipers at Abbey Gate zeroed in on one guy at the gate. He looked like a villain out of a Star Wars movie. He was wearing all black, trimmed beard, acting very calmly "as a Hindu cow." I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the COC looking at him. He said if that guy does anything fishy then drop him.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did the snipers pass the intel?

(2) Answer. They physically brought a photo into the COC to show us.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When the CO was shown this photo, he said if this guy makes any kind of move then drop him?

(2) Answer. Yes. He verbatim said, "you drop him."

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was it clear to everybody?

(2) Answer. Yes. I think it was clear to everybody in the room.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was ROE at this point, was it SROE?

(2) Answer. I believe that's fair. I'm not sure. Our battalion was directed to not do warning shots.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): For this individual, in order to fire on this guy he had to show hostile act/hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Yes. But I don't believe he did.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What did you hear from the COC on various or specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. I don't remember a description, who it was, what to look out for. I don't remember where I heard this, but I heard that the individual was there a day or two prior to the IED and there was concern about children being casualties and the person left.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): The same individual?

(2) Answer. No. The snipers came to the COC, we were shown the picture (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave his guidance, and that was it. I don't know if that was the guy. The guy never came back up again.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you know where the guy was located at the gate?

(2) Answer. *Orienting on the map* I'm not sure where he would have been sitting. I can't tell from the angle of the photo shown.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): As best you recall, what other guys stood out?

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(2) Answer. There was one other guy. Two days prior to the incident. *Showing picture*. I zoomed in on the picture and saw this guy. He was not the one we saw prior that looked like the Star Wars villain. He was by himself and had a backpack on his front. I first saw him back in Aug 23 as I was looking through the photos from back then.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you remember any request to engage targets?

(2) Answer. I do not remember that happening. I don't remember the report coming in and requesting to engage anybody. I was in the COC or sleeping in the COC.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember any discussion/requests about ROE and engaging anyone?

(2) Answer. No sir I don't remember any talks about requesting to engage,

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How often were the CO and (b)(6) at the gate?

(2) Answer. Daily. They were out there regularly.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When they came back, did they bring you back any info about force protection?

(2) Answer. They might have but I don't remember.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there any discussion at the BUB about increasing force protection, or how to improve?

(2) Answer. Yes. I remember that (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) did have a conference with Taliban leadership in person talking about a security plan. I was not there. The Taliban was interested in how the security plan would work out. There was concern about engagements between us and the Taliban to ensure it did not happen.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you went out on the 24th did you have concerns about force protection or how the Marines were operating?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I thought it would be easy for someone to come in and blow this up

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): On the 24th, what did it look like? Did it look different from the 22nd?

(2) Answer. I think over time the crowds just got larger and larger. We could see them on the ISR feed and the crowds were getting bigger. Interestingly, as we let people in to get processed, it took so much time that some Afghans got frustrated and decided to leave.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why do you think that was?

(2) Answer. I think the DoS was not very clear on what they wanted. First it was AMCITS, then visa holders, then green cards. I spoke to a man named (b)(6) from DoS who said that they were doing their best to get AMCITS out. This was at Abbey Gate. He was out by the chevron with me. However they were not always out there. There were times that they were not available. The DoS reps were not around, would be unavailable, or there was no rep in the JOC.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else regarding threat streams regarding a suicide attack, VBIED, complex attack? Anything more credible or more specific that you may have heard?

(2) Answer. We thought maybe a VBIED at the North Gate. We had to cancel flights for two reasons. The tarmac was a problem, and the possibility of rockets shooting planes as they arrive/depart. This was prior to the 26th. On 21 Aug around noon I wrote, "waiting for ISIS-K to show up and blow up the North Gate, maybe a rocket attack on a plane if we fly again." Not sure why I wrote that. Maybe something I heard being talked about.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Could that be because flights were not taking off because of the intermediate staging bases being full?

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(2) Answer. I did write that down 21 Aug. **Reading from his journal** "Afghans outside for days now. We stopped taking them in b/c all flights have stopped." I remember running around to get camo nets for the Afghans. "We were told not to push any more AMCITs. Other nations like Germany had full reign to pull out their people. Germans had 1000 seats open yesterday. We could have pulled AMCITS/SIVs and put our people on it, but the DoS said too many to process. (b)(1)1.4d

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)...Was there a time when you started to get into the 22nd-25th when he interacted with Marines/snipers?

(2) Answer. I don't remember him ever going to Abbey Gate. He would run the watch floor while I was sleeping. He slept most of night.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got out to Abbey Gate to assess, did you interact with Marines on the ground or the snipers to reemphasize ROE and intel threats you received at the COC?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. I specifically remember more telling them to get some sleep and put their cameras/phones down. I remember telling (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you're the man in charge here. I was more concerned with Marines staying off their phones and getting rest.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever go into the sniper tower?

(2) Answer. No sir.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the day of the 26th, was there anything you remember leading up to the attack that may have been out of the ordinary?

(2) Answer. No sir I don't. When the attack came I remember it being a surprise. When it came I remember it being like, well, here it is. I have a gap in my notes from the 23rd where I was talking about going with the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to Abbey Gate and when I talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from DoS. We had some blue on blue on the north side between the Marines and NSU. Later that evening I wrote it's been an uneventful day. And then my next entry is on the 26th, post blast. **Reading from journal** "We lost 11 Marines to a blast. Possibly a suicide attack." On the 27th I wrote we had our fallen angel ceremony.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 26th, were you tracking when it was going to be closed?

(2) Answer. I don't remember when, I remember discussions that it was going to close in the coming days. I was told an Army unit would take control when we were going to leave. After the attack I believe it fully closed.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any ISR of Abbey Gate prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. It looks like it has the all the other days while were on Abbey Gate. Pulling AMCITS out. The ISR was mainly on Abbey Gate.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How were you notified of the blast on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It came over green gear to my radio operator. He came in and said there was an attack/explosion at Abbey Gate. Everyone's eyes turned to the ISR feed to see what was happening. I immediately ran into the JOC, said, "Attention in the JOC, there has been an attack at Abbey Gate, we are working the situation," and ran back to the COC.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was the ISR on Abbey Gate at the time of the explosion?

(2) Answer. Yes sir. However the ISR was offset from the location of the explosion, so we didn't actually see the explosion.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see any gunfire on the ISR Feed?

(2) Answer. No sir. I don't know if I'd be able to see it or not.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear any reports about gunfire?

(2) Answer. There was talk there was possible gunfire coming from the top of that far side canal wall. I don't think that was true. I think somebody may have made a mistake. I don't think it was a complex attack, just an IED.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So Marines were saying they were shot, why do you think they said that then?

(2) Answer. It could have been blue on blue. I'm not sure why. I really don't know and I would just be speculating. The end state was there were no shots fired. Not sure what the Taliban was doing either at this point.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is there anything else about the attack that sticks out to you?

(2) Answer. No sir. When it happened it did feel like it was a surprise. We were told verbally ISIS-K could potentially conduct a suicide attack. But we kept hearing it and as you hear it more and more you get numb to it. At this point we got tired of hearing it because it was never coming, until it did.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You talked about using tactical radios as your primary means, as (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) were forward at most times, how much comms did you maintain with them (pushing/pulling information to/from COC and CO/ (b)(6)). Was it frequent comms?

(2) Answer. Yes. I believe so. Once we got into our rhythm I don't believe there was any real problem with comms between the COC and Abbey Gate. When battalion leadership went down to the gate they always had radio operators with them.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the surprise on the attack, was the COC at the battalion level, was there anything your team pulled intelligence wise through the days, bottom up, into the COC and your BN S2 shop analyzing, recording it, then took intel from higher, and then sit down with you, CO, (b)(6) and then just talk about things. Getting at building an intel picture and determining necessary actions at the gate?

(2) Answer. I don't think there was any breakdown of feeding us any intel from higher and getting it to troops on the deck. The reports they were getting up to us would be pushed where it needed to go. I'm not sure if the picture got up to the JOC

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What does your BUB look like?

(2) Answer. Last 12/24 hours, next 12/24 hours, hit the warfighting functions, then to the company leadership.

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ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you start to redeploy, what did you do with your equipment in the COC?

(2) Answer. We had our CAPE set sent there, but it got looted and we destroyed it. We mostly fell in on equipment that was there. We had SIPR and CENTRIX laptops. I believe we took them with us, but I did not leave with a computer.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about intel products, yellow canaries, what would have happened with all of that?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. It should have been shredded, but I can't remember.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you deal with any SD cards from the snipers?

(2) Answer. I don't remember any SD cards coming to the COC. I don't think it ever did. If it did I missed it. Not sure if any was passed to the S2.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who made the decision to destroy the intel?

(2) Answer. BGen Sullivan.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything you were told to preserve?

(2) Answer. Not that I can remember.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about the picture on the phone from the snipers?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. It was on one of the sniper's phones.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The past two years have you done any interviews or spoken out publicly about Abbey Gate?

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(2) Answer. Just with my wife and siblings. No social media or other media.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you read anything in the news regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Not really. I may read something. I did see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testimony. I do not remember what he said actually happening.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Specifically, what happening?

(2) Answer. That he requested to engage the target to the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) stating he couldn't authorize and he didn't know who could.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So the only conversation about this occurred in the COC?

(2) Answer. Yes. When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said drop him if he does anything. That's the only time I know of.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How often have you spoken with Marines from 2/1?

(2) Answer. About a year ago. They came here to do mountain training. We really didn't talk about the Abbey Gate explosion. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) actually contacted me in August. We exchanged a few texts but didn't discuss Abbey Gate.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else you wish to add?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I'm still irritated about having to police call the terminal before we had to leave.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever get a reason on why?

(2) Answer. No. I heard it was supposed to be functioning airport.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anyone else we need to talk to?

(2) Answer. I know you'll be talking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be good to talk to as he was in the COC when I wasn't. He possibly could fill in some gaps. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in (b)(6) He was one of our clerks. He actually assisted with the CASEVAC and was the first one to tell me how many KIAs we had. He was around in the COC and would be good to talk to. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out of the Marine Corps now, my memory of him was that he was scatterbrained the whole time. He was our other (b)(6) but he was all over the place. He's a great guy but might not provide clear accounting of what occurred. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his XO of weapons company. The XO seemed to know about what was going on over (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think his last name may be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 13 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 16. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

13 OCT 2023
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
ıre of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231013
DATE

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Exhibit S026

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 24 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 24 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be denoted by (b)(3)130b (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. <u>Question and Answer 1</u>.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As we are going through this, we are looking for your personal recollections. Not what you may have heard second hand. We understand this was two years ago and it was a hectic time. It is okay not to remember. When did you enter the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. (b)(6). I was in the reserve for 5 years before that, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I am an infantry officer. I got to 2/1 in October of 2018. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). I deployed with ADVON in March of 2021, so I had been with them for about 2.5 years at that point. I got back September 8, 2021 then checked in here at TBS in October, 2021.

c. <u>Question and Answer 2</u>.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you a staff platoon commander over there?

(2) Answer. I was sir. I checked into IOC in (b)(3)130b, (b) (6). October 2021-June 2022 I was a bull pen instructor, then I was and instructro from June to January, 2023.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What is your billet here?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b) (6)

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you receive notification you would be going to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We found out that Weapons Company was going via the (b)(6) on 14 August. We had heard initially from open source reporting on 12 August. I was at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d conducting a joint exercise with JAF and the Army. I was there from Aug 6th to the 14th. Then I flew from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d the I got to HKIA on the evening of the 18th. We had a layover in (b)(1)1.4d due to the flight crew.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were evacuees already flowing into Al Udeid at that time?

(2) Answer. They were. Mostly people who worked at the embassy or the airfield at the time.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who were you with on the 18th?

(2) Answer. Echo Company, 1st Platoon, the Shock Trauma Platoon, and the EOD team from the (b)(1) 1.4a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were present.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(6) What did you do when your arrived?

(2) Answer. When we left, we were receiving reports of the airfield in chaos. We got off that night, went to secure the plane and realized that was not required. I linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then the (b)(6). I made sure Echo Company was situated, they went to the gym, then I found Weapons Company who had been there for about approximately 6 hours.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who was with you in (b)(1)1.4d?

(2) Answer. Myself, the 81mm mortar platoon, and half the fire support coordination center.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive an ROE brief while you were there?

(2) Answer. No, sir. Not prior to entering HKIA. I know the company did some in Camp Buehring, but I was not there to receive that.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your understanding of the ROE as an infantry officer at the time?

(2) Answer. Myself and SSgt Hoover and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) briefed that self defense was authorized, Hostile Act, Hostile Intent, Positive identification, but other than that to treat individuals on the airfield as civilians. Other than that, I was worried about fires approval and the over the horizon strike cell in (b)(1)1.4d held approval for fires. I knew we could use battalion mortars in self-defense, we never made them fire capable at HKIA though.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So on the evening of the 18th, what was Weapons Company doing?

(2) Answer. For the first 24 hours we didn't get tasked with a gate. Part of the company was at the PAX terminal. After that, we went to part of Abbey Gate.

Pause in the conversation for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to describe the common shared lexicon of Abbey Gate ranging from the inner gate to the Barron Hotel.

Initially, Golf and Echo were tasked to hold the inner gate. The (b)(1)1.4d were at the Barron Hotel. As Golf cleared from inner to outer, then from outer to the Barron, Weapons Company took over the inner gate security. We weren't approving Battalion fires at the time, so the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) for the first two days in the main JOC until we realized that wasn't necessary. After that he used me kind of as a directed telescope at Abbey Gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So that brings us to the 20th or the 21st, what was that tasking like?

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(2) Answer. I kept count of the people we were processing. At the time the comfort areas inside of HKIA were overwhelmed. We didn't have the capacity. So there were times when only Abbey Gate or none of the gates were processing. The (b)(6) goal for me was to keep the battalion COC and JOC up to date with how many people we brought in. After the 22nd, it was about coordinating between the battalion and the companies.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you keep track?

(2) Answer. By speaking with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as well. I spoke to all of them. I couldn't tell you exactly how many now, but I would say a couple thousand every day.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you hearing any threat streams?

(2) Answer. Yes, our (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave his MLCOA when we arrived. We talked about VBIEDs, and gold Corrolas. We knew that if an attack came it would probably be ISIS, not the Taliban.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Due to the fact we were working with the Taliban? Did you hear about that at the time?

(2) Answer. I heard they were on the outskirts of the town when I got on deck on the 18th. The first time I saw them was when I was with Golf Company, the night the chevron was emplaced. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) do a KLE with the Taliban.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there any specific ROE regarding the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Only Hostile Act/ Hostile Intent toward US forces.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you at the gate?

(2) Answer. Probably 18-20 hours a day, except for the 24th. I was only down there for a couple hours until we got RIPd out. I was there with Golf Company, then we

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RIPd out with Echo Company on the 24th. It was Golf with Fox from the 20th-23rd. On the 23rd, they were RIPd out with Echo. Weapons was at the inner gate the whole time.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were the conditions at the gate?

(2) Answer. Extremely chaotic until it was cleared to the Barron Hotel. After that, it was controlled inside the gate. Outside in the canal area was always utter chaos. If the civilians thought they were being processed in some fashion they were calm, but if not the emotion of the crowd was overwhelming.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From the 20th-22nd who did you usually interact with?

(2) Answer. I'd say probably the company XOs the most, my peers. I was a captain as of 01Jul, but I went to IOC with all those guys. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) some, but he was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) The (b)(6) and the (b)(6) were down there pretty often, that's why I had initially been in the JOC. After I rotated down, he was mostly in the COC but the (b)(6) probably came once a day. I saw BGen Sullivan about 3 times, I don't think I ever saw MG Donahue or RADM Vasely.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much did you interact with (b)(6), the sniper team?

(2) Answer. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at least once a day in passing. They weren't the only (b)(6) team that was down there, our other snipers were at the inner gate. It was mostly just (b)(6) at Abbey Gate, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a good Marine. They were attached to Echo company at the time, but working for the battalion, being tasked through (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't interact with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) too much. We were friends, but not in an official capacity at the time.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you do from the 23rd-26th?

(2) Answer. Similar to what I was doing, but at that point we were less concerned with numbers and I had a system for the companies working the gate to report it. I was with Weapons in the inner gate sometimes, sometimes in the JOC trying to get DoS. Filling in where I was needed.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there a battle rhythm once the gate was established?

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(2) Answer. I don't think I could speak intelligently to that question at this point.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How about you personally for that 20-22nd time period, what was your battle rhythm?

(2) Answer. I was getting 3-4 hours a day until the 23rd, then I probably slept 11 hours straight. I was getting enough sleep to operate, I was able to get more sleep later so I guess we had a rhythm. I would rack out in the Weapons Co area we had by the cafeteria.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you getting into the COC or the JOC?

(2) Answer. Once or twice a day. Every day after I woke up, I would swing in and see any taskings for me or Weapons Company from the COC. I'd go to the JOC, see if there were any changes to fires authority. Then I would talk to my CO, go to the inner and outer gate, then do the reverse before I went to bed.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear about any threat streams in these touchpoints?

(2) Answer. There were IED threat streams every day that we were there. At times it was VBIEDs, at times suicide bombers. I would hear them in the JOC or from (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) in the Battalion COC.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any specific threat streams?

(2) Answer. On the 26th or the night of the 25th we received a picture or description of the person thought to be the bomber.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where did that description come from?

(2) Answer. From (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was grainy, pretty blurry. There was a blue background, a guy with a beard. Some kind of headdress. You could see major or knew the major features on the person.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would it have been enough to pick him out in a crowd of thousand of Afghans?

(2) Answer. If you're asking if I think it was enough to identify a threat, I think it was enough to identify that we need to confirm if that was the person or not.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember where it came from?

(2) Answer. I only remember it coming from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time, it wasn't in my purview to ask if we had HUMINT, etc.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you say that was?

(2) Answer. Maybe the evening of the 25th, or the day of the 26th.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where were you at the time?

(2) Answer. In the COC, with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe. It's been a long time

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was that photo shared to the gates?

(2) Answer. I believe so. I didn't see anyone receive it. But when I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) they knew there was an IED threat at the gate, but we had IED threats at the gate the whole time we were there.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were Marines becoming de-sensitized to that threat?

(2) Answer. To an extent. I know around 1400 on the 26th there were imminent reports of an attack. When we got close to that we did what we could, got behind cover until a reasonable time had passed. There wasn't a great answer to an IED threat in that environment. Either we were there to physically keep the crowd back, or the crowd would overwhelm us and no one would have gotten processed.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay if you (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) received that photo what would you do?

(2) Answer. Share it with my company. Everything that I got, I know that everyone (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) like platoon commanders would have been shared.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How would you have shared that photo, did you have it on your phone?

(2) Answer. I never had it on my phone. It went through the S2 side. I am comfortable saying the threat stream made it down to the gate, especially any BOLOs. I am comfortable saying (b)(6) would have had any threat reporting given to the S2.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned one occasion where there was an imminent threat, were there any other occasions where leaders took similar actions?

(2) Answer. We took cover and halted processing any time there was an imminent threat. I can't speak to another specific time.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many times do you think that happened, where force posture needed to be adjusted like that?

(2) Answer. At a minimum, once or twice a day, posture had to be adjusted based on intel reporting and what we saw at the gates.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there times that you were at the gate that you saw the Marines receive intel? How would they receive that?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. Over Signal. Green gear wasn't working at the gate. I wasn't getting messages from the S2. The (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) doesn't have a tactical role outside of fires, so most of our units were tasked directly. Individual commanders were getting tasks from battalion, so any info I got, I got directly from the COC.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But you are confident that threat streams made it to the squad level?

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(2) Answer. I couldn't speak to that at the squad level. I know that company level was receiving those reports and taking actions that affected everyone down to the squad level.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From the 20th-26th, how much interaction did you have with (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Not too much. I didn't have an official capacity with them, it was just that I knew them personally. I went into the tower several times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They ever show you photos or suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I had no knowledge that they had identified any kind of threat until the attack had already occurred.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you learn that they had identified a threat or someone who matched the description of a possible attacker?

(2) Answer. It was a long time ago. Confidently, I can't give a time line. I know, confidently, that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me after the attack that (b)(6) had reported they had thought they had seen the person who matched the description we had received through intel. That's all that I could confidently say.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you had limited interaction with the snipers, and in your interactions they never showed you a photo or suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. No sir.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever speak with them about that after the fact?

(2) Answer. I never spoke with anyone from (b)(6) that told me that, just (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who told me about it.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who did you say was tasking sniper teams during the evacuation?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was getting his tasks directly from the (b)(6) to my knowledge. It was a slightly weird dynamic. I know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was handling reporting and taskings.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were they tasked to do?

(2) Answer. Observe, report, and conduct overwatch.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were they tasked to pull people out and assist with processing?

(2) Answer. They were not tasked to do that directly. I know that it is something that everyone there did, however.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often were you doing that?

(2) Answer. Pretty much the whole 25th and the 26th. Something we noticed, specifically at the jersey barrier, until the 25th, Echo had cleared all the way to the footbridge (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided to collapse to the jersey barrier the night of the 25th to decrease our exterior footprint. The day of the 26th, the crowd was getting anxious because they were watching the news, so people were pushing themselves to heat exhaustion and injury. I realized that people recognized (b)(6) rank as someone with authority, so most of the 26th I was on the jersey barrier because I knew they would listen to me if I told them to sit down and wait to be processed.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on the 25th and the 26th?

(2) Answer. I don't know about the 25th, absolutely on the 26th. They were there when the attack happened. They were there multiple times throughout our time at Abbey Gate.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever see the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) go into the tower on the 26th?

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(2) Answer. No, sir I never saw them go on that occasion. I had seen them talk to the snipers on multiple occasions prior to the 26th, but not on the 26th. I know they had interactions with (b)(6) It was certainly at the tower, but I don't know if it was in the tower. I know that I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) outside the tower at some point throughout the week.

I am not confident they went in the tower prior, but I didn't see them talk at all on the 26th.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(6) Do you remember any IED test run or an occasion that EOD had to be called to the gate?

(2) Answer. Sir, I was just inside the outer gate where we would do additional searches before going to inner gate where they would be processed be CAT red. I was there when a black pack got tossed over the wall. We treated it like an IED. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) called someone to look at it. I don't remember more details than that.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what was in the bag?

(1) Answer. If I recall correctly, the assumption was that it was someone trying to toss something over to children. I think it was children's clothes or toys, but I don't know. It was a long time ago.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever interact or coordinate with the Taliban?

(2) Answer. There were times that we were in close proximity. At most it was a handwave or gestures to get people over, but never a conversation.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you witness the Taliban kill anyone?

(2) Answer. No, sir, I did not witness it. I did hear gunshots on the far side of the chevron, I heard stories from the evacuees, and saw bruises and welts on evacuees. It was consistent and enough to notice, but I didn't every see the Taliban execute anyone.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did any Marine ever tell you that they witnessed the Taliban execute civilians?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I heard stories from North Gate, some guys from 1/8. I didn't witness that, but no Marines around me or under me told me anything like that.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Up to the attack, was there ever a time where you felt like you could have engaged under the ROE?

(2) Answer. No, sir. If there had been, then I would have.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was there ever an occasion where you were unsure that you or your Marines could engage someone, so you would have needed to request guidance from higher?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) To your knowledge did the ROE change during the NEO?

(2) Answer. After the blast, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did. Throughout the preceding week, we had a problem with people climbing the fences especially on the inner side of the Abbey Gate. (b)(6) and our gun truck saw that multiple times, and we didn't engage. After the blast, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us give them one warning, then engage. Up until the blast, the ROE was the standard, defensive ROE.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 26th, other than the 1400 threat, do you remember any other specific threats?

(2) Answer. No, sir. Just having that description of the person and that he would detonate around 1400. We took appropriate action. Other than that, it was just the same consistent threat streams.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone on the 26th identify a suspicious individual or someone who matched a BOLO?

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(2) Answer. Throughout our time there, every Marine saw suspicious individuals that they watched. No one ever pointed out someone suspicious to me. I didn't ever see anyone act outside of the baseline.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have any interactions with any (b)(6) or SOF?

(2) Answer. Throughout, from multiple countries. They would come grab their target, but we didn't do anything other than help them pull people out of the canal.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone besides your chain of command pass intel to you?

(2) Answer. About threat streams? No, sir. The only thing we would get outside the chain of command would be pictures of people or signs they were trying to extract. They wouldn't show us threats.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned that at some point Echo Company cleared out to the footbridge, did you ever go out there? What did that look like for the Service Members with the crowd?

(2) Answer. It looked different at different times. (b)(1)1.4d and foreign militaries were along that wall a lot of the time. Marines set up a barrier with riot shields by the footbridge. Everywhere that service members were, the crowds would form. About 30 or 40 meters passed that, the crowds would thin out.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many Marines would you say were out that far?

(2) Answer. I would say it varied by time of day. At night there were less civilians. A couple hours after sunrise, more would show up. We mimicked that. I would say there was up to a squad maintaining that riot shield wall, then a platoon to two platoons outside the jersey barrier. Upwards of 30-60 Marines, then foreign troops and (b)(1)1.4d as well.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you there for the RIP between Echo and Golf?

(2) Answer. No sir, I was at the JOC when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me about the RIP. I went out again around midnight to 0100 then again around 0800.

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ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were there any differences you noticed in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Every day, the crowds were getting less compliant as we approached the 31st.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any difference in crowd size that evening, the 25th into the 26th, did the crowd thin out?

(2) Answer. I don't think they did, at least not as significantly as usual.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Had Golf collapsed and the crowd formed at the jersey barrier by the time you got down there?

(2) Answer. Yes, sir. That jersey barrier was more appealing than wading through the canal.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Looking at this tactically as an infantry officer, if you knew the gate was being closed the next day, you had threat reporting of an attack, and the crowds were larger and more anxious, what do you think of that scenario tactically?

(2) Answer. I prefer not to Monday morning quarterback the decisions made. I think the individuals making the decisions thought that they were appropriate for the circumstance. Physical controls like jersey barriers were useful. Less of those were available further out, you would have had to use more Marines. Three Marines at the Jersey barrier could hold back the whole crowd. It would have taken more effort to hold back the crowd if the Marines hadn't collapsed.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The evening of the 25th into the 26th, you got back to the gate around midnight. Throughout that evening, into the next morning, were any adjustments to force pro made?

(2) Answer. Other than collapsing to the jersey barrier and the instance where we got off the wall and took cover, no sir.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you pulling people out of the crowd that night?

(2) Answer. No, sir.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see Marines take cover that evening?

(2) Answer. Possibly, sir. The nights get jumbled.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Can you speak to any noticeable changes to the crowd in size and demeanor on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It was one of the larger crowds we had seen. They were more agitated and less responsive to our commands. They were easier to excite, going from listening to us to pushing each other quickly.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you hear any timeline about gate closure?

(2) Answer. It kept getting pushed back. It was initially the evening of the 25th, then noon of the 26th, then 1800 on the 26th. My understanding was the (b)(1)1.4c needed us to keep the gate open to evacuate people through the outer corridor. Also, we were still pulling blue passports out of the crowd on the 26th. If we were going to be there, we were going to keep pulling people out.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the attitude of the Marines on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I think everyone was aware of the increase in the amount of threat reporting. Most of the Marines were focused on getting as many people out as possible. I think they all knew what they were doing, saving women and children. It was an important mission.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As a commander, looking at risk to force vs risk to mission, do you think you could have processed people if you pulled Marines into the gate?

(2) Answer. No, sir. We processed more people than any other gate. We had physical stand off with the inner and outer gate, then we had the canal to create a long

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space to pull people out of. The first couple of days, we only had the outer gate. Through those doors, you can only let a couple people through and you had no stand off. That was more concerning. Having physical controls and a larger area made it much easier.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you or any of the other Marines preparing to close the gate prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. I'd say the priority was getting people out prior to 1800. We had started clearing out our holding area in the outer corridor, in order to reduce our footprint. We had already done our link up for turnover with the 82nd at the inner and outer gate, we had pushed our fire plan sketch data to them. The engineers had started moving vehicles and concertina wire into place in the inner corridor. Some Weapons Company assets moved our sustainment gear back to our bivouac area.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the outer corridor, were any changes to force protection or improvements made on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Besides what we discussed about pulling people off the wall or collapsing back, no.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were any additional (b)(1)1.4g or snipers emplaced?

(2) Answer. We emplaced another (b)(1)1.4g I think right after we identified the black backpack. I can't speak to how many snipers were in each tower. I know we had two medium machine guns in overwatch at the inner gate. We had QRF ready and Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) on standby. We had an ambulance ready with personnel at the inner gate.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 26th, you were at the outer corridor all day? How about at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer. I was sir. A buddy of mine was sending me pictures of an interpreter the whole time we were there, and the interpreter made it to the canal on the 26th. It was just the men in the family who got there around 1430, so they were waiting for their women. Their women got there around 1730, Nikoui helped me pull them out of the canal. We walked them in and searched them. I was walking back from the inner gate when the bomb went off.

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dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We have a video from 10 minutes prior, from one of the (b)(1)1.4d guys. He pans from the Barron, past the jersey barrier. You can see 20-30 Marines by the jersey barrier, you're one of them?

(2) Answer. Most likely, yes sir.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Earlier you said 3 Marines could hold back the crowd. Why were there so many Marines that afternoon?

(2) Answer. They were from Golf, not my company. So I am not sure or questioning their actions. I think they were trying to get as many people out as possible. I think 2nd and 1st platoon had RIPd out a couple of hours earlier, so I know that some guys who were there weren't on duty to be there, like SSgt Hoover or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think they were just trying to get guys out.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out there that day?

(2) Answer. Several times, sir. I spoke to him a couple times. I know he spent a lot of time coordinating with the (b)(1)1.4d at the Barron Hotel.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How much time did he spend doing that?

(2) Answer. Unsure of the exact amount of time. Even when he wasn't there, the (b)(6) was always there. When (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there, he was around engaging with his subordinate leaders.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As far as you know, when he was at the Barron Hotel he was coordinating with the (b)(1) 1.4d

(2) Answer. As far as I know, sir.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So until 1730 you were at the wall, mostly searching for the female family members?

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(2) Answer. Mostly, sir. But as I mentioned people listened to rank. I spent a couple of hours on the wall. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at some point, who told me we were going until 1800. So then it was just looking for female family members and helping with crowd control.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No one stuck out to you as suspicious during that time?

(2) Answer. No individual that stood out to me more than the rest.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many total people were in the family you helped?

(2) Answer. Three men and a teenage boy, then three wives.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What did you do with them?

(2) Answer. I brought them to the holding area, searched them, then passed them off to some Marines from Weapons Company. Then I was walking back and the blast went off. I know they made it out.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We know the blast happened at 1736 and 52 seconds. About how far away from the blast were you?

(2) Answer. Less than 50 meters away. I was just inside the outer gate, walking back along the series of jersey barriers. Between 30-50meters.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you remember hearing or seeing?

(2) Answer. I grabbed my 152 and was going to give my report. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) beat me to the punch. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) start establishing security. Once I was sure security was being set, some guys and I moved and passed through the outer gate. I interacted with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He told me to set security and get the Marines. I didn't even realize he was wounded, that was right at the gate. He was shuffling at the time. We were hit by the cloud of CS gas and smoke right after that. I went out of the outer gate right after that.

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oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did that impact your ability to see and breathe by the inner gate?

(2) Answer. Absolutely sir. It got worse as you went further. I was probably the fourth guy through the hole in the fence. By the time I got near the canal wall, I remember another cloud of CS gas as I was working my way back to the jersey barriers. It stopped me momentarily. I couldn't breathe at all but forced myself to keep going.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) at any point of this movement?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing him near the inside of the gate. I think he was to the right of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but I did not speak to him.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You've made it through the initial hole in the fence, and work toward the jersey barriers. You get to the area where the wounded are, then what?

(2) Answer. The first wounded person I saw was SSgt Hoover. A Golf Company Marine got him on his feet. SSgt Hoover was a hell of a guy, he was incredible. Taylor was a big dude, so the Golf Company guy wasn't getting him there. I shook Hoover awake, we told him we needed to get him up. He woke up for a second, then he stood and coughed blood on my face. We got him up over our shoulders, then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came and got him the rest of the way.

I looked over and saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and some others cutting a hole on the fence from the inside. I threw a tourniquet on a Marine, Lopez I think, then worked on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I carried (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out. Then when I came back through it was mostly civilians.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was Hoover trying to walk or were you dragging him?

(2) Answer. He was trying to walk, but he was a big boy. We were mostly dragging him.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where did you put the tourniquet on the Marine you think was Lopez? How was he?

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(2) Answer. His leg, he was hemorrhaging from his leg. He was unconscious. Other Marines were also working on him.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After that was (b)(6) what injuries did he have?

(2) Answer. At first I thought he was just (b)(6) I shook him awake. He stood, then immediately face planted. (b)(6) (b)(6) then took his kit off and carried him in. Once I made it back out, it was mostly wounded civilians.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you treat civilians as well?

(2)Answer. We did. We got a decent number through before we collapsed back inside. It was a pretty horrendous scene.

Worth mentioning. One of the first things I heard was rounds from near the Barron Hotel. I remember sighting down my RCO that way and looking at a Taliban on the chevron who wasn't facing us. So it wasn't from them. We heard rounds over head, but it felt consistent with the single shots the (b)(1)1.4d had been firing the whole time. It was not automatic, and to me, highly unlikely it was from an AK.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long did it take you to reach the outer corridor?

(2) Answer. Maybe 60 seconds.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see any Marines firing their weapons?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I know there were Marines on security later, that made conscious decisions not to shoot. I know that when I was assisting in the evacuation, a Marine LCpl saw a guy standing on his cell phone. He and another Marine yelled and told him to stop. They were discussing what to do, that guy eventually sat down and got off his phone. The Marines didn't engage, they had good weapons discipline and were cognizant or the environment that we were in.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It took about 15 minutes to CASEVAC all the wounded US Forces?

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(2) Answer. Yes, sir. I was out there until the last service member was evacuated.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After you fell back to the inner corridor, what did you do?

(2) Answer. I linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who were the QRF and security at the inner gate. I talked to them, then sent them back to link up with their unit. Then I went back to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was being worked on by two corpsmen while talking on the radio. He handed me the radio, told me there would be a reaper overhead, and to get it killing things. But tasking of that asset was pushed to someone else.

At that time, Echo Company was pulling security away from the walls in case anything got tossed over. Golf Company was trying to re-task organize. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked like he was mentally impaired at that point. I had seen them previously. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had initially pulled security outside, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) discussed this with him and they eventually collapsed back inside the gate. I couldn't say exactly when that was.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When was the decision to pull security reversed, after the CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. I would say within 30 seconds of the initial decision. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) seemed mentally out of it. My guess is due to the proximity he was from the blast.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get any blast effects?

(2) Answer. I just remember thinking it was a loud flashbang. There was a little concussive force you could feel. (b)(6) (b)(6).

bbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you spoken to any media about this event?

(2) Answer. Not external to the Marine Corps, sir. For the 1-year anniversary, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Nothing official other than that.

ccccc. Question and Answer 106.

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ACCG-SR
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often do you consume social media or news regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I avoid it, sir. I avoid social media for the most part anyways. I am also somewhat concerned, that the longer I go from the event and the more I discuss with other people, it clouds my memory of what happened. Personally, it's just not something I enjoy thinking about, either.

I have this story I'd like to share, about when I was waiting for the females, LCpl Nikoui helped me pull those women out. After we pulled them out, he asked me how long we would keep doing this. I told him I don't know, but as long as we were there, we would keep helping people. He told me, "hell yeah," and smiled at me. That was approximately 15 minutes before the blast.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Are you aware of some of the Congressional proceedings regarding Abbey Gate? If so, where did you hear about that?

(2) Answer. People send it to me, sir. I saw the video of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) testifying to Congress.

eeeee. Question and Answer 108.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any thoughts on the validity of the statements he made? Specifically about identifying the bomber and requesting engagement authority. How likely is it that that conversation would happen between a Sgt and the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I think it is possible that a conversation between a (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and the (b)(6) could have occurred. If (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were at the gate, and they were. In the work up to the deployment, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did fairly regular sit-downs with the NCOs and tried to develop an environment where they could bring things to his attention. In an infantry battalion, you know who the good NCOs were, so if he had identified someone, it is possible that they would have brought the (b)(6) o the tower. It could have occurred. The first time I heard about that conversation, though, was in the interview with the HFAC.

I had heard, and I don't know if it was before or after the blast, in conversations with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that (b)(6) thought they had identified someone. So that was not news, but the conversation with the (b)(6) was first heard.

fffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What are your thoughts on the (b)(6)?

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(2) Answer. One of the most competent people I have ever worked with. Competent, composed. I will try to work as a company commander under him when he becomes a (b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the time you were a (b)(6) What was your relationship with other (b)(6) as well as the (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) and I had arrived at 2/1 at the same time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I knew each other really well. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I had deployed together. The relationship with (b)(6) across the board was good. I had been there the longest, and (b)(6) is the senior position. I was in charge, along with my CO, of training the fire support teams in the battalion. I had also spent six months as the (b)(6) (b)(6) I had a solid amount of interactions with the (b)(6).

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So what was your relationship with your (b)(6) as your Senior Rater?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) on the (b)(6) profile, since you brought it up, sir.

iiiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you spend much time with the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. Most of my development did not come from the (b)(6) (b)(6) I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) leveraged having a strong (b)(6) and senior company commanders to help run the battalion. Having strong leadership underneath, helped him to be more hands off. I will also say, when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) first showed up, I was the physical development officer for officer physical training. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) paired with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during our workouts and they came in second, which says something. That was impressive. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has a lot of good qualities.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned you get sent information about Abbey Gate, how often do you speak to members of 2/1 about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I would say pretty regularly, sir. I try not to let the focus of our relationship be that one 12 day period.

kkkkk. Question and Answer 114.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) learned about the terms PIG and HOG. I understand that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a PIG. In regards to the interactions between the (b)(6) (b)(6) would the (b)(6) talk to a PIG instead of the team leader who is a HOG?

(2) Answer. I can't speak to that, sir. The only thing that would make that portion of it make sense. Is if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't there or they were both speaking and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) jumped in. I know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran a tight ship, so if he was there, he would have at least started that conversation.

I didn't know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that well. He came from Echo Company about 4-6 months before we left. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) well. If he was there, he would have had been involved in that conversation. That's all I can speak to for certainty.

llll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From where you sat, do you think that your team thought tactically in designing the layout of Abbey Gate and how you changed your posture? Or was it viewed more procedurally to pull people out?

(2) Answer. I think our main focus was on getting people out, not on running a perimeter defense.

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. No, sir. I think the Marines did an excellent job of understanding their environment and the mission they were there for. They did an excellent job exhibiting extreme restraint under chaotic circumstances.

nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Anyone you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would talk to him. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) rom Golf Company. He was a squared away and mature NCO and he worked at the gate a lot. I know he was there in the immediate aftermath.

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ACCG-SR
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231024, which begins on ~~page~~ question 1 and ends on ~~page~~ question 117. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231024
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231024
DATE

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Exhibit S027

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Unit

1. On 25 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Before you deployed to Afghanistan where were you? What were you doing?

(2) Answer. from MCIOC attached to 24th MEU. 2020 did not meet staff until mid 2020. Pre mission training. Myself and other Marine agreed to come here from PMT and did not have to be attached. As (b)(1)1.4a we are on MUE we cannot do anything from the ship. Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to Italy for 4 and a half months. I was in Italy basically scraping the publicly available information about the ships in the media. Early MAY we heard of the possibility of the MUE being chopped to CENTCOM. I Went to (b)(1)1.4a for a for a few days for Exercise SeaBreeze With a team from Kiev Military information support team. Got a call from Italy saying that we're going to (b)(1)1.4a. I can speak a bit about 1-8 as they were in (b)(1)1.4a doing evacuation control center. Training incase certain scenarios happen. In (b)(1)1.4a we did ECC and ECP drills.

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c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Talk about ROE, did you ever receive any ROE training?

(2) Answer. They may have in (b)(1)1.4a but there was the typical SJA come in and tell us the ROE. They came in teams.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was ROE to your understanding?

(2) Answer. Inherent right to self-defense of yourself and others that are in capable. Hostile intent/hostile act. At the time we had been doing things for the past week in a half.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did you know you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. August 13 or 14. We get to the marshaling area at (b)(1)1.4a I didn't fly until August 15.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Who was part of the MEU Information Operations Section?

(2) Answer. It started at 2D Marines and a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was two enlisted two officers. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went home in May. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed on ship. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the ground with me.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What did you understand your missions and overall mission to be?

(2) Answer. Evacuating American citizens in the area and SIV Special immigrant visas. My individual mission was coordinating with a battalion. Putting instructions out to the group of people. Make sure the file was good and okay. 15-20% of it was me messing with my gear. (b)(6) checking docs. Visa Passport approved civilians. Which did change to in progress visas. Bad documents being shown. Photo IDs let them in.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Do you think you had the right equipment?

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(2) Answer. Before HKIA yes, initially yes. Once I got out there I just started to help out

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you have to adapt the messaging?

(2) Answer. No firearms, explosives etc, North gate, east gate, Abbey gate. Battalion Landing Teams running gates. Changed the message by sending new messages to someone so that information could be translated and put out.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. What was day on like on the ground?

(2) Answer. We were briefed as the situation being chaotic. GIRoA Mostly pulled out. We were told we were landing on a contested airport. Landed around 930-945 on 15 August 21. No gunfire going off outside of people working with (b)(1)1.4d. We were given explanations of rules and when to put on Kevlar and FLAK. During the brief they were concerned. A cell phone was thrown over the gate and a contractor picked it up and the phone exploded. Throughout the day. The gear and my speakers hadn't arrived. 2215 I went back to lay on my poncho liner. Everyone's phone started ringing on the evening of the 15. The Combat Logistics BN, a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we're hearing it's from 300-400 people. They pushed over the fence and rifle fire was coming in our direction 45 degrees over the airport.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your first mission out there?

(2) Answer. 350-400 Marines and 1000+ Afghan Civilians pushing across the airfield. They made it through the terminal across the flight line. We pushed them back to the other side of the terminal. Bags were left everywhere. There were no translators at that time. Machine Guns still were still firing overhead. There was firing inside the terminal and the Afghan civilians would not move.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. When was it eventually calmed down?

(2) Answer. It was the C17 incident where they got ran over and dropped from the plane. That's when it calmed. The Afghan Army or NSU Reaction force got involved and were doing their own thing that kept the civilians at bay.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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(1) Question. When did you receive your equipment?

(2) Answer. Morning of the 17th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Were you linked in with the Army (b)(1)1.4a team yet?

(2) Answer. Not until the 18th that's when they arrived. One came from (b)(1)1.4d (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Talk about the 19th when Abbey Gate opened?

(2) Answer. When they got on deck we got a white board and wrote down the plan 2, 3 man teams. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) For the 18th to 19th we had the gear, they brought six or seven additional speakers. The Afghans took a speaker from the north gate. At the shift change we gave them the vehicle and I go to the JOC. I got a call from a Marine in Quantico of someone trying to travel back. Checked docs, drove them to the Holding area. Holding area playing the same messaging. Please be patient it was a twelve on twelve off.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Who would you talk to in order to get those updates?

(2) Answer. We stopped through the CoC Enough to ask what the updates were. I wouldn't say inaccurate it was just general stuff. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I ask did they hear about whatever we've heard and they would confirm or deny. Once we were at the gates we would ask have you heard or not heard about whatever the new update was.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What were the crowds like at the gates?

(2) Answer. At north gate no. The BLT at East gate, Abbey gate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), I would look for to get information out, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from weapons co. The people were getting rowdy but couldn't convey what they wanted because they didn't speak English. Typically it was always an easy fix to the rowdy crowds for example, they would be pointing at a pallet or a box of water and no one knew who the water belonged to so we would just hand out the water. It was simple fixes to the rowdy issues.

r. Question and Answer 17.

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(1) Question. Talk about shift changes of day crew to night crew what info did you pass?

(2) Answer. We would pass off things like instances of trying to move people from one gate to another gate, locations of speakers, what speakers may need to be moved. Where to put gear, and if they see someone shooting in the air just leave them be as they are the Taliban and they are there to keep the crowds calm. We changed batteries a lot so we didn't have to follow up until later for the most part.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Once we shut the gate they'd pile in and we can't get out. A Taliban truck would pick up an RPGs and RPKs were facing the Marines at the East gate. I couldn't see the Taliban the next day and I asked about them and there was a Taliban guy next to him he was following up on him.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban hurt people?

(2) Answer. When the crowd got rowdy the Taliban would start shooting in the air

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Did you witness Taliban executing people?

(2) Answer. I did not see executions, but I did see guns to heads. 22nd - 26th all the attention and resources and effort was put towards checking documents.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What would you change the message to? What happened when both gates were closed?

(2) Answer. When they decided to change. The message was changed to these two locations are closed. 'Go towards Abbey gate.' The numbers of where everyone went swelled. We had control of a portion of the canal, left side on map. Once the swell began a lot of the people started to heat CAT at the jersey barrier. We could walk to about the Barron compound. There were civilians prior to the 25th, we checked their docs already. Late 26th that's when it was put out to be on the lookout for clean shaven, clean clothes, possibly a backpack. We went to towers asking had they heard about it. They started taking pictures, the sniper team started taking pictures of people who look a little off. I took a photo of a photo to try and confirm if it may be the person. The

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people at the S2 said the photos were not matching. I did that two or three times and after the third time I decided I clearly was not finding what they were looking for.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Who was your main point of contact in the tower? Did the day shift team ever go to the tower?

(2) Answer. I belonged to the MEU so I was able to come and go as I pleased. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the tower quite a few times. I tried to take a speaker to the tower to push out info over the canal. There was a truck spray painted. There were a couple of holes and he would go up to check out things in the tower. Once documents were checked they hung out and kind of started to get rowdy. We got a speaker to them so that someone could explain the process to the civilians. The day shift did go up to the tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after injuring himself did not go up the ladder.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. What was being put out over the threat stream? Were there any threats coming in?

(2) Answer. There were more reports of threats coming in the closer to the leaving date it got. People were getting shot. When asked what happened the injured party would point at someone. I do not know if it was Taliban or not. North gate was where I heard more of the injuries coming in.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. During that time 20-22 AUG prior to the blast were there any reports of an IED probe?

(2) Answer. I was not necessarily briefed on probe attacking just 'be on the look out'. They didn't look too concerned with trying to cross over. I wasn't concerned with bag dropping. Lots of people fit the description of clean shaven, clean look.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Do you feel like the Marines at the Gate were reacting to suspicious persons or abnormal behavior because of threat reporting?

(2) Answer. I don't know if Infantry Marines thought about that but most of the time you don't just do something, they try to see what they could get away with. We were concerned with the mopeds but not too much. Quite a few matched the "Clean Look"

aa. Question and Answer 26.

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(1) Question. Do you remember any conversation about the Marine Snipers having someone 'in their sights'?

(2) Answer. I do remember them asking for the descriptions. They asked and were like "are we allowed to engage" and I told them "I don't know I'm just the IO". The Snipers are asking what to do but no one really told them the specifics of what to look for. The pictures I had I would not say there was a legit reason to act on that person in the threat. Some matched the description but not the backpack. If we see the person that matches a description no one can give the yes or no to engage based on what they were observing?.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Did you see leaders reinforcing ROE Messaging while working at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I believe it may have been like at the gate, we got reports but nothing actually what the report was saying. I did have to explain a bit further what the ROE was to the snipers.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Did the ROE change? What about Taliban cooperation near the Gates?

(2) Answer. With Taliban on the Chevrons, everyone was flooded with hostile intent. At a point it turned to 'we are working with the Taliban'. They were all over the place.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. How many snipers are typically up there in the tower?

(2) Answer. Two in a corner trying to catch a nap two at one window and one at another window. For the most part they were focusing out the canal to outer corridor window. They could see everything up in that window, The chevron containers, Marines were using MREs for pillows. We would do what we could to boost morale.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Did you ever pass information to the Tower? Did you get the information from the JOC?

(2) Answer. We did a little bit of info transferring. I would be in and grab an MRE and I never would go in looking for intel to get to the gate. One of the odd parts about hearing about the suspicious person was the information they would put out. It was never an actual description it was almost always something like "the suspected

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individual is he was last seen here" or, "he was seen in a market here" or "we lost him here."

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Do you know how this information was being put out?

(2) Answer. A lot of things were SIPR Chatter with who was passing the info down. Many of the reports, there are two types that you all were receiving. Just listening to TOC Ops and the other some are on the front lines and getting reports on leads that were never tied specifically to one person.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Did you ever hear anyone say they saw the bomber? Where were you at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. Someone would say "I have reticle on a guy can I shoot". You were in CoC or JOC and if I was in the JOC it would come over the radio. When the explosion went off it was 1730 something. I was in the cans getting wifi and I hadn't heard the explosion as I was two buildings down. It was after noon to 1 o clock and while I was in the cans.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Was there ever a "hey, let's sit down and talk about this and what happened during these so many hours?"

(2) Answer. When I was sat down to talk about this it was 'where things were moved' 'what was heard over the JOC,' what I would do differently with the crowd. Who or if we stopped people that were just walking alone. If they don't have anything bad on them just take them to the terminal. (b)(6) ..

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Was there anything significant about the crowds on any specific day?

(2) Answer. Nothing significant, just when they tried to rush out of the control area, side focused and check on this gate. I was out at Abbey gate at the same time they were.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Leadership presence at the gates, did you ever really see the command team out there SgtMaj and (b)(6)

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(2) Answer. The MEU Co and SgtMaj were in the JOC all the time. They could have been but it was hard to tell. I didn't personally know the CO or SgtMaj from 2/1 so I wouldn't be able to pick them out of a crowd.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Did they request to engage that guy you showed?

(2) Answer. Not that I am aware of. They just asked me and I said if they have the intent and hostile act, "ROE says that you can engage". I would tell them that outside of that 'that it's not my call' but they were asking and I did kind of explain.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. What was the sniper team attitude toward the ROE?

(2) Answer. I believe at one point before the 26th. Corollas going toward the North gate. They were saying if someone was inside the wire ROE is changing. As far as getting away from standard hostile act hostile intent no.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Were the Marines told to take specific action with any threat or person?

(2) Answer. There was a time where Marines got behind the tower. I was on the wall constantly; they would pull people off the wall but when they would say come down shut up take cover it lasted maybe 15 Minutes. The first time 10-15 Taliban start pointing firearms at civilians. I assume they had to see or hear someone.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Did you have any interaction with (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Army MAJ (b)(1)1.4a, one of the bigger interactions he knew I was trying to get a hold of a guy and his kids. He had one interaction where he gave a family's number to the LNO.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Do you remember who was in the tower when you took that photo?

(2) Answer. I could see some people's chevrons but can't remember names.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

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(1) Question. Do you remember seeing or hearing cards are being passed out to the crowd?

(2) Answer. This is the first time I'm hearing this. From the MEU side of it we didn't do any of that.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. Are you aware of the sniper's requesting engagement authority?

(2) Answer. As far as am I aware of them? Not directly, I wasn't present for that.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. Do you believe that guy was the bomber in the photo you showed us?

(2) Answer. I don't know, he met some criteria but not all.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. Tell me about the morning of the 26th.

(2) Answer. So the morning of the 26th coming off shift during the darkness hours we were around the gate. There were a lot of people who went home during the night and came back during the day. Population around the gates got smaller at night. At the jersey barrier there was a row of Marines there to keep people from jumping over. That area was the last stand. The FET team was scattered about. Other than losing a portion of property from the foot bridge to the sniper tower everything was normal. It was "be on the lookout for a guy" but I became desensitized. The force posture was about the same. Marines were in the tower keeping people calm getting them water and food. Outer corridor full of military and the near side of the canal had people there. Nothing seemed off or seemed to have changed drastically. I don't know whose call it was to keep processing, but I remember hearing someone say keep letting it run. As far as the posture it seemed to be the same as the day prior.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. Did you see the Marines execute a battle drill, procedures?

(2) Answer. I never saw the Marines get down and take cover, but I wasn't at any particular gate at all hours of the day. I was bouncing between 6-7 different locations. There were Taliban on the chevron, but everyone kept an eye on them, around the Barron compound people would pop up and down. For the time I was there I was focused and never really turned around. Around 1500 I went to go get Wi-Fi.

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On that day not that I can recall any interaction. We had the truck set up how it was needed, facing the chevron. But there was not much interaction. We learned the truck needed to change the other day and that's when it got switched.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. How was the Marines morale at the gate?

(2) Answer. Same as it had been, corpsman running up and down. Marines on canal wall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. How any times that night did you go from Abbey Gate to the JOC?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2-3 time. That's when we had 30 minutes of down time. We had the gate shut and c wire everywhere. Inside the east gate there was a holding area and a lot of tents. Marines were posted up on the tactical vehicle holding the gate closed. Marines were saying the same as I was. This gate is closed go to Abbey. The people who spoke English and could translate and helped get the message out so that we could get people moving. A male who could translate the message did and we were able to help get his family processed. His wife passed his baby is a basket and from there the basket was crowd surfing until someone just threw the basket to the side. We went to help find it. The baby was a couple weeks old and then his wife soon followed.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. What happened on the 26th when you found out about the explosion?

(2) Answer. In the relative time frame of 25th to 26th of Incoming from the JOC that sound started going off more and more. The Marines were probably desensitized like us and were just checking documents. I was probably in the JOC an hour before the explosion. I received a messaged from my wife and a friend about the explosion and I was about to nap for about 10 minutes. By the time I got to the JOC they were loading people and taking people to the Role2 medical facility. We know that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were at Role2 because they could say "I'm in the MEU." 82nd took Ryan Knauss to Role 2 and learned he wasn't 82nd and promptly moved him to the MUEs Role 2. I immediately went to the JOC and they said no one was leaving and I went to go get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Were there any reports of Marines taking gun fire?

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(2) Answer. I'm not sure I wasn't paying attention to that specifically. The speaker took the brunt of the blast but the motor in the truck worked. I never heard they we're taking gunfire.

The equipment you brought here they said destroy everything. There were Marines beating on windows and smashing things. Half of my equipment was already loaded into shipping containers, so it made it out of HKIA.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. What did you do after the attack?

(2) Answer. After the explosion they said gates are done we're done. EOD was working on a demo plan and they were going to dig a hole and then they were told they wouldn't be doing any demo. The equipment we brought here they said destroy everything. There were Marines beating on windows and smashing things. Half of my equipment was already loaded into shipping containers so it made it out of HKIA.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. Do you follow any social media about all this?

(2) Answer. I follow (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I met up with him on the anniversary. I did see the most recent address. Some of his accounts I agree with and I remember the "hey I see this possible can we engage" and I was the only (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) so that was me when he says (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Did you see any leadership at the gates?

(2) Answer. I did see a few bronze oak-leaves out there and Gen Sulivan was at the time Task Force 51/5 CDR. And we were all shocked to see him go and meet with the Taliban. I wouldn't necessarily say it was targeting and engaging authority as it was more of a "can I shoot this guy"

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Do you remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) being on ground or him being in the tower?

(2) Answer. I didn't know many officers outside of the MEU so I can't recall if I saw him out there or not.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

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(1) Question. Anything you want to add?

(2) Answer. I don't believe any of what I am saying is groundbreaking. Obviously, this was geared toward the incident. The biggest thing I had to come to terms with was playing God. You have 18- and 19-year-old kids that have been a Marine for 8 months and they have to make the decision of whether or not to act on ROE and they are standing right by the Taliban. And there were times where people look like Americans and talk like them and the Taliban took their documents. Had an ANA 4 star come up and say call your JOC they're expecting me. In plain clothes. I didn't see or catch or pick up on anything.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the time they flew in were on the night shift with me and they may have seen or heard different things. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

No I already went there (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went up there once or twice. It was never a set plan to go here first. But as we didn't belong to anyone specifically, they would ask what are you doing out here. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from what I saw, my time in (b)(1)1.4a CLB XO, all my training was BLT 1/8, from just talking to him and seeing how things were out there. We would offer our help, but he would help significantly.

It never clicked that they were separate companies.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Kolter R. Miller

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 25 October 2023, which begins on question ~~page~~ (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1 and ends on question ~~page~~ 56. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

25 OCT 2023
DATE

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Exhibit S028

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What do you do?

(2) Answer. I work with armed forces reviewing reserve medical cases of those who were injured during training.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. How do you think your career progression has been?

(2) Answer. I had a bit of an issue coming back with family because of the transition.

d. Question and Answer 3.

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(1) Question. What unit were you attached to and what did you do?

(2) Answer. G Company 3rd platoon, we did the normal ITX running ranges that training. My platoon worked with the SSgts and medical. Make sure you all teach as much as you know and to be as proficient. We got tasked with the Tactical Recovery mission. We did one TRAP Mission profile in the 53 Area and then we went to do a mission profile to see how long it would take to treat a patient and the bird would get us.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Did you start receiving briefs on ROE?

(2) Answer. We did before deploying but didn't receive anything on Afghanistan specifically. We were told we weren't going to support anything there or do anything until we did. I signed a 10 year NDA on March 15, 21 while we were doing QRF so I cant really talk about that. Worked with people down there and we were in (b)(1)1.4a for three and a half months. Took it upon ourselves in medical team where we ran scenarios and drills to teach all that we could. We had patients 2-300 meters from each other. If they messed up they restarted. We did inflight IV. Day and night .

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. When did you know you would be going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. August 3rd we came back to (b)(1)1.4a with G Co. Special training operation center 4 days CQB stuff. After the 4th day 1Sgt and the CO watched us train and we went back and were told we would be going to Afghanistan, and we went back to the camp and were told what we could take. Hey you're on a 96 tether and that was around the time we knew but didn't know when. After a few days when we returned to camp all the ammo and everything was out and we packed what we needed and left.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did they tell you what the mission was in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. At first it was we would pick up high value targets. We would do that at first, but they decided that would be too dangerous. They gave a quick brief at the airport of ROE at the airport. "make your best judgements" if you feel safe engage/ do what you have to do. We were checking that they had the right documents.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. NEO. What day you arrived in Afghan August 15 21

(2) Answer. It was dark. When we arrived, they had us run to the terminal. We did weapons checks and made sure we had everything. We did PCC and PCI checks.

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There were so many citizens at the airport. They put us in a gym then we did another PCC and PCI check to make sure nothing was lost on the walk to the gym. We received a brief on what we would do. The next day we were told to stand at Abbey Gate. We were searching the females. We pulled the women out of line and took them to the back to search, out of respect for their religion. I found a book that showed us how to say we are medical. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) explained to the women we would need to search them. We found mostly gold and money on the women. Gold bracelets mostly up their arms. After the search we put them back in line. That was Day 1. Day 2 they put G Co 3 Platoon on crowd control outside of Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. How were you organized? What was your medical team structure?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) we kind of just ran a 2 person team for 28 guys in the platoon.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Would you say your training was more decentralized from 3rd Platoon?

(2) Answer. We always integrated the training. We always taught TCCC. If a specific thing was needed in an algorithm, we did a one on one with that person.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. How often would you say Corpsman were integrated with 3rd platoon prior to deploying to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. From July 2020 up to deployment it was a daily thing. We were always teaching classes, or they were teaching us.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. You were with the unit a year prior to deployment. Where were you when you received ROE Brief?

(2) Answer. We were in (b)(1)1.4a The platoon Commander gave that brief, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He basically said if you feel threatened or that the civilians may feel threatened by the enemy then that gives you cause to engage. If shots are taken at you or your life is in danger. People take this differently but that's what I understood. I am not sure about anyone else. It was in a huddle away from everyone. They made sure everyone wrote them down.

m. Question and Answer 12.

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(1) Question. What was steady state like at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. It was more medical beside when the Marines are vetting. It was mostly crowd control and making sure the citizens are comfortable. But I would say it's more medical because those people have been there for about a week. Me and (b)(3)130(b); (b)(6) we were working with heat cats non-stop and elderly. 200-300 heat Casualties. We didn't know initially where the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) was set up. Did you know there was a platoon 2 and a half to three miles down the road. I was taken there. I established a rapport because the enroute Corpsman were with them. They said if there are major injuries take care of them if not let us know. I briefed the G Co Corpsman (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Max. This is where the STP is and we can take them there for better care. (b)(1)1.4d had a connex that they kept locked that had AC. We asked to use it but they wouldn't open it. We kicked the door in and used it. We started rendering care in there. While we were treating patients, they were just dropping to get behind the gate. Once someone dropped, we searched and brought them to the box.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Did you get any sleep? What did that look like for you?

(2) Answer. About 10pm we would turnover with CAAT platoon … 10-11 sleep at night and up at 0500 to get back into the rhythm. We did that about 7 days straight.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you ever receive any threat briefs or info?

(2) Answer. They kind of said to keep an eye out for suspicious people around our platoon. Once we heard there was a threat it was 2 days prior to that stuff happening. They didn't tell us what we had to do. We just talked to each other and our people. We said 'hey if this happens this is the actions we will have to take'. We had heard that chatter the last couple of days.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Were you ever told about any imminent threats? What were the Marines told to do in cases like that?

(2) Answer. They were told to fall back behind the gate and get into a defensive posture and to keep a clear sight of the battlefield.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. As far as you could tell did the leadership take threats seriously?

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(2) Answer. Yes, because there was a point in time where people kept going past the gate and wall but they were told to keep their distance. We ended up setting a CCP. It was ten meters from the outer gate. That's where the casualty collection point was. Critically wounded was behind cover. They plan to move people down kind of fell apart and people just started running through the gate. We had to get to a point to regroup. On the 24th was when we set up the pre-planned CCP.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How often did you see officers in platoon company and battalion level at the gate?

(2) Answer. They were there all the time. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) every day. It was constant officers were at the gate. I didn't know many officers outside of my platoon. I saw the (b)(6) on day 2. My section was calm, and I was working with interpreters and my (b)(6) walked up to me and said it looks like you guys are pretty calm. And I saw him again the day of the blast.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban?

(2) Answer. I didn't see the Taliban personally. I just knew they were by the horseshoe area.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you see the Taliban hurt or shoot anyone?

(2) Answer. No, it was all hearsay. Just stories being told but I was focused on the medical aspect. There were shots going off from (b)(1)1.4d guys.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. At any point 20th -26th was there ever a change on the ROE?

(2) Answer. No one specifically came and told me the ROE had changed.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What were you told regarding bolo specifics?

(2) Answer. They told us to look out for a clean-shaven fresh-looking person. It was hard to tell if anyone fit that description because of how much medical stuff we were dealing with. There were times where we did interact with the crowd and that

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would be towards the evening. It was pretty rowdy. In the afternoon, it was saving babies form c wire and stuff.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Did you feel not safe or as if the Commd wasn't taking the appropriate mitigation steps?

(2) Answer. Someone told me they were supposed to close the gate once we got the threat, but they didn't and that did make me nervous, but I always tried to put myself in the safest spot.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Do you feel that you were informed of the environment of what to team was doing?

(2) Answer. I think communication was a big thing everyone had trouble with. People kept getting pulled left and right. It was either take care of this or handle that. I didn't have a radio. Information got to me through the PL, CO CDR, or the SSgt.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. How did they disseminate info?

(2) Answer. They said they would use Signal but I believe that was for the CMD but my PLT CDR came and told us once he knew something.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. At night was more engagement with the crowd. Did you start in the morning, was there a brief every morning or what?

(2) Answer. Our PLT CDR and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would have their huddle at night. Once they received info, they would tell us before we stepped off.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. How did that change over time, what did that look like?

(2) Answer. Ever changing. The first patient I worked with was a 6-month-old baby. The baby was wrapped in too many blankets and the baby was not responding. I did my checks and ended up unwrapping the baby. I gave the baby a sternum rub and they baby came too, I doused the blankets in cold water and we got it checked out. I just found work to do. I walked in the general location of my platoon, checking and making sure they are good making sure if they needed water or a break, they got that.

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bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. The posture that changed based on the threat. Prior to the blast can you recall how many times you had to get down and take cover?

(2) Answer. There was one night, the second or third day. Some guy, we were working in the middle section manning the area in the inner corridor and some guy popped up with an AK and just started shooting in the air. Everyone just turned towards the guy really quick and got behind the gate. It happened twice and the marines threw flash bangs over. We don't know who the shooter was. We weren't given a direct description of who or what to look for, only that there was a possible IED. We were just trying to do the right thing.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Who gave the clean-shaven report? Is there any standing description?

(2) Answer. It was put out by squad leaders. When people do things like that, clean shaven is what they typically look like. No specific clothing, they said watch out for backpacks, but everyone had that. Everyone in the crowd looked like that. It is hard to see that specifically in the crowd, because you have to be trained for that.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. At any point throughout your time at Abbey gate was there anyone circulating a picture of someone who would pose a threat?

(2) Answer. No. I would everything in my green book. I did just a rough draft of everything. I personally did not see a photo of anyone.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Any interaction with the tower? The snipers?

(2) Answer. No just the corpsman attached to me. At first, he was help support, stayed attached to his team but he did help out treating civilians and walking around. He helped and trained with TCCC.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. What there a point where your two would talk and would share anything?

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(2) Answer. No, it was just normal chatter, here is where CCP is. W/ Medical Communication has to be on point.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Day of the blast, 10-15 minutes prior to where are you and what are you doing?

(2) Answer. We woke up in the van that morning around 0800. At that time HM3 Soviak had started collecting kids. From 0800 - 1100 we just started taking kids. We took about 25 kids to one of the facilities. Around 2030 we got the word to go to the gym to clean our face and do hygiene. Gunny comes running in and said we have to go back and said something like you have to relieve 1st platoon. We stood there a couple of hours, then gave word they were about to close the gate. I'm sitting on an MRE box. We were shooting the shit. I spit in on the ground I looked back up, and everything slowed down. As soon as I look up the IED goes off. I saw clothing and people in the air. Go to the X, we grab our med bags (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said we need to stand here; this is game time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I believe he was brought up by a SSgt. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) Another Corpsman (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) another went to the black. A Corpsman was freaking out and out SSgt was trying to calm him down. I grabbed his flack and said "This is what the fuck we do, this is what we trained for," and then I proceeded to tell him what I needed from my med bag, more gauze and an IV starter kit and he calmed down a little after that.

We pulled up to the STP and they are outside waiting for us and they sent a few people to help us get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out the back. I talked to him once he got on the table, and he talked back to me. The doc told me I could let go. I asked three time are you sure and the Doc assured me it was okay to let go, and I let go. I grabbed two handfuls of med bags. And asked the Doc if they needed them and she told me to take them, and I got back in the van, and we went back to where we were treating patients. I met with my senior line and met with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) And he asked to start triaging patients and pass it up to 1SGT I got up to nine or ten people. 1Sgt is trying to get all the numbers. This is all at the CCP. I hop on another patient HM3 Soviak. (b)(6) (b)(6) The best way to describe it would be the goonies movies. I (b)(6) method. I knew he was gone, and we put him in the back of the van and my SSgt told me to work on another patient. It was a young girl. Shrapnel metal through the back came out the top. We made sure she didn't have breathing issues. But she was good just a little freaked out.

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(b)(6)
(b)(6) I found it and I had only one gram of TXA left and some ketamine and got him in the back on the van. The Marines started getting in a defensive posture to protect the CCP and us, and that's what I saw from looking around. When I came back, I saw the (b)(6) I grabbed him by the flack and told him where there was protection. I don't believe he was talking while he was injured just looked a little out of it. I told him to go where to go behind the Marines, and that was the last time I saw him. We were working on patients. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When I returned again the Marines were in more in a defensive posture.

I was in the Casualty Collection Point when the blast went off and I was in the HESCO barrier. I was not injured. (b)(6) One of the most crucial things we wish we had when the IED went off. When we were in (b)(1)1.4d they took our Independent duty corpsman from us and they said they needed him in (b)(1)1.4d because of this we would go to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for things we hadn't seen before. The STP Doc froze at the triage point and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took over the inner gate of that location as far as patients coming.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What are the different levels/ types of Medics?

(2) Answer. Basic E-1 to E-5 can be basic corpsman in infantry platoon. Don't have higher echelon of care cannot sign off on prescriptions. IDC That's more free range of treating medical in the clinic. One step below PA but can still do what they do, chest tubes and things. Anywhere between E5 to E6, he would have been our triage office- person taken while in (b)(1)1.4d That kind of took away from our role. He said he did nothing in (b)(1)1.4d I am unsure of behind the scenes.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What was the medical ROE?

(2) Answer. It was never clearly defined.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Did any leadership ask you to treat civilians?

(2) Answer. No, the marines said that prior to the NEO, we didn't have the medical supplies to support everyone. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) built a trauma box and brought it and if we needed supplies then we wouldn't have run out fast.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

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(1) Question. Have you watched any of the testimony or YouTube videos of Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. I don't get into all of that. I know my story and that's my story. And their story is their story. But I tried to do my best with what I was given. I just cared about the medicine. When I came back, they looked at me like you don't have your pin you're nothing.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Have you ever sat down and talked to the 3rd platoon marines?

(2) Answer. I talk to the squad leaders, but I talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he was just a grunt there. He thanks me for saving his life all the time.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. Is there anything that you want to tell us or want to add.

(2) Answer. No. I just want to tell my story the way I saw it. I have a video from the day. We were just chillin at the CCP point and relaxing. If I recorded another 3-5 minutes it would have recorded the blast.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Do you think there is anyone else we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He worked on, Sanchez and Lopez. Pretty much the same as I did. He was with HMS he was up with the HQ.

Describe for me that day when the blast happened. Walk me through it once that blast happened.

When the blast happened, I was positioned 25 meters from the Sniper tower. I was relaxing on an MRE Box. Everything slowed down and then the IED Blast went off. I grabbed my med bag, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the Senior line corpsman and he jumped infront of us, so that we can stay at the Control Casual collect P1 and P2. As patients came to us. We saw some had marines put at least a tourniquet on some of them. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought patients to me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I noticed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was saying I don't know what to do repeatedly, so I grabbed him and said this is what the fuck we do, this is what we trained for and told him to get everything I needed to keep treating this patient. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave us a thumbs up. I was still holding pressure and people came to help get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) off the bus and the doc asked what happened and I explained and gave her a quick overview of the patient's recent medical history, and she told me to let go. I go to grab a couple of med bags and asked if they needed them, and they said no take them I got back to the medline and asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) what he needed from me. He said start checking, expected patients and I got up to 9 or 10 patients I gave the piece of papers that had the casualty triage card to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he gave it to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) so that he had a number of what is to come. I hopped on HM3 Max Soviak, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

her down. She seemed fine just a little scared. I saw 5 patients in total. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

hey, it happens. I know from being there to the moment we left I'd say we treated 200-300 heat injuries of Afghan civilians. Most had limbs locked up. Babies maybe 50-60 babies that had injuries. A couple with c wire injuries. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) brought two young girls 5 and 3. Before, we just ran, a young girl that got stepped on, her to the STP on a litter that as 3 miles away. Right before we left a British soldier arrived pulled up offering to help. On the way back from dropping of the woman off. There were two young girls that had 80% of their body burned. The mom and sister only said Taliban repeatedly. The mom said the Taliban came into their house and burned. The STP kept turning them away. Once I showed the people the extent of the injuries under the two girls clothes, they were shocked and only just began treating the young girls. I almost delivered two babies. I got a pregnant woman to the plane where soon after the plane took off, she had the two babies.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 25 OCT 2023, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 10. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

25 OCT 2023
DATE

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Exhibit S029

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 25 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions from BG Curtis will be denoted by C1, questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and questions from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will be (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Since we conducted a group interview with your team during the investigation two years ago and didn't cover it then, what is your personal background?

(2) Answer. I entered the Marine Corps in (b)(6). I was an infantryman, I arrived to 2/1 in March of 2015 as an 0311. I did the selection for scout sniper in (b) (3) 130b, (b) (6). From there we deployed on the 13th MEU in February or March of 2016. We sailed through PACOM, from San Diego to Hawaii, then up to 5th Fleet into CENTCOM. (b)(1)1.4a We went here and there. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a operating in the AOR. We got back in September of 2016, and I turned 21 when we got back.

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After that, I had a break of time with scout sniper platoon. I got the boot because I got in trouble, so I re-applied in February of 2017. After that we did a workup, then a unit rotation to Okinawa from October of 2017 to around March/April of 2018. From there, I (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) Then I went back to 2/1, went to sniper school in the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6). Then in March or April of 2019 we went to the 31st MEU until getting back in the fall of 2019.

From there, I went to the Scout Sniper Unit Leader's Course in (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I went to (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) after that. I was a non-select, but made it through (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I came back after that, finished up ITX. Around January or February of 21 we were solidified to go on the (b)(1) 1.4a then in April we deployed and went to (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a That was a nice space.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You were attached to Echo Company for that?

(2) Answer. Yes. Team 1 was with Fox Company at the BEC in Iraq. We were attached to Echo Company, the crisis response company. The other team and a half remained with Weapons Company in (b)(1)1.4d in a general support role. Golf Company was over in (b)(1)1.4a

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you hear that you would support a NEO?

(2) Answer. We started talking about it right when we moved from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4d So about 2 weeks before that move, in late May it popped up on the radar. Definitely in June in (b)(1)1.4d it was on the radar. Our team was going on training rotations with platoons from Echo Company to (b)(1)1.4d Every time the phone rang we thought it might be call to go. Early to Mid-July, the writing was on the wall that someone was going to go. We were waiting with our bags packed, that was frustrating. We saw the Taliban stalemating on how many provinces they had, then they suddenly took the whole country except for Kabul. All while we were sitting there. That was interesting.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you get notified you were going to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. Around 13 August, 2021. First or second week of August. We were doing a lot of IPBs with the CO and (b)(6) and getting ROE briefs.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was in those ROE briefs?

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(2) Answer. Inherent right of self-defense, defense of others and US military personnel and assets. That was about it, if you were in fear of your life and had positive ID. It circled around that you would see people with guns, but it might be the ANA. And obviously we knew the Taliban were around, so we knew we needed hostile intent.

Someone asked if we saw Taliban shooting into the crowd, could we shoot at the Taliban? And the answer was no unless we could identify US civilians in the crowd. That's where the SJA drew the line. If I'm remembering correctly, if we saw someone engaging the (b)(1)1.4d that wasn't even enough.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone ask to clarify that?

(2) Answer. I can't remember. Someone asked if we saw the Taliban shoot into a crowd and killed people, could we do anything. That stuck with me, since that is something I personally saw.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So it was defensive ROE, you need hostile act and intent. If it was a threat to others, you had to identify it was a US citizen or personnel that was in danger?

(2) Answer. That was my understanding of it. CNN walked out there one day with their entourage, so I knew that if someone shot at them, I could defend them.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you depart for HKIA?

(2) Answer. I believe it was the 16th. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived the 16th with the quartering party, about 24 hours prior to us. We landed about 0200 or 0300 on the 17th.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What happened on arrival?

(2) Answer. I flew in with the rest of my team and 2nd Platoon, Echo Company. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with us, from 2nd Platoon. We linked up with the headquarters element from Echo, some of the battalion, then found our spot in the gym. I punched out with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get the lay of the land. We grabbed a John Deere gator and drove around to take everything in and get a baseline on how we could put ourselves into the fight. Shortly after that, our platoon commander, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up. He told us we were no longer attached to Echo Company, we were back with Weapons

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Company for tasking. Our first real task was to get to a red radar tower on the airport. We relieved the team that was there. We sat there for a day, then we broke down. We hung out with 4th Platoon, Echo after that and tried to employ ourself with them.

To back up, at the radar tower we were looking south at the main terminal. From there we observed ANA or ANP holding security at the main PAX terminal. We didn't see anything too irregular from that vantage point, it was pretty quiet. After that, we went into priorities of work. Getting observation and drawing a range card. Look for anyone doing something nefarious.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How was the team doing when you got on the deck, with the chaos and the number of people?

(2) Answer. One of the first nights, when we got into the gym, from that point on there was constant gunfire. It sounded like a constant gun fight and explosions over near North Gate, I don't know if that was 10th Mountain or what. As far as my team, I got lucky. I had been with the platoon since 2015. We had two new guys that had only been with the platoon for a year, so we drafted our teams. I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because I had hawked him and brought him over to the platoon. He had done 2-3 deployments with FAST then the last few with 2/1. He is a great infantryman, that's why I wanted him. I sent him to the sniper school and he passed, crushed it. Then I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wanted him. After that, I picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I didn't pick (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but I got him as my point man, which was a whole debacle. He turned 19 while we were deployed. Then we also picked up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They were all good. We had good cohesion with the team. We were friends to a degree, but had the maturity to understand the chain of command in the team. I made the calls, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made calls in my absence. The guys did all the individual actions that you expect and train to. It wasn't until Abbey Gate that some of the more human dimensions popped out.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the debacle with picking (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I had originally picked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I had a lot of time in the platoon with him, molding him into what I wanted him to be. Other team leaders had tried to take (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) telling me I didn't need a radio operator. I wouldn't give him up, so they took (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and gave me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It turned out to be good. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is a good kid. They were just mad that I had better picks.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) OK, your initial time was spent conducting observations, and you were working for your Platoon Commander and not Echo Company?

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(2) Answer. Yes. While we were doing that, Echo Company had two platoons doing a defense on the southern side of the runway toward the pax terminal itself. After we left the radar site, we linked in with 4th platoon. There was an old air traffic control tower that they had a fire team in, saying that they thought they were getting shot at when they went on the roof. We went over there and set up to see if we could see anyone shooting at them.

We had heard reports about spotters and engagements from a Taliban sniper, so we were trying to look for that. After we set up, the Marines there walked out on the roof to have a cigarette. When they did that, they took a round overhead. The guy on the other end shooting didn't know what he was doing. We heard the snap whizz and figured the general direction it was coming from, maybe southwest. Then we hung out for a while before we got recalled.

We ran into the team leader from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They were south of the flightline and had a hide in a half blind of an Airplane. ANA rolled up, talking. The 82nd also rolled up, exchanged some information. You could see that the ANA had like blue or red garb under their uniforms, their mannerisms were odd and they were postured and their hands were on their guns. That was interesting. After that they took off, and my team was called back to the battalion COC.

We linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and did a hotwash of the last 24 hours and got put on rest, while the other team was still out there. I had words about that with him, since we had another team stranded out there since we didn't have our own vehicles hotwired yet. I didn't get it, but he told us to hang out. That morning or night, he woke me up to go talk to the (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came with me. The (b)(6) had a tasking for our team to occupy the sniper position at the Outer Gate of Abbey Gate. A platoon from Fox Company was supposed to move to Camp Sullivan to retrieve some American citizens and we would provide overwatch. We got our stuff together and punched out to that tower. That was around the 19th of August, I am pretty sure.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was the scene like at Abbey Gate on the 19th?

(2) Answer. We get down there, I don't know if the Fox Company platoon was there. There were Marines staged east of the gate, in the inner corridor where the HESCOs are. We got in the tower and joined a machinegun team from (b)(1)1.4d They had one window and we had another, and we shared the window facing west out of the tower towards what would becalled the chevron. The outer corridor was filled with people all the way from the gate to the intersection passed where the chevron would end up. The one west of the Barron. That's where the Taliban had their gun trucks, on the west side of the intersection. That was their ECP. They had some C-Wire on the eastern side. You could see all the way down there. We sat there for a bit, then they got the call to open the gate.

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There was a vehicle against the gate to prevent it from opening. Once they opened, it was a mad house. They deployed CS, so I had to eat that. That was great. Our (b)(6) and some PJ were sucked into the crowd. I remember the PJ trying to pull his Glock out and fire warning shots. I didn't think that was going to do anything, but that PJ had a light on his pistol. It was like he was drowning in a pool of people.

After they got the gate opened, they pushed that crowd back and back and back to the northwestern staging area by the Barron Hotel and the shack in the inner corridor. That's where we stopped for the duration of that day as we tried to get control of the situation.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sometime after that, they put in the chevron?

(2) Answer. I believe that was that night. They put in streetlights, which meant we could see but it impacted our night optics. We could only use our scopes since the NVGs would get bloomed out by too much light. After that a crane came with the shipping containers to set everything up. I took a siesta for an hour or two at that point, so things are a little hazy until the sun comes up.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That brings us about to the 20th then?

(2) Answer. That sounds about right.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After the (b)(1)1.4d mission didn't happen, what was your tasking?

(2) Answer. Really nothing. I don't remember getting any follow on word. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) might have came and told us to stay in place, but we stayed because we knew that's where work was going to happen for the duration.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: When did the (b)(1)1.4d depart?

(2) Answer. The 19th or maybe the night of the 20th. We were up there with them for maybe two days, it was pretty cramped up there. Once they thought we were good, they pushed back to the Barron.

s. Question and Answer 18.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What were your comms like at this point?

(2) Answer. Spotty. Green Gear wasn't great. On the 19th or the 20th, (b)(6) set up at the tower at the inner gate, looking south and west. We had decent comms with them. The day of the 20th, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4g Our Wi-Fi pucks weren't working, so it was hard to get up on Signal with the platoon commander or the (b)(6) It was more just having direct line of communication between company commanders rotating in and out, or the (b)(6) and the (b)(6) (b)(6) coming out. BGen Sullivan came to the gate a couple times. We always had 2 dudes on observation (obs), and 1-2 guys on rest. We couldn't just do that forever though, we had to resupply ourselves and we had a Bobcat so we usually resupplied the guys at the gate with water and MREs. Our corpsman spent a lot of time providing aid and helping out the other corpsmen. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a really, really great corpsman. He is a father, and honed in on the humanity of it all. People were just trying to leave the country, out there for days at a time, running into the Taliban, starving. Anytime people collapsed, he was trying to help people.

He would come in, nap, then go do it again. We were all just rotating on and off post to keep obs, especially to the west. We did have a line on the 153s, our black gear, to (b)(6) on what we saw at the parking lot over there.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you have some comms, who is making contact with your platoon commander and how often?

(2) Answer. He was spending a lot of time at the inner gate post. Our company had a CCP established there with some medical personnel from the battalion. I don't know if the surgical team was there. The company HQ for Weapons was, so he would come in and out of there and come visit us. He would act as re-trans for us, bouncing info forward and back. If we needed something, we could always reach him.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often did he come to the tower?

(2) Answer. I don't know, I can't say with any kind of validity. It was regular, not sparse.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would the company commanders, (b)(6), and the (b)(6) come to the tower?

(2) Answer. The (b)(6) did once. All the company commanders did except for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That bird's eye view was pretty priceless, you could see over the cement wall

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and the whole area down to the other tower. You could see over the connex to a degree. The (b)(6) did 2-3 times that I do remember, once on the 26th for sure.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you guys got to the gate, you were establishing your battle rhythm. Two guys on, one or two resting, the rest doing supply runs. That's pretty much the routine?

(2) Answer. Generally speaking, yes.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We talked about ROE in terms of defense of others. Your understanding was that Taliban had to be shooting at US citizens to engage. Did that ever change or did it remain the same?

(2) Answer. To my understanding, it remained the same. It probably got more restrictive to a degree. I'm trying to remember, it was weird. After they put up the chevron, two up armored Humvees rolled up with weaponry. We watched an IED probe go on and we didn't know what that was.

At one point, we watched the Taliban shoot people and radioed to request engagement authority and were denied since they weren't shooting Americans.

There just weren't a lot of specifics in terms of changes that I can recall, if there was, it just wasn't something to worry about with a million other things going on. Any changes made weren't significant.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you personally see the Taliban kill people?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was on and off. It was after they put in the chevron. They would be shooting in the air, then they would look down and shoot their guns off into the crowd on the other side of the chevron. Then there was the gap between the chevron and the Barron Hotel and they would shoot people in there.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you could see people shot in the gap between the chevron and the hotel, but you had to infer about the crowd on the other side of the chevron? But you could see them shot in the gap?

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(2) Answer. Yes. Yes, I could see the gap. I remember one time specifically, I don't remember the date I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said he saw the guys shoot two people (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said he saw them shoot one guy later that night. They were beating people constantly too.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: You saw impact and you saw people drop?

(2) Answer. Yes.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you saw that and requested engagement authority from higher?

(2) Answer. Yes, from my recollection. Specifically, the night that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on glass was the first time. The answer I remember was, "are they shooting at you or Americans, what positive ID do you have,?" and we said none since we couldn't verify that it was US citizens being killed.

It was mostly on black gear to the other team and our platoon commander to move that request higher. I know we had to use the 153 at one point. We occasionally had a direct line to battalion, but a lot of times we wouldn't.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you radioed (b)(6) and the Platoon Commander requesting to engage?

(2) Answer. I guess, I can't remember exactly what I or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said. We would see something, and I would tell him to call it up on the radio. I don't know exactly what he would say on the radio, especially if he had to go outside. I was focused on what was going on. I don't know exactly what the response was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would say that they would either say we needed positive ID or that he got no response on the radio.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why do you think the ROE was structured that way?

(2) Answer. We were told that it was because the Taliban were in a supporting role with the battalion, we had done key leader engagements with them and they were working in a support role with TF 51/5 to let people through. The American answer is they paid them not to kill us. I heard that from a couple different people.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you understood they were providing external security and we were coordinating with them?

(2) Answer. Yes. I remember standing there with the (b)(6) and he was drawing out command relationships. There was the MEU, 2/1, the 82nd, and the Taliban. BGen Sullivan and his posse and the (b)(6) did some KLEs with them at the chevron that I remember.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What do you think would have happened if you shot Taliban on those occasions?

(2) Answer. I don't know. Maybe a gunfight would have ensued. From our perspective, they were in a checkpoint. We had our m110 and our SASR up there. We had a line of sight to the trucks and all the Taliban on top of the tower. In that sense for us, it would have been a turkey shoot initially. Civilians would have been getting shot for sure.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Just to confirm, from your understanding did the ROE ever change while you were at HKIA? At the flight line, radar tower, or at the gate?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So standard ROE hostile act and intent, positive ID, the whole time?

(2) Answer. Yes.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But you felt the positive ID was impossible in terms of identifying US civilians?

(2) Answer. Yes.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned an IED probe that you suspected, can you talk us through that?

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(2) Answer. This was around the 20th or the 21st. I can't remember the day, but it was earlier on. Team 3 cued into a black Toyota 4-Runner with a white Taliban sticker on the back. From there, they keyed in on some individuals that were out of the baseline, this was around the parking lot area by the water tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave us a couple BOLOs to look out for one guy in particular, an older gentleman we called the shot caller and the younger guy he was with. We called him the pancake hat, it was a traditional Afghan hat.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) A flat top hat with a roll called a Pakol?

(2) Answer. It looked like a stupid looking beret. We called him the pancake hat and he was with the young gentlemen. We saw them around, checking things out. We took some pictures of them. We keyed onto them. They would go back and forth. The shot caller came up to an empanada stand, we got some pictures of him. The younger gentlemen and the shot caller came to the nearside canal path across the bridge. We didn't have security there yet. They walked up past our tower. When they got to the path, Team 3 saw them. They both had a backpack and they were buddy carrying a 5-day duffel. They each had one handle. Made us wonder what could be that heavy. They walked past our tower. We were in a stand to phase, wondering what would happen. They walked into the very crowded area with 3 bags in total. They walked out with nothing.

That had us on alert. That was cause for trouble. We looked for that blue duffel, then a brown Jansport-style backpack with a Nike swoosh on it. We called it out. When they came out they had nothing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) comes up and links up with me. We walk around the jersey barriers looking for those bags. Trying to do something. We found a tan pack and called it to EOD.

They came out with their dogs, we formed a cordon. The dogs didn't find anything. We kept finding backpacks and there were just so many people.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you get EOD out there?

(2) Answer. They were in and out of the area. They had emplaced (b)(1)1.4g so they were around. I assume (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or the Platoon Commander radioed it up when we saw those two individuals, they were out there pretty quick.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But it turned out to be nothing?

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(2) Answer. We never found the bags. So to me, it was a probe on what they could get away with it. That's all I can think of.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Any other incidents with bags?

(2) Answer. A couple times bags would get thrown over the wall behind the tower and get caught in a C-wire. Marines would have to come knock it off. It happened after the blast once and it didn't concern anyone.

I know it also happened by Team 3. They saw some dudes trying to break through the wall by their position, trying to circumvent the ECP.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So multiple occasions with bags, for a number of reasons during your time there?

(2) Answer. Yes, multiple times. Everyone had back packs and suit cases, trying to cram their life into a bag and leave the country.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What kind of intel reports were you getting IRT to threat streams and BOLOs?

(2) Answer. I remember a call out about a gold Toyota Corolla, one about a taxi cab, one about a garbage truck as possible VBIEDS. There was a report prior to the 26th of a potential suicide bomber, I can't entirely remember.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you receive those reports or updates?

(2) Answer. I can't really remember. Probably via 152s or 117G. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to set up the 117 Golf because we could kind of reach the COC with that. I remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us to keep 153 traffic to a minimum because it was essentially an open net. So it was 153, green gear of some capacity, or word of mouth.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How about Signal?

(2) Answer. I would have to look, I still have my messages.

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* Pause to scroll through Signal App*

Nothing I can find specifically right now. I don't have too much traffic during this period, mostly just some conversations between me and a corpsman I used to have that got out about people to try and find to get out.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Okay so communication was (b)(1)1.4a or word of mouth?

(2) Answer. Correct

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): And that was about those three VBIED threats?

(2) Answer. Yes.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. During your time out there, were you given BOLOs for individuals or possible attackers?

(2) Answer. Not before the 26th that I can recall.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were there times leading up to the 26th that your team identified someone that you thought was suspicious?

(2) Answer. Outside of the IED probe and trying to figure out who was in charge of the Taliban in huts down the road, no key individuals come to mind.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): No suspicious individuals that your team took pictures of that you sent up to higher, anything like that?

(2) Answer. Maybe one time, prior to the 26th. We were hot swapping SD cards. There was period where we didn't have an SD card in the tower. I sent this picture of a guy in sunglasses up at one point, he just looked suspicious to me, that was on the 20th I think.

We took pictures of what we called the Red Unit Taliban, better equipped with better gear and looking in charge.

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xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How would you pass photos up, you mentioned SD card swaps?

(2) Answer. I failed to mention that part of our battle rhythm was to head to the COC every 24 or 36 hours. We, either (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or myself, would bring our SD cards and any info we had up to the S2A, and they would burn those photos and we would use a different SD card. That's how we tried to pass up relevant information.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who was that S2A?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. A lengthy gentleman. I think he was (b)(6)

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Would (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ever come get SD cards from you?

(2) Answer. Yes, to the best of my knowledge that happened once or twice as well.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you ever get any pictures of the Taliban shooting or harming civilians?

(2) Answer. Answer: No. I have a video on the 26th of the Taliban beating people with a stick that I'm sure you've seen, but that's about it.

As a side note, at some point, I don't know exactly when, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took the camera to the Barron. They snuck up on the wall, and were taking pictures of the Taliban in front of the chevron to try and document them killing people. I don't know what happened to those pictures, I think they would have been passed to the battalion.

I also later came to find out that a sniper team from 1/8 was engaging suspected VBIEDs from their position at North Gate. I know the ATL of that team was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6).

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay so you receive several VBIED threats, but aside from those two guys with the duffel bags, you never received intelligence on a suicide attacker at the gate?

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(2) Answer. Not that I can remember. The events of the 26th probably obscure some of that if there was.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But during that time, your team took photos of plenty of suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. Yes, we passed those up on the SD card. We would usually log those in our obslogs. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has those copies. Looking back, those are a little underwhelming. We tried to make a note in the log to the best of our ability.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. C1: Some individuals said it was frustrating to get a BOLO and see multiple people in the crowd that would fit the same description. Did you feel the same?

(2) Answer. Yes, 100% sir I would say that is accurate. To an untrained observer, from the ground level that was also processing people, you can only expect so much at one time. Definitely, 100% frustrating.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You requested to engage the Taliban on multiple occasions, were there any other requests to engage?

(2) Answer. No, and I only remember that one specific time that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked to engage. Other than that, it was just trying to find out what ROEs situations fall under, and we understood that the ROE was what it was, there wasn't much we could do about it. There was no point in asking, we knew the answer.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, there was a RIP between Golf and Echo on the night of the 25th. We know Echo had pushed the crowd out to the footbridge and had Marines dispersed along the canal wall. Do you remember that?

(2) Answer. Yes. At some point after the first day, we started to clear the near side walk way. The canal wasn't the original route for people trying to escape, it was initially the chevron. Once civilians found out they could go through the canal, they flooded that area so we needed to push them back. We had control to around the footbridge where we had an exit control point we could turn people away from. We had good dispersion along the canal, with a Marine about every 10 meters. There were probably about two squads of Marines out there. If not, probably a bit more.

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The UK was out there too, they were brutal. They were on the canal wall until they went back to the Barron Hotel. They held the bridge for a while, shoulder to shoulder with the Marines, pulling and processing people. (b)(1)1.4d were holding the line with us as far as that's concerned.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were you awake when the RIP with Echo and Golf happened?

(2) Answer. I don't think so. I did an all nighter the evening before, so I think I was catching some sleep. When I woke up on the 26th, the security was collapsed to the jersey barrier by the sniper tower, because the night before I could have walked to the footbridge.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How big was the crowd the night prior?

(2) Answer. It was massive. Once the crowd figured out they could go that way, it was packed. People resorted to walking in the canal itself. It was packed the night before, it was a sea of people on the far side of the canal. Golf collapsed security to the base of the tower, in conjunction with the (b)(1) 1.4d leaving so the crowd came to the base of the tower.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were you tracking that the 26th the gate was going to close?

(2) Answer. I do. I think the time 1600 was being thrown around. I remember the (b)(1) 1.4d coming back and forth, getting ready to close down.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was there a change in the crowd after the security collapsed down?

(2) Answer. Yes. Up to this point, I want to say that there was another gate east of the inner gate open. I can't remember. North Gate and East Gate were closed. We were the last point that anyone could come through on the 26th. The crowd size greatly reflected that. People were desperate. It was frustrating to me, the military aged males in the crowd. People were shoving each other, throwing themselves on the C-wire, asking Marines to shoot them. People trampling each other. That morning, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came to the tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were close to him. He would come hang out with us to decompress. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would hang out at the base of the tower as well. I remember that morning, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would hangout. I remember looking down and seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the front of the line physically

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fighting to control the crowd. I felt like he was out of control, and didn't understand what his position should have been as the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he needed to go get him. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went down and ended up pulling him out because he was out of it. People in the crowd were just desperate, it was a mess.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone tell you why Golf Company had collapsed security?

(2) Answer. At some point you are going to have to withdraw from the area, but I think we still had 12 hours of processing to do. But I don't know, I know the timeline was shifting, I think it shifted to 1600. Then when 1600 came, we still kept it open. But I don't know why they collapsed. Tactically it didn't make sense to me.

When I was coming up, we were being trained for IEDs in Afghanistan so I was always taught the importance of standoff and dispersion. By the time we got to the 26th, we had everyone bundled up on the nearside of the canal with no dispersion. Essentially the whole platoon.

To summarize, I don't know why. It doesn't make sense to me.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 26th, did you still see people in the crowd with US passports?

(2) Answer. I spent the 26th in the tower and wrapping our business up. I can only speculate, I wasn't down there at that time. My time trying to pull people out personally had kind of come to an end.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the morning of the 26th, when did you get up?

(2) Answer. Sometime early morning.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) After waking up and seeing the crowd had collapsed to your tower, then what do you do that morning?

(2) Answer. We got word, sometime before midmorning, maybe around 0800 to make sure that we had our stuff packed away. The rest of the battalion was going through their destruction criteria and packing their stuff away. We were still holding

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overwatch, but also cycling back by elements of our sniper team. We have an alpha element and a bravo element. We sent our team back by elements to make sure our EDL and our serialized gear was packed away to get ready to get out of there.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So as you were prepping to retrograde, did you spend any time on overwatch?

(2) Answer. Yes, we got a very specific BOLO on a suicide bomber. I think it came over the net, if not, it came in person. From (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if it came in person. Or maybe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The description that we were given, it was a younger clean shaven gentlemen. I can't remember if he was with another individual, but I remember another individual being a part of it. We keyed in to two individuals.

I think maybe we found them, sitting west of our tower. Close to where the blast site ended up being. I first keyed into them, then I think (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up.

(b)(1)1.4a had been up there before looking for people, but I know it was (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) that came up on the 26th. I feel like he confirmed that the individuals we saw looked like the BOLO.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Why did he confirm that, because he received the same BOLO?

(2) Answer. To the best of my knowledge. I don't know, but he seemed pretty sure.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) About when did he come up?

(2) Answer. Around mid-morning. I don't remember his name or rank, but it was definitely a (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) I didn't really know he was (b)(1)1.4a I think I figured that out after the fact.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay so how were you seeing these individuals?

(2) Answer. We had pictures of the individuals, and we had the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) guy look at him through our scope, trying to discretely point out where he was in the canal. He confirmed that was the guy that the BOLO was for, that it looked like the guys.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Okay so the guys you see match the description of a BOLO, then what?

(2) Answer. We watch him and the individual that he was with. These two guys weren't trying to leave, as in evacuate the area through US personnel. The gentlemen in the black garb, had maybe a tan base layer on. He was eating a snack, some crackers or something, and handing out some little cards. We were trying to see what they said, he was only 16 meters away. The bomber was sitting with him, maybe in blue garb, I think. They were friendly, snuggled up to each other. Coaching or maybe coddling him. We watched him for maybe an hour, I don't know how long. They weren't trying to leave, everyone else was desperate to leave.

Maybe it was a false positive, but to me it looked like they had bad intentions.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The gentlemen with the black headdress, how old was he do you think? What did he look like?

(2) Answer. A little older. Maybe late thirties. I think he was bald. I can't remember. We took pictures of him through the camera and passed that SD card up. After the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up and confirmed the BOLO, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got on the radio, and we asked to shoot him after we passed up the pictures.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The other guy was in blue?

(2) Answer. Blue garb, and clean shaven. With longer, maybe curly hair.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you pass those pictures up?

(2) Answer. Before the (b)(6) into the tower, I don't remember. I think we gave the SD card to our platoon commander, or maybe the element that went back. I can't confirm that it was passed up, but to my knowledge it was passed up in the late morning of the 26th.

www. Question and Answer 74.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long did you continue to observe those two for?

(2) Answer. I can't really remember. I remember that after we asked to shoot them, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up. We talked him through what we saw. We told him we saw

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the guy, that the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came up and confirmed that those were the guys of the BOLO. I talked him through the details, that they were 16 meters away and that we would shoot him with the .308 and did the math for point of aim and point of impact. I told him I would shoot both guys through their face, and it would probably hit someone behind them.

I asked him where the engagement authority for that was, he said that was a good question, then he left. Sometime after he left, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) came back up, then we lost sight of the BOLO.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Prior to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) coming up, you said the request was called up. To where, the COC? And who was in the tower when your team called it up?

(2) Answer. Either the COC or our platoon commander. I think it was me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time. We were alpha echelon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gun (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I took pictures, then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) called it up.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked the CoC?

(2) Answer. I don't remember specifically. It would have been along the lines of, "We have PID, and we are requesting to engage." It was enough to get the (b)(6) (b)(6) to walk up.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the COC respond?

(2) Answer. I don't remember. I didn't hear it and I don't remember (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) talking about a response. I think the radio was in the tower at the time.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long after that call until the (b)(6) came to the tower?

(2) Answer. I can't quantify that.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Who was in the tower when the (b)(6) comes and who does the talking?

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(2) Answer. Me, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were there. I primarily did the talking, it was mostly me.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you point those individuals out to him, or did you show him the pictures? Did he already see the pictures since you sent them up?

(2) Answer. He may have seen the pictures. I definitely didn't blatantly point them out because we didn't want to spook them. I think I vaguely talked him on, maybe scooted the spotting scope back so he could look through. I cant remember if I had him look through.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So you told him how you would engage the target, then what did you say?

(2) Answer. That we want to shoot that guy, and we wanted to know where the engagement authority lied for this. That's what we asked, and he said good question. Then we may have exchanged a few more words, then he departed.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what those few more words were?

(2) Answer. No I don't.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you seen (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) HFAC testimony?

(2) Answer. I haven't. I have spent a lot of time with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we lived through most of it. I stay away from social media accounts of it for the most part. I watched part of it, but not all of it in its entirety.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He recounts this sequence of events and states that the team showed the (b)(6) the individual and he asked for the authority to authorize engagement, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says he asks, "Well then who does," when the (b)(6) said he doesn't know. Does that line up with your recollection?

(2) Answer. I remember the (b)(6) answer being to the effect of, that's a good question or I don't know. I was primarily doing the talking. I am sure

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) chimed in here and there. I can't 100% recall. We conveyed the information that we needed to convey.

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): After saying he doesn't know, did you ever hear anything back about that request?

(2) Answer. Nothing.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): did you ever try to follow up with your platoon commander?

(2) Answer. I don't remember so. I remember after we lost the individuals, we rotated back to get our gear. Right when I got back to the tower, that's when the bomb went off.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was it still morning when you talked to the (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I want to say that sounds accurate.

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you lose track of those individuals?

(2) Answer. I want to say in the afternoon.

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You think it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the tower at the time?

(2) Answer. That sounds accurate.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you have the SD card with those pictures?

(2) Answer. No, we never got it back.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone else besides the (b)(6) and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) come to talk about those pictures?

(2) Answer. Not that I can recall.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you think that was the bomber that you saw?

(2) Answer. I can only speculate. I think potentially, yeah. Why would two guys sit there for a while, scout out an area and then leave. Then a couple hours later the bomb goes of.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you have authority to engage those individuals under the ROE?

(2) Answer. No.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you identify those guys as part of a hostile force, like ISIS-K?

(2) Answer. Negative.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As a scout sniper team leader, you understood ROE. If you understood the ROE, and you knew you weren't authorized to engage that target, why request authorization to engage?

(2) Answer. Because it was two dudes that we did not have 100% PID on just sitting there. Going on a hunch, they were sitting there looking suspicious. The one guy eating crackers didn't have guns or a bomb that you could see. The younger individual didn't look like he had a suicide vest or anything like that, he didn't even use a suicide vest. So the intent looked like it was somewhere there, but we didn't know if it was with them. If that makes sense. We had a description over the radio, and a Marine confirm that these guys matched the description. It plays into the rabbit hole of, can you just start shooting guys who are a little suspicious?

To answer the question directly, we asked to engage in the event that it was an opportunity to kill the individual that we suspected to be the suicide bomber.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were there other Afghans that looked like them and could have matched the description of that BOLO in the crowd?

(2) Answer. Yeah, absolutely. But it plays into the factor of the guys sitting there on the wall, with the older guy coaching the younger guy. They weren't doing what everyone else was doing and they matched a description. That's the best that we had to go off of.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Moving into the afternoon of the 26th, you had lost observation of that individual before you went to take care of your gear?

(2) Answer. Yes.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else unique on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, there was a very specific time hack that they thought the suicide bomber was going to detonate. If I remember, about a minute prior to that time all the Marines laid down and got behind cover. I stayed on the gun. Someone had to keep their head up. We buttoned up and closed our windows. Made sure everyone had flaks and Kevlars on.

That's the other thing. That morning when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in our tower, I think we took a round to the tower, right in the window behind (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) head. Those windows are thick. Something impacted the window, and it spider webbed. Throwing something at the window wouldn't have done that. We heard a hard thwack. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told him to put his Kevlar on, he thought we just got shot at, and that was a guy with prior combat experience.

Also on the morning, we saw a husky Russian-Afghan looking guy with an AK with a grenade launcher mounted on it. We saw someone else with a gun too, and we saw that guy just whacking people with a stick. He had a vest with grenades on, he was standing next to our guy (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) who just looked up at me like he couldn't believe what he was seeing. I think that was all prior to keying into the suicide bomber.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you see the (b)(6) or the (b)(6) again prior to the attack?

(2) Answer. I don't think I did. If I did it was in passing, and the opportunity to engage those two guys had passed.

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wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was leadership presence like at the gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer. I remember seeing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) down by the canal, I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) by the wall. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that day because he came and sat in the tower at some point before our conversation with the CO. I might be getting my days mixed up. That shot we took to the window might have happened the day before.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anyone else that sticks out? We acknowledge you were in the tower throughout the day.

(2) Answer. Not that I recall.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When did you go to recover your gear?

(2) Answer. Maybe 1300. It was early afternoon (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to make sure our EDL was squared away earlier. I definitely saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that day, because he's the one who told us to get our stuff packed. And I think to take a shower too. Intermittently, he would come put two guys in the tower so we could go do hygiene, but there was no way to really do that since everyone was so disgusting. We went to go take a shower in the hidden showers behind the gym, but the water was out. I shaved since people were upset we hadn't shaved in a week. That's when we started to head back out there.

zzzz. Question and Answer 103.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you stop in the COC or the JOC while you were at North HKIA to ask about the suspicious individuals?

(2) Answer. No. I wonder about that thinking back, but the guys were gone by that point. Nobody had eyes on them and I was frustrated with other stuff. It's frustrating to think back on, that maybe I should have asked more questions. We didn't stop in, that I remember. We headed back. I think fourth platoon was staged by the inner gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were in an up armored blue Range Rover. We dropped some stuff with fourth platoon, I was feeling like I was in a rush to get back to the tower. That was a pretty common feeling. They gave us a bunch of CS and Flashbangs that we put in the truck. That's when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) headed back while we did that. Once we got loaded, we took off and we were pulling up to the sniper tower when some engineers asked us to back up. That's when the bomb went off.

aaaaa. Question and Answer 104.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was you, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the vehicle at the time?

(2) Answer. Yea. I looked at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and told him it was an IED. I ran to the tower, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) finished parking and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was trying to kick his way out of the back of the truck since the door was stuck.

bbbbb. Question and Answer 105.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You were in the truck, were the windows open? What did it sound like?

(2) Answer. The windows wouldn't open. I don't really remember what it sounded like when it went off just a loud boom. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said it kind of hurt. I just remember the massive cloud of smoke, debris, and body parts. There was nothing else it could have been, just a massive explosion and the cloud of debris was twice as tall as the tower. It obscured everything in the area.

ccccc. Question and Answer 106.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So what did you do when you got out?

(2) Answer. I ran right into the tower. I tried to get some SA on what was going on. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in there. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was freaking out; I think he was close to the window when it went off. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was standing there with the SAS, screaming. I was asking where (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were, trying to figure everything out. I was just looking around.

I remember running up to the tower and running into a big 6'2" Marine. I ran into him and he fell on his back. There were dudes covered in blood running out of the smoke. In the tower, I could the debris was starting to settle. I was trying to see everything in the canal. Marines were laying everywhere. I was trying to find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), the guys said they went out there. That's when I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just laying there with everybody else. That's when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up. I told him that he needed to get accountability because I was going down to help.

ddddd. Question and Answer 107.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the time?

(2) Answer. I ran into the tower, and I saw him in the corner between the canal wall and the jersey barrier. He was really close. He was laid out. I can't remember if his eyes were shut or open, I just saw him lying there.

eeeee. Question and Answer 108.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So then you went down to get him?

(2) Answer. Yeah. This all happened really quickly. I tried to go out, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabbed me and told me to wait. Part of our planning process for this was that this could have been a complex attack. Their MLCOA would be to follow the bombing up with an attack. So (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to wait, we waited for like 10 seconds. Then he told me to go. I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) through the fence. Gunny told me we needed to cut a hole in the fence, since the initial hole was 30 meters away. I tried to throw a rock at the tower, to tell them to pass down the breaching kit we brought with us, I wanted the bolt cutters. I had to run back into the tower and yell at them to give me the bolt cutters. I then went to cut a hole in the fence, another Marine helped me do that. I remember getting a weird adrenaline dump and felt tired doing that. We pried the fence back, then I tried to aid (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I got to him; I was just going to drag him out. I grabbed him, he screamed a little bit. I figured that would have to do, so I took a knee behind the canal wall. We weren't taking any direct fire at that time.

I do remember looking at the fence as I was going through and hearing some cracks overhead. It sounded like gunshots; I couldn't tell you from what direction. I know that one of the first things I heard was the M2 on the Taliban gun truck, but we weren't taking any fire from them at all. So that wasn't to worry about.

I got to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) dragged him a bit, he screamed. I decided to triage him a bit. Shortly after, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up. We tried to do a little triage since we weren't taking fire. Then we moved (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) out, so I think we threw him on a riot shield and carried him back to the tower. I think I handed him off to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I dropped him off at the CCP, then I went out to see if anything else needed to happen. No one had security to the east, so I posted up on the jersey barrier facing that way with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

At some point, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us to come and break it down, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I bounded back in at that point. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were still out there taking a knee by the X. I told them to get up and move. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me he was a commissioned officer. I couldn't figure out what they were doing. It was ridiculous and it pissed me off. That was incompetence. After that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) directed me where to post up, but I realized I shouldn't be doing that. Then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pulled us all back into the gate. At that time a dude and a girl were running up to the gate with a backpack, I almost shot them. We held them back, but (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to let them in. That confused me, we just got blown up, why are we going to let everybody in. I felt like we didn't need to let everyone in. After that we closed the gate. I think a backpack was thrown over the wall at some point. It was a mad house.

I remember when I was pulling security by the vehicle outside the gate, I was looking at the Taliban by the Chevron through my sights. I saw a dude in a lawn chair pointing and laughing. I wanted them to do something stupid, I would have taken them out.

After that whole debacle, I went back into the tower. At that point, the guys told me that they took fire from the east side of the tower. They described it as two shots to the south

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side of the tower, then one more after they closed the window. After that, we grabbed the pen flares that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had acquired. There were gaggles of people by the canal we wanted to disperse.

(b)(3)130b,(b)(6) came up and asked if we saw anything. We saw some kid with a phone near the blast site, and we pointed him out. He was like 13, the warrant officer told us to just leave the kid. We just started shooting pen flares near crowds to get them to leave the area and establish our security posture.

Then we just break down our stuff and pack up to head back to inner gate where we consolidated with everybody. We held rear security while the company moved out of there.

fffff. Question and Answer 109.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When you got to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

ggggg. Question and Answer 110.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is that the only casualty you had treated?

(2) Answer. It was. It pissed me off, because it felt like he had been stepped over and left there by the time we got him. The fact that he is alive is insane to me, because he was in a pile of dead bodies. No one I know that was around him lived. Hoover was next to him and succumbed to his wounds, so I guess it would make sense that bodies got pulled off of him.

hhhhh. Question and Answer 111.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you see him at the Role II?

(2) Answer. I don't think that I did, my Corpsman and I went to look for him. A (b)(1)1.4a a mammoth of a man with a beard asked us what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looked like. He talked to us about it and told us that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was barely holding on and fighting through his injuries. I don't think I actually saw him. If I did, it was very briefly.

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iiiii. Question and Answer 112.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you know who made the decision to send him to the Shock Trauma Platoon instead of directly to the Role II?

(2) Answer. Probably the MEDEVAC vehicle. I think he was just so urgent that they ran him directly to the STP, since so much was going on and everyone else was treating other people. I know (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) treated him some at the CCP and put some occlusive dressings on his wounds. Thinking back, it was pretty lucky. While we were in (b)(1)1.4a we did training on the dummies that bleed. Figuring out a hasty method to make a junctional tourniquet. I felt bad, talking to the corpsman what the blood looked like coming out, and they told me it was probably a severed artery. I don't know if I could have known that about his leg at the time.

jjjjj. Question and Answer 113.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you receive any blast effects, (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

kkkkk. Question and Answer 114.

(1) Question. C1: Did you ever interact with (b)(1)1.4a in the tower?

(2) Answer. Potentially, but I am not sure.

lllll. Question and Answer 115.

(1) Question. C1: Would anyone mean (b)(1)1.4a when they say (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. Potentially, but not in the capacity that I think of it. I can't say for sure. I can say the doctor I talked to that treated him was the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

mmmmm. Question and Answer 116.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Going back to the individual that was out of place on the 26th, who took the picture?

(2) Answer. I believe it was me.

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nnnnn. Question and Answer 117.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you show that picture to anyone at the COC?

(2) Answer. I believe that we passed the SD card with the pictures to the COC.

ooooo. Question and Answer 118.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you show the camera itself to anyone?

(2) Answer. I believe (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) I still don't know his name. We had limited interactions with him prior. There were a million people coming to the gate, and we had the best view.

ppppp. Question and Answer 119.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember who was there when you showed the picture to the COC?

(2) Answer. I don't recall or any responses.

qqqqq. Question and Answer 120.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember what you said in conjunction with passing that picture?

(2) Answer. Not specifically, no.

rrrrr. Question and Answer 121.

(1) Question. C1: Did you get an out brief after the event?

(2) Answer. Not other than the hotwash and the initial investigation that your team did.

sssss. Question and Answer 122.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Based on your recollection, did you ever see someone shoot at the tower?

(2) Answer. I never saw anyone shoot at the tower, no.

ttttt. Question and Answer 123.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You said (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) remembered that he was alert, (b)(6) (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(6)

uuuuu. Question and Answer 124.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Are you in touch with him?

(2) Answer. I see him regularly. I was in the room when he did the podcast with Travis Haley.

vvvvv. Question and Answer 125.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Have you done any interviews?

(2) Answer. No. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think. It was an (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) he just wanted my account of things.

wwwww. Question and Answer 126.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned seeing the human dimensions of your team at the gate. What do you mean by that?

(2) Answer. Compounding fatigue and lack of sleep. Looking through magnified optics for lengths of times rots your brain, you get fatigued. Couple that with babies being thrown, people dying, seeing that desperation. It weighed on people, especially our corpsman. He is a father, as is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). People had a hard time with that, seeing the things that happened.

People would lose their shit sometimes. I yelled at two Marines for pointing their grenade launcher with a sponge round in it at two civilians from real close. I was like, "what are you doing?" We wanted to help, it was hard to sleep with everything going on. So we helped, people were getting mad and people were tired. Then there was also a language barrier. Ultimately, these are all human beings. What if these people were your mother or your sister? People are desperate.

xxxxx. Question and Answer 127.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Is this the photo of the guy that you saw? *Shows the picture of the bearded individual sitting on the wall. *

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(2) Answer. Yes. That is the picture. That's the dude. I think we had another picture of the individual behind him in the blue too. That is the guy that he was sitting with, I think. Maybe we didn't have a picture of the other guy, but this dude for sure is the one that was eating crackers and coddling the younger guy.

Maybe we didn't get a picture of the other guy that he was with, but definitely this bald guy in black matched the BOLO. I don't know if this second guy of the photo was the second individual. I don't think the second individual is in this photo.

yyyyy. Question and Answer 128.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else you want to add?

(2) Answer. The State Department sucks. We were doing their job the whole time while they were working a 9-5. I saw their after action, and stopped reading after the first two paragraphs. They just wanted to shift the blame, there were no lessons learned.

I get that it's war, and that Marines are going to die. At the end of the day, we all do the bidding of the government. Maybe that's a jaded perspective, but that's my take on it. At the end of the day, we were trying to help people and save people. I took one family, took him to DoS and told him that the family wanted to leave. The DoS told me I needed to get that guy out since he worked with the (b)(1)1.4c for 15 years, but I don't know how I was supposed to deduce that. I don't know how many people might have been left because of that.

zzzzz. Question and Answer 129.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6), or maybe someone like (b)(1)1.4a, were in the tower and you were discussing shooting the individuals on the wall. I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked why not engage or apprehend the guy, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that the guy responded, "The asset cannot be comprised." what does that mean?

(2) Answer. I am not sure. I think that may have been an after the fact thing. I (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c Seeing a picture would give us something to go off. Looking back now, I wish we would have shot them.

aaaaaa. Question and Answer 130.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Two years ago, you said that you passed the photos up. You said that it was bothering you that you passed those up and you never heard anything back, you wanted to know if it was the guy. You didn't mention the conversation with the CO at the time. Why didn't that come up, why not mention that the first time we spoke?

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(2) Answer. I don't have a good answer for you. I think I brought it up in the hotwash with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), but I don't know. I don't have a good answer for you.

bbbbbb. Question and Answer 131.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anything else to add?

(2) Answer. No, not that I can think of.

cccccc. Question and Answer 132.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Who else should we talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He has retired, he does (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) He is a big guy. Their perspectives would be good. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he is a Marine's Marine. The rest of our team (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be good. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) another very experienced guy. The (b)(6) and the (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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~~CUI~~

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THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231025, which begins on question ~~page~~ 1 and ends on question ~~page~~ 132. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

20231025
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer)

20231025
DATE

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 26 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b,(b)(6)

1. On 26 October 2023, BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which the INTERVIEWEE answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review their transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. <u>Question and Answer 1.</u>

(1) Question. Can you please provide a little career background?

(2) Answer. I arrived at 2/1 Echo company and about 6-8 months later I joined (b)(6). We were going to deploy in 3 months after I joined the platoon. We were training to see who matched together best. I was with (b)(6) We deployed in March. In (b)(1)1.4d We conducted long range shoots. We got word we were going to Afghan at the 4 of 7-month mark while in (b)(1)1.4d Watching the news pretty-closely and we heard more info from social media than what was being put out. The (b)(6) brought us in with little to say about what was going to happen next.

c. <u>Question and Answer 2.</u>

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(1) Question. Did you ever get ROE Briefings?

(2) Answer. We were pulled in a room (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was giving a brief along with the jag and it was kind of confusing for me personally. They were not sure exactly what they would be walking into. We didn't believe we would be the ones to go due to feeling like we've been hyped up and not sent out before. Some people got cards that had the ROE on them but I did not remember receiving one. I remember the (b)(1)1.4a cards being straight forward and similar to Generic ROE (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or maybe CENTCOM CDR or 51/5 handed down the ROE. He flew around to kind of fly around the place and check in (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) instructed us to use sound judgment and simply do the right thing.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Did you understand you had the right to defend yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, but it was still a pretty gray area we did not understand.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When you got to Afghanistan did you understand you had the right to defend yourself? Hostile act or intent?

(2) Answer. If they shoot at you and you know something is about to go down you have the right to defend yourself (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had left 12-24 hours prior alone. When we arrived, we knew some had gotten in small scuffles and some were wounded (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was trying to engage someone and there were too many people and avoided to not kill innocent civilians. ROE constantly changed on the ground. If an American citizen was being fired upon and we had the right to defend them, but it was too crowded to know who was or wasn't an American citizen. Later found out we were working with the Taliban, and I did not know and used my best judgement to not put myself or others in danger, as well as protect myself legally.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What was your understanding of the RoE?

(2) Answer. Even before we pushed out to Abbey Gate, we knew we had justified means to engage many individuals, but we were told not to and chose not to out of fear of punishment when returning home. We understood hostile act with hostile intent. We had 100% justified reason to engage people, but we were told not to. We kept finding ourselves in weird situations that made us question what exactly the right thing was.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you first know for sure you knew you would deploy to Afghanistan?

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(2) Answer. At the ROE brief and 2-3 days between and we were told Echo would be punching out. We sent one of our guys and enabler assets. There was an issue at (b)(1)1.4d where a suspicious vehicle entered the gate and delayed flights.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. When do you physically get on a plane?

(2) Answer. August 16

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. With whom did you go with?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Were you in a different platoon at once upon arrival?

(2) Answer. It's all one platoon but they moved me to a team of seniors, and they moved the other LCpl to the other team of seniors.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. When you arrive at HKIA, talk us through that?

(2) Answer. It was about 4 hours. I remember there is some type of issue with having to land on a taxi way. They gave me CS cans and we expected heavy contact/kinetic engagements on the ground. Nothing came of it.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What was your position on the team?

(2) Answer. The eyes and ears of the team itself. It's usually the most junior guy on a team because there's a lot to teach and execute. Route planning, navigation, packing. Anything to better the team.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Can you talk about any other training prior to deployment?

(2) Answer. 1-3 weeks on indoctrination. To see if you would make it. 38 people initially were there for the training and 4 made it out. If you can communicate and work

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well with teams over 3 months, you will be worthy of staying. As a SLUG/PIG my job was to learn everything possible about Sniper-craft. I had to be employed just as any sniper within a team. I took on advanced medical training, shooting, and infantry skills.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Who was Sniper trained on the team?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did your graduate as a PIG?

(2) Answer. You graduate as a slug after INDOC and after 3 months of probation as a PIG. If you prove yourself to be both a good shooter, leader, and thinker you are allowed to remain within the teams and platoon. The platoon came together in (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d where everyone came together as a team, and it was the best learning experience ever. Years of experience brought together.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. By the end of training, you are a PIG, at the point of deployment?

(2) Answer. First month of deployment was my last month of training.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Was this your first deployment? What happened when you landed?

(2) Answer. This was my first deployment. We hit the ground hard. Arriving at HKIA we got out set up on a perimeter. There was a young lady that walked up to us. Its dark when we arrive. We got pushed to connexes and picked up more ammunition and then to the gym. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) goes to make coordination with higher, all team billets execute their duties.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Who did (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) make contact with when you landed?

(2) Answer. The CO at the time was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's who (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) should have made contact with once we come off the aircraft. We were checking maps and checking the ground. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was doing his comm piece and (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) is a JFO and he couldn't really do much as far as controlling the air. Our job was to basically find work.

s. Question and Answer 18.

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(1) Question. What's your first mission?

(2) Answer. Team gets back together, and we have to figure out how we would travel so we broke windows and hot wired vehicles. Our mission was to provide reconnaissance from a Satellite tower and surveil the terminal. Defense in depth lines were set. We were going to rotate but it didn't last long. We were ensuring force protection and pointing out weak spots within and outside the airport. We also surveilled people in the terminal. We did in depth field sketches, getting distances and milling out objects to better engage threats if need be.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Would you mind going to your barracks room and getting your logbooks so we can discuss them?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) goes to get a box from his room. Below is a brief description of what was in the ice box*

(2) Answer. Brought ice box. Brought sketches of Abbey gate. Do outs logs. Took military items and took photos of them. Sheets built up for ranges and dope sheets. Psychological planning. What things were hot to brief. Sketch on (b)(6)? Has the PIG bible. Describes everything they would do in a conscience element. Packet has every in-depth definitions of training. A few publications of how a round will do to someone or go through someone or what it will do to their body. Has family history in Marines. (b)(6) was in the Marines for about 8 years and then in the Army National Guard. And (b)(6) works in the pentagon, retired Air Force. Observation logs from Day 1 Abbey gate to the day they got hit. It is okay to make copies of docs. Not logs.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. What was your mission out there?

(2) Answer. One of your responsibilities is to maintain the obs log. We ended up a 7-man team. It was my duty to report and to write everything down. We kept our own logs as well as those for the team strictly.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. What was the mission up there in the tower?

(2) Answer. To make observations to S2. We would send it up in a sheet and continually take pictures and maintain surveillance. Had a runner getting food describing what they saw to S2. S2 was telling the runner what they found on the SIG. At a point I was a runner. But at a point they did have to go back because they were not eating.

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w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. How can I tell when there's a BOLO?

(2) Answer. I report what I see. That was the hard piece in terms of communications. When we arrived to Abbey gate we knew there was no way someone would not try to take advantage of the amount of people there. That did come out eventually. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us the run-down of what SIGINT was picking up between Al Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS-K. They told us to rest up because tomorrow will be big. They told us to pack our assault packs with essentials. Keep your ILBE in the center and if we have to burn everything in case we have to escape the airport light, we will. In the north gate there was a lot of kinetic activity as well as in the mountains. We waited and prepared to be pushed into the city and got our tasking. The mission changed 4-5 times while in the assembly area at the inner gate. (b)(6) took over and they pushed us down to Abbey gate. The gates were closed but it was a lot of commotion. The 19th or 20th was when we pushed through with the gate.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Describe the location of the Sniper tower (b)(6) was located in at Abbey gate?

(2) Answer. The gate closest to the airfield is abbey proper. The outer gate. Inner gate closest to airfield. Outer gate 155 meter to the chevron. Canal wall closest to sniper tower.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Which date do you arrive at abbey? Anyone on the team can annotate the log, right? who made the most inputs on the log?

(2) Answer. I want to say the 19th. the most inputs could have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). – Identifies his handwriting.- (21 August 0600 that is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Handwriting (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made entry on 26 August 0210 "I believe is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)." When we were caught – I grabbed everything. That's how I ended up with the logs. I believe (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 22 August 0610-1535 (at least the bottom of the page is (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hand writing). 25 August at 1119 is possibly (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Everyone should have writing on this log.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Are there periods of time, you where you were with someone and you remember the event?

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(2) Answer. Sometimes. I start writing and then I would hand off the logs to take photos and let someone else fill in the log.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Start on 21st what happened? When did you arrive at abbey gate?

(2) Answer. We arrive at abbey gate I believe the 19th. We go through the riot situation. The (b)(1) 1.4d are currently in the sniper tower. We the team and the (b)(1) 1.4d have a machine gun element. The (b)(1) 1.4d were there for 2 or 3 days. They were running in and out. and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) form (b)(6) are together (b)(6) was going to mesh with another team. And they sent (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to (b)(6) We were not down any people, we had a full team (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was just added. The other two teams were just added together.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at the gate? What happened when you arrived at the gate?

(2) Answer. August 19 is when we arrived at the gate. It was pretty crowded. When we moved from the assembly area and Golf Co and rear. (b)(1)1.4d had a JLTV style vehicle and the xo popped on the vehicle. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got in line with golf company guys. We grabbed each others flaks and pushed the crowd back. Gun fire was going above head from (b)(1)1.4d and Taliban (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got dragged into a crowd. Our PPE was getting caught on walls, gear being ripped off and we were in a full on 300 style fight. The air was burning from CS, Gunfire rang out and everything just started swaying and we could not breath. (b)(1)1.4d were hitting people with their vehicles. They hit a group of people and it took a lot of yelling and hitting their vehicle to stop them. I was pulling (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as he was falling into the crowd.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. When did you clear the surge?

(2) Answer. Clear the surge. We muzzle thumped our way out and I almost past out (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) almost passed out (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started administering aid to people after he came to. He thought he would die. And I felt like it was worse than the 26 in my mind. We had marines stuck and we gassed ourselves and when the crowd pushed out a lot of people got trampled. Kids were dead, a woman looked like she was crushed by a cider block. Trying to grab people that are escaping. And kids kept getting caught into the crowd. We came out of the riot bloodied up and we decided not to gas anymore.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

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(1) Question. This question may have been, what else do you have there, as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had what looked like a ziplock bag with a newspaper and a small book he found in the Gym?

(2) Answer. Grabbed a newspaper and found something in the gym.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. What else do you have related to your job?

(2) Answer. Old camp Pendleton map. Has a shot placement book. Found out the rounds they were using would go through people. Has a tactical thought process slide. Different ranges for guns notes.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Your CO joined you in the sniper tower with (b)(1)1.4a Cleared the areas and using riot shields. People are getting crushed against walls and fences?

(2) Answer. We had gotten ordered not to shoot over anyone's head (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. NO QUESTION CAPTURED

(2) Answer. That was whenever Echo could get in the same space of each other. It was made clear we will not shoot over anyone's head. 1/8 was doing it, there were lieutenants with brass knuckles (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team was exercising restraint. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was adamant about who they are helping. His SNCOs were helping explain what they were not to do. To avoid collateral damage. The more experienced were telling them shooting over head with a weapon won't help.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. What happened on the 20th ?

(2) Answer. 19th it cleared. The team got together and they said they don't think they would be able to hold up long. Later in the night on the 19th the Taliban are sitting on their trucks and there was too much light for night optics to work. We asked for flood lights to be put out, when they were put out we could see with the optics. The truck with connex boxes come in and created the chevron. Combat engineers set up c-wire at the base of the tower toward the chevron chain link fence. On the 20th the Chevron went up and it affected the visuals from the tower. The immediate area behind the chevron is obstructed. At this point no one is in the canal yet. They are still talking with people and handing out food.

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ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. How did you get the first BOLO?

(2) Answer. There are BOLO messages. That started 18th into the 19th and the 20th. A cyber message. We drive up to the NSU and they leave the post and throw down their firearms. NSU were trying to evacuate as well. The 20th everything is calm and bringing food in. kinda calm. The crowds grow on the 21st. and there was a dummy dropped. All of the crowds, (b)(6) and we didn't have a (b)(1)1.4g up yet but we heard about a Toyota corolla if EOD didn't set up comm. Signal was used if comms were down. EOD set up (b)(1)1.4g system. On the 21st Comms are being affected. Runners and signal app are being used. Did not use black gear because of Taliban. Signal worked okay. WhatsApp was compromised. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may have more messages from or on signal. I was more on the team camera.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. How were you passing things to the S2?

(2) Answer. Use SD card to get info to S2. They ask us to gather more info on

somethings or people. I ran around probably the most but running to and from S2 was not one set person. Whoever is on gun and optic are most important.

c. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. Pictures that you took with your camera are being passed to the 2/1 S2 Shop via SD Card, how many times a day?

(2) Answer. Maybe 2-3 times a day. As often as possible.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. How are you managing overwatch, protect those on the ground and paying attention to threat streams and individuals?

(2) Answer. We have two sniper teams, as well as continuous all-weather day and night surveillance.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

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(1) Question. Any discussion of potential IED test run?

(2) Answer. Yes, we coordinated well there was not (b)(1)1.4g was working. We heard a suspicious vehicle in parking lot. This is the day of the blast. The vehicle is full of back packs. He had all white on and lots of gold heavy set male with a brown vest and long white beard and glasses are gold aviator type. And he was given the name "shot caller."

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Do you believe there was hostile act and hostile intent?

(2) Answer. Shot caller is the guy in the parking lot.

*At this point, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) begins reading from his obs logs from Abbey gate:

21 August
0800 POI 3-4 group of males
Coordinating with a team reporting what they are doing. Shot Caller looks at inner gate and tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said "I know we have to get the MFer". Put the SAS in west window. "A lot of energy was being put towards Shot Caller." (b)(6) communicates (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is closest to inner gate. Green gear comms is how they are communicating. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was calling things out.

0745 Partial plate on the vehicle in the parking lot C120 in the native language. Description of elder. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) named Shot Caller. White garb brown vest long white beard.

0805 2–3 man detail accompany Shot Caller. To the calm side of canal, no one thought to jump in water yet. They make their way forward and keep looking at the tower and inching toward the gate.

0820 Shot Caller goes back to car and makes phone calls and is looking nervous at this point.

0917 someone in group moves away.

0920 clean cut male is with Shot Caller. Clean cut has blue duffel. Another male carries a coyote bag. Two walkers walk towards entry control point.

0930 Shot Caller is elder man in white garb

1031 two walkers moving Shot Caller moving with someone else. We are watching the bags Shot Caller walk up pretty close to us. Shot Caller is on the north west side of the tower but getting closer. We shut one window and the camera is still recording Shot

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Caller. As he is walking up, we think we may have to drop him- we know there is something wrong but when we see the bags come out of the vehicle and when we see the bags, its fitting the descriptions the only thing that doesn't match is the Toyota corolla. The actions are suspicious and that is why we thought that we may have to stop him, and we hit the Shot Caller with the camera. Once he sees we have the camera and the Rifle on him he runs to the parking lot.

Concludes reading from log

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Do they have weapons visible?

(2) Answer. They did not have any visible specifically no wires because there is a team carrying the bag that's why we had suspicion. They kept picking the bag up and putting it back down.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. What is their route?

(2) Answer. They just keep walking up and down. Shot Caller gets on phone looks left. Shot Caller stays in parking lot after we took photos of him. He knows we are taking photos and he's moving fast back to parking lot. One on right (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is on east side window. I pop the camera out and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pops out rifle and we scream hey! And I take the photos. The bags are not going in one direction at one single time. The bags are not near him. I believe they are in the parking lot near the vehicle. Shot Caller is with one person near the tower.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. * Reading from Logs*

(2) Answer. After photos
1045 we were looking at umbrellas in the parking lot (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) calls out there are multiple bags in a forerunner. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) calls and says I've got bags in Parking lot

1223 hotel gold corolla get away from me. Threat stream came out. No threat stream on Shot Caller and group just on gold corolla.

1225 someone acting frantic with a backpack. Their body language is off. Frantic person was not tied to any threat stream, him being suspicious was just tied to behavior and body language. And it just catches his attention

1305 man runs from camera. This is frantic individual with a backpack in blue smog

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1318 Shot Caller is just looking around in other vehicles. Shot Caller is picking up phone and putting it back down multiple times he stays in parking lot and doesn't go past umbrellas

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. What happened to the photos on the SD Card once they are taken to S2?

(2) Answer. When SD cards go to S2 we have no idea where those photos go. I was hoping they were downloading the photos, but I do not know what they did with them.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. Who was the EOD Person?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was being pulled in many directions.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question. What was happening at this point?

(2) Answer. Lost eyes on Shot Caller. Taliban doing weird stuff.

ww. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. What happened next?

Starts reading from Logs

(2) Answer. 1344 found bag within perimeter (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) handwriting starts 1318.

Between 1349 and 1600 we observe the two individuals move into the crowd and another guy with a bag move into the crowd at 1349. So now three people are in the crowd. Dust starts to pick up in the parking lot. Cameras go down. Shot Caller is nowhere to be seen. Weapons are down but optics are up. Now group of three are in crowd Shot Caller was not one of the three. The Three are the people we observed previously.

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Two individuals walked into the crowd and a third separate. Team camera is on. Pancake head, with traditional Afghan wool hat. (b)(6) had bowl cut, man wearing pacool. We first started watching the three in the parking lot. They are on the inner wall moving towards my positions. People started yelling a bit more. Marines are down by the Barron hotel. Marines on the outside in the vicinity of the near side of the canal. They range about 30-40 meters. They are more in buddy pairs. More than ten Marines doing this. A girl jumps in the water. She stays out somewhere. She came and stole cigarettes and sold shoes. When she jumped in the water everyone follows. A six y/o girl jumps in the canal, sewage water. They fed the girl and her brother. The girl put a cigarette out on one of the Marines so we kind of stopped feeding her and her brother.

1448 girl jumps in canal on or about 1500 on the 21st the guys start moving into the crowd. Pancake traditional headgear (pacool), (b)(6) bowl cut (1053), and third military age male. Three military age males. At this point I am moving pretty quick and the three are on the near side of the canal.

xx. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. They disappeared and it is not on the log. Why did you get the log together on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It may be on someone's personal log. Why did you decide to get your log straight. We were just in (b)(1)1.4d and decided to get our logs straight. Some of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) things ended up burned and some of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1349-1600 that's the gap. Because I was concentrated on watching these three guys. It calms down a little and I was able to take the photo of the girl in the water.

They make their way in the crowd and you can hear panic in (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) voice, at this point he is talking over the green gear radio. He's saying "They're moving in they're moving in." As they are walking in I start to lose sight of them as they get closer into the crowd. It was about 1305 when I lost visual of these guys.

I was told to go find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and everyone is starting to notice I'm frantic. I scream to the gun guys and ask if they see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and tell them to keep and eye out. I am in the inner corridor trying to find him, I find a bridge EOD guy and let him know what's happening. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came from the inner gate to sniper position. He said hey we are gonna go out and tackle these guys ourselves.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran to the inner Corridor and I am passing info to tower. I follow (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was told not to go with him but I did and we are walking pretty quick down the U shape barrier. Toward the opening in the fence. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) jumped up on jersey barriers by the break in the fence and tells everyone to calm down and to sit down. I kept looking and people are shouting "officer officer, look look" and the crowd separates. They are on the far side of chain link fence, when the crowd parts I

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see a duffle right in front of me near the opening on the near side of the canal. About 5-7 meters away, the bag is about 3.5 - 4 feet long. It was probably definitely the bag. I am trying to get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) attention and I was telling the (b)(1) 1.4d to get the dogs. And the (b)(1)1.4d EOD guy is talking to the Marine Warrant Officer. Dog sniffs bag and sit down. And we tell everyone to get down. Women were crying and kids are crying and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I look at each other like we are about to die. A woman was upset and praying and I was consoling the praying woman and holding two children. We sit for 30 minutes before getting the 'all clear'. At this point I am behind the jersey barrier. I cannot see what specifically is happening.

The crowd is staying put and the Marines too just saying put behind a wall. I do not know what company was on the gate at this time but it could have been Echo. We got the all clear 30 minutes later. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told Me not to mention this to their wives. I heard there was a bag drop was attempted at the north gate as well.

yy. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. Did anyone every say what was in the bag?

(2) Answer. Never talked about what was actually in the bag.

zz. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. Start to Finish. Who gives the all clear?

(2) Answer. I just hear it not sure who gave it. From us walking out to coming back in this may have taken 45 minutes.

* Starts reading from Logs*

1600 Taliban observed putting children and a father and kids on top of boxes. The media showed up at this time. And the Taliban starts giving out food to people.

aaa. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. How do you know they were shooting people? When and where was this happening?

(2) Answer. They can't drive a vehicle through it to his us but on the other side of the chevron was chaos. I saw executions through the SSRT on the gun. The first one I saw was AK shot someone in the head. About 20-30 meters beyond the chevron my field of view opened up around the 20-30 meters behind the chevron. I witnessed multiple executions. Taliban male is in brown garb in man jams. Who shot someone execution style. When I saw it happen, I just stopped and told everyone what I just saw. The Taliban shot what looked like a male in the head. I saw the male look up just before he was shot in the head. And I saw the impact of the bullet. Once the Taliban pulled the

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trigger the person's he kind of jerked back. I saw executions on the 20th. I put a few on the log but not all of them.

bbb. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. You believe the last entry ended at 1600

(2) Answer. NO ANSWER CAPTURED

22 August 1710
23 August 1734 large crowds running down the street beatings and shootings follow. I saw the shootings myself

ccc. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Are you able to distinguish if the executed people are American citizens?

(2) Answer. No. Numerous times throughout the week I witnessed executions occurring on the other side of the chevron.

A Green laser kept lasing us. It hit my eye. I did not know what to do at this time. But its hard to distinguish hostile act hostile intent at this point, and I do not believe I should act at this point. I have hundreds if not thousands of civilians everywhere. I don't want blue on blue. I exercised restraint because I know there could be collateral damage of civilians. I also don't have PID of who is lasing me. At this point it doesn't meet PID nor the ROE.

My 1stSgt came to check on us. I am switching eyes as I was just lased, and he hits my on the shoulder and someone got shot on the other side of the chevron. I told him that and they told me to take a nap. I believe it would have been easier to do something about the Taliban with the ROE if we had control.

We would drive around the airport and things would shoot overhead, - I head two guys came under fire and they were told not to fire and just had to take cover-

I did go down to the Barron hotel and they wanted a report, so myself doc (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) we were going to get up to the roof tops to get better observation. This was after the dummy drop so this was after the 21st maybe 22nd or 23rd.

We push down we walked up to (b)(1)1.4d We were sweet talking and climbed into the stair well got low put black sheets up and we see everything on the other side of the chevron. We saw the tables and the dead bodies. We were within 5 meters of the Taliban. I am

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taking notes doc is holding up corner. And we jump from roof top to roof top and some (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got up on a roof top three buildings down. Some guy had a go pro recording -two guys- Taliban freaks out. Once I saw them I started pushing back. We are further down. The two guys got chewed out by the (b)(1)1.4d interpreter. We brought photos back and the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked how did we get the photos and how did we get that close.

The rumor mill was that the Taliban was being peaceful and that was not the case. That is why we did that and to find out the weapons system. I could not say whether they were Americans.

md. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. Have you seen an interview on social media?

(2) Answer. Yes and with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) says we have photos he means the ones on the SD cards that S2 has them. It was too many photos and I did not want my phone storage taken up by all of those photos. I stopped taking photos by the 21st or 22nd and I had a feeling someone would blow us up and I might catch it on my phone. I had helped and picked up a kid on the canal wall and I started to take a photo but decide against it because I felt it was wrong to take a photo.

eee. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. Were there other threat streams coming through?

(2) Answer. After the first few days they were saying there was possible VBIEDs. What we are finding we are trying to find in the area but there are things on social media that we were looking at and later looking for in the crowd as potential threats.

Someone was able to get a car to the tower by driving on the wall. It was a small car and I was yelling at the car to push back. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me to calm down, but it was another Afghan trying to drop someone off close to the gate and it ended up not being a threat.

fff. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Was there any hostile act or hostile intent?

(2) No didn't meet PID didn't meet ROE. The crowd was helping by telling the car to get back. The car backed up and got off the wall.

ggg. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question. Threat streams making their way to you or open social media saying suicide vest concerns?

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(2) Answer. We started getting texts from green berets asking to get interpreters. Can you contact this person. Instagram messages are being sent to people in the tower. Giving out descriptions of people, giving descriptions to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a and EOD started coming up in the tower. It was used to calm down the crowd.

hhh. Question and Answers 57.

(1) What (b)(1)1.4a SM do you remember?

(2) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a big guy with dark hair. The (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was called (b)(6) They would come up to ask what we had going on to help or for overhead cover.

jjj. Question and Answers 58.

(1) Question. Did anyone give you any type of description?

(2) Answer. The (b)(1)1.4a guys gave us a description. They asked for overwatch while they did precision extractions.

Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had been messaged to find a family. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed Afghans back to have Marines in buddy pairs. We stopped and kicked people out because they begged us to shoot them. Near side of canal wall pushing out toward foot bridge. We had on head lamps and flashlights. Trying to find a particular family. We did a few flashes they did a few flashes. And I jump in the canal and help the family over.

kkk. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. Describe what is happening in the building across the canal?

(2) Answer. I looked in the crack house and everyone in the crack house had an evil look on their face. 10-15 meters. I make hard eye contact with a guy. The people are wearing traditional Afghan clothing. There are about 6 people in the family and I am helping them cross the wall. I am having them grab each other's shoulder. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) there is something weird about a house. And he agreed their facial features body language and they are postured up. They are going from sitting to standing and they seem tall. We talked about it and we just did not like their body posture and body language. I am back in the tower by 0247 on the 26 August.

cl. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Why did the (b)(6) come up?

(2) He came up later in the day, but he came up that day because we had a PID on the photo. It is my understanding a runner was sent out to get the (b)(6)

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(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) just on the gun and explained to the (b)(6) what's going on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is confirming everything going on. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said to the (b)(6) You can have two casualties, or you can have 8 and the (b)(6) just sat there and thought to himself about that. No wires were seen coming from these males or bag. The ID is coming from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Things around them didn't match. Everything around them was erratic but they were not. The guy had a blank stare face and had a lot of confidence. The (b)(6) sits there and says "No I am not risking that I don't know what to do", and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) looks up at the (b)(6) (he was on the gun) and says "Who the fuck does?" and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said I'll go tackle him myself. After that the guy slipped back into the crowd. The (b)(6) walks out and says he will get back to us. The (b)(6) told them no.

From the Ops Log
They spotted three hours later (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is writing -0210-0258

I woke up to flash bangs and a lot of people being rowdy. This is early morning on the 26th. I am trying to figure out why they are so loud. A girl maybe 18 or 19 got caught in c-wire. And they were trampling her. Not long after I placed my head against the bullet proof window, heard a pop and felt impact. The window vibrated on my head, and I saw a round had landed directly behind me.

We got a description of what to look for from the (b)(1)1.4a Description was a "clean shaven guy in brown". The really big guy (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is giving the BOLO and doesn't say how he got the threat stream. There was a guy that had a green Gen 3 FLAK but in jeans and they asked were we looking for the guy. The guy they are looking for may be 30-40. A guy in his lap had his head down, in his lap, and he had his hair being caressed. The guy in the brown garb was who I was keeping an eye out for.

I don't know where the clean-shaven description came from but I'm pretty sure that's an ISIS description thing. That's something the (b)(1)1.4a was briefed on and does not know by who but it's kind of stressed when they are briefed in (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in tower. (b)(1)1.4a guys come up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is in the tower and another (b)(1)1.4a and could have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describes someone and the team fairly quickly spots the individual in question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is in on gun (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is doing obs log (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is obs logging and looking through his SSOT. We end up rotating through guns every thirty minutes. I was definitely on the gun but not sure about who was on the spotting optics. There were red balloons set up that had not been there prior. A bald man is staring at me (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he is the older guy. The younger guy is in his lap. Took photos of bald guy. I motioned to him to come over. He did not react when we lased his forehead. The (b)(6) came up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) identified an olde male with a black garb as possibly being the guy who stared at him straight through the lens.

mmm. <u>Question and Answer 61.</u>

(1) Question. Why did the (b)(6) come up?

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(2) Answers. He came up later in the day, but he came up that day because we had a PID on the photo. It is my understanding a runner was sent out to get the (b)(6)

nnn. Question and Answer 62.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) why do you think he said no?

(2) Answers. The description was pretty exact and I could see why the (b)(6) said no but at this point we were not allowed to use CS without a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) approval. In my opinion, I feel it was hostile act, hostile intent. But that's where it gets tricky. Everyone sat behind that gun and had that same feeling. This felt real and pretty serious. I was basing this on their body language. The only other time I saw anything similar (the body language) was days prior when there was the dummy drop of the blue duffle bag.

ooo. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question. Was it a vibe or something definitive on what you saw before?

(2) Answer. It was the vibe and how I saw the people with the dummy drop before, it was the state that they were in (calm) and everything around them was chaos.

ppp. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question. *Photo is shown to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)*

(2) Answer. Sometimes when we see guys like that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) does recognize yellow/ tan vest) they would come up and sit down and they would do sexual things towards our tower or asking to take our photo. They look calm (the current picture) But it seemed as if something else was going on in their mind (referring to the PID individual). Its totally his facial construct. And after everything knowing that they were sitting were the actual explosion happened. I am 100% sure it was the bomber. You could tell some were tired because they been there so long and a new person shows up and sits for a long time.

(b)(6) leave they go to the inner corridor, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may have been with him. And he made a joke about how the (b)(6) holster was empty.

qqq. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question. If they had displayed hostile act or hostile intent why didn't you engage?

(2) Answer. I would have asked for permission to act because if I was to follow the ROE because this would have happened very differently if I had shot that guy I believed that was the guy that hit us. Because of his behavior how he seemed calm.

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rrr. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question. Did you know we used the balloons to identify those that need exactions?

(2) No

sss. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question. If (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had not have come to the tower, do you think you would have keyed in on him?

(2) Answer. We had keyed in on him and said Hey come up. We showed him who it was and he said that's our guy. Someone from (b)(1)1.4a gave descriptions before. Then we call (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) up and show him who we had our eye on, he says that's our guy. I am very confident that was the guy because I don't think incidents like that happen. Too many things made sense. Based on where the blue bag was, and the vibe you are getting from watching him. I can confidently say I believe that's the bomber. When we had the dummy drop, everyone stayed in place. Day of the blast marines were lined up on the wall. I heard (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) gave the order to collapse. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said something's really weird today, this is on the 26th, the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from echo came out and said something is gonna go boom today, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and you guy are going to lose your fucking brains. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frustrated. Flashbangs are overhead.

ttt. Question and Answer 68.

(1) Question. Do you guys talk about this over chat. Like after all this has happened?

(2) Answer. No. the blast happened. I personally don't like to talk about it. There are some things. It was unhealthy for me. There are things I heard there is no way that happened. Just people claiming Echo got into a scuffle and claimed to have shot a second bomber just people being overzealous about what they did. Just pulling people off the x when they didn't or saying they created the opening in the fence. And I had to turn off my phone and turn on my brain. I was basically being told we were lying about getting into contact with small arms and I was at a point where it felt as if no one would listen. The whole thing kind of killed my morale and I felt I lost a lot of friends and my mentor, and I don't know why.

uuu. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question. Is there anything on social media you don't agree with?

(2) Answer. Theres one kid. We saw the same thing we saw the same person we ask each other "are you sure, are you sure that we felt the actual same." I've searched Reddit or Twitter to see if there were certain impacts or anything like what I felt.

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xv. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question. At 17:36:52 I'm tracking that you had been on a pretty regular run as time allows that let you take care of referred and you're in the middle of backing up your vehicle as the bomb goes off.

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

We came back from normal run and we were rushing to get back to the gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said if you guys leave something bad is going to happen. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the tower together. First Platoon was out on the flight line. I took photos because I was feeling down because I said I would never see combat. They said, hey get as much of this down as you can so they could close the gate referring to tons of non-lethal. We pull up to close the (b)(1) 1.4a vehicle, and immediately (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) tells (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to back up. We back up and stop. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came and said he was going to set up C-wire. We push into reverse and a massive explosion goes off. Boom. It knocked the air out of me and shook the ground as far back as the platoon on the flight line. I saw bodies go in the air. I saw a torso and legs get launched across the street. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pushed out the vehicle. I had to kick the doors open and gunfire from all directions began. I was sighted in on the Taliban and saw they were sitting in lawn chairs and laughing at us. When I peeked around the vehicle, I saw three guys shoot towards the canal. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frozen, and I took the front, and he follows. I am hearing shots and what looks like people are screaming but their screams are muffled to me. Things started to not seem real. I picked up a child bleeding profusely. He was spaying blood all over my kit and my entire right side including both arms to my elbow got covered in blood. (b)(6) (b)(6) My buddy fell on top of me covered in his own blood and I knew I needed to get to a position and get fire superiority quickly.

www. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question. When do you get back to the tower?

(2) Answer. I push to the tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was fucked up and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabs me (b)(6) (b)(6) He pushed me. There were two impacts on the window. I pushed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to a corner, slammed the window shut, followed by a third round barely missing me. I stayed low and moved gained sight picture as well as I could. I pop up through the window and cannot find where they are shooting form. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at (b)(6) Had another view from a different angle. I pop up to scan out the window. I grabbed the M107 SASR and dropped my M4 to engage a second floor structure with a higher caliber. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me calm down and not use the SASR. I was upset that we were not being as aggressive as we could. I was placed into a new security position. The shooting stops after 2 ½ - 3 minutes. I cannot see anyone I knew got hit. I turned towards where all the American casualties were, and I couldn't look at it because I didn't want to see my guys.

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After EOD came everyone started waking up and screaming in pain. It was a lot of dead people. The Taliban met us at a gate and we saw 82nd guys coming out also.

xxx. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. Have you gone on social media to be interviewed?

(2) Answer. I did but I told them I don't want it to be aired. Because I don't want to air that out and not be in the right headspace.

I have talked to people on my team about this. That's why I'm kind of angry at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a bit. I would say fucked up shit like if (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was there we would have gotten back with more people. I was the first at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hospital bed along with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

I have talked to him about the podcast. I don't know if it was because of (b)(6) and I wanted to go about it in an old school manner. I would disagree with somethings he described in terms of who exactly passed the info over to us. I believe it's because he doesn't understand the intelligence process.

If I had no idea about those other things in relation to the other agencies on deck I would think it's a spook coming to talk to me too. I didn't agree when he testified to congress about the timeline of the suspected suicide bomber. We spoke about that in person and he agreed that the timeline given was unintentionally shorter. Everything is pretty much 100%. (b)(6) and is trying somewhat harder to remember the course of events Myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are the same page about talking about this publicly. I understand what he is trying to do for the families and our generation affected by this. I respect and support what he does publicly.

We got everything. What (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did was huge. What our Corpsman did was huge. Everyone in their own way definitely saved lives. This craziness continued until we left, even near blue on blue incidents on the days leading to us leaving, due to chasing enemy around the airport.

Reference to (b)(1)1.4a that's the thing I thought 'ehh' I thought it was definitely referencing the (b)(1)1.4a guys. There were a lot that came in and out that were definitely not conventional. And would not say they are (b)(1)1.4a because they came in a flannel. I think there are somethings that kind of get lost and us not being able to write and sit down and do without giving it to S2 I just would not go as far as saying it was (b)(1)1.4a

It was my team only that handed the SD cards to S2. Just the Sniper team and S2.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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ACCG-SR
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Lance Curtis

LANCE G CURTIS
BG, US ARMY
Investigating Officer

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~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) THURS OCT 26, which begins on page 1 and ends on page 21. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement) 10/26/2023 DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Name of Supplemental Reviewer)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Supplemental Reviewer) 26 OCT 2023 DATE

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Exhibit S031

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 19 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

1. On 19 October 2023, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at (b)(6) (b)(6) to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The Interview team asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered verbally. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was afforded the opportunity to review his transcription below, and signed a memorandum for record attesting to the accuracy of this transcription. Questions asked by the interviewers are annotated as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How long have you been in the Marine Corps?

(2) Answer. A little over 6 years. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) ?

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(2) Answer. Yes sir. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. That would have been Feb 2020 I want to say I went to (b)(6). Then I was transferred over to the platoon Jun 2020 and I was with them about a year prior to the deployment, then through the deployment. We deployed April 2021.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many Marines were in the platoon?

(2) Answer. We deployed with 21 including me. We had four teams. Plus we had three corpsmen included, 24 total. It was three teams of six, then I would go wherever to plug in.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What point do you remember hearing about deploying in support of the NEO?

(2) Answer. As the (b)(6) I would plug into SIPR at (b)(1)1.4a and read the reports. To be honest no one really knew what was going on. If we left it would have been around Aug. We probably got about three days tops from finding out officially to deploying.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the platoon move together?

(2) Answer. No. One team went with Echo Company, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6) were with me and we flew in 12-15 hours afterwards from (b)(1)1.4a The other team remained in Iraq with Fox Company.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer. Around the 17th of August.

i. Question and Answer 8.

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(1) Question. What was your understating of ROE when arriving on the ground?

(2) Answer. My understating was self-defense. If there is hostile act/hostile intent you can engage. In addition to that if we knew and AMCIT/Blue Passport life was in danger we could take action.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So self-defense of US forces and US Citizens?

(2) Answer. Yes. Which is really hard to do. If you're holding up a blue passport you would get mugged.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your mission when you first arrived there?

(2) Answer. When we landed the airfield was mostly clear. I landed a little bit ahead of my teams with my radio operator to get the comms situation set. We were then basically told to find work in the sector. We had our sector area to hold, I did a leader's recon to find locations for sniper teams to do overwatch/security. There wasn't much because it was an airfield. That's what we did for the first few days. Just radioed up anything unusual or situations with the Afghans on the ground in the airfield. It wasn't anything crazy.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): As the (b)(3)130b,(b)(6) how are you communicating to the (b)(6)

(2) Answer. I have a direct line to the COC and (b)(6) (b)(6) was out doing crowd control. He would check in on us but we reported directly to the COC. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was out there too, but he was focused on the infantry platoons/mortar squad.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When your platoon was tasked to move to Abbey Gate, what task were you given?

(2) Answer. I was told we weren't able to process people b/c the gate was so big, and Fox Company needed to get the crowd pushed back so we could create room to process people. My tasking was to find overwatch positions to help them with that. The wall that runs along Abbey Gate only provided a few raised areas to do so, so we occupied the towers along the perimeter walls. I had (b)(6) at the tower at the outer gate, and (b)(6) at the tower inside the inner gate.

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n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So (b)(6) was at the tower the whole time?

(2) Answer. I would push (b)(6) back to shower/eat at times and replace them with another team. (b)(6) mainly was in that tower though.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you augment (b)(6) during your time at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I pushed one guy, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to (b)(6) to provide them additional manning at the forward tower.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Why did you place (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) team at that tower and not another team?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was a very motivated sniper and I wanted to place him there because he wanted to be there, and I trusted his capabilities.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Was his team your best sniper team?

(2) Answer. Well his team was with Echo Company leading up to the deployment to HKIA, so his team was connected and had relationships built with Echo Company, who was out at Abbey Gate. All my team leaders were school trained snipers and very capable, that's why I rotated them up there.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Can you talk through the makeup of the team?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) could plug and play in a lot of positions. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - new guy. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - An extra guy to augment the team. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) All the team members were capable guys and trained for this.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Had any of those guys deployed before?

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(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had. He deployed about 3-4 times with the battalion. I don't think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had done a deployment. We ran a screener in Jan 2021 to round out the teams.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did anyone have combat experience?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had, he had a NAM with a C device. Other than him it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ((b)(6)) and my Plt Sgt in Afghanistan (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who had combat experience (b)(6) and did not deploy.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) has he EAS'd or is he still in?

(2) Answer. He's out now. He's going to college in Wisconsin. I sent (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) his contact information.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As they were establishing Abby Gate, how often were you down there?

(2) Answer. The comms was shit throughout the whole corridor. I figured out if we had comms between the Abbey Gate tower pushing to the inner gate tower, I could re-transmit comms back to the COC. On the morning of the 26th I was out there all morning helping get a family out who were connected with a Marine family from Pendleton.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So much of the reporting from the outer gate back to the COC would go through you?

(2) Answer. Yes.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The days leading up, 19-25 Aug 21, how often were you in the outer corridor area and sniper tower?

(2) Answer. I would check on them 2-3 times a day if I was co-located with them. The outer corridor area I would be spending more time down there as we were trying to get people out. We would have split responsibilities (a team in the tower and other guys

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in the outer corridor). Snipers in the tower would identify people in the canal to pull and radio their location to the team on the ground.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever give guidance on how many people you wanted in the tower at a time?

(2) Answer. I mentioned I would like three people in the tower, but I never gave specific guidance on that. Based on the situation the TLs were able to make calls on their manning as long as they had two people in the tower. Being on overwatch for two weeks is not something snipers are supposed to do. The OPTEMPO was high and it was exhausting.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What were the snipers' primary duties?

(2) Answer. To provide overwatch and report. I took it upon myself to split hide sites and help get people out and processed. To save people we understood we had to be out there.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You would get out around three times a day, how often were you talking on the radio with them daily?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. Typically as their (b)(6) I would usually operate from the COC, but our comms were bad and I wasn't doing much good at the COC. To improve the comms/reporting I decided to get out of the COC and to the gate to get my own eyes out there on the situation. They would pass radio reporting about hourly. Maybe 2-3 hours during slower periods. It was never longer than that.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

bb. (1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Were the sniper teams getting their tasking just from you or from others as well?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure. I gave them the mission of overwatch and that's what we went with. There were a lot of leaders out there. If they received tasking from other leaders I am not aware of it.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How other were battalion leaders out there by the outer gate?

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(2) Answer. I remember the (b)(6) stopping by our positions daily. I'm not sure how often but they did get around the battle space.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about company coommanders?

(2) Answer. The whole time. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were all out there. They didn't stop.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So if the Taliban was doing harm to AMCITs and you could take action to protect them, did you ever see Taliban killing evacuees?

(2) Answer. I don't know if they killed them. I saw them doing grave harm. Beating, stabbing, but I never saw anyone killed. I heard they were shooting/killing up by the connex boxes (chevron), but I never saw it personally.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you receive a report from (b)(6) about killing Afghans?

(2) Answer. I did. It was up by the chevron. But to me it's impossible to actually see that occurring. That was further away to see exactly what was happening. In my opinion there was nothing that we could do to prevent that from occurring.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did (b)(6) ever ask to engage the Taliban?

(2) Answer. Yes. They asked if the ROE has changed. I asked the COC and they stated no. That's what I relayed. They asked me about 2-3 times.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Was this on the 26th?

(2) Answer. It was prior to the 26th.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, did the ROE ever change?

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(2) Answer. No. I was never told it changed, and confirmed with the COC 2-3 times. It remained defensive ROE, had to show hostile act/hostile intent. This is what I shared with my sniper team.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What about EOF, were there any changes to that?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) had flashbangs, but it was not feasible to employ them from towers. Marines on ground would deploy them along with tear gas. (b)(1)1.4d would fire warning shots, we were not allowed to.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How do you know you were not allowed to fire warning shots?

(2) Answer. Not sure where it came from, but I asked leadership if we could because the (b)(1)1.4d were. I was told we weren't allowed to. I'm surprised accidents didn't happen with all the warning shots being fired.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How did you manage your guys at the towers?

(2) Answer. I had (b)(6) manning the back tower since (b)(6) had less guys. It would calm down at night (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was adamant at keeping his team in the outer sniper tower the whole time. That's why I made him come back to shower/eat and push up another team to replace them. I wanted to make sure his team was able to refit/reset. Most of the time it was (b)(6) on the outer gate tower, they only left when I made them switch out.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many hours of sleep do you think the teams were getting?

(2) Answer. I would guess no more than 5-6 hours. We didn't get a lot of sleep.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Between 19-23 August, what kind of threat reporting were you getting?

(2) Answer. I don't remember getting a lot of threat reports. It may have been something like a vehicle in the area. I remember it was mostly us pushing up individuals acting suspiciously. Every night I would go to the S2 and try to match up photos and threat reports. If we saw backpacks we would push it up, EOD would come out and

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check it out and nothing would come from it. I felt that this was an Afghan testing what we would do with an IED.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Where was this?

(2) Answer. Cars would pull up in the parking lot by the footbridge, we never went out to check that. I think for the backpack it was before the 26th when EOD went out to check the backpack. It was one time for certain, I can't recall if EOD went out any additional times.

pp. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Leading up to the 26th, did you ever get anything on individuals in your threat reporting?

(2) Answer. It was primarily cars. I remember cars. We would get random snippets on things but not a lot of context. It mainly came from the COC tactical radio or a yellow canary. I relayed to my teams either face to face or would radio up to the other teams. I would go up to (b)(6) to make sure they had the right details.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) As you got closer to the 26th did the threat reporting change?

(2) Answer. I would say it became more frequent. The crowds were growing and Afghans kept asking us if the gate was closing. I don't know if that was fueling the threat reporting growing. I remember as we got closer to the 26th it was about individuals and less about vehicles.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get BOLOs or descriptions of individuals?

(2) Answer. I think on the 25th or 26th we got a description of a bald, Middle Eastern man carrying a backpack. This matched the description of the entire crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many people met that description in the crowd?

(2) Answer. The crowd was thousands. In my mind it was impossible to identify that person in this crowd.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you get any other reports from the COC?

(2) Answer. No specifics. It was general and sometimes vague information.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you remember any specific threat reports on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I remember the morning of the 26th we were like, "Oh...an ISIS attack may happen." That type of reporting was frequent and we just tried to make light of it.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On the 25th, we're tracking Echo Company was manning the gate and pushed the crowd to the footbridge, do you remember that?

(2) Answer. I remember the crowd was pushed back. Most of the time the crowd came back to that barrier on the near side by the sniper tower. The crowd ebbed and flowed.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could you see down to the footbridge from the tower inside the inner gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. We would see down that corridor.

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How many people were keeping the crowd back at the footbridge?

(2) Answer. There were a lot. The (b)(1) 1.4a had guys all over the place. Maybe like 10 or a squad out there where the crowd was.

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In your opinion as a leader, as you got increased threats of and IED attack, would you want your troops towards the footbridge or the sniper tower looking at the possibility of conducting a CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. I feel like that's a gimme question. We were out there trying to find people to process to evacuate, but we needed space to be able to see these individuals and families. It was hard to do so when they were crushed up against the barrier by the

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tower. On the 25th there was a threat, but the only way to prevent Marines being injured/killed from an IED attack would be to cease operations. We still had a mission to accomplish.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question. In your opinion, regardless of where of the crowd was, we would have still sustained casualties?

(2) Answer. Yes. You would have casualties. It's impossible to know how many, and also impossible to know where the attack would occur.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question. Do you remember the Marines collapsing back to the sniper tower from the footbridge?

(2) Answer. I knew they were ripping with Echo Company, but I never observed that happening.

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question. On the 26th, how was the crowd?

(2) Answer. I noticed how the crowd had grown in size around the sniper tower and near side walkway. The far side canal walkway was also full. The crowd had become noticeably more desperate and more aggressive. They wanted to leave.

ccc. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question. Do you think the crowd was anticipating the gate closing?

(2) Answer. Yes. They all knew it. None of us told them. But they knew it.

ddd. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question. On the 26th, what threat reporting did you receive?

(2) Answer. Just that one about a bald, Middle Eastern male with a backpack, or it may have been a briefcase. I remember during the afternoon of the 26th, there was going to be an IED attack. We pulled everyone back, took cover, ceased operations, had a countdown to the explosion. I'm not sure how they knew that. Then 10 min passed, 20 min passed, 30 min passed, then the decision was made to resume operations.

eee. Question and Answer 56.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember any other times you did that?

(2) Answer. That was the only time I remember like that. It was crazy how the intel was saying they knew the time of the blast. Then about 30min after the time of the supposed blast, and nothing happened, we resumed operations. We needed to get people out.

fff. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did the Marines want the gate to close?

(2) Answer. No. 2/1 dudes wanted to get as many people out as they could.

ggg. Question and Answer 58.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So 20 min after the supposed blast time, Marines wanted to get back at it and continue processing people?

(2) Answer. Yes. We followed orders when to cease and take cover, but we wanted to get out there and help people.

hhh. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Do you remember (b)(6) passing up reports about any suspicious people in the crowd on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I Don't remember that happening.

iii. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Could that be because you were out with your teams?

(2) Answer. Yeah. Definitely. If they passed it over the radio that could have happened. But no one ever mentioned that to me.

jjj. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So no one told you about or showed you a suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. No.

kkk. Question and Answer 62.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you remember (b)(6) asking for engagement authority on a suspicious induvial on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No. I don't remember anyone asking me if we could shoot a guy.

lll. Question and Answer 63.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So on the 26th, you don't remember a report about a bald guy, black garb, passing out cards in the crowd?

(2) Answer. No. If I heard that I would have gone up to the tower. I was down there the whole morning and never heard that.

mmm. Question and Answer 64.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How likely is it that they would have asked you to engage someone?

(2) Answer. It would be situation dependent.

nnn. Question and Answer 65.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): If it's an occasion were there see a guy matching a BOLO, not displaying hostile act/hostile intent, would they ask?

(2) Answer. They would not have shot them. They would have asked me, a company commander, or passed up the request via radio.

ooo. Question and Answer 66.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How likely would a sniper team leader go directly to the (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. Not likely.

ppp. Question and Answer 67.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you know how often the (b)(6) would go into the tower?

(2) Answer. They would go up there and be around. I was never in the tower when the (b)(6) was in the tower.

qqq. Question and Answer 68.

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(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did the (b)(6) ever tell you the sniper team asked to engage the individual?

(2) Answer. No.

rrr. Question and Answer 69.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you ever see the picture of the guy the sniper team wanted to engage?

(2) Answer. No. I have seen a lot of photos, but I never saw a photo of a guy they wanted to engage.

sss. Question and Answer 70.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Would they push photos to you or the S2?

(2) Answer. Both. Either they would go through me and I would push them to the S2, or if they were going back to the COC I made sure they would go to the S2 to provide the photos.

ttt. Question and Answer 71.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you are not aware of any scout sniper requesting engagement authority on an individual in the crowd on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No.

uuu. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): And to your knowledge there is not a photo of the guy they wanted to engage?

(2) Answer. To my knowledge no. I don't remember seeing one. The S2 would have all the photos.

vvv. Question and Answer 73.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Prior to the attack, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to North HKIA to do a refit/reset run. Could they have provided the photos to the S2 then or gone to the COC to discuss the suspicious individual?

(2) Answer. Yes it's possible. I wasn't with them.

www. Question and Answer 74.

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(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Where were you primarily on the 26th in the early afternoon?

(2) Answer. Primarily with the rear tower after that morning. We were told we were RIPing so I began to plan for our RIP with the Army.

xxx. Question and Answer 75.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What was your timeline for the RIP?

(2) Answer. I wasn't told one, I just knew it was happening. I just started to get things together that would need to happen for the RIP.

yyy. Question and Answer 76.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you talk with anyone from the 82d prior to the blast?

(2) Answer. No I didn't, only afterwards.

zzz. Question and Answer 77.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When the blast occurred where were you located?

(2) Answer. At the COC. I was in the sniper tower about 20 mins before and talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about the RIP plan (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wasn't there. I just checked on them, said they have overwatch and that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would be back.

aaaa. Question and Answer 78.

(1) Question. Do you remember when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his team left and how long their trip was?

(2) Answer. It was before I got there. It was a quick trip. They got back right before the blast.

bbbb. Question and Answer 79.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): When you were up in the tower with (b)(6), did they relay they had asked for engagement authority on an individual?

(2) Answer. No. they didn't mention that. I just came up to check with them, shot the shit with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for second, that was it.

cccc. Question and Answer 80.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Did you see any leadership out by the outer gate at that time?

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(2) Answer. Not the (b)(6) at that time (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was out engaged with his Marines. He was pushing himself being out there all the time.

dddd. Question and Answer 81.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) So how long were you at the COC when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer. I was watching it happening on the drone feed. The (b)(6) weren't in the COC. I ran out of the COC, grabbed some guys and our gear. We hopped in a vehicle and went towards the gate. It took us about 15-20 min to get out there. I met up with my company commander at the inner gate. I thought they needed vehicles for CASEVAC, so I sent my Corpsman and vehicle up to the outer gates to help. I went to the (b)(6) and spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the inner corridor tower. He said he heard the blast and saw a small puff of smoke. I helped with pushing reports to the COC. We set up a Rear CCP to help people fall back when we shut down the gate.

eeee. Question and Answer 82.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did you help with any casualties?

(2) Answer. Not Directly.

ffff. Question and Answer 83.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) When did you heard about (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) condition?

(2) Answer. I heard he got hit, but I was told he wasn't that bad. I can't recall who told me that. Obviously, he wasn't good. After the CASEVAC was complete, we jumped in the vehicle and went to check on him. We had our guys on two towers to keep providing overwatch and security. We pulled the sniper team out of the outer corridor, put teams in the towers in the inner corridors.

gggg. Question and Answer 84.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) How often would a radio operator speak with the (b)(6) (b)(6) for engagement authority?

(2) Answer. In this case I could say it was possible. The (b)(6) was out there spending time with the Marines. I never heard of him asking for engagement authority from the (b)(6).

hhhh. Question and Answer 85.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did (b)(6) ever talk to you about them seeing an individual and/or asking for engagement authority?

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(2) Answer. No. Not while I was there. They never mentioned that to me.

iiii. Question and Answer 86.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Were you surprised hearing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) say this in his testimony?

(2) Answer. Yes. I was taken aback and surprised. I visited him, paying out of pocket with my own money, with (b)(6) about six months after we got back and he never mentioned that to me. It hurts that I was never told any of this.

jjjj. Question and Answer 87.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Why do you think that was?

(2) Answer. Well (b)(6) wasn't co-located with us in (b)(1)1.4d So it may be because they had a relationship with Echo Company. But we did the whole train up together, and when we got to HKIA they fell (b)(6) (b)(6)

kkkk. Question and Answer 88.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You think that was relayed to them on (b)(6) again?

(2) Answer. I believe so. (b)(6).

llll. Question and Answer 89.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You talked to them on the 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes. I spoke with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he made no mention of a conversation with the (b)(6) in where he requested engagement authority on a suspected individual.

mmmm. Question and Answer 90.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Did (b)(6) asked you for ROE changes, and did they understand it was your job to coordinate with higher?

(2) Answer. Yes. They did that multiple times.

nnnn. Question and Answer 91.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) What was your personal battle rhythm/sleep cycle?

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(2) Answer. Most of the days I was out there from 0400 to sunset. I would do a de-brief with the S2, get some sleep, and get back out there.

oooo. Question and Answer 92.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): You talked about your teams not in (b)(1)1.4a but doing the entire workup together. During your training, would you have radio operators thinking they were authorized to request engagement authority above you?

(2) Answer. We didn't do that in training. Sniper teams can work on their own. For example, they do request call for fire directly from the weapons team, it would be specific scenarios like that.

pppp. Question and Answer 93.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): What has been stated, is that a radio operator (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) non-sniper school trained, requested directly to the (b)(6) for engagement authority. My question is, that is something like this trained on, for a non-sniper to call up past echelons to request authority to engage?

(2) Answer. No Sir. We never trained to that.

qqqq. Question and Answer 94.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Since redeploying from Afghanistan, have you ever given an interview or spoken publicly about Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. No. Only the interview was to a Marine Corps historian in an official capacity. Other than that no, and I really don't want to.

rrrr. Question and Answer 95.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): How often do you read or consume social media regarding Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Initially I did a lot, but not so much anymore. It's bad for my mental health. I stopped following and reading social media when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started making a lot of these comments.

ssss. Question and Answer 96.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Bad for your mental health why? Because you disagree with what (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is saying?

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(2) Answer. Yes. What's being said now is not helping others with closing the wounds. It's more counterproductive.

tttt. Question and Answer 97.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): So you PCS'd in May 2022? How often do you get with Marines from Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes. We've had a couple platoon things, more social things. I haven't linked up with anyone from (b)(6) spoken in depth.

uuuu. Question and Answer 98.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Do you have any contact with anyone from (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. I did initially. Not really anymore. I've tried to stay engaged with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but he has not been responding to any texts. Jun 25 was the last response from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I keep in touch with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a little bit.

vvvv. Question and Answer 99.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Is there anything else you want to cover or you think is important to add?

(2) Answer. No sir. We pretty much covered my notes.

wwww. Question and Answer 100.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Anyone else you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). When I wasn't in the tower he was always there.

xxxx. Question and Answer 101.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Where was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer. With me in the COC.

yyyy. Question and Answer 102.

(1) Question (b)(3)130b, (b)(6): Who would have been on the radio at the (b)(6) tower at time of the blast?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the (b)(6) but really the platoon RO. If I wasn't in the tower, he was there on the radio.

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4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Supplemental Review of Administrative Investigation

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), have reviewed the statement resulting from my interview on (date) 20231019, which begins on page 1 and ends on page ____. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me and consider it to be accurate. I have made this statement freely and willfully.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

20231019
DATE

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

20231019
DATE

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Exhibit S032

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY / UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152-5202

ACCG-SR 05 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a Operations Battalion

1. On 05 October 2023, BG Lance Curtis, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel in the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of the scope of the supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation, which included fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing. BG Lance Curtis will be denoted as C1, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is written in full.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with the interviewers introducing themselves and the describing their backgrounds. BG Curtis provided an overview of the scope of the review, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. BG Curtis oriented (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the unclassified map of Abbey Gate, for the purpose of providing a shared lexicon to ensure clarity of communication during the interview. The interviewee would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. <u>Question and Answer 1.</u>

(1) Question. C1: Does the map orientation I just provided to you make sense?

(2) Answer. It makes sense to me, I remember the inner gate having the better gate. It all makes sense.

c. <u>Question and Answer 2.</u>

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(1) Question. C1: Tell me about yourself?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

there until August 17, at which point I was pushed to Abbey Gate. My team joined a day later. I was injured on the 26th. I was medically evacuated after that. Last year I deployed for 6 months to Iraq. Now I'm back. I supported the joint task force there as the (b)(1)1.4a planner.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. C1: Explain again why you were in (b)(1)1.4d on the 17th?

(2) Answer. Our detachment deployed to go to the information warfare taskforce in Afghanistan. I moved from Afghanistan to (b)(1)1.4d so our detachment was supporting the over the horizon mission set. We worked with the (b)(1)1.4a on the ground. We supported some of the NEO planning when NEO was just an idea. Then, I believe at the one star level at SOCCENT, it was decided that one (b)(1)1.4a would go forward. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) who I met at that time.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. That is correct.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. C1: So why are you picked as an individual augmentee?

(2) Answer. It was unclear whether the team from Fort Liberty was going to make it into HKIA. So they figured they had to send something.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have a specific skillset?

(2) Answer. No, other than just being capable.

h. Question and Answer 7.

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(1) Question. C1: You were an E5 until when? How many years do you have in?

(2) Answer. I picked up in September of (b)(6), I just hit (b)(6) years in service.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. C1: What is your (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. The (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. C1: Was it (b)(1)1.4d

(2) Answer. I think so.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. That's where Ryan was?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, we didn't see him. We were at the Role II for a couple hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. C1: How much do you remember post blast?

(2) Answer. I remember most immediately post blast, but it's a little hazy as I receive treatment.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. C1: What are the docs telling you immediately while being treated?

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(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. C1: What we found the first time around was doctors would shout out GSW as a point of reference for the type of wound, not a definitive finding. In regard to the fishing weights, forensics found it was only ball bearings. But a lot of secondary fragmentation did occur.

(2) Answer. Mhm.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. C1: When could you talk to your parents?

(2) Answer. At the hospital in Afghanistan. I told them I was okay and that I was on my way to Germany. They were on vacation in the Black Sea at the time, I told them not to end their vacation and that I'd be back in North Carolina in a few weeks.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me, sequentially, what happened from when you heard that you're going to HKIA to the time that you are boots on ground at HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were in the SOCCENT compound, getting our equipment ready. The initial plan was three people were going to Afghanistan. We had our weapons and our stuff ready. We got the call that it would just be one person. Initially it was also one other sergeant and one staff sergeant. We found out it was just me, so from there I was told I will meet (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was an IO with the Marines. I went from the SOCCENT HQ building to the terminal. I was there for a couple hours, then I get on a military flight with a fire department that had to go to HKIA. To the best of my knowledge, it was just us on that flight.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. C1: Did you take any specific (b)(1)1.4a equipment?

(2) Answer. A lot actually. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. C1: Remember how long the flight was?

(2) Answer. No, I had been at the PAX terminal for 8 hours. I think the flight took off at around 1200 and we got there around 1900-2000.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. When do you land?

(2) Answer. I don't really remember, the day after the Afghans on the airfield.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. C1: Tell me your first recollection hitting the ground?

(2) Answer. This was my first deployment. The first thing I remember is a lot of gunshots. The Afghans fire in the air to quiet the crowd. You can see the tracers flying. Then it was just a mad dash to figure out where I was supposed to go. I didn't have cell service. I wandered around until I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Then I packed

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my equipment in and moved to the JOC at which point I meant (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who ran the IO cell for the Marines at the time.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. C1: What is the team construct at the time? My understanding is that there were between 4-6 people on the team? I want your recollection of the (b)(1)1.4a team construct

(2) Answer. The other 4 Army (b)(1)1.4a got on ground the next day. The first night was just me and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) working to move around Abbey Gate. We were taking manpack Next Generation loudspeaker systems (NGLS) to the gates to provide Marines the ability to message to the crowds and negate some of their problems. So we were emplacing NGLS and moving around.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. C1: Is your mission crowd control mitigation?

(2) Answer. Yes, that was our mission the entire time.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. C1: What languages do you speak?

(2) Answer. English and Spanish.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. C1: You're using Afghan linguists to help you then? How were they selected? What's that look like?

(2) Answer. We pulled them from the crowd. Once they were processed and waiting to be transported, we asked if anyone spoke English. A lot did, and we would take them and ask them to help us while they waited. It didn't matter exactly who, but we tried to pick people who had spouses with them so they wouldn't have to leave their kids alone. They didn't mind as long as they didn't miss their bus.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. C1: Did you have any non-optimal individuals translate?

(2) Answer. Yes, we just had so many every day.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

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(1) Question. What gate did you start at?

(2) Answer. That first night was East Gate. *Gestures on the table with his hands while describing areas on the picture of the area of operation* If this is the main hangar, there is a road at a 45 degree angle up. Once you follow that, there are two metal poles. That first night they put out c-wire and made an almost bubble into the street that ran parallel to HKIA to help channel the crowd.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. C1: How many people that first time? Hundreds?

(2) Answer. At least two thousand. There was a lot of traffic, people packed in together, and people coming from each direction for several hundred meters.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. C1: So where did they put you as the (b)(1)1.4a?

(2) Answer. We moved with a lot of autonomy. That first night we were out there 17 August 2021, I think, we put the load speaker right in front. The speaker was placed directly behind the c-wire and pointed toward the crowd. We would've like to elevate it more. That first night we had a guy from the processed group talk for 2-3 hours. We kept working the NGLS, but we also helped the Marines filter people through the crowd. Then we didn't stop at the comfort zone that night, it wasn't big yet. We were helping out where we could. That first night was pandemonium. East Gate had a big corridor straight out that was just full of people.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. C1: Do they have the MRAPs to bolster the gate yet?

(2) Answer. No, not until around 24 August 2021.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. C1: Yea, East gate seemed difficult with the pushing of the crowd. What was the messaging you would put out?

(2) Answer. True. We were there for another two hours. We would put out entry criteria, SIV, passports, etc. We had MP3s that had a pre-recorded messages in Dari, Pashtu, and English that would play on repeat. Then when that wasn't playing, the interpreters would message to stop pushing, etc.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

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(1) Question. C1: Are people getting crushed at this point?

(2) Answer. At North Gate, yes. East Gate had a little cutlet in which people were trying to enter through, which was the Marines biggest problem there. We were at East Gate for a few hours, then went to Abbey Gate the next morning.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. This is the 18th now?

(2) Answer. Yes. The (b)(1)1.4d were still there. I believe they closed the gate that morning because of the state of the crowd. The crowd was pushing hard, so I know (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d to help control that. After that, we go back to the office. We hadn't slept yet. Then our other four showed up: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Ryan Knauss.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. C1: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in charge of the team right? Then you have Ryan Knauss and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)?

(2) Answer. Correct (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had two deployments at that point so he was very experienced.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. C1: When did you meet up with them?

(2) Answer. Late that night, maybe 2000-2100. We do an introduction of them around HKIA. We go to North, East, and Abbey Gate and the comfort zone now that people were being filtered there. We were changing batteries on the loudspeakers and showing the team who was in charge at the gates. We were all together that first night. The following morning we split into teams. At which point we split into day shift/night shift and roved anywhere that had the most conflict, usually the comfort zones.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. C1: Why? When does it get better?

(2) Answer. They didn't like sitting in the sun. They could be there for 72 hours, it didn't get better until the 24th roughly.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

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