



SECRET//FVEY

Exhibit 001

# JTF-CR

## Afghanistan NEO

### After Action Review

17 SEP 21



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Defense of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)

## Focus Area: Defense of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)

**Issue:** Securing HKIA at the Onset of Operations

**Discussion:** The JTR-CR developed force requirements, RFF 2034, and built the TPFDD to deploy in-theater forces which included MEU, SPMAGTF, IBCT, and JTF-CR HQ. The collapse of GIRoA and ANDSF created a security gap at S-HKIA, and despite an in-flow of initial forces there remained insufficient airlift in theater to rapidly close the forces required to establish security for all of HKIA. The complete collapse of ANDSF, TURMIL reluctance to extend beyond N-HKIA, insufficient air assets for rapid force closure, and pressure to initiate evacuation contributed to the airfield being overrun on 15/16 Aug. As forces flowed in, the JTF-CR established battlespace for the 24MEU and SPMAGTF to assume security of the eastern portion of the airfield, and for 1-82 AB to assume the western portion. Once sufficient forces were on the ground, security was never again in question.

**Recommendation:** While considered in the planning phase, the scope and scale of the desperate population was not fully appreciated. In future NEOs, the impact of a desperate and panicked population as a risk to mission and force should be more significant consideration. During planning, refine the conditions and triggers that will inform decisions for posturing aircraft in theater to expedite force closure in order to mitigate risk.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Evacuation Control Center Operations

## Focus Area: Evacuation Control Center Operations

**Issue:** Preparation and Planning

**Discussion:** Throughout the planning phase, evacuation control center (ECC) operations were developed to mirror the doctrinal template of small task organized teams to screen, protect, process, transport, manifest, and embark evacuees. Both the 24MEU and SPMAGTF conducted Service directed pre-deployment NEO training, and both commands conducted large scale ECC rehearsals to validate TTPs and assess ECC throughput capacity while in theater prior to entering the CJOA. The speed of change in the operating environment and pressure to commence evacuation operations coupled with incongruent DoS messaging generated a surge of evacuees to include multi-national evacuees. These conditions combined with the absence of the JMEEL and lack of consular affairs officers within the first 72-hours and other enabling capabilities required the JTF-CR to execute ECC operations at the military pax terminal instead of at the entry control point. Despite the confluence of these factors warranting consolidation of ECC operations at the N-HKIA pax terminal, actual evacuee processing achieved pre-planned IOC and FOC throughput estimates.

**Recommendation:** Ensure evacuee categories are clearly delineated and projected prior to evacuations. Maintain the CLB as the most trained and prepared element to conduct large scale evacuation screening and throughput. Conduct a programmatic review with the interagency on the versatility, interoperability, and efficacy of the NEO Tracking System (NTS) as an interagency system.



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Evacuation Control Center Operations

## Focus Area: Evacuation Control Center Operations

**Issue:** Change in Evacuee Designation (day-to-day)

**Discussion:** Throughout execution constant policy changes in evacuee eligibility caused disruptions in how the JTF-CR managed evacuation operations. Changes in evacuee priority from special immigrant visa (SIV) applicants [pre-NEO], to U.S. Government (USG) and American Citizens, to AMCIT and SIVs, to POTUS' unrestricted approval of designated personnel, back to AMCIT, SIV, and Special Interest Groups, caused disruptions in how the JTF-CR managed the problem. The JTF-CR capacity to screen evacuees was never the limiting factor; however, the throughput continuum ebbed and flowed based on the availability of aircraft and TSH capacity to receive evacuees. Moreover, the added responsibility, mid-stream, to adjudicate the list of eligible evacuation populations to include a previously unknown 30K NSU personnel ultimately became a key factor to recommend mobilizing the CRAF.

**Recommendation:** Ensure DoS identifies sufficient marshalling areas for evacuee holding by category and synchronize marshalling instructions with DoD asset availability and sustainment capacity. Ensure inflow of DoS consular augmentation (Foreign Emergency Support Team) meets evacuation scope and scale requirements.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Department of State Integration

## Focus Area: Separation of Planning and Execution Entities

**Issue:** American citizen and special immigrant visas applicant notification, reception, and processing.

**Discussion:** Planning with DoS began in April and JTF-CR sent an LNO to the USEK in May. In July, the JTF-CR embedded a (6) person planning cell at USEK to expand direct planning efforts. Throughout this time period, processes were established whereby DoS would message evacuees with specific instructions for evacuation. DoS Consular Officers (or designated representatives) would then accompany DoD personnel at the entry control points to screen potential evacuees. During execution, the Afghanistan Crisis Task Force (ACTF) authorities implemented distinct processes that were not informed by in-theater plans. For example, during several points in the NEO execution messages were sent to a certain groups with instructions to arrive at a particular location. At times, these messages conflicted with gate conditions and real time capabilities at HKIA to screen, process, and relocate evacuees. Moreover, DoS replaced Kabul-based planners and other key embassy personnel with a CONUS-based foreign emergency support team (FEST). The JTF-CR was unable to plan or coordinate with this entity prior to its arrival.

**Recommendation:** DoD and DoS personnel at all levels need to plan, cooperate, and endeavor to stick to the plan to successfully execute the NEO and this can only be accomplished if each party is engaged with the appropriate decision-making and executing entity. FEST integration in planning efforts should be a priority requirement. Finally, the lack of doctrine and uncommon terminology/culture between DoD/DoS can be mitigated with the establishment of inter-agency NEO doctrine.

USCIB/CI/IR/IS/IO/IS/IO/IS/IO  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

0128

02/02/22

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# HKIA Airfield Operations

## Focus Area: HKIA Airfield Operations

**Issue:** HKIA Airfield Operations

**Discussion:** There was TURMIL capabilities to execute airfield operations and the volume of traffic required to execute NEO. As conditions changed on HKIA and airfield capacity requirements increased, a senior U.S. airfield authority (SAA) to coordinate and direct air traffic control, prioritize flow, manage ground operations, and provide in transit visibility of U.S. and coalition fights became crucial to NEO. The early withdrawal of NATO support contractors required an immediate temporary enabling force (i.e. Air Force Crisis Response Group) to maintain evacuation operations. The overall air operations picture was unclear due to multiple and disparate air tasking order tools.

**Recommendation:** Senior airfield authority should have transitioned immediately to the U.S. due to a preponderance of capabilities. Assign the air operation coordination cell to the main effort. Consider developing a program of record that is capable of fusing disparate air management tools.



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Crisis Action Planning: Abbey Gate Attack

## Focus Area: Crisis Action Planning: Abbey Gate Attack

**Issue:** Planning and Readiness

**Discussion:** JTF-CR participated in contingency drills to inform immediate responses (MASCAS, Ground Attack, Downed Aircraft, PR/TRAP, IDF) that included friendly force actions at HKIA gates. The JTF-CR identified that crowding at all the gates represented a vulnerability. Engineering improvements and additional defensive measures were identified and ultimately implemented during execution at each of the gates based on pre-mission AT/FP assessments and real time threat streams (both internal and external to HKIA). Notably, engineering improvements were not authorized prior to NEO due to the sensitive nature of the mission. Specifically at Abbey Gate, JTF-CR forces planned for a defense in depth that included physical and electronic measures to enhance security and maintain crowd control.

**Recommendation:** Sustain contingency drills in the planning and preparation phase. Ensure NEO forces are adequately resourced with engineering equipment and crowd control capabilities.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Crisis Action Planning: Abbey Gate Attack

## Focus Area: Posture and Responsiveness on the Day of Attack

**Issue:** Mitigating Risk and Response

**Discussion:** Throughout execution, there were persistent and credible internal and external threat streams across all HKIA. As such, USFOR-A FWD retained the Role 2 capability in its entirety through end of NEO. Abbey Gate was the primary U.S. and international throughput gate due to its proximity to the UK marshalling area at Barron Hotel and the efficiency created by engineering improvements. On the day of the attack while North Gate and East Gate remained closed due to crowding, UK forces were concluding evacuee operations and preparing for a passage of lines from Barron Hotel through Abbey Gate. This factor, along with the persistent threat streams, elicited additional force protection measures that included additional security, ISR, and reinforced medical capability. Following the suicide attack, these preparatory actions enabled an immediate and effective response to reinforce Abbey Gate, evacuation of casualties in mass, and appropriate follow on action to restore operations.

**Recommendation:** Continued emphasis on security planning, preparation, and immediate response to contingency. Recognition that in execution of a NEO, the environment can instantly change from permissive to non-permissive due to terrorist acts.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# *HKIA Withdrawal Under Pressure*

## **Focus Area: HKIA Withdrawal Under Pressure**

**Issue:** Enabling Joint Tactical Exfiltration

**Discussion:** After the collapse of GIRoA, 82 ABN began JTE planning and leveraged the JTF-CR to set conditions for termination of NEO. The JTF-CR conducted a relief in place with 1-82 ABD at the gates. Ultimately, the JTF-CR did not withdraw under pressure, but set conditions for JTE by concluding evacuee operations no earlier than 12-hours prior to JTE execution. Further, in coordination with 82 ABN, the JTF-CR developed a contingency plan to evacuate personnel aboard JTE aircraft if required. Despite a 107mm rocket attack on the morning of 30 Aug, the JTF-CR continued to evacuate personnel and exercised the contingency plan when a family showed up as the JTF-CR was boarding retrograde aircraft.

**Recommendation:** Retain NEO capabilities until the end. The enabling action of the JTF-CR to evacuate personnel on the last day, sequenced with the final retrograde of JTF-CR Forces enabled the 82 ABN to transition to a JTE posture, consolidate, and retrograde successfully. NEO forces should remain integrated into JTE planning to eliminate gaps in transition of phases, RIP, and conclusion or termination of NEO operations.



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# ISB and TSH Site Establishment and Operations

## Focus Area: ISB and TSH Site Establishment and Operations

**Issue:** Capacity at TSHs and utilization of an ISB to support evacuation operations

**Discussion:** Prior to NEO execution, CENTCOM directed the JTF-CR to focus their effort and resources towards Kabul in order to support the screening, processing, and evacuation of AMCITs and designated persons from HKIA. During the early planning phases, JTF-CR identified the sustainment requirements (e.g. JMEEL) to support up to 10k evacuees (at a given time). CENTCOM confirmed the ISB and TSH were the responsibility of the Department of State (DoS), AFCENT, and ARCENT to develop and manage. When the NEO was directed, to our knowledge, the TSHs were not at Full Operational Capacity (FOC), as well as, the DoS Consular Affairs and HN Immigration personnel were not capable of receiving and processing the mass quantity of evacuees. Due to the rapidly evolving situation and national caveats (e.g. AMCITs only to KUW and other European nations), the tempo of operations slowed, and at times stopped our ability to evacuate personnel from HKIA. Additionally, the JTF-CR would have preferred to utilize Qatar as the sole ISB to process evacuees, of all types, prior to their follow-on movement to a TSH. This would have simplified the manifesting and 'uploading' of aircraft at HKIA, as the ECC operations would have had the flexibility to put any type of evacuee on aircraft and not be concerned with the 'type' of evacuee and the final destination.

**Recommendation:** Increase DoS and HN personnel capacity to screen and process evacuees at the TSHs and utilize an ISB as the sole APOD as to not impede with evacuation from a combat zone.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

# Afghanistan Special Interest Groups

## Focus Area: Afghanistan Special Interest Groups

**Issue:** Afghanistan Special Interest Groups

**Discussion:** From the White House down to the private citizen, well-intentioned requests to evacuate particular groups and individuals began to flood the JTF JOC. The actions taken for these special cases came at the expense of the broader NEO effort, and were difficult for the JTF-CR to prioritize and validate. Additionally, the watch floor received phone calls, emails, and text messages to the point of clouding information systems, and reducing its capability to handle the myriad crises occurring on and near HKIA. Midway through NEO execution, USFOR-A (FWD) developed a prioritization mechanism for these special interest requests. However, the special interest requests continued to complicate evacuee operations and compete for limited resources (i.e. buses).

**Recommendation:** The top down driven special interest group requirements needed a separate and distinct command element to receive, process, prioritize, and assign tasking to NEO forces in order to facilitate high priority evacuation.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## **(JTF-CR ADDITION) Multinational Coordination**

### **Focus Area: Multinational Coordination**

**Issue:** Incorporation of multinational partners in the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)

**Discussion:** Planning for NEO with multi-national partners was challenging when not authorized to talk about NEO. Throughout planning, the requirement to incorporate international partners was clearly identified. JTF-CR met with representatives from various entities to discuss how multinational coordination would occur during evacuation operations; however, JTF-CR lacked the authority to expand direct engagement with foreseeable foreign partners (except for the UK). The U.S. requirement to provide multinational agencies and their evacuee populations with logistical support was also not fully understood in planning. With limited guidance, personnel, or material support from higher headquarters, JTF-CR was forced to create ad-hoc business rules, battle rhythm events, and coordinating efforts during execution to ensure collective mission accomplishment.

**Recommendation:** Early coordination with international entities and the creation of simple and flexible processes across all levels of command will enable improved execution at the tactical level. Finally, the establishment of an O-6 level entity to oversee an international coordination cell could have alleviated many issues described above.



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## **(JTF-CR ADDITION) Sustainment Challenges**

### **Focus Area: Requirement to support NATO and non-NATO partners**

**Issue:** Sustainment challenges supporting all of HKIA

**Discussion:** The JTF J-4 cell created and became the Joint Logistics Operations Center integrating the USFOR-A logistics section, 1st Theater Sustainment Command LNO, other multinational forces, and OGAs. The ad-hoc JLOC held and executed a joint logistics transportation board, a deployment and distribution operations center, a joint civil-military engineering board, a logistics coordination board, a joint movement center, a joint petroleum office, and created a multi-national ad-hoc combat logistics detachment. However, the J4 was neither manned nor augmented to hold this level of synchronization and execution, but the demand from the eighteen nations, and several other government organizations required the J4 shift to this structure to support all NATO and non-NATO partners. The demand from the international community included transportation, supply and sustainment, facilities, services, and engineering. On several occasions, the J4 created a temporary logistics detachment and engineer platoon with personnel to address re-supply of food, water, ammunition, obstacles, and movement of personnel. The early transition of forward logistics element, the rapid collapse of TURMIL and NSPA contractors forced the JTF J4 to create ad-hoc organizations to support uniformed personnel and non-uniformed personnel daily.

**Recommendation:** A general support logistics battalion should be identified and deployable to execute the duties required to support a brigade (reinforced) sized unit at the operational area.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## (JTF-CR ADDITION) Sustainment Challenges

### **Focus Area: Transition from NSPA contracts to JTF forces**

**Issue:** Unclear transition plan from NSPA to uniformed personnel.

**Discussion:** The JTF-CR was not manned with the right personnel to absorb the functions of the remaining NATO contractors running the water treatment plant, waste water treatment plant, prime power, ground and air fuel farm(s), dining facility, plumbing, electrical, and facilities maintenance. During the execution phase, the J-4, manned with five service personnel, was undermanned and ill-equipped to execute base support operations. After the initial breach of HKIA and the subsequent collapse of most BOS-I functions, only 60% of NSPA contractors came back to work in the power plant, the waste water treatment, the DFAC, trash collection, black water services, and cleaning of latrines. However, that entire force was not replaced after they departed on 25 Aug. In quick order both the waste water and water treatment facilities malfunctioned as well as prime power. The water treatment plant had pumps that operated in Taliban controlled areas and those malfunctions could only be mitigated not corrected. The waste water treatment facility was only a few hours from overflowing as the last C-17 departed HKIA. It was the ad-hoc organizations created by the J4 that surged onto these facilities to support all coalition forces on ramp eight and nine, and the tens of thousands of Afghans the JTF was evacuating. Without these services the evacuees would have suffered more hygiene related health crises, the facilities would spew black and grey water into the streets causing HKIA to be a biohazard and compromised the success of the NEO.

**Recommendation:** The departure of the NSPA contractors was planned for and JTF-CR requested a temporary enabling force as a replacement but this was not sourced. In the future, a BOS-I capable temporary enabling force should be a primary consideration for immediate sourcing.





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## (JTF-CR ADDITION) Sustainment Challenges

### **Focus Area: CL I sustainment and logistics infrastructure limitations**

**Issue:** Strain to a fragile and compromised logistics system

**Discussion:** The JTF-CR did not have 30 days of sufficient supplies to sustain operations. The logistics system never had more than 1-day supply on hand for the 21K people on HKIA at the height of NEO. Over the course of the operation, 18 multi-national forces requested various types of support from an already strained and compromised logistics system. None of the multinational forces had the capability to execute their own support operations. The unforeseen requirement of supporting multiple NATO forces caused additional strains on inventories, sustainment and distribution operations causing the force to stay in the black and require dozens of C-17s to bring in subsistence from over-the-horizon—daily.

**Recommendation:** Deploy a general support Army battalion and preposition portions of stocks of several of classes of supplies at the operational area to ensure responsiveness.



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

## (JTF-CR ADDITION) Sustainment Challenges

### Focus Area: Sustainment Challenges

**Issue:** Ad-Hoc methods of support

**Discussion:** The unforeseen requirement of supporting multiple NATO forces caused additional strains on inventories, sustainment and distribution operations; and BOS-I functions. Furthermore, the JTF-J4 had to explore multiple avenues of support due to the operational isolation of HKIA by the Taliban and ISIS-K. The J4 explored and created a single, limited GLOC outside of HKIA to move emergency supplies, cargo and equipment onto the airfield with support from JSOC and OGA. This limited GLOC was a result of negotiations with the Taliban security screen and supported by JSOC and the National Support Unit. This became the fastest single source contracting method for food, baby diapers, baby formula, baby food, clothing, vehicles, heavy equipment and specialty trucks. However, this was not established by any framework or command relationship, but arose as an expedient solution to the growing humanitarian crisis and exploited by the J4 and the contracting cell. This allowed a cooperative solution to support the flow of NSU and their families from HKIA and the evacuees coming in from the north, east, Abbey, and south gates. This did not mitigate the strain on the system, but did provide support to transportation assets, MHE, and specialty food items for infants to the network.


**Recommendation:** Empower contracts for single-source and immediate buy-outs of equipment and perishables to relieve pressure from strained logistics systems.



# JOINT TASK FORCE CRISIS RESPONSE (JTF-CR) PLANNING TIMELINE

V1: CAO 17 Sept 2021

Exhibit 002




USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abbey Gate Investigation)

0140


# JOINT TASK FORCE CRISIS RESPONSE (JTF-CR) NEO EXECUTION TIMELINE

V1: CAO 17 Sept 2021



USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abbey Gate Investigation)





# MEDICAL COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (HKIA AFG)

ROLE 2E Hospital	Capacity
US Surgical Teams	4
UK Surgical Team	1 (20 Pax)
Operating Rooms	2 (4*)
Trauma Beds	6
ICU	7
ICW	14
COVID Isolation	No updates / 206
COVID Quarantine	No updates / 231
Autoclave Sterilizer	1
PPS CLVIII	On Hand
COVID Testing (PCR & Antigen)	Available
Blood	92 Units (WB)
Ancillary (Lab, Pharm, Vet, PHO)	Available
CT Scan	1
Ventilators	8
Morgue	0 / 8
MEDEVAC	21 (+EVAC 27AUG)

<p>1.4a, 1.4g</p>	
-------------------	--

JTF CR Surgeon MEDLOG Support	HKIA ON HAND
Shortages	Amoxicillin, Mg SO4, Ventilator tubing, sunscreen, Lancets on 25AUG21
R1E/FRST	UDP, RII, IV tubing, Cidex fluid, Hoffman kits and FRST CLVIII PP arrived on 27AUG21
Formula, diapers, blankets, bottles	Pending confirmation of arrival w/1TSC
Additional Table	USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abey Gate Investigation) and transfer cases arrived 27AUG21

<p><b>US Surgical Teams (R2E): 4</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FRSD (29 aug)</li> <li>SOS X2 (12 members remaining beyond 29 AUG and in direct support to 1/82 on 29AUG)</li> <li>AF AD HOC Trauma team (Tentative departure: 29AUG)</li> <li>3/10 MTN Role 1 (in direct support to 1/82 NLT 29AUG)</li> <li>Blood: 92 units (US+NOR) (receiving additional 20 UNITS 27AUG)</li> </ul>	<p><b>UK Surgical Team R2: 20 PAX</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Surgical Team: 1</li> <li>Medics</li> <li>Providers</li> <li>Nurse</li> <li>CRNA</li> <li>AELO</li> <li>Tentative departure: 28AUG</li> </ul>	<p><b>US SPEC OPS Joint Medical Augmentation Unit (JMAU) Surgical Team R2: 10 PAX</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 X PA</li> <li>2 XSURG</li> <li>2 X ER</li> <li>2X CRNA</li> <li>4 X 18D/SUPPORT</li> <li>2 SURGICAL PACKAGES</li> <li>Remaining beyond 29AUG</li> </ul>	<p><b>SPMAGTFSTP R1E: 50 PAX</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>44 HMS (24Line/2Xray/2PMT/ 1 Pharm)</li> <li>2 ER DOC</li> <li>2 ER RN</li> <li>1 PA</li> <li>1 IDC</li> <li>Tentative departure: 28AUG</li> </ul>	<p><b>24th MEU R1: 64 PAX</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>58 HMS</li> <li>1 PA, 1EMPA</li> <li>1 ER DOC, 1 MEDO</li> <li>2 RN</li> <li>CLASS VII: 30 DOS</li> <li>Blood: 0</li> <li>Walking Blood Bank kits: 50</li> <li>Tentative departure: 29AUG</li> </ul>	<p><b>1/82<sup>nd</sup> R1E: 72 PAX (Does not include line medics) (HQ: 2)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Red Devils (1/504): 1Ped, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 9 Medics (Tentative departure 30AUG)</li> <li>Geronomo (2/501): 1 GMC, 12 Medics (Tentative departure 30AUG)</li> <li>1/194: 1 ER doc, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 6 Medics (Tentative departure ~28AUG)</li> <li>307<sup>th</sup> BSB (CH2/02/2021): 37 PAX</li> <li>FRSD (1 Surgical Teams); Blood: 40 units</li> <li>Tentative departure: 28/29AUG</li> </ul>
---	--	--	--	---	--





SPMAGTF-CR-CC EOD  
Post Blast Analysis  
Abbey Gate Suicide Bombing

Kabul, Afghanistan  
26-27 Aug 2021



(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Who: SPMAGTF-CR-CC EOD

What: Post Blast Analysis (PBA)

When: 20210826-27

Where: 42S WD 20202 24113, Abbey Gate Entry Control Point (ECP)

Why: To analyze the construction and effects of the IED.



1.4a

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)






Post Blast Analysis  
Orientation



View from South Abbey Gate Tower

Post Blast Analysis  
Orientation (Continued)



View from blast site



View from South Abbey Gate Tower



Approved for Release

Page 25 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1 4a, 1 4g

Page 26 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1 4a, 1 4g

Approved for Release





1.4a, 1.4g

ball bearings recovered from blast site



Ball bearing entry holes



TPT vic hood



SAPI plate



TPT vic license plate

URGENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

0150



(b)(6)




(b)(6)

(b)(6)



**Task Organization**



UNCLASSIFIED

Version 15 Slide 1 of 10

Exhibit 007



# ***Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Withdrawal Plan***

***21 AUG 2021***

**Overall Classification of this brief is:**

***~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~***

Classified by: General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.  
Commander, USCENTCOM  
Derived From: USCENTCOM CCR 380-14 (12 Apr 21)  
Declassify on: **21 AUG 2046** 02/02/22

UNCLASSIFIED





## Withdrawal Key Facts and Assumptions

**Problem Statement:** How does USCENTCOM maximize the evacuation of AMCITs and designated personnel while retaining the ability to retrograde all deployed NEO forces NLT 31 AUG?

### Key Facts:

- 31 AUG (R-Day) remains the goal for complete evacuation of USMIL forces
- **To accomplish the mission we must initiate equipment retrograde NLT 20 AUG and initiate personnel redeployment NLT 24 AUG.**
- **Total Pallet Position equivalent to withdraw from HKIA: ~3,100**

### Key Planning Factors:

- HKIA SECFOR Min force= 5 x IN BNs to secure withdrawal exfil
- **C-17 Capacity for PAX: 400 (Approved CDRUSTRANSCOM)**
- **23 flights of 400 PAX/sortie yields 9,000 PAX/day**
- **Personnel evacuation will end on 29AUG (R-2)**
- **Sequel:** extends USMIL presence in HKIA through 04SEP21.
- **Branch:** establish Enduring Diplomatic Mission assumes Tb establish a permissive/semi-permissive environment conducive to enduring presence

### Key Assumptions:


- US will not have an enduring presence past 31 AUG
- USMIL redeploys to Kuwait
- USFOR-A FWD redeploys to CFH
- NSU will be evacuated (3k NSU/20k families)
- TURMIL departs HKIA before U.S. withdrawal, pending policy decision
- Tb is the governing authority within Afghanistan and “cease fire” provides time/space for NEO (permissive environment for NEO)
- At some point, Tb will limit Afghan access to HKIA
- Will sustain a working MOG of 8
- PAK Air BLVD remains open
- UK, CAN, NOR, DEU will depart IAW US Retrograde plan
- ISB capacity will not be a LIMFAC
- Based on sustained rate, personnel evacuation will not exceed 90k by 31AUG
- Weather will not restrict flight operations
- 24/7 Flight operations will be conducted
- AMCITs will fly to Qatar, then Kuwait, for onward movement to the U.S.
- Afghan evacuees will fly to ISBs in Qatar, Bahrain, Germany, UAE
- Personnel Recovery will be required until all forces depart
- As contractors depart, BOS-I services (lights, power, sewer, sanitation) will become critical shortfalls over time
- Equipment will be left behind and/or demilitarized within prioritization



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Slide 3 of 10

# Go To Zero: Base Plan (R-Day)



1.4a, 1.4g

- Decision Points**
1. Begin W/D of Non M.E. Equipment
  2. Go to Zero or Maintain Presence
  3. Initiate Withdrawal Operations
  4. Shift Main Effort from Evac to W/D
  5. Redeploy Personnel Recovery
  6. Execute JTE
  7. Execute Sequel for 4 Day Delay

- Key Events**
- Force REDUX (combat power)
  - NEO Termination Declaration
  - NEO END OF MISSION
  - JTF-CR Redeploys
  - JTE Complete

**72hr EXFIL Step Down**

- JTE will be executed with the following forces:
  - BN (+)
  - NSU (250 MIL)

Assumption: Td can maintain external 20029 during EXFIL

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY



Approved for Release

Page 33 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1 4a, 1 4g

Approved for Release

Page 34 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
1 4a, 1 4g





## *Sequel & Branch*

- **Sequel planning extends NEO operations to R-Day (31 Aug) followed by four days of equipment and MILPAX retrograde**
- **Branch planning establishes a limited stay behind force to provide security to a continuing diplomatic mission based out of HKIA**









SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Slide 7 of 10

# Sequel: R+4 Flow Chart

Need decision NLT 24 Aug to implement this sequel...allows two (2) more days to evacuate



USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
Coalition (Abbey Gate Investigation)

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Page 37 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5)

Approved for Release



Page 38 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED

Version 15 Slide 10 of 10



## ***Discussion***

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



## ***Back Up Slides***

UNCLASSIFIED






SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Back Up 1

# Go To Zero MACRO Flow Chart



**Bottom Line: To accomplish the mission we must initiate equipment retrograde NLT 20 AUG and initiate personnel redeployment NLT 24 AUG.**

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

02/02/22

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY





SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Back Up 2

# Combat Power Withdrawal (Base Plan): 24/27 Aug

24 Aug

27 Aug



C2	USFOR-A PWD, JTF-CR, TAC
Combat Power	2-301 x 10, SPMAC, MFU, 1.4a, 1.4g
Capabilities	PRTF, ERQG, MCT, CRE, FST, CLB, BLT
Multinational	NOR, GBR, CAN, TUR, GER, NSO 01, NSO 02, NSO 03
Outflow	USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abbey Gate Investigation)

C2	USFOR-A PWD, JTF-CR, TAC
Combat Power	MEU, 1.4a, 1.4g
Capabilities	ERQG, MCT, CRE, FST, BLT
Multinational	GBR, TUR, NSO 01, NSO 02, NSO 03
Outflow	C-RAM, PRTF, STRATCOM, 02/02/22

0165

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY









SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Back Up 3

# Combat Power Withdrawal (Base Plan): 30/31 Aug

30 Aug

31 Aug



SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY









SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Version 15 Back Up 4

# Combat Power Withdrawal (Sequel): 1-2 Sep

1 Sep

2 Sep



0167

02/02/22

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY




SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY


Version 15 Back Up 5

# Combat Power Withdrawal (Sequel): 3-4 Sep

3 Sep



4 Aug



C2	TAC
Combat Power	1.4a, 1.4g
Capabilities	CRE
Multinational	TUR, NS901
Outflow	USFOR-A FWD, JTF-CR, MEU, FST, ERQG, MCT, NS901

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 (Abbey Gate Investigation)

0168

C2	
Combat Power	
Capabilities	
Multinational	
Outflow	NS901, 1.4a, 1.4g, TAC, CRE

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Approved for Release





# Security Plan



Location Descriptions	
North Gate	1
East Gate	3
Abbey Gate	4
HKIA Airport Entry	6
Outer Cordon	●
Inner Security	●
Key Security Points	○

**Phase I (current)- Begins POD 21/22 AUG**  
 Taliban Control Blue Area/ U.S. Control Green Areas

- Within the Blue areas we expect the Tb to dissipate all traffic and large gatherings
- Taliban will disperse all HKIA gate traffic
- Recommend Taliban occupy checkpoints at blue dots

**Phase II (JTE)- R - X Taliban Control Blue and Green Areas**

- Taliban begin to transition in to Green area for JTE
- Taliban will secure our exit

SCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
 (Abbey Gate Investigation)

0169

02/02/22

Approved



Page 47 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
Exhibit 008 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 48 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 49 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



Page 50 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 51 redacted for the following reason:

Exhibit 009 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



Page 53 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 54 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 55 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release






~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

Exhibit 010

COMREL


# USCENTCOM



USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545  
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

02/02/22

~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~



Page 57 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
Exhibit 011 (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 58 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



Page 59 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 60 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 61 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



Page 62 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 63 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
Exhibit 012 (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 64 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

Page 65 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 67 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

Page 68 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 69 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 70 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 71 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

Page 72 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 73 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 74 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 75 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

Page 76 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 77 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 78 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 79 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

Page 80 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 81 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 82 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(1)1 4g, 1 7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

30 September 2021

## MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6) 23 September 2021

1. On 23 September 2021, [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Arifjan, Al-Udeid Air Base to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: [redacted] (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing background information as context leading up to the months and weeks for what we were going to discuss. In the day before the NEO they stated that President Ghani told the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in Kabul, "Don't fight," which resulted in the rapid collapse of Kabul on 15 August 2021. In addition to Ghani's statements, other coalition forces had begun conducting their own Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in other parts of Afghanistan. For example, British forces exfiltrated more than 100 National Directorate of Security (NDS) leaders prior to 15 August, and then on the 14th or 15th, Ghani said don't fight, [redacted] (b)(6) stated the Taliban, as reported open source, planned to encircle but not take Kabul, but ended up entering the city to secure it and prevent lawlessness after the government forces fled, [redacted] (b)(6) stated on the morning of 16 August, the Taliban (TB) were in position securing the perimeter of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) with gun trucks. US forces were in no position to engage the TB in a fight due to the lack of combat forces on the ground. The TB could have made the situation much worse than the 13 KIA we lost, with the possibility of inflicting casualties in the triple digits if they wanted to.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What capabilities/enablers, beyond combat formations, were at HKIA from 16-30 August?

- Sustainment?
- Protection (MPs, ADA, EW)?
- Medical – Role II, with what limitations on care?



- Engineer?
- Intel/ISR?
- Movement/Maneuver – QRF?

(2) Answer. [REDACTED] (b)(6) The major headquarters (HQ) were USFOR-A (FWD) led by RADM Vasely (V2), 82nd Airborne led by MG Donohue (D2), and JTF-CR led by BGen Sullivan (S1). In terms of combat power the following units were at HKIA: 1-82, 1-194 Bastards, 3-10 Mountain [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a company size element, 2-10 Mountain [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a platoon size element, the 24th ARG/MEU (~1,700 personnel), SPMAGTF-CR-CC had a Company (+) size element, 82nd Airborne had an Engineer element, there were about a dozen JTACS. JSOC's TF 61-6.1 was there for AMCIT recovery. The UK had forces at Abbey Gate, where they were shuttling civilians from the Baron Hotel to Abbey Gate. Abbey Gate was owned by the British during the NEO, until they turned it over to the US on 25 Aug. In mid-July, Turkey said their forces would secure, but not defend HKIA. They ended up conducting BOSS-I and Airfield Operations functions.

On 18 or 19 Aug, there were ~8,000 military personnel aboard HKIA with between 4,000 and 6,000 combat forces there to secure the perimeter. The [REDACTED] (b)(6) deferred to the 82nd ABN DIV for exact force numbers.

Prior to 15 Aug, there were 60 RAID towers at HKIA, which were reduced down to 3 on 26 Aug because contractor support had departed, and systems were crashing. The PTDS and Scan Eagle systems that were at HKIA had been destroyed via combat demilitarization during the emergency evacuation of the embassy. There was one USMC CHD team, and one 82nd Airborne CHD team. Two HC-130s, and three HH-60s (personnel recovery at HKIA). TF Talon had four AH-64s, four UH-60s, and four CH-47s at HKIA. Department of State (DoS) had their own rotary wing (RW) aircraft, as did the CIA. The Role IIE on HKIA was also fully manned by US Forces and Norwegians.

COMREL was confusing, even to us at USFOR-A, which had TACON of 82nd Airborne and JTF-CR. There were numerous officers at the O-5 and O-6 level who were confused by the COMREL, which was complicated by having two, 2-star GO/FOs on the ground. The 82nd Airborne were responsible for HKIA security. D2 coordinated with S1 about security. V2 was overall commander on the ground.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) Unless Bagram had remained open, 18th Airborne Corps Commanding General, LTG Kurilla, wasn't going to take command of the NEO mission, per the Joint Staff. D2's arrival at HKIA was unexpected.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) I recommend speaking with the CENTCOM [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about the other units that were at HKIA, unbeknownst to USFOR-A.

c. Question and Answer 2.



(1) Question. What interaction did US forces have with MN forces and agencies?  
- Did these agencies/forces take responsibilities during the NEO (security, screening)?  
- Where these agencies/forces coordinating actions or operating independently of US forces?  
- What was the demand from MN forces/agencies for logistics support?  
- What coordination was done with the Turkish Military and what were their responsibilities?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) USFOR-A's (b)(6) met daily on HKIA at 1030 with the Multi-National Coordination Cell (MNCC), comprised of representatives from the 17 nations who had signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the US to evacuate their personnel in the event of a NEO. The MNCC representatives would coordinate bus movements into HKIA, de-conflict aircraft arriving/departing HKIA. When V2 became the Senior Airfield Authority, he was able to control the airfield de-confliction process.

(b)(6) At 1600 on 26 Aug, in Turkish spaces, Ambassadors, Defense Attaches, and others held the Embassy Caucus, which I attended. I shared intelligence about the pending attack, so everyone was aware, and knew it was happening. The intelligence community didn't know the gate, but assessed it would be the Abbey Gate due to the number of people there. There would be other coordination that occurred at the daily Embassy Caucus, to include coordination of bus movements to/from HKIA. Mil-Mil engagement was also conducted at these meetings

(b)(6) – Besides interaction at the MNCC and Embassy Caucus, there was coordination with the various NMUs, and special interest groups like TF Dunkirk and TF Pineapple. There were more than 200 special interest groups contacting the Joint Operations Center (JOC) at HKIA directly via phone and email. People from President Biden's office, various members of congress, retired GO/FOs – all contacting the JOC asking to get certain people out of Kabul. USFOR-A FWD/ JTF-CR built an international coordination cell to handle all these requests.

(b)(6) – At Abbey Gate, Marines were standing on HESCOs (dirt-filled barriers) staring into crowds looking for US passports, because the priority for evacuation was American Citizens (AMCITS).

(b)(6) – Besides conducting crowd control, Marines at Abbey Gate were forced to play God by identifying who would be allowed into the airfield. The TB complained to the JOC about DoS messaging, because it changed daily and caused significant confusion regarding which type of travel documents were acceptable for people to gain access to HKIA. A significant problem with DoS messaging was that Afghans did not understand what "immediate family" meant, and therefore resulted in significant friction. There were numerous AMCITS who chose to stay in Afghanistan because their extended family



members were not allowed to enter HKIA. DoS failed to appropriately explain that immediate family meant one spouse, and children under the age of 21.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was the role of DoS during the NEO at HKIA?

- Did they participate in screening/processing at the Gate?
- Did they pre-coordinate movements of AMCITs or other personnel to gates?
- What input did the Ambassador have to operations?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Consular section of US Embassy Kabul (USEK) switched out with a team from D.C. in the middle of the NEO. Prior to the NEO, USFOR-A worked with Ambassador Wilson on planning and coordination. The D.C. team should have been there prior to the NEO instead. During the 16-19 Aug timeframe, DoS sent Ambassador Bass to HKIA with a new consular team to run the NEO. Consulars were not located at every gate 24/7, but they maintained a constant presence at the Evacuation Control Centers (ECCs). DoS did not get one message right to the Afghans during the NEO. JTF-CR was co-located with Ambassadors Bass and Wilson, and there was constant coordination between them. V2 met with Ambassadors Bass and Wilson twice daily, which yielded additional DoS C2 issues. Ambassador Bass was overseeing the NEO, while Ambassador Wilson was still there at HKIA as well, resulting in confusion regarding who was in charge of what for DoS.

This was largely a DoD-run NEO, but should have been DoS-led. There was no formal NEO request from DoS until 16 Aug. Had DoS declared a NEO sooner, we could have gotten the Washington team into Kabul sooner. During the CENTCOM-led NEO Table Top Exercise (TTX) at the end of June, General McKenzie stated a NEO was going to happen. There was a DoS presence from Kabul at the TTX, but none from D.C. that we can recall. The 8 Aug Rehearsal of Concept Drill conducted in Kabul was Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) focused. During that ROC drill, projections were made that Temporary Safe Havens (TSHs) would be full within 48 hours of a NEO beginning, and they were. Outbound evacuees from HKIA were surpassing projections until the TSHs got full which caused a cease to outbound flights. Germany, Bahrain, and UAE agreeing to take evacuees allowed flights to begin again.

V2 spent 8-10 hours a day on the phone with POTUS, the VP, SECDEF, CJCS, and M4, and was constantly being pressured to get more people on planes. White House communications with V2 were likely recorded. The constant theme during POTUS calls was, "How do we get more people out?" This created an urgency among everyone at HKIA, but it's unlikely that the Afghans knew about that. Much of V2's bandwidth was consumed by these daily phone calls.

The order detailing COMREL for the NEO was issued after it had already commenced. LtGen Mundy, former MARCENT Commander, was OK with the JTF-CR being TACON



to USFOR-A, but he was not anticipating there being another 2-star GO/FO on the ground.

(b)(6) (b)(3) DoS disseminated word about which gates would be open daily, then the gates would be overwhelmed by more than 5,000 people, which would result in switching to different gates being open. Coordination for determining which gates to open went through Ambassador Bass. Ambassador Wilson was more focused on up and out communication.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What was the estimated number of HN civilians at the gates on a daily basis between 15 – 26 Aug?

- Was criteria established for shutting gates because of crowds?

(2) Answer (b)(6) (b)(3) There were roughly 2,000-3,000 people at the gates every day. East Gate, West Gate, Abbey Gate, and North Gate were open to people, while South Gate was open to vehicles.

(b)(6) (b)(3) On 18-19 Aug, there were roughly 13,800 people at North Gate, but throughout the NEO there were consistently 2,000-3,000 people there. Each gate had an O-4 or O-5 Gate commander who could decide to close the gate based on the situation on the ground. V2, D2, and S1 coordinated daily with DoS to determine which gates would be open, which was driven by the force protection situation and threat level. On 19 Aug the threat level spiked, and ISIS-K began moving forces to hit HKIA.

(b)(6) (b)(3) After the Abbey Gate attack, USFOR-A began keeping 2-hour metrics throughput at the gates. North Gate was problematic throughout because Afghans thought they'd be able to breach that gate, and it was eventually closed permanently.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What was the throughput of screened individuals per day?

- Per hour?

- At each Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) (b)(3) I have daily throughput numbers I can provide via SEPCOR. South, Abbey, and West Gates were open on 26 Aug.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What was the ROE during the NEO?

- ROE executing Crowd Control?

(2) Answer (b)(6) (b)(3) I don't know what the ROE was during the NEO.



(b)(6), (b)(3) 130b Each gate came with its own dynamics, and the personnel executed the ROE differently. At some gates, security personnel went straight to warning shots, while others acted differently. The actions depended on the background and training of the unit assigned to the gate. At the North Gate, warning shots were employed constantly. Personnel assigned to Abbey Gate employed proper escalation of force (EOF), acted empathetically, and dealt with a more orderly crowd. There were Marines at both North and Abbey Gates. ROE were not properly disseminated due to the lack of time to conduct proper Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSO&I) of security forces. As forces from the 82nd Airborne were landing at HKIA, they immediately deplaned and ran into position in order to fortify perimeter security positions, and secure the airfield. There was never an ROE published that detailed EOF procedures. The 82nd Airborne had a MP Company that assisted with crowd control at the gates, and employed riot control agents.

(b)(6), (b)(3) 130b Around 90% of forces at HKIA used proper EOF procedures.

(b)(6), (b)(3) 130b By 17-18 Aug, Marines and TB were working together to identify and pull people out of the crowds to get them into the airfield. The TB's 313 Badri forces came to HKIA to assist with crowd control. The US, TB, and NSU forces providing security at HKIA displayed significant discipline by not escalating against each other.

(b)(6), (b)(3) 130b The COMREL on paper did not match reality, and the same could be said for the ROE. Often the ROE was changed via verbal understanding among commanders, and would not be properly disseminated to the forces at the gates because there was no mechanism in place to do that. There were daily discussions about ROE between commanders and lawyers.

#### h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. How many credible threats against the perimeter were received per day in comparison to the number of attacks?

- What forums and media/communications were used to inform subordinate units of changes to threat assessments/credible reporting?

- Did the 82nd take on this role when they arrived?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b Until 24 Aug, there had been three credible threats resulting in BOLOs being issued. Marines, acting on threat reporting, disabled a vehicle on 18 Aug by firing at its engine block. Prior to 26 Aug, the TB weren't searching people, they were just doing crowd control. On the 18th, POTUS cleared USFOR-A to share threat information with the TB. We passed 11 folders to TB with information on potential threats. As threats developed, the JOC received tear lines, and D2 ordered the information to be shared with the TB. On 26 Aug, I knew the attack would happen, and initially believed it would be two vehicles. I thought it would happen the morning of 26 Aug. Throughout the day, gates would build up with people then thin out by the



evening. Intel reporting indicated ISIS-K was moving the bomber into place at 1630 on 26 Aug.

There was a nightly 2100 intelligence sync with USFOR-A, the 82nd, and the Marines, where we shared intelligence on threats with unit intelligence officers. There was also a combined fusion cell that enabled cross-talk throughout the day. At 2200 daily there was an intelligence sync via SVTC with the larger intelligence enterprise. Units at HKIA used Chat Surfer to disseminate information on threats. Intelligence officers at HKIA knew that ISIS-K was staging in a hotel 2-3 kilometers west of HKIA, and D2 asked the TB to conduct an assault on the hotel, but they never did.

Leading up to the 26th, the intelligence indicated there would be two attacks, so immediately following the blast we began scanning for additional attacks with ISR assets. Prior to the attack, D2 and other generals at HKIA physically went to the gates to check the security posture. Immediately following the attack, the TB started securing routes, implementing road blocks and conducting searches.

(b)(6), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abbey Gate was scheduled to close the evening of the 26th, regardless of the attack. There was significant pressure from all 17 nations at HKIA to keep gates open in order to get their people inside.

i. Question and Answer 8.

- (1) Question. What was the threat info on 26 August 2021?
- (2) Answer. To be provided via SEPCOR at TS level.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did USFOR-A coordinate with the Taliban/Afghan outer cordon/security screening elements?

- Why or why not?
- If yes, to what effect?
- What were the expectations for these forces?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There was daily, if not hourly, coordination with the TB on security, which was a result of General McKenzie's 15 Aug visit to Doha, as a result TB would assist with evacuating our people. On 16 Aug, USFOR-A had its first engagement with the TB's assigned LNO, Malawi Hamdullah. V2 and D2 met with Hamdullah daily at 1000 to coordinate and share intelligence. Coordination was conducted concurrently in Doha at the highest levels of the TB leadership. We frequently communicated with the TB via text message to instruct them on which people to let through their checkpoints and which documents were acceptable. The TB frequently shared their frustration regarding the inconsistent messaging coming from DoS. No tactical level coordination was conducted with the TB prior to the 16th. As a



result of DoD not having enough forces on the ground to fight the TB when Kabul began to collapse, the US military was forced to develop a working relationship with the TB.

Despite the fact we were conducting numerous kinetic strikes against TB convoys advancing towards Kabul on 14-15 Aug, the TB kept advancing with unknown intentions or objectives. Roughly 2,000 people had to be evacuated from USEK to HKIA.

(b)(6), (b)(3) - Between 5,000-7,000 TB fighters were released from Parwan and Pul-e Charki prisons prior to 15 Aug, which rapidly built the TB force.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was the MEDROE for treating HN Civilians, not being evacuated?

(2) Answer. J3 – Civilians wounded on scene were treated, but medical care was provided judiciously in order to preserve assets to support US personnel. If civilian injuries required extended care, the JOC would coordinate with the TB to send the civilians to a hospital in Kabul. Within the first 96 hours of the NEO, four Afghans were crushed and killed in the masses of people at the gates. Their bodies were held in the Role II facility aboard HKIA until coordination was made with Red Crescent Society to collect the bodies.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What was the general array/location of forces and activities at HKIA after arrival of the 82nd?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) - This question can be better answered by the 82nd Airborne, who will have daily POSREPs. (b)(3)130b, (b) (6)

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Describe the physical terrain of HKIA and the surrounding area?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) - I'll provide via SEPCOR.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Was there a MASCAS plan, what was it, and who was in charge of executing?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) - The MASCAL plan was exercised and rehearsed several times prior to 26 Aug. The (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), coordinated drills. All medical teams executed the plan flawlessly. Some of the KIAs were separated from their

identification, which necessitated Marines coming in hours later to identify bodies. There was a six hour period where KIAs had not been properly identified because some had been separated from their IDs. Three C-17s were used to backhaul all casualties to higher level of care.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What was the PACE plan for communications between the joint force elements?

- FM/TACSAT?
- Digital tools in the JOC – Chat Surfer, Jabber?
- Were LNO's used to supplement the PACE plan?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(3) There was a standing SVTC Bridge and SVOIP Bridge open at all times. At its peak there would be 100 stations dialed in, at its low there were 30 dialed in. All JOCs used Chat Surfer. Each JOC had LNOs. 82nd and JTF-CR ran FM to gates.

(b)(6) (b)(3) JTF-CR had two separate Chat Surfer rooms, but I'm unsure if they logged it. Signal and WhatsApp messenger applications were critical to sharing information rapidly among all units and partners. Most communication was being conducted via Signal.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. What was the COP for Intel and Ops?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(3) Will send SITEMP via SEPCOR.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Was a post-blast analysis completed for the Abbey Gate Attack?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) (b)(3) SMAGTF-CR-CC EOD conducted on 27th.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Was there a need for or were electronic counter-measures used at the gates?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130p We don't know. JTF-CR is the best POC.

s. Question and Answer 18.



(1) Question. Were Guardian Angels (dedicated overwatch) used at the gates as an additional security measure?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b. That's a better question for the tactical level units, 82nd and JTF-CR.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you complete any AARs, lessons learned, storyboards, and could you provide them?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b. Every unit and component was tasked to submit an AAR to CENTCOM by 17 September

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. What else would you want us to know?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b had nothing to add.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Who else in your HQ should we talk to? Anyone else not in a subordinate element that was at HKIA?

(2) Answer.

- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) kept meticulous notes of all V2 conversations, and can speak to the decision about keeping Abbey Gate open

- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the Embassy/Ambassador

- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and coordinated AMCIT movements to gates

- (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b will know what threat information was passed to units at gates.

- (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will have daily POSREPs

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. How much longer do you have in this duty position and where are you going next? Do you have contact info for you next location?

(2) Answer. (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b. USFOR-A disestablishes in the next 14 days. I can be reached via cell phone at (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b and I can provide contact information for anyone else from USFOR-A

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

27 September 2021

MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 23 September 2021

1. On 23 September 2021, B Laneuri and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), conducted an interview of [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at USAG Kuwait HQ to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a conversation with [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b following prepared questions, and a scribe [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b captured [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b questions, rendered to writing below. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b

(b)(6), (b)(3) 130b was present for the interview as well.

3. Discussion.

a. BG Curtis began by explaining the scope of the investigation, the methodology to be used to capture the statement, and introduced everyone in the room.

b. Question and Answer One.

(1) Question: What is your background and training?

(2) Answer: I am a 68Z. Prior to that I was a 68W (Combat Medic) and 68C (LPN).

c. Question and Answer Two.

(1) Question: How did you come to be in Afghanistan

(2) Answer: Our Pre-Mob started on 8 October. I arrived to Afghanistan around 1 November and was originally at Bagram Airfield. We moved the hospital to Kabul support US Embassy Kabul. Around 15 June, the Ghost team moved to HKIA and integrated with the Norwegians. The Norwegians had an O-5 hospital commander. We were 1 level above them and they fell under our unit. We were a direct report unit to Admiral Vasely for any medical concerns. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b (Air Force) had direct contact. We also had the Air Force JET, which was on Bagram and moved. In total, we had 56 people and 20 as the (Forward Resuscitation Surgical Team) FRST from 3 MEDLOG. There were 9 army medical personnel during the day of the attack, 1 Senior Enlisted, 3

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

MEDLOG. It was actually two teams of ten which made the FRST. Each group of 10 was a FRSD (D = Detachment). On 26 August, we only had 9 of the 20 because we had re-deployed other personnel.

d. Question and Answer Three.

(1) Question. Referencing the Diagram, what was the layout and capabilities?

(2) Answer. The UK had a Role 2 Lite. The 82d came in later. Basically, everyone already in country was on the East side with the FRST. The FRST was a Role 2-E, which meant it didn't have a veterinarian, vet clinic, or preventative medicine. It was a 2-E because it had a CT Scanner. The 82d set up on the other side of camp. We had technical supervision of the 274th FRST and they fell under Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR). (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b was triple hatted and wanted to consolidate forces into a Role 2. There was roughly a 5-6 minute drive to talk to each unit. The shock trauma team was a Role 2 Lite and provided medical aid to people moving through the gates. Their main task was mostly COVID mitigation. They were later positioned near Abby Gate the day of the 26<sup>th</sup> for preparations for a potential attack.

e. Question and Answer Four.

(1) Question. How did the unit's sync?

(2) Answer. There was a medical sync everyday at 1700 of all medical units including the Shock Trauma platoon, 274th, 82d, JTF-CR, and Task Force Medical – Afghanistan (TF MED-A). There were also organic assets as well. The C2 worked well. JTF-CR worked for USFOR-A (United States Forces Afghanistan) so they worked for Admiral Vasely. All medical assets we under (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b became the USFOR-A surgeon in practice. Before USFOR-A, (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b was the -C surgeon. After the 82d arrived, the structure would have been USFOR-A at the top down to the 82d, then down to the 3 BDE units and Marines. Our team used Chat Surfer as a line of communication. We also utilized a SIPR phone connection to have all other medical units on a call 24 hours each day. We could just hit the un-mute button and talk directly to a counter part.

1.4a, 1.4g

f. Question and Answer Five.

(1) Question. What were the medical capabilities? For example, why was it split (referencing the diagram)? Was it an operational requirement; based on space, threats, or another reason?

(2) Answer. For the 274th, initially we wanted them in the hospital over to the left of the diagram. We tried multiple times to pull them to the hospital and it made sense to



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

us because all the assets were in the hospital and we had life support. Otherwise, if they were to experience an emergency, it would be a 5-7 minute drive across the flight-line. The 274th provided medical screening for evacuees at first. They didn't have baby supplies or supplies for pregnant women as we did not anticipate that population. They requested additional supplies which were delivered later. The FRSD is usually 10-11 Soldiers but were brought up to 20. So the two teams of 10 (FRSD) made up the FRST and we received those plus'ed up number approximately 2 days after General Donahue arrived. The Role 1 of the 194th is the Battalion aid station. That was their Charlie Med. A Charlie Med is essentially sick-call for service-members. The equipment in the hospital was one x-ray, multiple portable "bumble bees" (x-rays), CT scanner, 10 (+) ultra sounds, seven ICU beds, 14 Internal Ward Car (ICW) beds, and morgue capabilities.

g. Question and Answer Six.

(1) Question. What were the capabilities of the FRST

(2) Answer. Role 2 – They just didn't have holding capacity, but had surgical capability. The 274th itself is a Role 2. They were just focused on surgical. The Charlie Med, even though they were co-located with the FRST, was still primarily just sick call. So even though they were together, they acted as two separate units. We asked the 274th for assistance with the JTF-CR and if they could assist the shock trauma platoon and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), but they declined. I am not sure why they declined. The 274th came in late, set up shop in that specific location (referring to diagram), and then left before the other medical unit. They were from the 1st BDE of the 82d. To be clear, they left after the attack on 26 August and did see patients, but since they did not have holding capacity, the 10 they saw were all transferred over to our unit which is why it made sense that they should have been co-located.

h. Question and Answer Seven.

(1) Question. When did you depart in relation to the 1st BDE, 82d?

(2) Answer. Our unit left on 30 August and were on the flight line at 1000. 1st BDE left before that.

i. Question and Answer Eight.

(1) Question. Between the time of attack (26 Aug) and leaving on 30 Aug, what was the plan on downscaling?

(2) Answer. When the 82d arrived, their command told us that we would leave early, but they ended up folding up before we left. This likely had to do with how conditions changed on the ground after the 26 Aug attack. The original plan for the FRSD was to leave on 24 August, but there was no way the other units could handle



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

USA

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

after all the civilians showed up on the flight line on 14/15 August. Before 24 August, they told us to wrap up, but we wanted to stay (and did stay) which was very lucky that the command allowed us to make that call. Then there was a plan for us to leave on 26 August, but I am glad we didn't. Because we didn't leave we had 10 surgical team capability on 26 August.

j. Question and Answer Nine.

(1) Question. Who made up the Role 2E?

(2) Answer. The Rolee 2-e was U.S. and Norwegian forces mixed with some from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Australians. Most internationals were in the 2-e. They were also involved in the Role 1. The Norwegians plussed us up. They had 38 personnel in theater.

k. Question and Answer Ten.

(1) Question. Where you short any equipment?

(2) No one died because of waiting for surgery, and I attribute that to what we had in theater and that we worked on this 30-60 days before practicing for situations like this. After we saw what happened on 14 August, everyone worked together and saw what could go wrong if we were not ready. After 14 August, more showed up and the UK set up a two Role 2 lights, and the Germans came in with General Donahue. Surgical Capabilities-wise, the ESC (310th (departed August 28-30th) and later the 3DESC (arrived mid-Aug) and 1TSC asked repeatedly if we needed more Soldiers and we declined because we had enough of everything and quickly would have run out of room.

We had at least 100 type O blood and brought between 100-150 back with us. We were great on blood. Our multi-national partners left their blood as they departed theater which plussed us up so we had a lot. We left with more than 100, but not more than 200 and that was after the MASCAL on 26 Aug. We had the joint blood people in Qatar that also sent us more. We were never short on supplies on anything. We had requested class 8 for a long time since June. Once MG Russel arrived with the 1TSC over the horizon, we immediately got the stuff we needed and fast. He made that happen. That was the 2d week in August before the surge on 14 August. Our FLE (Forward Logistics Elements) was 3 Army and 2 Airforce consisting of 3 Bio meds and 2 logisticians. They managed everything like pros.

l. Question and Answer Eleven.

(1) Question. What was the threat stream that you were aware of?



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

(2) Answer. There was stream. Let me clarify, there were multiple serious and credible threat streams before 26 Aug and after 26 Aug. We took Indirect Fire (IDF) multiple times, including the day I left, that impacted the runway.

m. Question and Answer Twelve.

(1) Question. What were the division of responsibilities?

(2) Answer. The German Role was there for Role 2 things and had capabilities. They set up shop at Bldg 200 away from the hospital to the north right of the airport somewhere around 600-800 meters away. I do not remember seeing anyone treating personnel from them on 26 August, but I was fully engaged in treatment. I heard from (b)(6), (b)(3) 1 that they had a Role 2 with (Turkey?).

n. Question and Answer Thirteen.

(1) Question. Please discuss what the Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE) were.

(2) Answer. Initially any pregnant women over 36 weeks would go to our hospital for additional screening. Before 14 August when the surge happened, we treated practically no Afghans. We could treat PDSS (Persons Designated Special Status) and Admiral Vasely would notify our leadership of PDSS that we needed to treat. So the people at the Ministry Of Defense for example, we would have taken them. That was the only way we saw patients prior to 14 August. Later, it is true that some Afghans were injuring their children in order to get the children seen by our hospital which would get the parents pulled into the airport. This had to do with the structure of the gates and the screening of the people. After 14 August, multiple gates were set up with the Taliban setting up an exterior perimeter and turning away those without papers. Inside of that, the Afghan NDS still had a presence and also screened. Then they would reach the airport where the 82d and Marines were the screeners. The local nationals would usually not be allowed onto the airport. So the parents who made it that far, but couldn't get on the airport, some of them injured their children and then would hand them off to the Marines to get the kids treated – that ultimately would get a parent onto the airport and then they could stay because of some Dept of State requirement. Some of the videos everyone saw of handing children/babies up to Marines on the wall were because the kids had been injured and the parents could get to the airport, not because they wanted to give their children to the U.S. alone and were leaving them. That's not all of them, or at least, I cannot know everyone's motivations, but some of the injuries looked intentional to the children. And for some reason or another, we still would see those types of injuries even if they were past the U.S. gate and on the airport, it was unclear why. Some of the injuries, actually quite a few, were from bullets or falling shrapnel. The Taliban especially liked to disperse crowds by firing bullets into the air and that seemed like a constant. Those bullets landed, or pieces of them, and they were



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

hitting people. It was pretty clear that is what some of it was as we found pieces of the debris or cuts that were consistent with falling debris.

m. Question and Answer Fourteen.

(1) Question. On 26 August, the explosion happens. Are you activated?

(2) Answer. So we knew of the threat stream that day and were told probably around 1130 or so to expect an imminent attack. We made the wake-up call to everyone to have them come back by about 1330 because many were resting as we had people on night shift as we always had staff on. We then let the other units know via the SIPR line we had with them that had been on call the entire time, but on mute. We did not make the call on where people were brought, they just started bringing people in. There was a point where we exceeded capability, but that has a specific meaning. We were supposed to triage at the door, and everyone who came into the hospital prior to letting them in as they could be armed/have an IED, but with the numbers coming in, that wouldn't work. We triaged at the door/outside the Emergency Room (ER). Many that arrived initially were the walking wounded who just walked over to the ER and we triaged them. Of the U.S. forces, specifically the 13, 8 arrived dead on arrival. 5 others passed within an hour or two, but we worked on them and attempted to save them. There was just no capability on Earth that could have saved them with the extent of internal injuries that they suffered from the concussion/blast. Their cause of death was the initial blast injuries and proximity; that resulted in internal injuries. Of the 5 that arrived still alive, some of the 5 were conscious and you could see it in their faces they were about to go as they had faded so much. All of them passed within an hour or two. What we did with the traumas that came in was historical and our team was great. We went from 70 patients and over 60 traumas to zero in about 12-15 hours. 0700 on 27 Aug was when the last person was decompressed from the hospital.

n. Question and Answer Fifteen.

(1) Question. Is there any kind of medical capability that you did not have that could have made the difference?

(2) Answer. Not that I can think of, especially factoring in where we were, the limitations with us surrounded, and the amount of people that were coming in. Either way, I don't think there is anything that could have been done. Most were so bad, I don't think anything could have saved them. It was not the lack of capability or ability, it was just the severity of the injury.

o. Question and Answer Sixteen.

(1) Question. Was there a population that arrived that likely would have died and we were able to save them.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) 23 September 2021

(2) Answer. Yes. I can think of at least one scenario off the top of my head where a DCCS/Afghan National arrived that was severely injured and would have passed, but we were able to save them. That said, the U.S. forces were our primary effort and no U.S. force was denied treatment in order to treat a local national.

p. Question and Answer Seventeen.

(1) Question. How many service-members were injured?

(2) Answer. We treated 70 patients that day and 62 of those were traumas. The last patient we saw was at 2130. There likely could have been more as I do not know the exact numbers the UK and 82nd saw, but I know they sent over 10 to us. Those 10 are counted in our 70 as those 10 exceeded the capability of the 82d. The 274th FRSD transferred to us. We also don't have the numbers for the walking wounded that came to us, but there were a lot.

q. Question and Answer Eighteen.

(1) Question. Prior to the 26 August attack, what were you treating?

(2) Answer. Treating pregnant women, but there was no trauma like gunshot wounds other than the rounds falling from the sky and a few that injure h msel s n concertina wire or ma have been intentionally wounding themselves. [redacted] 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b

[redacted] 1.4a It was a 5 minute air flight to it, but not sure where it was located. We saw some of their patients. On the 14 Aug. when the crowds arrived, we didn't know the crowds intentions or who was among them. So we locked down the hospital right after that to prevent it from being overrun. That worked.

r. Question and Answer Nineteen.

(1) Question. What kind of medical screening was taking place at the gates to your knowledge?

(2) Answer. I never personally visited the gates, but I know from my position and the [redacted] (b)(6) some of the details a [redacted] e up gates and 0 syncs. [redacted] ere was a s ock trauma platoon. [redacted] 1.4c

[redacted] 1.4c

[redacted] 1.4c Based on the 1700 meetings, I know at the gates that people were treated for dehydration and heat exhaustion. The medical team and marines set up tarps to cover up people from the sun as that was crushing the civilians being packed so tightly and outside all day. The medos also did blood tests to check co-morbidities such as



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

23 September 2021

diabetes. If a person was pregnant at 36 weeks or more, we would treat them or if they had a child that was under 6 months, we would treat them. Otherwise, they needed to go to a local hospital.

s. Question and Answer Twenty.

(1) Question. Were there any patients taking up beds prior to 26 Aug?

(2) Answer. No, we had no patients at that time before the blast. Some local nationals had been treated for dehydration or simple stuff, but could be discharged and sent back so that is what was happening. These treatments were brought up during the 1700 daily sync.

t. Question and Answer Twenty-one.

(1) Question. How was treatment different after 26 Aug?

(2) Answer. One thing that changed is that near the end, they wanted a medical provider on all flights. That was something that 3d Medical Brigade helped cover. There had been medical issues including people going into labor on flights. I know we request Air Evacuation (Air Force) to decompress 55 patients who were in the hospital or needed a higher level of care. Some of this was right after. We cleared 70 patients in from 1330ish until about 2130 with the last being discharged/decompressed at 0700 on 27 August the next day.

u. Question and Answer Twenty-two.

(1) Question. What were the medical assets on the ground?

(2) Answer. There was one (1) casualty evacuation vehicle (CASEVAC) that was a Chinook that went across the airfield to our hospital and it had 12-13 patients from TF Pegasus. That was the Chinook that was on the television reports that flew across the flight line and kicked up all the dust. That was the best and fastest way to get people across the airport in a group. I am not sure if it was dedicated for that mission or just acquired for use as most of the CASEVAC was just grabbing any vehicle that could move and haul people. CASEVAC capability was vehicles of opportunity. There was 3 Turkish ambulances. Two were up-armored. We had a makeshift F350 as an ambulance. Mostly it was whatever flatbed or pick-up truck a person could grab and use. I am not clear who TF Pegasus was. It may have been the CAB. The Marines acquired 2 FLAs type vehicles, but no other CASEVAC vehicles. The 274th arrived without equipment and set up far away from us. It was likely do to the rapid push to get them into theater, but when they set up away, it did not make sense to us as they didn't have equipment. They wanted to set up at Alvarado and collapse there. So with no equipment and being so far out, they were too far away to assist with trauma and had no holding capacity. That is why they sent all their patients to us on 26 August.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 23 September 2021

v. Questions and Answer Twenty-three.

(1) Question. Was there a MASCAL plan.

(2) Answer. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b  
[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b

The Norwegians owned the plan and designed it originally. The U.S. reviewed it and modified/approved it through TF Med-A. Other than the walking wounded, the whole plan didn't survive contact. But that is the norm and what we train for. For example, we were supposed to wand everyone entering the hospital for protection. There were so many that we couldn't and just had to immediately start triaging. Overall, I'd estimate that 80—85% of the MEDROE was carried out with the other 15% being things like that the example above with the wands.

w. Question and Answer Twenty-four.

(1) Question. Discuss the 26th and the threat?

(2) Answer. About 1140 we received notice from the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) that the JOC (Joint Operations Center) had a credible impending threat. We shared that on our SIPR Bridge (the SIPR phone). We received that at 1140-1145 and the Deputy Hospital Commander posted/announced it out so that made us recall in place via Whatsapp at 1145 with a deadline of 1345 to be at the hospital. Our TOC was notified of the IED blast at 1605. We preemptively activated our MASCAL course of action which had a surgical/trauma teams prepped and ready at their beds. At 1620, the TOC notified us of 15-20 patients. We had the 10 trauma teams ready to go.

x. Question and Answer Twenty-five.

(1) Questions. What visibility did you have of the surge medical assets at gates?

(2) Answer. Originally a lot of the wound were classified as gunshot wounds, but they were actually because of shrapnel. But there were some gunshot wounds. There was a non-U.S. patient that had a bullet inside the back of his head after small arms fire. We saw 0 coalition injuries that I remember. The Brits couldn't use their Operating Room (OR) because of the size. They had to use that area as a morgue. I don't remember dead Afghans in our morgue. We did become at capacity for the morgue. We used a make-shift reefer trailer which was 40 feet long to make an expeditionary morgue. Even though we planned for a MASCAL, there just was limited time and room to construct a morgue for that event especially in light of our exfiltration plans that were set to be in the next few days. Triageing outside of the hospital helped a lot, especially with the walking wounded and keeping the rooms clear to move and operate on the most serious. I was the person writing the patients on the board and assisting everywhere. We saw 70 total including the 10.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 23 September 2021

z. Question and Answer Twenty-six.

(1) Question. Discuss after 26 August and the exfil?

(2) All coalition forces and many Afghans came to the fallen heroes' ceremony at 1330. We had 55 total medevac'd. It was a mix of US, but I think approximately 18 were U.S. Categorizing the injuries, most were shrapnel and small arms fire. As for shrapnel, I don't specificall remember the type like protrudin medal pieces, but you should talk to [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b

5. The oint of contact for this memorandum is the undersi ned a [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b and [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b  
[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(3) 130b

[redacted] (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS  
Brigadier General, USA  
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)  
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT  
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)  
[redacted] JTF Crisis Response, 23 September 2021

1. On 23 September 2021, BG Lance G. Curtis, 3 ESC Commanding General [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, MARC [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) conducted an interview with [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) at Naval Air Station Bahrain, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis, [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) interviewed [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) in a conversational manner. This interview was captured and rendered to writing as closely what was said in the discussion as possible. For the purpose of this, [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) will refer to [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) will refer to [redacted] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6).

3. Discussion.

a. BG Curtis began by explaining the scope of the investigation, the methodology to be used to capture the statement, and introduced everyone in the room.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Is [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a standing unit?

(2) Answer, [redacted] (b)(6) It is [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a It is a standing unit, certified as a [redacted] n 2 9, as o ert o 0 .

c. Question and Answer 2

(1) Question: As the planning for this operation started, it was led mainly by CENTCOM, and the products are components of this planning correct?

(2) Answer: [redacted] (b)(6) Yes, we started planning and prep in April. We stood up to Operational Planning Teams, both looking at various aspects of NEO. These OPTs included MARCENT and US Embassy Kabul (USEMBK). One of the major efforts was to determine the conditions and triggers for NEO. The JTF was activated in May 2021 in an order. On the order following that we were assigned as TACON for planning

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

purposes to U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). We remained TACON to them from the start of execution through the end of mission, and for multiple stages of planning. We conducted a PDSS in May that included walkthroughs of Bagram, Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), and the Embassy Compound in Kabul. I knew throughout the planning process that once Bagram went away, that the battle space would be massive. HKIA security was not optimal, with each part of HKIA divided into its own compound, with its own security. There was no unit of effort or command, even though the Turkish Military was ultimately responsible for the security of HKIA throughout the summer of 2021. The Turkish Military was really only securing North Gate and the North HKIA compound. We assessed in May that HKIA would require at least four battalion to secure the perimeter.

(b)(6) Our activation in May came with a JMD with approximately 187 personnel. We did not deploy that many to HKIA and mainly relied on reach back to (b)(1)1.4a We did put three LNOs early into Afghanistan, at USFOR-FWD and USEMBK. We also set a three person quartering party at HKIA in May.

(b)(6) Bagram was dropped by CENTCOM during the rehearsal of concept (ROC). We wanted to keep Bagram, because we felt it was a viable option. Starting 2-3 weeks into June, during the tabletop exercise (TTX) and ROC with CENTCOM, it was clear that they were hinting that Bagram would not be used. This was officially confirmed around 04 July. Bagram had been handed over in June to ANDSF but we were still planning against it throughout June.

d. Question and Answer 3:

(1) Question: So you wanted to use Bagram, but you were denied by CENTCOM?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We had looked at all options from Bagram, Maz-a-Sharif, and Kabul. CENTCOM took Bagram off the table. During the initial planning timeline we conducted a war game with both Aerial Ports (Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) and Bagram) involved, that showed different timelines, but it was pulled by CENTCOM.

e. Question and Answer 4

(1) Question: Was that decision tied to the perceived threat level?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I can only speculate the decision was made due to simplicity, or perhaps due to the defensibility or ease of access to the location, though I think Bagram was more defensible, so concerns about threat could not have driven that decision. I would also like to know why that decision was made.

f. Question and Answer 5



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: What was the C2 and task organization tied to having these multiple ports? Was the complexity of multiple ports perhaps why the decision was made to only use one?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) It's possible, there were a lot of different corps level elements incorporated into various branch and sequence planning that may have led an effort of that scale.

(b)(6) I agree, the task organization was always a little "wonky", starting with the planning process with USFOR-A. We initially wanted the JTF to activate at a co-component level, we had no real authority as the planned.

g. Question and Answer 6:

(1) Question: Why do you think Bagram was taken off the table?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) In regards to Bagram, the LNO indicated no real specific threat that would have taken Bagram off the table, other than the complexity of trying to manage two Aerial Ports of Entry (APOE). We usually felt that was more threat tied to HKIA. Sure, there was the prison in Bagram, but there is also prison near HKIA. HKIA always felt less defensible due to its terrain, specifically its proximity to Kabul and the urban area.

(b)(6) The OPTs were reaching out and monitoring Kabul to evaluate situations that would mandate a noncombatant evacuation (NEO). They were evaluating the friendly, political, and enemy situations. For instance, district and population centers were falling. We knew that the Brits were planning on leaving if Kandahar fell and that if the Brits left it would likely "spook the herd". The Brits held off on their announcement until NEO was officially announced.

(b)(6) Similarly, internal to the U.S., Ghazni Province was our trigger. We knew that if Ghazni fell, that NEO would be a go, it was only two hours south of Kabul.

h. Question and Answer 7:

(1) Question: The thought process was if Ghazni fell, there was no chance for Kabul?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, but we still thought it would hold longer than it did. The ANDSF in Kabul were assumed to be the best troops and still capable of holding the city.

(b)(6) We did have indicators this wasn't the case. President Ghani was encouraged to consolidate all of his crisis response units in Kabul, but he largely ignored this and sent these forces across the country.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

i. Question and Answer 8:

(1) Question: What was the methodology behind making that decision?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) It was clear the decision was only about political pull. Ghani sent these forces all over at the expense of Kabul, but it soon became clear that the ANDSF were less strong than initially anticipated, which is indicative of poor intelligence and understanding of military.

j. Question and Answer 9:

(1) Question: Explain how the task organization was built?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The potential task organization for the JTF was initially comprised of 24 MEU and the SPMAGTF. We also planned having 3/10 MTN IBCT available starting on the 15th of August that was supposed to supplement and provide additional security, from within CENTCOM. We figured this would be the main force to support us, so the 82nd was a surprise. The decision was made by Gen McKenzie due to the C-17 association out of Joint Base Charleston. There was clearly no support for the C-17 demand in theater. Kabul was in duress and they needed a force fast.

k. Question and Answer 10:

(1): Question: What was your initial manning footprint during the NEO?

(2): Answer: (b)(6) Our initial Early Entry Assistance Team (EEAT) was only 49 PAX. It was designed to assist the Department of State (DoS) process special interest visas (SIVs), which they did about once every three days due to aircraft availability. We were limited due to the 650 PAX boots on ground (BOG) limit. Twenty of those individuals were meant to help screen and process SIVs when they were asked, but they never were. They weren't planned on as being shooters. The NEO is mission essential for the MEU and the SPMAGTF, and the MEU was certified by the expeditionary operations training group (EOTG). Those guys were prepared to assist with a NEO, and the forces we had at (b)(1)1.4a were conducting rehearsals for a NEO as well.

l. Question and Answer 11:

(1) Question: What was your manning posture?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) It was 49 personnel in the EEAT, plus our LNOs, and a quartering party of about 60 personnel.

m. Question and Answer 12:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with [REDACTED] (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: How did you pick those personnel?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We were focused on those individuals who could be cross functional, but with an emphasis on planning capabilities. We always needed a subordinate element to execute any operations. We had 24th MEU and GCE from the SPMAGTF.

(b)(6) The debate was always too much or too little with capability. We prioritized a clear command and control (C2) element in place in case the NEO went live.

n. Question and Answer 13:

(1) Question: Any lessons learned from the personnel selection?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I think the selection was about right in the aggregate. I might've gone a bit heavier on an operations section.

(b)(6) I didn't think force flow would play out the way it did. I thought that the C-17s, the joint military forces, and other key components would still come into play in our favor. It was apparent about 48 hours into execution that this was not going to happen.

o. Question and Answer 14:

(1) Question: When did you get notification that you would execute?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We were notified we may have to leave in about 96 hours. We imposed a 48 hour time limit on ourselves to get prepared. After reviewing more information, we determined a 24 hour posture was needed. We were staged and ready to go at the JTF level. We used the joint manning documentation and conducted mission rehearsals as we prepared to execute. The EEAT went on the 19<sup>th</sup> of July.

p. Question and Answer 15:

(1) Question: So what was the incremental buildup of JTF-CR?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) At the start we had 85 associated personnel that were on deck and ready to go at Kabul. From there, MEU elements went forward first on the 12th of August. That was 24th MEU with their command element and security of their headquarters, their snipers, and their provisional rifle company. They arrived during the period of darkness from the 13th to the 14th of August. We jumped from our initial 85 PAX on the 4th of August, up to 254 PAX on the 13th of August. Around that time the BOG jumped up to about 3400.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

3 September 2021

(b)(6) The BOG really went out the door when NEO was announced, it was clear that more manpower was needed to support the operation. The BOG was never officially scratched, it just became ignored.

(b)(6) That's true, the mentality was to get big in order to get small, and we had to get people to HKIA. Looking at force flow, things started to change rapidly. Lead elements were moving into theater, but C-17 availability was an issue. TF Talon and the embassy folks were pulling out from Kabul to HKIA via their own internal aviation elements. TF Wild Boar (3/10 MTN IBCT), was acting as the security element. Then 24th MEU deployed their ECC light package, without any security. The Turks and ANDSF were holding security positions, and TF Polar Bear was also assisting.

q. Question and Answer 16:

(1) Question: How were people running onto the airfield?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) What precipitated the "night of the zombies" was Ghani leaving the country. Afghans heard that he left the country, and they saw the embassy personnel starting to move over to north HKIA. They all saw this, the ANDSF crumbled, and people just started to flood the airfield on the night of the 15th.

r. Question and Answer 17:

(1) Question: Do you think that some of the ANDSF tried to get out?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, some definitely came in through the gates.

(b)(6) It was very difficult to make it to the gates due to the density of bodies. Fit and aggressive males had an advantage, they were simply more able to endure and make it through the crowds. I have no doubt that some males passing through screening were from the ANDSF.

s. Question and Answer 18:

(1) Question: When Ghani left on the 15th and the airfield was flooded, what happened to the security that was in place?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Security of HKIA was always a hodge-podge. There were 12 compounds and there was no clear command and control of the security between the ANDSF and the Turks.

t. Question and Answer 19:

(1) Question: Didn't Ghani tell the chief of police to take over security for all of Kabul?



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)  
(b)(1)1.4a 3 September 2021

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, but he left when it became clear that Ghani had abandoned the city. The Afghan forces had way too many control nodes, they were not centralized. The Turks held their portion together to an extent, but they didn't really have control. The Kabul Garrison Command (KGC) was the last element to own all Afghan units, but when the Afghan Garrison Commander also fled there were no more touch points between their different elements.

(b)(6) Yeah, but the Turks wouldn't even leave the northern area of HKIA and go to the southern terminal area.

u. Question and Answer 20:

(1) Question: Why wouldn't the Turks go to the southern compound?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Because there was conflict between them and the Afghan forces. If the Turks got close and they weren't with Americans, the Afghans would draw weapons on them. However, the Turks did seem to exert some influence over the ANDSF location efforts. The Turks owned the northern area for security and would not go south. The Kabul Air Compound (KAC) had a weekly meeting which all elements showed up to in order to de-conflict, but there was no C2.


v. Question and Answer 21:

(1) Question: Once the Afghans abandoned their post on the 15th, why wouldn't the Turks push south? Were they afraid of the Taliban?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) It was too much area for them to hold. Their Alamo plan was to save themselves by holding their compound in the north HKIA.

(b)(6) It was estimated that they only had 400 PAX, and not all of them were fighters. A lot of those guys were administrators.

w. Question and Answer 22:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

x. Question and Answer 23:

(1) Question: Tell me about the night of the 15th?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Sure, on the 15th of August there were massive groups of people flooding in from the south. On no less than three occasions we had to empty the JOC of almost all personnel. We were desperate for manning, and it got to the point that if you had a rifle, you were out pulling security. At the time JTF-CR and subordinate units only had about 300 personnel. We had to pull 50 out of 53 Marines in the JOC out to the line to pull security.

(b)(6) The encroachment on that night got about 200 meters away from overrunning the JOC in North HKIA, they just happened to be drawn towards the planes instead.

y. Question and Answer 24:

(1) Question: Were there any hostiles in that crowd?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, on the morning of the 16th, Marines killed two hostile individuals with weapons that were displaying hostile intent in the crowd.

z. Question and Answer 25:

(1) Question: How did the Taliban come into play?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They actually helped push the crowds out after we asked, through either BG Kline or Gen McKenzie. They apparently offered to take over security of the full airport, which we declined.

aa. Question and Answer 26:

(1) Question: Why would they help and offer that?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They wanted the international credibility. They offered security of the airfield and even of the embassy because they were trying to keep those locations functional in order to maintain HKIA as an international airport. They were focused on long term credibility.

(b)(6) The top lesson learned is that when the mobs of people you're trying to help are the threat, you need to change your mentality. The threat to mission to me at this point was the mob and that continued throughout the operation. ISIS-K was a risk a risk to force.

bb. Question and Answer 27:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) What was the Taliban reaction to the shooting? Did that shooting follow the rules of engagement (ROE)?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The Taliban didn't really have a reaction, they weren't integrated into the security of the airfield yet. Once we did integrate them it was a difficult thing to keep together, on multiple occasions they would verbally threaten our Marines at the gates, but it was always deescalated.

(b)(6) In terms of ROE, the shooting followed standard escalation of forces. The two individuals were armed and committing a hostile act with hostile intent towards the crowds. It was never formalized, but the evacuees inside the gate were under U.S. protection. ROE was limited to self-defense SROE and informally included defense of others, if those others were in the perimeter.

(b)(6) The only formal discussion we had about ROE was in regards to the bags that individuals were throwing over the walls and fences because we were concerned that they may contain explosives. However, there were also many people who threw over their property before attempting to climb the fence themselves. That act was dangerous, but it was not always hostile.

**cc. Question and Answer 28:**

(1) Question: Did the NSU also help clear the crowd with beat sticks?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes they did.

(b)(6) With the Taliban and the NSU both on the airfield we have to keep them separated, we didn't want them to clash with the crowds in between them. The NSU ended up securing the southeast.

**dd. Question and Answer 29**

(1) Question: Tell me about the 82nd's arrival.

(2) Answer: (b)(6) On the 15th we were fully TACON to USFOR-A. The notice the 82nd was being deployed to HKIA came down in a CENTCOM night order. At the same time POTUS raised the BOG to 3400. 1/82 IBCT arrived during the period of darkness on the 15th into the 16th. When they hit the ground we basically told them "go left and secure the gate". We sent runners to help them establish defensive positions, even prior the 1/82 IBCT being able to establish comms.

**ee. Question and Answer 30:**

(1) Question: Which way did the 82nd go?



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They went west towards Camp Alvarado. The leaks were coming in from the west, the gate there was entirely uncovered. We put them around the West Gate, and as a whole along the perimeter on the west. That included Santa Fe, MOI, and New York Gate.

ff. Question and Answer 31:

(1) Question: Speak more about the 15th into the 16th, please.

(2) Answer: (b)(6) By the time the 82nd has been emplaced it is the 16th. At this time all of our guys were on line and focused on ensuring the crowd doesn't make it through to north HKIA. We are starting to get worn out. At about this time (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c offered 1300 shooters and 210 vehicles to help maintain security. This force was the National Strike Unit (NSU). We didn't initially know accepting the help with additional forces, would also require us to evacuate 24,000 of their family members out of the country. Not that it mattered, the NSU was essential to clearing HKIA.

(b)(6) The NSU started establishing order in both the north and the south, they cleared the international and domestic terminals, and started taking up security along the perimeter. The perimeter had pretty murky boundary lines between a lot different forces.

gg. Question and Answer 32:

(1) Question: Over this duration what were your priorities?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We were focused on a few things at the time. The first priority was to establish security which was difficult given the speed of the NEO and the forces we had available. Our second priority was to keep the airfield operational. We needed a response team to control air traffic after towers 1 and 8E were destroyed by the mobs storming the airfield. We had JTACs and MMTs controlling aircraft from a tent on the ground after we determined that the runway was not fouled.

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33:

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: What did the actual NEO look like at this time?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The directive we had at the time was to fill all of the planes, which led to tons of people at the gates knowing they might be able to get through.

(b)(6) The State Department started pushing out where and when to go (gates, times for entry), without any focus on metering. This combined with the confusion about what documentation was actually acceptable never created a clear message of who could be let in, which resulted in tons of people at the gates. I would say we had 3,000 at a gate and 10,000 people around the gate.

(b)(6) It was brutal, people were desperate. Babies were being thrown over the gate to avoid being crushed.

ii. Question and Answer 34:

(1) Question: How were people coming in through the gates?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The gates were functional for a while after opening, and you would be able to process people in through the gates. Then thousands of people at the gate would get excited and press the gates. People at the gate trying to get screened probably spent 2-3 days trying to get pulled into the gates, except for some special cases.

(b)(6) At the start of the NEO, it was clear that we would focus on the American Citizens, but Ambassador Wilson's staff and his consular officers were clearly insufficient to get people in.

jj. Question and Answer 35:

(1) Question: How many gates were there?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Initially the plan was to operate North Gate and Abbey Gate.

(b)(6) Ambassador Bass showed up with an emergency consular team on the 19th of August to help. AMB Bass took over command and control to try and clarify the messaging from Department of state.

(b)(6) That's our perception, but this was never put out directly.

(b)(6) We got the feeling, messaging to evacuees of where to go (gates) was coming out of D.C. with no clear reasoning, coordination, and synchronization.

kk. Question and Answer 36:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: Did the consular officers seem shocked by these messages?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, they usually seemed to be caught as unaware as we were.

(b)(6) Still, the confusion of having both Ambassador Bass and Ambassador Wilson push out messages to American citizens made things unclear.

(b)(6) True, these messages would get pushed over WhatsApp and tons of people would subsequently show up the gates and further complicate the situation.

II. Question and Answer 37:

(1) Question: So on the 15th, the 82nd begin to arrive, how many of them are present at this time?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Initially one battalion. The JTF had TACON of them for 3 or 4 days by directive. JTF-CR was in charge of the perimeter, so once (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) arrived we had touchpoints with him in order to instruct him on how to array his forces. His command post was at Camp Alvarado. Right around this time the pressure from the White House to evacuate was huge so our priorities in order were security, speed, and then screen. A blue passport meant that you and all your family were able to come in. HKIA was filling up rapidly and so were the temporary safe havens (TSH). We could process about 1,000 people a day. On the 19th to the 20th we had about 14,500 people staged and ready to fly on HKIA. Consular Officer were deputizing Marines.

(b)(6) The base only had the capability to support 6,000 with water and electricity. On the 16th-17th the U.S., NSU, Turks, and Afghans consumed all of the logistical reserve, so we were on the razor's edge. It was one MRE a day for evacuees, and two a day for Service Members.

mm. Question and Answer 38:

(1) Question: What was in charge of logistics?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) From JTF-CR it was (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) When 1-82 came in it bumped out our units supply packages, which broke the supply chain.

nn. Question and Answer 39:

(1) Question: When did the 82nd HQ arrive?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) During the period of darkness on the 18th. They took over perimeter security for the airfield at that time. The JTF-CR became TACON to the 82nd. 1/82 IBCT was still under the JTF-CR at that time, along with 24th MEU and SPMAGTF. An email from Gen McKenzie put the 1/82 IBCT under 82nd.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(b)(6) This was confusing since people would say that the 82nd ran security, but the JTF handled throughput and the NEO operations. But meanwhile, 1-82 ICBT was still technically under the JTF for a period of time. TF Polar Bear/ Wild Boar became the quick reaction force (QRF) and also the snatch and grab for gates even though they were task organized to 1/82 IBCT.

(b)(6) We maintained security at the ECPs, along with the NSU, as that falls under ECC operations. 24th MEU provided security as provisional rifle companies.

oo. Question and Answer 40:

(1) Question: What equipment were you short?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We were never short EES systems or people to run them. We were short C-17s. This may have been caused by politics but also how people were being dropped off. The US personnel were being sent to (b)(1)1.4a and the Afghans to (b)(1)1.4a if the plane was half and half, the aircraft would need to fly to (b)(1)1.4a to unload Afghans and then travel to (b)(1)1.4a for US personnel. Another complication was that the NSU required 33% of all air. This was to reassure the alliance between US and the NSU. Eventually the contracted reserve air fleet (CRAF), started flowing in which relieved some of the pressure. The internal threat was the NSU and Taliban. The external threat was the mob.

pp. Question and Answer 41:

(1) Question: Are you getting any reports indicating a threat from the NSU?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No. I don't know if they would have turned, but they would have gotten ugly. Regardless, it was something we needed to mitigate because they were only 200m away from us.

qq. Question and Answer 42:

(1) Question: What was the role of (b)(1)1.4c at the time? Can they control the NSU?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We didn't have a formal relationship with them, but they were willing to work with us in our JOC. They couldn't control the NSU, they were more peers on equal status. (b)(1)1.4c may have helped train them and coordinate their movements, but their primary handlers were the (b)(1)1.4c told us about the initial transaction cost of getting 30,000 NSU affiliate out. Threat wise, we had to give those assurances as they saved us the 48 hours it may have taken to clear and secure the airfield.

rr. Question and Answer 43:

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

23 September 2021

(1) Question: Please tell us about the 24th of August?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) That's when the 82nd had the reigns for security. I had a relationship established between the Operations Officers from USFOR-A and the 82nd.

(b)(6) At that time, we started maintaining a strike bridge which was essential in getting the primaries, and anyone we needed, on the net raid, to solve any issues that arose. We maintained that for two weeks, and along with our (b)(1)1.4c and RAID cameras, we had good visibility. Also on the 24th, USFOR- began her retrograde and the 82nd retained TACON of the JTF. Our JOC had also turned into the international JOC because the evacuation coordination was our responsibility.

ss. Question and Answer 44:

(1) Question: The raid cameras are from the Turks KAC? Is any of this footage recorded?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, they had 13 raid cameras that became our lifeline to the gates. I don't believe it was recorded, I think it was destroyed and not retained. You could maybe ask contractors if they saved it to see the madness at the gates. The (b)(1)1.4c would show you the same, however. It would be a loss not to have some of that footage.

tt. Question and Answer 45:

(1) Question: So on the 25th what are the threat streams related to the attack? What is the response?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) At the time reporting supported the conclusion a suicide borne IED attack could occur at either Abbey or North Gate. It was likely going to be Abbey, but we felt that North Gate would have been more catastrophic. We had a high confidence, and 12-24 hours prior we were certain that the attack was coming.

(b)(6) We had about 60-70 credible threat streams that required our action. We had to dep one of the aircraft due to an internal threat of a bomb on a plane. We had countless threats of suicide IEDs, vehicle IEDS, and small arms attacks. I never got a sense that this threat was more credible than all the rest. It made sense it would be Abbey Gate, because it was the gate with the most traffic and throughput. The other gates were closed frequently because of crowds, but the crowds moved at Abbey Gate.

(b)(6) You're free to go through my JOC Log on this. Some threats happened, and others didn't. I felt confident that an attack was coming as the 26th approached and the window closed, and we were getting fidelity of this from the high side.

uu. Question and Answer 46:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: Why was Abbey Gate utilized so heavily?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The situation at the North Gate was too bad, and the gate setup too ineffective, to allow it to stay open consistently. East Gate would open for short periods to get AMCITs through before getting clogged. Abbey Gate was the most controlled multi-national site to get people out. It was simply the most efficient.

vv. Question and Answer 47:

(1) Question: 1/8 was in the North, and 2/1 and the coalition forces were at Abbey. What was the difference in atmosphere?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The North Gate was packed all the way up to the gate. They tried to make a small buffer big enough to get 100 people screened, but there was a constant press. Abbey was a longer process, and the Taliban had better control of the populace. There were better security measures there as well with c-wire (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4, (b)(1)1.4g) emplaced. The setup of the area with the canal and the "chevron" allowed for the most multinational access, but the Brits were closing out, and scheduled to conduct a passage of lines with us on 26 August. DoS would also stage a lot of groups outside Camp Sullivan, which was near Abbey Gate, and direct the groups to Abbey, especially AMCITs.

(b)(6) The Brits used the Barron Hotel as their hub, which was beyond Abbey Gate. The Brits were on their last push to get people through at this time (26th August), before they collapsed back into HKIA.

(b)(6) The East Gate helped take some of the pressure off of Abbey, but it didn't provide the same amount of standoff for the unit on the gate. Abbey Gate had clear entry points and barriers. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) ran the snatch and grab crews as dictated by higher entities, often just operating off a description like "pull two girls in red dresses and their party through".

(b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) probably got over 100 groups through. Some of those groups were as small as five, some were larger than 100. These groups may have been directed by the White House, Department of State, retired Four-Stars, or the Pope. All of these calls were consuming bandwidth, people were getting hundreds of texts and dozens of calls every day.

ww. Question and Answer 48:

(1) Question: The Taliban are primarily operating as crowd control on the perimeter?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, they were pretty antagonistic towards our guys there.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(b)(6) We shared some of our intel packages with them, we got info that was basically "REL/ Taliban" from CENTCOM.

xx. Question and Answer 49:

(1) Question: When does Golf Company assume Abbey Gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They didn't assume it fully. There were some complications. The Brits, Echo from 2/1, and Golf from 2/1 each had elements pulling 24-7 operations at the gate. They increased their effort when the Brits were preparing to go "end of mission" at the Barron Hotel. We had (b)(1)1.4c and moved the shock trauma platoon closer to the inner gate.

yy. Question and Answer 50:

(1) Question: Who was in charge of the gate and the shock trauma platoon?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The shock trauma platoon and the gate were under the control of (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) who organized the defense. There were

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(6) There were two blast studies, done by the U.S. and the Brits that assessed the blast as a command detonation.

aaa. Question and Answer 51:

(1) Question: Were there Guardian Angels in place?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes they were snipers in place in the tower by the gate. I'm not sure what else they had, the Battalion and Golf Company Commander could say better. I believe the Brits had some as well.

bbb. Question and Answer 52:

(1) Question: Did you get any specific intelligence indicating details about the threat?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We got some details like haircut, but nothing that we verified as credible. There were a bunch of shady people, but nothing fit clearly. It does not seem like the individual who conducted the attack was indicated previously. I don't have total recollection as JTF Intelligence section merged with MEU intel section.

ccc. Question and Answer 53:

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: I heard that he was flashing a U.S. driver's license to get closer?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I never heard anything like that.

(b)(6) It was possible, if anyone had any kind of U.S. identification the guidance was to let them through.

ddd. Question and Answer 54:

(1) Question: Any identification or thoughts on who the attacker was?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No identification on the attacker. We just know that he wanted to hurt Americans and cause maximum casualties as he had a three dimensional target, he had a professional metal plate with metal ball bearings. He was standing at the canal with people across from and below him. There were casualties out to 10 meters, and injuries up to 30 meters. The plate was professional.

eee. Question and Answer 55:

(1) Question: Was the attack coordinated with small arms fire?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No, but we were getting reports of two bombers. We think the guy detonated in the canal, and some injured folks came around the back side of the Barron Hotel and reported the blast to the Brits which started a report of a 2nd bombing. Getting hit by ball bearings looks similar to a gunshot wound. There was only one bomb.

fff. Question and Answer 56:

(1) Question: There were some reports of doctors pulling bullets out of the wounded?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The NSU approach to crowd control was to use flashbangs and fire thousands of rounds into the air daily, for a week. Some of those rounds could come down and hit someone. The NSU was pretty careless and out of control. They fired on Marines and the Marines killed a couple of them in self-defense.

ggg. Question and Answer 57:

(1) Question: Could you hear the blast?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) Yes, We instantly spun up vehicles to act as CASEVAC. We knew it was a MASCAL, and fortunately was something we rehearsed with USFOR-A FWD. We had Role 2 capabilities and the shock trauma platoon forward. The medical response was instant, we didn't need air CASEVAC, and the first casualty was receiving treatment within 15 minutes.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, 23 September 2021

hhh. Question and Answer 58:

(1) Question: How many Afghans were killed in the blast? Were any of the dead Taliban or other nationalities?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I've heard about 130-160 Afghans were killed. I don't know about other nationalities, but it seems likely. I don't know about any Taliban.

(b)(6) Separately, it was madness after the blast. We had to process 80 orphans through UNICEF to get them out after the blast area, and they were coming through the JOC.

iii. Question and Answer 59:

(1) Question: What were the Taliban doing after the blast?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They kept doing security along the outer perimeter and screening people.

jjj. Question and Answer 60:

(1) Question: How did you track who was processed through the gates?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The system of record for NEO is the NEO tracking system (NTS). But at the time, we were being asked specific questions from higher about what types of people we were evacuating. We weren't able to answer that because we had to prioritize speed over accuracy. Also, we still haven't rectified that 4 or 5 computers fell off the network when scanning NSU personnel. Those evacuees' information was hand written and we have very little data on them. It wasn't possible to stop at the point of friction in a crisis to count people by type. It also would have added strain to our logistical system by keeping evacuees at the airfield longer.

(b)(6) On average, we processed 8,000-10,000 people a day. We got a total of 79,655 people out of country.

kkk. Question and Answer 61:

(1) Question: How did you down scale operations from the 26th to the final departure?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We departed on the 30th and we echeloned out by stick, our final stick was 18 people. Abbey Gate never reopened after the blast, I'm not sure how it was sealed.



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(b)(6) After the blast, the number of people at all of the gates dropped from the thousands to the hundreds. The threat to mission had been the mob, but once the bomb went off, the crowds never got larger than 1,000 people. The threat to force was the enemy. The threat to force ended up eliminating the threat to mission because evacuees on ground knew it was over.

(b)(6) It made the other gates more manageable. They brought the AMCITs and others through the West Gate and NSU Gate after that.

### III. Question and Answer 62:

(1) Question: Who was authorized to deal with the Taliban?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) RADM Vasely and BG Kline granted many subordinates the ability to coordinate directly with the Taliban. It became critical to running a gate, because gate unit leaders could speak and coordinate with the Taliban in order to get in supplies or block a road. However, it did lead to them speaking to the Taliban and the Taliban threatening to kill the guards if they weren't let in, on occasion.

### mmm. Question and Answer 63:

(1) Question: Was there an actual physical gate at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, there was a tiered system. The main gate was about 10-15 meters wide. There was a gap on the side and "leakers" got in. They used HESCO barriers and dozers to fill. Leakers were corralled and eventually pushed out.

### nnn. Question and Answer 64:

(1) Question: When did you two leave?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We left on the 30th. Six-hundred seventy-two (672) people showed up through special interest groups after midnight, and we were in full "demil" mode by 0730 to get out. Most of these folks were coming in through the south terminal. We would get a call and send a bus out to get them. We were down to our "bantam weight" of 18 Marines for the ECC, and we had a no luggage order for the C-17s.

(b)(6) The no luggage order was due to an existing threat about an IED in a bag.

(b)(6) We compromised by giving them clear plastic bags to fill with their possessions.

(b)(6) The atmospherics inside the airfield at the time had feces everywhere, trash, discarded luggage, empty bag, and clothes scattered around.

ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

ooo. Question and Answer 65:

(1) Question: Who was able to the make the call to close a gate due to crowding?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The tactical level commander on ground was able to make that call if they felt it was a risk.

(b)(6) Higher echelons could also monitor (b)(1)1.4c and make the decision to shut down a gate.

ppp. Question and Answer 66:

(1) Question: How about reopening the gate?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) That authority stayed at the O-7 level after passing a conditions check in the JOC.

qqq. Question and Answer 67:

(1) Question: Was it widely disseminated that the Brits were pulling out?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes, most information we received was pushed out by calling attention to the JOC.

rrr. Question and Answer 68:

(1) Question: Who decided to keep Abbey Gate open as the Brits tried to evacuate everyone?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) It was never a unilateral decision, it usually stemmed from a conversation between MG Donahue, RADM Vasely, and BGen Sullivan.

sss. Question and Answer 69:

(1) Question: How did the threat stream affect these decisions?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) The threats were coming in about all the gates, about multiple target, including in email threats. As the window closed to process evacuees, we got even more threats but they were impossible to identify with any fidelity and take action.

(b)(6) The Brits, the 82nd, and USFOR-A all came over regularly to collaborate on intel. All parties felt confident that a suicide attack was coming. We didn't know when or where. A preponderance of reports were saying Abbey Gate.

ttt. Question and Answer 70:



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a 23 September 2021

(1) Question: Before the 26th of August, who did you feel that JTF-CR worked for?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) USFOR-A, but we coordinated with the 82nd, despite not falling under the 82nd because the 82<sup>nd</sup> was primarily handling security.

uuu. Question and Answer 71:

(1) Question: Was this driven by the relationship between RADM Vasely and MG Donahue?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) Yes, I'd agree with that.

(b)(6) Yes, they divided up responsibility. NEO information went directly to RADM Vasely every half hour and all security issues and leakers went to the 82nd.

vvv. Question and Answer 72:

(1) Question: After the explosion, did the JTF move off the wall?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) Yes. They were replaced by the 82nd on the morning of the 28th. They began switching out during period of darkness on the 27th.

www. Question and Answer 73:

(1) Question: On the 30th of August, what does the retrograde look like to ensure that Service Members were able to get out without the airfield getting rushed?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) 1-82 had security handled. They emplaced obstacles and filled any holes on the wall.

(b)(6) After the 26th the population outside was reduced by 90% and the Taliban had effective check points in place. There were less people trying to get near the airfield and they were more likely to be intercepted by the Taliban. The Taliban did that effectively, and the threat dropped after that.

xxx. Question and Answer 74:

(1) Question: Is there anything else you would like to add?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) I just want to say that the conditions on the ground were changing rapidly. There was an intense volume of threat streams. It was as confusing and dynamic as a situation can get. If the operation had gone on longer, once we had the C-17s and ECCs operating effectively, and the multinational coordination was resolved,



ACTS-SCK-DO

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Interview with

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

23 September 2021

we would have been able to operate even more effectively. There wasn't true multinational coordination until a couple of days prior to the end. The context is just that the environment was changing rapidly. The pressure was high to evacuate a population that was under duress and we had to shift through massive threat streams. People were waiting outside of the gates to get in for days. We had to execute a NEO, combat, and humanitarian operation all at the same time. All of that was combined with the logistics of supporting over 10,000 people on HKIA. It was a challenging, multi-faceted situation.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(6)

or

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer